G.R. No.

L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE
HOTEL
AND
MOTEL
OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondentappellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower
court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on
July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).

provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent

conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and
loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due
process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the
personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the
fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted
a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner
Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del
Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of
Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City
of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
districts in Manila;
for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number,
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being
Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board,
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
right to privacy and the guaranty against self -incrimination; that
Manila. 1wph1.t
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in
first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause
wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the
for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
v. Salaveria , but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
what they considered to be applicable American authorities and
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
Page 1 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary

injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this
appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to
have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation. 2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co ., 3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, 4extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society. 7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex
to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate

of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great

part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts,
far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the
seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a
pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; 13 prohibiting
the operation of pinball machines; 14 and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of which are intended
to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too
often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of
any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in
which the objection is raised to the question of due process. 16 There is
no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to f ree the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter,
from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers
an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment
of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.

Page 2 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees

provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150%
for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for
the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable. 23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta 24 this Court
affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public
purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has
been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure. 26 The discussion of this particular matter
may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the
mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case,
persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need
and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in
these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from
the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against
the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in

order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal

liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all. 29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying
legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar, 30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to
the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest. 31 What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider. 32 How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty.
It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to
be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite
time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt
as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which
from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a
full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged
vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction Co . 33 toAdderley v.
Florida, 34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a
statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding
or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this
the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and

propietor,
and
NATIONAL
WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion,
we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of
this Court:

Page 3 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo,

sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de
las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago
de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se
termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado
contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato
colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se
niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica
injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir
se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado
organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del
paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays
for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported
by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles
from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is
a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining,
majority
rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable
in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the
industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion
for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead
with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass
upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations
regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations
and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in
the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations
in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of
views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farmlaborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any
or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary
of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of
public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and
in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and
induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or
share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be
paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement
of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out
that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to
the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
they could not be expected to have obtained them and
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such farrules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
judgment rendered herein.
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
Page 4 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court
to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S.,
304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy ,
22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington,
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian
Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93
F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758,
760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
(Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44,
24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v.
Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed.
624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural
dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the
peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise
of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is
solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision,
with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon
which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new
trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is
alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records
of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers
in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove
his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts
is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS,
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO
and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence
KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL
Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185,
ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE
57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative
CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA .
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the
petitioners,
latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
vs.
against them. It should not, however, detract from their
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTCduty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN,
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant
DALMACIO
LIM
JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE
to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any
Page 5 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for

petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for
petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.

In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-FacultyStudent Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found
a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3
of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers
to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they
would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.

Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to
compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with
the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common
students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for
credit during summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the
issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the
position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be
admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no
duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit
the petitioner, the petition did not prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the
concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance
to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is
again challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the
individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the
case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek readmission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused
admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and
character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's
academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the
classroom. The school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem
to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more
compatible with your orientations."

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board

composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio
Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand
Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students.
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were
informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline
contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The
complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on February
8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of
students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School
regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written
answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991,
otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through
counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in
abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence
against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear
before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with
regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation
of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27,
1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing
from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March
2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in
accordance with the rules laid down in the case
of Guzman vs. National University ; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the
affiants-neophytes;

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission
into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3
of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due
to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries
inflicted on another.

c) Hazing which is not defined in the School

catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the
proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No.
3815;

Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to

the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this
time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.

d) The Board will take into consideration the

degree of participation of the petitioners in the
alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;

The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as
follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized
in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and
10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of
such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of
petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese
General Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim,
though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was
also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the
same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del
Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their
written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt.
Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice,
they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they
requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.

e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable

to the President of the University, i. e.,
Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases
where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of
dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the
penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on
the Law School level but also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules
on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The
Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or
"auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the
"auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical
hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to
assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were
assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity.
Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to
prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes
under their care. The Board considered respondent students part and
parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board
pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation
or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity

Page 6 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the

Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to
review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the
University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University,
accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master
Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming
they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are
still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more
persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act
through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is
responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which
led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "of fense of the
respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of
the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior."
Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent
students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner
Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas and
Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991,
inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither
had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set
the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial
Court
of
Makati,
a
petition
for certiorari,
prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as
students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a
temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from
taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the
alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order
the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and
stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing
incident. 15

The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the
writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond
dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the
enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on
academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in
expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its
disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the
penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the
circumstances.
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge
ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent
students had been denied due process in the investigation of the
charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision
of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them
their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree
as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the
contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary
proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University , 22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v. Dames
II 24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various
investigative proceedings held before they were expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their
argument that it is Ang Tibay case 25 and not theGuzman case which is
applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with
the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to
the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case. 26

Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining

order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining
order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day
after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro
Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental
Petition of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the
aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to
the original petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that
the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of
investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students;
that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same
being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the
previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day
lifetime. 17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental
petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as
pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent
students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate
respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which
allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to
maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and
Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant
case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating
petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their
names from its roll of students. 20

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not

met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia
del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty four hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records show
that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students
mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written
statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted
an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It
is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No.
3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School
Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students.
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20
clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity
to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled
against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start
of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates
put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent
students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were
not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991

Page 7 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

order, they were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting that they
were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract
from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.
An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March
2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as
being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right
to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of
our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim

the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for himself a
respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of
free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the
"best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just
man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of
hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of
Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption,"
the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:
Young men of the richer classes, who have not
much to do, come about me of their own accord:
they like to heart the pretenders examined, and
they often imitate me, and examine others
themselves; there are plenty of person, as they
soon discover, who think that they know
something, but really know little or nothing; and
then those who are examined by them instead of
being angry with themselves are angry with me.
This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous
misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks
them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach?
they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order
that they may not appear to be at a loss, they
repeat the ready-made charges which are used
against all philosophers about teaching things up
in the clouds and under the earth, and having no
gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their
pretense of knowledge has been detected
which is the truth; and as they are numerous and
ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array
and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your
ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. 38

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee

failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March
10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein
respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory
questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault
petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that
there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91
Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed
sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members
of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before
the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and
the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it
is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process,
particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As
we have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature,
due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges
against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal
information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students
involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue
shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed
bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs
to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of
dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing
frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their
insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness
and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from
fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the
cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in
our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file
the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by
passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 35
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer
irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed
to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate
reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and
found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's
disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority
of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to
do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's
academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and
the present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms
subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom"
cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire , 37 thus: (1) who may
teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and
(4) who may be admitted to study .

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have

similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State,
Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their
ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at
thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the
Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe,
gradually lost their autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along
the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which
awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This
was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in
the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554),
Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to
freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of
fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic
freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights
related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with
freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words,
with the right of individuals in university communities, such as
professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue,
discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the
argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom
is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license.
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been
stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of
independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of
tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have
been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how
to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom
could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart.
As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic
and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what
shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to
study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of
sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely,
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term
of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the
institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the

Page 8 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal

protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the
1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State
shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time,
being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by
some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the
expense of the rest.
In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973
Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher
learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the
provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor." 39
Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an
attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up
with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by
students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate
and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different
from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the
question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained:
"Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the
frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave
it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic
freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked:
"When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic
freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied:
"Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken
thought, "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology , 41 we have consistently
upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of
higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under
the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their
field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and
regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students.
This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social
and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to
assist and cooperate with the schools." 43

In essence, education must ultimately be religious not in the sense

that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian
or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the
renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education
which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular
brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been
lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as
the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they
may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v.
Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and
orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under
the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit
petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student
body." 46Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but
congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such
a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by
petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded
on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991,
the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result
of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as
"brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the
imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension?
We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in
Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of
respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondent s
students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution
of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila
University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the
Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and
ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.

Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules
may include those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step
further, the establishment of rules governing university -student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of
the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in
the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and
plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their
own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education"
forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and
that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own
a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and
assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and
integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of
Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their
barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be
borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of
the total man.

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and

prohibition) the following resolutions of the Commission on Elections:
Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being
unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and
Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and
factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and
local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No.
2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other
deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing
arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election
period. 1Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2

On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P.

Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting
the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of
Page 9 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January

1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde
and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent
Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some
twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later,
the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by
Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and
found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a
bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and
detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the
firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad
of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among
those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's
sworn explanation meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light
on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.
Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm
Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the
firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution
which, among other matters, recommended that the case against
Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law
Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the
filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec.
261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner
to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in
relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in
abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the
information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He
argues that the rules and regulations of an administrative body must
respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code
provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from running
for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either been
declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that
gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit
of the provisions of the Code; that the resolution did away with the
requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain
offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate
may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal
charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case,
and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to
the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running
or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution
No. 2327 violates the fundamental law thus rendering it fatally
defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost
his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued.
Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge
against him on his qualification to run for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e.,
whether he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to

return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the

two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from
the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search. According to him, without a warrant and
without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within
the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun
cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the
search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was
clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the
Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party
respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently,
making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his
constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166,
which prohibits any candidate for public office during the election
period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a
security officer or bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to him
as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner
further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he
did, the firearms in compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-atArms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on
the
petition 13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not
take the position of COMELEC and prayed instead to be excused from
filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261,
par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that
"the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points
out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the
firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that his
right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City
Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's
possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written
explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation
of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita , hence, the intention of the offender is
immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged
constitutional infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since this petition may
be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and
stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution

for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants

subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist
nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun
cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly,
COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the
manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that
it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report
regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano
when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances
and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender
or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The
existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is

Page 10 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity

of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by
police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a
confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted and
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the
time of their arrest; 22where apart from the intelligence information,
there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that
appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where
the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing
prohibited drugs was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in
accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport
and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of
the accused fitted the description given in the confidential information
about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying
a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when
queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier
was already established by police authorities who received confidential
information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the
vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty
(20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were
impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to
earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into
petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec.
2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the
search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question
the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it
however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no
infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of
setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the
Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec.
5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992.
The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was
not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily
giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been
announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the
purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did
not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing
vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent
would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to
arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.

The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner
that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the procedure established by law
should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard
because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in
fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident.
This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of
which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process
guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only
a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals , 33 we held
that
While the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice . The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over
to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at
risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a
process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary
investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation.
Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party
respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident
was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence,
it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised
that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for
reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his
claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion
itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's
protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the
charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his motion
for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition
against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and
with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the
right to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not
waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search
conducted by the Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless search
cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner.
Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992
being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made
permanent.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it
was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano
did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen
(14) armed policemen conducting the operation, 29 driver Arellano
being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a
mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against

petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.

Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

Page 11 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and

prohibition) the following resolutions of the Commission on Elections:
Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being
unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and
Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and
factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and
local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No.
2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other
deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing
arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election
period. 1Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P.
Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote petitioner
who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting
the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January
1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde
and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent
Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some
twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later,
the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by
Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and
found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a
bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and
detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the
firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad
of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include petitioner as among
those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's
sworn explanation meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light
on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation.
Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm
Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the
firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was pet itioner's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution
which, among other matters, recommended that the case against
Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law
Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the
filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec.
261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner
to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in
relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in
abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the
information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He
argues that the rules and regulations of an administrative body must
respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code
provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from running
for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either been
declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or

for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that
gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit
of the provisions of the Code; that the resolution did away with the
requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain
offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate
may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal
charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case,
and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to
the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running
or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution
No. 2327 violates the fundamental law thus rendering it fatally
defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost
his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued.
Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge
against him on his qualification to run for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e.,
whether he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the
two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from
the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search. According to him, without a warrant and
without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within
the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun
cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the
search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was
clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the
Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party
respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently,
making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his
constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166,
which prohibits any candidate for public office during the election
period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a
security officer or bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to him
as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner
further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he
did, the firearms in compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-atArms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on
the
petition 13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not
take the position of COMELEC and prayed instead to be excused from
filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261,
par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that
"the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised
Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points
out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the
firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that his
right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City
Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's
possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written
explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation
of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita , hence, the intention of the offender is
immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged
constitutional infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since this petition may
be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view, 17 as well as the search conducted at police or

Page 12 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and
stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution

for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants

subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist
nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun
cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly,
COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the
manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that
it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report
regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano
when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances
and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender
or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The
existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is
determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity
of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by
police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were
reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a
confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted and
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the
time of their arrest; 22where apart from the intelligence information,
there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that
appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where
the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing
prohibited drugs was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in
accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport
and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of
the accused fitted the description given in the confidential information
about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying
a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when
queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier
was already established by police authorities who received confidential
information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the
vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty
(20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were
impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to
earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into
petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec.
2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the
search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question
the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it
however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no
infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of
setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the
Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec.
5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992.
The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was
not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily
giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been

announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the
purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did
not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing
vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent
would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to
arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it
was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano
did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen
(14) armed policemen conducting the operation, 29 driver Arellano
being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a
mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution.
The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner
that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the procedure established by law
should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard
because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in
fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident.
This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of
which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process
guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only
a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals , 33 we held
that
While the right to preliminary investigation is
statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice . The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over
to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at
risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a
process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary
investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation.
Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party
respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident
was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence,
it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised
that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for
reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his
claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion
itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's
protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the
charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his motion
for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition
against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and
with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the
right to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not
waive his right to a preliminary investigation.

Page 13 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search

conducted by the Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless search
cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner.
Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992
being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.

Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business,
violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made

permanent.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila

contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in
the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one
subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations
are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the
institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien

residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected.
by
Republic
Act
No.
1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity
and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and farreaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due
process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses
an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the
law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence
and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival
and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free
the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so
that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed
economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances
justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens
of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in
case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act
or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the
United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage
in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization,
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to
present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature
of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the
heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue
such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a
judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,
particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1)
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the
police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be
well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary,
considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are
the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the
province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and
duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly
understood that their application to the facts of the case may be
brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it
has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through
which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is
that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof.
The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in
the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not

Page 14 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling

within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely
an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise
it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable
relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction
and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review .
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place
and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in
the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to
implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other
hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right,
have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise
of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has
been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of
the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of
the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve
directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely
a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it
falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further
and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein.
The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common,
trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the
immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race,
color or citizenship.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in

the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs,
food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and
things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers
around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar,
the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the
needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out.
The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a
small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a
supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in
the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be
invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of
the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the
towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has
replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry
without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without
murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are
made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives.
The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and
extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to
be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired
not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of
almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and
articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric,
the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the
retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the
threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the
result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it
is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first
argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious
consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive
competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass
upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down
the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention
year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail
trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings,
and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade
act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the everincreasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as
witness the following tables:
****Tables Deleted****

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume
and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown.
But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities
producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite
number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into
existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization
in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under
modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have
multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the
retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the
infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed
within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the
functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed
food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities
comprising the nation.

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments,

By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948
Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships,
while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere
market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and
gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years.
It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of
retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven
times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers,

Page 15 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official
report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in
the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the
native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically
helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional
convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been
sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the
enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been
adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence
of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution
categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the
Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the
retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble
opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the
general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests
that had already brought under their control the commercial and other
economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed.,
p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he
says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance
over the economic life of the country is not desirable and
that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength.
Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien
hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is
but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government
as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle
for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the
same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom.
Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized
movement for the protection of the nation not only against
the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its
economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic
field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other
quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe
so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express
sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution
No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of
Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20,
1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially
pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality
proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does
not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling
that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With
ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization,
alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and
concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination
of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market,
and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not
patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national
economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and
of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals,
producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is
desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or
importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new
competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that
aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating
it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the

producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find

the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find
the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus
curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the
pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook
or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a
general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the
retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they
have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of
the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to
establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public
from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they
have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic
deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret
combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the
operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived
to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield
to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws,
smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import
and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have
engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As
a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both
by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives,
action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence
of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that
worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the
alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore,
becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of
harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are
well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of
goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the
national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs
of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the
State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security .

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and

circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial
hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that
has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the
national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police
power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and
security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question
that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of
the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root
and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or
his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is
attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he
temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would
prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting
them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to
his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such

Page 16 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never
really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He
undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and
profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in
this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be
ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers.
We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all
presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held
that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine
Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the
concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs.
Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally
restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming
houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with
the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial
nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of
American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation
of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the
vessel an American character, that the license is granted;
that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as
contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the
Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine,
as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise,
that this whole system is projected."

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as

already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These
differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence
to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction .

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail

trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and
aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the
law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare
that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal
protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide
scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In
addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to
the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co . (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable
basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is
essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification .
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid
ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this
jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the
case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity
of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a
condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine
Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was
held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the
law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which
forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens
as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2
Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana , 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a
statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that
no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention,
to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare,
good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot
question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State , 99 N.
E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons,
among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found
not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate
purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as
to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to
our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex
rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the
U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city
of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard
rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against
aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance
may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object
of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and
that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that
latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local
conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an
apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio,
1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of
Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking
was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and
limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar
statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May , L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So
also in Anton vs. Van Winkle , 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court
said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of
issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool,
billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional
rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners , 90 N.W.
1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's
findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any
way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the
community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission , 92 L. ed.

Page 17 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial

fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void,
because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and
because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of
the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification
for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth
of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two
Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley
Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a
tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons
over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that
there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the

police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United
States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been
held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to
be attained. . . . .
xxx

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As
we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in
daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty
and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations
on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions
and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do
no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle , 297 F.
340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction
between the alien and the national, thus:

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in

the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free
to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. .
. . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

d. Authorities contra explained.

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State
courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and
citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the
laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable
or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and
hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or
pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the
United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making
unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than
English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for
the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there
would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese
would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of
their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The
real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no
public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on
the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable
for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220
(1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent
in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was
declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was
arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which
attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that
the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery ,
47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination
bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification was proposed.

xxx

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word
"reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in
a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is
to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights
secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable,
and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. .
..
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be

reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class,
and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302.,
1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele , 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
...

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389,
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming
into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our
laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it
is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of
different psychology from our fellow countrymen.
Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that
the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own
country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and
control have been engendered and formed under entirely
different regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a
part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot
be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature
was without plausible reason for making the classification,
and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature
decisive.

395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature,

passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the
operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the
first questions to be considered by the court is whether the
power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in
connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without
substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort,
and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary
occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to
the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and
honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature
to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality
and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this
country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been
so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and
without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and
welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and
indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien,

Page 18 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he

now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a
deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner,
which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is
the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable.
Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious
form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged
therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in
question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired
legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects
private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into
effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to
have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory
note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose
is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines
from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are
the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have
no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have
no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not
really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even
our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not
propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens
of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all
aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national
survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then
economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their
own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives
that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional
limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a
people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation

and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And
in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the
nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose
and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the
nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is,
therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the
nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a
remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and
national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and
meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien
domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how
tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already
engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their
lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only
upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court
on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should
not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in
the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to
judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the
motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent
with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of
the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions
are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other
arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law
does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be
thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the
elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation;
that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc.
Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of
the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not
import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the

sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the
constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a
noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru
the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must
have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people,
their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing
their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is

the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals
the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business
and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision
which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which
reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest

requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain
from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate
for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it
is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to
promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American
citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted
on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title
completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of
the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not
readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and
"prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in

various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of

intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of

Page 19 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases

intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7;

quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the
subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the
tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc."
sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the
sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of
getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included
within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State,
48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and
necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition
of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be
regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey
meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating
police power in connection with a thing the best or only
efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State
vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it
has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803,
p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or
"prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the
regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms
"nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many
provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have
made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in
accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which
would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any
case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected;
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by
any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects
of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens.
Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law
for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for
them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the
law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not
transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection
guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the
law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our
power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill

should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action
and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it
cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the
law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in
the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever
existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the
supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of
the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp.
29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more
than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of
the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can
be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations,
such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in
retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners
engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the
law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment
to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating
against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are
all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing
that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject
to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs.
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Page 20 of 20
CONSTI 2- Due Process Cases