Notes - Rules 82 To 91

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS)
PROF. DOROTHY UY NAVA
4C & 4D, Second Semester, SY 2009-2010

II.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

B.
PROBATE/ADMINISTRATION MODE
9.
RULE 82 Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and

Removal of Executors and Administrators
Sec. 1. Administration revoked if will discovered; Proceedings thereupon. - If after letters of

administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his
will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be revoked and
all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to
the court, and render his account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the
issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as
hereinbefore provided.
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator; Proceedings
upon death, resignation, or removal. - If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in
its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns,
or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor
or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Sec. 3. Acts before revocation, resignation, or removal to be valid. - The lawful acts an
executor or administrator before the revocation of his letters testamentary or of
administration, or before his resignation or removal, shall have the like validity as if there
had been no such revocation, resignation, or removal.
Sec. 4. Powers of new executor or administrator. - Renewal of license to sell real estate. The
person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are granted after the revocation
of former letters, or the death, resignation, or removal of a former executor or
administrator, shall have the like powers to collect and settle the estate not administered
that the former executor or administrator had, and may prosecute or defend actions
commenced by or against the former executor or administrator, and have execution on
judgments recovered in the name of such former execution or administrator. An authority
granted by the court to the former executor or administrator for the sale or mortgage of
real estate may be renewed in favor of such person without further notice or hearing.
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, 190 SCRA 112 (1990)

1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her four
children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.
2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who was
receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as
co-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate
and the heirs.
3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their opposition.
The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of
GONZALES.
4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It was
held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two
children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to
manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate.
5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES should be
nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
RULING:
Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated.
1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate,
or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.
2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them
to protection from removal without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides
the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a
court must have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal.
3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in OLBES
motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought
against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that
conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that
the former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.
4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was
shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties
(sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land
Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate.
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Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to reinstate
GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices
and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it
would result in orderly and efficient administration.
10.
RULE 83 Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family
Sec. 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. - When three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come
into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order
one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
Sec. 2. Certain articles not to be inventoried. - The wearing apparel of the surviving husband
or wife and minor children, the marriage bed and bedding, and such provisions and other
articles as will necessarily be consumed in the subsistence of the family of the deceased,
under the direction of the court, shall not be considered as assets, nor administered as
such, and shall not be included in the inventory.
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Santero v. CFI of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 (1987)
Pablo Santero had 3 illegitimate children with Felixberta Pacursa (Princesita,

Federico and Winy) while he also had 4 illegitimate children with Anselma Diaz
(Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel).
A Motion For Allowance filed by Anselma (as guardian of V,R,A,M) for support which
included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities. The oppositors
contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and
have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They also
alleged that the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
allowance. Anselma admitted some of her children are of age and not enrolled for
the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given
the requested allowances, citing Art. 290 of the Civil Code: Support also includes
the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
The court granted the motion and the children were given an allowance.
Later, the children (V,R,A,M) filed another Motion for Allowance to include an
additional 3 children (Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito). The court granted the motion.
Anselma clarified that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as
represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support
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and her first three (3) children who were then of age should have been included
since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. But an Order was issued by the
court directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three
additional recipients or children of Anselma.
Felixberta's children (P,F,W) filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that Anselma's
children are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority
age, two are gainfully employed and one is married. They also said that the
administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero did not have sufficient funds to cover
said allowance.
HELD:
SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order.
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts.
290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing
and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he
completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving
spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until
what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received
for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
The fact that Anselma's children are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment
and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art.
188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, Anselma's children (V,R,A,M) are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo
Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code (substantial law) gives the surviving spouse
and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the
"legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
Heirs of Miguel Franco v. Court of Appeals,
418 SCRA 60 (2003)
ORIGINAL:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to overturn a Decision rendered by the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals on 6 October 1995 in CA G.R. CV No. 37609. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 7 (RTC) and ordered the cancellation of TCT
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No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel Franco (whose heirs are the petitioners herein), and the issuance of
a new transfer certificate of title for Lot No. 5172-B, PSD-64806, in favor of the heirs of Quintin Franco
(Quintin). Quintin was the patentee of a parcel of public land, surveyed as Lot No. 5172, Cad. 85 Ext.
(subject property), located at Lianib, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, and containing an area of 70.6381
hectares. Being the patentee, Original Certificate of Title No. P-436 covering subject property was issued in
Quintins name on 9 July 1954.
Quintin died intestate on 8 December 1967. His brother, Miguel Franco (Miguel,), filed a Petition for Issuance
of Letters of Administration on 17 October 1968, before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte
(intestate court), praying that he be appointed as administrator of Quintins estate. This Petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. R-531, was opposed by Faustina Franco Vda. De Cabading (Faustina), the sister of the
decedent, on the ground that Miguel was unfit to be the administrator. She prayed for her own appointment
as administratrix instead of Miguel. Upon motion of Miguel, the intestate court appointed him as special
administrator of the estate on 3 December 1969. However, on 23 July 1971, Faustina, then apparently joined
by the other heirs of Quintin except Miguel, moved for the latters removal as special administrator.
On 27 August 1973, the intestate court issued an Order declaring inter alia that, based on the evidence,
Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject property. This finding was subsequently used by the intestate
court as one of the grounds for granting the motion to remove Miguel as special administrator, per the Order
dated 1 September 1973. In the latter Order, the intestate court said that since Miguel was claiming
ownership over half of the subject property, his conflicting interest rendered him incapable of rendering a
true and faithful account of the estate.
Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 September 1973 Order, wherein he alleged for the first time
that one-half of the subject property was transferred to him by virtue of a document entitled General Power
of Administration and executed by Quintin in 1967. It was also discovered that on the basis of this General
Power of Administration Miguel had filed a Petition dated 2 January 1972 before Branch 1 of the Dipolog
Court of First Instance, docketed as Misc. Sp. No. 2993, seeking the cancellation of OCT No. P-436. This
Petition was granted in the Order of 6 January 1973, wherein it was directed that the new transfer certificates
of title be issued, one in the name of the heirs of Quintin and the other name of Miguel. Thus, Miguel was able
to obtain Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-20203, covering half of the subject property, on 13 February
1973.
The other heirs asked the intestate court to cancel TCT No. T-20203 shortly after learning about it through a
Motion for Reconsideration filed in the estate proceedings. On 4 May 1977, the intestate court issued an order
cancelling TCT No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel, on the ground that Miguels acquisition of the title
was fraudulent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order in its Decision of 29 February 1984. According to
the appellate court, the intestate court had no jurisdiction to settle questions of property ownership. This
Court, in a Resolution dated 1 October 1984, affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Consequently, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed before the RTC a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
3847, seeking the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 in the name of Miguel, who had died in the meantime.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The RTC found that the General Power of
Administration evinced an existing trust relation between Quintin and his brother Miguel, with Quintin as
the signatory thereof acknowledging that he was holding half of the property titled in his name in trust for
Miguel. Applying Article 1452 of the Civil Code, the RTC concluded that a trust had been created by force of
law in favor of Miguel to the extent of one-half of the property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered on 6 October 1995 the challenged Decision reversing the RTC
decision, ordering the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 and directing the issuance of a new transfer certificate
of title in the name of the Heirs of Quintin. The appellate court concluded that Miguel had succeeded in
registering the property through fraud, surreptitious conduct, and bad faith. As basis, it recited the following
circumstances:
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1. In his petition for the issuance of letters of administration, Miguel admitted that the subject property in its
entirety belonged to his brother, Quintin, with his inclusion of the entire property in the list of properties left
behind by Quintin, without asserting ownership over it or any part thereof;
2. The intestate court had declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject property and
dismissed, for lack of sufficient evidence, the claim of Miguel to half of the property;
3. OCT No. P-436, covering the entire subject property, was registered as early as 9 July 1954 but it was only
on 13 February 1973 that Miguel Franco obtained the TCT covering half of the property in his name. His
silence for 19 years had militated against his claim of ownership and may well be indicative of laches on his
part;
4. The subject property was solely declared for taxation purposes in the name of Quintin;
5. The General Power of Administration, on which Miguel anchored his claim of ownership, had simply
documented a delegated power to administer property and could not be a source of ownership;
6. The Order dated 6 January 1973 of Judge Rafael Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2993, which directed the
cancellation of OCT No. P-436 was issued without factual basis. Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act
which was the apparent basis of the Order contemplated only summary proceedings for non-controversial
erasures, alterations or amendment of entries in a certificate of title and therefore could not be invoked if
there is no unanimity among the parties, or if one of them had posed an adverse claim or serious objection
which would render the case controversial.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners brought forth the
present petition. While asserting that the transfer and registration of one-half of the subject property in the
name of Miguel was not done through fraud or in bad faith, they point out that at no time did the respondents
question the execution or genuineness of the General Power of Administration which purportedly admits of
the existence of a trust relation between Quintin and Miguel. They also claim that the Court of Appeals failed
to appreciate the recognition which Quintin had accorded to the rights and interest of Miguel.
The findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; hence, the review of the case is in order.
After a thorough examination of the case, we hold that the petition lacks merit and affirm the Decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Miguels claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by his statement in the Verified Petition
for issuance of letters administration that he filed on 17 October 1968. Therein, he stated:
7. That said Quintin Franco left the following properties:
a A parcel of agricultural land located at Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte known as Lot No. 5172, Dipolog
Cadastre-85 Ext., Cad. Case No. 9. LRC Cad. Rec. No. 769, (S.A. 7612), covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-436, under Tax Dec. No. 676, assessed at P26,120.00, with an area of 706,381 sq. m. (citations omitted)
While he explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time he was
remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof during the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted
his claim to the subject property quite belatedly, i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in a court
pleading that it belonged in its entirety to his brother. Thus, the statement and the accompanying silence may
be appreciated in more than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a judicial admission
combined.
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A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
In the same vein, a judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that
this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he made the admission.
In his Motion to Admit Amended Petition, he merely alleged inadvertence in failing to state his claim of coownership. Yet no evidence was adduced to prove the alleged inadvertence. And even assuming there was
indeed such a mistake, Miguel had ample opportunity to make the rectification in the initial stages of the
intestate proceedings.
Bearing on the weight of the combined declaration against interest and judicial admission is the assumption,
arising from his duty as special administrator of the estate of Quintin, that he had full knowledge of the status
and extent of the property holdings of the decedent. The following observation of the Court of Appeals is
worth citing:
This tolerant silence militates against Miguel Francos claim of co-ownership. Juxtaposed with his previous
judicial admission of Quintin Francos absolute ownership of Lot No. 5172, it is not difficult to see that the act
of Miguel Franco in registering one-half of the property in his name was an insidious and surreptitious, if not
belated, maneuver to deprive the legal heirs of Quintin Franco of their lawful share and interest in the
property. As a matter of fact, Miguel Franco may well be charged with laches.
The statement under oath of Miguel was made in the intestate proceedings. It was presented in evidence and
utilized as such in Civil Case No. 3847. Thus from the substantive and procedural standpoints alike, the
statement being both a declaration against interest and judicial admission should be accorded the full
evidentiary value it deserves.
Another important point, albeit simply corollary. The intestate court in its Orderdated 27 August 1973
declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the property and accordingly denied Miguels claim of
ownership over half the subject property. The Order was apparently issued for the purpose of determining
which properties should be included for the inventory of the estate of Miguel. While the intestate court does
not have the authority to rule with finality on questions of ownership over the property of the decedent, it is
not precluded from making a provisional determination over such questions for purposes relevant to the
settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to include properties in the inventory of the estate.
And yet, at no time did Miguel file a motion for the reconsideration of the 27 August 1973 Order of the
intestate court which denied Miguels claim of ownership. It was the 1 September 1973 Order of the intestate
court, by virtue of which Miguel was removed as special administrator, that he contested. While the 27
August 1973 Order is a provisional determination of ownership over the subject property, yet conformably to
ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to dispute such an order which rejects his claim of
ownership. Miguels inaction unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable weight that should be accorded the
statement as a declaration against interest and a judicial admission.
Now, the issue viewed from the perspective of the Torrens system of registration. Under the Land
Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after the expiration of
one year from the entry of the decree of registration. The decree is incontrovertible and becomes binding on
all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process. OCT No.
P-436, covering the subject property in its entirety, was registered as early as 9 July 1954 in the name of
Quintin. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership of registered land. Whatever claim of ownership
Miguel had raised should have been weighed against Quintins title. Unfortunately, the Dipolog RTC, Branch 1
apparently ignored this fundamental principle when on 6 January 1973 it issued the Order directing the
registration of half of the subject property in the name of Miguel.
The undue haste which characterized Miguels success in obtaining judicial registration of his ownership over
half of the subject property is noticeable. His petition seeking the issuance of a title over his purported half of
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the property was dated 2 January 1973, and yet incredibly, it was granted only four days later, or on 6
January 1973. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The order dated January 6, 1973 of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2993, directing the
Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. P-436 and to issue new separate transfer certificates of title for Lot No.
5172-A and Lot No. 5172-B to the Heirs of Quintin Franco and Miguel Franco, respectively, was therefore
without factual basis. Besides, it would appear that the order was based on Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) which contemplates summary proceeding for non-controversial erasures,
alterations, or amendments of entries in a certificate of title. . . .
It is clear from reading Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act that the same may be utilized only under
limited circumstances. Proceedings under Section 112 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or
insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues. More importantly, resort
to the procedure laid down in Section 112 would be available only if there is a unanimity among the parties,
or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. Such unanimity among
the parties has been held to mean the absence of serious controversy between the parties in interest as to
the title of the party seeking relief under said section. Clearly, there was no such unanimity among the
parties in interest, namely, all the heirs of Quintin. The surreptitious registration by Miguel of the property
had worked to the prejudice of the other heirs of Quintin.
There is no document in existence whereby the ownership of any portion of the subject property was
conveyed by Quintin to Miguel. The General Power of Administration does not suffice in that regard.
Indeed, it does not contain any language that operates as a conveyance of the subject property.
The RTC ruling, from which petitioners draw heavy support, maintained that Miguel owned half of the
property because the document entitled General Power of Administration states that it admits of an
existing trust relation between the signatory Quintin Franco on the one hand, and Miguel Franco on the other
hand. The RTC cited Article 1452 of the Civil Code which reads, thus:
ART. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken
in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each.
Article 1452 presupposes the concurrence of two requisites before an trust can be created, namely: that two
or more persons agree to purchase a property, and that they consent that one should take the title in his name
for everyones benefit. The aforementioned provision is not applicable in this case, as it clearly speaks of an
instance when the property is acquired through a joint purchase by two or more persons. That circumstance
is not present in this case since the subject property was acquired through Quintins application for a patent.
There is no proof that Miguel had joined Quintin in acquiring the property.
Lastly, as noted by the Court of Appeals, while tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The subject property had been
consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of Quintin, and this fact taken in conjunction with the
other circumstances inexorably lead to the conclusion that Miguels claim of ownership cannot be sustained.
Thus, even without having to inquire into the authenticity and due execution of the General Power of
Administration, it is safe to conclude that Miguel did not have any ownership rights over any portion of the
subject property and that the registration of half of the property in his name was baseless and afflicted with
fraud.
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WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of
the Court of appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
11.
RULE 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and

Administrators
Sec. 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and property; How
right enforced. - The executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased partner shall at
all times have access to, and may examine and take copies of, books and papers relating to
the partnership business, and may examine and make invoices of the property belonging to
such partnership; and the surviving partner or partners, on request, shall exhibit to him all
such books, papers, and property in their hands or control. On the written application of
such executor or administrator, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may order any
such surviving partner or partners to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and to exhibit
the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided, and may punish any partner
failing to do so for contempt.
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. - An executor or administrator
shall maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to
the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to
do by the court.
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate
not willed. - An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration.
Mananquil v. Villegas, 189 SCRA 335 (1990)
- This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.
- It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator
for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna.
- In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract with
the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zernas estate.
- The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.
- It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a
partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.
- When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed
administrator for LEONGs estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were
made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS
should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zernas
estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estates
administrator.
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ISSUES:
1 Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate courts approval regarding
the lease.
2 Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred.
RULING:
1
NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial
executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of
administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate.
For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into
lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority
and approval.
Thus, considering that administrator LEONG was not required under the law and
prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly
lease real properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of LEONG, cannot be taken to task
for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to
secure its judicial approval thereto.
2
NO. There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be
suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease
contracts involving properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership of HIJOS DE
VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession are prohibited fro leasing, either in person or through the mediation of
another, the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence,
suspension for four months.
12.
RULE 85 - Accountability and Compensation of Executors and

Administrators
Sec. 1. Executor or administrator chargeable with all estate and income. - Except as
otherwise expressly provided in the following sections, every executor or administrator is
chargeable in his account with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into
his possession, at the value of the appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the
interest, profit, and income of such estate; and with the proceeds of so much of the estate as
is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold.
Sec. 2. Not to profit by increase or lose by decrease in value. - No executor or administrator
shall profit by the increase, or suffer loss by the decrease or destruction, without his fault,
of any part of the estate. He must account for the excess when he sells any part of the estate
for more than appraisement, and if any is sold for less than the appraisement, he is not
responsible for the loss, if the sale has been justly made. If he settles any claim against the
estate for less than its nominal value, he is entitled to charge in his account only the amount
he actually paid on the settlement.
4D Page 10

Sec. 3. When not accountable for debts due estate. - No executor or administrator shall be
accountable for debts due the deceased which remain uncollected without his fault.
Sec. 4. Accountable for income from realty used by him. - If the executor or administrator
uses or occupies any part of the real estate himself, he shall account for it as may be agreed
upon between him and the parties interested, or adjusted by the court with their assent;
and if the parties do not agree upon the sum to be allowed, the same may be ascertained by
the court, whose determination in this respect shall be final.
Sec. 5. Accountable if he neglects or delays to raise or pay money. - When an executor or
administrator neglects or unreasonably delays to raise money, by collecting the debts or
selling the real or personal estate of the deceased, or neglects to pay over the money he has
in his hands, and the value of the estate is thereby lessened or unnecessary cost or interest
accrues, or the persons interested suffer loss, the same shall be deemed waste and the
damage sustained may be charged and allowed against him in his account, and he shall be
liable therefor on his bond.
Sec. 6. When allowed money paid as costs. - The amount paid by an executor or
administrator for costs awarded against him shall be allowed in his administration account,
unless it appears that the action or proceeding in which the costs are taxed was prosecuted
or resisted without just cause, and not in good faith.
Sec. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. - Not to charge for services
as attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. An executor or
administrator shall be allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day for the time actually and
necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes
into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses,
legacies, or distributive shares, or by delivery to heirs or devisees, of two per centum of the
first five thousand pesos of such value, one per centum of so much of such value as exceeds
five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per centum of so
much of such value as exceeds thirty thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred
thousand pesos and one-quarter per centum of so much of such value as exceed one
hundred thousand pesos. But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the
settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree or
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If
objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be re-examined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be
apportioned among them by the court according to the services actually rendered by them
respectively.
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate
any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
4D Page 11

When the deceased by will makes some other provision for the compensation of his
executor, that provision shall be a full satisfaction for his services unless by a written
instrument filed in the court he renounces all claim to the compensation provided by the
will.
Sec. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. - Every executor or administrator
shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving
letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of
extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for
disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require
until the estate is wholly settled.
Sec. 9. Examination on oath with respect to account. - The court may examine the executor
or administrator upon oath with respect to every matter relating to any account rendered
by him, and shall so examine him as to the correctness of his account before the same is
allowed, except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its
correctness is satisfactorily established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees,
distributees, and creditors of the estate shall have the same privilege as the executor or
administrator of being examined on oath of any matter relating to an administration.
Sec. 10. Account to be settled on notice. - Before the account of an executor or administrator
is allowed, notice shall be given to persons interested of time and place of examining and
allowing the same; and such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or
by advertisement in a newspaper or newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
Sec. 11. Surety on bond may be party to accounting. - Upon the settlement of the account of
an executor or administrator, a person liable as surety in respect to such account may,
upon application, be admitted as party to such accounting.
Tioco v. Imperial, 53 Phil 802 (1928)
Respondent Panis, counsel for the administration of estate of the deceased, before
final settlement of the accounts, moved for the allowance of attorneys fees in the
sum of P15,000
The judge, over the objection of the petitioner administrator Uy Tioco, granted the
same; Uy Tioco did not appeal
Almost 2 months later, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of minors
Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, sons and only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion
for reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified of the motion for
allowance and the grant thereof; denied
Yangco gave notice of his intention to appeal
Meanwhile, Panis, through Wijangco, filed a motion for execution of of the
P15,000; he claims that since Bruno Uy was already dead, his share will go to his
4D Page 12

father (petitioner) who did not appeal the decision of the court and consequently,
only the share of Pedro Uy should be withheld
Yangco objected but the judge ordered the payment of of P15,000
ISSUES, HELD and RATIO:
Whether the orders were valid and final
court said that they need not be determined in the case at hand, but they are
appealable
there is no provision of law authorizing the lower court to enforce the immediate
execution of such orders in probate proceedings after an appeal has been perfected
what is the character of liability for attorneys fees in probate proceedings?
the attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to
the executor or administrator
the services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust; thus, liability for the
payment of attorneys fees rests on the executor or administrator (if the fees are
beneficial to the estate, then executor or administrator is entitled to reimbursement from
the estate)
Tumang v. Laguio, 96 SCRA 124 (1980)
Tumang was the executrix of the will of her husband, Dominador Tumang. She filed a
petition to have the probate proceedings closed so that she and her children can have the
inherited properties transferred in their names. However, Laguio opposed claiming that
Tumang failed to account for additional property that came under her possession.
Apparently, certain cash and stock dividends were not included in the initial accounting.
Tumang countered that since she had already rendered an accounting to the court
then the court had no more jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the court still has jurisdiction to require accounting
HELD:
Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court
may require until the estate is wholly settled."
It has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate
after he has filed an account should file a supplementary account thereof, and may be
compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters occurring after the settlement
of final account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account."
There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix received funds of
the estate after the approval of her final accounts and before the issuance of an order
finally closing the proceedings is admitted. She must, therefore, account for the same, in
consonance with her duty to account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have
come into her possession by virtue of her office.
4D Page 13

The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident

of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to
be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered
closed and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted
for. The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of
jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the
Rules provide that "he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the
estate is wholly settled."
Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677 (1987)
The decedent Ogan died testate, instituting his natural children as heirs and naming
Binamira and Occena as co-executors. When the decedent died, Binamira was appointed as
special administrator. And after due notice and hearing, letters testamentary were issued
to him and his fellow executor Occena. In the course of the proceedings, the court ordered
the filing of claims against the estate of the appropriate creditors. One of those who filed
claims was Binamira, for the supposed fees due to him as a special administrator. The fees
he sought to collect started out at 7% then increased to around 33% later on, which was
met with much opposition from the heirs and his fellow executor. A compromise was
however entered into by the parties as to payment of claims and part of the estate was
released and distributed to the heirs. The court properly affirmed such compromise
agreement and Binamira resigned as co-executor. Consequently, Binamira was required to
render a final accounting and report. To this he complied but sought compensation
afterwards. This was opposed by the heirs, averring that his claim was barred by the
compromise agreement already. The lower court affirmed the claim however, on the
ground that the same was allowable under the agreement and that it was subsequent to the
subject matter of the same.
ISSUES:
Whether Binamira is barred by an earlier compromise agreement to claim payment from
the estate for rendering final accounting and report as co-executor?
HELD:
The finality of the compromise should not be taken to mean that, it in effect terminates
Binamira's obligation as co-executor. Under the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 85, Section 8,
Atty. Binamira is obliged to render further accounts as the court may require until the
estate is wholly settled. The duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere
incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded when the
same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by
the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated.
Lacson v. Reyes, 182 SCRA 729 (1990)
Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and testament of
Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will.
Granted. He then filed a motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging that the heirs
4D Page 14

have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs
denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00 which was
already paid. Lower court granted the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.
HELD:
No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Second, The
Rules of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the
necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorneys fees from
the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of
executors or administrators commissions, and never as attorneys fees. Where the
administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter who must pay therefore.
Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs
and not from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
Salonga v. Pascual, 488 SCRA 449 (2006)
Law partnership files petition for review of the CA 1995 decision which affirmed the orders
of the RTC of Malabon regarding the estate of Dona Adela Pascual with Dr. Olivia Pascual as
executrix.
Olivia Pascual engaged the services of petitioner in connection with the settlement
of the estate of Doa Adela. Their agreement stipulated that the final professional fee "shall
be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved
inventory of the estate.
Olivia then initiated probate proceedings of the will Dona Adela, the court allowed
probate of the 1978 Last Will and Testament of Doa Adela.
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of
the total gross estate of the late Doa Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on
the court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement.
The Probate court noted the lien as chargeable to the share of Olivia Pascual. It then
issued an order requiring all persons having claims for money against the decedent to file
said claims with the Clerk of Court at Malabon. Accordingly, petitioner filed a Motion to
Annotate Attorney's Lien on Properties of the Estate of Doa Adela Vda. de Pascual.
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of
petitioner's attorney's lien the figure, characterized as "tentative," based on the gross
appraised value of the estate of Dona Adela
Olivia Pascual filed her comment and/or opposition to the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution on attorney's fees. She argued that a lawyer of an administrator or
executor should charge the individual client, not the estate, for professional fees. Olivia
Pascual also claimed, citing jurisprudence, that the counsel claiming attorney's fees should
give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate, and that such was not
accomplished by petitioner considering that no notices were given to the several legatees
designated in Doa Adela's will.
4D Page 15

The Probate Court denied the motions for writ of execution filed by the petitioner
saying that the bulk of the estate of Dona Adela is still tied up with the estate of her late
husband Don Andres, the proceedings over which still pending in another court. The CA
upheld the order of denial of the probate court arguing that petitioner may directly claim
attorney's fees only against Olivia Pascual and not against the estate of Doa Adela; and
that petitioner's claim is also premature since contrary to the requisite stipulated in the
Retainer Agreement, there is no court-approved agreement for the distribution of the
properties of the estate of Doa Adela as yet.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner can only claim attorneys fees against Olivia and not the
estate
2. Whether or not sufficient notice of the claim was given to the heirs of Dona Adela
3. Whether or not the motion for execution is premature
HELD:
1. As a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is primarily liable for
attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the executor or
administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or
administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in
attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the
benefit of the estate. However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the
attorney's fees, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an
action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and
not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate
or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as
an expense of administration. If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that
notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to enable these persons
to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment. Attorneys fees, as stated in Escueta, partake the nature of an
administration expense. It is an expense attending the accomplishment of the
purpose of administration growing out of the contract or obligation entered into by
the personal representative of the estate, and thus the claim for reimbursement
must be superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.
Moreover, it cannot be escaped that the Retainer Agreement was entered into
between petitioner and Olivia Pascual prior to the filing of the probate petition, and
that at such time, she had no recognized right to represent the estate of Doa Adela
yet. This circumstance further bolsters our opinion that if petitioner insists on the
judicial enforcement of the Retainer Agreement, its proper remedy, authorized by
law and jurisprudence, would be a personal action against Olivia Pascual, and not
against the estate of Doa Adela. If this were the recourse pursued by petitioner,
and Olivia Pascual is ultimately held liable under the Retainer Agreement for
attorney's fees, she may nonetheless seek reimbursement from the estate of Doa
Adela if she were able to establish that the attorney's fees paid to petitioner were
necessary administration expenses.
There may however be instances wherein the estate should not be charged with
attorney's fees. If the costs of counsel's fees arise out of litigation among the
4D Page 16

beneficiaries thereof themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular

persons, the estate generally cannot be held liable for such costs, although when the
administrator employs competent counsel on questions which affect his/her duties
as the administrator and on which he/she is in reasonable doubt, reasonable
expenses for such services may be charged against the estate subject to the approval
of the court. It has also been held that an administrator who brings on litigation for
the deliberate purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit is
not entitled to reimbursement for counsel's fees incurred in such litigation.
Clearly then, while the direct recovery of attorney's fees from the estate may be
authorized if the executor refuses to pay such fees, and claimed through the filing of
the proper petition with the probate court, such claim remains controvertible. This
is precisely why Escueta and its progenies require that the petition be made with
notice to all the heirs and interested parties.
2. Proper notice was not given to all the heirs of Dona Adela. Only Olivia Pascual was
given a copy of the Motion for a Writ of Execution.
Such notice is material to the other heirs to Doa Adela's estate. The payment of
attorney's fees, especially in the amount of 3% of the total gross estate as sought for
by petitioner, substantially diminishes the estate of Doa Adela and may
consequently cause the diminution of their devises and legacies. Since these persons
were so named in the very will itself and the action for probate which was filed by
petitioner itself, there is no reason why petitioner could not have given due notice to
these persons on its claim for attorney's fees. The requisite notice to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees is anchored on the constitutional principle that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. The payment of such
attorney's fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the decedent, and may
effectively diminish the value of the testamentary dispositions made by the
decedent. The instant claim for attorney's fees is thus precluded by the absence of
the requisite notices by petitioner to all the interested persons such as the
designated heirs, devisees, legatees, as required by the jurisprudential rule laid
down in Escueta.
3. The claim or motion for execution however is not premature. Petitioners have two
options to enforce their claim: (1) a separate suit against the executor or
administrator in the latter's personal capacity, (2) a direct claim against the estate
itself, with due notice to all interested persons, filed with the probate court.
The retainer agreement also allows two possible causes of action:
(a) An obligation on the part of Olivia Pascual to pay the final fee of 3% of the gross
total estate payable upon approval by the Probate Court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties to the court- designated heirs of the estate. Recovery
here of attorney's fees has to await the final ascertainment of value of the gross total
estate of Doa Adela, as well as the approval by the Probate Court of the agreement
for the distribution of the properties. The Retainer Agreement makes it clear that
the final payment of attorney's fees is contingent on these two conditions, and the
claim for attorney's fees based on the Retainer Agreement cannot ripen until these
conditions are met.
4D Page 17

(b) The direct claim for attorney's fees against the estate, as authorized under
Escueta. The character of this claim is not contractual in nature, but rather, as a
reimbursement for a necessary expense of administration, and it will be
allowed if it satisfies the criteria for necessary expenses of administration. Its
entitlement can be established by the actual services rendered by the lawyer
necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of administration, and not
necessarily by the contract of engagement of the attorney's services.
By filing their claim directly against the estate of Doa Adela, petitioner has clearly
resorted to this second cause of action. There are consequent advantages and
disadvantages to petitioner. Since the claim arises irrespective of the contingencies
as stipulated in the Retainer Agreement, the attorney's fees may be collected against
the estate even before the final determination of its gross total value or the final
approval of the project of partition. As earlier stated, such claim for reimbursement
is superior to the right of the beneficiaries to the estate, and as such, there is need to
finally determine the respective shares of the beneficiaries before attorney's fees in
the nature of administration expenses may be paid out.
The one distinct disadvantage, however, is that the Retainer Agreement cannot be
deemed binding on the estate or the Probate Court since the estate is not a party to
such contract. This would not preclude the Probate Court from enforcing the
provisions of the Retainer Agreement if, in its sound discretion, the terms of
payment therein are commensurate to the value of the actual services necessary to
the administration of the estate actually rendered by petitioner. Yet if the Probate
Court does choose to adopt the Retainer Agreement as binding on the estate of Doa
Adela, petitioner may again be precluded from immediate recovery of attorney's
fees in view of the necessity or precondition of ascertaining the gross total value of
the estate, as well as the judicial approval of the final agreement of partition. In any
event, whether the claim for attorney's fees was pursued through a separate suit
against Olivia Pascual (in her personal capacity) for the enforcement of the Retainer
Agreement, or against the estate of Doa Adela as reimbursement for necessary
administration expenses, it remains essential that a hearing be conducted on the
claim. In either case too, the hearing will focus on the value of the services of the
petitioner and the necessity of engaging petitioner as counsel.
In short: Administrator or executor primarily liable for attorneys fees subject to
reimbursement from the estate. When direct recovery of the attorneys fees is made on
the estate rather than on the administrator or executor, proper notice must be given to
all heirs of the decedent.
Quasha Ancheta Pea and Nolasco Law Office
v. LCN Construction Corp., 563 SCRA 426 (2008)
ORIGINAL:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with petitioners Quasha Ancheta
Pea and Nolasco Law Office (Quasha Law Office) and the Heirs of Raymond Triviere praying for the
reversal of the Decision[1] dated 11 May 2006 and Resolution[2] dated 22 September 2006 of the Court of
4D Page 18

Appeals granting in part the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent LCN Construction Corporation (LCN)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 81296.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the settlement of
his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. M-1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office,
representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed
administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha
incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and
administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation
expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took
over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, [3] for their own behalf
and for their respective clients, presenting the following allegations:
(1) That the instant Petition was filed on January 13, 1988; and Atty. Enrique P. Syquia was appointed
Administrator by the Order of this Honorable Court dated April 12, 1988, and discharged his duties
starting April 22, 1988, after properly posting his administrator's bond up to this date, or more than
fourteen (14) years later. Previously, there was the co-administrator Atty. William H. Quasha, but he has
already passed away.
(2)
That, together with Co-administrator Atty. William H. Quasha, they have performed diligently and
conscientiously their duties as Co-administrators, having paid the required Estate tax and settled the
various claims against the Estate, totaling approximately twenty (20) claims, and the only remaining
claim is the unmeritorious claim of LCN Construction Corp., now pending before this Honorable Court;
(3)
That for all their work since April 22, 1988, up to July 1992, or for four (4) years, they were only given
the amount of P20,000.00 each on November 28, 1988; and another P50,00.00 each on October 1991;
and the amount of P100,000.00 each on July 1992; or a total of P170,000.00 to cover their
administration fees, counsel fees and expenses;
(4)
That through their work, they were able to settle all the testate (sic) claims except the remaining
baseless claim of LCN Construction Corp., and were able to dismiss two (2) foreign claims, and were
also able to increase the monetary value of the estate from roughly over P1Million to the present
P4,738,558.63 as of August 25, 2002 and maturing on September 27, 2002; and the money has always
been with the Philippine National Bank, as per the Order of this Honorable Court;
(5)
That since July 1992, when the co-administrators were paid P100,000.00 each, nothing has been paid to
either Administrator Syquia or his client, the widow Consuelo Triviere; nor to the Quasha Law Offices or
their clients, the children of the deceased Raymond Triviere;
(6)
That as this Honorable Court will notice, Administrator Syquia has always been present during the
hearings held for the many years of this case; and the Quasha Law Offices has always been represented
by its counsel, Atty. Redentor C. Zapata; and after all these years, their clients have not been given a part
of their share in the estate;
(7)
That Administrator Syquia, who is a lawyer, is entitled to additional Administrator's fees since, as
provided in Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court:
4D Page 19

"x x x where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may
be allowed..."
In addition, Atty. Zapata has also been present in all the years of this case. In addition, they have spent
for all the costs of litigation especially the transcripts, as out-of-pocket expenses.
(8)
That considering all the foregoing, especially the fact that neither the Administrator or his client, the
widow; and the Quasha Law Offices or their clients, the children of the deceased, have received any
money for more than ten (10) years now, they respectfully move that the amount of P1Million be taken
from the Estate funds, to be divided as follows:
a)
P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased [Triviere] who are represented by the Quasha
Ancheta Pea & Nolasco Law Offices;
b)
P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses for the Quasha Ancheta Pea & Nolasco Law
Offices;
c)
P150,000.00 as share for the widow of the deceased [Raymond Triviere], Amy Consuelo Triviere; and
d)
P200,000.00 for the administrator Syquia, who is also the counsel of the widow; and for litigation costs
and expenses.
LCN, as the only remaining claimant[4] against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special
Proceedings Case No. M-1678, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October
2002. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it
denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to
submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court. LCN also averred that
the administrators and the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere had earlier agreed to fix the former's fees at
only 5% of the gross estate, based on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even
overpaid P55,000.00. LCN further asserted that contrary to what was stated in the second Motion for
Payment, Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court was inapplicable, [5] since the administrators failed
to establish that the estate was large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or required a
high degree of capacity on the part of the administrators. Finally, LCN argued that its claims are still
outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be
allowed until they have been paid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against
the estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of the
estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the latter insolvent.
On 12 June 2003, the RTC issued its Order[6] taking note that "the widow and the heirs of the deceased
Triviere, after all the years, have not received their respective share (sic) in the Estate x x x."
The RTC declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
considering that:
[T]here appears to be no need for an accounting as the estate has no more assets except the money deposited
with the Union Bank of the Philippines under Savings Account No. 12097-000656-0 x x x; on the estate taxes,
records shows (sic) that the BIR Revenue Region No. 4-B2 Makati had issued a certificate dated April 27, 1988
indicating that the estate taxes has been fully paid.[7]
As to the payment of fees of Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, the RTC found as follows:
[B]oth the Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased (sic) are entitled to the payment for the services
they have rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased as they have over a decade
now spent so much time, labor and skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time the
administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.[8]
Hence, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid, to wit:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the instant motion is hereby GRANTED. The sums to be paid to the
co-administrator and counsel for the heirs of the deceased Triviere are however reduced.
4D Page 20

Accordingly, the co-administrator Atty. Syquia and aforenamed counsel are authorized to pay to be sourced
from the Estate of the deceased as follows:
a)
P450,000.00 as share of the children of the deceased who are represented by the Quasha, Ancheta,
Pena, Nolasco Law Offices;
b)
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses for said law firm;
c)
P150,000.00 as share for the widow of the deceased Amy Consuelo Triviere; and
d)
P100,000.00 for the Co-administrator Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and for litigation costs and expenses. [9]
LCN filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] of the foregoing Order on 2 July 2003, but it was denied by the RTC
on 29 October 2003.[11]
On 13 May 2004, LCN sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by assailing in CA-G.R. SP No. 81296, a
Petition for Certiorari, the RTC Orders dated 12 June 2003 and 2 July 2003, for having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.[12] LCN maintained that:
(1) The administrator's claim for attorney's fees, aside from being prohibited under paragraph 3, Section 7
of Rule 85 is, together with administration and litigation expenses, in the nature of a claim against the
estate which should be ventilated and resolved pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 86;
(2)
The awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim
in the sum of P6,016,570.65; and
(3)
The alleged deliberate failure of the co-administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
liabilities of the estate does not warrant the Court's favorable action on the motion for payment.[13]
On 11 May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN.
While the Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could
not claim the same from the funds of the estate. Referring to Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the appellate court reasoned that the award of expenses and fees in favor of executors and administrators is
subject to the qualification that where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not charge against
the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the
attorney's fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Offices should be borne by their clients, the widow and
children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.
The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 share and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to
the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis that Section 1, Rule 91 of the
Revised Rules of Court proscribes the distribution of the residue of the estate until all its obligations have
been paid.
The appellate court, however, did not agree in the position of LCN that the administrators' claims against the
estate should have been presented and resolved in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Claims against the estate that require presentation under Rule 86 refer to "debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the decedent during his lifetime and which could
have been reduced to simple judgment and among which are those founded on contracts." The Court of
Appeals also found the failure of the administrators to render an accounting excusable on the basis of Section
8, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.[14]
Finding the Petition for Certiorari of LCN partly meritorious, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of
the public respondent are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that (1)
the shares awarded to the heirs of the deceased Triviere in the assailed Order of June 12, 2003 are
4D Page 21

hereby DELETED; and
(2)
the attorney's fees awarded in favor of the co-administrators are hereby DELETED. However,
inasmuch as the assailed order fails to itemize these fees from the litigation fees/administrator's fees
awarded in favor of the co-administrators, public respondent is hereby directed to determine with
particularity the fees pertaining to each administrator.[15]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the 11 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Motion, however, was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 22 September 2006, [17] explaining
that:
In sum, private respondents did not earlier dispute [herein respondent LCN's] claim in its petition that the
law firm and its lawyers served as co-administrators of the estate of the late Triviere. It is thus quite absurd
for the said law firm to now dispute in the motion for reconsideration its being a co-administrator of the
estate.
[Herein petitioners], through counsel, likewise appear to be adopting in their motion for reconsideration a
stance conflicting with their earlier theory submitted to this Court. Notably, the memorandum for [petitioner]
heirs states that the claim for attorney's fees is supported by the facts and law. To support such allegation,
they contend that Section 7 (3) of Rule 85 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application to the
instant case since "what is being charged are not professional fees for legal services rendered but payment for
administration of the Estate which has been under the care and management of the co-administrators for the
past fourteen (14) years." Their allegation, therefore, in their motion for reconsideration that Section 7 (3) of
Rule 85 is inapplicable to the case of Quasha Law Offices because it is "merely seeking payment for legal
services rendered to the estate and for litigation expenses" deserves scant consideration.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, private respondents' motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. [18]
Exhausting all available legal remedies, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari based
on the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AWARD IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS ALREADY A DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR
OF THE CO-ADMINISTRATORS
I
The Court of Appeals modified the 12 June 2003 Order of the RTC by deleting the awards of P450,000.00 and
P150,000.00 in favor of the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively. The appellate
court adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid
and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the residue of the
estate.
Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond
Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court inapplicable.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
4D Page 22

with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
According to petitioners, the 12 June 2003 Order of the RTC should not be construed as a final order of
distribution. The 12 June 2003 RTC Order granting the second Motion for Payment is a mere interlocutory
order that does not end the estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution directing the delivery of the
residue of the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestate proceedings to a close and, consequently,
puts an end to the administration and relieves the administrator of his duties.
A perusal of the 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the
residue of the estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to
the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their
respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out of the reported P4,738,558.63 value of the estate,
the petitioner children and widow were being awarded by the RTC, in its 12 June 2003 Order, their shares in
the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled.
The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and rule on the pending claim
of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the
estate, if any, to his heirs.
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was
not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate,
still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and
widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or
provided for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it
may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or
appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule
90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the
estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of
them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs."
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of
the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is
not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in
awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its
obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its
Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single
sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective shares from
the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
4D Page 23

Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total
value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the
same.
Petitioners earlier invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,,[19] where the Court sustained an Order
granting partial distribution of an estate.
However, Dael is not even on all fours with the case at bar, given that the Court therein found that:
Where, however, the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable distribution of the inheritance in
accordance with law and the final judgment in the proceedings and it does not appear there are unpaid
obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond required,
such partial distribution may be allowed. (Emphasis supplied.)
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of
the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against
the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.
Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending
final termination of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as possible be discouraged by the
courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The
reason for this rule is that courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the
end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in
the inheritance.
Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by
the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.
II
On the second assignment of error, petitioner Quasha Law Office contends that it is entitled to the award of
attorney's fees and that the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney.
Compensation provided by will controls unless renounced. x x x.
xxxx
When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional
fees for legal services rendered by him. (Emphasis supplied.)
is inapplicable to it. The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction.
Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting
arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award of
attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would
later renounce that it was an administrator.
In the pleadings filed by the Quasha Law Office before the Court of Appeals, it referred to itself as coadministrator of the estate.
In the Comment submitted to the appellate court by Atty. Doronila, the member-lawyer then assigned by the
Quasha Law Office to the case, it stated that:
The 12 June 2003 Order granted the Motion for Payment filed by Co-Administrator and counsel Atty. Enrique
P. Syquia and the counsel Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila and Co-Administrator for the children of the late
Raymond Triviere. x x x.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
It would again in the same pleading claim to be the "co-administrator and counsel for the heirs of the late
Raymond Triviere."[21]
4D Page 24

Finally, the Memorandum it submitted to the Court of Appeals on behalf of its clients, the petitioner-children
of the late Raymond Triviere, the Quasha Law Office alleged that:
2.
The petition assails the Order of the Honorable Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63 granting
the Motion for Payment filed by Co-Administrators Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and the undersigned
counsel together with the children of the deceased Raymond Triviere, and the Order dated 29
October 2003 denying Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the First Order.
xxxx
I.
Statement of Antecedent Facts
xxxx
4.
On 13 May 2004, Atty. Enrique Syquia, co-administrator and counsel for respondent Amy Consuelo
Triviere and the undersigned counsel, co-administrator and counsel for the children of the late
Raymond Triviere filed their Comment.[22]
Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised
Rules of Court since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate. [23] When Atty. Quasha passed away in
1996, Atty. Syquia was left as the sole administrator of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere. The person of
Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as
administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be
deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the latter's death for the same would be in
violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators, particularly, Section 2,
Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of Court.[24] Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely
helped in the settlement of the estate as counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond Triviere.
In its Memorandum before this Court, however, petitioner Quasha Law Office argues that "what is being
charged are not professional fees for legal services rendered but payment for administration of the Estate
which has been under the care and management of the co-administrators for the past fourteen (14) years." [25]
On the other hand, in the Motion for Payment filed with the RTC on 3 September 2002, petitioner Quasha Law
Office prayed for P200,000.00 as "attorney's fees and litigation expenses." Being lumped together, and absent
evidence to the contrary, the P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses prayed for by the
petitioner Quasha Law Office can be logically and reasonably presumed to be in connection with cases
handled by said law office on behalf of the estate. Simply, petitioner Quasha Law Office is seeking attorney's
fees as compensation for the legal services it rendered in these cases, as well as reimbursement of the
litigation expenses it incurred therein.
The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent
with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co-administrator
of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied
it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party cannot
change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. [26] When a party adopts a certain theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not
only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need
not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
at such late stage.[28]
4D Page 25

This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. [29] In the interest of justice and within the sound discretion
of the appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal, only when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly
meet the issue raised in the new theory.[30]
On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it necessary to exercise leniency on the rule against changing
of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules of fair play and in the interest of justice. Petitioner Quasha Law
Office presented conflicting arguments with respect to whether or not it was co-administrator of the estate.
Nothing in the records, however, reveals that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was indeed a
substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha upon his death.
The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of an estate by granting letters of administration to a
person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to serve as such, following the procedure laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes
for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the death of an administrator, to wit:
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal. x x x.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty.
Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of
administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty.
Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered
legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in
1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of
administration.
The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule
85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees for legal
services rendered by them.
However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from the time of
death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed
for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003 Order,
the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate, in
consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as coadministrator), representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the
estate of their deceased father.
Finally, LCN prays that as the contractor of the house (which the decedent caused to be built and is now part
of the estate) with a preferred claim thereon, it should already be awarded P2,500,000.00, representing one
half (1/2) of the proceeds from the sale of said house. The Court shall not take cognizance of and rule on the
matter considering that, precisely, the merits of the claim of LCN against the estate are still pending the
proper determination by the RTC in the intestate proceedings below.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 11 May 2006 and Resolution dated 22 September 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81296 are AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1)
Petitioner Quasha Law Office is entitled to attorney's fees of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00), for legal services rendered for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of
4D Page 26

their deceased father, the same to be paid by the Triviere children in the manner herein discussed; and
2)
Attorneys Enrique P. Syquia and William H. Quasha are entitled to the payment of their corresponding
administrators' fees, to be determined by the RTC handling Special Proceedings Case No. M-1678,
Branch 63 of the Makati RTC, the same to be chargeable to the estate of Raymond Trieviere.
SO ORDERED.
13.
Rule 86 Claims against Estate
Sec. 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. - Immediately after granting letters

testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons
having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said
court.
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. - In the notice provided in the preceding
section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall
not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first
publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered,
on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such
claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month.
Sec. 3. Publication of notice to creditors. - Every executor or administrator shall,
immediately after the notice to creditors is issued, cause the same to be published three (3)
weeks successively in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and to be posted
for the same period in four public places in the province and in two public places in the
municipality where the decedent last resided.
Sec. 4. Filing copy of printed notice. - Within ten (10) days after the notice has been
published and posted in accordance with the preceding section, the executor or
administrator shall file or cause to be filed in the court a printed copy of the notice
accompanied with an affidavit setting forth the dates of the first and last publication
thereof and the name of the newspaper in which the same is printed.
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. - If not filed, barred; exceptions. All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for
the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that
they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may
set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though
4D Page 27

the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
Sec. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. - Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary
with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only
debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution form the other
debtor. In a joint obligation of the decedent, the claim shall be confined to the portion
belonging to him.
Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. - A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute
his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action
in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment
for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the
foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency
judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his
mortgage of other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of
the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall
receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein
contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate
that such redemption shall be made.
Sec. 8. Claim of executor or administrator against an estate. - If the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in
writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the
adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order
the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend
such claim.
Sec. 9. How to file a claim. Contents thereof; Notice to executor or administrator. - A claim
may be filed by delivering the same with the necessary vouchers to the clerk of court and
by serving a copy thereof on the executor or administrator. If the claim be founded on a
bond, bill, note or any other instrument, the original need not be filed, but a copy thereof
with all indorsements shall be attached to the claim and filed therewith. On demand,
however, of the executor or administrator, or by order of the court or judge, the original
shall be exhibited, unless it be lost or destroyed, in which case the claimant must
accompany his claim with affidavit or affidavits containing a copy or particular description
of the instrument and stating its loss or destruction. When the claim is due, it must be
supported by affidavit stating the amount justly due, that no payments have been made
thereon which are not credited, and that there are no offsets to the same, to the knowledge
of the affiant. If the claim is not due, or is contingent, when filed, it must also be supported
4D Page 28

by affidavit stating the particulars thereof. When the affidavit is made by a person other
than the claimant, he must set forth therein the reason why it is not made by the claimant.
The claim once filed shall be attached to the record of the case in which the letters
testamentary or of administration were issued, although the court, in its discretion, and as
a matter of convenience, may order all the claims to be collected in a separate folder.
Sec. 10. Answer of executor or administrator; Offsets. - Within fifteen (15) days after service
of a copy of the claim on the executor or administrator, he shall file his answer admitting or
denying the claim specifically, and setting forth the substance of the matters which are
relied upon to support the admission or denial. If he has no knowledge sufficient to enable
him to admit or deny specifically, he shall state such want of knowledge. The executor or
administrator in his answer shall allege in offset any claim which the decedent before death
has against the claimant, and his failure to do so shall bar the claim forever. A copy of the
answer shall be served by the executor or administrator on the claimant. The court in its
discretion may extend the time for filing such answer.
Sec. 11. Disposition of admitted claim. - Any claim admitted entirely by the executor or
administrator shall immediately be submitted by the clerk to the court who may approve
the same without hearing; but the court, in its discretion, before approving the claim, may
order that known heirs, legatees, or devisees be notified and heard. If upon hearing, an heir,
legatee, or devisee opposes the claim, the court may, in its discretion, allow him fifteen (15)
days to file an answer to the claim in the manner prescribed in the preceding section.
Sec. 12. Trial of contested claim. - Upon the filing of an answer to a claim, or upon the
expiration of the time for such filing, the clerk of court shall set the claim for trial with
notice to both parties. The court may refer the claim to a commissioner.
Sec. 13. Judgment appealable. - The judgment of the court approving or disapproving a
claim, shall be filed with the record of the administration proceedings with notice to both
parties, and is appealable as in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or
administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of administration, the amount ascertained
to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the
judgment creditor any priority of payment.
Sec. 14. Costs. - When the executor or administrator, in his answer, admits and offers to pay
part of a claim, and the claimant refuses to accept the amount offered in satisfaction of his
claim, if he fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover costs, but must pay
to the executor or administrator costs from the time of the offer. Where an action
commenced against the deceased for money has been discontinued and the claim
embraced therein presented as in this rule provided, the prevailing party shall be allowed
the costs of his action up to the time of its discontinuance.
See Section 20, Rule 3
4D Page 29

Sec. 20. Action on contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money
arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil 209 (1914)
Don Ocampo died in 1906 and possessed certain real properties which he left to his three
children by virtue of a will. The fourth clause of the will stated that: I also declare that I
have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously
paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.
The will was probated and a committee was appointed to hear and determine the claims
against the estate. The committee then submitted a report on June 27, 2008. On July 12,
2009, Isidro Santos, one of the creditors of Don Ocampo, filed a petition in court asking the
committee to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate. The petition was
denied by the court. Isidro Santos then instituted a proceeding against the administratrix of
the estate to recover his claims. This case was dismissed by the court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court committed an error when it denied the petition to reconvene the
committee.
2. Whether the court committed an error when it dismissed the petition against the
administratrix considering that the testator, by his will, acknowledge the debts and
directed that they be paid.
HELD:
1. The court did not commit an error. Where the proper notices has been given, the right
to have the committee recalled for the consideration of belated claims rest upon the
condition that it is presented within 6 months. In the present case, the 6 months starts
to run from July 23, 1907, thus, petitioner can only present his claim until January 23,
1908.
2. The court did not commit an error. The claim against the estate is enforceable only
when the prescribed legal procedure was followed. Moreover, the action cannot be
considered as an enforcement of a legacy in order that it may be instituted against the
administratrix. The testator, in his will, left the total net assets of his estate, without
reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired
to leave anything, by way of legacy to any other person. These considerations clearly
refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave to Isidro Santos anything by
way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present action
was improperly instituted against the administratrix.
Stronghold Insurance v. Republic-Asahi Glass,
492 SCRA 179 (2006)
4D Page 30

DOCTRINE:
A surety companys liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of
the principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of
that liability.
FACTS:
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor
of JDS Construction, for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in RepublicAsahis compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, where Republic-Asahi was to pay JDS
P5,300,000.00 for said construction, which was supposed to be completed within a period of 240
days. In order to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS
shall post a performance bond of P795,000.00. JDS executed, jointly and severally with
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. a performance bond.
The pace of the construction progress turned out to be slow, and Republic-Asahi
rescinded the contract when it became apparent that the project cannot be completed
within the 240-day target. As a result of the rescission, Republic-Asahi was compelled to
hire the services of another contractor, to which it incurred additional expenses. RepublicAsahi filed for its claim against Stronghold under bond that the latter issued for JDS in favor
of Republic-Asahi. Stronghold refused to pay, claiming that its obligation had been
extinguished by the death of JDSs proprietor, Jose Santos.
ISSUE:
W/N Strongholds liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the
death of Santos, the principal.
HELD:
No. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that
are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money
claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are
not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed before
the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his
contracts with Republic-Asahi were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by
provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or
liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can
set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold as
surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
The liability of Stronghold is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance
bond. As a surety, Stronghold is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code.
Under the law and jurisprudence, Republic-Asahi may sue, separately or together, the principal
debtor and the surety, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal
debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor.
Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, Republic-Asahi may still sue Stronghold
alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latters liability under the performance bond.
4D Page 31

14.
Rule 87 Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. - For the
recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or
administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which
survive.
Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until have share assigned. - When an executor or administrator is
appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for
damages done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until
there is an order of the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee until the time
allowed for paying debts has expired.
Sec. 4. Executor or administrator may compound with debtor. - With the approval of the
court, an executor or administrator may compound with the debtor of the deceased for a
debt due, and may give a discharge of such debt on receiving a just dividend of the estate of
the debtor.
Sec. 5. Mortgage due estate may be foreclosed. - A mortgage belonging to the estate of a
deceased person, as mortgagee or assignee of the right of a mortgagee, may be foreclosed
by the executor or administrator.
Sec. 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. - If an
executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the
estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person
is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or
chattels of the deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any
deed, conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to
disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the
last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to appear
before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person
so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such interrogatories as are
put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to prison until he
submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his
answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office.
4D Page 32

Sec. 7. Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account. - The court, on complaint of
an executor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or administrator
with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person
to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other
papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or
administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited refuses to appear
to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a
lawful order of the court.
Sec. 8. Embezzlement before letters issued. - If a person, before the granting of letters
testamentary or of administration on the estate of the deceased, embezzles or alienates any
of the money, goods, chattels, or effects of such deceased, such person shall be liable to an
action in favor of the executor or administrator of the estate for double the value of the
property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of such estate.
Sec. 9. Property fraudulently conveyed by deceased may be recovered; When executor or
administrator must bring action. - When there is deficiency of assets in the hands of an
executor or administrator for the payment of debts and expenses of administration, and the
deceased in his lifetime had conveyed real or personal property, or a right or interest
therein, or a debt or credit, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid any right, debt,
or duty; or had so conveyed such property, right, interest, debt, or credit that by law the
conveyance would be void as against his creditors, and the subject of the attempted
conveyance would be liable to attachment by any of them in his lifetime, the executor or
administrator may commence and prosecute to final judgment an action for the recovery of
such property, right, interest, debt, or credit for the benefit of the creditors; but he shall not
be bound to commence the action unless on application of the creditors of the deceased,
nor unless the creditors making the application pay such part of the costs and expenses, or
give security therefor to the executor or administrator, as the court deems equitable.
Sec. 10. When creditor may bring action; Lien for costs. - When there is such a deficiency of
assets, and the deceased in his lifetime had made or attempted such a conveyance, as is
stated in the last preceding section, and the executor or administrator has not commenced
the action therein provided for, any creditor of the estate may, with the permission of the
court, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, a like action for the recovery of the subject of the conveyance or attempted
conveyance for the benefit of the creditors. But the action shall not be commenced until the
creditors has filed in a court a bond executed to the executor or administrator, in an
amount approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator
against the costs and expenses incurred by reason of such action. Such creditor shall have a
lien upon any judgment recovered by him in the action for such costs and other expenses
incurred therein as the court deems equitable. Where the conveyance or attempted
conveyance has been made by the deceased in his lifetime in favor of the executor or
administrator, the action which a creditor may bring shall be in the name of all the
creditors, and permission of the court and filing of bond as above prescribed, are not
necessary.
4D Page 33

Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 148 (1997)

A criminal case for libel was filed by Assemblyman Raquiza against Villegas who allegedly
imputed to him acts constituting violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While the case was pending, Villegas went to the US where he stayed until he died in 1984.
Nevertheless, trial proceeded in absentia; by the time of his death in 1984, the prosecution
had already rested its case. 2 months after notice of his death, the court issued an order
dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
The court eventually held the heirs of Villegas civilly liable (moral, actual and exemplary
damages).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Villegas can be held civilly liable / Whether the court acted in
accordance with the ROC.
HELD:
No. Rule 111 of the ROC provides that the civil liability which is not extinguished by the
death of the accused is that which does not arise from the criminal act. In this case, the
source of the civil liability sought to be enforced against the heirs is that which arose from
the libelous act. There should have been substitution under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and as provided
in Rule 87, Sec. 1: No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him. Thus, the court set aside the order (one making
the heirs civilly liable) without prejudice to the right of Raquiza to file the appropriate civil
action for damages against the executor or administrator of the estate.
Obando v. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148 (2000)
ORIGINAL:
In resolving this appeal, the Court invokes the following principles: (1) a lawyers standing in a case remains,
until a substitute takes over pursuant to Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (2) a trial court may act
upon a motion to dismiss at any time a ground therefor becomes available, even after a responsive pleading
to the complaint has already been filed; (3) a civil case initiated by an estate administrator may be dismissed
upon a showing that the said administrators appointment as such has been revoked by the probate court;
and (4) the dismissal of an action may be made after the ground therefor becomes known, even if the trial
court has refused to do so earlier when that ground was not yet available.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the July 30, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 47594, which affirmed the dismissal, without prejudice, of
Petitioner Felizardo Obandos action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218. Mis spped
4D Page 34

The Facts
In 1964, Alegria Strebel Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for
settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras. While settlement of the estate was
pending, she died and Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of Don Jose and Doa Alegria.
Hardly had the proceedings in both intestacies begun when Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of
what purported to be Doa Alegrias Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo S. Obando (herein
petitioner), a nephew of Doa Alegria.
The alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and several other members of the Obando clan properties
left by the Figueras couple, including two parcels of land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City,
covered by TCT Nos. 13741 and 17679. When the probate case was consolidated with the intestate
proceedings, Petitioner Obando was appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estates.
As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was submitted to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) for examination and comparison of Doa Alegrias alleged signature therein with
samples which both parties accepted as authentic. The NBI found that the questioned and the standard
signatures were not made by the same person. This led to the indictment and the conviction of Petitioner
Obando in Criminal Case 90-85819 for estafa through falsification of a public document.
On February 20, 1990, the probate court denied Eduardos Motion for authority to sell the aforementioned
two parcels of land in New Manila. Despite such denial, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on
the strength of an Order issued by the probate court on May 15, 1991. New titles were issued for these lots in
the name of Amigo Realty.
On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria,
filed a Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (collectively referred to as the respondents) for the
nullification of the sale. The proceedings were docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12384 and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79.
However, in Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court, in its Order dated December 17,
1997, removed Petitioner Obando from his office as co-administrator of the joint estate of the Figueras
spouses. Consequently, in the civil case, respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss dated January 27, 1998,
after Obando had rested his case. The respondents built their evidence around the loss of his legal standing to
pursue the case. In its Order dated February 11, 1993, the trial court granted the Motion and dismissed the
civil case without prejudice. Jo spped
Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals
likewise dismissed his Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and affirmed the dismissal Order of the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of Obando that he did not lose his legal personality to prosecute
the civil case since there was no categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery and its probate
was still pending.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of the action for reconveyance because the probate courts Order dated
February 5, 1998 "alluded" to the fact that the alleged Will was a forgery. That the probate of the alleged Will
had not yet been decided on the merits did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner
Obando as co-administrator. The dismissal of the civil case was without prejudice, because the trial judge
anticipated that Obando could regain co-administration of the estates on appeal.
4D Page 35

Hence, this Petition.
Assignment of Errors
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
"A........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE
TRIAL COURTS ALLOWANCE OF RESPONDENTS JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT ONE OF THE LAWYER-MOVANTS THEREIN WAS NO LONGER THE COUNSEL OF
RECORD FOR RESPONDENT FIGUERAS AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS FILED.
"B........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE
TRIAL COURTS RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE LAW WHEN IT GRANTED A MOTION TO
DISMISS ON LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE/LEGAL STANDING AT THE TIME WHEN THE
[PETITIONERS] HAVE ALREADY RESTED THEIR CASE AND THE [RESPONDENTS] HAVE
BEGUN PRESENTATION OF THEIR EVIDENCE.
"C........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
SANCTIONED THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BASED ON ORDERS OF OTHER
COURTS THAT HAVE NOT YET ATTAINED FINALITY. Spped jo
"D........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD
THE TRIAL COURTS WHIMSICAL AND CAPRICIOUS DEPARTURE FROM ITS PREVIOUS
RULINGS DENYING RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS.
"E........WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED
ITS 30 JULY 1998 DECISION IN CA-G.R. 47594 UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDERS
DATED 11 FEBRUARY 1998 AND 12 MARCH 1998."
Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the trial court could act on a
motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardos counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to
dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the
conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as
administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and (4)
whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the trial
court.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Counsel of Record
Petitioners claim that when Atty. Joaquin Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss, he no longer represented the
respondents, as shown by Eduardos Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said
counsels services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner Obando.
4D Page 36

We disagree. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance
with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following
requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for substitution; (2) the clients
written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can
still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for substitution must carry
proof that notice of the motion has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by
the Rules. Miso
In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested
that he had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and
Compromise Agreement. Besides, the filing of the Motion to Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the
said respondent; hence, he had no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an attorney who has
already been dismissed by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the clients rights. In
the present case, had there been any irregularity, it should have been raised by the respondents, not the
petitioners.
Second Issue:
Timeliness of the Motion to Dismiss
The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only before the filing of a responsive pleading.
Thus, petitioners complain that it was already too late for Respondent Eduardo Figueras to file a Motion to
Dismiss after Obando had finished presenting his evidence.
This is not so. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging improper venue
cannot be entertained unless made within that period. Nex old
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss
on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4)
discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. Except for lack of cause of
action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for
dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally
considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules. Mani kx
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal
of the civil case based on Petitioner Obandos lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only
after he had been convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his
representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the respondents.
Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss filed after their Answer was
submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present
controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.
Third Issue:
Removal from Administration
Petitioners aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because Obandos conviction
for estafa through falsification was still on appeal.
4D Page 37

We disagree. This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando derived
his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator. When the
probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on
behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case. Thus the trial court properly
granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground. Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in this Petition. He should
raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras estates.
Maniks
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal from administration are on appeal only means that his
legal standing could be restored; thus, the civil case was correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his
conviction is reversed and his appointment restored by the probate court, the case may continue without
being barred by res judicata. The lower courts Decision showed that it was careful in its action. On the other
hand, Obando has yet to show that he has regained administration of the Figueras estates. Noteworthy also is
the fact that his removal from office was predicated not only on his conviction for a crime, but also on his
failure to render an accounting of the rentals of a property leased to the Community of Learners.
Fourth Issue:
No Conflicting Rulings
Respondent Eduardo Figueras earlier Motion to Dismiss was denied in the trial courts March 4, 1993 Order
which reads:
"x x x [I]t is pertinent to note that the criminal case of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document filed against [petitioner] and the Petition to Remove him as co-administrator are
still pending determination. Thus, suffice it to state that while herein [petitioner] remains as
the co-administrator of the estates of the deceased Figueras the Court will continue to
recognize his right to institute the instant case in his capacity as judicial administrator,
unless he be removed as such by the probate Court pursuant to Rule 82 of the Revised Rules
of Court."
Thus, petitioners allege that the trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings
when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardos later Motion to Dismiss.
We cannot see any conflict between these trial court rulings. Obviously, they were based on different grounds.
The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue
as co-administrator of the Figueras estates. On the other hand, the second Motion was granted because the
probate court had already removed him from his office as co-administrator. The change in his legal capacity
accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court. We see no reversible error in the appellate
courts affirmance of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Rioferio v. Court of Appeals, 419 SCRA 54 (2004)
4D Page 38

Alfonso Orfinada died intestate, leaving properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City
and Caloocan City. He was survived by his wife and several children. 6 months later, the
heirs found out that an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate was executed by Teodora Rioferio
(Alfonsos paramour) and her children involving the properties in Dagupan. Alfonso
Clyde Orfinada (son) filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of the estate of Alfonso.
He was joined by his mother and siblings in filing the complaint for Annulment/Rescission
of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cancellation of TCTs. In their answers, the
Rioferios argued, among others, that the parties are not the real parties-in-interest but
rather the estate of Alfonso Orfinada in view of the pendency of the administration
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute rights belonging to the deceased
subsequent to the commencement of administration proceedings.
HELD:
Yes. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. In Gochan v Young, the Court
ruled that Rule 87, Section 2, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or
to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet
no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator
appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he
is made a party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to
recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if
not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring
suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
15.
Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Sec. 1. Debts paid in full if estate sufficient. - If, after hearing all the money claims against the
estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such claims, it appears that there are sufficient
assets to pay debts, the executor or administrator shall pay the same within the time
limited for that purpose.
Sec. 2. Part of estate from which debt paid when provision made by will. - If the testator
makes provision by his will, or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of
debts, the expenses of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according
4D Page 39

to the provisions of the will; but if the provisions made by the will or the estate
appropriated, is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of the estate of the testator, real
or personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any, shall be appropriated for that purpose.
Sec. 3. Personalty first chargeable for debts, then realty. - The personal estate of the
deceased not disposed of by will shall be first chargeable with the payment of debts and
expenses; and if said personal estate is not sufficient for that purpose, or its sale would
redound to the detriment of the participants of the estate, the whole of the real estate not
disposed of by will, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after obtaining
the authority of the court therefor. Any deficiency shall be met by contributions in
accordance with the provisions of section 6 of this rule.
Sec. 4. Estate to be retained to meet contingent claims. - If the court is satisfied that a
contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the executor or administrator to retain in
his hands sufficient estate to pay such contingent claim when the same becomes absolute,
or, if the estate is insolvent, sufficient to pay a portion equal to the dividend of the other
creditors.
Sec. 5. How contingent claim becoming absolute in two years allowed and paid; Action
against distributees later. - If such contingent claim becomes absolute and is presented to
the court, or to the executor or administrator, within two (2) years from the time limited
for other creditors to present their claims, it may be allowed by the court if not disputed by
the executor or administrator, and, if disputed, it may be proved and allowed or disallowed
by the court as the facts may warrant. If the contingent claim is allowed, the creditor shall
receive payment to the same extent as the other creditors if the estate retained by the
executor or administrator is sufficient. But if the claim is not so presented, after having
become absolute, within said two (2) years, and allowed, the assets retained in the hands of
the executor or administrator, not exhausted in the payment of claims, shall be distributed
by the order of the court to the persons entitled to the same; but the assets so distributed
may still be applied to the payment of the claim when established, and the creditor may
maintain an action against the distributees to recover the debt, and such distributees and
their estates shall be liable for the debt in proportion to the estate they have respectively
received from the property of the deceased.
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been in
possession. - Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of
the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become
liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of
their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall
contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.
Sec. 7. Order of payment if estate insolvent. - If the assets which can be appropriated for the
payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the executor or administrator shall
4D Page 40

pay the debts against the estate, observing the provisions of Articles 1059 and 2239 to
2251 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be applied to the payment of debts are not
sufficient for that purpose, the provisions of Articles 2239 to 2251 on Preference of Credits shall be observed,
provided that the expenses referred to in Article 2244, No. 8, shall be those involved in the administration of
the decedent's estate. (n)
Art. 2239. If there is property, other than that mentioned in the preceding article, owned by two or more
persons, one of whom is the insolvent debtor, his undivided share or interest therein shall be among the
assets to be taken possession of by the assignee for the payment of the insolvent debtor's obligations. (n)
Art. 2240. Property held by the insolvent debtor as a trustee of an express or implied trust, shall be excluded
from the insolvency proceedings. (n)
CHAPTER 2 - CLASSIFICATION OF CREDITS
Art. 2241. With reference to specific movable property of the debtor, the following claims or liens shall be
preferred:
(1) Duties, taxes and fees due thereon to the State or any subdivision thereof;
(2) Claims arising from misappropriation, breach of trust, or malfeasance by public officials committed in the
performance of their duties, on the movables, money or securities obtained by them;
(3) Claims for the unpaid price of movables sold, on said movables, so long as they are in the possession of the
debtor, up to the value of the same; and if the movable has been resold by the debtor and the price is still
unpaid, the lien may be enforced on the price; this right is not lost by the immobilization of the thing by
destination, provided it has not lost its form, substance and identity; neither is the right lost by the sale of the
thing together with other property for a lump sum, when the price thereof can be determined proportionally;
(4) Credits guaranteed with a pledge so long as the things pledged are in the hands of the creditor, or those
guaranteed by a chattel mortgage, upon the things pledged or mortgaged, up to the value thereof;
(5) Credits for the making, repair, safekeeping or preservation of personal property, on the movable thus
made, repaired, kept or possessed;
(6) Claims for laborers' wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done;
(7) For expenses of salvage, upon the goods salvaged;
(8) Credits between the landlord and the tenant, arising from the contract of tenancy on shares, on the share
of each in the fruits or harvest;
(9) Credits for transportation, upon the goods carried, for the price of the contract and incidental expenses,
until their delivery and for thirty days thereafter;
(10) Credits for lodging and supplies usually furnished to travellers by hotel keepers, on the movables
belonging to the guest as long as such movables are in the hotel, but not for money loaned to the guests;
(11) Credits for seeds and expenses for cultivation and harvest advanced to the debtor, upon the fruits
harvested;
(12) Credits for rent for one year, upon the personal property of the lessee existing on the immovable leased
and on the fruits of the same, but not on money or instruments of credit;
(13) Claims in favor of the depositor if the depositary has wrongfully sold the thing deposited, upon the price
of the sale.
In the foregoing cases, if the movables to which the lien or preference attaches have been wrongfully taken,
the creditor may demand them from any possessor, within thirty days from the unlawful seizure. (1922a)
Art. 2242. With reference to specific immovable property and real rights of the debtor, the following claims,
mortgages and liens shall be preferred, and shall constitute an encumbrance on the immovable or real right:
(1) Taxes due upon the land or building;
(2) For the unpaid price of real property sold, upon the immovable sold;
4D Page 41

(3) Claims of laborers, masons, mechanics and other workmen, as well as of architects, engineers and
contractors, engaged in the construction, reconstruction or repair of buildings, canals or other works, upon
said buildings, canals or other works;
(4) Claims of furnishers of materials used in the construction, reconstruction, or repair of buildings, canals or
other works, upon said buildings, canals or other works;
(5) Mortgage credits recorded in the Registry of Property, upon the real estate mortgaged;
(6) Expenses for the preservation or improvement of real property when the law authorizes reimbursement,
upon the immovable preserved or improved;
(7) Credits annotated in the Registry of Property, in virtue of a judicial order, by attachments or executions,
upon the property affected, and only as to later credits;
(8) Claims of co-heirs for warranty in the partition of an immovable among them, upon the real property thus
divided;
(9) Claims of donors or real property for pecuniary charges or other conditions imposed upon the donee,
upon the immovable donated;
(10) Credits of insurers, upon the property insured, for the insurance premium for two years. (1923a)
Art. 2243. The claims or credits enumerated in the two preceding articles shall be considered as mortgages or
pledges of real or personal property, or liens within the purview of legal provisions governing insolvency.
Taxes mentioned in No. 1, Article 2241, and No. 1, Article 2242, shall first be satisfied. (n)
Art. 2244. With reference to other property, real and personal, of the debtor, the following claims or credits
shall be preferred in the order named:
(1) Proper funeral expenses for the debtor, or children under his or her parental authority who have no
property of their own, when approved by the court;
(2) Credits for services rendered the insolvent by employees, laborers, or household helpers for one year
preceding the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency;
(3) Expenses during the last illness of the debtor or of his or her spouse and children under his or her
parental authority, if they have no property of their own;
(4) Compensation due the laborers or their dependents under laws providing for indemnity for damages in
cases of labor accident, or illness resulting from the nature of the employment;
(5) Credits and advancements made to the debtor for support of himself or herself, and family, during the last
year preceding the insolvency;
(6) Support during the insolvency proceedings, and for three months thereafter;
(7) Fines and civil indemnification arising from a criminal offense;
(8) Legal expenses, and expenses incurred in the administration of the insolvent's estate for the common
interest of the creditors, when properly authorized and approved by the court;
(9) Taxes and assessments due the national government, other than those mentioned in Articles 2241, No. 1,
and 2242, No. 1;
(10) Taxes and assessments due any province, other than those referred to in Articles 2241, No. 1, and 2242,
No. 1;
(11) Taxes and assessments due any city or municipality, other than those indicated in Articles 2241, No. 1,
and 2242, No. 1;
(12) Damages for death or personal injuries caused by a quasi-delict;
(13) Gifts due to public and private institutions of charity or beneficence;
(14) Credits which, without special privilege, appear in (a) a public instrument; or (b) in a final judgment, if
they have been the subject of litigation. These credits shall have preference among themselves in the order of
priority of the dates of the instruments and of the judgments, respectively. (1924a)
Art. 2245. Credits of any other kind or class, or by any other right or title not comprised in the four preceding
articles, shall enjoy no preference. (1925)
CHAPTER 3 - ORDER OF PREFERENCE OF CREDITS
4D Page 42

Art. 2246. Those credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific movables, exclude all others to the
extent of the value of the personal property to which the preference refers.
Art. 2247. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific movable property, they shall be
satisfied pro rata, after the payment of duties, taxes and fees due the State or any subdivision thereof. (1926a)
Art. 2248. Those credits which enjoy preference in relation to specific real property or real rights, exclude all
others to the extent of the value of the immovable or real right to which the preference refers.
Art. 2249. If there are two or more credits with respect to the same specific real property or real rights, they
shall be satisfied pro rata, after the payment of the taxes and assessments upon the immovable property or
real right. (1927a)
Art. 2250. The excess, if any, after the payment of the credits which enjoy preference with respect to specific
property, real or personal, shall be added to the free property which the debtor may have, for the payment of
the other credits. (1928a)
Art. 2251. Those credits which do not enjoy any preference with respect to specific property, and those which
enjoy preference, as to the amount not paid, shall be satisfied according to the following rules:
(1) In the order established in Article 2244;
(2) Common credits referred to in Article 2245 shall be paid pro rata regardless of dates. (1929a)
Sec. 8. Dividends to be paid in proportion to claims. - If there are no assets sufficient to pay
the credits of any one class of creditors after paying the credits entitled to preference over
it, each creditor within such class shall be paid a dividend in proportion to his claim. No
creditor of any one class shall receive any payment until those of the preceding class are
paid.
Sec. 9. Estate of insolvent nonresident, how disposed of. - In case administration is taken in
the Philippines of the estate of a person who was at the time of his death an inhabitant of
another country, and who died insolvent, his estate found in the Philippines shall, as far as
practicable, be so disposed of that his creditors here and elsewhere may receive each an
equal share, in proportion to their respective credits.
Sec. 10. When and how claim proved outside the Philippines against insolvent resident's
estate paid. - If it appears to the court having jurisdiction that claims have been duly proven
in another country against the estate of an insolvent who was at the time of his death an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and that the executor or administrator in the Philippines had
knowledge of the presentation of such claims in such country and an opportunity to contest
their allowance, the court shall receive a certified list of such claims, when perfected in
such country, and add the same to the list of claims proved against the deceased person in
the Philippines so that a just distribution of the whole estate may be made equally among
all its creditors according to their respective claims; but the benefit of this and the
preceding sections shall not be extended to the creditors in another country if the property
of such deceased person there found is not equally apportioned to the creditors residing in
the Philippines and the other creditors, according to their respective claims.
4D Page 43

Sec. 11. Order for payment of debts. - Before the expiration of the time limited for the
payment of the debts, the court shall order the payment thereof, and the distribution of the
assets received by the executor or administrator for that purpose among the creditors, as
the circumstances of the estate require and in accordance with the provisions of this rule.
Sec. 12. Orders relating to payment of debts where appeal is taken. - If an appeal has been
taken from a decision of the court concerning a claim, the court may suspend the order for
the payment of the debts or may order the distribution among the creditors whose claims
are definitely allowed, leaving in the hands of the executor or administrator sufficient
assets to pay the claim disputed and appealed. When a disputed claim is finally settled the
court having jurisdiction of the estate shall order the same to be paid out of the assets
retained to the same extent and in the same proportion with the claims of other creditors.
Sec. 13. When subsequent distribution of assets ordered. - If the whole of the debts are not
paid on the first distribution, and if the whole assets are not distributed, or other assets
afterwards come to the hands of the executor or administrator, the court may from time to
time make further orders for the distribution of assets.
Sec. 14. Creditors to be paid in accordance with terms of order. - When an order is made for
the distribution of assets among the creditors, the executor or administrator shall, as soon
as the time of payment arrives, pay the creditors the amounts of their claims, or the
dividend thereon, in accordance with the terms of such order. chan robles virtual law
library
Sec. 15. Time for paying debts and legacies fixed, or extended after notice, within what
periods. - On granting letters testamentary or administration the court shall allow to the
executor or administrator a time for disposing of the estate and paying the debts and
legacies of the deceased, which shall not, in the first instance, exceed one (1) year; but the
court may, on application of the executor or administrator and after hearing on such notice
of the time and place therefor given to all persons interested as it shall direct, extend the
time as the circumstances of the estate require not exceeding six (6) months for a single
extension nor so that the whole period allowed to the original executor or administrator
shall exceed two (2) years.
Sec. 16. Successor of dead executor or administrator may have time extended on notice within
certain period. - When an executor or administrator dies, and a new administrator of the
same estate is appointed, the court may extend the time allowed for the payment of the
debts or legacies beyond the time allowed to the original executor or administrator, not
exceeding six (6) months at a time and not exceeding six (6) months beyond the time which
the court might have allowed to such original executor or administrator; and notice shall be
given of the time and place for hearing such application, as required in the last preceding
section.
4D Page 44

16.
Rule 89 Sales, Mortgages and other Encumbrances of Property of

Decedent
Sec. 1. Order of sale of personalty. - Upon the application of the executor or administrator,
and on written notice to the heirs and other persons interested, the court may order the
whole or a part of the personal estate to be sold, if it appears necessary for the purpose of
paying debts, expenses of administration, or legacies, or for the preservation of the
property.
Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts
and legacies through personalty not exhausted. - When the personal estate of the deceased is
not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale
of such personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the
estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of
such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the
Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber so much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the
purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears that such sale,
mortgage, or encumbrances would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part
cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in
the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the
whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the
circumstances.
Sec. 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond. - No such authority to
sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal estate shall be granted if any person
interested in the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned to pay
the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies within such time as the court directs;
and such bond shall be for the security of the creditors, as well as of the executor or
administrator, and may be prosecuted for the benefit of either.
Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons; Disposal of
proceeds. - When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal
estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the
court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the
heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the
executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary
to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be
granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall
be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
Sec. 5. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of estate to pay debts
and legacies in other countries. - When the sale of personal estate, or the sale, mortgage, or
other encumbrance of real estate is not necessary to pay the debts, expenses of
4D Page 45

administration, or legacies in the Philippines, but it appears from records and proceedings
of a probate court in another country that the estate of the deceased in such other country
is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies there, the court
here may authorize the executor or administrator to sell the personal estate or to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber the real estate for the payment of debts or legacies in the
other country, in the same manner as for the payment of debts or legacies in the
Philippines.
Sec. 6. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty acquired on
execution or foreclosure. - The court may authorize an executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate acquired by him on execution or foreclosure
sale, under the same circumstances and under the same regulations as prescribed in this
rule for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of other real estate.
Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under
the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due
from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal
estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such
other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or
beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause
notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of
hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such
further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in
such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will account
for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied
with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the
estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the court may authorize it to be public or
private, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The executor or administrator
shall be furnished with a certified copy of such order;
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and place of
the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice of execution sale;
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate
thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of
the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate,
which shall be as valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
4D Page 46

Sec. 8. When a court may authorize conveyance or realty which deceased contracted to
convey; Notice; Effect of deed. - Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract,
binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of
the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to
convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed
upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real
property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. The
deed executed by such executor, administrator, or clerk of court shall be as effectual to
convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such conveyance
shall be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been given
personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such further notice has been given, by
publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in the hands of the
executor or administrator will thereby be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from
receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend.
Sec. 9. When court may authorize conveyance of lands which deceased held in trust. - Where
the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, the court may,
after notice given as required in the last preceding section, authorize the executor or
administrator to deed such property to the person, or his executor or administrator, for
whose use and benefit it was so held; and the court may order the execution of such trust,
whether created by deed or by law.
Acebedo v. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186 (1993)
Felix Acebedo died with several real estate properties, and settlement of his estate was
pending with the probate court for 16 years. Some of his heirs wanted to sell some
properties (to pay unsettled claims against the estate then distribute the remainder among
the heirs) so they filed a motion with the court to approve a conditional sale already made
to a third party. The petitioner, who is also an heir and the administrator of the estate,
opposed the motion, questioning the validity of the sale since it was made without prior
court approval. The probate court approved the conditional sale.
ISSUE:
Is it within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court
approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said
properties?
HELD: YES.
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with
the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
4D Page 47

An heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the
property under administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the
probate court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are
however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right.
Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words,
the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share
in the property held in common.
Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385 (1998)
Respondents filed a complaint for Specific Performance against Petitioner on the

basis of a Contract to Sell of a lot in Sta. Rosa Laguna wherein a downpayment of
P300,000 was received by the Petitioner.
Petitioner admits these but claims that the subject property formed part of the
estate of her father in respect of which a petition for probate was filed in the RTC.
This was allegedly known by the Respondents.
Petitioner claims that the same should be approved by the probate court and upon
realization of the nullity of the contract, she wanted to have the contract rescinded
and was willing to give back the downpayment.
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which allows the
sale of properties subject of a probate proceeding provided that it is beneficial to the
estate and complies with the requirements of the law. It further stated that where
the administratrix realizes the nullity of the transaction entered into, she is not
estopped from interposing the contracts nullity.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Courts decision. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceeding valid and
binding without the approval of the probate court?
HELD: YES
Contract to Sell Valid
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner
entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful
owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land.
4D Page 48

The Supreme Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs
from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner
of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial
approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late
father.
Administration of the Estate not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the
"complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." 19
Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner
and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the
private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the
termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for
petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature
partition and distribution of the properties of the estate.
Estoppel
Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell
with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial
payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and
representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them.
Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an
unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and
with full awareness of its consequences.
17.
Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
person may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs.
4D Page 49

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. - Questions as to advancement made,

or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Sec. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. - If at the time of the distribution the executor or
administrator has retained sufficient effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for
the expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such expenses of partition may be
paid by such executor or administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not
inconsistent with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they shall be paid by the parties
in proportion to their respective shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment
shall be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested in the partition does
not pay his proportion or share, the court may issue an execution in the name of the
executor or administrator against the party not paying for the sum assessed.
Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. - Certified copies of final orders and
judgments of the court relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded
in the registry of deeds of the province where the property is situated.
Palicte v. Ramolete, 154 SCRA 132 (1987)
ORIGINAL:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring the
deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the petitioner's motion that the
Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot
Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title
to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued on February 5, 1979
by the respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo
Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by respondent Marcelo
Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of the Banilad Friad Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 27639;
4D Page 50

5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu, covered by TD No. 010661, with
an area of 76-708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac Mactan Island, with an
area of Forty Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square meters more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a Government lot at Lahug, Cebu City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central, Cebu City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid for them for the amount
of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded to lone bidder Asuncion
Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs of the late Don Filemon
Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Felipe V. Belandres and
approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-Officio Sheriff, was issued for these lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, bid at P20,000.00;
2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642, of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640, of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete for the transfer to her
name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled "Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo
Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal among which, is that movant, Palicte, is not one of those
authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R, she does not
qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed of
redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A
4D Page 51

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO
REDEEM UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REAL
PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
B
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER, WHO IS A DECLARED HEIR OF
THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO RIGHT
OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS A DECLARED
HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF REDEMPTION OF
CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE
AS THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT DEBT CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4)
PARCELS OF LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of
redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided in the last
preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner
hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the
property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on
some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold. Such
redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term
"successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276 Fed., 216,
223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption (Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38 Pac., 627;
4D Page 52

Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., 1057);
one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law (XI McKinney's California
Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold
(Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her
husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband' title passes to
her (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This court has held that a surety can not
redeem the property of the principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the
debt of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently
is not a successor in interest in the property. (G. Urruitia & Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28
Phil., 260, 268). (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was levied
upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs in Special
Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent's
liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the property is under administration. (Barretto vs.
Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the
decedent's property even while it is under administration. With more reason should the heirs be allowed to
redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three other co-heirs, the
administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputed parcels of land.
We see no need for such prior approval. While it may have been desirable, it is not indispensable under the
circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in the act of redeeming property
for the estate. The petitioner contends that the administrator and the three other heirs agreed to the
redemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such approval. What is beyond dispute from the records is
that they did not disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the petitioner. There is likewise nothing in the records
to indicate that the redemption was not beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate pending the order of
distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its
properties is greater than anybody else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely holds it for the
creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent interest were allowed to exercise
the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103 Phil. 889, 892)
where a son redeemed the property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial Sheriff of
Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court called "inchoate right of dower or
contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as successor-in-interest of her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or mother, is also an inchoate or
contingent interest, because upon the death of the father or the mother or both, he will have
a right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate interest is a successor in
interest with right to redeem a property sold on execution, then the son is such a successor
in interest, as he has an inchoate right to the property of his father.
4D Page 53

The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator as the judgment debtor and
as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the deceased is the judgment debtor and the heirs who will
eventually acquire that estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to transfer the titles of the four (4)
parcels of land covered by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon Sotto to her
name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the estate.
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 267, 345- 346):
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90
provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application
of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there
should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the
decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be
issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration,
allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and
proper, (3) besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for
the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court."
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-redemptioners in the redemption made
by the petitioner before the motion to transfer titles to the latter's name may be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders declaring the deed of
redemption null and void and denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilda
Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as
stated above.
SO ORDERED.
De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 216 (2002)

4D Page 54

ORIGINAL:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which prays that the
Decision dated February 28, 1997 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 42958,1 be set aside; and, that another judgment be entered ordering the Presiding Judge of
Branch 123 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to give due course to petitioners notice of appeal, to
approve their record on appeal and to elevate the records of Sp. Proc. No. C-1679 to respondent appellate
court for further proceedings.
The factual background:
Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas in Sp.
Proc. No. C-1679, entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas". Said case was
subsequently consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-18102 and Civil Case No. C-17407.3 Deceased spouses Rafael
and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas
(deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas),
Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositorapplicant in the intestate
proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime, had
given the following real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratrix-petitioner
Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent:
"1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m. distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde
1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
2. Title No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
3. Title No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita
N. de Leon (herein petitioner)
4. Title No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas
5. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to daughter Teresita N. de Leon
6. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. given to son Ramon (OppositorApplicant herein)
7. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Ramon but was somehow
transferred to Antonio Nicolas, and the property is now titled in the name of the latters widow,
Zenaida Carlos Nicolas."
xxx
xxx
x x x."4
On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent documents relative to
the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper determination of
the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice to the present registered
owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the collation of properties." 5
4D Page 55

On October 10, 1994, respondent Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying the properties to
be collated and attaching to said motion, the documents in support thereof, to wit:
"3. A more complete list of the properties to be collated is as follows:
1. Title No. T-36734 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 14,119 sq. m., xerox copy hereto
attached as Annex "A", distributed as follows:
1.1 10,110 sq. m. given to daughter Estrellita N. Visconde, under TCT No. V-554 of Valenzuela
Bulacan (Annex "B"), and later sold by Estrellita to Amelia Lim Sy for P3,405,612.00 and the
Deed of Sale hereto attached as Annex "B-1";
"1.2 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas, xerox copy hereto attached as Annex "C";
2. Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq. m. and
TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. "given to daughter Teresita N.
de Leon by a Deed of Sale, xerox copies are hereto attached as Annex "D", "D-1" and "D-2";
The 4,000 sq. m. lot was sold by Petitioner Teresita for the amount of P1,888,000.00, xerox copy of
the Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "D-3";
4. Son Antonio received additional properties under a Deed of Sale, hereto attached as Annex "E",
which are those covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 283 sq. m.; TCT
No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 1,000 sq. m. and TCT No. T-10907 located at
Caloocan City with an area of 310 sq. m., xerox copies hereto attached as Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and "E3";
The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. is supposedly earmarked for Oppositor-applicant Ramon but was
somehow included in the Deed of Sale to son Antonio, and the property is now titled in the name of
the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas;
5. TCT No. T-68554 located at Caloocan City with an area of 690 sq. m. where the ancestral home is
presently located;
6. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,876 sq. m. and sold for P850,000.00,
hereto attached as Annex "F";
7. Son Antonio received another property with an area of 1,501 sq. m. and sold for P200,000.00,
hereto attached as Annex "G";
xxx
xxx
x x x."6
A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals that the amended motion refers to the same real
properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above which are not found in the original motion.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
"Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and the
comment thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following properties to be
collated to the estate properties under present administration, to wit:
4D Page 56

(1). 4,009 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas described in paragraph 1.2 of the Amended
Motion For Collation, marked as Annex "C"; (the xerox copy of the transfer certificate of title
in the name of Antonio Nicolas did not state "the number and the technical description of the
property. The administratrix should get hold of a certified copy of the title of Antonio Nicolas
about subject property;
(2). Two lots, covered by TCT No. T-36989 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 4,000 sq.
m. and TCT No. T-33658 located at Polo, Bulacan with an area of 6,109 sq. m. given to
daughter Teresita N. de Leon by a Deed of Sale;
(3). The property covered by TCT No. T-36987 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of 283
sq. m.; the property covered by TCT No. T-40333 located at Polo, Bulacan, with an area of
1,000 sq. m. and another property covered by TCT No. T-10907 located at Caloocan City with
an area of 310 sq. m. xerox copies of which are attached to the Amended Motion For
Collation, marked as Annexes "E1", "E-2" and "E-3";
(4). The lot with an area of 310 sq. m. given to son Antonio Nicolas which property is now
titled in the name of the latters widow, Zenaida Carlos Nicolas.
"Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include the foregoing properties which were
received from the decedent for collation in the instant probate proceedings.
"SO ORDERED."7
We note that only those lots described under paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the "Amended Motion for
Collation" were ordered included for collation.1wphi1.nt
On November 18, 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the
properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago" 8 and that titles may not be
collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23, 1995, the RTC issued an Order denying said
motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled properties should be
collated,9 citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court
concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on
the heir.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23, 1995 10
which respondent opposed.11
On July 18, 1995, the RTC issued an Order, pertinent portions of which read:
"x x x Foremost to be resolved is the issue of collation of the properties of the deceased Rafael Nicolas
which were disposed by the latter long before his death. The oppositor-applicant Ramon Nicolas
should prove to the satisfaction of the Court whether the properties disposed of by the late Rafael
Nicolas before the latters death was gratuitous or for valuable consideration. The Court believes that
he or she who asserts should prove whether the disposition of the properties was gratuitously made
or for valuable consideration.
The Court has already set for hearing on July 21, 1995, at 8:30 a.m., the reception and/or
presentation of evidence in the issue of collated properties disposed before the death of Rafael
Nicolas."12
4D Page 57

On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on ground of conflict
of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject properties acquired by
her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be included in the collation; 13 and, ordered
the hearing on the collation of properties covered by TCT No. T-V-1211 and T-V-1210 only.14
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties enumerated in the
Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that her appointment as administratrix be maintained; and that the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-13206
described as Lot 4-A with 4,009 square meters be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the
registered owners mentioned therein and not subject to collation. 15
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.16
Petitioners Teresita N. de Leon, Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and the Heirs of
Antonio Nicolas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction claiming that:
"I
"RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONERS OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE THEIR APPEAL
HE INSISTED ON HEARING THE MATTERS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF A REGULAR
ADMINISTRATOR AND COLLATION ON DECEMBER 24, 1996 AND RESETTING ITS CONTINUATION
TO JANUARY 21 and 28, 1997 INSPITE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND/OR REAFFIRMATION OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM WHICH ACTS THERE IS NO APPEAL NOR ANY
PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW."
"II
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE DID NOT INCLUDE IN
HIS ORDER-ANNEX J THE HEARING ON THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF TCT NOS. T-36734, T36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333 and T-10907 (WHETHER THEY ARE STILL PART OF THE
ESTATE OR SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INVENTORY/ESTATE) THEREBY ASSUMING
WITHOUT ANY BASIS THAT THESE PROPERTIES TO BE STILL PART OF THE ESTATE OF RAFAEL
NICOLAS WHEN THEY ARE NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SOLD WAY BACK IN 1979 FOR
VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS TO PETITIONER TERESITA N. DE LEON AND ANTONIO NICOLAS
HUSBAND OF PETITIONER ZENAIDA NICOLAS." 17
After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after hearing the oral
arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals found the petition devoid of
merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994 directing the inclusion of the properties therein
enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal from the order of collation; that the appeal of the petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996
and December 3, 1996 removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed; and, observing that the
notice of appeal and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC, the appellate court resolved:
"WHEREFORE, while finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge, he is
hereby ORDERED to act on petitioners appeal on the matter of the removal of petitioner as
administratrix.
SO ORDERED."18
4D Page 58

Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignments of error:
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED DECISION
THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1994 WAS FINAL.
"SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR</P>
"RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED IN THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION THAT THERE WAS NO COGENT OR COMPELLING REASON TO DISTURB THE
QUESTIONED DECISION."19
Petitioners claim that: private respondent never presented any document to prove that the properties
transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous title; private respondent never notified
petitioner of any hearing on said documents to give them opportunity to show cause why their properties
should not be collated; the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
confiscatory, depriving them of due process; the said order is interlocutory in nature and therefore nonappealable; the properties acquired by petitioner Teresita N. de Leon and her deceased brother Antonio
Nicolas, married to petitioner Zenaida C. Nicolas and their children, were sold to them as evidenced by public
documents; and, the properties were already titled in their respective names or sold to third persons.
Private respondent contends that: due process has been afforded the petitioners when the RTC resolved the
issue of collation of the subject properties after hearing; petitioner deliberately omitted certain material facts
in the petition to mislead the Court because petitioners were actually given at least three (3) times the
opportunity to ventilate and oppose the issue of collation; as stated by the appellate court in the Resolution
promulgated on February 10, 1997, both parties affirmed that the RTC had proceeded to conduct hearings on
January 21 and 28, 1997 as originally scheduled; presentation of evidence had been terminated and the twin
issues of the appointment of a new administratrix and the collation of two (2) properties covered by TCT No.
T-V-1210 and T-V-1211 were already submitted for resolution to the court below;20 subject properties are
collatable under Articles 1601 and 1071 of the Civil Code and Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Rules of Court and
the ruling in Guinguing v. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; petitioner failed to present evidence that there was
valuable consideration for these properties and failed to rebut the evidence that petitioners do not have the
financial capability to pay for these properties as evidenced by the testimony of credible witnesses who are
relatives of spouses decedents.
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had become final for
failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is interlocutory in nature. Our
pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of
the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the
said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed
by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out
in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory.
Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the
courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the
inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if
such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein
4D Page 59

belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature
as to the ownership of the said properties."21 (Emphasis supplied)
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, 22 can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.23 The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded in
Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:
"The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title
or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be
settled in a separate action.
"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so."24
Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."25
Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in considering the
assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who dispute the
inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing
rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims.
Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or
alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the question and on the heir."
in support of his claim that the assailed Order is a final order and therefore appealable and that due to
petitioners failure to appeal in due time, they are now bound by said Order, is not feasible.
What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the aforediscussed jurisprudence that the
Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is because the
questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate
court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is
not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the
subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
4D Page 60

or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties.
In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of exclusion from
or inclusion in the estates inventory, thus:
"We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two disputed
lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the
case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testators
estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is
not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
"Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles
thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those
issues should be resolved, if and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication
of this appeal.
"The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased Valero
spouses were consolidated, as ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the
conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated, as contemplated in section 2,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3176.
"We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found that the proceedings have not yet
reached the stage when the question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised and
decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net remainder (remanente
liquido) of their conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the other hand, up to this time, no
separate action has been brought by the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustias Torrens titles to the
disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation.
"In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs.
Rustias titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the
stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be
determined."27
In the light of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Section 1 of the same
Rule, to wit:
"Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such person may demand and recover their respective shares from the
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."
4D Page 61

Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order of
Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have already
discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at the early
stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we found no
indication that the debts of the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal
estate have already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion
for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature.
And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final order, still, the
same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine that a final order is
appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on
which it is based as mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, which provides:
"SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefore."
An examination of the subject Order as quoted earlier, 28 readily reveals that the presiding Judge failed to
comply with the said constitutional mandate. The assailed Order did not state the reasons for ordering the
collation of the properties enumerated therein. The Order simply directed the inclusion of certain real
properties in the estate of the deceased. It did not declare that the properties enumerated therein were given
to the children of the deceased gratuitously, despite the title in the childrens names or deeds of sale in their
favor. Moreover, in his Comment, private respondent makes mention of the testimonies of his witnesses but
these were not even mentioned in the Order of November 11, 1994. Petitioner would have been deprived of
due process as they would be divested of the opportunity of being able to point out in a motion for
reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law considering that there were no facts or laws cited
in support of the assailed Order of collation. As a final Order, it is, on its face patently null and void. It could
have never become final. A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may
be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. 29
For it to be considered as a valid final order, the RTC must then first rule and state in its order whether the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36734, T-36989, T-33658, T-36987, T-40333, T-10907 and the 4,009
square meter lot were acquired by petitioners from the deceased parents of the parties by onerous or
gratuitous title; and must specifically state in its order the reasons why it ordered the subject properties
collated. It is only then that the order of collation may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Until and unless the constitutional mandate is complied with,
any appeal from said Order would have been premature.
Either way therefore, whether the Order in question is a final or interlocutory order, it is a reversible error on
the part of the appellate court to rule that the so-called order of collation dated November 11, 1994 had
already attained finality.
As to the prayer of petitioners that the RTC be ordered to give due course to their notice of appeal from the
Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996 removing petitioner Teresita N. de Leon as
administratrix of the estate of private parties deceased parents,30 to approve their record on appeal31 and to
elevate the records of Special Proceeding No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals It is not disputed by the parties
that said Orders are appealable. In fact, the Court of Appeals had correctly directed the RTC to give due course
to petitioners appeal and this is not assailed by the private respondent.
But, the approval or disapproval of the record on appeal is not a proper subject matter of the present petition
for review on certiorari as it is not even a subject-matter in CA-G.R. SP No. 42958. Whether or not the record
4D Page 62

on appeal should be approved is a matter that is subject to the sound discretion of the RTC, provided that
Sections 6 to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court are observed by appellant.
Finally, the elevation of the records of Special Proceedings No. C-1679 to the Court of Appeals for the purpose
of petitioners appeal from the order removing the administratrix is unnecessary where a record on appeal is
allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon the
approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties; but retains
jurisdiction over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal. 32
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 28, 1997 and
Resolution dated April 3, 1997 of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. The Order dated November 11, 1994
issued by the Regional Trial Court and all other orders of said court emanating from said Order which involve
the properties enumerated therein are considered merely provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice to
any of the heirs, administrator or approving parties to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title.
The Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Branch 123) is directed to immediately act, without further delay,
on petitioners appeal from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 23, 1996, subject to Sections 6
to 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
18.
Rule 91 Escheats
Sec. 1. When and by whom petition filed. - When a person dies intestate, seized of real or
personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same,
the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may
file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province where the deceased last resided
or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and
praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.
Sec. 2. Order for hearing. - If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof,
which date shall be not more than six (6) months after the entry of the order, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for six
(6) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
as the court shall deem best.
Sec. 3. Hearing and judgment. - Upon the satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed
in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the person died
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person
entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, the court shall
adjudge that the estate of the deceased in the Philippines, after the payment of just debts
and charges, shall escheat; and shall, pursuant to law, assign the personal estate to the
municipality or city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the
municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If the deceased never
4D Page 63

resided in the Philippines, the whole estate may be assigned to the respective
municipalities or cities where the same is located. Such estate shall be for the benefit of
public schools, and public charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or
cities.
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be
used.
Sec. 4. When and by whom claim to estate filed. - If a devisee, legatee, heir, widow, widower
or other person entitled to such estate appears and files a claim thereto with the court
within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of
and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the
proceeds, after deducting reasonable charges for the care of the estate; but a claim not
made within said time shall be forever barred.
Sec. 5. Other actions for escheat. - Until otherwise provided by law, actions for reversion or
escheat of properties alienated in violation of the Constitution or of any statute shall be
governed by this rule, except that the action shall be instituted in the province where the
land lies in whole or in part.
In re Estate of Lao Sayco, 21 Phil. 991 (1924)
[Wrong citation. This is a 1912 case.]
Lao Sayco died. The administrator of his estate requested that the property of the decedent
be delivered to his nephew (allegedly his sole heir). Notices were sent to interested parties
to establish the right of the alleged heir, and the notice of the date of the hearing was made
thru publication for three weeks prior to the date set. The municipality of Mambajao
entered its opposition, claiming that the property of the decedent should be delivered to it
because the decedent had no legal heirs. The lower court ruled in favor of Mambajao. The
administrator appealed the judgment.
ISSUE:
W/N the municipality of Mambajao was entitled to the property left by the decedent.
HELD:
No, for failure of Mambajao to comply with procedural requirements. In order that the
property which belonged to the decedent Lao Sayco may be decreed to have reverted to the
Senate, pursuant to the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is
indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code
should have been complied with. The municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an order
of reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property
aforementioned; it did not comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required
proofs in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an
investigation. It does not appear that there was an inquisition provided by law, for the
record is not accompanied by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real and
4D Page 64

personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a statement of the places where
the realty is located. Neither is it shown to have ascertained whether the deceased
Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether the deceased Chinaman
executed any will during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any other place
any relative entitled to inherit from him. Moreover, the notice summoning the persons who
believed they were entitled to his property should have been published for at least six
consecutive weeks, and not for three as was directed in the order.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 375 SCRA 484 (2002)
Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national, died without heirs, leaving properties
behind. Solano, a faithful girl Friday of Hawkins, alleged that a deed of donation was
executed in her favor by Hawkins, but such were misplaced and could not be found.
The Republic, in light of the missing deeds of donation, filed for a petition for
escheat of the estate of Hankins. After establishing that there were no known heirs and
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the
estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
Seven years after the judgment, Solano, claiming that she had found the deeds of
donation, filed for annulment of judgment due to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. The Republic opposed, stating that Solanos petition for annulment
of judgment had no basis and that the same was barred by the statute of limitations.
ISSUE:
W/N Solanos claim had prescribed.
HELD:
Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who
dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the
state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." Since escheat is one
of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions
and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by
which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statute, and a
time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. A claimant to an
escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such
judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate;
but a claim not made shall be barred forever." A claimant has been defined to be any
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. Solano,
as a donee, is a claimant within this definition. Thus, her claim had prescribed because it
was filed 7 years after the judgment, way beyond the 5-year prescriptive period.
4D Page 65

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ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS)

PROF. DOROTHY UY NAVA

4C & 4D, Second Semester, SY 2009-2010

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

RULE 82 Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and

Sec. 1. Administration revoked if will discovered; Proceedings thereupon. - If after letters of

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Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, 190 SCRA 112 (1990)

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RULE 83 Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family

Pablo Santero had 3 illegitimate children with Felixberta Pacursa (Princesita,

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

RULE 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and

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RULE 85 - Accountability and Compensation of Executors and

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

beneficiaries thereof themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

Statement of Antecedent Facts

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

Rule 86 Claims against Estate

Sec. 1. Notice to creditors to be issued by court. - Immediately after granting letters

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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS), SY 2009-2010

See Section 20, Rule 3

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Rule 87 Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators

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Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 148 (1997)

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Rioferio v. Court of Appeals, 419 SCRA 54 (2004)

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Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate

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