G.R. No.

127240

March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2 admitting petitioner Ong
Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required
in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing
to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative
process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses
to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to
present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner,
as well as the petitioner himself.3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former
placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has
no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his
1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. 6 The state also
annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his
net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the
State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been
married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner
actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in
1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be
any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8 and a JointAffidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner
married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in
accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been
living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they
had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to
the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court
held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state
in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name
appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and

pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence."
This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as
the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of the petition, an
opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing
to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such
opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is
not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER
STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of
which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and
formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient .
(Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be
the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which

has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17

SO ORDERED.

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed
by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to
disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of
any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to
settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include
the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This
address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms
part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he
failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e.,
to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background
of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled,
however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and
former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concu

G.R. No. 126223

November 15, 2000

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZA PULIDO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Special Second
Division of the Court of Appeals dated August 27, 1996, 1 which affirmed in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,2allowing herein private respondent, the beneficiary
under a life insurance policy issued by petitioner, to recover the face amount of the said policy.
Briefly, the antecedent facts are:
On January 9, 1989, petitioner received from one Florence Pulido an application for life
insurance, dated December 16, 1988, in the amount of P100,000.00 which designated her
sister, herein private respondent, as its principal beneficiary. Because the insurance applied
for was non-medical, petitioner did not require a medical examination and issued a policy on
the sole basis of the application on February 11, 1989. On April 1992, petitioner received
private respondents claim, which declared that the insured, Florence Pulido, died of acute
pneumonia on September 10, 1991.

Petitioner withheld payment on the ground that the policy claimed under was void from the
start for having been procured in fraud. It is petitioners contention that even before they
received private respondents claim for death benefits, their investigation concerning the
subject policy yielded the information that the insured, Florence Pulido, died in 1988, before
the application for insurance on her life was made. 3 While this was communicated to private
respondent in a letter dated April 29, 1992, 4 private respondent had already filed her claim
earlier that month.5 In another letter dated July 27, 1992, however, petitioner confirmed to
private respondent receipt of the claim papers and assured her that her case was "being given
preferential attention and prompt action".6
Following the filing by private respondent of her claim, petitioner caused another investigation
respecting the subject policy. Pursuant to the findings of this second investigation, petitioner
stood by its initial decision to treat the policy as void and not to honor the claim. On November
9, 1992, private respondent enlisted the services of counsel in reiterating her claim for death
benefits.7 Petitioner still refused to make payment and thus, this action.
The complaint before the lower court sought payment of the face amount of the policy,
equivalent to P100,000.00, with interest at 24% per annum for undue delay in payment
pursuant to Section 244 of the Insurance Code, and for P5,000.00 as "consequential
damages".
For its part, petitioner interposed that it was legally justified in denying plaintiffs claim, the
results of its investigations having indicated that the insured was already dead at the time the
policy was applied for. It also counterclaimed for attorneys fees.
To substantiate its defense, petitioner submitted copies of the reports of its investigators. The
first report,8prepared by one Dr. Benedicto Briones, was dated April 1, 1992, and had attached
to it a questionnaire, responded to by one Ramon Piganto, 9 who represented to be the
brother-in-law of the insured and the barangay chairman of Cardiz, Bagulin, La Union. To the
question "Where does [Florence Pulido] reside now?", Piganto had replied that Florence
Pulido used to live in Cardiz, but was dead since 1988. Pigantos statement was signed by
him, and witnessed by his wife, Nenita Piganto. This report was petitioners basis for treating
the disputed policy as void since April 1992, even before receipt of private respondents claim.
The next two reports pertained to the investigation petitioner commenced after private
respondent filed her claim. One report, dated October 2, 1992, was submitted by Ferdinand
Tanchoco, another of petitioners investigators, and dealt with Tanchocos interview with a
certain Remylyn Piganto, a 14-year old high school student who was the niece of the insured
and daughter of Ramon Piganto. Remylyn purportedly told Tanchoco that her auntie Florence
Pulido died young a long time ago, before Remylyn was even born. 10 Remylyn, however, did
not execute any written statement. The other report, dated December 28, 1992, 11 was
prepared by Dr. Benedicto Briones, who also prepared the first report dated April 1, 1992. This
last report intimated the claim of some neighbors of the Pulido family that Florence Pulido died
in a car accident in 1985. These persons, however, refused to give their names or execute
statements on the matter, as they were reportedly afraid of Ramon Piganto, the insureds
brother-in-law.12

During the trial, plaintiff-private respondent testified that the insured died of acute pneumonia
on September 10, 1991 in Barangay Cardiz, Bagulin, La Union and was buried two days after
within their own yard. Plaintiff next presented as a witness Dr. Irineo Gutierrez, who testified
that he attended to the ailing Florence Pulido on September 8, and 9, 1991 at their house in
Cardiz. Dr. Gutierrez then authenticated a Certificate of Death, 13 issued on September 12,
1991 by the Local Civil Registrar of Bagulin, La Union, which bore his signature in his capacity
as then Municipal Health Officer of Bagulin, La Union. The death certificate declared that
Florence Pulido died on September 10, 1991 at around 4:00 in the afternoon.
A neighbor of the Pulidos, Francisco Villano, also testified in support of plaintiff that the
insured died of illness on September 1991. Villano claimed that he was at the Pulidos house
when Dr. Gutierrez attended to the insured. He also said that he went to the wake of Florence
Pulido and was able to view her remains.14
Meanwhile, defendant-petitioner presented Pablito Angalot, petitioners Life Claims Manager,
who said that even before the filing of private respondents claim, petitioners Claims
Committee had already declared the disputed policy null and void in light of the investigative
report dated April 1, 1992. However, petitioner was unable to present Dr. Benedicto Briones,
the investigator who prepared the April 1, 1992 report. Also, when it presented Ramon
Piganto, whose statement attached to Dr. Brioness report dated April 1, 1992 was the basis
for petitioners treating the subject policy as void, Piganto denied giving the statement that
Florence Pulido died in 1988, and said that he was made to sign a blank coupon bond. 15
Ferdinand Tanchoco, petitioners other investigator, identified his investigative report 16 and
recounted the results of his investigation focusing particularly on the interview with Remylyn
Piganto. Tanchoco also reported that private respondents information on the insureds death,
as declared in her claim certificate, tallied with the entries of the death certificate as found in
the records of the Local Civil Register of Bagulin, La Union.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, which was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals, states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of P100,000.00, representing the face value
of the insurance policy sued upon, with interest thereon at the legal rate from January 8, 1993,
the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid, plus P20,000.00 for and as attorneys
fees and costs of suit.
In ruling in favor of plaintiff-private respondent, the trial court found no reason to doubt the
correctness of the entries in the Certificate of Death, which declared that Florence Pulido died
on September 10, 1991. It is also found that defendant, petitioner herein, failed to discharge
the burden of proving its affirmative defense that fraud attended the issuance of the policy
sued upon. Contrarily, as the lower court observed, the evidence defendant presented
sustained the validity of the policy instead of establishing its alleged fraud.1wphi1

The lower court also struck down as hearsay the two reports prepared by Dr. Benedicto
Briones, the said investigator not having been presented as a witness in court. It also held as
hearsay the alleged declaration of Remylyn Piganto, as recounted by Ferdinand Tanchoco in
his report and on testimony, since Remylyn herself did not take the witness stand.
However, the lower court found plaintiff-private respondent entitled to legal interest only, and
not to 24% per annum as prayed for. Under Section 242 of the Insurance Code, the refusal of
the insurer to pay a life insurance claim within the period prescribed will entitle the beneficiary
to collect interest on the proceeds "at the rate of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary
Board" for the duration of the delay, unless the refusal to pay is based on the ground that the
claim is fraudulent. Fraud being the ground invoked by petitioner for refusing to honor the
claim, the lower court found no unreasonable delay in petitioners decision to withhold
payment.
The petition is without merit.

could not substitute for the full and convincing evidence that is required to prove it. 21 A failure
to do so would leave intact the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
public duties, which was the basis of both respondent court and the trial court in finding the
date of Florence Pulidos death to be as plaintiff-private respondent maintained.
We cannot likewise give credence to petitioners submission that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses for plaintiff-private respondent are in themselves evidence of
fraud. Such alleged inconsistencies are matters of credibility which had been ably passed
upon by the lower court.
The absence of fraud, as a factual finding of the lower court adopted by the Court of Appeals,
entirely consistent with the evidence on record, will not be reversed and, hence, is final and
conclusive upon this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

As a rule, a petition for review on certiorari may raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.17This Court does not countenance the elevation of patently factual
questions disguised by a loose and general wording of the assignment of errors.
It is clear that the only issue the petition raises for review is respondent courts negative
finding of fraud in the obtainment of Florence Pulidos insurance policy. Fraud is a question of
fact which must be alleged and proved at the level of the lower court. 18 The records bear out
that since the onset of this case, the main issue has always been whether there was fraud in
the obtainment of the disputed policy, or put differently, whether the insured, Florence Pulido,
was in fact dead before the application for insurance on her life was made. This the lower
courts had effected ruled on, upon a preponderance of the evidence duly received from both
parties. We see no reversible error in the finding of both respondent court and the trial court in
favor of the correctness of the entries in Certificate of Death, duly registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Bagulin, La Union, which declared that Florence Pulido died of acute
pneumonia on September 10, 1991. Dr. Irineo Gutierrez, the Municipal Health Officer of
Bagulin, La Union whose signature appeared in the death certificate, testified in addition that
he ministered to the ailing Florence Pulido for two days immediately prior to her death. This
fact is likewise noted in the death certificate.
Death certificates, and notes by a municipal health officer prepared in the regular performance
of his duties, areprima facie evidence of facts therein stated.19 A duly-registered death
certificate is considered a public document and the entries found therein are presumed
correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing
otherwise.20 Petitioners contention that the death certificate is suspect because Dr. Gutierrez
was not present when Florence Pulido died, and knew of Florences death only through
Ramon Piganto, does not merit a conclusion of fraud. No motive was imputed to Dr. Gutierrez
for seeking to perpetuate a falsity in public records. Petitioner was likewise unable to make out
any clear motive as to why Ramon Piganto would purposely lie. Mere allegations of fraud

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 55691 May 21, 1992
ESPERANZA BORILLO, in her behalf and in behalf of her children, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA BORILLO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed on 24
November 1980, petitioner urges this Court to review and reverse the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (Third Division) in C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R, promulgated on 3 September 1980,
which reversed and set aside the 3 June 1978 decision of Branch II of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Abra in Civil Case No. 1043.
On 10 February 1977, petitioner, for herself and on behalf of her children, filed before the
abovementioned trial court a complaint against private respondent and Marcos Borillo for the
recovery of several parcels of land located at Bugbuguis, Quillat, Langiden, Abra particularly
described in said complaint, under the first cause of action, as follows:
(a) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr. and pastureland) . . . with an area of 1231 sq. m.; with
assessed value in the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6319 in the name of
Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

(b) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 980 sq. m.; with an assessed value in
the sum of P40.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6320 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

ordering the private respondent and Marcos Borillo to pay actual and moral damages plus
costs.

(c) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 698 sq. m.; with assessed value in the
sum of P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6321 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al.;

In their Answer filed on 14 March 1977, private respondent claims that parcels (a), (c) and (d)
were sold to her by her late brother Elpidio in 1935, while Marcos Borillo claims that parcel (b)
was sold to him by Elpidio sometime in 1937, long before Elpidio's marriage to petitioner.
Although they did not declare these parcels for taxation purposes in their respective names,
they immediately took possession and occupied the same as owners thereof. Private
respondent had been paying the realty taxes on parcels (a), (c) and (d) since 1948 6 and
explains her failure to secure in her name tax declarations for said parcels during Elpidio's
lifetime by alleging that she trusted him because he was her brother and he had assured her
that she could transfer in her favor the title thereto anytime. After the Second World War,
Elpidio and Rosita, another sibling, sold to her their respective undivided shares in parcels (e)
and (f).

(d) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 570 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 6322 in the name of Esperanza Borillo, et al. 2
and one-fifth (1/5) undivided portion of two (2) parcels of land, also located in the same place
as the above four (4) parcels, particularly described under the second cause of action, thus:
(e) A parcel of land (Riceland unirr.) . . . with an area of 1440 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P60.00; under Tax Declaration No. 1745 in the name of Venancio Borillo;
(f) A parcel of land (Cornland) . . . with an area of 684 sq. m.; with an assessed value of
P20.00; under Tax Declaration No. 0746 in the name of Venancio Borillo. 3
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1043.
In the complaint, petitioner alleges that the abovementioned parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d) were
originally owned by her late husband, Elpidio Borillo, with whom she had four (4) children,
namely: Patricia, Melecio, Bonifacia and Quirino. Although said parcels of land were
unregistered, they were declared in 1948 in the name of Elpidio under Tax Declaration Nos.
0731, 0732, 0733 and 0734, respectively. 4Elpidio had been in peaceful, public, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner even before his marriage to
petitioner and until his death in 1970. After his death, petitioner continued to possess and
cultivate said parcels of land and enjoy the fruits thereof until sometime in 1971-1972 when
private respondent and Marcos Borillo, Elpidio's siblings, forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed
her of the property. Despite repeated demands, Marcos and the private respondent refused to
return the property to the petitioner and her children. In 1974, new Tax Declarations, namely
Nos. 6319, 6320, 6321 and 6322 5 for parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), respectively, were issued in
her name. Upon the other hand, parcels (e) and (f), also unregistered, were inherited by
Elpidio, his brother Marcos and sisters Catalina, Aurelia and Rosita, from their father,
Venancio Borillo. Elpidio's 1/5 pro-indiviso share therein was unlawfully taken by private
respondent sometime in 1971; the latter refused to return it to petitioner and her children, who
are Elpidio's heirs, despite repeated demands.

On 15 March 1977, private respondent alone filed an Amended Answer. On the other hand, on
5 April 1977, Patricia and Melencio Borillo filed a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiffs on the
ground that they did not authorize their inclusion as such and that the private respondent is
the true and lawful owner of the land in question. 7
At the trial, private respondent relied heavily on Exhibit "3", a private document purportedly
showing that Elpidio sold to her all his property for P40.00, and Exhibit "4", which she claims
to be a deed of sale of parcels (a), (c) and (d) allegedly executed by Elpidio Borillo in 1935.
Upon the other hand, Marcos Borillo claimed that the deed of sale evidencing the sale to him
of parcel (b) was lost during the Second World War. Both parties claim actual possession of
the property. Private respondent and Marcos Borillo even claimed possession for more than
thirty (30) years.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered on 3 June 1978 a decision in favor of herein
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs
as the true owners of parcels A, B, C and D described in par. 4 of the complaint and as coowners of parcels E and F described in par. 6 of the complaint with Rosita Borillo, Aurelia
Borillo and the defendants Catalina Borillo and Marcos Borillo. With costs against the
defendants. 8
The trial court arrived at this decision on the basis of the following findings of fact:

Petitioner then prays that judgment be rendered declaring her and her children owners of
parcels (a), (b), (c) and (d), as well as the 1/5 pro-indiviso portion of parcels (e) and (f), and

The claim of ownership by the plaintiffs with respect to the four parcels of land described in
par. 4 of the complaint is preponderantly established by Tax Declaration Nos. 731, 732, 733
and 734, Exhibits, "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3" for the plaintiffs. These tax declarations covering the
four parcels of land in question are tax declarations issued in 1948 and is (sic) in the name of
Elpidio Borillo, husband of plaintiff Esperanza Borillo. Defendants never declared it (sic) in
their name (sic) and no action or attempt whatsoever was made by the defendants to declare
it (sic) in their name (sic) during the lifetime of Elpidio Borillo. It was only after the death of
Elpidio Borillo and the institution of this action by the plaintiffs that defendants took action and
strangely declared it (sic) in their names.
Obviously, the bulk of evidence for the plaintiffs are (sic) the tax declarations in the name of
Elpidio Borillo which do not absolutely prove their ownership. But the circumstances obtaining
in this case renders (sic) the tax declarations Exhibits "A, A-1, A-2 and A-3", reliable and
predominantly point that plaintiffs are owners of the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of
the complaint as against the plaintiffs (sic). First, it will be noted that Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and
A-3 were prepared and issued long before the death of Elpidio Borillo. He was then a bachelor
having married the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950. Defendant Catalina Borillo married long
before the 2nd World War. Defendant Marcos Borillo likewise married before World War II.
Defendants have properties declared in their names. Marcos Borillo accompanied the
Assessors who measured the four parcels of land according to him (sic). Despite the status of
the parties and the Assessors having been accompanied by defendant Marcos Borillo, still the
four parcels of land were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo. It is unconceivable ( sic) why
it was (sic) declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo, if it does (sic) not belong to him. True, that
tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, but it cannot be gainsaid especially in
rural areas like Langiden, Abra where lands are not surveyed and titled, that tax declarations
are strong evidence of possession and ownership.
Secondly, the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint were declared in the
name of Elpidio Borillo for 29 years and no action whatsoever was taken by the defendants to
have the tax declarations (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3) be (sic) cancelled and declared the
lands (sic) in their names during the lifetime of the declared owner Elpidio Borillo and
immediately after his death. It was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint and after the
plaintiffs caused the cancellation of Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and declared the lands in their
names when defendants attempted to declare it (sic) also in their names. The unfathomable
tolerance of the defendants of having the four (4) parcels of land be (sic) declared in the name
of their deceased brother, Elpidio Borillo in 1948 and remained (sic) in his name after his
marriage with (sic) the plaintiff Esperanza Borillo in 1950 even (sic) after his death in 1971, is
fatal and strongly negate their (sic) defendants' claim of ownership. No person like the
defendants will ever allow his/her property be (sic) declared in the name of another for twentynine (29) years. The fact that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for twenty-

nine (29) years coupled by (sic) his actual possession during his lifetime until his death in
1971 as testified to by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested
witness strongly outweighed the evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate that
the four parcels of land described in par. 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio Borillo. The
claim of defendants that they are (sic) in actual possession before World War II up to the
present is persuasively belied by Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3 and the testimony of Clemente
Llaneza.
The claim of defendant Catalina Borillo that she purchased parcels A, C and D described in
par. 4 of the complaint from her deceased brother Elpidio Borillo before World War II as
evidence (sic) by Exhibits "3" and "4" appears unreliable and incredible. Exhibit "3" which is an
acknowledgment receipt dated May 12, 1946 made no mention of what property has been
sold. There is no evidence of any transfer of ownership. In fact, there is nothing clear from the
evidence as to what land of Elpidio Borillo is referred to in Exhibit "3". From the terms of
Exhibit "3" and the alleged consideration thereof, it thus becomes obvious that it is only a
receipt evidencing a loan of P40.00.
Exhibit "4" (receipt) which is the main basis of the claim of ownership by defendant Catalina
Borillo with respect to parcels A, C and D in par. 4 of the complaint, appears unreliable and
cannot prevail against the evidence for the plaintiffs. This Exhibit "4" for defendant Catalina
Borillo is undated and unsigned. Defendant Catalina Borillo testified that she does not know
the contends of Exhibit "4". Elpidio Borillo as shown by Exhibit "3" for defendant Catalina
Borillo and Exhibits E and F for the plaintiffs knows how to write his name. Yet, Exhibit "4" was
not signed by him. Aside from the patent defects of Exhibit "4" on its face which renders it
unreliable, it will be noted that during the pre-trial proceedings, defendant Catalina Borillo
presented Exhibit "4" to support her claim as alleged in her answer of having purchased
parcels A, C and D from Elpidio Borillo in 1935. Clearly embodied, however, in Exhibit "4" are
tax declarations Nos. 0732, 0731 and 0734 which are indeed tax declarations in 1948 in the
name of Elpidio Borillo. Considering that Exhibit "4" is a document executed in 1935 according
to the defendant Catalina Borillo, why are Tax Declarations Nos. 731, 732 and 734 which were
issued only in 1948 incorporated? The inclusion of non-existent document (sic) in Exhibit "4"
at the time of its alleged execution absolutely renders Exhibit "4" wholly unworthy and
undeserving of any credence. 9
Private respondent appealed from the adverse decision to the respondent Court. Her codefendant, Marcos Borillo, did not.
The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 64536-R. In her Appellant's Brief, private
respondent assigns the following errors:

and it was only in 1977 after the filing of the complaint that defendants so declared the
properties in their name (sic); that Exhibit 4 is unreliable being unsigned by Elpidio when there
is evidence that he could sign his name; that Exhibit 3 did not mention the property sold; that
Exhibit 4 was made in 1935 as alleged in the answer but surprisingly it embodied Tax
Declarations 731, 732 and 734 which were issued only in 1948; and that the alleged sale of
the right of Elpidio over parcels (e) and (f) are without receipts.

THAT THE FACTS RELIED UPON IS (sic) NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

II
THAT THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
On 3 September 1980, the respondent Court promulgated its decision
decision of the trial court, thus:

10

reversing the

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby rendered declaring defendant Catalina Borillo as the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d)
and of the one-fifth portion of Elpidio Borillo in parcels (e) and (f); that defendant Marcos
Borillo is the owner of parcel (b); with costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The respondent Court made the following disquisitions to support its decision:
We are convinced that the preponderance of the evidence tilt (sic) heavily in favor of
defendant. Defendant established she has been in possession in the concept of owner of said
three parcels of land (a), (c) and (d) since her purchase of the same long before the war and
she cultivated the same in the concept of owner, paying the real estate taxes and thereafter
declaring it in her name while Marcos Borillo acquired parcel (b) from Elpidio since 1938 of
which he took possession in the concept of owner, and declared the same in his name paying
the real estate taxes. No less than Melecio Borillo, son of plaintiff Esperanza, not only
withdrew as party plaintiff with his sister Patricia but he even testified that he knew from the
very mouth of his father Elpidio while he was still alive that he sold the property in question to
defendant Catalina Borillo. It has also been shown that Elpidio Borillo sold his 1/5 portion of
parcels (e) and (f) also before the war to defendant and she had been in continuous
possession since then in the concept of owner.
Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, such uninterrupted, adverse, open possession for thirty
(30) years by defendants regardless of their title or good faith upholds said defendants' right
over the property. (Parcotillo vs. Parcotillo, 12 SCRA 435, 440).
In finding for the plaintiffs the trial court relied on the tax declarations in the name of Elpidio as
proof that plaintiffs are the owners of the questioned property since the property is untitled;
that for 29 years no action was taken by defendants to declare the property in their name ( sic)

We disagree. Declaration of ownership for taxation purposes, or assessment declaration and

tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership. They are only prima facie evidence of
possession. (Evangelista vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562)
However, if the holder of a (sic) land presents a deed of conveyance in his favor from the
former owner thereof to support his claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax
receipts relative to the property may be used to prove good faith on his part in occupying and
possessing the same. (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phi. 384) And while it is true that tax
receipts do not prove titled (sic) to a land, nevertheless when considered with the actual
possession of the property by the applicant, they constitute evidence of great weight in
support of the claim of title of ownership by prescription. (Viernes vs. Agpaoa, 41 Phil. 286;
Land Registration and Mortgages by Ventura, pp. 125-126)
Plaintiffs admitted that defendants are in possession of the lands in question and the records
show that even during the lifetime of Elpidio, the defendant had been paying the real property
taxes of the property (Exhs. 1 to 1-I). The sale of parcels (a), (c) and (d) to defendant is
evidenced by Exhibits 3 and 4. Although Exhibit 3 does not indicate the property subject of the
sale, such deficiency can be attributed to the fact that this was a document executed between
brother and sister without the assistance of a lawyer but testimonial evidence has been
adduced that cured this defect. True it is that Exhibit 4 appears not to have been signed by
Elpidio and he merely imprinted a cross over his name when it appears that he knew how to
sign. However, defendants Catalina and Marcos Borillo categorically testified that Elpidio
signed his name only by copying a sample. Hence, it is understandable if Elpidio did not sign
Exhibit 4 for he must not have been furnished a (sic) guide to be copied. No evidence was
adduced that Exhibit 4 was actually executed in 1935. What was established is that Elpidio
sold said three parcels to defendant Catalina before the war. In confirmation of said sale,
Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that is why it reflects the Tax
Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year.
On the other hand, outside of the fact that the property remained to be declared in the name
of Elpidio plaintiffs have not adduced any other evidence to buttress their claim of ownership.
Plaintiff Esperanza paid for the real property taxes of the property only on June 22, 1977 after
the complaint was filed in court. (Exhibit C) It is not improbable that the reason why the
properties remained in the name of Elpidio inspite of the fact that it has long been sold to

defendants is because this is a sale between brother and sister where mutual trust and
confidence is to be expected. Indeed, during the lifetime of Elpidio he never questioned the
acts of ownership exercised by the defendants over the property and even after his death in
1970, plaintiff Esperanza only remembered to assert their alleged right in 1976 when she
attempted to talk to defendant who told her it was already sold to them and yet it was only in
1977 that the complaint was filed.
Petitioner took this present recourse asking Us to review the respondent Court's findings of
facts and reverse its decision on the ground that the same is based solely on "speculation,
surmise and conjecture," and that it committed a "misapprehension of facts."
After private respondent filed her Comment and the petitioner submitted a Reply, this Court
gave due course to the petition 11 and required the petitioner to submit her Brief within thirty
(30) days from notice, 12 which she complied with. 13 Private respondent subsequently filed her
Brief. 14
The petition is meritorious.
To begin with, the respondent Court committed a grave error in reversing the trial court's
judgment insofar as it concerns defendant Marcos Borillo. As earlier stated, the latter did not
appeal from the trial court's decision. As against him, and more particularly with respect to
parcel (b), the decision has long become final and the respondent Court is without jurisdiction
to review the same. 15 Otherwise stated, beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer
within the scope of the power of review of any court. 16 The appeal interposed by private
respondent did not benefit Marcos Borillo because the former does not have anything to do
with parcel (b) and the defense in respect thereto is exclusive to the latter.
The respondent Court likewise erred in reversing the trial court and ruling that private
respondent is the owner of parcels (a), (c) and (d) and Elpidio Borillo's 1/5 pro-indiviso share
in parcels (e) and (f).
It is of course settled that the appellate court's findings of fact are binding and must be
respected by this Court. 17 There are, however, recognized exceptions thereto, 18 among which
are when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting, 19 when
they are totally devoid of support in the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion. 20
These exceptions obtain in the present case.

The fact that parcels (a), (c) and (d) were originally owned by Elpidio Borillo is not disputed by
private respondent. In fact, she claims to have derived her title over the same from the former
through a sale in 1935. Thus, the question to be resolved is whether or not Elpidio Borillo did
in fact sell the said parcels of land to the private respondent.
To substantiate her claim, private respondent presented two (2) documents, Exhibits "3" and
"4". The trial court in its judgment described Exhibit "3", dated 12 May 1946, as a mere
acknowledgment receipt of a loan of P40.00 and not a sale for it does not mention any
property sold and is not acknowledged before a notary public. It then concluded that said
instrument is a mere receipt evidencing a loan. On the other hand, Exhibit ''4'' is an undated
and unsigned document written in lead pencil on simple grade paper. The instrument has no
witnesses, is not acknowledged before a notary public and has a mere cross over the written
name of Elpidio Borillo. It was duly proven that Elpidio knew how to write and sign his name.
Although Exhibit "4" was purportedly executed in 1935, the same mentions Tax Declaration
Nos. 0731, 0732, 0733 and 0734 issued in 1948 in the name of Elpidio Borillo. Private
respondent herself testified that she had no knowledge of the contents of said instrument. The
trial court ruled Exhibit "4" as "wholly unworthy and undeserving of any credence."
In reversing the foregoing findings, the respondent Court tried to justify the deficiencies and
discrepancies in Exhibit "3" by saying that the absence of specifications as to what property
was sold is understandable because the transaction was between brother and sister. It added
that this defect was cured by testimonial evidence. It made no attempt, however, to explain the
variance in the date of the alleged sale (1935) and the date of the instrument (1946).
As to Exhibit "4", the respondent Court accepted private respondent's explanation for the
absence of the signature of Elpidio Borillo on the purported deed of sale saying that contrary
to petitioner's assertion, Elpidio did not really know how to write his name. Private respondent
and Marcos Borillo testified that Elpidio's signature appeared on his voter's registration record
and voter's ID card 21 only because he was given a sample to copy. They declared that unlike
those occasions, at the time of the sale, Elpidio was not given any sample to copy; this
explains why he just printed a cross over his name. As to why it mentions tax declarations
issued in 1948, although it is claimed to have been executed in 1935, the respondent Court
theorizes and speculates that:
. . . In confirmation of said sale, Exhibit 4 must have been executed on or before 1948 that is
why it reflects the Tax Declarations of said property to be effective in the same year. 22
It is thus clear that what was originally submitted by private respondent as the original deed of
sale was later accepted by the respondent Court as a deed of confirmation of sale.

Both Exhibits "3" and "4" are private documents. Hence, before they may be received in
evidence, their due execution and authenticity must first be proven by the party presenting
them. 23 At the hearing of this case before the trial court, the controlling rule on this point was
Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

Before parol evidence may be admitted in order to identify, explain or define the subject matter
of a writing, it must first be shown that the writing itself already contains a description sufficient
to serve as a foundation for the admission of such parol evidence; the evidence should also
be consistent with the writing. Otherwise stated, in order to admit parol evidence to aid in the
description of the subject matter of a deed or other writing, there must be a description that
will serve as a foundation for such evidence; the writing must at least give some data from
which the description may be found and made certain. Parol evidence is not admissible to
identify the property where the description thereof is so vague as to amount to no description
at all. In other words, parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description, but only to apply
it. 26

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness. 24
Private respondent did not present anyone who actually saw the execution of Exhibits "3" and
"4", witnessed Elpidio affix his signature on Exhibit "3" or make the cross over his written
name in Exhibit "4". There are no subscribing witnesses. The due execution then of Exhibits
"3" and "4", as the alleged deeds of sale transferring title over said parcels of land to private
respondent, was not satisfactorily proven; thus, the same can not be received in evidence.
Even if We are to assume that Exhibits "3" and "4" are admissible in evidence, they still do not
satisfactorily prove the transfers of titles over the subject parcels to the private respondent. As
earlier pointed out, Exhibit "3" makes no mention of any property sold. Hence, it hardly
qualifies as a deed of sale. It suffers from a patent and not just an intrinsic ambiguity. The
respondent Court then committed an error by giving credence to the testimonies offered to
cure such ambiguity. It disregarded the parol evidence rule then applicable, namely, Section 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreement. When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term "agreement" includes wills. 25

In his Commentary on the Rules of Court, 27 former Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran explains
the rule in the evident of patent ambiguity, as is the case in Exhibit "3":
. . . The rule is that "if the words of a document are so defective or ambiguous as to be
unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to
say." (Steph, Evidence, Art. 91) The reason for the rule, in the language of Mr. Justice Story, is
that "if the language be too doubtful for any settled construction, by the admission of parol
evidence you create and do not merely construe the contract. You attempt to do that for the
party which he has not chosen to do for himself; and the law very property denies such an
authority to courts of Justice." (Peisch v. Dickson, Fed. Cas. No. 10, 911, 1 Mason, 9.) As Lord
Bacon said, "Ambiguitas patens cannot be holpen by averment." (Bacon, Max., 23) A case of
patent ambiguity is that of a deed wherein "a parcel of land" without description is donated.
The donation is void. The uncertainty cannot be explained by parol evidence. (Wigmore on
Evidence, 2d. ed., p. 414.) The following appears to be the most accurate and most
comprehensive statement of the rule regarding patent ambiguity: "In other words and more
generally, if the court, placing itself in the situation in which the testator or contracting party
stood at the time of executing the instrument, and with a full understanding of the force and
import of the words, cannot ascertain his meaning and intention from the language of the
instrument, then it is a case of incurable, hopeless uncertainty and the instrument is,
therefore, so far inoperative and void." (Palmer v. Albee, 50 Ia., 429, 432, quoting 1 Greenleaf
on Evidence, par. 300.)
As to Exhibit "4", We agree with the trial court that it could not have been prepared in 1935, as
contended by private respondent, because it makes reference to Tax Declarations issued in
1948, thirteen (13) years later. Common sense and logic reject such contention. Unfortunately,
the respondent Court belabored the explanation that Exhibit "4" must have been executed on
or before 1948 to confirm the prior sale. This is unacceptable as it is purely conjectural.
Absent any evidence that it was signed by Elpidio Borillo, it is not difficult to conclude that this
document does not proceed from any legitimate source. It is one which could easily be

fabricated. The trial court did not then err when it considered Exhibit "4" as "wholly unworthy
and undeserving of any credence."
It is not also true, as was held by the respondent Court, that the conclusion of the trial court
that Elpidio Borillo was in possession of the property in concept of owner until his death, is
based solely on the tax declarations in his name. As shown earlier, the court considered the
testimonies of the petitioner and one Clemente Llaneza whom the trial court described as "an
uninterested witness." Thus:
. . . The fact that the lands were declared in the name of Elpidio Borillo for twenty-nine (29)
years coupled by his actual possession during his lifetime until his death in 1971 as testified to
by Esperanza Borillo and Clemente Llaneza who is an uninterested witness strongly
outweighed the evidence for the defendants and convincingly indicate that the four parcels of
land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint really belong to Elpidio Borillo. . . .
It is thus clear that the authorities cited by the respondent Court on the probative value of the
tax declarations favor the herein petitioner and not the private respondent. For indeed, while
tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are prima
facie evidence of possession. Accordingly, since Elpidio Borillo, during his lifetime, and then
the petitioner, after his death, secured and were issued tax declarations for the parcels of land
in question, and were in fact in possession thereof, the excuse offered by private respondent
as to her failure to obtain the tax declarations deserves no consideration at all. The flimsiness
or implausibility of the excuse becomes more apparent when We consider the findings of the
trial court that private respondent has other properties declared in her name for taxation
purposes and that neither she nor Marcos objected to the measurement by the assessors of
the four (4) parcels for Elpidio Borillo.
The conclusion then is inevitable that the late Elpidio Borillo did not sell and alienate parcels
(a), (c) and (d) to private respondent.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion requires that there be public, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession in the concept of owner 28 for a period of ten (10) years, in case of ordinary
prescription, 29and thirty (30) years, in case of extraordinary prescription. 30
After reviewing the evidence presented before it, the trial court concluded that Elpidio Borillo
had actual, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land during his
lifetime and until his death in 1970. The respondent Court reversed this finding and ruled that
it was private respondent who had the possession since her purchase thereof in 1935.
It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court's findings of facts with the highest
respect and not to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and impelling reasons
to do so. 31 The reason for this is that trial courts have more opportunity and facilities to
examine factual matters than appellate courts. 32 They are in a better position to assess the
credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of their testimonies, but also by their demeanor
on
the
33
stand.
In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 34 We ruled:
Elementary is the rule that the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.
(Vda. de Alberto, et al. vs. CA, et al., 173 SCRA 436 [1989]) Absent any substantial proof,
therefore, that the trial court's decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect. This should be so
because the trial court is, after all, in a much better position to observe and correctly
appreciate the respective parties' evidence as they were presented. (Matabuena vs. CA, et
al., 173 SCRA 170 [1989])
We find no impelling, compelling or cogent reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial
court.

As to parcels (e) (f), private respondent presented no deed of sale in her favor.
Private respondent can not likewise seek refuge under a claim of ownership by virtue of
acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Abra dated 3 June 1978 in Civil Case No. 1043 is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.