1732 :

1. Common Carrier are persons, corporation, association engaged in the business of

carrying or transporting of passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air for
compensation offering service to the public.
2. Private Carrier vs. Common Carrier
a) Private Carrier - one available only to certain individuals
b) Common carrier- one available to the general Public,the public enjoy as a right
not as a permission.. The code does not state whether regular, scheduled basis.
c) In case of accident- the employee is generally liable except if the owner acted in
fault, fraudulent or reckless or oppressive
d) If the vehicle is employed as private carrier the civil code provision should not
apply.
e) Prescription - one year from the occurrence of the damages
1733.
3. Common carriers from the nature of their business and by reason of public policy are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them.
1734.
4. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
unless the same is due to:
a) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity
b) Act of public enemy in war, whether international or civil
c) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods
d) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the container
e) Order of the competent public authority
When common Carrier is not liable: under this article unless acted with fault. (1739)
1735
5. In all cases other than those mentioned in nos.1,2,3,4,5, if goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated , common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they have observed extraordinary diligence.
General rule: carrier is presumed at fault. Except under 1734.
1736.
6. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods
was unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same is delivered actually, constructively by the carrier to the
consignee or the person who is authorized to received them.
7. An action for misdelivery prescribes in 10 years
1737
8. The common carriers duty to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored

in transit unless the shipper or owner has made its right of stoppage in transitu .
a) Stoppage in transitu
i. The carrier as depositary and will be liable as a depositary
1738.
9. The extraordinary liability of he common carrier continues to be operative even during
the time the goods are stored in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination
until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has reasonable
opportunity to remove them or otherwise dispose them.
1739. In order that the common carrier must be exempted from responsibility , the natural
disaster must be the proximate and only cause of the loss. However the CC must exercise
due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of
flood, storm or other calamities.
1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a
natural disaster shall not free the carrier from responsibility
1741. If the shipper or owner merely contributes to the loss, destruction or deterioration
of the goods, the liability of the carrier shall be equitably reduced.
1742. If the loss was due to the nature of the goods or packing , the CC must exercise due
diligence to prevent it or lessen it.
1743. If through the order of public authority the goods are seized or destroyed, the
common carrier is not responsible , provided the PA had power to issue order
1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the
liability of the former for L,D,D less than extraordinary diligence is valid
a) In writing signed by the Shipper
b) Supported by valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the CC
c) Reasonable , just and not contrary to law
1745. Void stipulations
a) Goods are at the risk of the owner
b) CC is not liable
c) CC need not observe any diligence
d) CC shall exercise less than the good father of the family
e) CC not responsible for the act of its employee
f) CC not liable for thieves or robbers
g) CC not liable on the L,D,D on the defective condition of equipment used in
contract.
1746. Agreement limiting the liability of the Common Carrier may be annulled by the
shipper or owner if the common carrier refused to carry unless there is consent from the
shipper owner
1747. If the common carrier without just cause, delays the transportation or changes the
usual route, the contract limiting the liability of the common carrier cannot be availed.
1748. An agreement limiting the liability of the Common Carrier for delay on account of
strike or riot is valid.
1749. The stipulation that the common carrier will be liable for the value of the goods
appearing in the bill of lading unless the shipper has declare a greater value is binding.
1750. An agreement fixing the sum of what the onwer or shipper can recover if the
goods is destroyed, deteriorated or loss is valid provided that it is reasonable and not
contrary to law

1751. The lack of competition of the common carrier can be taken into consideration
WON the limiting agreement of the CC is reasonable, just and not contrary to law
1752. Even there is a limiting agreement, CC is presumed to have been negligent
1753. The law of the country to which the goods is to be transported govern in case of
loss deterioration or detruction.
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or
services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public
convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability. That liability
arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier
has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations
and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent
from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public
convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent
precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements.
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. CA
Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC; it did not
have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and there was only one shipper, one consignee for a
special cargo.
The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC,
and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional, episodic or unscheduled.
First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. CA
Based on Article 1732 NCC, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in
the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and
transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. (De Guzman Ruling upheld)
Respondents argument that the term common carrier as used in Section 133(j) of the Local
Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving
vehicles or vessels either by land, sea or water is erroneous. The definition of common carriers in NCC
makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land, water or air. It does not provide
that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common
carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in question were transported from
Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However, in
all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by
the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is
suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
(2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods, according to all the circumstances
of each case. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless
the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase
"natural disaster or calamity. However, the Court said that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or
calamity. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does
not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or
calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735
of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law.
And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the
Civil Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the
"proximate and only cause of the loss," and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster. This Petitioner Carrier has also
failed to establish satisfactorily.
National Development Company vs. CA
Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the
shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or
negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the
universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who
has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage.
The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad
enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers
of the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. Both owner and agent
should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its
origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract.
Ganzon vs. CA
Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art.
1734. The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid authority for petitioner to carry out. In any case,
the intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment
by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the
sea the scrap of iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was
attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioners employees.
By the delivery made during Dec. 1, 1956, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the

possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier of transportation, the
contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, Ganzons extraordinary responsibility for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. According to Art 1738, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or persons with right to
receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair the contract of
transportation as the goods remained in the custody & control of the carrier.
Macam vs. CA
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of
the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was
indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. However, in the export
invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand
letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This premise draws us to conclude
that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than
the consignee, the right to receive them was proper.
The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC
without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of petitioner, we gather that he has been
transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. When mangoes and
watermelons are in season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week.
The goods are released to GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to
immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls
by himself or his "people." In transactions covered by a letter of credit, bank guarantee is normally required
by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers, petitioner
dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. In his several years of
business relationship with GPC and respondents, there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was
first presented before the release of the cargoes.

Maersk Line vs. CA

While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise,
and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously
assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be
made within a reasonable time.
While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the
subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were
expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there arises no need to execute
another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. In the case before us, we find that a delay
in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of
reasonableness.
Everett Seamship Corp. vs. CA
In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that all claims for which it may be liable shall be
adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if

paid, and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss. Its
liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, had the
option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.
Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with
the stipulations.
The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that the common
carrier has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by the shipper.