INTRODUCTION

The formation of the African Union, which has been described as the
inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of Pan-Africanism and Pan-African
unity that gave rise to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and later The African Union (AU), remains the latest and `greatest'
achievements made in the African quest for a continental unity/unification or
integration.
The African Union was proposed by the Libyan leader Moammar Al Qaddafi
as a more effective institution for increasing prosperity in Africa. The AU was
formally established in September 2001, in Sirte. The AUs objective is to
harmonize the economic and political policies of all African nations in order to
improve pan-African welfare, and provide Africans with a solid voice in
international affairs. Supporters of the AU believe it will have a stronger charter
than the OAU, will be better funded, and will have the "teeth" that the OAU
lacked, including the power to create a common African Parliament, a Central
Bank, a common African currency and an international Court of Justice. It is hoped
that the AU will have the authority and ability to achieve economic and political
integration among member states, as well as work towards a common defense,

foreign and communications policy: national boundaries will be blurred, armies

merged, and a single passport introduced.
The AU will replace the OAU, which was established in 1963 to promote
unity, solidarity and international cooperation among the newly independent
African states. It provided both practical resources and political backing for
countries in their struggle against colonialism and helped to mobilize the battle
against the apartheid regime in South Africa. However, during the past four
decades the OAU has been hindered by internal conflict and self-serving heads of
state. According to most critics, the OAU has protected the interests of African
heads of state without addressing the real problems. Because of the OAUs
tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, it has
proved of limited use across a continent of constant conflict and widespread
government corruption. It has done little to address Africas economies or to
combat AIDS and other disease plaguing the continent.
While the goal of more effective continental unity is widely shared, there is
widespread skepticism whether the new organization will prove more effective
than its predecessor. The question however remains: Will the AU
succeed where the OAU failed? In other words, will the AU
succeed in integrating African economies?

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

This paper intends to:
* Provide answers to these and other questions. It appraises the
challenges before the AU in its bid to integrate Africa
* Find out whether or not the AU has lived up to its expectations
* Determine whether the AU has faired better than its predecessor the (O.A.U)
METHODOLOGY:
. In order to analyze the main issues that will be identified in this study, this
research will be expository, descriptive and also historical in content. This is of
utmost importance because it helps to trace the origin of the organization and the
reason for his establishment as well as the transition from the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). In doing so, this research will
mainly be based on secondary sources, such as academic journals, books, UN
reports, media and NGO materials and possibly government documents and will be
non-empirical in nature.
.

LITERATURE REVIEW
3

Generally, regional integration can be political, economic, social or cultural.

According to Haas, E. in his work Titled Beyond the Nation-States:
Functionalism and International Organization Regional integration is a process of
combining separate economies into larger political communities. To the extent that
political and economic forces are inextricably intertwined, any discussion of
integration must encompass both economic and political variables. Thus, in this
paper, the generic reference to regional integration is employed. Regional
integration has, thus, been defined as a process of peacefully creating a larger
coherent political system out of previously separate units, each of which
voluntarily cedes some part of its sovereignty to a central authority and renounces
the use of force for resolving conflict between Members.
In the piece The Analysis of International Relations Deutsch, K. and other
early theorists have noted that authentic regional integration encompasses the
whole system. Thus he argued that in reality, regional integration is a process, in
which, seemingly, participating countries inexorably seek, inter alia, economies of
scale, increased commercial activities, and uninhibited factor mobility, via
institutional integration and policy integration, both of which refer to the
growth of collective decision making and the sharing of responsibility for policies.
Babarinde,

O.A.

in

Analyzing

the

Proposed African

Economic

Community opined that there are three broad approaches to regional integration.
4

The first school of thought claims that the best path to regional integration is to
create a higher supranational authority, to which participating states surrender part
of their sovereignty. This perspective, otherwise known as the Federalist Strategy,
calls for a federal structure, whereby political power is legally shared between the
national and the supranational levels of government. In this case, national
governments will have to surrender part of their sovereignty to the newly created
supranational institutions.
At the other end of the theoretical spectrum is the Functionalist Strategy.
Lodge, J. in Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy. Simply put, this approach
refers to a mere functional cooperation by participating countries. Conceivably,
this road to regional integration does not require member states to part with an iota
of their autonomy. It merely entails and encourages inter-governmental
cooperation. While the Federalist approach may be avaricious by asking for too
much too hurriedly, the Functionalist appears to be evasive and lackadaisical.
Hence, a common ground is proposed, which is a hybrid of the aforementioned
strategies.

Again Lodge, J. in his work Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy.

Claimed that Neo-Functionalist Strategy posits that regional integration can best be
achieved via the creation of specialized administrative institutions at the trans5

national level, which shall endeavor to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness
of regional integration to member states. If they are successful with their modest
tasks, the argument goes; the supranational entities would be accorded more
competencies by member states. Sovereign states participates in regional
integration for various reasons because, they expect tangible benefits, whether
political, economic or social. Politically, a country may participate in a regional
scheme in order to bolster its military prowess, augment its political stature, and
deter or wade off aggression from hostile neighbors.
Similarly, countries may integrate so as to achieve economies of scale,
optimally allocate scarce resources, and accelerate economic growth or to increase
trade. Socially, countries may also participate in regional integration for
socioeconomic reasons, either to facilitate factor mobility or to stem the influx of
immigrants from less affluent neighboring countries. In any case, participating in
regional endeavors can plausibly increase the fortunes of the domestic economy.
Theoretically, and in practice, regional integration framework can be further
discussed, on the basis of whether they entail the removal of trade barriers or the
adoption of common policies.
According to Brigid Laffan in the work Integration and Co-operation in
Europe, he was of the opinion that most-favored nation, free trade area, and
customs union, which involve the elimination of trade barriers, are manifestations
6

of negative integration. Conversely, common markets and economic unions

denote positive integration, because they usually require institutional edification
and policy coordination. It could, thus, be generalized that the more advanced the
level of integration, the greater the incidence of positive integration.
The integration of Africa may be a complex process, but the stakes are high,
and will ultimately determine the Continents political and economic future.
However the basic issues are how any meaningful political and economic
integration in Africa can be achieved? This work examines political and economic
problem facing the African Union in her quest to integrate the continent which is a
clear departure from all previous work done on integration particularly on the
African Union.

CHAPTER PROPOSAL
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE
AFRICAN UNION:
7

This chapter established the historical background to the formation of the

African Union which has been described as an inevitable historical maturation of
the ideas of Pan-Africanism and Pan-African Unity that gave rise to the formation
of the Organization of African Unity.
CHAPTER TWO: ISSUES OF IN TEGRATIO N I N AFRIC A
In discussing the issues of integration, this chapter examines the initial
ideological differences and disagreements among the African leaders in the pre
-OAU era and the best way of achieving African unity. Also, other issues that
served as an impediment to the successful implementation of the ideas of
continental integration within the OAU were also highlighted.
CHAPTER THREE: AFRICAN UNION AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
The idea of integration as conceived by African leaders is not in anyway out
of place considering the challenges of globalization. The visions are there but
practicality remains an illusion. This chapter takes a look at the political challenges
the African Union confronts in her quest to integrate the continent.
CHAPTER FOUR: AFRICAN UNION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
It is a known fact that integration is an inevitable strategy for survival in the
global scheme of things. This chapter x-rayed the economic problems ravaging the
8

African Union from becoming relevant or important in the new emerging world
order which is geared towards strengthening the base of her economies
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
This research traced the genesis and reasons for the
emergence of regional blocs, especially in Africa. The main reason
being that Africa wanted to be an active player in the global
economy. The discussion also notes that because the OAU failed
to facilitate meaningful growth and development in Africa, aside
other factors, it metamorphosed into the AU. The study examines
the problems the AU will contend with in its efforts to integrate
African economies and proffers solutions.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF AFRICAN UNION

Introduction
One of the major obvious features of the earth is its division into
geographical units. Although the world is obviously a world of individuals, human
individuals; yet at a very broad level, the world is divided into continents, seven
continents: Africa, Antarctica, Asia, Australia, North America, South America and
Europe. The African continent in the late nineteenth century contained a vast
mosaic of tribal peoples who lived in a varied landscape of desert, rain forest,
savannah, mountain, and coastal lands. All these peoples had adapted their social
and economic organizations to their environments; and their political systems
varied from large empires to tribal groupings under chieftains.
For several centuries, from the eleventh century to the nineteenth century,
Africa was the object of Arab and European political incursion and domination.
Although such a predatory relationship existed even among groups within the
continent, the nineteenth and twentieth-century European imperialism was
particularly unique in being colonial - based on a mixture of economic, strategic,
cultural, and nationalistic motives. 1 European imperialism expressed itself in the
partition of the African continent. Apart from the disruption or destruction of many

10

traditional African societies, Europeans in Africa extensively exploited the

continent's mineral and agricultural products, often by means of forced labour2.
After several decades, of subjugation, Africa began to move from a continent
of colonies to a continent of independent states in the period after the Second
World War (1939 - 1945); although the nationalist struggles for independence were
often impeded or undercut by the complex mosaic of differing ethnic, linguistic,
and religious communities, which made unification difficult. 3 With the
establishment of modern states in Africa based on artificial national boundaries
devised by the European powers, which produced a national consciousness based
on European colonial territories, the idea of continental unity became a major issue
among the various nationalist leaders .4 This culminated in the founding of the
African Union in 2002.
Pan-Africanism and Pan-African Ideas
The first step in the formation of the African Union was the
Conceptualization of the idea of Pan-Africanism. According to Lawrence O.C.
Agubuzu, the African Union has been designed and structured to consolidate and
strengthen all steps towards the idea of Pan-Africanism and of continental
government undertaken before and since the founding of the OAU in 1963: 5 Yet
there seems to be diverse opinions, which are sometimes conflicting, on the
11

meaning or definition of `Pan-Africanism'. One of the earliest conceptualization of

the term was give in the 1930s by W. E .B. DuBois, the veteran Afro-American
Scholar and agitator, who stated that the Pan-African movement. Aimed at an
intellectual understanding and cooperation among all groups of African descent in
order to bring about "the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro
people.6
Also, Rasford Logan viewed the phenomenon in terms of self-government
by African countries South of the Sahara, but Anthony Enahoro disagreed and
insisted that Pan-Africanism included the economic, social and cultural
development of the continent, the avoidance of conflict among African states, the,
promotion of African unity and influence in world Affairs . 7 In addition, PanAfricanism, in the opinion of Colin Legum, is essentially a movement of ideas
and emotions; at times it achieves a synthesis; at times it remains at the level of
antithesis. 8
From the above definitions and perceptions, we can deduce that the major
component ideas of Pan-Africanism included: Africa as the homeland of Africans
and persons of African origin; solidarity among men of African descent, belief in a
distinct African personality, rehabilitation of Africa's past; pride in African culture,
Africa for Africans in church and state, the hope for a united and glorious future
Africa. All these elements or combinations of them form the principal aims of
12

twentieth-century Pan-African associations; they pervade the resolutions of PanAfrican meetings held outside and inside the continent since 1900; they permeate
the utterances and publications of men like W.E.B. DuBois, Marcus Garvey,
George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumab, Julius Nyerere and Stokeley Carmichael.9
Thus, with simplification Pan-Africanism can be said to be a political and
cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African descendants
abroad as a unit; it seeks to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of
oneness among the people of the African world; it glorifies the African past and
inculcates pride in African values.
It can be deduced, therefore, that the origin of Pan-Africanism or Pan-African
ideas is a relatively long one. According to V. B. Thompson, the man who first
expressed pan-African sentiments will never be known. Hence it is futile to try, as
some writers have attempted, to ascribe the phenomenon to any one man or trace
its origin to a particular year. In his words,

Of course the term "pan-African" and its derivative panAfricanism" were not coined at the time the phenomenon which they
describe emerged.... Though the words "pan-African" and "panAfricanism" became popular after the 1900 London congress, their
substance had been thought out long before. It is a struggle in which
Africans and men of African blood have been engaged since their
contact with modern Europe. 10

13

Based on the above assertion, Pan-African thinking originally began in the socalled New World becoming articulate during the century starting from the
declaration of American independence (1776).I1 It represented a reaction
against the oppression of the black man and the racial doctrines that marked
the era of abolitionism. It also found expression in the independent church
movement in the New World and Africa as well as in resistance to European
colonial ambitions in Africa.l2
The above notwithstanding, Sylvester Williams, a West Indian lawyer from
Trinidad, is said to be the first to use the term `pan-Africanism' and the first to
organize a pan-African congress in 1900.13 This was in London, where he brought
together a number of Africans and men of African descent then living in Europe to
discuss the question of colonialism and foreign domination of black peoples, racial
prejudice and the treatment of Africans in South Africa, the future of Africa and the
international standing of the only a three black states existing in the world at the
time, namely, Haiti, Ethiopia and Liberia. With the death of Sylvester Williams
shortly after the London pan-African congress, Burghardt DuBois, who had
introduced the question of independence in the London Congress, took over from
where the Late Williams had stopped and succeeded in organizing a series of five
Pan-African congresses. This earned him the name `Father of pan-Africanism'.14
14

Moreover, the details of the pan-African congresses as well as the activities

of all the pan-African leaders such as DuBois, Marcus Garvey, Felix Houphouet
Boigny, Casely Hayford, Bankole Awooner Renner, and many others seem to fall
outside the scope of this research work. The main issue here would be how all the
pan-African ideas and the activities of pan-African leaders became institutionalized
in the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
According to L. O. C. Agubuzu, the end of the Second World War (19391945) shifted the focus of the Pan-African movement to Africa, signaling a
convergence of interest and objectives between the global Pan-African
movement, inspired by Africans in the Diaspora and the emergent modern
nationalist movements in several of the colonial African States.

15

Thus, African

nationalism, became intricately bound up with the Pan-Africanist movement in

the decades (1945-1965) preceding the decolonization
This period

also witnessed

process. In Africa.

16

the articulation of ideas of regional

and continental cooperation among African colonies aimed at tapping the

economic and political potentials of the continent. The Emergence of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
It was indeed in the context of this broad commitment to the idea of PanAfrica by African nationalists and political leaders that debate raged within the
nationalist movement, long before independence was achieved by most African
15

countries, not about the desirability of an umbrella organization for the collective
expression of the aims and objectives of Pan-Africanism - for there was a
seeming consensus on this - but about the form which such an organization
should assume and the extent and substantive content of its powers and functions.
Undoubtedly, the institutionalization process of the .various pan-African
ideas was a gradual one; it obviously gained ground in the late 1950s, with the
political independence of few African states - particularly Ghana and Guinea. As
heads of government of the newly independent states of Ghana and Guinea,
Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure respectively announced after a meeting in
Accra on 23 November 1958 that they had decided to constitute their two states
into a Union, the Ghana-Guinea Union, which, they added was to be the nucleus of
a nation of west African states.

17

The significance of the announcement lay in the

fact that it was the first time that African leaders of independent African states
emerging from different political regimes, and therefore different colonial language
areas, came together to make pronounces on the general desire for West African
unity.
From a sentiment for West African unity, a wider and all-embracing
commitment for continental African unity emerged on 1 St May 1959, when Kwame
Nkrumah and Sekou Toure signed a joint declaration in Conakry by which they
16

expressed their intention to broaden the basis of their Union to make. it the nucleus
of a wider `Union of Independent States of Africa' to which member states would
surrender portions of their national sovereignty' in the full interest of the African
Community. 18
In July 1959, a meeting was held in a small Liberian town of Saniquellie
between Kwame Nkrumah and William Tubman of Liberia at which they signed
the famous "Saniquellie Declaration", in which they agreed to form a loose
association to be known as "the Community of Independent African States". At the
meeting, they formulated six principles which would guide the operation of the
association, third and most important was that,
... Each state and federation; which is a member of the Community,
shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure.
The Community is being formed with a view to achieving unity
among independent African States. It is not designed to prejudice
the present or future international policies, relation and obligations
of the States involved."19
Although the "Saniquellie Declaration" was a modification of the earlier
declaration signed in May 1959, it however raised certain controversial issues that
led to the emergence of blocs among the new African states which represented the
two major methods of achieving African unity.

17

20

These issues, which shall be

elaborated in the next chapter, featured in the various bloc-conferences of African

heads of states and government between 1960 and 1962.
In spite of this ideological (moderate versus radical) divide, steady progress
towards the establishment of a continental organization, embracing independent
African states in 1963 - a turning point being the establishment of a ., sevenmember political committee that year, comprising CongoBrazzaville, Ethiopia.,,
Cote d' Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Arab Republic, to organize
a future Summit of African Heads of State and Governments . 21 The Committee's
work was followed by the Conference of African Foreign Ministers, in Addis
Ababa, in May, 1963 and the Summit Conference of African Heads of State and
Government a few days later to inaugurate the OAU.
The Charter which was a compromise between the loose association of
states favoured by the Monrovia Group and a stronger federation of African states
advocated by the Casablanca group, was signed on May 30. 22 Of the thirty-two
independent African countries, thirty of them endorsed the Charter. So, the
founding countries of the OAU were: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Zaire, Benin, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Egypt and
18

Burkina Faso. Morocco and Togo were not represented at the conference although
they were later allowed to sign the Charter.
The aims and objectives as set out by Charter establishing the organization
are: to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; to coordinate and
intensify efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of
colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation, having due
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 23

The Charter also stipulated seven principles that would guide the
interactions/relationships among members: sovereign equality of member states.;
non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each state and for the inalienable right to independent
existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration; unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as
well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state;
absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which were
still dependent; and affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all
blocs24
19

The Need for Stronger Union: From OAU to AL

What the OAU Charter provided for was a loose confederation or
association of states, whose members undertook to coordinate and harmonize their
.

general policies through cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic,

communications, health, sanitation, nutritional, scientific and technological spheres

as well as cooperation in defense and security. 25 There was no specific mention of
political union or even of Pan-Africanism. This was indeed one of the many
glaring weaknesses of the Organization. According to Zdenek Cervenka, although
the signing of the Charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement at a time
when Africa was sharply split into three rival blocs, the Organization hardly moved
at all after fourteen years of its establishment 26.
Thus, it had become evident and accepted as early as 1979, when the
Committee on Review of the OAU Charter was establish, that a need existed to
amend the continental instrument in order to streamline the Organization to gear it
more accurately for the challenges of a changing world. 27 In line with
Globalization and efforts being made in the advanced countries to establish
stronger economic union, African leaders had realized the need for a stronger union
in Africa, which would reflect the dynamics and realities of' African and
international politics; in order to advance the idea of Pan-Africa. Despite numerous
20

meetings, however, the Charter Review Committee did manage to formulate

substantive amendments that culminated in the treaty establishing the African
Economic Community (AEC) and the African Union28.
The treaty establishing the African Economic Community was submitted at
the 27th Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Abuja from June 2 - 6,
1991. The African Economic Community, like the European Union, is aimed at
economic integration of all the nations of Africa. The aims and objectives of the
Community among others, include,
: . . to promote economic, social and cultural
development and integration of African economies in order
to increase economic reliance and promote an endogenous
and self-sustained development; to promote cooperation in
all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the
standard of living of its people, and maintain and enhance
economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations
among Member States and contribute to the progress,
development and the economic integration of the African
continent; and to coordinate and harmonize policies
among existing and future economic communities in order
to foster the gradual establishment of the African
Economic Community 29
Following the ratification of the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty, the
Organisation of African Unity operated on the basis of its Charter and the AEC
Treaty and, effective May 1994, it began to be referred to as the OAU/AEC. 30 It
was against this background that the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the OAU in
21

Sirte, Libya in September 1999, with determined promptings from . the Libyan
leader Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, decided on the establishment of the African
Union, in conformity with the .objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of
the AEC Treaty.
The Sirte Declaration was followed by the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lome, Togo on 11 July 2000
where the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted; and it was
subsequently lunched at the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Summit of the OAU, in
Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001.31 During the same period, the initiative for the
establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NIEPAD) was
also establish .32 On July 9, 2002, a day after the closing ceremony of the OAU
and its last and Thirty-eighth Summit, the African Union was born.
Among others, the objectives of the Union include:
... to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African
countries and the people of Africa; to defend the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of its member states; to
accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the
continent; to promote and defend African common positions and
issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; to encourage
international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; to promote peace, security, and stability on the
continent; to promote democratic principles and institutions,
22

popular participation and good governance; to promote

andprotect
human and peoples'
rights in accordance
with the African Charter or, Human and People's Right and
other relevant human rights instruments...33

Finally, the launching of the African Union in Durban, South Africa on July 9,
2002 by the First Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union was a
momentous and seminal event, a major land mark, and indeed a turning point in
the evolution of the theory and practice of Pan-Africamsm and African
Development.

34

In the words of the Kenyan political economics, Rok Ajulu, the

African Union is not simply a continuation of the OAU by another name; rather
"...tills is the beginning of a new paradigm of development in Africa. The African
Union/New Partnership for Africa's Development is a more thorough-going project
aimed at ending poverty and underdevelopment, deepening democracy and
economic governance, and more crucially, pioneering a completely new
relationship and partnership with the developed world.35
It is remarkable, in this respect, that building on almost forty years
experience in continental, regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration,
Africa began the dawn of the new millennium with a resurgent and re-invigorated
enthusiasm and a new paradigm of continental unity and development which
situate the birth of the African Union in the wider context that calls for the
emergence of a new structure, dynamics and pattern of political economy in a
23

rapidly changing system of global production, trade and interdependence. With it,
the necessary conditions that would enable the continent to play its rightful role in
the global economy, politics and in international negotiation were established36.

Lastly, apart from the expectation those African leaders would now be
committed to clean government. and strong economic policies as spelt out in the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), they are also expected to
commit themselves to promoting peace, security, and good governance and holding
each other accountable for their individual and collective efforts to achieve
NEPAD's economic, political, and social objectives37.

ENDNOTES
1. E. A. Ifidon, "Unity without Unification: The Development of Nigeria's
"Inside-Out' Approach to African Political Integration, 1937-1963", in
International Social Science Review, Volume 83, Numbers l & 2, 2002, pp. 46.
2. R. Goff, W. Moss, J. Terry & J. Upshur, The Twentieth Century - A Brief
Global History, 4t` Edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp. 43 - 55.
3. Ibid., pp. 376 - 389.
24

4. Ifidon, "Unity without Unification: The Development of Nigeria's 'Inside-Out'

Approach to African Political Integration, 1937-1963", pp. 46 - 47.
5. L. O. C. Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU. - The Challenges of African Unity
and Development in the Twenty-fist Century, NIIA Lecture Series No. 83 (Lagos:
Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 2004), p. 19.
6. The Crisis, (November, 1933), p.247.
7. R. Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1981),
pp. 1 - 2.
8. C. Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), p. 14.
9. Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice, p. 3.
10 V. B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism (London:
Longmans, 1964), p. 7.
I1 .A. K. Wodajo, "Pan-Africanism: The Evolution of an Idea", Ethiopia
Observer, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1964), pp. 166 - 167.
12.Ibid.
13.C. O. C. Amate, Inside the OAU - Pan Africanism in Practice (London:
Macmillan Publishers, 1986), p. 34.
14.Ibid.
15.Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity and
Development in.the Twenty. fist Century, p. 20.
16.Ibid.
17.Amate, Inside the OA U-Pan-Africanism in Practice, p. 40.
18.Ibid.
19.Legum, Pan Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 45.
25

20. See J. L Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", in Omu &
Otoide (eds.), Themes in International Studies and Diplomacy, p.'183.
21.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, pp. 21 - 22.
22.R: Uweuche (ed.), Africa Today4United Kingdom: Africa Books Ltd, 1991), p.
29.
23.Ibid., p. 21.
24. "Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)", Addis Ababa, 1963,
Article III.
25.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty. fist Century, p. 22.
26.Z. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU (New York:
African Publishers, 1977), p. 3.
27."Transition from the OAU to the African Union", Department of Foreign
Affairs of South Africa, www.dfa.gov.za. Retrieved on
07/04/09. See also Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", p.
189
28. "Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa",
in The Union Government Doc.Assembly/AU, 2(VII)2006, pp. 27 - 30.
29.Uweuche (ed.), Africa Today, p. 39.
30.Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity and
Development in the Twenty fist Century, p. 23.
31. "The African Union, NEPAD and Human Rights: The Missing Agenda"
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, November 2004, p. 54.
32.1bid.
33.News Letter: African Association of Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 1, January April, 2001, pp. 24 - 28.
26

34.Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU.- The Challenges ofAfrican Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, p. 13.
35.Quoted in ibid., p. 17.
36.News Letter: African Association of Political Science, pp. 24 - 28.
37.IMFSURVEY, Vol. 31, No. 13, July 18, 2002, pp. 209 - 211.

CHAPTER TWO
ISSUES OF INTEGRATION IN AFRICA
Introduction
According to International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, the term
`integration' can be defined as "a process whereby the quality of relations
27

among autonomous social units (kinship groups, [ethnic groups], cities, trade
unions, trade associations, political parties etc) change in such a way as to
erode the autonomy of each and make it a part of a larger aggregate." 1
Narrowing this broad definition to international relations, L. N. Lindbert
defined integration in two ways: first as "the process whereby nations forego
the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies
independently of each other, seeking 'instead to make joint_ decisions or to
delegate the decision making process to a new central organs"; and secondly as
"the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are personal to
shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre." 2
It can be observed from the above definitions that integration tends to
challenge the very foundations of realism (state sovereignty and territorial
Integrity), and this has given the term a theoretical status - the theory of
`international integration' which refers to "the process by which supranational
institutions replace national ones - the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty
from state to regional or global structures." 3 Such a shift in sovereignty to the
supranational level would probably entail some version of federalism in which
states or other political units recognize the sovereignty of a central government
while retaining certain power for themselves, as in the case of the European
Union (EU).
28

Like most continents and regions, Africa has indeed had its experience of
international integration. With the establishment of the Organization of Africa
Unity (OAU) in 1963, African states celebrated their first `success' in attempt
at continental integration. However, it was not all rosy for African leaders.
Thus, in the 38 years history of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the
organization had to deal with a number of issues that hindered or slowed , down
integration in Africa. These issues were inter-state and intra-state conflicts;
racism, colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa; and economic crisis broadly classified/grouped into political and socio-economic issues.
In discussing the above issues in this chapter, we shall first examine the
initial ideological differences and disagreements among the African leaders in
the pre-OAU era, on the best way of achieving African unity.
The Initial Issue of a Consensus Approach to African Unity
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded at a time when
African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were
anxious to consolidate their leadership. 4` Across the continent they saw the
danger posed by the divisions of language, culture and religion, by the
economic inequalities, by the controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn
by the colonial powers. African leaders also realized that after independence
regional cooperation would be essential to the utilization of the continent's vast
29

potentialities and the protection and preservation of freedom. It quickly

became clear that a high degree of co-operation was necessary among the
fledging African States, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic
and political entity. It was to achieve this co-operation that the OAU was
established.
Understandably, there were considerable differences of opinion as to,
how African unity would best be attained. Even as far back as the decades
preceding the decolonization process in Africa, there were conflicting
ideological approaches to regional and continental unity and cooperation
within the Pan-African movements 5 For example, some pan-Africanist under
the aegis of Back-to-Africa Movement thought that Africans in Diaspora
should return to Africa and assist in the redemption of the continent by
bringing the concept of civilization to the continent. However, the Back-toAfrica Movement -was not a success because of varying opinions of Africans
both home and abroad. Thus, long before independence was achieved by most
African countries, debate raged within the African nationalists' movement
about the form which an umbrella organization - for the expression of the aims
and objectives of Pan-Africanism - should assume and the extent and
substantive content of its powers and functions 6. As one commentator has
observed,
30

In the continental phase of the development of PanAfricanism in the 1950s and 1960s,...the more Africa
became divided into numerous sovereign states, the more
conflicting approaches and policies to African Unity came
to dominate the African ,international political arena 7.

The first and the second Conferences of Independent African States, held
respectively in Accra, Ghana in April 1958 and Addis Ababa, in June 1960, as
well as the first All African People's Conference, in Accra in December 1958
and the second All African People's Conference in Tunis; Tunisia in January
1960 illustrated the ideological, personality and linguistic (Arab, Anglophone
and Francophone )', differences that militated against a consensus on the form
of African continental unity. To this must be factored in external manipulation
by the Great Powers and the determination by Britain and France to maintain
their spheres of influence in their former colonies 8.
Indeed, between 1958 and 1962, a number of regional African groupings
had emerged, notably the Casablanca Group, the Monrovia Group and the
Brazzaville Twelve or, as they chose to call themselves, the Union of African
and Malagasy States (UAM), to reflect two of the leading approaches to
continental unity. On the one hand, there was the so-called Moderate Group,
comprising Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and most of the Francophone countries,
which advocated a gradualist, neo-functionalist approach in the form of a loose
31

association of states, to African unity. On the opposite side was the so-called
Radical Group, led by Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which advocated immediate
continental political union in the form of a United States of Africa. Several
reasons , had been given for the continental division into the above three rival
blocs 9.
Despite the divisions, there was a sustained desire to unite all the
independent African states, and each of the three groups made frequent
attempts to end the division - through diplomatic channels, in the lobbies of
the UN, and at, various international gatherings attended by delegations from
African states. Because governmental policies in Africa are largely determined
by, personalities, the compromise agreement was reached by direct talks
between Heads of State during their mutual visits in the pre-1963 years, which
had been mainly preoccupied with African Unity 10 Consequently, Kwame
Nlcrumah's call for continental unity was brushed aside, and the African
leaders settled for a superficial unity which brought together African Heads of
States but not African peoples. This in no way affected the sovereignty of each
independent State, and they were left free to pursue policies in which
continental priorities were sacrificed to narrow national interests.
This

arrangement

suited

the

so-called

'Moderate'

Conservative

governments in countries such as Ethiopia (as it was then under Emperor Haile
32

Selassie), Nigeria under -Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Liberia under

President Tubman, and Libya under King Idris; they had commanded a
majority in the Organization, and made sure that none of the OAU decisions
would conflict with their interests.'

11

The willingness, on the other hand, of the

'Radicals'- such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo

Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton
Obote of Uganda - to join. The OAU was based on a hope that they would
gradually would be able to convince the others to come their way and shift the
Organization to a unity of greater depth and closer co-operation than that
offered by the loose provisions of its Charter 12. Indeed, the hope of this latter
group came to reality with the establishment of the African Union several
years after.
With the signing of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity in
1963, African countries demonstrated their desire to do away with `bloc
politics' - what Bolaji Akinyemi has called the 'out-fighting' between the preOAU Blocs

13

- which dominated their relationship in the early 1960's. Indeed,

many African leaders realized that the division within their ranks was
dangerous enough; it helped to heighten their jealousies, suspicions and
chauvinisms. More important, it gave the Europeans of whatever political
persuasion the best opportunity to play one group of Africans against the
33

other.'14` In the words of R. Uwechue, "it is not sufficiently realized that,

because of these deep divisions the OAU represented a largely negative
agreement - not to move too much to the left nor too far to the right. As a result
of this stagnating consensus, the OAU has in the past fourteen years moved
hardly at all 15.
Thus, apart from the above `personal' rivalries for dominant positions
among, conflicting African leaders, other socio-economic and political issues
drove wedges against the OAU's quest for continental integration. The
remaining part of this chapter shall examine these issues.

Socio-Economic Issues

Although

political

matters

or

crises

constituted

the

primary

preoccupation of African leaders and states during the OAU years, yet these
leaders 'had also shown concern on the question of economic and social
development of the continent. It was perhaps due to this concern that the
Economic and Social Commission was established as one of the three
specialized commissions of the OAU with functions that had to do with the
economic and general welfare of the African peoples, such as initiating studies
34

and reports with regards to economic and social issues affecting the destiny of
the African peoples 16.

However, before the establishment of OAU, the imposition of arbitrary

state boundaries gave rise to political, social, and economic fragmentation that
has continued to impede regional integration - a goal for many Africans since
the late colonial era as well as a perceived answer to some of the more
troubling legacies of colonial 17. A related problem was the prevalence of small
internal markets throughout the continent:
Seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa have population under
1 million, and another fourteen have fewer than 5 million
people. Even in larger countries low average incomes limit
purchasing power and countries are landlocked, creating
another need for cooperation. Colonial infrastructure was
designed to facilitate external administration and commodity
exports, offering scant basis for transactions within or between
territories. Disparities in monetary systems and trade
regulations also create barriers to commerce. The international
marginality of African economies and difficulties attracting
outside investment and, trade on favourable terms have
additionally spurred efforts
toward integration. 18
Again, most of the educational institutions and economic relations of African
states were plugged into Western nations; there was very little, if any,

35

economic interdependence that would facilitate the movement toward

continental integration.' 19
Given these challenges, the appeal of regional integration would seem
evident. However, unlike political issues, the question of economic and social
development was largely left at the bottom rung of the -OAU's priorities, at
least up to the late 1970s. According to N. Chazan et al, "economic growth
slowed substantially throughout Africa during the course of the 1970s, and by
decade's end many countries . were afflicted by declining output, fiscal
shortfalls, and -rising debt." 20 The first real attention of African leaders and the
OAU towards econornic and social matters took place in 1980, when a
concrete plan of action towards economic - and social development was drawn
for the emancipation of the continent's peoples and states from their fate of
economic underdevelopment. This was embodied in the OAU's 1980 Lagos
Plan of Action, which manifested Africa's enduring appeal for the idea of
"collective self-reliance" as a central part of the continental agenda towards
economic emancipation

21

As. the then most authoritative official record of Africa's serious

attempt to change the depressing economic conditions of the African countries,
the elaborate history of the Lagos Plan of Action began in 1979. From
February 12th to 16th in 1979, and at the invitation of the Secretary-General of
36

the Organization of African Unity, a symposium on the future development

prospects of Africa towards the year 2000 was held in Monrovia, Liberia.
Attended by about 40 experts from all parts of Africa and outside, representing
the world of economics, science, labour, health, diplomacy and futures
research, who took part in a personal capacity, the principal focus of the
symposium was as follow: "What type of development should Africa aspire to
for the year 2000? and What ways and means should be employed for this
purpose?" 22
Definitely, the symposium constituted a crucial point in the effort in the
diagnosis of the causes of African economic tragedies. For instance; it was
agreed that in spite of many years of independence, the- problems of
underdevelopment and unemployment persist in all African countries with the
tenacity of a bad winter. In short, the general diagnosis read like a death
sentence as one expert after another narrated his own findings - these ranged
from massive infant mortality to violent death in all forms. 23 The symposium
therefore recommended urgent measures which must be taken by the African
states in order to save the present and future generations of Africans from the
excruciating agencies occasioned by economic and social development.
Consequently, the Report of the Symposium in Monrovia was discussed
at several OAU Ministerial Meetings and in the various capitals in Africa
37

resulting in drafts that were discussed and approved at the meeting of OAU
Heads of State and Governments in Lagos between 28th and 29th of April
1980. The draft final Act of Lagos (as the Lagos Plan of Action was called)
was the first OAU meeting of Assembly of Heads of State and Government
devoted exclusively to economic problems of Afi-ica. 24 It focused on the
consideration of guidelines and measures for national and collective selfreliance in economic and social development for the establishment of a new
international economic order which aimed at the eventual establishment of an
African common market and leading to an African Economic Community.

At the Summit, the African leaders confirmed their full adherence to the
Plan of Action for the Economic; Social and Cultural Development of Africa;
and agreed among other things to strengthen those already existing structures
for an eventual establishment of an African Common Market which was
considered as a first step towards the creation an African economic community.
The Assembly on the same day adopted the draft for the implementation of the
Plan of Action and the setting up of an African community:
We reaffirm our commitment to set up by the year 2000, on the
basis of a treaty to be concluded, an African Economic
Community so as to ensure the economic, social and cultural,
integration of our continent, the aim of this community shall
be to promote collective, accelerated, self-reliant and self38

sustaining development, as well as cooperation among and

integration of its Member States in the economic, social and
cultural fields 25.
The Lagos Plan of Action was the most important achievement of the
OAU's Economic and Social Commission until the adoption in 1991 of the
Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) by the
Summit of Heads of State and Government. According to the Treaty, the
African Economic Community would use the then existing as well as the yet to
be established Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as its building
blocks 26.
Political Issues
Apart from the above discussed socio-economic issues that obviously
heightened continental political differences then, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) was also faced with political issues that invariably affected
continental integration. According to L. B. Ekpebu, in the 38-year history of
the OAU, the organization had had to deal with a number of. Political issues
(alongside the crippling and continuing economic crisis facing - the continent)
which centered on interstate and intra-state conflicts as well as the long-drawn
battle against racism, colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa 27. However,
these political matters or rather -crises constituted the primary preoccupation
39

of the African leaders and states after and since independence, thereby leaving
the question of economic and social development at the bottom rung of the
organization's priorities 28.
One reason why economic matters/issues had been overshadowed by
political issues is that political events are usually more compelling and
spectacular, while economic. difficulties develop insidiously and are seldom so
specific or dramatic. In the words of R. Uwechue;
When are talk if the OAU's inability to achieve a satisfactory
degree of economic co-operation among African Countries
and of Africa's continued dependence on non-African powers,
we console ourselves by blaming the colonial past-and do very
little about it. When there is a Pan-African political crisis or
war, everybody talks about it and the OAU is asked to resolve
the problem. Nobody demands that it should tackle with
equal vigour and collective spirit the continent's transports,
which are ' in reality no less a danger to Africa's survival. 29
Thus, it is in these areas of political issues that the concrete achievement of the
Organization of African Unity can be assessed, particularly in the area of
decolonization and struggle against anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa 30.
In the first place, Article II (1) of the OAU Charter had provided for the
eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa, and a Liberation Committee
was established with the responsibility of liquidating colonialism which was
seen as the principal aim of the OAU. With the continental agenda of liberation
40

of the southern -states from colonial and minority rule, the OAU liberation
committee was also tasked to channel support to the peoples of southern
Africa 31 Although more that thirty states had gained independence in the first
wave of independence in Africa before the establishment of OAU in 1963,
however in the second wave that was generally more violent, the lusophone
states of Guinea-Bissau, -Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Angola finally
overcame 400 years of colonial domination following the revolution in
Portugal in 1974. 32
Moreover; only Zambia and Malawi had joined the ranks of African self
rule by 1965, when the white settlers of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) issued
their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Whereas Malawi opted for
a policy of. accommodation with the white power, Tanzania and Zambia
became significantly involved with the liberation movements of Zimbabwe,
Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa 33. In fact, the headquarters of
the Liberation Committee was placed in Dar es Salam, capital of Tanzania,
which was at the time the only independent mainland state in the region.
In 1975, Spain withdrew from the Western Sahara, setting in motion a
period of unresolved continental strife over control of the territory. By 1980
the struggle against white rule in Rhodesia was crowned with success: the
41

independence of Zimbabwe brought the British colonial presence in Africa to

an end. While Namibia gained independence in 1990, South Africa that was the
last and most recalcitrant, remnant of an internal colonial presence in
contemporary Africa, completed its transition to a multiracial democracy in the
spring of 1994.
If the OAU was so successful in the decolonization of the continent and he
elimination of white minority regimes in southern Africa, the same can not
categorically and authoritatively- be said about the organization's role in
conflict resolution. N.. Chazan et al have noted that OAU's record on crisis
management had remained 'uneven 34 Similarly, Agubuzu has stated that a major
area of under-performance by the OAU, which had earned it the derogatory
label of a "toothless bull-dog", was its limited capacity to deal effectively with
the problems of conflicts and political instability, bad governance and lack of
rule of law, especially the violation of human rights in member states 35.
A rather striking feature of the OAU's handling of inter-state disputes is
that none had ever been dealt with by the Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration - the organ created specifically for that purpose in
1964.36 While the Commission was looking for work to do without finding any,
the work that it should have been doing was being given to various ad hoc
commissions and committees of the OAU member-states to perform. Thus,
42

disputes among the OAU members had been settled through direct negotiations
between states, good offices offered by third parties,, ad '/roc committees
composed' of Heads of State, and diplomatic negotiations conducted during
sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and-Government 37.
By and large, the disputes that were submitted to the ad hoc
commissions and committees were over border and territorial claims and
allegations of subversion by some of the OAU member-states against other
member-states. There were also a few cases of civil wars in which the OAU
tried to intervene. Although Paragraph 2 of Article III of the OAU Charter
prpvi.ded for non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states, but the
OAU invariably had to intervene on the side of the established order, as in the
case of the civil wars in Zaire, Nigeria and in Chad 38. Thus, it was largely
because of the above political issues that the OAU moved with strong
determination in the last two decades or so (1980 - 2002) of its existence to
promote democracy, good governance and human right 39. These later form part
of the political orientation of the African Union.

In conclusion, the road to African continental integration has not been an

easy one, largely because of the socio-economic and political history of Africa
during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period. African peoples
43

have diverse history and were also colonized by different European powers. At
independence, the people of Africa inherited a legacy, which was tinted by
colonialism. 40 Since independence; various efforts have been made aimed at
socio-political and economic cooperation and integration. However, while
some leaders suited a stronger integration, others preferred a loose one. With
time, African leaders were able to arrive at a consensus with the establishment
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was a middle way between
the strong union and the federalist structure as advocated by the two groups.
Since the establishment of the OAU, and through, out its 38-year
existence, the Organization was faced with several issues of integration, which
this chapter has critically examined. Although the OAU experienced more
failures than successes, it remained a focal point for collective initiatives and
for conflict management 42. As a result of certain lapses in the-OAU Charter,
coupled with some fundamental changes that had taken place in the
international political system, African leaders moved towards establishing a
structure that would enhance the socio-economic and political life of the
African people, as well as enhance the status of African states in world
affairs 43. These efforts culminated in the transition from OAU to AU in 2002.
By the time it gave way to the African Union (AU), the OAU's
membership had grown to 53 member-states. Morocco, which had withdrawn
44

its membership in 1987 in protest against the admission of the Saharawi Arab
Republic (Western Sahara), was the only African country, which was not a
member of the OAU at its transition. 44 Although some observers have alleged
that the AU is an `old wine in new skin', one thing for sure is that the dream of
one of Africa's great leaders and heroes, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, has finally been
realized. In his closing remark at the , Casablanca Conference in 1961, Dr.
Nkrumah noted that "the future of Africa lies in a political union - a political
union in which the economic, military and cultural activities will be
coordinated for the security of our continent 45. For U. J. Ogwu, "the African
Union is not only new; it is different from the OAU. No doubt it emanated
from the OAU, but it is informed by the lessons learnt from the OAU, the
increased marginalization of Africa in the post-Cold War world, and the need
to overcome the multiple crises confronting Africa through unity, 'integration
and development 46.

The succeeding chapters shall examine how the `new' African Union has
been handling political and socio-economic problems in Africa.

45

ENDNOTES
1. D. L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 3 (New
York: Collier & Macmillan and the Free Pres, 1968), p. 522. See also E. B.
Hass, The Century of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.
2. L. N. Lindbert, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 6.
46

3. J. S. Goldstein and J. C. Pevehouse, International Relations, Brief Third Edition

(New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), p. 250.
4. R. Uwechue, "The OAU - Time for a Change", in Z. Cervenka, The Unfinished
Quest for Unity: Africa and the "OA U (New York: African Publishers, 1977),
p. ix.
5. L. O. C. Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, NIIA Lecture Series No. 83 (Lagos:
Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 2004), p. 20.
6. Ibid., pp. 20 - 21
7. Quoted in ibid., p. 20.
8. Ibid., p. 21.
9. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OA U, p.1.
10.Ibid.
11. Uwechue, "The OAU - Time for a Change", p. ix.
12.Ibid., pp. ix - x.
13. A. B. Akinyemi, "The O.A.U. and African Identity", Nigerian-Forum (N.I.I.A.
Lagos, May 1981), pp. 116 - 119.
14. S. O. Agbi, The Organization of African

Unity and African Diplomacy,

1963 -1979 (Ibadan: Impact Publishers, 1986), p. 1.

15. Uwechue, "The OAU - Time for a Change", p. ix.

47

16. See Article 20 of the `Charter of the Organization of African Unity',

Addia Ababa, 1963. This is the equivalent of Article 61 of the United Nations
Charter establishing the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

17 .N. Chazan et al, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 3rd

Edition, (Boulder: Lynne Riemler Publishers, 1999), p. 311.
18 .Ibid.
19 .R. Goff et al, The Twentieth Century: A Brief Global History, Fourth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994), p. 388.
20. Chazan et al, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, p. 325.
21.Ibid., pp. 310 - 311.
22.A. Adedeji, "The Organization of African Unity: Problems and Prospects",
a paper presented at the Command and .Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna,
March 21, 1986, p. 6.
23.Ibid., p.. 7.
24.lbid., p. 8.
25.Ibid., pp. 8 - 9.
26. Agubuzu, From the 0A U to AU: The Challenges of African Unity and
Development in the Twenty-fist Century, p. 28.
27.L. B. Ekpebu, Africa and the International Political System, (Ibadan: Sam
Bookman Publishers, 1999), p. 19.
48

28.Adedeji, "The Organization of African Unity: Problems and Prospects", p.

5.
29.Uwechue, "The OAU - Time for a Change", p. xi.
30.Agbi, The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, p. 3.

31. Chazan et al, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, p. 394.

32.Ibid., p. 6.

33.Ibid., p. 395.

34.Ibid., p. 14.
3 5. Agubuzu, From the OA U to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity
and Development in the Twenty-fist Century, p. 26.
36. Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OA U,
p.64.
37.Ibid.
3 8. Amate, Inside the OA U - Pan-Africanism in Practice, p. 431.

49

39.Agubuzu, From the OAU to AU.- The Challenges of African Unity

and Development in the Twen'ty-fist Century, pp. 28 - 29.
40 J. 1. Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", in
F. I. A. Omu & L. E. Otoide (eds.), Themes in International Studies
and Diplomacy (Benin City: Mindex Publishing, 2002), pp. 182 183.
.4 L Ibid.
42. Chazan et al, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, p.
361.
43.Osagie, "Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa", p.
185.
44.Ibid.
45. Quoted in C. Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 57.
.46.U. J. Ogwu, "AU and Africa's Development", in Agubuzu, From the OA U to
A U.- The Challenges of African Unity and Development in the Twenty-fist
Century, p. 8.

50

CHAPTER THREE
AFRICAN UNION AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS
Greater African integration has long been a cherished but elusive goal.
Political leaders at official conferences and formal summits have long promoted
the idea, although with only limited results on the ground. There is a renewed
impetus to establish closer economic and political ties among the continents
numerous countries, based on a heightened appreciation of the need for regional
integration and a clearer understanding of the past failures.

51

The flame of unity and freedom lit in the sixties has continued to glow,
though dimly, to illuminate the path of the transition from the OAU to the African
Union (AU). The AU is not a child of an impetuous inspiration but the offspring of
a gradual but dedicated progression towards ideals and commitments. The
continent has remained in dire need of solutions to its critical problems and it is
this very condition that propels the need for change and progress.
When, in the 1990s, the notion of a Pan-African Union was born again, it
was the liberation of South Africa from apartheid that helped it back to life.
Equally, there is the argument that the main influence propelling Africans towards
greater economic and political unity is globalization. Faced with a trading system
which insists on transnational capital having carte blanche, Africans became
increasingly aware that they would have to stand together if they were to defend or
advance their own cause. But even as they favoured unity in principle, they could
not necessarily agree on how closely united they should be and what forms their
unity should take.
Several years ago the OAU Summit had set up a 14-member committee to
review its charter. By 1996 when the Yaounde Declaration was issued, the Charter
Review Committee had held six sessions and had submitted, on an annual basis,
reports to the OAU summit. As Jackie Cilliers notes, not dissimilar to the impasse

52

within which the UN finds itself, the review of the OAU Charter remained the
captive of the competing national interests of a number of member states.

However, for a number of important countries, such as South Africa, the initiative
towards the establishment of the AU provided a way out of this impasse.
A major problem, indicative of the ideological divide of the 1960s, was the
vision of a single federal African states that inspired leaders like Moammar
Gaddafi, a vision which many of the states did not share but which they were
hesitant of criticizing. The Libyan initiative, it was interpreted, was intended to
enable the North African leader to break out of the prolonged diplomatic isolation
brought about by its poor relations with the US, the UK and some of the Arab
States. Notwithstanding the misgivings, the declaration adopted by the 4th Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999 set the fast
track to the Constitutive Act of the AU that emerged. In July 2000, African Heads
of state met in Lom, Togo for the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU. At the end
of that Summit they came out with a Draft Treaty for an African Union which
would replace the OAU. Incidentally, that came a hundred years after the first-ever
Pan-African Conference was held in London.
The OAU Lusaka Summit meeting of July 2001 mandated the SecretaryGeneral to proceed, in consultation with member states, with a process to work out
the rules of procedure to launch the key structures within the AU; such as the
53

Assembly of heads of states and government; the Executive Council of Foreign

Ministers, the Commission (including its structures, functions and powers), and the
Permanent Representatives Committee of Ambassadors. The Lusaka Summit also
agreed to incorporate the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and
resolution as an organ of the AU. After a review of its structure, procedures and
working method in a typically uncertain manner, the first draft text provided for the
AU to co-exist with the OAU and AEC rather than serving the purpose of
rationalization and consolidation.
The seminal assembly of the African Union held in July 2002 in South
Africa closed the shop on the OAU which had been in existence since 1963.
Much hope was raised by this development as manifested in the statement of the
Nigerian Foreign Minister, Sule Lamido: Arising from the realization in todays
world order, we Africans are essentially on our own, the leaders had to re-think.
We have to look inwards to try to create a stronger, more effective process of
continental interaction, something more integrative, merging our economies,
markets, and capacity. We have to bring our potentials so that our partners will be
forced to engage us. 2 Such moving statements have not been lacking in Africa but
the AU, like OAU, is an inter-governmental organization and the pace of change is
therefore still likely to be determined by what cynics refer to as lowest common
denominator politics. 3
54

The Constitutive Act of the AU envisages the establishment of a

supranational type of executive body that can promote integration and sustainable
human development more effectively than the OAU. The Act has the following
bodies as principal organs:
The Assembly of the Union;
The Executive Council;
The Pan-African Parliament;
The Court of Justice;
The Commission;
The Permanent Representatives Committee;
The Special Technical Committees
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
The Financial Institutions.
Among the AUs major objectives, as stated in Article 3 of the Act, Are
Active greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of
Africa;
Acceleration of the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
A common market and economic community,
International cooperation, taking dual account of the charter of the UN and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
55

 A common defence policy for collective security.

Keeping in mind the challenges of globalization and marginalization there
was a consensus, even if only for public consumption, that the aim of the Union
would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in 37 years and to advance
from there to chart a new dynamic vision of collective continental action and
cohesion for Africa. The big question, however, is, will the re-launch or rebranding
of the OAU achieve the desired objectives? Can the AU stop the yawning and the
tightening of the stomach muscles that used to accompany the mention of the name
of the OAU? 4 Would a United Africa benefit the ordinary people and can African
leaders sustain the organization through a corporate agenda?
Critics have been quick to dismiss the Constitutive Act as utopian, while
some believe that the treaty does not present a new agenda for Africa, as the whole
thing appears to be only a declaration of intention which does not respond to the
realities and aspirations of Africans. Although reinforcing stereotypes of
backwardness and hopelessness is not conducive to finding solutions to any of
Africas problems, old habits die hard. Though the post-Cold War ideological
schisms are eroded, the contentious matters stemming from the colonial
background, which hamstrung the OAU in several instances, persist. A union that
must last cannot be driven by the distrust which prevails in some circles of
collective effort in Africa.
56

AU AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The state-centric approach to international affairs leads states to think of
sovereignty from an exclusive angle. Many leaders do not share the vision of a
single Federal African state. Under the terms of the Constitutive Act of the AU,
Article 4 lists 16 principles which contain an ambitious wish list, including, for
example, the establishment of a common defence policy and the right of the
Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of the
Union in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity. As Michael Mulikita rightly observes, the Act makes no
reference to the UNSC, which is the primary instrument for dealing with the type
of emergencies referred to in Article 4(h) of the Act. 5 More worrisome and in the
classic manner of state-centric organizations, Article 4(g) effectively nullifies
Article 4(h) by affirming non-interference by any member state in the internal
affairs of another. Hence, as Mulikita concludes, under the non-interference
clause, a regime guilty of the type of gross human rights violations outlined in
Article 3 (on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the promotion and
protection of human and peoples rights in accordance with the African Charter on
Human and People Rights) and Article 4(h) can legally obstruct Union
intervention. This confirms the old habits, the old fears and the old traits since the
1960s. The Act does not provide for the tools or mechanism with which to
57

implement, monitor or advance these lofty ideals. It is recalled that in the OAU
Charter, Article 3(2) on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states led
to serious drawbacks and had negative implications for the activities of the
organization for several decades. In this period, ruthless, corrupt and
unaccountable leaders emerged across the continent, without African states or
leaders confronting them. Along with other factors, it led OAU to degenerate into
what the Kenyan statesman, Oginga Odinga, called a Trade Union of African
Heads of State.6
In the same vein, Article 30 states that governments that come to power in
future through unconstitutional means will not be allowed to participate in the
activities of the Union. Jackie Cilliers believes that the Act does not incorporate
extensive principles for democratic governance, the definition of unconstitutional
changes, or the measures that the AU would take in response to such
developments.7 These apparent contradictions, admittedly, provide an example of
the ambivalent attitude of African states towards the sensitive issue of national
sovereignty. It strengthens the impression that the AU amounts to merely giving
the OAU a fresh coat of paint without the inner structures undergoing any
renovations.8
This paper, without lapsing into unprofitable pessimism, notes that the AU
project is going to be a much more expensive undertaking than the regular amount
58

of $31 million annual budget of the OAU. Quite clearly, much thought needs to be
devoted to how the union will be funded, especially the Pan-African Parliament.
The doubts emerge against the background of the fact that by mid 2000, only 17 of
the 53 member states of the OAU were up to date in the settlement of their
financial obligations to the regular budget.9 The question is how will the additional
obligations be met, against the background of the near permanent poor showing of
African economies.
Similarly, the overlapping membership of several regional grouping with
duplicating mandates and structures leading to inadequate financing of the
integration process, poses a serious threat to continental union. Ironically, African
leaders refer to their sub-regional efforts regarding security arrangements, but they
are not ready openly to chastise their colleagues for undemocratic tendencies in
their sub-regions.
Some of the noticeable habits of the African leaders which have not altered
dramatically over the decades are obstacles to any genuine union on the continent.
These include a penchant for luxury items like expensive official vehicles,
presidential jets and the expending of inordinate amounts on running public
offices, foreign travel and diplomatic representation which cannot be sustained,
instead of engaging in pooling or coordinating representation; military spending in
excess of two percent of the GNP (any success achieved in reducing military
59

spending translates into an expansion of public domestic savings); corruption

which is widely recognised as a serious obstacle to development; and ethnic and
communal conflicts fuelled by elite struggle and the asphyxiating debt gap.
Another major challenge the AU has to contend with in its
effort to integrate African economies is the existence of civil
strives and conflicts in Africa. In an editorial comment, the African
Journal of international Affairs and Development once notes that
virtually every country in Africa has either a festering or full
blown

conflict

to

deal

with.10 Since

no

war

leaves

the

neighbouring countries untouched, what ordinarily begins as

minor dispute over power and resources can quickly engulf an
entire region. The result is displacement of people (refugees),
reduction in the flow of aid and investments, suspension of
development projects etc. All these definitely hinder regional
integration.
The lack of sustained political commitment to put in place
agreed policies and plans has been one of Africas major
shortcoming, and in the context of the African Union, this is an
issue that needs to be addressed. In the words of Tom Nevin, the

60

real challenge facing the AU is to get 53 nations all reading from

the same page11. Buttresing Amoako and Nevin, Prof. Ndulo said,
The traditional explanation of the failure of
integration schemes in Africais that there is a lack
of political will in the member countries that is
necessary to see integration succeed, expressed in
the chronic nonobservance of commitments
undertaken within the respective agreements and
in the insufficient use of the instruments set up by
these agreements.12
What the foregoing suggests is that African leaders lacked the will
to make integration work. Related to this is the fact that for
integration to succeed, some element of national sovereignty
must be sacrificed. But, according to Mair and Peters-Berries,
hardly an African state ruler is really prepared to
do that. For the transfer of resources and power of
decisions to a supranational institution means a
dissolving of the mass of patronage with which
they can buy loyalty. Hence the well-known
pattern:
in
rhetorical
speeches,
regional
integration is conjured up and sometimes a
monetary union is quickly decided upon as the
goal. But in practice business is got down to in a
much more restrained way.13
Also another challenge before the AU is how to incorporate
the generality of Africans into integration schemes in the
continent. There is enough evidence to support the fact that,
apart from all else, regional efforts have failed in Africa because
61

such efforts sidetracked the people. In this wise, the AU itself

seems to have fallen into the same pit, as did the OAU, which it
replaced. Its Act seems more an instrument for building a
coalition of states rather than uniting of people as obvious in
the provisions for the Unions structure and decision-making
process (Article 5 to 22) .It is only in the case of Economic, Social
and Cultural Council that members are to be drawn from outside
Governments and bureaucracies of members states. Even then,
Articles 22 sub-section 2 emphasize that the functions, powers,
composition and organization of the Economic, Social and Cultural
Council shall be determined by the Assembly. It should be noted
that the Assembly consists of Heads of State and Governments.
K.Y. Amoako said;
It is self-evident, that national policies have
sustainability,
if
there
is
appropriately
widespread participation in their formulation and
execution. But we have only began to
understand, how this dynamics works at the
supra-national level. What is safe to say at this
stage is that the process of integration has so far
largely been in the hands of governments alone.14
Regional integration efforts have also not been successful in
Africa because gains and drawbacks unavoidably are unequally
62

distributed between member countries, and no satisfactory

mechanism for compensation has as yet been devised.31
According to Ernest Harsch,
A major stumbling block to successful regional
integration has been the great diversity in African
countries sizes, national resources, level of
development and connections to global markets.
Tiny Benin does not have the same economic
interests as its giant oil-rich neighbour, Nigeria.
South Africa and Malawi do not experience the
costs
and
benefits
of
regional
trade
15
arrangements in the same way.

Besides, the benefits from integration are only somewhat

accruable in the long run whereas its cost has to be met in the
short term by members who obviously have more than enough
social, political and economic problems to cope with at home.
According to Prof. Adedeji: There are states that cant even pay
the salaries of their civil servants. How can you expect them to
take out of their non-available resources to pay contributions to
(regional organizations)?16
Another challenge before the AU is how to make African
governments incorporate
policies.

The

policies

regional
of

agreements

liberalization,
63

into

national

privatization

and

deregulation as well as unsound package of macro-economic

policies

imposed

through

structural

adjustment

conditionality/programme by the IMF and World Bank, which have

now

been

institutionalized

within

the

WTO

through

rules,

agreements and procedures, are biased against African countries

on one hand and regional integration efforts on the other hand. 17
The programmes, focusing heavily on liberalisation and market
mechanisms, are almost exclusively national in scope as they
obliged each African
government to negotiate separately with its external financing
institutions,

without

regard

to

regional

considerations. 18

Meanwhile, the external financing institutions i.e donors, prefer to

fund national programmes rather than regional cooperative
projects.19 Prof. Muna Ndulo, Director, Institute for African
Development (IAD) concurs on this:
There is the problem of low priority accorded to
the implementation of integration programs vis-vis national ones which are very often
supported
and
financed
by
influential
international institutions such as the IMF and
the World Bank. For example under the
structural adjustment programs in place in most
African countries, domestic considerations take
64

precedence
over
preoccupations.20

sub-regional

integration

Finally, the AU is an ambitious undertaking but despite the change in name,

many of the institutions that have been created as part of the OAU and the African
Economic Community will continue unchanged for the foreseeable future.
However, in spite of these identifiable features, it is necessary to provide clarity on
whether the Union is a replacement or a continuation of the OAU and whether the
Union aims at both economic and political integration. The overwhelming
competition instituted by globalization must be openly noted because globalization
in its current form is the biggest threat to African independence, sovereignty and
therefore to its development. Globalization is said to be a magnified integration
which threatens all.
One could be driven by the optimistic variety of patriotism to believe that
the Union can be made to work for the African people at large. However, at a more
critical level, if is difficult to believe that adequate space will be made for what is
widely referred to as African civil society, especially if that civil society seeks to
make use of the aspirations of the AU to offer criticisms of rulers which are illegal
to voice at the national level. Many are sceptical that a union designed by the
beneficiaries of state power will be allowed to work to any other advantage than
that of the dominant political class.
65

ENDNOTES
1. Jackie Cilliers, Towards the African Union, African Security Review,vol. 10,
No., 2, 2001, pp. 115-119.
2. Sule Lamido on Nigeria has no Reservation on African Union, ThisDay,
(Lagos) April 8, 2001, p. 21.
3. Jackie Cilliers, From Acronym to Action: The Seminal Assembly of the
African Union in African Security Review, vol. II, No. 1, 2002,p. 97-102.
4. See Cameroon Duodu, Give Unity a Chance, News African Magazine, July 29,
2002, pp. 20- 21.
5. See Konstanz Mulikita, The UN Security Council and the OAU: Conflict or
66

collaboration, African Security Review, vol. II, No 1, 2002, pp. 29-30.

6. Adams Oshiomole, Popular Participation and the African Union, in Adagbo
Onoja (ed.), Plying the Foreign Pitch, vol. 2, 2000- 2001, Abuja: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2001, pp. 119-120.
7. Cilliers, Towards an African Union, op. cit p. 106.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Konstanz Mulikita, The Security Council and the OAU p. 30.
11. Tom Nevin, Exit OAU, enter AU. Will the African Union
succeed where the
OAU failed? African Business, September 2001, p.10.
12. Muna Ndulo, African Economic Community and the Promotion
of IntraAfrican Trade African Notes, May 1992.
13. Regional integration in Africa: mainly a good idea so far.
File://A:/
Development and cooperation. htm
14. K.Y Amoako, quoted in Dayo Kawonishe, Metamorphosis of
the OAU.,.,
p.4.
67

15. Ernest Harsch, Making African Integration a Reality African Recovery

September, p.13.
16. You must first set your house in order African Recovery,
September 2002 ,
p.16.
17. This was evident at Libreville, Gabon on 11th January 2000
when the Bretton
Woods

Agents

recognised

the

failure

of

Structural

Adjustment Programmes in Africa and asked for Africas

forgiveness. See Mwalimu George Ngwane, Why We Need An
African Union Now (Buea: Kalak Book, 2000), p.6.
18. A better environment for integration? African Recovery,
September 2002,
p.12.
19. Ibid.
20. Muna Ndulo, African Economic Community

CHAPTER FOUR
AFRICAN UNION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
68

Integration is no longer a simple question of

propriety, it is an inevitable strategy of survival
and development. The rhythm of globalization
sustained by the tidal wave of economic
liberalization and disparities in the share of
projects, have made it as emergency for African
countries to hold each others hands it they wish to
expand, strengthen, and integrate their economic
area.
- Salim Ahmed Salim, former OAU Secretary General.

Africa have come to realise that the economic power of nations has become
by far the most dominant factor in the relevance and importance of countries in the
emerging global order. This is why even the major world powers are continuously
striving to widen and strengthen the base of their economic strength, through a
conscious effort to expand their economic space and market size. In the case of
Africa, a continent which has been marginalized for too long a time in the world
economy, integration is no longer a matter of convenience, but an indispensable
strategy for survival and development.1
The pace of globalisation, coupled with the sweeping wave of economic
liberalization, and with the imbalances in the distribution of the benefits in favor of
the strong economies, has increased the urgency for African countries to join hands
to expand, fortify, solidify and integrate their economic space, to serve as a
platform for take off and effective integration into the global economy. Regional
69

integration therefore at the very least constitutes Africas response to globalisation,

and an instrument to reverse the trend towards the marginalisation of the
Continent. It cannot be disputed that some advances were made in the quest to
foster closer integration in the continent through the structures of the OAU and
sundry ad hoc efforts. However, the obstacles confronting African endeavor were
quite immense. Africa was being threatened increasingly into marginalisation by its
failure to cope with the demands of globalisation. While even stronger economies,
with their advanced technological base, were finding it necessary to consolidate
their level of economic integration as a means of gaining from the opportunities of
this historic phenomenon.2
The people of Africa were confronted with multiple setbacks of incessant
conflicts, political instability, and the HIV-AIDS pandemic among other things.
Efforts by individual States to resolve these numerous issues are often quashed by
gargantuan external debt crisis. Thus, Africa came to realise that the magnitude of
the external and internal challenges could be handled only by consolidating
continental unity and that the status quo and the nascent structures of integration
could not sustain the impending threat. This African response is best studied in the
light of the reforms made to the existing integrative organ, that is, the OAU as well
as the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD) aimed at bailing Africa
from its present despondency.
70

NEPAD is a merger of the Millennium Partnership for Africas Recovery

Programme and the Omega Plan 3. It is a project of the AU aimed at tackling issues
such as peace and security, good economic, political and corporate governance, and
to make the continent an attractive destination for foreign investment. A NEPAD
(2001) positioning document says: The New Partnership for Africas Development
is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared
conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their
countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and
development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy
and body politic.4 Writing in the African National Congress (ANC) web journal,
ANC Today, President Mbeki who formulated the African Renaissance concept and
is a key driver of NEPAD, said: The challenge to end the economic
marginalisation of Africa, and therefore to attract the necessary resources into our
continent to ensure its development, stands at the heart both of the vision of an
African Renaissance and NEPAD.5 The NEPAD initiative is quite timely given the
African situation and its emphasis that the hopes of Africas people for a better
life lie in their own hands and not on the magnanimity of others, is helping to
increase Africas profile 6. NEPAD is rooted in good governance and democracy,
which distinguishes it from previous regional development initiatives. An
interesting issue however is that the feasibility of democracy in Africa depends not
71

so much on the pronouncements of African leaders, rather, it lies more on how

democracy can be used to meet the social and economic needs of the people.
The question however remains: Will the AU succeed where the OAU failed?
In other words, will the AU succeed in integrating African economies? This
chapter attempts to provide answers to these questions. It appraises the socioeconomic challenges before the AU in its bid to integrate Africa.
Economic cooperation, according to John Rourke, is a process whereby
sovereign states cooperate with one another bilaterally or multi-laterally through
IGOs (such as the IMF) or processes (such as the G-7 meetings). 7 Whereas
economic integration means such a close degree of economic intertwining that, by
formal agreement of informal circumstances, the countries involved begin to
surrender some degree of sovereignty and act as an economic unit. 8 It should be
noted, however, that

there is no precise point when economic cooperation

becomes economic integration. This is because the process involves more of

moving along a continuum ranging from economic isolation, through mercantile
policy, then to economic cooperation, and finally to economic integration.9
The EU as well as NAFTA countries have moved along this continuum
towards integration. It should be noted also that the process of economic
integration, rather than be a single strand of activity, is a very complex
phenomenon, which result from the interaction and mutual strengthening of
72

transnational trade and finance, inter-governmental and non-governmental

international organisations, transnational values, and other aspect of regime
building.10 In fact, the inseparable nexus between economics and politics extends
to regional integration. This perhaps explains why Hassan Sunmonu, General
Secretary of the Organisation of Africa Trade Union Unity (OATUU) said:
By integration, we dont mean just economic integration, but
economic and political integration, infrastructure, linking energy,
linking roads, transport and so on.11

By and large, however, regional economic institutions have been established

both by independent states within a geo-political region and the United Nations.
The latter established five regional economic commissions all over the world.
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), Economic Commission for West Asia (ECWA), Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) and Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP).
On the other hand, the independently established regional institutions in the
world regions include the European Union (EU) in Europe, North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA) in North America, Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in Asia, The Arab League in the Middle East, and the nascent
African Union (AU) in Africa. A detailed analysis of the factor, which led to the
73

formation of the foregoing regional associations by states in the region concerned,

is outside the scope of this study.
But if Walter Kennes, European Commission economists assertion is
anything to go by, the reason cannot be separated from the obvious benefits, which
a successful integration will provide for the integrating states. According to
Kennes:
Regional integration is only one aspect of a wider strategy to
promote equitable growth. Successful regional integration
improves competition, reduces transaction costs, allows economies
of scale, attracts foreign direct investment and makes macroeconomic coordination easier.12

Although the end of World War II witnessed the proliferation of regional

associations striving to integrate member states, the collapse of the cold war
rekindled the desire to pragmatically achieve integration. Suffice it to say that the
post-cold war era has witnessed as intense and growing global trend towards the
development of regional economic and political blocs. Thus, integration of states
suddenly became the received wisdom and indeed a fascinating path to tread, in
order to accelerate socio-economic development.
It is worthy to mention that during the cold war years, regionalism and
integration had lesser attention paid to them unlike what obtains in contemporary
times. This is particularly true of Africa, which enjoyed financial and economic
74

assistance/patronage by the East and West blocs in their inordinate ambition to

contain each other and spread their spheres of influence. However, the retreat
from Africa, occasioned by the coming to end of the East-West ideological
conflict and the consequent economic crisis experienced in the continent, made
African leaders, including those who have initially ignored the call for integration
to realise that unless Africa speaks and acts in accord, under development and
poverty will continue to ravage the continent.
The clamour for integration is not a thing of the twenty first century. Indeed,
the challenges of globalisation and marginalisation of Africa merely rekindled the
call and need for integration. As the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stressed in
his message to the 9th Summit of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) in Kampala, 8 June 2004:
The continent continues to face numerous daunting
developmental challenges. Economic growth is still far below what
is needed to meet the millennium development goal of reducing
poverty by half by the year 2015. Adult literacy for the majority of
sub-Saharan Africa stands well below the developingcountry
average. And the rising incidence of AIDS is dramatically
reducing life expectancy. Effective regional integration has a
major role to play in helping African countries address these and
other common concerns13.

In like manner, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria said,

75

In all these years, regional economic cooperation and integration

has remained a central pillar of Africas development strategy. It
has rightly been considered as a necessity rather than a choice. It
has been seen as nan essential instrument for faster collective
growth and prosperity for the countries and peoples of this
continent. It is our hope, and indeed our shared aspiration, to
create a larger economic entity and market place that would
facilitate viable production capacities in industry and agriculture,
through a collective exploitation of our enormous human and
natural resources.14

President Obasanjo further said,

Regional economic cooperation and integration can also make it
possible for us to collectively build integrative infrastructures in
transport, communications and energy which would otherwise be
too costly for individual, small and fragmented African countries
to undertake. Above all, in the ruthlessly competitive world of
globalisation and liberalisation, cooperation and integration offers
us the only chance to be relevant and to speak with one voice in
international negotiations.15

What the foregoing suggests is that regional integration is indispensable for Africa
to achieve meaningful economic growth and development. This is the crux of the
challenge before the nascent AU. In fact, according to New African, the aim of the
AU is to bring the deepest possible integration of the continent socially,
economically, militarily, culturally and politically.16 Specifically, the objective of
the AU, as contained in Article 3 (c) of the Constitutive Act is to accelerate the
political and socio- economic integration of the continent. In achieving the
76

foregoing objective, the AU has series of challenges and problems to contend

with. What are these? The facts provided in this study are not meant to mock
Africa. Rather, they are to attract attention to the worrisome conditions in the
continent.
AU and Socio-Economic Problem
The first and perhaps the most important challenge before the AU is how to
promote inter and intra African trade. A number of factors have contributed to the
low volume of trade, usually recorded by African states in their trade with one
another. One, is the fact that most (African) countries produce only raw materials
for which there is virtually no demand elsewhere in Africa. 17 Two, for many
countries in Africa, few commodities often make up the bulk of exports to the
rest of the continent.18 For instance, in Angola petroleum and petroleum products
account for more than 90 per cent of its export to other Africa countries whereas in
the Seychelles fresh fish constitutes nearly 98 per cent of such exports. 19 Three,
African countries are still grapping to undo a legacy dominated by trade with their
former colonial rulers rather than with each other. 20For instance, despite the fact
that Senegal surrounds Gambia, trade between the two neighbours is negligible.
Senegals biggest trading partner is France, while Gambia trades extensively with
the UK.21 Gumisai Mutume notes that due to hindrances to trade within Africa,

77

exports from Tunisia and Cameroon often find their way to French warehouses
before being redirected to each others market shelves.22
Another challenge the AU has to contend with in its effort to promote
regional integration in Africa is the low level or inadequate/inefficient
infrastructures, especially transport and communications, in Africa. In the area of
communications: Africa has the lowest telephone density in the world yet the
highest telephone charges, and three times the rate of faults per line as in other
developing regions.23 According to a World Bank report: For every 100 people in
Africa, there are 1.2 telephone lines the lowest rate in the world. 24 The report
further adds that: Telephone calls between African countries can be 50 100
times more expensive than they are within North America.25
On transportation, the World Bank report notes that freight costs for
imports to landlocked African countries are more than twice as high as in Asia. 26
The report is right, albeit worrisome, when one considers the fact that to ship a car
from Tokyo, Japan, to Abidjan, Cote d Ivoire costs $1,500, while shipping the
same car from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to Abidjan costs up to $5,000.27 Travelling
from one African country to another usually meant first via Geneva or Paris. 28 As
Ernest Harsch points out: African businessmen frequently need to wait 6 8
weeks to get visas to visit other African countries while citizens of the UK or
France can travel to many African countries and obtain visa on arrival.29
78

Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, a leading voice on regional integration in Africa and

former Executive Secretary, UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in an
interview with Africa Recovery said the environment for regional integration
has been absent in Africa30 He laments the stagnant, declining economies of
African states and asked rhetorically:
If you cant provide enough transport facilities at
home, how can you be thinking of West African or
pan-African transport facilities?31.

The foregoing is indeed a challenge before the AU.

Besides, the liberalisation imposed by structural adjustment opened the
African market to goods coming from the highly industrialised countries, which no
African country can compete with, that has led to the de-industrialisation of Africa
as manufacturing industry now account for less then 5 per cent of GDP compared
to 10 15 percent in 1960 1975.32 Hence, how to launch a new process of
industrialization is, according to Prof. Adedeji, one of the problems the African
Union will have to face.33 In Africa, overlapping membership of the regional
economic communities has worked against the overall objective 34 of regional
integration. The RECs were created as stepping stones to regional integration and
now there are 13 RECs covering a range of functions and intentions: almost all

79

African countries belong to more than one of these RECs, 27 countries belong to
two, 18 belong to three and one country belong to four.35
In addition to the sub-regional RECs, there are well over 100 other
multinational or bilateral groups devoted to fostering cooperation around specific
activities, such as telecommunications, aviation, maritime transport, banking, river
management, agriculture, energy and others.36 Two prominent examples in these
regard are the Arab League and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). According to P.O.M. Njemanze,
The membership of the Arab League is working against the
economic integration of Africa. This is because the Arab world,
which includes African countries north of the Sahara desert, is
united in the promotion of the interests of the Arabs worldwide.
The interests of the Arab League do not always agree with that of
African countries south of the sahara.37

On OPEC, Njemanze notes further that:

The existence of OPEC as a commodity cartel is working against
economic integration of Africa. This is because its membership,
which includes non-African nations has polarised the continent
into OPEC and non-OPEC members. As the allocation of
production quotas by OPEC affects the price of crude oil in the
world market and the high price of crude oil adversely affects the
economies of non-OPEC African countries, the boat of economic
integration of Africa is moving against the tide since the prices of
crude oil will remain a source of disharmony in relationship
between the OPEC and the non-OPEC African countries.38
80

The establishment of a union as contained in the Constitutive Act presupposes a

high degree of social and political integration of member states. It remains unclear
whether a union modelled along the example of European integration can be
successfully established in Africa. This is all the more problematic in the sense that
intra-African trade, notwithstanding the existence of sub-regional economic
arrangements as ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA, has persistently remained
below the 5 percent mark calculated as a fraction of the
continents total external trade.39
Lastly, for the AU to achieve its objectives, especially facilitating economic
integration of Africa, it should involve the African peoples in its programmes.
History has shown that if the objectives of the AU are left solely in the hands of
African heads of states, then it is doomed to fail. The ethic rests on the firm believe
that development cannot, and should not, be undertaken on behalf of a people,
rather it should be an organic outcome of the cohesiveness of states and society.
This demands the continuous involvement of interest groups and African masses
directly in the integration process so that the AU will be a Union of African
Peoples rather than a Union of African heads of states.

81

ENDNOTES
1 Abraham, K. 2000. The Challenges and Prospects of Pan-African Economic
Integration. Paper presrnted at the conference on Economic Integration
and Transboundary Resources Organised by the Ethiopian International
Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), June, Addis Ababa
2 Ibid
3 OAU. 2001. African Union and Continental Stability M Document
82

www.allafrican.com
4 NEPAD. 2001. The New Partnership for African Development Document.
www,nepad.org
5 Babarinde, O.A. 1996. Analyzing the Proposed African Economic Community:
Lessons from the Experience of the European Union, Prepared for the Third
ECSA-World Conference on The European Union in a Changing World,
Sponsored by the European Commission, D-G X, Brussels, Belgium, 19-20
September, 1996.
6 Omoweh, A.D. 2003. Re-thinking Integration in Africa. Journal for Diplomacy
and Foreign Relations, 13(1): 34-42
7. John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (Guild ford,
Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group/Brown & Benchmark Publishers,
1995), p.569.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. See Africa Recovery Vol. 16 Nos. 2-3. September, 2002, p. 18.
12. The Courier: The Magazine of ACP-EU Development Cooperation. No. 188,
Setember-October 2001, p.75.
13. See UN Secretary General, Kofi Annas message to the 9th Summit of the
83

COMESA Authority in Kampala, 8 June 2004.

16. New African, September 2001, p.30.
17. Pieter Esterhuysen et al, Africa A-Z Continental and Country Profiles (Pretoria:
African Institute of south Africa, 1978), p.62.
18. Gumisai Mutume, How to Boost Trade within Africa Africa Recovery,
Vol.16, No. 2-3, September 2002, p.20.
19. Ibid ., p.21.
20. Ibid., p.20.
21. Gumisai Mutume, How to boost trade, p.20.
22. Ibid., p.12.
23. Dayo Kawonishe, Is Globalisation Exacerbating or Alleviating Poverty and

Underdevelopment in Africa? African Journal of International Affairs and

Development Vol. 6 (2), 2001, p.6.
24. See Gumisai Mutume, How to boost trade., p.22.
25. Ibid. 14
26. Ibid.
27. Press Conference on Regional Integration in Africa. File: //A:/PRESS
CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL INTERNATION IN AFRICA. htm
28. Press Conference on Regional, p.2.
84

29. Ernest Harsch, Making African Integration a Reality African Recovery

September 2002, p.11.
30. You must first set your house in order African Recovery, September 2002,
p.16.
31. Ibid.
32. African Recovery September 2002, p.17.
33 Ibid.
34. Accelerating the Pace of Regional Integration in Africa: The Challenges
Ahead. Opening address by K.Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary, ECA, to
the Third African Development Forum held 4 March 2002 at Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.

35. Ibid.

36. Ernest Harsch, Making African Integration, p.24.

37. Paul O. M. Njemanze, Economic Integration of Africa: An Anatomy of
Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces Nigerian Forum, Vol. 22, Nos.7-8, July
August, 2004, p.150.
38. Ibid.
39 See Konstanz Mulikita, The UN Security Council and the OAU: Conflict or
85

collaboration, African Security Review, vol. II, No 1, 2002 p. 30.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing presentation, we have traced the genesis
and reasons for the emergence of regional blocs, especially in
Africa. The main reason being that Africa wanted to be an active
player in the global economy. The discussion also notes that
because the OAU failed to facilitate meaningful growth and
development in Africa, aside other factors, it metamorphosed into
86

the AU. The study examines the problems the AU will contend
with in its efforts to integrate African economies and proffers
solutions.
It has been stated that there has been a consensus that the aim of the AU
would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in its years of existence and to
advance the cause of collective action in African affairs. This paper however
acknowledges that against the backdrop of the OAUs history and the general
African condition, the new Union project fits into a prevailing condition which
does not portend radical transformation due to internal and external constraints.
New institutions and frameworks, themselves, will do little to rectify the situation
described in the Yaounde Declaration of 1996 on Africa:
At the close of the 20th century of all the regions of the world,
Africa is indeed the most backward in terms of development from
whatever angle it is viewed, and the most vulnerable as far as
security and stability are concerned.1
Although this paper in conclusion would rather err on the side of hope than
of despair, unity may not make Africa suddenly rich but it can make it difficult for
Africa to be disregarded and humiliated. Perhaps marginalization, so often decried,
is what Africa needs right now. For one thing, it will help the evolution of an
endogenous development agenda, an agenda that expresses the aspirations of the
people and can therefore elicit their support. The AU may clearly be more than old
wine in new bottles in the sense that it offers at least a new approach to Africas
87

collective efforts, but, given the continued existence of old political structures
which will shape political will, the Union might well be new wine in an old bottle.
However, the fundamental issue is really not that of recounting the benefits
but that of developing the political will among African statesmen and their
readiness to bear the costs that is required to produce and sustain an effective
union. This demands equitable burden-sharing in matters affecting the continent
and the administration of the Union. It also requires an appropriate institutional
framework with sufficient authority and capacity for implementing decisions. The
creation of the necessary democratic environment rather than mere summit
diplomatic rhetoric and the involvement of civil society in order to ensure the
building of integrated production capacities are indispensable requirements for a
solid union.
The success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that
strikes a balance between the desires of member states to pursue their individual
interests, and the political will to forgo certain aspects of national sovereignty and
independence for the common good of the continent. African states, marginalized
by economic globalization and under severe strains from poverty, war and other
forms of degradation, cannot afford to be half-hearted in their pursuit of regional
cooperation. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how they can survive on their own in a
highly competitive global economy in the present world order.
88

Recommendations
Having identified the problems militating against economic
integration of Africa, which the AU must contend with, the
following

strategies

for

promoting

regional

integration

are

recommended. In the first instance, African leaders must not be

carried away by the success of regional blocs elsewhere,
especially Europe. Suffice it to say that African integration must
necessarily be different from that in Europe, America or Asia. In
Africa, it is an integration of countries with few products (mostly
raw materials) accounting for the largest percentage of their
export and weak industrial bases as well as infrastructures. For
Africa to move away from its uncelebrated position of a negligible
participant to an active player in the world economy, the process
of integration must focus on integrating markets through trade
liberalisation, harmonising monetary policies, promoting private
sector investment first at the national and later, the sub-regional
level.
Related to the above is the need to ensure that there are no
losers in African integration. In this regard, there is the need to
put in place well designed and adequately funded compensatory
89

machinery for countries with small and vulnerable economies.

This also requires establishing and publicising the fact that there
are gains to be made from cooperation in investment, in
infrastructure and market integration and also indicating in clear
terms the opportunity costs of not cooperating. As Amoako rightly
pointed out;
we need a new way of conceptualising and
financing regional integration which
calculates not only what it will costs to
integrate, but what it will cost us it we do
not move to effective political and economic
integration.2

Furthermore,

since

it

has

been

identified

that

the

underdeveloped nature of African economies is a barrier to

regional integration, there is the need to develop at the local,
national and regional levels, development policies which must aim
at promoting agriculture, industry, services including health and
public education etc. These must be protected and supported
through appropriate trade, investment and macro-economic
policy measures, which involves reallocation of expenditure away
from white elephant projects and excessive procurement of arms
90

and ammunition, mismanagement and corruption, creative use of

remittances

of

Africans

living

abroad,

corporate

taxation,

retention and reinvestment of foreign profits, prevention of tax

evasion by foreign investors and local elites and prevention of
capital flight. Also, foreign investment must be pragmatically
selected to suit first national and second regional objectives.
To achieve regional integration and unhindered intra-African
trade, investment in physical infrastructure - roads, railways,
power line, air services and telecommunications is necessary. 3
Commitments to build inter-African transport and communications
network should not be sacrificed on the alter of personal interests
of leaders.4
Regional heavy weights in Africa such as Nigeria (West
Africa), Egypt (North Africa) and South Africa (Southern Africa) by
dint of their sheer market size, natural endowment and relative
industrial bases, should be accorded special roles in African
integration. The identified countries, in addition to acting as poles
of growth, can lead the way through what has been described as
variable geometry, which makes it possible for certain states
to proceed on an accelerated track of regional integration. 5 If
91

there is any overarching lesson to be learned from failure of past

attempts at integration, it is that regional cooperation cannot
proceed far without a strong political foundation.55 Sustained
political commitment is, therefore, a necessary first step towards
regional integration. Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of
South Africa, concurs:
our experience of a number of decades makes
the clear statement that we have to think and
work in a new way. We have to make every effort
to understand in a real way the challenging work
ahead of us.6
UN, Secretary, General, Kofi Annan at the launching of the AU in
Lusaka, 9th July 2001 also adds that,
.. this promise will not be realized easily, unless
it is pursued with
singular determination by you, Africas leaders
This historic effort will require leadership,
courage and a willingness to depart, from the
ways of the past, if it is to do for Africa what the
European Union has done for Europe.7

A strong political foundation mentioned above necessarily

involves putting in place (where it is yet to exist) and
strengthening (where it is existing) democratic mechanisms. The
examples of successful economic integration drawn from other
92

parts of the world clearly indicate that they have been facilitated
by the democratic system of government in place in those
regions. It is heartening to know that the wind of democratisation
and political reform currently blowing across regions of the world
has not excluded Africa. A period of transition from authoritarian
regimes to popular democracies is now being witnessed in many
African countries. The mutual respect and truth expected to be
fully

restored

fundamental

by
ways

the

nascent

facilitates

democratic

regional

leaders

cooperation

will
and

in
by

extension economic integration.8 To further promote integration,

the RECs in the various sub-regions of Africa, which obviously
were created when it became clear that carrying out the larger
vision of regional integration was lagging, 9 should be well funded
and made to work hand in hand with the AU.
Lastly, for the AU to achieve its objectives, especially
facilitating economic integration of Africa, it should involve the
African peoples in its programmes. History has shown that if the
objectives of the AU are left solely in the hands of African heads of
states, then it is doomed to fail. The ethic rests on the firm
believe that development cannot, and should not, be undertaken
93

on behalf of a people, rather it should be an organic outcome of

the cohesiveness of states and society. This demands the
continuous involvement of interest groups and African masses
directly in the integration process so that the AU will be a Union
of African Peoples rather than a Union of African heads of
states.10 The rights of women also must be respected. According
to Bekerie,
if our notion of union does not take into
consideration the centrality of African women
and their rights to fully participate in all the
processes
and
mechanisms
of
the
state
formation, then the declaration is pretentious at
best, and deceptive at worst.11

ENDNOTES
1 Accelerating the Pace of Regional Integration in Africa: The
Challenges
Ahead.

Opening

address

by

K.Y.

Amoako,

Executive

Secretary, ECA, to the Third African Development Forum held

4 March 2002 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia p.4.
2 Ibid

94

3. Gumisai Mutume, How to Boost Trade within Africa Africa

Recovery, Vol. 4,
No. 2-3, September 2002, p.22.
4. For instance Mobutu Sese Seko refused to build the transAfrican highway
linking Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) to Uganda
for fear that insurgents might over-throw him through the
route. See African Recovery interview with Prof. Adebayo
Adedeji. Africa Recovery September 2002, p.17.
5. K.Y. Amoako, Towards the African Union, p.3.
6. Ibid., p.2
7. See address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at
the opening of the
38th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU,
Durban, South Africa, 8 July 2002.
8. Secretary General evokes promise inherent in Launch of
African Union.
SG/SM/7884/AFR

331,9

http://www..orgNews/Docs/2001/sgsm
884.doc.htm
95

July,

2001,

9. Muna Ndulo, Muna Ndulo, African Economic Community and

the Promotion
of Intra-African Trade African Notes, May 1992
10. .Accelerating the Pace of Regional Integration in Africa p. 3.
11. Ayele Bekerie, A General Essay on a Pan-African Perspective
on the
Transition from the Org anisation of African Unity to the
African Union, Journal of Comparative Education and
International Relations in Africa, Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2,
December 2001, p.65.
.

96

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