Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction.................................................................................................................................................. 2
Regulating Searches and Seizures: The Fourth Amendment......................................................................3
Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction to the exclusionary rule, its virtues and its vices...................................................................3
Searches.................................................................................................................................................. 4
The Meaning of Searches.................................................................................................................. 5
Privacy and Technology........................................................................................................................ 9
Seizures................................................................................................................................................. 12
Warrants and the Meaning of Probable Cause......................................................................................15
Background........................................................................................................................................ 15
The Probable Cause Standard........................................................................................................... 15
Execution of Warrants........................................................................................................................ 21
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement.................................................................................................23
Exigent Circumstances....................................................................................................................... 23
Plain View Doctrine............................................................................................................................ 28
The Automobile Exception.................................................................................................................. 30
Arrests & Search Incident to Arrest..................................................................................................... 34
Reasonableness................................................................................................................................. 40
Police Discretion and Profiling............................................................................................................ 45
Special Needs........................................................................................................................................ 50
Roadblocks......................................................................................................................................... 50
Reasonableness and the Use of Force.................................................................................................. 52
Reasonableness and the Use of Consent..............................................................................................55
Third-Party Consent........................................................................................................................... 58
Exclusionary Rule: Standing and Scope................................................................................................ 59
Standing............................................................................................................................................. 62
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree................................................................................................................. 64
Regulating Police Interrogations and Confessions....................................................................................69
The Fifth Amendment Privilege: Background Values and Scope...........................................................69
Voluntariness Doctrine and its Discontents............................................................................................70
Miranda: Procedures to protect privilege............................................................................................72
What Constitutes a Valid Miranda Warning?.......................................................................................77
What Constitutes a Valid Waiver?....................................................................................................... 77
Invocations......................................................................................................................................... 78
Waivers without Invocation................................................................................................................. 79
Remedies for Miranda Waivers (FOPT)..............................................................................................81
Introduction
Criminal procedure is largely regulated and legislated by the federal judiciary through
constitutional interpretation
Once the Supreme Court issues an opinion, that opinion is then re-interpreted by lower courts,
and those re-interpretations form the basis for criminal procedure
Reasons the Supreme Court is a bad regulator of criminal procedure
Court can only review practices that become the subject of a lawsuit
o Because criminal procedure must be the subject of a lawsuit in order to be reviewed,
many types of abuses are never reviewed by the supreme court because
Juries are sympathetic to the police
Police officers are rarely sufficiently solvent to warrant a lawsuit
Criminal charges are rarely brought against police for mistreatment of citizens
because they are exceedingly unlikely to win
o Thus, most criminal procedure issues raised occur when a person who has been charged
with a crime thinks procedure has been violated and challenges procedure through the
exclusionary rule
Under exclusionary rule, improperly collected evidence is excluded from trial
o Exclusionary rule is principle method of police control; implication is that many police
practices are never subject to review because are not related to the collection of
evidence
Supreme Court is particularly poorly suited to regulating criminal procedure because of limited
access to criminal procedure cases
o Can only hear 3-4 crim procedure cases per year
o Many of the cases that involve potential violations of criminal procedure never make it
into court system because exclusionary rule used at trial and as many as 90% of cases
end in a plea
o Lower courts are heavily biased towards the police
o The case selection method does not permit court to develop systematic approach to
developing procedure
Almost all law relating to criminal procedure is court-made, legislature is hesitant to place
restrictions on police abilities
o Therefore when court reviews conduct, court does not have understanding of whether
conduct is typical, connected with other practices, or the rationale for why conduct must
be required
Once Supreme Court opines on an issue, their holding is re-interpreted by lower courts and
applied by the police; the criminal justice system is massed against the criminal suspect
o Courts are overwhelmingly biased against suspects
o Police action is usually only reviewable through exclusionary rule so have no incentive to
act according to rules for actions not related to gathering evidence
Overall, means that while Supreme Court decisions are important, they do not necessarily reflect
activity actually taking place in the criminal justice system
Ds always want to claim that the 4th amendment was engaged earlier so that any evidence
obtained subsequently is the fruit of the poisonous tree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Exclusionary rule shapes the kind of 4th amendment cases judges seeexclusionary rule (4th
amendment) cases arise only when the police find something that an incriminates an individual;
this may affect judicial perception about the value and necessity of searches
3
Mapp v. Ohio Court considers whether evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 4 th
amendment is inadmissible in state court.
Police arrived at Ds home based on a tip that a suspect was hiding at Ds home. D refused to allow
police into her house. The police waited outside and after several hours forced the door open. The
police presented the woman with a fake warrant and then searched the house and found lascivious
books, pictures, and photographs. The State Supreme Court found D guilty, though evidence was based
primarily on [evidence] unlawfully seized
Court finds that evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is
inadmissible in a state court. Court argues that a right to privacy can be inferred from the
combination of the 4th and 5th amendments limiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
right against self incrimination. Court argues that though 4 th and 5th amendments previously were
not applied in state courts, they were not applied for practical considerations that are no longer
present. Court also argue that differences in federal and state rules invited police to evade the
rules at both level of government, and further by allowing the state courts to admit such
unconstitutional evidence encourages disobedience to the constitution. Court dismisses the
argument that enforcing the constitution allows criminals to go free on the basis of the
importance of judicial integrity.
Judicial integrity could also be interpreted in the opposite way given that the court will sometimes
be forced to rule in a way the court knows to be erroneous because of an of improperly collected
evidence.
Judicial integrity could also be interpreted in the other way in that the system gives police a strong
incentive to lie under oath when evidence has been improperly presented
Court also argues that the exclusionary rule is important to deter improper collection of evidence.
Though this is now the most common argument for the rule, there is no data to support the
inference that the rule successfully deters
At best only deters certain activity (does not deter intimidation or violence not intended to lead to
evidence)
Dissent argues that ruling shows a lack of judicial restraint. Dissent dismisses practical arguments
because they are unrelated to a constitutional question. Court argues that since law enforcement
problems vary from state to state, states ought to be allowed to form their own regulations on law
enforcement.
Presents questions of whether 4th amendment should be applied on a sliding scale strict
exclusion for relatively minor crimes
Logic behind the 4th and 5th amendments together operating to exclude S&S
o Use of force self-incriminating testimony was a clear violation of 5th amendment privilege;
the 5th amendment must be a ban on evidentiary use of that compulsion
o If 4th amendment seen as adjunct to 5th, then 4th should also be enforced with
exclusionary rule
Some argue that this interpretation of 4th amendment runs counter to text since
text does not prescribe the exclusionary rule
Exclusionary rule only matters if 1) incriminating evidence is found, 2) the government wishes to
charge a defendant with a crime the evidence proves
o If police know that either of these conditions is absent, are less likely to follow the rule
Costs of exclusionary rule are relatively low few escape punishment through exclusionary rule
Right level of deterrence some argue that one of benefits of rules is that it does not deter too
much
o If police suffered severe penalties for illegal searches, police would conduct many fewer
searches to limit their exposure, and these limitations on searches would drive down
overall levels of criminal deterrence
4
Searches
Criteria considered for identifying search
The Katz analysis is a social norms analysisconsider the norms in the area to determine whether an
individual has an expectation of privacy we are prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable given
location of the individual
Criteria
Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
Location of suspect/subject
Precautions undertaken by
individual to protect privacy
Character of technology
Explanation
1. Individual manifests expectation of privacy
2. Society accepts expectation of privacy as
objectively reasonable
Does area entered involved provide the setting
for intimate activities? (if in the home, the
answer is yes)
Did individual manifest an expectation of
privacy?
Did individuals take particular care to ensure
privacy?
1. Are the police occupying a space that any
member of the public could occupy or access;
applications:
broad hypothetical could public ever
occupy this space
practical do people regularly occupy
this space?
2. Are police accessing information that was
knowingly exposed to the public or a third
party?
Intimate v. Public/Commercial (not clear what
intimate means
Illegal v. Legal (no reasonable expectation of
privacy in protecting illegal information
Did police engage in physical trespass to
obtain information? (Considered, but not
dispositive)
Was sense enhancing technology used? How
invasive is the technology? Is the technology
generally available to the public? What sense
was enhanced? Does technology reveal
anything about the contents of a
constitutionally protected space? Could those
things ordinarily be learned without physical
trespass into the area?
Were the police complying with all pertinent
laws at the time of the search? (not
dispositive)
Is the evidence in question particularly
reliable?
Does invasion involve physical (tactile)
manipulation of a protected thing?
Case
Katz v. US
Oliver v. United States
US v Knotts
Katz v. US
United States v. Dunn
Florida v.
Riley(flyovers)
Dunn
Ciraolo
California v.
Greenwood
Illinois v. Caballes
Kyllo
Illinois v. Caballes
Riley v. Florida
(flyovers)
Unites States v. White
Bond v. United States
All-or-nothing approach to S&S Katz (and specifically deficiencies of Katz) raise question of
degree to which 4th amendment law should be uniform (as it has been in the past) for anything
that could be considered a search or seizure, rather than graduated depending on the degree of
the privacy invasion
o Establishing a uniform ruling either limits the tools available to the police or limits
restrictions on the police
If the line is uniform, anything beyond the cutoff point requires a warrant (which
provides substantial protection for S&Ss)
However searches that are not substantial (e.g. shining a flashlight into a pulled
over car) either are not regulated at all, or are not allowed because they are
S&Ss and thus require a warrant.
Some of motivation for allowing increasingly invasive investigative techniques may be that certain
crimes cannot be investigated effectively without covert operations because the participants and
7
victims are unlikely to report them (E.g. narcotics trafficking, bribery of public officials, intimidation
of witnesses, etc.)
o These crimes often involve consensual transactions
o Argument is that certain crimes can only be caught only with the techniques used in
White
Oliver v. United States Stands for notion that a physical trespass does not necessarily imply a search
and invoke 4th amendment protections.
Ds were charged with growing marijuana. Both Ds were growing marijuana in hidden fields that were
highly secluded and surrounded by no trespassing signs. Federal agents discovered the marijuana as a
result of warrantless trespass onto the property.
Oliver was the first case that cited Harlans concurring Katz opinion as the holding in Katz
Court found that the evidence procured through the police investigation was admissible. Court
argues that under Katz the individuals did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Court
argues 1) textualism that the 4th amendment extends to persons, houses, papers, and effects,
not fields 2) Katz analysis open fields do not provide a reasonable expectation of privacy 2a)
orginalism/evolving meaning?- that open fields do not provide the setting for intimate activities
the constitution is meant to protect 2b) social interest that there is no societal interest in
protecting the privacy of activities that occur in fields (growing crops) 2c) as a practical matter
police have access to a field that they do not have to homes. Court also states that the existence
of a property right is not dispositive in determining whether one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
United States v. Dunn Stands for notion that courts distinguish between open fields (no warrant
necessary) and curtilage (warrant necessary)the area immediately surrounding the home. Court
concluded that a barn 50 yards from the home was outside the curtilage so agents were allowed to jump
over fences and peer into the barn without a warrant.
Per the decision, curtilage issues should be resolved with reference to four factors:
o Proximity of the area to the home
o Whether the area is included within an enclosure surround the home
o Nature of the uses to which the area is put
o Steps taken by resident to protect area from observations
California v. Ciraolo Case finds that flyovers over curtilage ar 1,000 feet (the lowest height allowable for
a plane to fly) are not protected by the 4th amendment because the fact that private citizens can fly over
the area means that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there.
Florida v. Riley Flyovers of curtilage in helicopters are not protected by the 4 th amendment, at least as
long as such flyovers do not lead to physical disturbances of the property and it is possible for ordinary
citizens to fly over the area.
Investigators flew a helicopter over a covered greenhouse at a height of 400 ft based on a tip to the
Sheriffs office that marijuana was being grown in the greenhouse. Panels were missing from the
greenhouse roof that allowed the Sheriff to see marijuana growing inside the greenhouse.
Court found that the no search occurred under the 4th amendment in accordance with the finding
in Ciraolo. Court argues that if any member of the public could fly a helicopter at 400 feet over the
property, then an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Court also asserts that
evidence does not suggest that a flyover at 400 feet is sufficiently rare that an individual should
expect to have privacy from flyovers at that altitude. (Concurring opinion emphasis that there is
reason to believe that there is considerable use of airspace at 400 feet and thus no reasonable
expectation of privacy could exist).
The obvious counter to this opinion is that whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy depends on where the individual is located and how much air traffic enters the area
Dissent argues that under pluralitys view, expectation of privacy is defeated if ANY member of the public
could position herself to see into an area. Court argues that it is not determinative (or should not be
determinative) that the officers were flying at a height approved by flying regulations since evidence of
compliance/non-complaince with the law was not dispositive of a search in Oliver. Court argues that
finding that dispositive the fact that the officer was in a place he had a right to be is attempt to analogize
to an officer peering from a road, but a position in a helicopter is distinguishable because few have
access to helicopters, and so one might reasonably expect privacy from helicopter viewings even if
helicopters are allowed to go to a certain area. Another dissenting opinion emphasizes that evidence
does not indicate that there is enough helicopter traffic at that height to indicate that one has no
reasonable expectation of privacy there.
Supposing the dissents final point is correct (that in order to determine if the helicopter viewing
violated the 4th amendment, one ought to consider helicopter traffic to determine if individual had
a reasonable expectation of privacy); question is where to consider helicopter traffic to determine
if expectation of privacy was reasonable (local community? State? Nation?)
Dissenting opinion indicates that the courts understanding of intimate activities is sex-related
(sun bathing)the original meaning of the constitution was intended to product evidence of
sedition and commercial activities!
After Riley and Ciraolo, most aerial surveillance of curtilage is outside the scope of Fourth
Amendment concern, but physical invasion of curtilage is a search
Bond v. United States Tactile manipulation of a bag is a search protected under the 4 th amendment.
A Boarder Patrol agent squeezed soft luggage in an overhead storage area on a bus and felt a brick-like
object. He obtained consent to open the bag and found a brick of Meth. The Supreme Court found a
search because though passengers expect other passengers much touch their bag, passengers do not
expect bags to be felt in an exploratory manner.
Dissent points out that it is much more likely that another passenger will squeeze a bag in an overhead
compartment then it is that strangers will look in a backyard from an aircrafthard to know why ask
questions about what public does here, but not in Riley.
California v. Greenwood Warrantless trash searches do not violate the 4 th amendment.
An investigator received information that an individual by be engaged in drug trafficking. The investigator
obtained and searched the trash left in front of the individuals house. Based on the drug paraphernalia in
the trash police obtained a warrant and arrested the inhabitants.
Police overturned the lower court ruling in finding that the trash search did not violate the fourth
amendment. Court argued that 4th amendment is violated only if individual 1) manifests a
subjective expectation of privacy, 2) that society accepts as objectively reasonable (Harlan
concurring opinion). Court argues that the expectation of privacy in trash cannot be objectively
reasonable because garbage bags are readily accessible by animals, children, scavengers, and
snoops, and police cannot be expected to avert their eyes to evidence of criminal activity.
Dissent argues that as long as a package is closed, it ought to be protected by the 4 th amendment. Court
argues that a search of trash can reveal intimate details about ones personal life, like a search of a
house. Dissent concedes that when trash is strews about police cannot avert their eyes, but it does not
follow that trash in sealed bags should not be protected. Dissent argues further that it should not be
dispositive that trash was placed at the curb given that placing trash at the curb is legally required.
Knowing Exposure if an individual reveals his affairs to another, that information can be
conveyed by that person to the government (e.g. bank microfilms of checks, deposits, and other
financial records)
o concept used to limit 4th amendment coverage
Many issues related to the 4th amendment have arisen because of the advance of technology
9
Advanced technology raises the question of what is knowingly exposed to the public
US v. Knotts using a beeper to obtain information that could have been obtained through visual
surveillance is not a search for 4th amendment purposes (court found no search took place when police
monitored a beeper attached to a drum of chloroform as it travelled over open roads because a person
travelling on public thoroughfares has no expectation of privacy in his movements because she can be
seen by the public)
It is not clear that the analogy to what the public can see is appropriate since the public do not
follow people constantly, and the police do not have the resources to maintain surveillance on
someone the same way a beeper can
United States v. Karo
An informant tipped off police that a group of drug makers had ordered ten drums of a chemical used to
produce drugs. With the informants consent, police replaced one of the canisters with one of their
canisters with a beeper inside. Police tracked the can with the beeper while it was on public roads, but
eventually lost it and used the beeper to track it to a storage facility. Court considers whether delivery of
a can with a beeper inside of it is a search and seizure, and whether monitoring a beeper falls within 4 th
amendment protections when it reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual
surveillance.
Court finds that use of the tracker did not violate 4 th amendment protections. Court finds first that
the placement of the tracker did not constitute a S or S because the tracked was placed with the
consent of the owner. Court finds next that the transfer of the beeper was not an S or S because
the transfer itself did not convey any information. Court finds that monitoring a canister within a
house does violate 4th amendment rights because it is analogous to entering a house to gather
information. However, court argues that prior illegal use of the beeper does not invalidate later
legitimate use, and thus court was permitted to track the beeper on open roads. The warrant
obtained did not violate the 4th amendment because the improperly obtained information was not
necessary for the warrant (though information obtained subsequently was!)
Court did not address whether it was a search to use the beeper to track the canister to the
storage facility. Seemingly that should have been a search, and since it lead to the information
that allowed the police to get the warrant, possibly this should have been a 4 th amendment
violation.
Dissent argues that receiving a beeper where one expects none infringes on an individuals exclusionary
right, and thus the transfer of the beeper was an S&S. Dissent argues further that the case should be
distinguished from Knotts because in Knotts the officers had a visual on the can placed in the car, and
thus the beeper provided no information that couldnt have been obtained visually. Dissent argues that
use of the beeper is a violation even when used to find something contained in a car.
Kyllo v. United States use of a thermal imager without a warrant violates the 4 th amendment. Sense
enhancing technology cannot be used to obtain information not ordinarily available to the public about the
contents of a constitutionally protected area that one ordinarily could not access without a physical
trespass into the area.
An informant told an officer that an individual was growing marijuana in her house. Officer used a thermal
scanner to measure the heat emanating from the house, and in conjunction with electricity bills obtained a
warrant to search the house and discovered marijuana grown inside. Lower courts found that the device
was non-intrusive, but the opinion was appealed.
Court finds use of a thermal imager is a search under the 4 th amendment, at least until thermal
imagers are commonly used by ordinary members of the public. Courts strongest apprehension
seems to be the possibility that the thermal imager might reveal details of innocent activity. The
court argues that use of a thermal imager is analogous to use of a microphone directed at a house
because it can be used to obtain information that otherwise couldnt be obtained without a
physical invasion. Court argues that an interpretation of the 4th amendment as protecting against
only physical invasions was rejected in Katz. Court argues also that because of the complexity of
10
technology, the court is not comfortable making determinations on permitting technologies that
could advance and potentially infringe on 4th amendment rights. Opinion leaves open the
possibility that use of a thermal imager could be appropriate were it to proliferate into common
usage.
Worth noting that all lower courts had ruled the other way because the form of surveillance is nonintrusive and any member of the public could do it (may imply something about how well matches past
opinions)
Because Scalia had been so critical of Katz before this opinion, it is not clear if Kyllo endorses Katz
Dissent argues that the technology involves nothing more than gathering information that is exposed to
the public (heat waves that have left the house), like gathering information on odors coming out of a
house. Dissent argues further that the privacy interest is trivial because individuals who engage in
uncommon heat-producing activities can insulate that area particularly well. Court emphasizes that the
technology is not through-the-wall surveillance and does not reveal any information on the inside of the
house.
Were the dissents argument to hold, it would imply that Katz was ruled incorrectly because the
recorder picked up only information that was exposed to the public (conversation that was
escaping the booth)
There is some tension between the emphasis on the sanctity of the home and the statement in
Katz that the 4th amendment protects people, not places (that tension arises repeatedly, but
especially in this opinion)
o Potential pitfall of this is that may distract from other areas where privacy interests are
high, and thus may warrant sanctity (cyberspace)
One practical effect of finding in Kyllo is that pursuing white collar drug crime is more difficult, and
thus may shift even more focus to blue-collar drug crime (sales on the corner)
Courts focus on whether technology is in general use to determine whether police can use it
seems to imply that as technology advances, constitutional privacy protection will shrink
If 4th amendment involved a graduated regime, might be possible for police to use semi-invasive
technology in some cases (or in cases where law-makers considered justified)
Illinois v. Caballes Softens courts stance on not obtaining information in a protected space when only
illicit activity will be revealed.
D was stopped for speeding. While officer was writing D a ticket, a second officer walked a drug dog
around his car. The drug dog alerted the police and the police discovered marijuana. Court considers
whether the 4th amendment requires reasonable suspicion to justify using a drug dog (does dog sniff
implicate 4th amendment protections?)
Caballes has been seized, but seizure is reasonable even without a warrant because of Caballes
traffic violation
Court finds that the use of a drug dog does not implicate 4 th amendment protections. The court
argues that a seizure did not occur because D was not detained for extra time to allow the drug
dog sniff. Court argues further that the use of the drug dog does not infringe on a constitutionally
protected privacy interest because drug dogs alert only to drugs and interest in possessing
contraband cannot be deemed legitimate.
Guidelines for use of a dog sniff: 1) reliable (trained) dog, 2) dog sniff only outside of the vehicle,
3) stop does not add to the duration of an authorized Terry stop
If use of drug dogs does not implicate the 4th amendment, hypothetically drug dogs can be used
to sniff anywhere where getting there does not implicate a 4 th amendment S&S
o So with drug dogs, perform ordinary S&S analysis
The dissent argues that use of a drug dog does implicate legitimate privacy interest because drug dogs
frequently err (some estimate up to 60% of the time). Thus, often the alert of a drug dog will prompt
police to search, without a warrant, an area in which an individual has a legitimate privacy interestone
11
not at all linked to contraband or anything illegal. Dissent also argues that individuals have a legitimate
privacy interest in not being subjected to the embarrassment and intimidation of a dog search.
Seizures
Property seizure is typically fairly simplethe interfering with an individuals possessory interest
in a thing
The conflict in seizures arises because we expect police to take a proactive approach to fighting
crime, but at the same time want to establish some limits on police authority
Main conflict in seizure cases is temporalwhen did the seizure occur
o Generally, suspect will argue that seizure occurred early and thus behavior has been
protected for a long time
o State argues seizure occurred late and thus suspect had no constitutional protection
before that
Types of seizures
o Arrest Requires Probable Cause
o Stop Requires reasonable suspicion
Seizure line__________________________(official show of authority that communicates to a reasonable person that she is not free to leave)
Not a seizure
o Conversations require nothing because are not a seizure
Consent negates the existence of a seizure; an officer that has consent does not need PC or RS
Test 1: A seizure occurs when police engage in an official show of authority that
Mendenhall
would communicate to a reasonable person that she is not free to leave (objective
test)
Bostick
Was interaction consensual? (if yes, no seizure)
Did police show authority?
o Did police brandish weapons?
o Did police use intimidating tones of voice?
12
Florida v. Bostick
Officers boarded a bus and walked up and down the aisle talking to people. Officers asked Bostick if they
could search in his bag, and after he gave consent officers discovered cocaine in the bag. Bostick moved
to exclude the evidence on the basis that the officers entry onto the bus constituted a seizure, or at a
minimum interviewing Bostick was a seizure. To support his claim that he was seized, Bostick argues
that he was not free to leave because he was on a bus, and so leaving the bus would have left him
stranded; he also argued that encounter was coercive because police were blocking the aisle and were
armed.
Court finds that the police did not engage in a seizure because the encounter was consensual.
The court establishes that the standard for measuring a consensual police interaction is that an
ordinary person would feel free to go about business. The court rejects Bosticks arguments
relating to being stranded because such a limitation on movement is self-imposedit is not a
reflection of the polices actions. The court reinterprets the standard such that a seizure requires
that the police give the impression that individuals cannot leave. Court finds further that the
encounter was not coercive because the police asked for consent and the interaction was not
sufficiently forceful (the police did not point their guns at Bostick).
Dissent agrees with the standard applied by the court, but disagrees with the courts application of the
standard. The dissent argues that police sweeps are intimidating and the police officers stood in the
middle of the aisle of the bus and thus a reasonable person would not have felt fee to leave.
United States v. Drayton Establishes that officers need not advise bus passengers of right to refuse
cooperation in a bus sweep in order for a seizure to be consensual.
Plain clothes police officers entered a bus and questioned people. The police did not block the exit and
maintained a quiet tone of voice. The police notice two guys wearing baggy jackets in hot weather and
so asked if he could search them. They gave him permission and he found drugs.
Court finds that the officer did not conduct a seizure because the interaction was consensual.
Court re-establishes that in determining if a seizure has occurred courts must consider the totality
of the circumstances. Under this analysis court argue that the court cannot adopt a per se role
requiring the police to advise passengers of their right to refuse. In the situation at hand the court
argues that the situation is not coercive merely because it was on a bus, and it is not dispositive
that the officer displayed his badge because most people are reassured by badges.
Dissent argues that consent means something different and distinct when it is given in the context of
intimidation. Since consent in this case was given in context of intimidation, it cannot be properly
considered consent for purposes of defining a seizure.
13
In US v. Mendenhall court suggests factors that might indicate a seizure had taken place:
o Threatening presence of several officers
o Display of a weapon by an officer
o Some physical touching of the person
o Use of language indicating that compliance with officers request could be compelled
Some argue race should be considered in reasonable person test because minorities tend to
fear the police more; thus reasonable minority is less likely to feel free to leave
In Bostick and Drayton the dissent argues that the test is artificial because people in
conversations with the police do not feel free to leave
o Court seems to believe that the compulsion to stay is a good thing and thus this is not a
cause for concern
A seizure occurs when there is a show of authority and an individual submits. Conversely, when there is
a show of authority and an individual resists, a seizure has not yet taken place.
Brower v. County of Inyo Court held that the use of a roadblock violated 4th amendment right. The
argument is basically that
California v. Hodari D
Hodari fled when the police came around a corner. The police chased him and recovered a bag of crack
that he ditched while running. Hodari contends that he was seized when the police started chasing him
(argues on plain language of Bostick/Drayton definition of seizure). The police conceded that they did not
have PC for a seizure and thus if Hodari was seized when the police started chasing him, the fruits of the
seizure (the bag of crack) were products of an illegal search, and thus not permissible.
State contends that Hodari was not seized until the cop tackled him.
Supreme Court concluded that Hodari was not seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment
when he discarded the cocaine. The court finds that one is seized only when police apply
physical force to an individual and that person is within their control, or when police make a show
of authority that communicates to a reasonable person that he is not free to leave and an
individual submits to that authority. In support of its findings the court makes a public policy
argument that individuals should be compelled to comply with police instructions (and thus
should not be protected when run from police). Argument assumes that police are acting lawfully
within their authority.
Counter to the public policy argument is that 4th amendment is supposed to create incentive for
police (not people), and it is questionable whether people know enough about the law to know
that will be unprotected if they run (or if court had found other way that they would be protected if
they ran)
In opinion Scalia looks to originalism and textualism to justify argumentsthese are not the same
methods of interpretation applied in Katz.
Implication of the holding is that individuals are unprotected until physical force is applied or the police
show authority and people submit
Problem is that it is impossible to know if police are showing authority
o Police can claim were having a conversation, but if someone doesnt want to have one
then can claim that were showing authority to which individual did not submit (I assume
they dont need PC to show authority)
By hinging timing of a seizure on the actions of a citizen (rather than police), the police lose the ability to
determine in advance whether their conduct implicates the 4 th amendment. This creates uncertainty
because it is unclear when someone submits and thus it is unclear when the 4 th amendment is
implicated.
14
Once it is determined that the Fourth Amendment applies (that something constitutes a search or
seizure) there is a presumptive standard for permitting the S or S
o Substantive requirement probable cause
o Procedural requirement warrant
o Probable cause gives police the flexibility to act early in preventing crime thus the PC
standard is lower than the standard for finding guilt
As use of the word presumptive implies, there are many exceptions to the warrant requirement
Early case law indicated that when the 4th amendment applied, S & S was never permissible,
regardless of presence of PC
Arguments against warrant/PC requirement for S&Ss interpretation of the const
o Textualist prohibition on S&S says nothing about exceptions for warrants; only says that
warrants must have PC
o Textualist the text was intended to limit warrants, not expand their use (because of
abuse of warrants in colonial times)
Arguments for warrant/PC requirement for S&Ss
o Indiscriminate searches or seizures might expose people to unwanted government
interference without reason
o Imposes limits on executive authority of an executive that may act despotically
Protection offered by 4th amendment
o Magistrate Review requires inferences be drawn by neutral 3 rd party
Standard
facts and circumstances within the officers knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves
Informants
o Citizen Informant
o Confidential Informant
o Anonymous Informant
Draper v. United States Represents the courts rejection of the notion that it is improper to rely on
heresay to prove PC; however court acknowledges accepting heresay is problematic (thus Spinelli).
A Federal informant told federal agents that James Draper was peddling narcotics. Informant told federal
agents when Draper would get off of a train, what Draper was wearing, and that Draper would be carrying
drugs. The police corroboroated all details but the illegal act; based on that corroboration the police had
PC for a search.
When informant gives police tips, the only allegations that interest the police are allegations of
criminal activity
Spinelli v. United States Established a bright-line criteria for assessing probable cause in cases
involving informants based on veracity and basis of knowledge; case thereby set the stage for the
probable cause guidelines established in Gates. In the case police were informed by an informant that
Spinelli was engaging in gambling. FBI followed Spinelli and saw that he recrossed state lines several
times, had multiple phone lines, and was allegedly known as a gambler. Court found most of these
facts irrelevant, except insofar as they corroborated the tip.
Illinois v. Gates Offers the most recent standard on probable cause in cases of informants.
Policed received an anonymous tip that the Gates were drug dealers. The tip included information about
an upcoming Gates drug buy in which one of the Gates would drive to Florida, and the other would fly to
Florida to drive the drugs back. After the police corroborated the non-criminal allegations, including the
suspicious activity of the Gates staying in Florida for only one night, the police obtained a warrant to
search the Gates house and vehicle. The police discovered drugs and the Gates moved to exclude the
discovery because the police did not have probable cause.
The court found that the police did have probable cause. The court found that the anonymous tip
alone did not provide police with probable cause under the Spinelli test. However, court overruled
the Spinelli test and voice that the proper Probable Cause analysis is a totality of the
circumstances analysis in which basis of knowledge and veracity are components, but alone are
not dispositive. Under the new test the police consider whether given all the circumstances set
forth in an affidavit (including veracity and basis of knowledge) there is a fair probability that
evidence will be discovered. The court argued that the Spinelli test was deficient because if
Spinelli was applied with vigor it would exclude valuable police informant tips, and thus a tip
strong in one prong ought to be able to compensate for a weakness in the other prong. Once the
court applies this test, the court finds that under the totality of the circumstances there was a fair
probability because the information had been corroborated, thus supplementing veracity and
basis of knowledge. The concurrence establishes that the test for corroboration is whether it
gives rise to an inference that the tip of criminal activity is credible.
Gates court motivated by implementing a test that would encourage the use of warrants court
argues that the Spinelli test discourages the use of warrants by holding PC to a higher standard
than after-the-fact PC determinations
Courts finding seems to reflect notion that corroboration of detailed non-criminal facts indicates
that an informant had intimate knowledge of a criminals actions, and thus is more likely to know
about criminal activity.
Argues that an application of the totality of the circumstances test does not warrant an inference that a
search will turn up evidence. Argues that investigation did not corroborate all details thus does not give
rise to a fair probability that the search will reveal evidence.
17
Types of Informants questions of PC and informants arises in the context of the following types
of informantswhich type is involved has implications for the totality of evidence test
o Citizen informant average person who witnesses a crime and goes to the police to
provide testimony
o Police informant individual involved in criminal activity, but known to the police who has
previously provided tips in exchange for money or leniency
o Anonymous tipster
incentivizes the justice system to encourage the use of warrants (because PC determinations
without a warrant are scrutnized more closely through de novo review). Court then remanded for
the appellate court to apply a de novo standard of review to the case.
It is not clear that as a whole the ruling expands protections against abuse of PCsince the court
defers to inferences drawn by local law enforcement, judgments will rarely be revsersed
o Some argue that it is almost like police have been granted as much deference as trial
courts
One explanation for this deference might be that if are relying more heavily on
police testimony (undergoes increased scrutiny), it might induce police to perjury
Maryland v. Pringle A finding of PC requires only a fair probability that a search/seizure will lead to
evidence.
Police stopped a car for speeding and noticed a roll of money in the glove box. The driver consented to a
search of the vehicle and the police discovered drugs. Though the officer could not be certain which of
the three individuals in the car the drugs belonged to, the officer arrested all three. The lower court found
that finding the drugs did not give the officer probable cause to arrest all three individuals.
The Court of appeals reversed the lower courts decision and found that the officer had probable
cause to arrest all three individuals. The court emphasized that a PC determination is not the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of a trial court, but rather requires only a fair probability.
Thus, the question becomes whether historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable
police officer amount to a fair probability that a search/seizure will yield evidence. The court
argues that in this case, because all of the individuals were riding together in a car, that standard
was met. Court qualifies its finding saying that a fair probability does not exist to search
everyone in a public business establishment when the police have PC to believe the owner of the
establishment is engaging in illegal activity.
Ybarra - Fair probability of criminal activity (PC) does NOT exist for everyone in a public establishment
when police have PC to believe the owner of the establishment is engaging in illegal activity. Police
entered a bar where they believed the proprietor was selling drugs. Police searched everyone in the bar
and found drugs on one person. Those drugs were excluded.
Explanations of PC standards:
o Search PC to believe that place intend to search contains evidence of a crime
o Seizure PC to believe a person has committed a crime
Ordinarily, most legal standards are enforced by after-the-fact reviewif someone violates a legal
standard, that person can be sued
Limits on searches and seizures are enforced by both before and after-the-fact review
19
20
o
o
o
o
Particular warrants support probable cause because ensure that the officers have some
basis for a search/are seeking something
Limits the scope of the search in time and space (not open indefinitely, cant search under
rugs if are looking for a piano)
Ensures people are not wrongly deprived of their property
HOWEVER courts do uphold warrants with some vagueness in them (e.g. weapons,
narcotics, evidence of crime at this time unknown)
United States v. Grubbs Established that anticipatory warrants are constitutional and the criteria for
evaluating an anticipatory warrant is that 1) it is now probable that 2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or
a future will be on the premises 3) when the warrant is executedthis means it is probable that evidence
will be found and probable that the triggering event will occur.
D purchased child porn from the web from an undercover agent. The agent then obtained a warrant to
arrest Grubbs after he had accepted the material. The warrant did not specify the triggering condition
permitting Grubbs seizure so Grubbs moved to exclude the evidence. Though the trial court rejected his
motion, the 9th circuit reversed and granted his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court considered two
questions1) are anticipatory search warrants unconstitutional, 2) is a warrant insufficient for lack of a
triggering condition?
Court held that anticipatory warrants are constitutional and do not need to include the triggering
condition. The court argued in favor of anticipatory warrants that all warrants are anticipatory in
some sense because are based on whether PC exists to believe that evidence will exist in some
place at some future time. The court argues that the triggering condition does not need to be
specified in the warrant because there is no general particularity requirement (only places and
persons need to be described with particularity). Court argues further that police do not even
have to present a copy of the warrant to the SorSd individual (so cant argue that triggering event
needs to be in there so individual is aware of the limits of the search).
Court found that that in order to issue a warrant a court must find that a search is probable to
discover evidence (evidence will likely be there, and the triggering condition is likely to happen).
Execution of Warrants
Definitions of Reasonableness
1. Warrant based on probable cause
a. Execution of warrant must be reasonable (though there is not a lot of clarification on what
constitutes reasonable execution of a warrant)
i. Grubbs represents the trend toward allowing more flexibility in the execution of
warrants
Knock and announce requirement absent some lawful and reasonable interest in establishing
unannounced entry, Fourth Amendment requires police to knock and announce selves before
entry
o Purposes
Allow people to save their door
Protect some privacy interests (allows people to get dressed)(
Protects against violence shootouts in reaction to someone busting into a
house
21
United States v. Banks There is an exception to ordinary warrant requirements (specifically to the knock
and announce rule) when officers have a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances at the time that
took action.
Police obtained a warrant to search the house of a drug dealer. They knocked on his door, loud enough
that officers at the rear of the house could hear the knock, and then broke through the door after 15 or 20
seconds. The defendant moved to exclude all evidence on the grounds that the manner of execution of
the warrant was unreasonable (because the officers did not allow enough time before knocking in the
door) and the circuit court granted the suppression motion.
Supreme court finds that the evidence gathered during the search is admissible because the
decision to break down the door after 15 seconds was reasonable under the circumstances. The
court recognizes the exigent circumstances exception to the knock and announce rule, and holds
that the exception kicks in if officers had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstancesthus
it is irrelevant that D was in the shower at the time of the search because exigency is measured
based on the objective perspective of the officer at the time of the search. The court argues that
this determination must be made based on an analysis of all of the circumstances on a case-bycase basis, and thus does not lend itself to an application of rigid criteria. The court argues that
there was exigency in this circumstance because 15 or 20 is sufficient time for a drug dealer to
begin destroying evidence (flushing it down the toilet); thus it is irrelevant whether or not the
police provided sufficient time for the occupant to reach the door.
Noteworthy that court is basing is ruling on assumptionsthat the prudent drug dealer
would flush drugs as soon as heard the police knock; fallability of this assumptions
demonstrates the deference to police judgment in potentially dangerous situations
Muehler v. Mena Police have significant flexibility in how they can execute a warrant when they can
demonstrate serious physical danger (i.e. a killer with weapons); in cases involving infringements on
personal rights but potential danger to the police, courts balance the competing interests.
Police raided a house where they believe a dangerous gang member lived. The SWAT team crashed into
the house, handcuffed everybody, and detained all found individuals in handcuffs for the duration of their
search. Mena then sued arguing that the police used unreasonable force in detaining her by keeping her
in handcuffs through the entire search.
22
The court finds that the authority to detain an occupant of a searched house gives police the
authority to use reasonable force to detain that occupant, and thus Menas detainment was
reasonable. The court argues that in this case the use of handcuffs was reasonable because the
benefits of the handcuffing (ensuring the police were safe) outweighed the costs of the
handcuffing. The court argues that the government interest in using force to detain will always be
high when there is a threat from dangerous criminals. Thus court overrules the lower court in
finding Menas detainment did not violate the 4th amendment.
Court balances the interests at stake and finds Menas interest in not being handcuffed is
relatively trivial as compared to the police interest in preventing police injury
Concurrence argues that the case should be remanded to determine whether Mena was detained longer
than the search (because the government interest in detaining should have ended at that point). The
dissent also argues that giving full deference to the jury, there is evidence that the jury could have
interpreted to indicate that the use of force was unreasonable (not initially, but in prolonged detainment)
the court points to the fact that Mena was a small woman, she cooperated fully, and the officers didnt
follow standard SWAT procedure.
Los Angeles County v. Rettele Court will permit significant privacy intrusions in instances implicating
police safety. The police charged into the wrong house and found two people naked in bed. The court
found that the officers were justified in forcing the people to stand naked for the amount of time necessary
to ensure there were no dangerous weapons in the room. However, those privacy intrusions must not be
unnecessarily prolonged.
Wilson v. Layne Bringing the media or any third party not related to the execution of a warrant that goes
inside the home violates 4th amendment privacy protections.
Police were pursuing a fugitive. They got a warrant to search one of his possible locations, which
happened to be his parents house. Though the fugitive was not in the house, the police pinned and
detained the fugitives parents while accompanied by two members of the media. The home owners
sued arguing that the scope of the search the authority granted by the warrant.
The court held that media ride-alongs are not constitutional. The court found that police actions
in executing a warrant must be related to that warrant and argued that the presence of media
members was not related to the warrant against the fugitive. The court rejected arguments that
the media served a legitimate purpose in executing the warrant (ensuring the police did not
overstep bounds, protecting rights of Wilsons), arguing that a general public relations benefit
does not outweigh the constitutional protections against intrusion into the home. Rather, the
court found that individuals brought into a home during a search must serve a purpose related to
the execution of that warrant.
Wording of ruling leaves open the possibility that a 3 rd party could ride-along if it was
fulfilling the role of preventing abuses, but overall case seems to imply that 3 rd parties
cannot go into homes
o Conversely, case also potentially implies that 3rd party presence is not limited in
any other situation
amendment concerns are implicated because one does not have a legitimate privacy
interest in not being seen in a public place
Exigent Circumstances
Mincey v. Arizona Exigent circumstances do not provide a limitless exception to the warrant
requirement, but rather are bounded by the time period for which the exigency exists; once exigency
ameliorated the warrant exception ends (scope of search must be tailored to the exigency).
An officer set up a sting operation to purchase drugs from a drug dealer. He burst into Ds house with a
group of other officers, and was shot and killed. Homicide investigators then entered Ds house and
performed an extensive search without a warrant. D moves to exclude all evidence discovered during the
search as a violation of the 4th amendment.
The court holds that information obtained once the exigency no longer existed must be excluded
and that investigation of a murder scene is not an exception to the warrant requirement. The
court recognizes some exigency because it does not question the officers right to enter the
apartment. The court argues that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. The court
argues further that a crime scene exception is not justified on the theory that an alleged criminal
has forfeited rights to privacy because this view would find a defendant guilty before a trial. The
court also rejects the argument that a crime scene implies an emergency situation; the court finds
that police have the authority to search while a true emergency situation existswhile police are
not sure if other dangerous criminals may be around. Court also finds that no balancing of public
interests suggests that the court should find a murder scene exception because murders are not
substantially worse than any other crimes (and court is not willing to permit warrantless search of
any crime scene)
Consider first what the police needed exigency to do
o The first fourth amendment event was entering the apartmentpolice had the
authority to enter
o Second fourth amendment event involved the police searchthis search is
challenged
Though the police claim exigent circumstances in the case, it is not clear what the exigent
circumstances were
When assessing exigency in a criminal context, examine each item discovered item-by-item to
determine if police has exigency with regard to searching for that item (once exigency is
ameliorated, e.g. suspect is neutralized, police cannot continue the search)
o In exigent circumstances cases involving danger to the police, police can search for
people and search for weapons
Police can thus search anywhere it is objectively reasonable to think police might
discover people or weaponsthus search bound geographically, temporally, and
spacially by exigency
Fleeing suspects delaying would gravely endanger officers lives or the lives of others
Warden v. Hayden police told that a robber entered a house; police enter house
and find man, guns, and money
Justification deference to police in context of possession of guns
court willing to give police extra flexibility when police are in danger of
being killed; once that danger no longer exists (once suspect found),
police must stop search
Destruction of Evidence if officers do not search immediately, evidence will be
destroyed
Mendez v. Colorado police can search a hotel room from which odor of burning
marijuana is coming (even though offense minor)
United States v. Dickerson no need to knock and announce when there has
been a noisy encounter outside because people may already be inside
destroying evidence
Knock and Talk Strategy Police listen at door, knock on door, and peer inside to
see if can spot any drug activity, and enter and search if they see any
Declared unconstitutional in United States v. Johnson, but only because
court disbelieved testimony that officer had PC (had seen drug activity)
4th amendment implications police listening at door maybe like
bugging the phone booth; police crossing your curtilage, etc.
Community Caretaking if officers enter house to protect a community member (e.g. the
neighbors have not seen someone leave the house in several days)
Reasons allowed
Absence of law enforcement motive mitigates privacy concerns
Potential for overzealousness reduced when police looking out for
community
Concerns police might invent community caretaking motives
O.J. Simpson Case Police found glove during an unwarranted search
that they claimed was justified because they were concerned about OJ
Simpsons health because they had seen a spot of blood on his car
o Explanation seems unlikely since took four officers to the
Simpson house
25
entry was plainly reasonable because the risk of violence was ongoing, and it was reasonable for
the officer to believe that the violence could escalate.
Standard Police allowed to enter when have an objectively reasonable basis for believing an
occupant is injured or seriously threatened
o Objectively reasonable basis for believing an individual might need help
o Objectively reasonable basis for believing violence is just beginning (there will be future
violence)
This standard marks a significant departure from the prior law the Utah
Supreme Court, for instance, found that emergency doctrine only kicked in when
police had reason to believe someone was unconscious, semi-conscious, or
dead
Litigating these cases
o Break down the moment at which the 4th amendment is first triggered
4th amendment triggered when police enter the back yard (curtilage)
Justification police had PC because saw juveniles drinking in the
backyard (implies PC sufficient, warrant not necessary for entry onto
curtilage in this context)
4th amendment triggered again while police enter house
Justification Emergency aid doctrine
Case is important because it provides nation with clarification on the emergency aid doctrine
o Concern in these cases is that police can manufacture exigency
Response ***the authority to search is limited to searching to address the
exigency (no unbridled access)
Brigham City is a Utah Supreme Court decision, though the ruling does not apply nationally, many
states have elaborated similar emergency doctrines
Rationale for holding Dual role of police as enforcers and protectors in our society; police
officers motivations in entering home are different when they enter to protect people versus when
they enter to arrest/punish people and thus different limitations on police entry into the house
should apply in each situation
o Demonstrates societal concern for police role in domestic disputes especially, but also to
investigate when an elderly person hasnt been seen in a few days, etc.
There is some thought that because of the dual roles of police officers, different rules/limits on
police authority should apply depending on which role they are filling
o However, if different rules should apply, how should the law decipher whether police
entered a house for punitive or protective measures?
Consider preferences of people inside the houseoften wont reveal a clear
answer because police entry often involves protective measures for one person
in the house, but punitive measures for someone else in the house?
Consider subjective intent of police court in Stuart rejects this approach, but it
has been accepted in other jurisdictions
Consider objectively what one would expect people inside the house to want
Because there is no good clear way to distinguish when police are in a caretaking role, the law
applies a uniform standard and allows police to enter homes when fulfilling a community
caretaking rolecertain rights are thereby forfeited so that the police can better protect people
Destruction of Evidence
Background
Vale
Police arrest a man outside of his home who is suspected of drug dealing
The mans wife and brother show up to the house; the police use their return as an excuse to
search the home on the basis of an exigency for destruction of evidence
Supreme Court finds the search unconstitutional
26
Court motivated by the notion that the officers could have obtained a warrant to search
the guys home when they got the search warrant for the guy, but they didntthe
destruction of evidence doctrine thus use to circumvent the warrant requirement for entry
into home
Supreme Court defines a new standard for searching the home police need an objectively
reasonable basis for believing evidence is in the process of being destroyed
Lower courts softened the standard by substituting one of the following standards:
o Police have exigency for destruction of evidence if they have an objectively reasonable
basis to believe there is a reasonable threat of the destruction of evidence OR
o Police need an objectively reasonable basis for believing evidence is in the process of
being destroyed in order to search, but Police are allowed to secure the premises while
they get a warrant
o
Welsh v. Wisconsin Police do not have exigent circumstances to enter a home for fear of destruction of
evidence when the crime at issue is relatively minor (essentially overturned in next case).
D was seen driving into a field where he abandoned his car. Witnesses reported that D was very drunk.
Police used the vehicle registration to locate Ds home, and then entered the home without a warrant to
find D drunk. D moves to exclude the evidence as the subject of an illegal search.
Court holds that in assessing exigency, the court must consider the gravity of the underlying
offense, and that it is almost impossible to rebut the presumption that a warrant is necessary to
intrude into the home when the crime in question is relatively minor. The court argues that the
police were not in hot pursuit and there was little threat to public safety because D had already
abandoned his vehicle.
The dissent argues that a test of exigency based on severity of a crime will hamper law enforcement by
introducing additional uncertainty into the consideration of whether exigency exists.
Demonstrates the hierarchy of privacy protectionswhile police could have arrested D if found in
public, police did not have the authority to enter his home because homes are entitled to
heightened protection
Some concern that if the courts looked to punishment of a crime to determine exigency, it would
give the legislature an incentive to inflate sentences
Illinois v. MacArthur If police have probable cause to believe that a crime is occurring and a reasonable
basis to believe that if they do not enter a home evidence will be destroyed, police may use the least
restrictive means available to secure the evidence while a warrant is obtained (if possible).
Police accompanied a woman to her trailer to keep the peace as she packed her belongings. When she
was leaving she told the police that her husband had dope in the trailer. When the man exited the trailer,
police prevented him from returning inside to the trailer while another officer obtained a search warrant;
when the man needed to enter the trailer to place a phone call, the police officer accompanied him. The
man seeks to exclude the evidence of the dope found during the search on the basis that 1) keeping him
outside was an illegal seizure, 2) accompanying him into his house without a warrant was an illegal
search.
Court finds that the warrantless seizure and search were not unreasonable. The court argues that
1) the police had probable cause, 2) had reason to believe that D would destroy evidence, 3) used
the least limiting approach possible, 4) restrained D for a relatively very limited period of time.
The courts holding implicitly overturns the holding in Welsh protecting search of the home,
except in that a search of the home may warrant slightly more protections than other approaches.
Concurring opinion when D was inside the trailer, the police had sufficient reason to believe that
the evidence would be destroyed to warrant the polices entry without a warrant. Thus, police had
authority to use less invasive measure to achieve the same ends.
27
Court potentially influenced by the fact that they could have placed D under arrest while getting
the search warrantthus means used were considerably less restrictive
Fact that in this situation the police could have arrested D without a warrant, but could not
have entered his home reflects the hierarchy of privacy interests under 4 th amendment
considerations the home is granted more protection than any other space
Dissent argues that the search was unconstitutional because the crime was relatively minor and
implicates major privacy concerns.
Standard that emerges from the case; if police are faced with a destruction of evidence problem,
police can use the least restrictive means possible to maintain the security of the evidence;
typically this means the police have:
o PC
o Objectively reasonable basis to believe there is a reasonable threat of destruction of
evidence
o Police use the least restrictive means possible to secure the evidence
o As little time passes as possible (police infringe on rights for as little time as possible)
Litigating the case
o Police have probable cause
Veracity Tip from citizen informant meets the veracity requirement
Basis of knowledge requirement met because informant claiming first hand
knowledge
Issues confronted
o Can police keep D outside while they get a warrant
o Can police follow D inside when he went in to get things
Court answers the second question by answering the firstif police can keep
outside because of exigency caused by potential destruction of evidence, then
can follow him inside
Court does not overtly explain why the court might have justification for temporarily seizing D
(seizure), but not for entering his house to search
There is some concern that the exigent circumstances exception is easy to manufacturepolice
can always find exigent circumstances if the police think a suspect knows he is suspected of a
crime
Doctrine operates when police want to seize an item when they are searching pursuant to a
warrant or warrant exception and find something else incriminating
Introductory Case
o A guy was speeding and had a cracked windshield
o Officer pulled guy over and looked into the car to identify the VIN number (as he was
legally allowed to do
o While looking, he saw a gun handle sticking out from under the drivers seat
o In context, officer was allowed to seize the gun based on the plain view doctrine
Arizona v. Hicks Defines scope of the plain view doctrine: plain view doctrine does not permit any
additional searches, only the seizure of an item in plain view.
28
Officers obtained a warrant to search an apartment when a bullet was fired through the floor of the
apartment, injuring a man in the apartment below. While officers were searching, an officer noticed some
particularly expensive stereo equipment in an otherwise poor apartment. He picked up the stereo and
turned it over to obtain the serial number and called in the serial number to police headquarters. He
learned that the stereo had been stolen during an armed robbery. The court then considers whether
picking up and flipping over the stereo constituted an unconstitutional search.
The court finds that recording the serial number was not a seizure, but moving the stereo
equipment was a search, and thus was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The court finds
that taking action unrelated to the objectives of an authorized intrusion (performing any
unwarranted searches) constitute new invasions of privacyin this case the action was unrelated
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion because the police were searching for weapons or
suspects, neither of which could have been under the stereo. The court finds next that police may
seize evidence in plain site without a warrant only in certain circumstancesthese circumstances
appear to be when obtaining a warrant would entail inconvenience or risk to the police. The court
argues that there is no justification for permitting police to seize an item for which police could
not have obtained a warrant, had police known the item was on the premises. The court proceeds
to reject the dissents view that the rules that the search can be justified in this instance on the
basis that it constituted something less than a search because defining tiers of searches would
introduces uncertainty into the analysis.
Dissent argues that if the serial number had been visible it would not have been protected (because
recording was not a search), and thus the line drawn by the majority is arbitrary. Dissent advocates an
interpretation of the 4th amendment in which a search cannot be justified under the plain view doctrine, by
a cursory inspection can be justified as long as it is accompanied by reasonable suspicion. The court
dissent argues that a cursory inspection involves no exploratory rummaging, and thus that some brief
searches are so minimally intrusive that they are justified on the facts of a case. In other words, potential
gains for police are big, but potential costs to individuals are small.
Litigating Hicks
o Problem is that police expanded scope of legal search by picking up stereo
To litigate, argue that could have found weapons under the stereo
o State concedes that did not have PC to look for stolen stereo equipment
State had plausible arguments for PC for searching stereo equipment had
found guns and a ski mask
The plain view doctrines give PC for additional seizure only when an officer is already engaging in
a lawful activity and is legally in a place where she can gain physical control over the thing
Criticism of Hicks
o Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Scalia finds search unconstitutional because produces a new invasion of
privacy
He omits to consider (per Katz) whether owner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy as almost all litigators would have considered
o May just reflect Scalias previously vocalized view that Katz test
was wrong
o Scalia suggests the default arrangement is warrant is required warrant is required
Scalia focuses on fact that officer lacked PC to rule on the issue; lack of PC is
related to the warrant requirement
In focus, Scalia does not consider directly whether officers actions were
reasonable, as plain text of the 4th amendment would suggest the inquiry should
be (instead adopting the view that reasonableness requires a warrant)
In this way, court concedes loss of privacy might be marginal and that
loss to law enforcement may be great (suggesting activity is reasonable),
but does not find that activity is acceptable
29
Like exigent circumstances doctrine, plain view doctrine serves to effectively limit officers ability
to conduct wide-ranging searches of private dwellings absent a warrant (even with a warrant)
The rationale behind the plain view doctrine drives how it will be applied; rationales
o Inconvenience and risk
Inconvenience is probably not alone
Risk suggests plain view doctrine should be applied only when there is some
exigency when thing seen involves weapons or drugs
If exigencies dont exist, then probably cannot use the plain view
doctrine! (MacArthur), but rather should get a warrant
Reason that need exigency is that the court assumes a warrant is
required and thus there must be justification for any exception to the
warrant requirement
o If are legally there, then are not committing any additional invasion of privacy suggests
broader application of plain view doctrine
Horton v. California Eliminated the inadvertently discovered requirement of the plain view doctrine.
D robbed the leader of a coin club. Police obtained a warrant to investigate Ds house for proceeds of the
robbery, but due to an oversight the warrant did not include ability to search for guns (even though police
knew guns were likely to be in the house). The police discovered guns in plain sight and seized them; D
moves to exclude the guns on the basis that the guns were not discovered inadvertently.
Court finds that evidence does not need to be discovered inadvertently in order to qualify for the
plain view doctrine. Court explains the contours of the plain view doctrinethe doctrine requires
that 1) the evidence is in plain site, 2) the evidence is plainly incriminating, 3) the officer is lawfully
in a place where saw the thing, 4) the officer has lawful access to physically possess the object,
but the object does not need to be discovered inadvertently. The court argues that the
inadvertence standard undesirably injects subjectivity into the inquiry because it is based on what
the officer was expecting to find. The court argues further that individuals are already protected
because officers have no reason not to include something in a warrant, if they have PC for it
because doing so will expand the lawful scope of their search. The court also argues that the
inadvertence requirement may lead to the exclusion of valuable evidence for which officers did
not yet have sufficient evidence to develop PC (may suspect will find something because usually
do in that situation, but dont have evidence to look for it). Court argues further that as long as
the search does not exceed beyond the scope of the warrant, the search does not implicate any 4 th
amendment issues.
Reason for inadvertence requirement courts concerned about pretext (inventing justifications for
a search so that can actually search for something else)
Concern is that if police get warrant to search for evidence on a crime are almost certain a
criminal committed when suspect the criminal of other crimes, any evidence found to support
crimes they suspect the criminal of committing will be inadmissible
o Police could do a lot more investigation to get PC on other crimes, but effectively raises
costs for investigations of the most dangerous suspects (those suspected of several
crimes)
4th amendment law related to automobiles has evolved over time as automobiles have become
increasingly common
Developments in 4th amendment law related to automobiles:
30
o
o
o
o
o
Carroll v. United States Police can search a vehicle without a warrant when the police
have PC and if obtaining a warrant is not reasonably practicale.g. the vehicle is in
motionbecause of the exigency implied by the fact that vehicles can be driven away
Argument automobiles are fleeting targets so there is an exigency that warrants
seizing them; there is no hierarchy of 4th amendment events so if can seize them,
then can search them
Analysis proceeding from perspective of innocent person innocent
would rather police search immediately so can proceed on way
o Though courts deny hierarchy of 4th amendment events for
vehicles, it seems likely that courts endorse such a hierarchy for
homes
See MacArthur can seize an individual to secure
house while obtain a warrant
Dissent concerned that negatives criminal activity should not close eyes to
requirements of fourth amendment
Chambers v. Maroney Exception to warrant requirement to search a vehicle extends to
instances where police have already impounded the vehicle if the police could have
searched the vehicle when it was impounded because of concern that would force police
to search vehicle before impounding in potentially unsafe situations for police
Again, case only extends to vehicles that were moving when apprehended
Suggests reasonableness as the requirement for addressing whether search is
permissible, rather than warrant
Carroll/Chambers justified on diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle:
Individuals are forced to have their vehicles inspected so the public has
access to a vehicle
Vehicles are made for transporting people in public places; people could
be in an accident at any moment and the contents of their car might be
thrown into the public (this is distinct from the home or luggage where
one protects privacy and thus has expectation of it)
o Possible exception includes a car parked at home however this
exception is not to protect the car, but rather to protect the home
(and this probably isnt good law any more)
In some case, Carroll and Chambers was extended to vehicles parked in a public place
(again, because of mobility of vehicle)
South Dakota v. Operman; Cady v. Dombrowski authority to search vehicle extends to
all parts of vehicle (including trunk and glove compartment)
Exception to automobile exception for private containers
United States v. Chadwick Police do not have the authority to search containers
within a vehicle just because the container is put into a vehicle
Police wanted to search container so waited until it was loaded into a
vehicle
Court rejected diminished expectation of privacy argument because
expectation of privacy high in locked luggage
Sanders Extended Chadwick to apply to closed containers (a suitcase), even if
police wait until the vehicle is moving
Robbins Protection of containers within a vehicle is extended to cover even bricks
wrapped in opaque plastic
Why doesnt this change analysis of tape?
United States v. Ross qualifies exceptions to automobile exception when police have
PC that extends to entire vehicle, scope of a search extends to entire area in which
object of the search may be found and is not limited by possibility that will require
separate acts of entry; scope of search not defined by nature of container, but by object
of search and where have PC to look
Rule after Ross:
31
California v. Acevedo Case overturns exceptions to automobile exception and finds that different
standards do not apply to searches depending on whether PC is container-specific or vehicle-general.
Police received a tip from a federal DEA agent that a package was being sent through the mail
containing drugs. Police seized the package and arranged to have it picked up as scheduled so
police could follow the recipient back to his home. After recipient entered home, D arrived to the
recipients home and left carrying a brown paper bag that he then placed in his trunk. The police
then stopped him, fearing a loss of evidence if they allowed him to get away. Police opened the
trunk. Lower court cited Chadwick in excluding the evidence because PC was item-specific.
Court holds that the law does not distinguish based on whether PC is container-specific or vehiclegeneral, and thus police have the authority to search all containers found in a vehicle without a warrant, if
the search is supported by PC. The court argues that the case closely resembles Ross and considers
whether Ross requires police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a moveable vehicle; court concludes
that Ross does not require a warrant to open the sack. The court argues that there is no principled
distinction between a container found in a general search and a container found in a specific search
warrant treating them differently. Court argues further that there are few privacy implications involved in
distinguishing between the two, though there is a substantial law enforcement interest in treating them
both alike. Court argues further that privacy concern may swing in favor of permitting police to search
containers in vehicles because it implicates privacy concerns less than forcing police to search for
evidence in the entire vehicle (everywhere else). Court argues further that the prior rule introduced
uncertainty into the system which complicated police activity and also ironically limited police authority to
search in the places where they were most likely to discover contraband (while allowing search
elsewhere).
Concurring (Scalia) Does not assume a warrant is required. The only thing necessary for a 4 th
amendment search is reasonableness (on plain language); thus inquiry is into whether a search is
reasonable under the circumstanceson this basis ruling is not ground breaking, but merely extension of
past inquiries into reasonableness.
Dissent argues that court should maintain the distinction between item-specific and vehicle-general
searches. Dissent argues that the distinction provides a restraint against police practice and represents
the policy judgment that the decision to invade the privacy of an individuals personal effects should be
made by a neutral observer (magistrate). Court has replaced prior anomaly in jurisprudence with a worse
anomaly in which it is acceptable to search an item if someone puts it in their trunk, but not if they are
carrying it. Also rejects notion that prior standard put serious strain on law enforcement.
In Acevedo, court backs down from assertion that one has no privacy expectation in a car--acknowledges that expectations of privacy in parts of a car and luggage may be the same, but
finds that exigency applies to containers in vehicles
o After Acevedo/Houghton, officers still need PC to search packages outside of
automobiles (Chadwick- heightened expectation of privacy; no exception to warrant
requirement for luggage)
However- arguments for searching inside of autos could apply to searching
packages anywhere maybe suggest reasoning moving in direction of
eliminating the warrant requirement
California v. Carney Automobile exception applies to mobile home
o Lesser privacy expectation derives from vehicles capacity to drive on highway
Previously, cases imply exception applies because of exigency (though
Chambers suggests exigency is not the real problem, or courts will find
constructive exigency)
32
Wyoming v. Houghton Police officers can search even private belongings within a vehicle (e.g. a purse)
when belongings are capable of concealing the objects of the search because of the likelihood that
everyone in a car is working together.
Police pull over a car. The driver has a syringe in his pocket that he tells the police he intends to use to
take drugs. Police then search the vehicle. The officer found fresh needle marks are a passengers
arms, and elect to search her purse where the officers found drugs. The appellate court found that this
search was illegal because searches are illegal when they involve the search of the personal effects of a
passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity.
The court finds that officers with PC to search a car can inspect passengers belongings in the car
that are capable of concealing the object of the search. Court argues that should first consider
original intent of the Amendment to determine if search is permissible, but where that does not
yield a result, court does not adopt the warrant requirement interpretation, but rather asserts that
it must evaluate the search under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing the
privacy intrusion against the legitimate government interest. Court argues that under the original
meaning of the amendment as interpreted in Ross, search of items contained in a vehicle is
permissible, and there is not a convincing reason for restricting the application of this logic to
vehicle passengers. Court proceeds to balance privacy interests against law enforcement
interests and finds that permitting a search accords with the balancing test. Court argues that
passengers possess a reduced expectation of privacy and that government interests are
substantial because passengers are often engaged in a common enterprise with the driver and
might be able to hide contraband in passengers affects, or passengers might start claiming al
incriminating evidence in the vehicle.
Dissent writes from perspective of warrant requirement and argues that in prior case on search of
passengers, the warrant exception did not apply (US v. Di Re). Argues that states legitimate interest
does not outweigh privacy concerns because spatial association does not mean that passenger and
driver are in association. Argues further that the rule could be every bit as unambiguous as the majoritys
view, but it would just protect more privacy.
After Acevedo the authority to search an automobile includes the authority to search all
containers therein (period, full stop)
United States v. Di Re Searches of passengers clothing not included within a lawful search
o Wyoming v. Houghton Searches of passengers personal items is within a lawful search
Thus whether police can search a jacket may depend on whether passenger si
wearing the jacket
33
Court finds statutory language to indicate it is not unreasonable under Fourth Amendment for
postal inspectors to arrest without a warrant if have PC); court analyzes precedent and discovers
rule on arrests for felonies without warrant (in reality, the history and statutory language are
ambiguous. Court finds fact that CL accepted warrantless arrests indicates that it is not contrary
to constitution. The court does not balance the interests (as the court would now).
Concurrence noted anomaly created by courts decision because arrest is a seizure and
constitutional provision seems to impose same limitation on searches and seizures; also notes
anomaly that arrest is much more invasive personal intrusion than a search (even a search of the
home) ,but ultimately defers to history on judgment that not allowing could severely hinder law
enforcement
Dissent Argues warrant should be required, but warrantless searches should be allowed for exigencies,
and exigency will usually exist. Dissent argues that CL does not permit warrantless arrest as majority
indicates because CL felony definitions were very different and many crimes now considered a felony
were then merely misdemeanors; argues further that long-standing practice does not immunize the
practice from scrutiny. Dissent argues further that there is no better reason to trust the biased view of a
police officer that there is PC for an arrest than view that there is PC for a search. Dissent argues further
that there is no significant government interest because can arrest without a warrant if there is an
exigency.
However, court did not require the use of search warrantsarrests warrant
sufficient as long as unbiased magistrate reviews
Steagald v. US Arrest warrant not sufficient to search home of someone other than the
arrestee
Court found drugs when went to arrest someone at someone elses house
because warrant did not protect the other persons privacy interests (magistrate
did not review PC as to the individual whos house was searched)
Atwater v. Lago Vista Elucidates the relationship between the fourth amendment and state lawthe
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for minor criminal offenses, and thus does not
require case-by-case determinations of reasonableness for misdemeanor arrests; to determine if a
warrantless arrest is reasonable need 1) PC to believe crime occurred, 2) arrest not made in manner
unusually harmful to privacy interests.
Atwater was pulled over and her children were riding in the front seat without a seat belt. The officer had
previously pulled her over for this violation before. The officer then arrested the woman and booked her,
though she was released shortly thereafter. The woman then sued for damages asserting that she had
been unreasonably arrested. Trial court and appellate court rule for summary judgment in favor of the
city (police officer).
The court finds that the fourth amendment does not extend to restrict arrests for violation of
relatively minor crimes, and thus does not require a balancing of interests test. The court first
embarks on an assessment of the history of arrests for misdemeanors in order to infer whether
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor would have been considered unreasonable; the court finds
the assessment inconclusivethe court specifically points to English statutes that permitted
peace officers to make arrests for relatively minor non-violent offenses. Court argues further that
actual practice around the time of the constitution authorized local officers to make warrantless
misdemeanor arrests. The court next finds that it will not create a new rule declaring warrantless
misdemeanor arrests incongruent with the fourth amendment. The court argues such a rule
would require sensitive case-by-case determinations of government need, and that the court has
previously rejected compelling such determinationsdetermining the severity of the crime (and
thus whether it is a felony or misdemeanor) may vary based on factual determinations that are not
easily decipherable. The court argues further that the arrestees rights are already protected by a
right to magistrate review of the arrest within 48 hours. In the specific case, the arrest was
reasonable because the officer had PC to believe Atwater had committed a crime and the arrest
was not made in a manner unusually harmful to privacy interests.
Dissent argues that in the absence of a clear common-law rule related to misdemeanor arrests, the court
should balance the interests at stake. The dissent argues that the individuals personal liberty interests
are particularly high given that arrests are violent and the arrestee may be detained for up to 48 hours.
Given this interest dissent would restrict ability to arrest for fine-only offenses unless the officer is able to
point to specific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant an arrestin other words, the interests of
the city are viewed in contextthe dissent considers not general police needs, but needs to meet any
threats in the given situation.
Concern in dissent reflects concerns over search-incident-to-arrest; if they can arrest for a misdemeanor
crime, police may start arresting for these crimes so that they can searchthis leads to concern over
profiling
S Ct hesitant to say that offense is trivial (because kids can die when ride in front seat and are not
buckled in
Majoritys opinion demonstrates ascendancy of originalism in Fourth Amendment law
o Criticisms of orginalism in Fourth Amendment context
18th century rules were unequal and codified class privilege
Dramatic improvements in technology may make analysis of what government
does with information very important but 18th century technology was so different
that original intent is not applicable to these emerging practices
36
Police have some authority to search the place where the arrest is made
Evolution of doctrine
o Weeks v. United States asserted that the right to search the person of the arrested was
always recognized in CL
o Agnello v. United States Search incident permits search of the place where the arrest is
made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime and weapons that might
be used to escape from custody
o Marron v. United States search-incident authority extends to all parts of premises used
for unlawful purpose
o Cutting back the scope of the search incident doctrine a few cases then cut back the
scope of the search incident doctrine because there was ample time to get a warrant
o Court then returned to broad authority
Chimel v. California Limits search incident to arrest to the arrestees person and the area from within
which he might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence
37
Police went to Ds home with a warrant for his arrest. When D arrived at the home, the officers arrested
D and searched his home, without his consent. The court considers whether a warrantless search of Ds
entire house can be justified as incident to an arrest.
Court holds that the broad expansion of the search incident doctrine cannot withstand scrutiny,
and thus should be constrained to permit only search of the area from which the arrestee might
obtain a weapon or seek to destroy evidence. The court argues that the broad search is not
justified by the original rationale for the 4th amendmentthe original intent of the 4th amendment
was to protect privacy from abuses by the majority. The court recognizes that the main
justification for the search incident doctrine is that an arrestee may obtain a weapon and use it
against the officers; the court reaffirms that this justifies search incident to arrest in the room in
which a an individual is arrested, but does not extend to the entire house. Court argues that there
is no reasonable distinction that would justify searching an arrestees entire house if they are
arrested in the house, as opposed to arrested anywhere else.
Dissent argues that the standard by which 4th amendment searches are measured is not against whether
or not that are conducted pursuant to a warrant, but rather whether they are reasonable. The court
argues that when the police are already legally in a place (house), it is not reasonable to require that the
police leave the place to go get a warrant, especially when co-conspirators may destroy evidence. The
court then applies this set of factors and argues that there was an exigency created by the possibility that
the arrestees wife would hide or destroy evidence. Dissents argument amounts to a balancing of
interests in which the privacy interest is low because police are already legally in the place, and police
interest is high because of potential evidence destruction.
Arizona v. Gant SIA of a vehicle limited to when 1) area within wingspan of arrestee from which might
obtain a weapon, 2) evidence reasonable to believe vehicle contains evidence of arrest.
38
Police received an anonymous tip that drugs were being sold from a house. They went to the house and
met Gant who told them that the owner of the house was not home. They locked at Gant in their police
database and found that he had a suspended license. Later they went back to the house and arrested
the owner. When Gant drove up they arrested him (saw him driving on suspended license). While he
was in the patrol car the police searched his car and discovered a bag of cocaine. The lower court found
that the search was unreasonable based on the Scalia language in Thortonthere was no reason to
believe that there was evidence related to Gant driving with a suspended license in the vehicle.
The court holds that an SIA of a vehicle is reasonable only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. The court argues that an expansive reading of
Belton in which the entire passenger compartment is subject to search is inconsistent with the
ruling in Belton which said that it was consistent with Chimel (wingspan limitation). The court
rejects the argument that vehicle searches are reasonable regardless of whether have reason to
believe will uncover evidence of the arrest. The court argues that the privacy interests are higher,
particularly given that Belton authorizes officers to search closed containers. The court argues
further that police interests are law because the individual is already detained. Court argues
further that a broad reading of Belton is not necessary to protect law enforcement safety or
evidentiary concerns since it applies when an individual has already been arrested.
Concurrence (Scalia) argues that in interpreting 4th amendment, should first look to history, and if
history is inconclusive, then should balance the relative interests. Concurrence argues that in
terms of interests, the police always have a less invasive way of neutralizing concerns because
they can arrest the person (wants to eliminate the charade of police safety as the justification).
Concurrence argues further that he would not permit SIA within reaching area because it leaves
ambiguity, because other remedies (arrest) is available, and because it creates a bizarre incentive
for police not to secure arrestees so can search their vehicles.
Dissent makes a whole bunch of arguments. Dissent argues that Belton has already been relied on by
the police. Dissent argues further that no changed circumstances warrant changing Belton. Also argue
that the Belton rule has not proven unworkable and has not been undermined by later cases. Dissent
argues further that Chimel is meant to be applied as of the time of arrest, not of the time of the search
because otherwise the rule would never apply (because as of the search, exigency rarely, if ever, exists.
Criteria 2 reasonable to believe vehicle contains evidence of arrest involves something less
than probable cause
o Court does not say that it is reasonable suspicion provides some justification for
thinking that is not the right standard either
o Probably not limited to the passenger compartment, as it was in Belton
Gant raises the question of how Gant impacts the authority to search within the home
o Sweep authority Gant does not address the authority to sweep the home to ensure
police safety as discussed in Buie this authority probably is unchanged
o In home
If Gant logic transfers to the home
officers are no longer limited to grab space, but can now look anywhere
in the home if it is reasonable to believe they will find evidence of the
offense of arrest (which will almost always be the case in the home)
Area can search on grab space limited to real grab space (not grab
space charade from before)
Why we would think it would apply
o Scalia pushing for reasonableness as basis for searches, rather
than warrant requirement search history, balance interests
Searching arguably reasonable because officers are
already in the house
Why wouldnt apply
39
o
o
Virginia v. Moore SIA for arrests that are not authorized under the laws of the state do not violate the 4 th
amendment.
Officers determined Moore was driving on a suspended license and arrested him for the offense. While
they were arresting him, they searched him and found cocaine. However, under state laws, the officers
should have issued Moore a summons instead of arresting him.
Court finds that evidence should not be excluded as a violation of the 4 th amendment when the
arrest was not justified under state law. The court applies the Scalia methodthe court first
considers the constitutional history, and then proceeds to balance the relative interests. The
court argues that history does not provide a conclusive answer, but suggests that history does
not indicate that the 4th amendment was intended to apply to state law (reinforce state law/be
limited to state law). Accordingly, the court considers standards of reasonableness. The court
argues that reasonableness has never depended on interpretation of state law. The court then
considers the relative interests of the parties. The court argues that the arrestees interests are
low because there are already standards in place to protect an individual from arrest. The court
proceeds to argue that limiting constitutional arrests to those authorized by the state would create
a strange incentive discouraging states to impose greater restrictions on arrest authority because
it would make all information obtained incident to those arrests excludable. The court argues
further that tying constitutionality to state law would create varying constitutional 4 th amendment
standards, depending on the jurisdiction. Once the court determined that the arrest was not
unconstitutional, the SIA was reasonable based on concerns for officer safety.
Arrest (seizure) is reasonable under 4th amendment as long police have PC to believe are guilty
of a crime
Issues have arises around searchability of computersissues arise when police have a warrant
to search a computer for one thing, but discover evidence of some other crime
o State argument must be able to look in every file because it is possible that a file will be
hidden/misnamed
o 4th circuit electronic files are like paper files; a warrant for a computer is like a warrant
for a file cabinetyou can look at anything
o 9th circuit electronic files are distinct from paper files because it is possible to limit the
scope of the search for electronic filesas a result must do that
Reasonableness
Context
40
The exceptions above demonstrate the court is in the process of questioning its loyalty to
the warrant requirement
Terry reiterates the preference for warrants, but simultaneously prescribes
another exception to the requirement
Implies that a warrant is necessary even where not
o Terry is tried in the context of a police stopa warrant cannot be the requirement for a
police stop because it would not be possible to obtain a warrant for a police stop
o Terry occurring in the midst of the civil rights movement real concern about policing
using stops as a means of harassment
Vagrancy statutes were permitting police to stop almost anyone with almost any
(or no) justification
Police are frisking people in the community; it is invasivehow should the 4 th
amendment limit the power?
o At the other end of the spectrum, there are substantial community interests in proactive
policing
Terry enabled proactive community policing
Potential means for protecting privacy:
o Absolute protection things free from official inspection
o Warrant + Probable Cause
o Reasonableness privacy protection rooted in requirement that searches and seizures
be reasonable
Does not necessarily mean that the court will apply less stringent restrictions on
searches example even if one had PC to believe someone had been involved
in a crime, a bullet could not be fished out of that person because such a search
would not be reasonable
Concerns
Commentators nevertheless worry that a reasonableness standard will
lower privacy protections because courts will defer to lower courts who
will defer to the police
Concern that a totality of the circumstances test provides too little
guidance to the police on what can do
o Counter standard of reasonableness requires interplay
between officers actions and judicial decisions
Because reasonableness requires a balancing test, courts will be forced
to give a convincing explanation for inevitable choices, but the court
lacks the tools to give such an explanation
Use of reasonableness in assessing 4th amendment events has increased in recent years
o Camara 4th amendment reasonableness requirement applies to health and fire safety
inspection searches
o See 4th amendment reasonableness requirement applies to commercial warehouse
inspection
In expanding the application of the reasonableness standard, the court redefined probable cause
in terms of reasonableness, by doing so the court introduced reasonableness as a basis for
assessing constitutionality of 4th amendment events on its own
o Instead of PC defining reasonableness, balancing test came to define reasonableness
Before Terry, there was real doubt as to how the court would rule; possibilities:
o PC is required for a stop (effectively limits policing to reactive)
o Nothing required for a stop a stop is just a conversation (not a 4 th amendment event)
o
Stop-and-Frisk Authority
Terry establishes a new distinction between what does and does not constitute a 4 th amendment
event
o An arrest and an SIA are 4th amendment events
A stopand-frisk is not a fourth amendment event
41
The court in Terry finds that the distinction is not based on a frisk being
less intrusive it is very intrusive
Rather, justification is that a warrant would not work as the standard in
this context; PC would not work in this context, because by definition the
officer does not have PC, but rather needs to be able to conduct a
search in order to obtain PC
Searches under consideration in Terry were already being conducted by law enforcement thus
the review by the court serves to restrict these searches and bring them under review of the
courts
o Court did this by holding the searches to a reasonableness requirement involves a
balancing of the interests of law enforcement and the privacy interests of individuals
The court is moving in this direction for all seraches
Terry v. Ohio An officer has the authority to stop and frisk an individual when the officer can point to
specific articulable facts that warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate
and that that the officer was dealing with an armed and dangerous individual or officer would be
warranted in belief that his safety or that of others is in danger, even if the officer did not have probable
cause for an arrest.
An officer with 30 years of experience was patrolling his regular beat. He noticed two men who were
taking turns walking down the street and peering into one particular store window. The officer suspected
that the men were casing the place for an armed robbery. The officer followed the men and confronted
them. He seized the men and frisked them; he discovered that Terry had a gun. The state concedes that
the officer did not have PC for an arrest. Terry moved to exclude the evidence on the basis that it was
discovered during an illegal search.
The court finds that officers have the authority to stop and frisk an individual where specific facts
justify the action and the officer has reason to believe he is dealing with an armed or dangerous
individual. The court first finds that the stop and search is subject to fourth amendment review
the court argues that the procedure is invasive and literally involves a search of an individuals
person. The court finds that in order to justify a stop and search an officer must have specific
and articulable facts which, when combined with the inferences to be drawn from the facts,
warrant the intrusion; this standard requires that at the moment of the search and seizure the
circumstances would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate. The court argues that this authority is justified by the societal interest in effective
crime prevention and detention. Pursuant to this authority, an officer also has the authority to
frisk an individual for weapons when based on those specific acts the action is reasonable
(reason to believe dealing with a dangerous individual). The court argues that the officers need
this authority to protect their safety, and that the officers have to engage in this activity. Officers
have to engage in this activity because of the safety concerns, because the exclusionary rule is
the only way that the rule could be enforced and the power of the exclusionary rule is limited, and
because the stop and frisk is necessary to prevent crime. The court qualifies the holding such
that the search must be limited to a search for weapons. Under the circumstances in the case, the
court finds the stop and search reasonable and does not exclude the evidence.
Concurrence (Harlan) Fills in deficiencies in the opinion. The authority to frisk is derived from
the authority to stop. In order to have RS to frisk someone, one must first have authority to stop
someone (RS to frisk arises from having the additional RS that the individual may hurt officer).
Dissent argues that ruling effectively gives police more authority than even a magistrate (detached neutral
observer) has because officers are allowed to engage in 4th amendment events without even the PC that
would be necessary in order to obtain a warrant.
After Terry, the stop-and-frisk requirement is that an officer must have Reasonable Suspicion
(some quantum of specific facts that is less than PC)
Terry could have been limited to violent crimes, but thus far it has not been limited
42
43
Officers can search a vehicle for weapons as part of a Terry Stop (when see
weapons from outside) maybe cannot conduct a full search
The justification for this broadening scope is that where safety is concerned, it is
not realistic to think that an officer will not make this intrusion (will not search the
individual or the vehicle or order someone out of a car) because it is necessary
for their safety andthus the courts should not make the officers conduct illegal
because it will have no positive effect other than to get officers to break the law
more often
o Court has been very unwilling to allow elaborations on stop-and-frisk in the absence of
officer safety
If an officer feels something during a frisk that he believes is contraband, the
officer cannot seize that thing
Perhaps in response, officers have merely learned to say that they
thought they felt a weapon
Reasonable suspicion has come to define the legal standard applied to Terry stops RS is a
consider-all-the-circumstance inquiry
o RS is less demanding standard than PC in that RS can be established with information
that is different in quality, but also with information that is less reliable that necessary to
show PC
o RS is a quantum of factual evidence criteria (not just a hunch)
Alabama v. White An anonymous tip that someone is committing a crime can amount to RS if it provides
evidence on future activity that police can verify to supplement veracity and basis of knowledge
Police receive an anonymous tip that an individual would leave a particular building, at a specific time, get
into a specific car, and drive to a specific place.
The anonymous top was sufficient because it provided predictive information that police could
verify to justify the assumption that the individual was in cahoots with the suspected criminal
Fourth amendment analysis; once woman starts driving towards destination police can:
o Stop the woman based on RS that she is committing an offense (has drugs)
o Police can order woman out of the car
o Can order any passengers out of the car
o Police can frisk the woman and passenger if they have reasonable suspicion to believe
that they are dangerous
May have RS of danger based solely on the nature of the crimeRS suspicion of
distributing drugs warrants RS of danger because there is a high correlating
between drug trafficking and carrying guns (unclear what amount of rugs
warrants RS of danger)
The frisk would be limited to a search for weapons that can be used to hurt the
officersonly weapons that are accessible (cant search underwear)
Can pat down clothing
o Can require someone to pull out anything that feel that gives PC
to believe the individual has drugs or a weapon
o Officer cannot tactically manipulate the object (particularly for
drugs), but can resolve suspicion on weapons
Can pat down grab space in vehicle
Can pat down personal effects (purse)have the authority to search in
order to resolve suspicionif cant resolve suspicion by touching, can
pour out contents of bag
Pre-Gant in this context, the police would have just waited for woman to violate a traffic law and
then would have arrested her for the violation and obtained a full scale SIA
Florida v. JL An anonymous tip that someone is carrying a gun does not amount to RS.
44
The police received an anonymous tip that a young black man standing a particular bus stop was carrying
a gun. The tip described the shirt that the young man would be wearing. The police arrived, frisked the
kid, and found a gun.
The court finds that the officers did not have RS. The court distinguishes this case from the
situation in White where the tip described more details and contained predictive elements. In this
case, the tip provided no predictive information, and therefore presented the police with no means
by which to test the informants knowledge or credibility. Therefore, it is not possible to
corroborate the information in order to supplement veracity and basis of knowledge of the tip
because the information does not warrant the inference that the tipster was in cahoots with the
individual targeted. The court refuses to adopt a firearm exception to the RS standard (which
would permit to search on an anonymous tip when the tip involved a firearm), but the court
specifies that it is not ruling on whether one would have RS on a bomb tip.
Court reaffirms that RS does not refer to a fixed quantum of evidence, but rather is contextdependent assessment of reasonableness based on a quantum of facts
o Some argue that one problem with this approach is that courts cannot give persuasive
arguments of how they have balanced the various interests in the outcome
The courts justification for opinion is concern for harassmentthat people will use this in order to
get back at other people
o This concern may be unjustifiedthe average person isnt going to break the law by filing
a false report
o The only people who we really worry about doing this are people who are already
criminalsthese people probably have the best access to tips based on real evidence!
The RS standard is amorphous, and in some instances may be based on largely innocuous
details
o Police likely to be better at identifying suspect activity than they are at articulating what
about the activity makes them think that it is criminal
o Real concern likely that police will invent anonymous tips in order to justify a stop-andsearch based on a hunch
Wardlow establishes that unprovoked flight warrants RShowever the court does not clarify what
counts as unprovoked flight
o After Wardlow, police who want to investigate may just drive up on a person with sirens
blaring and use stop-and-frisk if that person runs
Though at this point, this may be provoked flight (court has not yet ruled on
issue)
Flight does not provoke RS of any particular crime, just RS of crime
o In most crimes where assess RS or PC, require that it be of a particular crime
Court accept as evidence the fact that the arrest occurred in a high-crime arearaises the
question of how high-crime areas should be defined or identified
o Usually rely on officers testimony about the neighborhoods reputation
Some argue that such conclusory statements should not carry much weight
Those who live in high crime areas are most likely to be poor and members of minority groups
these are the same people who are most likely to be skeptical of police intrusion (most likely to
run from police)
o Thus maybe doesnt make sense to allow unprovoked flight as evidence of RS (additional
indication that unprovoked flight in context of a bad neighborhood does not necessarily
warrant supposition of criminal activity)
Among central questions presented in the 4th amendment context is how strictly police discretion
should be regulated
One way police use discretionary power is the use of profilesassumption that certain
characteristics do or do not correlate with certain types of criminal activity
o US v. Sokolow DEA agents using a profile of a drug courier stopped someone at the
airport; the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the search
Supreme Court did not explicitly endorse use of profiles, but did not condemn
use either; dissent was very against profiling
Structural issues contribute to racial profiling communities are still segregated
What is racial profiling?
o Policy rely on racial disparities to target crime
Communities are still segregated police use this information to target crime; if
police want to arrest drug buyers, they will target white kids in black
neighborhoods)
The other consideration implicated by profiling is the growing link between race
and poverty (Blacks and Hispanics, in particular)
o Racial profiling is not the use of race to identify a suspect (know crime was committed by
young white male)
o Profiling is the association of race with criminality in order to identify suspects or
conduct investigation
Reasons police use profiling politically cheap
o Those in poorer neighborhoods vote less
o Easier to get convictions in poor neighborhoods (dont have same $ to contest
prosecutions)
46
It is cheaper to police when people are on the streets wealthier can pay for more land
and bigger houses which equates to broader expectations of privacypolice cannot
enter without a warrant
Academic debate on whether racial profiling is bad
o When a minority is targeted for questioning based in part on ancestry, he is taxed more
heavily than others, but the question is whether that tax is illegitimate
o The incarceration rate for blacks is many times higher than it is for whites, and it does not
correlate to differences in crime rates among the racial groups
Drug use is fairly consistent across races
o Defense
People of other races are not in a position to pay the tax effectively
Race is not being used invidiously, it is being used as a marker, but merely as a
signaling tool to pursue an unobjectionable end (like whiteness is used in
affirmative action context)
Interesting argument because of claims by many whites that in
affirmative action context they are innocent victims of discrimination
o Alternative to race-sensitive policing spend more on law enforcement to make up for
any diminution in crime control by prohibiting use of race as a proxy for increased
criminalityredistribute the tax onto all
Law should only permit use of race in investigation when have an urgently
compelling needan emergency situation where a crime has been or is about to
be committed
Racial profiling post 9/11
o Before 9/11 the country had just reached a consensus view that racial profiling was bad,
but now that it arises in the terrorism context, many people are in favor of it
o While most still claim they are against it, we have shifted what we mean by profiling allow
for profiling in certain contexts or senses raises question of what is racial profiling?
Not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest, or otherwise
investigate a person because of his race or ethnicity based on information about
a perpetrator of a specific crime (knowing is a young white male)
However, concept of a specific crime is hazy when dealing with ongoing
conspiracies (like terrorism plots)
Police can do a lot on the basis of racial or ethnic information at the very least,
police and chose to pay more attention to individuals based on racethis may
result in more stops, but does not constitute profiling
Definition of profiling may depend on how the suspect is treated
Does officer impinge on suspect by confronting him or invading his
privacy?
o If the officer does impinge on suspect, may imply a greater
intrusion on privacy interests and maybe we are less inclined to
permit such an intrusion (maybe the intrusion is impermissible
profiling)
Is the subject treated like an outsider when encountered?
o If the subject is treated like one of them than the investigation
essentially criminalizes himthis can be very insulting, and is
hard to recover from; this is certainly profiling and we may be
hesitant to impose a tax this great
Overall, investigative choices made on assumptions of criminal activity
are stigmatizing, so should be treated cautiously it may be misleading
go law enforcement and is certainly humiliating to the targeted group
Federal Guidelines on use of Race in Law Enforcement
o Traditional Law Enforcement activities
o
47
Whren v. United States The 4th amendment reasonableness requirement does not require police to
have anything more than PC in order to conduct 4th amendment search and seizure activities, even if
that PC is used as a pretext to target racial minorities for statutory violations that all people commit.
Police were driving in an unmarked police car and passed a dark truck with young, black, occupants.
The truck remained stopped at the stop sign for an unusually long time, and the police did a u-turn to
investigate further. Once the police U-turned, the truck turned right quickly without signaling and
speed off at an unreasonable speed. The police then pursued the vehicle and pulled up beside it. An
officer stepped out of the vehicle, approached the truck, and observed bags of drugs in the hands of
one of the passengers. Defense moves to suppress the evidence on the basis that the traffic stop
was a pretextual basis for investigating the men, mostly because they were black, and argues that a
stop should require PC, plus that a police officer acting reasonably would have made the stop for the
reason given.
The standard suggested by the defendants would likely requiring a showing that department policies
on when an officer can act permitted the stop that occurred.
The court finds that nothing beyond PC is necessary to conduct a stop. The court
acknowledges that in previous cases it has used the exclusionary rule to prevent the use of
pretextual bases for a stop, but only in the absence of probable cause. The court argues that
the standard suggested by the defense is based on subjective considerations and would vary
from place to place, and would be cause for undesirably unruly and expansive litigation. The
court argues further that the fourth amendment does not provide a constitutional basis for
objectioning to discriminatory use of race, but rather such a challenge should be made under
equal protection law.
Litigation steps
o The pull-over/stop was good because police had PC to believe that suspects had
driven at an unreasonable speed
o Drug seizure is OK based on the plain view doctrine
Case raises the issue of what the proper relationship is between the Fourth Amendment and
the substantive criminal law
Fourth amendment incorporates state law (in some sense) by requiring PC; PC requires that
o Based on information available at the time, there was a fair probability
o That the suspect had engaged in a defined criminal behavior
Those criminal behavior are defined in/by state law
o Because fourth amendment law is based on a state-set standard and includes
minimal requirements, if everybody is breaking the law, the fourth amendment does
no real work
Some would suggest that if the point of the 4 th amendment is to ensure that
police have a good reason to conduct a search or seizure, then the
Amendment should place limits on a states ability to define innocuous
conduct a crime
Opinion criticizes defendants argument on the ground that it would lead to fourth amendment
standards that vary by location; however this is what the standard in place does
48
Though the standards vary based on how they are established by the legislature,
rather than by the police
Whren affirms that there is no pretext s&s doctrine in the fourth amendmentthe legality of a
search does not depend on why it was conducted
o Though there is some concern that this permits arbitrary enforcement, the court
responds that this is an equal protection issue
o In order to make out an equal protection claim, a defendant would have to show that
the police intentionally discriminated against him based on a protected characteristic
(race); individual is unlikely ever to have the evidence necessary to prove this;
options
Empirical evidence that the officer could have pulled over a whole bunch of
whites, but instead waited for a Black person
Statistics are complicated because police have been shown to falsify
race on records to prevent inquiry into conduct
Confession by officer
Evidence of the practices of other officer in the jurisdiction
o The other issue with equal protection doctrine is what is the remedy under equal
protection? Is it still exclusion?
As referred to earlier, it is generally understood that when police rely on race as part of a
victim or suspect description, it does not implicate profiling issues
o Even so, there are limits to the extent to which the police can act based on racenot
reasonable for police to interview all of a minority group in an area based on a
witness description;
It is unclear to me if this raises 4th amendment issues
Police discrimination in traffic stops has received a lot of attention, partially because research
has been conducted that empirically demonstrates prejudice in traffic stops
o Even though no higher portion of Blacks than Whites speed, and there are many
more Whites on the road, Blacks are pulled over in much higher numbers
Some academic suggestion that those concerned with racial profiling should not focus on
remedying the effects of profiling, but rather should focus on remedying race-related
consequences of the drug war (high rate of incarceration of minorities)
o
Some courts have passed identification statutes that require individuals to identify themselves
when told to by the police
Chicago v. Morales Laws are void for vagueness if they are so vague that they fail to give notice of the
prohibited activity or encourage arbitrary enforcement of the law.
Chicago enacted legislation that prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one another
or anyone else in a public place. In order to be arrested for violating this ordinance, an individual had to
be loitering with a street gang member, be ordered to disperse by the police, and then disobey the
officers order. A case is brought arguing that the law is void out of concerns that is too vague, and thus
encourages arbitrary enforcement.
The court finds that the law is unconstitutionally vague. The court recognizes that vagueness
may invalidate a statute for two reasons: 1) the statute may fail to provide notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand the conduct that it prohibits, and 2) the law may authorize or even
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In this case the court finds that the law is
deficient for both reasons. The court finds first that the law raises notice issuesbecause the
officer issues an order only after the prohibited conduct has occurred, the law does not provide
the advanced notice necessary to a loiterer to determine if he is loitering; moreover, the dispersal
requirement does not give notice of what an individual is required to do to disperse (where does
individual have to go and for how long). The court also finds that the law leads to arbitrary
enforcement issuesthe court argues that avoiding void for vagueness requires that the
legislature establishes minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement, and no such guidelines
have been adopted here.
OConnor Raises notice and arbitrary enforcement issues attached to the definition of
loitering. Suggests that the issue with the statute could be resolved if the law specified that it
prohibited remaining in one place with no apparent purpose other than the intent to establish
control over identifiable areas, intimidating others from entering, or to conceal illegal activities.
In other words, statute OK if restricted to prohibited gang activity.
The part about standing with gang members does not raise notice or enforcement concerns
because gang members wear uniform equivalents because they want people to know that they
are part of a gang because part of their purpose is to intimidate
Dissent argues that the law was adopted to address the citys problem with street gangs. The dissent
argues that the law was adopted at the behest of the community, and thus reflects the communitys
decision to give this authority to the police in order to ensure that the neighborhoods are safer. By
encouraging the adoption of the law, the community has effectively legitimized the reasonableness of the
law because the community has willingly forfeited the liberty (willing to pay a tax) in question in order to
achieve a societal end. Dissent argues further that the law is not actually vague.
The point of Scalias dissent is that the community wants this statute because it gives everyone a
chanceall those approached have the chance to disburse and stay out of jail
At the same time that the community wants community members to stay out of jail, the
community also wants the streets cleared upthey dont want gang members on the corners
intimidating them from going out
When the law is revised, it provides less flexibility for the cops, but may provide less flexibility for
the community toomay be less of an opportunity for individuals to escape punishment merely
for disbursing
o It should be easy (maybe no more difficult) for officers to find loitering with intent, so
police will almost always have the PC necessary for an arrest
A void for vagueness challenge is a facial challenge; in order to succeed on a facial challenge, a
party must establish that a rule is unconstitutionally vague in applications.
Void for vagueness doctrine was designed to address the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by police, and thus constitutes one strategy for dealing with problems like racial
profiling
50
Scope of void for vagueness doctrine is narrow; does not relate to Whren-like stops
where police can employ clearly violated laws to decide who they stop
Some argue that the vagueness cases were decided against a background of institutionalized
racism; these people argue that the sense of distrust of community-based policing and skepticism
about police behavior do not map well to the contemporary scene in which members of the
community have sometimes been in the forefront of the push for some of these vague laws
o Counter argument is that these laws are still predominately passed by white elected
bodies and impose disproportional burdens on minorities
o
Special Needs
Roadblocks
Raise question of whether police can seize a group of drivers without any reason to believe that
any one driver or passenger is violating the law
Delaware v. Prouse court declined to permit suspicion-less stops of automobiles to check
license and registration; no special needs; balancing of interests is against that much police
discretion
o Police randomly pulled a guy over and asked him for his license; during the stop the
police saw Marijuana in plain view. The marijuana was excluded from evidence
o The court applied the reasonableness test and found that there were significant individual
interests in being free from random police intrusions, but minimal significant police
interests because police were unlikely to find anything
o In opinion, court suggested that the use of check points to randomly search might be
appropriate
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte court approved suspicion less checkpoints from the Mexican
boarder based on a balancing of interests (need to make stops is great, intrusion is limited)
o These stops are 4th amendment events, but there is a substantial law enforcement
interest
Michigan Dept of State Police v. Sitz OK to have random drunk-driving checkpoints under
balancing of interests
o Court balances interest Police interests
This was characterized as a non-criminal-investigation checkpoint
State argued a special police interest in the need to deter drunk driving (CGI)
The court also consider the nexus between the means used to pursue the ends
(deterring drunk driving)
o Individual Interests
Checkpoint presents less intrusion than an ordinary stop
Everyone is pulled over, so it is less humiliating
The stop is very brief
PROCESS
51
If there is a roadblock
o Roadblocks are appropriate if the police have a special need. In order to determine if
police have a special need, the courts balance interests of each party.
Police interests in ordinary investigation provides a de minimis interest
o In order for a roadblock program to be constitutional, the police must have an
administrative program in place that regulates police discretion
Indianapolis v. Edmond Ordinary crime prevention does not warrant roadblocks under the 4 th
amendment because a balancing of interests does not favor police interest.
Indianapolis began to operate vehicle check points in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The hit rate
was approximately 9 percent. As part of the interdiction a narcotics dog walks around the outside of each
stopped vehicle. Checkpoints are set up so as to ensure that each check takes no more than five
minutes, and warning signs are posted alerting drivers of checkpoints. Ps sued for declaratory relief.
Ordinary crime prevention does not justify warrantless seizures. The court weighs the interests at
stake in determining if the checkpoint is reasonable. The court argues that while it has approved
checkpoints previously, it has never done so in the context of ordinary crime prevention, but
rather has approved checkpoints only in the context of special needs. The court finds that
because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint is ordinary crime prevention, the
program contravenes the 4th amendment. The court expresses concern that permitting
checkpoints for ordinary police purposes would give the police too much discretion to construct
roadblocks for almost any conceivable purpose. The court finds next that the gravity of the crime
alone is not dispositive on special needs, but rather is one factor that can be considered in the
balancing of interests in a special needs situation. The court also rejects justification for the
program on the grounds that it serves a secondary purpose of keeping impaired motorists off of
the road (like Sitz) because permitting such a purpose would effectively permit all check points.
The dissent seems to apply the balancing of interests, and finds that it weighs distinctly in favor of
permitting the searches. The dissent argues that the random drug interdictions yield positive results
(finding drugs) in a much higher percentage of cases than either the Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz roadblocks,
and thus the government has a clear substantial interest.
Thomas Martinez-Fuerte was wrongly decided; a program of indiscriminate stops is never reasonable.
Illinois v. Lidster Roadblocks can be used to investigate specific criminal events pursuant to the 4 th
amendment (at least as long as there is a strong connection between the way the roadblock is conducted
and the crime)
A 70-year-old bicyclist was struck and killed by a hit and run driver. In response, police set up a
checkpoint the next week on the same road to ask motorists if they had any information on the hit-andrun, and to hand each one of them a flyer about the incident. D drove through the checkpoint erratically,
and the officer smelled alcohol on his breath. D challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and moved to
exclude the evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.
The court finds that the investigation of a specific crime warrants the use of a roadblock to
investigate the crime. The court distinguishes the roadblock from that in Edmonds. The court
argues that the police purpose was not to determine whether vehicle occupants were committing
a crime, and thus was not for a general interest in crime control. The court proceeds to balance
the relative interests of the parties. The court finds the motorists interests to be relatively minimal
one does not have a heightened expectation of privacy in a vehicle, information-seeking stops
are less likely to provoke anxiety, individuals are normally expected to cooperate in public
investigation of a crime, etc. Moreover, the court argues, checkpoints are unlikely to proliferate
absent stricter enforcement because of the intense resource requirements necessary for a
checkpoint. On the police side, the court finds the police interests to be quite substantial. The
police were investigating a crime that resulted in a death, the police were examining on the road
where the crime occurred (and so had an increased interest in investigating in the way that it did.
Dissent contests the application to the balancing of interests as applied in this case. The dissent argues
that many people are likely to find an unpublicized roadblock alarming, and a random roadblock seems
unlikely to yield important/useful police information.
Legal status of most roadblocks after Edmond and Lidster is uncertain, but Martinez-Fuerte style
roadblocks are on stable ground (definitively constitutional)
o Edmonds/Sitz raises the possibility that one can conduct a roadblock for the purpose of
doing a drug interdiction, but claim the purpose is something else, and thereby justify the
roadblock
This may eliminate the use of the drug-sniffing dogs
Though maybe not if drug dogs are allowed everyone their handlers are
allowed
Courts have traditionally considered searches and seizures at international borders to be
reasonable and have required neither RS, and have established few constraints on officers
o E.g. routine luggage inspections when travel through customs
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez Customs officials had RS to believe defendant was
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal; police detained her for 16 hours to procure a
warrant for a medical examination
o Court found that the seizure was constitutional arguing that 4th amendment balance of
interests leans heavily in favor of the government at an international border
o Courts reaffirmed this interest in United States v. Flores-Montano when the court upheld
a search of a vehicle in which officers removed and disassembled the gas tank of a
smugglers vehicle
Court argued that a search of the gas tank was far less intrusive than a search of
the glove box (which is sanctioned in border context)
Unlike most S&S cases, use of force cases are litigated in damage suits, not in suppression
motion in criminal cases
53
On police methods
o If an officer has grounds to use deadly force to affect a stop, the officer can shoot to kill
immediately (and is encouraged to in order to neutralize the threat)
o Law enforcement argues that they shoot in order to eliminate the threat
Accordingly, the officers aim to cause a sudden massive drop in blood pressure
to achieve this aim
As a result, officers aim for center mass
Shooting in the head or an extremity is more likely to make suspect angry without
debilitating
o The rules are structured to favor law enforcement
o Officers do not owe a duty to be careful because the suspect is creating the danger (logic
applied in Scott v. Harris)
STANDARD
Case
Tennessee v. Garner
Scott v. Harris
Criteria
Standard after Garner; to use deadly force officers must have PC+
o Officer has PC to arrest person
o Deadly force is necessary to prevent an escape
o PC to believe suspect poses a significant threat of death or GBI
to the officer or others
Standard for using deadly force to effect a seizure
o Whether officers actions were objectively reasonable under the
circumstances (considering all the circumstances)
In order to determine if the officers actions were
objectively reasonable, the court must balance the
nature and the quality of the intrusion on the individuals
4th amendment interests against the nature and the
quality of the intrusion on the individuals 4th amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental
interests
Tennessee v. Garner Deadly force cannot be used unless it is necessary to prevent an escape and the
officer has PC to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or physical injury to the
officer or others (criteria that construe reasonableness).
Police officers responded to a call about a burglary. One officer went behind the house and saw
someone slam the door and run outside. The officer told him to stop, but the suspect tried to climb over
the fence. The officer was convinced that if he made it over the fence he would escape so the officer
shot him in the head and killed him.
The court finds that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a felony suspect is
constitutionally unreasonable, unless the officer has PC to believe that the suspect poses a threat
of serious physical harm to the officer or to someone else. The court finds first that a seizure by
deadly force is subject to the reasonableness requirement of the 4th amendment and requires not
just that the seizure be reasonable, but that the means by which the seizure is achieved also be
reasonable. Accordingly, the court finds that it is not always reasonable to attain a seizure by
killing a suspect. The court considers the interests, and they obviously favor someone not ending
up dead. In its finding, the court overturns the CL rule that deadly force was a justifiable means of
preventing a fleeing felon from escaping; the court argues that this deviation is justified given the
rule was formed before the advent of guns and when all felonies were punishable by death! The
court argues further that the police interests in the use of deadly force are increasingly
questionable because most police/investigative departments have seriously limited the authority
of agents to use deadly force (so it must not be integral to enforcement activities).
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Standard after Garner; to use deadly force officers must have PC+
o Officer has PC to arrest person
o Deadly force is necessary to prevent an escape
o PC to believe suspect poses a significant threat of death or GBI to the officer or others
Typically, the reasonableness and interest balancing approach means less 4th amendment
protection, but Garner reverses that and uses the reasonable requirement to impose
requirements on the use of force that are more stringent than the PC requirement
The reason that most cases involving reasonableness tilt in the governments favor is because of
the type of cases that arise under the reasonableness question cases where PC standard
seems too low are rare, and most cases brought tend to arise in areas where exclusionary rule is
sought, so something was found, so the ordinary standard seems too high
Restrictions on police use of force seem generally to have been successfulpolice shootings
have gone down, but this has not been linked to an adverse impact on crime levels
o Some suggest that in order for a program limiting shootings to be effective, it must be
accompanied by an administrative program to examine all shootings (some method of inhouse deterrence)
Graham v. Connor All claims that law enforcement has used excessive force (deadly or not) in the
course of an arrest, an investigatory stop, or other seizure, should be analyzed under the 4 th amendment
reasonableness standard.
Police officer saw a man run into a convenience store, and run out quickly. The man was a diabetic and
was suffering from a sugar deficiency. The police then pulled the man over and tried to explain the issue.
The man then passed out on the curb. The police handcuffed the man and laid him down on the hood of
the police car. He tried to explain the problem to the police, but the police assumed he was lying. His
head was banged into the hood of the car. During the incident he suffered a broken foot, cuts on his
wrist, and bruises on his forehead and shoulder. The lower court ruled for a directed verdict for the
defendant, applying a set of criteria based on the due process clause.
The court overturned the directed verdict and held that all claims for an excessive use of force
should be analyzed under a 4th amendment reasonableness criteria. The court finds that
determining whether a particular seizure is reasonable requires a balancing of the intereststhe
intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government
interests at stake; the court finds that this is an objective standard whether the officers actions
were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances. The court finds further that
the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the officers perspective on
the scene, not from hindsight. Accordingly, the court remands the case to be considered under
the 4th amendment.
Graham squarely rejects using officers subjective intent as part of the 4 th amendment analysis
Court offers considerations that should be considered in the balancing of the interests:
o The severity of the crime at issue
o Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to safety
o Whether suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
Some have criticized that the standard requires police to make complex, instantaneous decisions
o Expert has countered that this approach encourages police to employ advance diagnosis,
planning, and training
Idaho v. Horiuchi Court found that officers shots at a fleeing felon were objectively reasonable
even though suspect did not pose an immediate danger to anyone
Scott v. Harris In determining if a 4th amendment use of deadly force was reasonable, courts perform a
balancing of the interests in which the courts balance the quality of the intrusion against the importance of
the governmental interests that justify the intrusion (this inquiry is very fact-based).
The police attempted to pull over a guy for speeding. The man resist arrest and instigated a high speed
chase that occurred on narrow roads at over 85 miles/hour. In an effort to end the chase, an officer
55
applied his push bumper to the rear of the suspects vehicle, and the suspect crashed and was rendered a
quadriplegic. The lower courts denied the officers plea of qualified immunity, and the case is appealed to
determine whether qualified immunity is justified (as it would be if the officers actions complied with the
4th amendment standards for effecting a seizure).
The court finds that the officers actions were objectively reasonable, and thus were constitutional.
The court considers first whether the acts alleged show the officers conduct violated a
constitutional right. The court argues that ordinarily such a circumstance would require
interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to the non-appealing party, but this case provides
video evidence of the chase, and thus the court assumes the facts to be those interpreted from
the video which show the plaintiff driving dangerously. In light of the facts as the court interprets
them from the video, the court finds that the officers actions did not violate the 4 th amendment.
The court argues that the proper test for determining whether the officers actions complied with
the 4th amendment is whether the officers actions were objectively reasonable. In this argument
the court argues that the standards articulated in Garner were not concrete standards for
determining where the use of force was appropriate, were merely an application of the 4 th
amendment reasonableness test. The court finds further than in order to determine whether a
seizure was objectively reasonable, the court must balance the nature and the quality of the
intrusion on the individuals 4th amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interest. In this context, the court considers the threat posed by the fleeing suspects actions, and
also considers that the suspect chose to create the danger, and thus has less of an interest in
being free form the intrusion. Thus the court finds the seizure reasonable.
The court seems to dismiss the strong interest on the suspects sidehis interest is his interest in
his life, but the court refuses to recognize it (probably because it is more focused on the threat he
posed to other peoples lives)
The dissent suggests that the officers actions were not reasonable because if the police had abandoned
the chase, the danger would have been averted, and the police probably could have caught the suspect
later because they had his license plate number. Dissent also questions the facts asserted by the
majority and argues that bystanders were not threatened, and questions what it interprets to be the
establishment of a per se rule that terminating a high speed chase with deadly force is objectively
reasonable.
Thus, qualified immunity not appropriate when police run over someone who falls off
motorcycle during a chase because officers did not acquire physical control through
means intentionally applied
Conversely, in Scott police did attain seizure through means intentionally applied, and thus had
seized Scott
o Seems to imply that seizure turns on intent of the officer in performing action
o This seems to apply a subjective standard where most 4th amendment jurisprudence
applies an objective standard
o
Both the majority and the dissent seem to think that warnings would have a large effect on
suspects behavior
o Social science studies contradict this assumptionstudies over the last several decades
on the social psychology of compliance, social influence, and politeness suggest that the
extent to which people feel free to refuse to consent is extremely limited given societal
pressures
Court offers assurance that the voluntariness of consent is carefully scrutinized by trial courts
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At least one study suggests this is not truein one study found that in 6 years DC never
found consent involuntary and in most cases did not discuss the subjective factors that
the supreme court said would be relevant in determining voluntariness
o Some argue that if police are routinely given consent, they have little incentive to develop
individualized probable cause
Why is a warrantless and suspicionless consent search consistent with the 4 th amendment?
o Because consent is an exception to the ordinary PC/warrant requirement
o Constitutional rights can generally be waived, but waiver does not explain the 3 rd party
consent doctrine whereby police can searched based on the consent of someone other
than the suspect
o In Schneckloth the court treated 3rd party consent cases as issues of assumption of
riskD assumed the risk that police would be permitted to search areas to which D
granted access to someone else
o However, assumption of risk does not explain Illinois v. Rodriguez where the court
extended 3rd party consent doctrine to intrusions based on the consent of a third party
whom the police reasonably believed to possess common authority over the premises
Scalia Requirement for satisfying the 4th amendment is that an officers actions
be reasonable. Requiring that the third party actually have access to the place
the third party consented to being searched would impose a requirement that the
officers actions not just be reasonable, but also correct; if an officer reasonably
believes an individual has common authority over the premises, than the officer
can reasonably search it
Dissent Grounded in reasonable expectation of privacy (disagrees over
whether consent search constitutes a search); A third party consent search is
reasonable because by granting access to ones premises limits ones
reasonable expectation of privacy over the premises. If an individual has not
limited his expectation of privacy, the police cannot dispense with the ordinary 4 th
amendment requirements, and thus a warrant is required.
Florida v. Jimeno 4th amendment is satisfied when it objectively reasonable for the officer to
believe that the scope of the consent permitted him to open a particular container (within the
automobile)
o
Ohio v. Robinette 4th amendment does not require that an individual must be advised that he is free to
go before his consent search will be recognized as voluntary; determining whether consent is voluntary is
q question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances, and whether an individual knew of his
right to consent is not dispositive
D was pulled over for speeding. After issuing D a warning and returning his license, the officer asked D if
he could search his car. D consented and the officer found a small amount of marijuana. P moves to
exclude the evidence on the basis that he did not know that he was legally free to go.
The court holds that officers are not constitutionally obligated to inform individuals that they are
free to go in order for a request for consent to search to be valid. The court applies the 4 th
amendment reasonableness requirement and finds that determining voluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances. The court argues that while knowledge of the
right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, it is not itself dispositive.
Third-Party Consent
However, assumption of risk does not explain Illinois v. Rodriguez where the court extended 3 rd
party consent doctrine to intrusions based on the consent of a third party whom the police
reasonably believed to possess common authority over the premises
o Scalia Requirement for satisfying the 4th amendment is that an officers actions be
reasonable. Requiring that the third party actually have access to the place the third
party consented to being searched would impose a requirement that the officers actions
not just be reasonable, but also correct; if an officer reasonably believes an individual has
common authority over the premises, than the officer can reasonably search it
o Dissent Grounded in reasonable expectation of privacy (disagrees over whether
consent search constitutes a search); A third party consent search is reasonable
because by granting access to ones premises limits ones reasonable expectation of
privacy over the premises. If an individual has not limited his expectation of privacy, the
police cannot dispense with the ordinary 4th amendment requirements, and thus a
warrant is required.
Dispute above comes to a head in following caseif consent is based on assumption of risk, then
if someone gives consent for a search who lacked the authority to give that consent, the consent
should be invalid; conversely if the rationale is reasonableness from the police officers
perspective, the consent should be fine
Georgia v. Randolph Whether consent is sufficient to grant police the authority to search a location
depends on the reasonableness of the search involvedthe analysis for determining if a search was
reasonable involves an assessment of the facts of the cases and a social norms analysisunder the
circumstances was it reasonable for an officer to believe that he had consent to search
D and his wife were involved in a domestic dispute. She called the police and when officers arrived at the
house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user, and claimed that there was drug
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paraphernalia in the house. The woman then gave consent to search the house, but D prohibited the
police from entering his house. The police entered the house anyway and obtained enough evidence to
procure a warrant. D moves to exclude the evidence because the initial search was unreasonable.
The court finds that the search was unreasonable, and accordingly the evidence should be
excluded. The court applies the reasonableness rationale to consent searches (requiring only
that the officer reasonably believed he had consent) and argues that social expectations about the
authority of co-inhabitants play a significant role in determining whether a search was reasonable.
Thus, whether consent is valid will be highly dependent on the facts of the case and local social
practicesthus a landlord/hotel manager could not consent to the search of a room, and most
guests probably could not consent to searching through certain areas of another persons house.
On an application of the reasonableness/social expectations requirement the court finds that it
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that they had consent to search because a house
guest would not feel free to enter when one of the owners of the house was telling him that he
could not enter. The court argues that this finding should not significantly impact police activity
because informants can still provide police with information so that police can obtain a warrant
and police authority to enter homes for community caretaking is unchallenged by the ruling (so it
will not negatively impact domestic abuse victims). The court argues further that the
reasonableness requirement implicates a fine line because in this case an individual would be
protected if at the door objecting, but would not be protected if he was in the bedroom, and thus
could not object.
Dissent voices concern that the ruling will have adverse effects on domestic abuse victimsthe dissent
interprets the rule to suggest that the abusing party will be able to keep out the police, even when the
abuse victim is trying to permit the police to enter. The court argues that co-occupants have assumed the
risk that someone they permit to enter might give the police access. The dissent rejects the social norms
analysis, arguing that that it introduces uncertainty into the analysis and that widely shared social
expectations are not a constant. The dissent also sites US v. White to suggest to suggest that the court
has previously recognized an assumption of risk rationale, and argues that this rationale has also been
extended to an analysis of objects and places. The dissent argues further than if an individual wants to
protects items from discovery from a 3rd party consent search, that individual can place the items out of
access and control of the 3rd party (e.g. in a locked cabinet). The court rejects that the owners interest is
protected in the holding because the owners interest is only protected if he happens to be at the front
door.
United States v. Matlock D was arrested and detained in a squad car. While D was in the
squad car, police obtained consent from his wife to search the house. Court upheld the search
o Case occurred before Georgia v. Randolph
o Randolph raises question of whether there is any way to square Matlock with the case
Randolph did not overrule Matlock
One way to address the issues in Randolph would be to combine consent analysis with another
standard (e.g. reasonable suspicion)consent is sufficient to give police the authority to search,
but only if police have some RS to suspect criminal activity
If no adverse consequences flow from the violation of a constitutional right, government officials
will violate the right as often as they wish and victims will not press their claims in court
Before Mapp v. Ohio the 4th amendment was not enforced at all against local policeMapp
changed this buy extending the exclusionary rule to cover state police (who did most of the
searching and seizing)
o Since Mapp exclusion has been the primary remedy for 4 th amendment violations
United States v. Leon Determining whether the exclusionary rule is necessary involves a case-by-case
determination; evidence should not be excluded when an officer acted in a manner that was objectively
reasonable, as in when an officer acts in accordance with an apparently valid warrant that later turns out
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to be defective, but an officer has not acted reasonably if he knew or should have known that the
magistrate was acting pursuant to an affidavit that contained false information, if he knew that the judge
had all but abandoned his role, or where the warrant is so facially deficient that it was not reasonably for
the officer to assume it was valid
A confidential informant alerted police that two individuals were selling large quantities of cocaine and
meth. The police began an investigation to corroborate the tip. The police corroborated the tip and
obtained a facially valid search warrant. Acting pursuit to the warrant the police searched the premises
and found a large quantity of drugs. Ds seek to exclude the evidence obtained from the search on the
grounds that the search warrant was deficient. The court considers whether it should modify the
exclusionary rule so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on
a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.
The court holds that a search pursuit to a valid search warrant that later turns out to be defective
is constitutional so long as it is conducted reasonably and in good-faith reliance on a search
warrant. The court argues that the 4th amendment does not expressly require the exclusionary
rule. The court argues further that there are substantial social costs associated with the
exclusionary rule because it interferes with the polices truth-finding function. The court argues
also that the social costs are particularly high when the police have acted in good faith reliance on
a search warrant because there are no deterrent effects on police conduct to counter-balance the
negative social impact. The court finds further that suppression of evidence should be ordered
only on a case-by-case basis in the unusual case in which the exclusion will further the purposes
of the exclusionary rule. Thus, an officers reliance on a magistrates PC determination does not
justify use of the exclusionary rule if the officers actions are objectively reasonable; the officers
actions will not be objectively reasonable if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was
misled by in information in an affidavit that the officer knew or should have known was false,
where the officer knows that the judge has abandoned his judicial role, or where a warrant is so
facially deficient that the officer cannot assume it is valid.
The dissent criticizes the majoritys ruling because it implies that the exclusionary rule is merely a
judicially created remedy designed to protect 4th amendment rights, rather than a constitutional right; the
dissent thinks that use of the exclusionary rule has been incorporated into the 4 th amendment. The
dissent argues that the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional
concerns as the initial seizure of such evidence and thus should be protected by the same mechanism.
The dissent argues further that the social balance of interests are not nearly as strong as suggested
because studies have shown that the costs of the exclusionary rule are low (exclusionary requests are
rarely granted).
In Leon the court splits the right and the remedythe 4 th amendment protects rights, but the
exclusionary rule is not part of that right
Deterrence argument
o Excluding the evidence in these cases will not achieve any deterrence because the
officers are acting in good faith
o The exclusionary rule is not targeted at magistrates, but at the police
Rule after Leon If the police are relying in good faith on a warrant from a magistrate, evidence
should not be excluded unless
o Belief that warrant was sufficient is not objectively reasonable
A bare bones warrant is not sufficient
Not sufficient when a warrant fails to specify the scope of the search
Not sufficient when the magistrate is not neutral or detached
Not sufficient if the affidavit contains falsehoods
The courts ruling reflects the view that the exclusionary rule will not have any deterrent effect
when an officer is acting objectively reasonably
o The exclusionary rule cannot have any affect on a magistrate because a magistrate is
intended to be a neutral observer, and thus is not intended to have deterrent effects on
his conduct
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The law has responded by developing 1983 actions which permit those subject to
unconstitutional action to sue for damages
Leon seems to have had little effect on magistrates no evidence suggests that warrants are
now more or less common, or are reviewed with more or less scrutiny
o When will it be unreasonable for police to rely on a magistrates warrant?
Presumably this will happen only when the magistrate is obviously wrong
o Similarly, a magistrates decision to issue a warrant will be overturned on appeal only
when it is obviously wrong (Gates)
Thus, maybe Leon does not do a whole lot of work (because any case where the
officer acted unreasonably, the warrant is likely to have been overturned anyway
When decided, Leon was thought to be very important for warrantless search cases
o The governments argument in Leon would seem to be immediately applicable to a
situation where the government argues that even if a search was not constitutional, it was
close enough that a reasonable officer could have believed it was constitutional
o However, Leon has not been expanded to warrantless searches
There is no statute that requires state courts to have an exclusionary rule
o So its only possible source is the constitution, but the court says the constitution does not
require it
may mean states need not have an exclusionary rule
might also mean that the legislature could do away with the exclusionary rule as
long as they replaced it with an equally effective remedy
Illinois v. Krull court applied the good-faith exception identified in Leon to a search pursuant to
an unconstitutional state statute
o The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer
acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect
on the officers actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant
Arizona v. Evans Court applied the good-faith exception of Leon when an individual was
arrested because an error in the court clerks database said that there was a warrant out for him
o Exclusionary rule operates as a deterrent on police misconduct, not mistakes by court
employees
o No evidence that the court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the 4 th
amendment
Groh v. Ramirez court excluded evidence because it found that an officers actions were not
objectively reasonable when the officer searched pursuant to a deficient warrant that the officer
had prepared (did not contain persons or things to be seized)
Key lesson of Leon, Krull, Evans The exclusionary rule applies only when the error is one made
by the police (when police conduct is not objectively reasonable)
Leon Good-Faith Exception and State Courts
o Leons good-faith exception is not applied everywherea number of state courts have
construed their own constitutions to suggest good faith is irrelevant when reviewing a
magistrates finding of PC
This is OK because state courts can find their constitutions are more constraining
than the 4th amendment
o In New Jersey, the state court mostly adopted the view of the Leon dissent
Herring v. United States Extends Leon; when police have conducted a search in good-faith that turns
out not to have been warranted, the exclusionary rule should be applied only when it will have deterrent
effects when the search turned out to be deficient because of recklessness or purposeful error by the
police.
D went to the sheriffs department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. An officer asked the
county clerks office to determine if there was a warrant out for D, and the clerk replied that there was.
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The officer then arrested D and searched him where he found a gun and meth. Later, the officer learned
that the warrant had been recalled 5 months earlier. D then moved to suppress the evidence recovered.
Use of the exclusionary rule is justified only where it will deter police misconduct; thus use of the
exclusionary rule is justified when police have acted recklessly or purposefully, but not where the
police have merely acted negligently in maintain a system with inaccurate information that other
officers relied on in good faith as part of a search. The court argues that the exclusionary rule
should be applied only where the benefits of deterrence outweigh its costs. The court argues that
exclusion does not outweigh its costs unless police conduct is sufficiently deliberate that it can
be meaningfully deterred.
The dissent argues that the exclusionary rule would have significant deterrent effects in this context
dissent argues essentially that the exclusionary rule always has significant deterrent effects when it
operates on police error. Thus, unlike Leon where error was made by the magistrate, here exclusion is
appropriate because the error was made by the police.
Leon and its progeny focus on the blameworthiness of police conduct and the need for
deterrence
Dissent also argues that there is a more majestic conception of the exclusionary rules purpose
that the rule provides a means for the judiciary to avoid the taint of official lawlessness and
ensure the public that the government will not profit from lawless behavior
Standing
The exclusionary rule remedy is available only to individuals who have standing to object to the
constitutional violation
Theories of standing
o Target theory subsequently rejected
o Legitimately on premises subsequently rejected
o Individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in a place
Implications of standing are that police can use inappropriate means to gather evidence on
someone else because that person will not have standing
Standing requirements
o Must show have an adversarial stake in the claimensures sharp litigation necessary to
rule
Will always be satisfied in a suppression motion
o Must show rights were personally violated
Evolution of Standing Doctrine
o Jones v. United States suggests anyone legitimately on the prmises has standing
In order to have standing to challenge an illegal search or seizure, one must
have been a victim of the search or seizure, one against whom the search was
directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through use of
evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone
else
o Rakas v. Illinois rejects the legitimately on the premises theory, and imposes a
reasonable expectation of privacy requirement
A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search or seizure only through
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third persons
premises or property has not had any of his 4th amendment rights infringed
Police stopped what they thought was a getaway car and seized a sawed off
shotgun in plain view; the evidence could not be excluded by the passengers
o Now looks like ownership of property seized does not give standing.
Minnesota v. Carter Temporary guests (those merely permitted on the premises) do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in another persons home and thus do not have standing to challenge
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illegal searches and seizures of these places when evidence that can be used against them is found
(however, almost all social guests will have standing); conversely individuals more like overnight guests
do have standing.
Ds were seen by a police officer through a crack in window blinds bagging cocaine. When the Ds left the
building, the police stopped the Ds and searched their car. They discovered a gun, pagers, a scale, and
cocaine. Ds then moved to suppress arguing that the initial observation of the drug packaging was an
unreasonable search, and thus the evidence discovered subsequently was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The court finds that the Ds do not have standing to challenge search, and accordingly the
evidence discovered should not be suppressed. The court argues that in Rakas the court
established that in order to claim the 4th amendment, a D must demonstrate that he had an
expectation of privacy in the place searched and that his expectation was reasonable. The court
argues that the amendment suggests that the 4th amendment protections extend only to a person
in his house, but the court have extended the doctrine to cover overnight guests. However, the
court rejects an extension of the doctrine to anyone legitimately on the premises. The court
argues that the purely commercial nature of the transaction, the relatively short period of time on
the premises, and the lack of previous connection between respondents leads that court to
conclude that Ds were more like individuals merely permitted on the premises, and thus do not
have standing to challenge the search.
Scalia Examines closely text of the 4th amendment and finds that it is not intended to protect
individuals who are in other peoples houses. 4th amendment says it protects people in their
papershouses, etc. Scalia argues that this could mean their houses or their respective
houses, but it must mean their houses because otherwise respective would apply to papers,
effects, etc. and would lead to absurd results because it would give any individual standing to
challenge the search of another individual. Scalia also examines the historical context in which
the amendment was adopted and argues that historical context indicates that individuals were
intended to be protected only in their homesthe law is essentially derived from the notion that
a mans home is his castle. He argues that while it is possible to regard an overnight lodging as
a mans temporary residence, a similar finding is not reasonable for a place where an individual
merely goes to pack cocaine.
Counters: 1 Assumes that the constitution couldnt possibly mean to give everybody (the
people) the right to challenge the search of another individual, but elsewhere in the constitution
the phrase the people is used to refer to such a collective right
2 It is not necessarily true that one never has a reasonable expectation of privacy in someone
elses pockets
o Sometimes individuals give things to other people to hold
o At the very least, could litigate this issue on social norms analysis (and would probably
win!)
Kennedy Argues almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus
protection against unreasonable searches in a hosts home. In this case, the individuals did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus were not protected by the 4 th amendment.
Breyer Argues that individuals do have standing to claim a 4 th amendment violation, but no
search occurred, and thus evidence should not be excluded.
Dissent reflects the concern that there is no remedy that prevents police from violating the 4 th amendment
to obtain evidence on someone other than the owner of the house or container that is being searched.
The courts general reaction to this is that police are deterred because by granting the
exclusionary rule to those individuals with a reasonable expectation of privacy, police will always
run the risk that some of the evidence they obtain will be excluded in certain circumstances, and
this risk is sufficient to prevent the police from violating 4th amendment (also protected through
1983 actions)
Standard developed by Carter is a social Norms Standard whether an individual has standing
depends on whether the individual has a personal expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable
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The standard litigating this standard requires an analysis of social norms for an area;
whether individuals in that area have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house or
container where their things were located depends on community practice
Litigating whether have reasonable expectation of privacy in someone elses
belongings
If give something to spouse to hold in purse, litigation might depend on
how purse is treated by others in the group, who else is accessing the
purse, etc. argue that no one else could/would have accessed purse
and thus expectation of privacy was reasonable
o Affirmative Criteria
Overnight guests do have this expectation of privacy because individuals are
most vulnerable during the night when they are sleeping
Majority of justices suggest that all social guests almost always have a
reasonable expectation of privacy
o Negative Criteria following suggest no expectation of privacy
Individual at a persons house for a short period of time
Individual at house for purely commercial purpose
Lack of a meaningful connection between the homeowner and individual seeking
exclusion
o Scope of standing doctrine bounded by where one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy
One does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy everywhere in the house
Issue with standing doctrine standardthe question for assessing standing is the same question
for assessing whether the 4th amendment was engaged ( a search occurred)
o Standing seems to involve a more zero-ing in sort of analysis
o Search involves a broad reasonable expectation analysis
In spite of the majority opinion, it seems like a majority of the justices (5) support the notion that
almost all social guests are protected (have standing) under the 4 th amendment
Some of language in majoritys opinion suggests that the individuals activity was not protected
because there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in illegitimate activities
o However, this logic would undermine almost all suppression motions because
suppression motions are used exclusively for excluding evidence related to illicit activity
Argument for strict enforcement of 4th amendment to exclude evidence of criminal activityby
making it harder to search an apartment for drugs, the 4 th amendment protects apartments where
no drugs will be found
o Remedy seems inconsistent with this aimin order to protect the public at large, we let
known criminals go free
United States v. Payner D charged with falsifying income tax return; one federal agent lured a
bank officer to dinner while another broke into the bank officers hotel room and stole document
used against the defendant
o The court found that D lacked standing
This case suggests issues raised by standing doctrinelaw enforcement can use standing rules
to determine how to conduct operations in order to obtain the evidence they want
o Problem is that standing rules are intended to be decision rules whose audience is the
courtthey are not intended to be considered by law enforcement when structuring
activities
o However, because of their role as decision rules, these rules have become conduct rules
determining how police conduct investigations
According to Justice Scalia, the Rakas principle (one can only assert own 4 th amendment
interests) is compelled by the 4th amendment
o This means that the only persons who will use the 4th amendment to challenge evidence
will be persons trying to protect their own illegal activities
o
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This may suggest that the 4th amendment bars the exclusionary rule (or at least
challenges its function) as a remedy
In fruit of the poisonous tree cases, one must always consider whether the suspect has standing
to challenge the initial search/seizure
Fruits include physical evidence, statements, confessions, etc.
Different questions apply to primary evidence and downstream evidence
o Primary evidence evidence discovered in the process of an illegal search or seizure
o Downstream evidence evidence discovered as a result of the evidence discovered
during an illegal search or seizure, but not discovered during the unconstitutional action
Suspects implicated by downstream evidence are much less likely to have
standing to challenge initial search or seizure
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Would the evidence inevitably have been discovered? (if so, not
suppressible) is a hypothetical independent sourcewould the police
have inevitably discovered the evidence in the course of their
investigation
Was the illegal search the proximate cause of discovering the evidence?
Relates to 4th amendment concept of attenuationwhether the taint of
the illegal search had dissipated
No per se rules, but rather is probably a balancing of facts analysis
Intent to search illegally in hopes of obtaining later evidence suggests
proximate cause; intervening events, likelihood that would have
discovered evidence anyway, etc. suggest no proximate cause
Brewer v. Williams establishes inevitable discovery as a means for severing proximate
causation in FOPT analysis, and thereby overcoming suppression motion
o At time, court accepts inevitable discovery when police had a search plan in place that
was 1-2 miles from the evidence, and was planning on closely searching the area in
which the evidence was ultimately found
The linchpin of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that the police must be trusted to reveal 1)
what they would have done, 2) that they wont invent evidence to justify a search, once they have
discovered evidence illegally
Murray v. United States Independent source doctrine applies to evidence initially discovered during, or
as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the
initial illegality
Law enforcement officers had been surveying D and several of his co-conspirators. They saw D drive
into a warehouse. Ds vehicle was driven out of the warehouse by other drivers. The police arrested
these drivers and discovered marijuana in the vehicle. After obtaining this information, other officers
forced entry into the warehouse and saw numerous burlap-wrapped bundles. They left the warehouse
without disturbing anything and applied for a warrant in which they did not rely on any evidence obtained
during their entry into the warehouse. Before trial, petitioners moved to suppress evidence found in the
warehouse as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The court finds first that the independent source doctrine applies to evidence initially discovered
during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from
activities untainted by the initial illegality. The court argues further that the inevitable discovery
doctrine is an extrapolation of the independent source doctrinesince tainted evidence would be
admissible if it was discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it
inevitably would have been discovered by an independent source. The court argues that these
rules to not create perverse incentives for the police because an officer with PC to enter a building
would not do so without a warrant because of the possibility of discovered evidence being
excludedat the very least he will have to justify his actions to the magistrate. Applying these
rules to this case, the court remands the case for a determination of whether the marijuana was
discovered through a truly independent source; the court recognizes that the warrant application
did not rely on prior entry to the warehouse, but if the agents would not have sought a warrant if
they had not earlier entered the warehouse, then the warrant search would not have arisen
through an independent source.
Hudson v. Michigan Proximate cause in the FOPT doctrine can be severed when the constitutional
interested protected would not be served by the suppression of evidence. To determine if the
constitutional interest protected would be served by the suppression of evidence, balance the interests of
the social costs of deterrence against the benefits.
Police obtained a warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at Ps home. When the police
executed the warrant they violated the knock and announce requirement. P moves to exclude the
evidence as the subject of an illegal search.
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The court holds that the exclusionary rule should never be applied to knock-and-announce
violations because the social costs to the violations are high, the deterrent benefits are minimal,
and the incentives to violate the rule are minimal.. The court argues that suppression of evidence
has always been a last resort, and is appropriate only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
social costs. The court argues that exclusion is not warranted merely because a constitutional
violation is a but-for cause of obtaining evidence, but rather for exclusion to be justified the
violation almost must not be so attenuated as to justify exclusion (remove the taint). The court
argues that a violation can become so attenuated even in the presence of a direct causal
connection when the interest protected by the constitutional protection would not be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained. In this case, the court argues that deterrence does not
outweigh social costs. The court argues that there are high social costsit would result in a
flood of litigation on whether an officers knock and announce was sufficient, and may deter
officers from proceeding safely in executing a warrant. The interest on the deterrence police
conduct is low because police conduct encourages police safety.
Kennedy In this case, relevant evidence was discovered not because of a failure to knock-andannounce, but because of a subsequent search pursuant to a lawful warrant. Suggests that
violation was not the but-for cause of the discovery of evidence (inevitable discovery?).
Dissent much more concerned about applying knock-and-announce.
One might argue that the knock-and-announce principle should be folded into the broader
requirement that searches be carried out reasonablythe same requirement that limits police use
of force against criminal suspects
o One could also argue that the rule is a good rule, but it should be left out of 4 th
amendment litigation (not protected by the constitution) because courts are not will
equipped to decide when no-knock entries are appropriate
Counter all 4th amendment litigation involves these fine-grained distinctions in
what police officers saw and heard
o Perhaps all of this suggests only that a detailed constitutional law of privacy is bound to
draw fine lines, question is should it draw these fine lines in the context of knock and
announce?
Direct application of doctrine to Hudson
o FOPT requires the suppression of all evidence the police obtained for a search or seizure
o Violation of knock-and-announce cannot cause the police to discover evidence, unless
the suspect is in the process of destroying the evidence at the time of police entry
o There is no constitutional right to be permitted to destroy evidence
o Thus knock-and-announce should never be enforced by suppression motion
Causation-based analysis is not the only way the 4th Amendment law governs the scope of the
exclusionary ruleanother approach focuses on whether police conduct was blameworthy
Additional implications of Hudson
o Hudson recognizes that the knock and announce rule is a 4 th amendment requirement,
but finds that the knock and announce rule is not remedied through the exclusionary rule
Language in opinion says that the suppression remedy is a remedy of last resort
Suggested the Mapp interpretation of a broad exclusionary rule is overbroad
dicta
o Thus, the case opens up the possibility for the exclusionary rule not to be applied to other
4th amendment violationsthis could provide the basis for overturning the exclusionary
rule 50 years from now
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Factual accuracy of statements made under duress is problematic where the only means of
stopping the interrogation is to assent to the interrogators views of what you did
o thus the view developed that a person should not face a coercive interrogation designed
to yield self-incriminating evidence
Opposition to coercive interrogation gained support from the practices of the High Commission of
the Court of Star Chamber in England which required one to swear that they would answer all
questions truthfully before knowing the subject of the inquiry; objection was based on the notion
that it is unfair for the state to attempt to coerce an individual to contribute to his own conviction
In spite of this opposition, the Fifth Amendment freedom from self-incrimination did not extend to
confessions at the founding of the USconfessions were excluded only if they were
untrustworthy
In 1897, Supreme Court brought pretrial interrogation into the scope of the 5 th amendment
o Bram v. United States Bram was charged with killing the master of the ship he was on
travelling from Boston to South America; Brams confession occurred when he was
stripped naked
The situation of the accused and the nature of the communication made to him
by the detective necessarily overthrows any possibility that his confession could
have been the result of purely voluntary mental action
Wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not
voluntary, the issue is controlled by the Fifth Amendment
Consider the conversation by the light of the impression it was calculated to
produce on the mind of the accused
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Meaning of Massiah was not completely clearnot clear how far the right to an attorney
extendedit was unclear whether it mattered if D had already been indicted, been arraigned, or
retained counsel
Escobedo D had been arrested, but not charged and invoked his right to counsel
Escobedo v. Illinois Where the investigation is no long an inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out
interrogations that lend themselves to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied counsel, the accused has not been advised of right to remain silent, no statement elicited
can be used at trial.
The reach of Escobedo was unclearseemed to indicate that the court was leaning to
addressing right to be free from self-incrimination through an extension of the 6 th amendmentby
extending right to counsel to all parts of the investigation
However, Court took a different route in Miranda, instead opting to protect suspects through the
5th amendment
Case looked like Court was moving towards extending the 6th amendment to all interrogation and
making it the main basis for moderating police interrogation
Miranda kills the 6th amendment as an avenue for protecting suspects in the interrogation context
(opts instead for protections under a 5th amendment theory)
Step 3: Miranda
Court examined police manuals to determine what is happening in interrogations rooms because
it was believed that no one had access to interrogations rooms because observers were excluded
o Today the response iswhat about videotaping interrogation? Could suggest changes in
jurisprudence
In Miranda, court turned to the issue of psychological coercion
Raises question of whether Miranda alters due process analysis
o Incrimination
If have custody and planned interrogation, must give warnings
Once give warnings, suspect must waive or must invoke
o What counts as a waiver?
o If invoke, what are the next steps? Must all interrogation stop?
Warnings
Florida v. Powell speaks to adequacy of warnings
Police have adapted very well to Miranda
o When Miranda was reconsidered, many police amicus briefs supported keeping Miranda
suggests police prefer this to voluntariness test where would scrutinize closely whether
action was coercive
o because under Miranda, once give warnings, are good to go! basically per se satisfy
voluntariness test
Miranda v. Arizona The prosecution cannot use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination, and a suspect gives a valid waiver of his constitutional rights.
Rather than pointing to specific facts of an unconstitutional interrogation, the facts examine police
interrogation practices in general. The court recognizes that since outsiders are excluded from the
interrogation room, it is not possible to examine the facts of a specific interrogation, and instead looks to
police manuals to determine interrogation techniques. The Court description suggests that though these
techniques are not violent, they are coercive. Specifically the court expresses concern over the use of
deception (false line-up), police providing mitigating explanations to suspects (legal and moral excuses),
police suggesting it is suspicious to invoke Constitutional rights, 4 good-cop/bad-cop, and the length of
time of interrogations.
The court finds that in order to obtain testimony from custodial interrogations, police must follow
strict procedural safeguards. The court argues that even without employing any of the strategies
listed above, custodial interrogation by its nature exacts a heavy toll on liberty and has a coercive
effect that may compel individuals not to exercise their 5 th amendment rights, and thus no
testimony obtained from a D can truly voluntary. Thus, the freedom from self-incrimination
extends to any period of custodial interrogation. While states are free to come up with more
effective protections for suspects rights, at a minimum police must inform suspects before a
custodial interrogation that 1) he has a right to remain silent, 2) anything he says can and will be
used against him in court, 3) right to an attorney, 4) if he cannot afford one, one will be provided.
If at any point during questioning a suspect manifests a desire to stop speaking, the interrogation
must stop; similarly if he manifests a desire for an attorney, the interrogation must stop until the
attorney arrives. This implies that no inquiry will be made into whether the suspect was already
aware of his rights. If interrogation continues in the absence of an attorney, a heavy burden rests
on the state in proving that an individual waived his rights; just because a warning was given
does not signal that any confession is therefore voluntary absent a valid waiver of the suspects
rights. Whether a voluntary waiver was given is a factual analysislengthy interrogation before a
statement was given, and any evidence of trickery suggest a lack of voluntariness. In spite of this
holding, purely voluntary confessions are still permissible.
Analysis is a sort of constitutional default analysisin the context of interrogation all elements
are present that are necessary to invoke 5th amendment protections; court argues that in the
absence of a better solution, at a minimum Miranda applies
The dissent criticizes the holding for lacking a sound basis in the text of the Constitution. One dissenter
also points out that a flaw inherent to the system developed by the court is that if one considers custodial
interrogation to be inherently coercive and thus involuntary, a suspect cannot voluntarily waive his rights
because his opportunity to waive his rights will also arise in a coercive context.
Miranda warnings
o Right to remain silent
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o
o
Compulsion
Custody
Interrogation
Testimony For which compulsion is cause in fact
Incrimination
Custody the level of restraint associated with a formal arrest; is a totality of the circumstances
analysis, from the perspective of the suspect
o Satisfies Custody Requirements
Orozco v. Texas suspect questioned in his bedroom at 4am by 4 officers was in
custody
Any arrest (Berkemer v. McCarty)
Taken into station house and not free to terminate the encounter for an extended
period of time
o Fails Custody Requirements
Oregon v. Mathiason no custody when suspects voluntarily go to station house
and confesses
Terry stops do not satisfy the custody requirement (Berkemer v. McCarty)
Interrogation
o Express questioning counts as interrogation
Exceptions
Booking Question Exception
Perkins Where direct questioning is not coercive person questioned
does not believe person who is asking questions has power over them
o The functional equivalent of express questioning counts as interrogation any words or
actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect.
Muniz individual pulled over for drunk driving
o Nothing that occurred at the roadside was protecteddont need to give Miranda in tops
o Physical evidence not protected by Miranda (e.g. field sobriety tests)
o Considered in custody once taken to booking station
Booking question exception questions asked in the course of booking are not
considered interrogation for the purposes of Miranda
Rhode Island v. Innis Interrogation includes direct questioning and its functional equivalent any words
or actions by the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.
A taxi driver was shot and killed. A few days later a taxi cab driver was robbed at gunpoint in the same
area. When that driver went to the station to give a statement, he identified his assailant from a picture
on a bulletin board. While on patrol an officer spotted the suspect, arrested him, and advised him of his
Miranda rights. Soon the Sergeant arrived and gave the suspect his Miranda rights, then the Captain
arrived and gave him his Miranda rights. On the way back to the station one patrolman started a
conversation with another patrolman about there being a school nearby and his concern that a child might
find the gun and shoot herself. The suspect then volunteered to show them where the gun was and let
them right to it. The Court considers whether the evidence should be excluded because it was obtained
through an interrogation without a valid Miranda waiver.
The Court first recognizes that Miranda does not cover only direct questioningseveral of the
practices that evoked concern in Miranda did not include express questioning. The Court also
recognizes that interrogation must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that
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inherent to the custody because not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been
taken into custody can properly be considered interrogation. Accordingly, the Court holds that
the 5th amendment applies to direct questioning or its functional equivalent. Applying that
standard, the Court finds that the suspects 5th amendment rights were not violated because there
was no reason that the police should have known that their conversation was likely to elicit an
incriminating responsenothing in the record suggests that the officers were aware that the
respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience, and the conversation
consisted of merely a few offhand remarks.
Stevens dissents because he believes that to protect suspects rights, interrogation must include any
police conduct that has the same purpose or effect as direct questioning, and thus statements that appear
to be designed to call for a response should be considered interrogation. He believes this standard has
been met in this instance.
Illinois v. Perkins Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware he is speaking to a law
enforcement officer (when concern about coercion is absent); questioning by an undercover officer does
not count as interrogation.
The police received a tip on an unsolved murder from an inmate at a correctional facility who heard the
account from his cell mate. The police than insert an undercover agent into the cell block with the
suspect. While planning an escape, the undercover officer baited the suspect into telling him about the
murder.
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The Court finds that the statements were voluntary, and thus can be admitted at trial. The Court
argues that conversations with undercover agents do not implicate the concerns of Mirandathat
statements will be coercively obtained because the statements do not take place in a policedominated atmosphere. The Court argues that when a suspects considers himself in the
company of cellmates, a coercive atmosphere is lacking, and thus the danger of coercion
subsides.
Concurrence agrees that the questioning did not violate the Miranda requirements, but expresses
concern that the deception may have violated due process. He argues that deliberate deception
appears to be incompatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction
will not be obtained by inquisitorial means.
Dissent argues that Miranda was not intended to deal merely with police coercion, but any police tactics
that may operate to compel a suspect to make incriminating statements without awareness of his
constitutional rights. Dissent argues further that compulsion can be achieved by any police deception,
and also argues that a jail is an inherently coercive environment because of fear of other inmates.
Illinois v. Perkins
o He has 4th, 5th, and 6th amendment objection
4th No go under White; informant is not a search
US v. White conversations with undercover agents (even those wearing
wires) are not searches
If Perkins had come out differently, undercovers would have been totally
permitted before arrest, but almost totally prohibited afterwards;
potentially there is no great reason to draw this line
5th Claim is that was under custody and was interrogated (direct questioning)
6th Places some constraints on this use of undercover agents; 6 th amendment
right to counsel protects from police eliciting information for crimes with which
one has already been charged
o 5th Amendment State Argument
Not in Custody, he is at home; thus this is not Miranda coercive custodial
environment
Even if Custody, doesnt count because is not type of coercion Miranda had in
mindhad no reason to think people he was talking to had power over him
o Suggests that a lot of Miranda is dicta
In certain situations the use of undercovers to get information from defendants in custody runs
into 6th amendment problems
o Arizona v. Fulminante Undercover offered to protect a guy in jail from assault from other
inmates if the informant would tell him what happened in a rumored murder
Perkins suggests that trickery is an appropriate means of obtaining incriminating statementsis
that the right signal to send?
o Concern police may use deceptive tactics to avoid Mirandas restrictions
o Police may mislead a suspect in an effort to induce him to waive Miranda rights
Pennsylvania v. Muniz
o Muniz was arrested for drunk driving and taken back to the station house where was
asked a series of questions during booking
o He sought to have answers suppressed
o Routine booking exception to Miranda questions used to secure the biographical data
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services are not subject to suppression under
Miranda
Adequacy of Warnings
o Best thing is to give language tracking text of Miranda itself
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Florida v. Powell
Miranda says must say have the right to consult with lawyer and have right to
have lawyer with you during interrogation
Powell you have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our
questions and you have the right to use any of these rights at any point durint the
interview
Claim language did not explain made clear that had right to have lawyer sit with
him
Court When take common-sense approach, clear that should have understood
warning
Davis v. United States Invocation of Miranda Rights must be unequivocal; if suspect says
something equivocal (e.g. Maybe I should talk to a lawyer) about invocation of right to silence or
counsel, doesnt count
o Before interrogation waives Miranda rights
o 1.5 hours into interview he says Maybe I should talk to a lawyer
o Officers ask him for clarificationask if he is asking for a lawyer, or merely commenting
on a lawyer
o He says he doesnt want a lawyer
o Later says I want a lawyer, and questioning ceases
The text of Miranda shows consistent concern about the waiverthe opinion suggests that
nobody will waive her rights
However, waivers are extremely commona study suggests that only 21% of people invoke their
Miranda rights
If no Miranda warning has been given, an individual cannot waive her Miranda rights
Language of Miranda Warnings
o Courts have been flexible with language of Miranda warnings
o As long as all 4 parts are conveyed, and the police make no attempt to mislead a
suspect, Miranda warnings likely to be sufficient
If an individual invokes his right to an attorney, Miranda does not require the suspect be given a
right to an attorney immediately, but requires rather that the police stop questioning the individual
Discrepancy between Davis and Powellpolice can say whatever and it counts as a valid
warning; people have to same exact magic words to invoke rights
o Means people who invoke Miranda (who know how to invoke Miranda) are going to be
people who didnt need Miranda to begin with criminals, or people with legal
representation
o Consider in equivocal analysis
Timing (how soon after Miranda warning, where lawyer comment comes in
relation to waiver)
Invocations
Effect of Invocations
o In order to invoke, must be unequivocal
o Invoke Right to Silence Mosley; police must scrupulously honor that right
o Invoke Right to Counsel Edwards replaced by Shatzer
Cannot question you unless you re-initiate unless they have released you for 2
weeks into you own environment (whether that be jail or freedom)
Michigan v. Mosley Mosley was arrested, briefly interrogated, and then invoked right to remain silent.
Later a different officer advised him of his rights, obtained a waiver from him, and secured information
from him about a different crime. The Court found no violation of his rights.
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Miranda cannot sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any
further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated
a desire to remain silent. Whether statements obtained after a person in custody has invoked his
right to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut of questioning was scrupulously
honored. In this case, the suspects rights were honored because the subsequent questioning
was about a different crime, and occurred at a different time, and thus was consistent with
Mosleys earlier refusal to answer questions about the first crime.
Edwards v. Arizona Once an accused has invoked the right to counsel, a waiver cannot be established
by showing the suspect responded to further interrogation; one an accused expresses desire for an
attorney, he cannot be subject to any further interrogation until counsel has been made available.
Suspect was arrested given his Miranda rights. After being told that another suspect had implicated him,
Edwards expressed a desire to make a deal. He then invoked his right to counsel. The next morning two
detectives shows up to speak with Edwards. The guard told Edwards that he had to talk to the
detectives, even though Edwards expressed a desire not to talk to anyone. The officers then read
Edwards his Miranda rights, and he agreed to talk to the police, as long as the conversation was not
recorded. Edwards claims that his testimony should be excluded because having invoked his right to
counsel, he did not validly waive the right.
The Court holds that when an accused has invoked his right to counsel, a valid wavier cannot be
established by a showing that the individual responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation, even if he is again advised of his rights; the Court further holds that an accused
who expresses a desire for counsel cannot be subject to any further interrogation until counsel
has been made available, unless the accused initiates the communication.
After Edwards and Mosley, invocation of the right to counsel gets greater protection than
invocation of right to remain silent
Edwards holds that when a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel, the police cannot
initiate further questioning
o Meaning of initiating question (Oregon v. Bradshaw)
Police officer did not initiate further questioning when conversation followed
suspect asking police what would happen to him because suspects question
evinced a willingness and desire for discussion with police
Dissent contests that question suggested a general willingness to have a
conversation with the police
After Edwards, the definition of invokes is also particularly important because after an individual
invokes, the police may have no further opportunity to question him
o Davis v. United States If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood only that the suspect might be invoking, precedent do not require the
cessation of question. The suspect must umambiguously invoke to get Miranda
protections
Smith v. Illinois an accuseds response to further interrogation after his request
for counsel cannot be used to cast doubt on the clarity of the initial invocation
Once invoke unambiguously, all questioning must stop
Concern of Dissent some Ds may respond hesitantly so that the only invocation
they will/could ever give is tentative Davis effectively means these people are
forced to be talked to the police, but Edwards was designed to prevent that result
o Connecticut v. Barrett suspects refusal to make a written statement without counsel
present did not amount to a generalized assertion of counsel sufficient to count as
invoking
Minnick v. Mississippi If suspect invokes, is allowed to consult counsel, and this is interrogated,
this violates Edwards
o Once an individual has invoked, individual must have counsel with him at any future
questioning
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Roberson suggests that when invoke right to counsel, right stands even if are questioned for a
different crime
o Minnick says right stands even after D has seen a lawyer
o Does that mean that invocation is good until the suspect is released from prison years
later?
Absolute nature of Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick give police officers a strong incentive to
avoid invocations
o Presumably coercive questioning tactics that ratchet up pressure are more likely to lead
to invocations
o Thus these cases presumably pushes police towards less coercion
However, this would seem to hold true only if people invoke Miranda rights, while
in fact 79% of time people do not invoke.
While Miranda majority indicated that the State would have to meet a heavy burden to
demonstrate waiver, subsequent decisions have lightened the load considerably
o North Carolina v. Butler Individual refused to sign waiver form, but agreed to talk with
officers; Court found Miranda waiver valid
In at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words
of the person interrogated
o Colorado v. Spring Waiver valid even if defendant not apprised of every alleged crime
with respect to which police intended to interrogate him once Miranda warnings are
given it is difficult to see how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand his
constitutional rights
There is some question of whether it matters to a waiver whether the suspect is already
represented by counsel
o In NY police cannot approach a suspect (and thus he cannot waive) if the police know
that the suspect is represented by counsel
Moran v. Burbine
Police arrested D in connection with a local burglary. Shortly before the arrest the police learned the
name and address of a man who committed a previous murder. The police realized that this individual
had been arrested in connection with this burglary. Accordingly, the police read the individual his Miranda
rights. Meanwhile, Ds sister called the public defenders office and the PDO called the police to inquire
about when D would be interrogated and to alert the police that D was represented by counsel. The PDO
was told that D would not be interrogated until the next day. Later that evening D was interrogated and
confessed. D then moved to exclude evidence of the confessions because the police misinformed the
attorney or because the police failed to inform the suspect of the attorneys efforts to reach him.
The Court finds that D validly waived his Miranda rights. The Court holds that a waiver requires
that 1) that an individual voluntarily waived his rights, and 2) that the waiver must have been made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of
the decision to abandon it. Applying this standard, the Court argues that D waived his rights. The
Court holds further that once it is determined that a suspects decision to waive was un-coerced
and that he was aware of his rights, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid. The Court
argues that events that occurred outside of the presence of D can have had no impact on his
ability to comprehend and knowingly relinquish his constitutional rights. The Court holds further
that deliberate or reckless withholding of information is only relevant to the constitutional validity
of a waiver if it deprives D of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his
rights and the consequences of abandoning them. The Court argues further that Miranda
warnings are intended to protect an individuals right against self-incrimination, not to prevent all
police trickery, and thus the Court declines to extend Miranda to require the police to notify Ds of
an attorneys attempt to reach him. The Court argues that Miranda was intended as a balance
between protecting against the innately coercive environment of the interrogation room and the
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need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement. The Court recognizes that on
facts more egregious police deception can on some instances rise to the level of due process.
The Dissent argues first that the burden of showing a valid waiver rests on the government; the dissent
argues next that Miranda was intended to protect against deceptive misstatements by the police, and it is
not possible to distinguish between these deceptive misstatements and the concealment that occurred in
this instance. The dissent argues that the balancing approach applied by the majority is erroneous
because that balance would justify a rejection of warning about the right to counsel and because the
majority incorrectly applied the testthe balance on the side of the suspect should be (had previously
been) weighed as the individual interest in liberty threatened by deceptive practices. The dissent argues
further that under ordinary agency law, the deception of the attorney was akin to deception of her client,
and ordinarily Ds are entitled to truthful answers from the police, and thus D should be entitled to the
remedy he would have if he had been lied to directly. The dissent also criticizes the majority for
suggesting that the police have the authority to deny counsel the ability to see their clients.
Missouri v. Seibert
Ds son had cerebral palsy and died. D feared charges of neglect because the child had bedsores on his
body. D then plotted to burn down her house so that police would not find out. She planned to leave a
mentally ill teenager in the house to avoid any appearance that her son with cerebral palsy had been left
unattended. Several days after the incident police awoke D at the hospital and questioned her without
giving her Miranda warnings. She confessed. She was then given Miranda warnings; the officer
obtained a waiver and a confession from her. The trial court declined to suppress the post-warnings
statements because by that point the warning had been given. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed.
The Court concludes that the second statements should be suppressed. The Court holds that in
cases of sequential confession, the threshold question is whether in the circumstances the
Miranda warnings could reasonably be found effectivei.e. could the warnings effectively advise
the suspect that he had a real choice? And could the warnings reasonably convey that the
suspect could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier? If yes, then the Miranda
analysis precedes normally, but otherwise the evidence must be excluded. The Court argues that
the justification for this ruling is that a suspect could hardly believe his Miranda warnings if they
were given to him just after making a confession. This inquiry is highly fact bound, it will include
at leastthe completeness and detail of the first round of questioning, the overlapping content of
the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and second questioning, the continuity of
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police personnel, and the degree to which the police treated the questioning as continuous. In
this case, the Miranda warnings could not be effective because the questioning was continuous
and the police did not advise the woman that her statement coiuld not be used (though this
statement would not be dispositive).
Breyer Rule should be that exclude the fruits of initial unwarned questioning unless failure
was in good faith
Kennedy Whether Miranda should be enforced depends on a consideration of whether
suppressing evidence would serve the legitimate interests promoted by Miranda and whether
admission of evidence would frustrate Mirandas central concerns and objectives. The implication
of this is that statements should not be excluded if the statement given before the Miranda
warning was brief. In this case, the Miranda objectives are serveddeterring improper police
conduct and the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence.
Suggests that should conduct ordinary FOPT analysisif the first statement is shown to be involuntary,
the court must examine whether the taint dissipated through the passing of time or through changed
circumstances.
United States v. Patane Physical evidence obtained from unwarned testimony is admissible at trial.
D was arrested for harassing his ex girlfriend; he was then let out and violated his restraining order by
trying to call her. When officers began to investigate, they learned from the ATF that D was a convicted
felon with a firearm. Detectives then went to Ds residence. They attempted to advise him of his rights,
but he cut them off. They asked him about the gun, and he eventually told them where it was. D then
moved to suppress the physical evidence on the basis that it was the fruit of an unwarned search.
The Court holds that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not necessitate the exclusion of
physical evidence at trial. The Court argues that the Miranda warnings are not Constitutionally
required, but rather are a means of protecting against the 5 th amendment right against self
incrimination; however the right of self incrimination does not suggest the exclusion of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements. The Court argues further that
because the Miranda rules sweep beyond the requirements of the Constitution, any further
extension of the rules must be justified by the protection against compelled self-incrimination.
The Court argues that an extension of the rule is not justified here because police conduct
violating Miranda is already deterred by the suppression of testimonial evidence.
Kennedy Exclusion of physical evidence cannot be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive
to both law enforcement interests and a suspects right during in-custody interrogation.
Admission of non-testimonial physical fruits does not run the risk of admitting into trial an
accuseds coerced incriminating statements and thus is not required by the 5 th amendment.
Dissent expresses concern about the need for deterrence that would justify FOPT for physical evidence
obtained from statements made without a Miranda waiver. The Court suggests that failing to suppress
physical evidence will give officers an incentive to ignore the Miranda warnings when they think that they
may uncover physical evidence. The dissent argues that the 5th amendment does protect against
admission of this evidence because a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coercion, and the 5 th
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to derivative evidence.
Breyer Thinks that FOPT standard for derivative physical evidence should hinge on whether evidence
was collected in good faith.
Kennedys position
o In Seibert finds statements inadmissible because the Miranda violation was intentional
and the police took no steps to cure it
o Patane position harder to understand; adopts pluralitys rule, but seemingly without the
pluralitys rationale (recognizes less importance for physical evidence)
o Unclear how Kennedy would vote in a case that involved an intentional violation and
physical evidence
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