Guy v.

CA
502 SCRA 151
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei
(a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are
the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors
were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed
for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate
may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a
joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have
been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a
Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational
assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate
of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence,
she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections
to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of
the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the
wards
RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the
court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been
authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the privaterespondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their
status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they
have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants
even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the
determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action
may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to
claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
July 14, 2012 Leave a comment

Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to
Mely and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason
of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks
and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance
with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there
is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if
the change will avoid confusion. The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says
that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth
certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in
a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of
their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen
fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name

or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the

corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according
to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest
of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of
her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon
his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
national law is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the
renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back
to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are
to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law

of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law
is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets
of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other
than the private law of the State of California.

Van
Dorn vs.
Romillo
Jr. 139

SCRA
139
October
8, 1985

Fact of
the
Case:

Petition
er Alicia
Reyes

Van is
citizen
of
the

Philippin
es while
private

respond
entRich
ard

Upton is
a citizen
of
the

United
States,
were

married
on 1972
at

Hongko
ng.
On1982,

they got
divorced
in

Nevada,
United
States;

and the
petitione
r

remarrie
d
toTheod

ore Van
Dorn.

On July
8, 1983,
private

respond
ent filed
suit

against
petitione
r, asking

that
thepetiti
oner be

ordered
to
render

an
accounti
ng
of

her
busines
s
in

Ermita,
Manila,
and

bedeclar
ed with
right to

manage
the
conjugal

property
.
Petitione

r moved
to
dismiss

the
caseon
the

ground
that the
cause of

action is
barred
by

previous
judgeme
nt in the

divorcep
roceedin
g before

Nevada
Court
where

respond
ent
acknowl

edged
that they
had

nocomm
unity
property

.
The
lower
court

denied
the
motion

to
dismiss
on the

ground
that
theprop

erty
involved
is

located
in
the
Philippin

es, that
the
Divorce

Decree
has no
bearing

inthe
case.
Respon

dent
avers
that

Divorce
Decree
abroad

cannot
prevail
over

theprohi
bitive
laws of

the
Philippin
es.

Issue:

(1)Whet
her or

not the
divorce
obtained

the
spouse
valid to

each of
them.

(2)Whet
her or
not

Richard
Upton
may

assert
his right
on

conjugal
properti
es.

Held:

As
to
Richard

Upton
the
divorce

is
binding
on him

as
an
America
n

Citizen.
As heis
bound

by the
Decision
of
his

own
country
s Court,

which
validly
exercise

d
jurisdicti
onover

him, and
whose
decision

he does
not
repudiat

e, he is
estoppe
d by his

ownrepr
esentati
on

before
said
Court

from
assertin
g
his

right
over the
alleged

conjugal
property
.
Only

Philippin
e
National

s
are
covered
by the

policy
against
absolute

divorcet
he same
being

consider
ed
contrary

to
our
concept
of public

policy
and
morality.

AliciaRe
yes
under

our
National
law
is

still
consider
ed

married
to
private

respond
ent.
However

,petition
er
should

not be
obliged
to
live

together
with,
observe

respect
and
fidelity,

andrend
er
support

to
private
respond

ent. The
latter
should

not
continue
to
be

one of
her
heirswit

h
possible
rights to

conjugal
property
.
She

should
not be
discrimi

nated
against
herown

country
if
the
ends of

justice
are
to

be
served.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was
born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

Conjugal disharmony

eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against

petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of

adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse,
the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is
concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995,
the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of

bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible

as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as

a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground
of bigamy.

Quita vs
Court of
Appeals

Decemb
er 22,
1998

Fact of
the
Case:

Fe D.
Quita,
the

petitione
r,
and
Arturo T.

Padlan,
both
Filipinos

, were
married
inthe

Philippin
es
on
May 18,

1941.
They got
divorce

in San
Francisc
o
on

July 23,
1954.Bo
th
of

them
remarrie
d

another
person.
Arturo

remarrie
d
Bladina

Dandan,
the
respond

enthere
with.
They

were
blessed

with six
children.

On
April 16,
1972,

when
Arturo
died, the

trial
court
was set

to
declared
as
to

whowill
be the
intestate

heirs.
The trial
court

invoking
Tenchav
ez
vs

Escano
case
held

thatthe
divorce
acquired

by the
petitione
r is not

recogniz
ed
in
our

country.
Private
respond

entstres
sed that
the

citizens
hip
of
petitione

r
was
relevant
in
the

light of
the
ruling in

VanDor
n
v.
Rommill

o Jr that
aliens
who

obtain
divorce
abroad

are
recogniz
ed
in

thePhilip
pnes
provided

they are
valid
accordin

g to their
national
law. The

petitione
r
herselfa

nswered
that she
was an

America
n citizen
since

1954.
Through
the

hearing
she
alsostat

ed that
Arturo
was
a

Filipino
at
the
time she

obtained
the
divorce.

Implying
the
shewas

no
longer a

Filipino
citizen.

The
Trial
court

disregar
ded the
respond

ents
stateme
nt. The

net
heredita
ry

estatew
as
ordered

in favor
the Fe
D. Quita

and
Ruperto,
the

brother
of
Arturo.

Blandin
a
and
thePadl

an
children
moved

for
reconsid
eration.

On
Februar
y
15,

1988
partial
reconsid

erationw
as
granted

declarin
g
the
Padlan

children,
with the
exceptio

n
of
Alexis,
entitled

to onehalf of
the

estate to
the
exclusio

n
of
Ruperto
Padlan,

and the
other
half to

Fe
Quita.Pr
ivate

respond
ent was
not

declared
an heir
for her

marriag
e
to
Arturo

was
declared
voidsinc

e it was
celebrat
ed

during
the
existenc

e of his
previous
marriag

e
to
petitione
r.Blandin

a
and
her
children

appeal
to
the
Court of

Appeals
thatthe
case

was
decided
without

a
hearing
in

violation
of
the

Rules of
Court.
Issue:

(1)
Whether
or not

Blandina
s
marriag

e to
Arturo

void ab
initio.
(2)

Whether
or not
Fe D.

Quita be
declared
the

primary
benefici
ary as

survivin
g
spouse

of
Arturo.
Held:

No.
The
marriag

e
of
Blandin
a
and

Arturo is
not void.
The

citizens
hip of Fe
D.Quita

at
the
time of
their

divorce
is
relevant

to
this
case.
The

divorce
is valid
here

sincesh
e
was
already

an alien
at
the
time she

obtained
divorce,
and

such is
valid in
theircou

ntrys
national
law.

Thus,
Fe D.
Quita is

no
longer
recogniz

ed as a
wife of
Arturo.

She
cannot
be the

primary
benefici
ary or

will be
recogniz
ed as

survivin
g
spouse

of
Arturo.