ROGELIO NOGRALES V. CAPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, DR.

OSCAR
ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ,
DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA and NURSE J. DUMLAO,
G.R. NO 142625 (2006)
FACTS: Corazon Nograles, pregnant with her fourth child (aged 37 at the
time) was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning
on her 4th month of pregnancy. While she was on her last trimester, Dr.
Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and development of leg
edema, indicating preeclampsia
1. On May 25, 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains and
as such they went to see Dr. Estrada, who advised that she be
admitted to the Capitol Medical Center (CMC)
2. Upon Corazons admission, Rogelio Nograles executed and signed the
Consent on Admission and Admission Agreement
3. Dr. Rosa Uy, a resident physician of CMC conducted an internal
examination of Corazon and informed Dr. Estrada of the findings
4. Dr. Joel Enriquez, the anesthesiologist, was notified of Corazons
admission. When asked if he needed the services of an
anesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Estradas refusal, Dr.
Enriquez continued to observe Corazons condition
5. Around 6am, Corazons water bag ruptured and her cervix was fully
dilated. At 6:15am, Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of 10 grams of
magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely Villaflor, the assisting physician
administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium sulfate
6. At 6:22am, Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to
extract Corazons baby. In the process, a piece of the cervical tissue
was allegedly torn.
7. Thereafter, Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding
which rapidly became profuse. Her blood pressure then dropped from
130/80 to 60/40 within 5 minutes. The assisting nurse (Dumlao)
administered hemacel through a gage 19 needle as a side drip to the
ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose
8. At 7:45 am, Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with
bottled blood. It took around 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory
(headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson) to deliver the blood
9. At 8:00am, the head of the OB-Gyne department, Dr. Noe Espinola,
was informed of Corazons condition by telephone. Dr. Espinola then
ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a Consent
to Operation
10. Despite Dr. Espinolas efforts, Corazon died at 9:15am. The cause of
death was hemorrhage, postpartum
11. As such, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with RTC Manila
against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson,
Dr. Espinola and the assisting nurse. Petitioners alleged that defendant
physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and

management of Corazons condition. Petitioners charged CMC with

negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians
and hospital staff.
12. RTC Manila ruled Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages finding that:
a. The victim was under his pre-natal care and his fault began in the
incorrect and inadequate management of the pre-eclamptic
condition of his patient
b. Dr. Estrada misapplied the forceps causing the cervical tear
c. He failed to notice to erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao of
hemacel by way of side drip, instead if IV
13. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. In affirming the RTC decision,
CA applied the borrowed servant doctrine which provides that once
the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge of the
proceedings, the acts or omission of operating room personnel, and
any negligence associated therewith, are imputable to the surgeon.
While the assisting physicians and nurses may be employees of the
hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally become the
temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the
operation is in progress, and any liability may be imposed upon the
surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat
superior
ISSUE: WON CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada
HELD: Yes.
While physicians, as consultants, are not technically employees, the control
exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in
fact exists, the control test is determining. For the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The
hospital may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the
hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority.
A hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician
providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an
independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known,
that the physician is an independent contractor.
For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff
must show that:

(1)

(2)
(3)

The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a

reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was
alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
hospital;
Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority,
the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of
and acquiesced in them; and
The plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to

determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician. The first
factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes described
as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be
negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. The hospital need not
make express representations to the patient that the treating
physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation
may be general and implied.
CAB: CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff.
Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority
thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
(1)CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical
staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada
(2)CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead.
(3)Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr.
Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of CMC, gave the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member
of CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed
specialists in treating Corazon.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes
characterized as an inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a
perceived employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's
services.
ON THE RELEASE FORMS AND WAIVER
The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do the
consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon's death due
to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being
in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against

hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals "from any and all
claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be
contrary to public policy and thus void.
LIABLITY OF OTHER RESPONDENTS
1. DR. VILLAFLOR -- Dr. Villaflor admitted administering a lower dosage of
magnesium sulfate. However, this was after informing Dr. Estrada that
Corazon was no longer in convulsion and that her blood pressure went
down to a dangerous level. At that moment, Dr. Estrada instructed Dr.
Villaflor to reduce the dosage of magnesium sulfate from 10 to 2.5
grams. Since petitioners did not dispute Dr. Villaflor's allegation, Dr.
Villaflor's defense remains uncontroverted.
2. DR. ROSA UY Nothing shows that Dr. Uy participated in delivering
Corazon's baby. Further, it is unexpected from Dr. Uy, a mere resident
physician at that time, to call the attention of a more experienced
specialist, if ever she was present at the delivery room.
3. DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ Dr. Enriquez is an anesthesiologist whose field of
expertise is definitely not obstetrics and gynecology. As such, Dr.
Enriquez was not expected to correct Dr. Estrada's errors. Besides,
there was no evidence of Dr. Enriquez's knowledge of any error
committed by Dr. Estrada and his failure to act upon such observation.
4. DR. PERPETUA LACSON -- There was no unreasonable delay in the
delivery of blood from the time of the request until the transfusion to
Corazon. Dr. Lacson competently explained the procedure before blood
could be given to the patient.
5. DR. NOE ESPINOLA Dr. Espinola's order to do hysterectomy which was
based on the information he received by phone is not negligence.
6. NURSE J. DUMLAO -- There is no evidence of Nurse Dumlao's alleged

failure to follow Dr. Estrada's specific instructions. Even assuming

Nurse Dumlao defied Dr. Estrada's order, there is no showing that sidedrip administration of hemacel proximately caused Corazon's death