Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6025

May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-6026

May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs.
Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In
Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons
and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres
Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn
their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.;
they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines,
and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and

take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed
public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance
to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or
"Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and
there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and
army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the
crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen
attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10,
1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August
26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated
the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several
others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee
on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or
associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent
success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres
Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and
the place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the
different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps"
(HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having
come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082,
14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the
crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in
said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
together with many others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing
of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the
Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in
fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,

by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings,
planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:
(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,
Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as
other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and
held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a
mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the
military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the
Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the
CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches
encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress
of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was
organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos,
Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the
court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October,
1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was
given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis".
He made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and
the CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party.
1wp h1. t

(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the
World Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by
the people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he
preferred to go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the
frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement
cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go
to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and
incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four
comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at
330 P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to
give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only
way out was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and
that Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino,
etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to
the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming
heroes by fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the
CLO since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a
Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of
the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO
was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee
of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by
the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially
the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct
its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution
contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579").
Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated
Communist ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders
of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and
World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V-899,
V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the
"Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor
Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of
the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and
organizers to different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the
union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will
register said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the
workers is continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the
Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under the
control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its
aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and antiCommunist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis
will be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides
and made them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the
simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the
CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".

(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter
of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists
abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-20012004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." mentions different groups of labor unions of which
Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU
(Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez
as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor.
(Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor.
(Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party. (Exh.
D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with
Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that
he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground.
(Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2)
His election as President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.
W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle "the
liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)

(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like
Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO Praises Balgos and
Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army
and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez opposes acceptance of decorations from
Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks.
(Exh. C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan
for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)

(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs,

Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh.
D-451-451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB),
and National Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in
their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the
creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950
the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a
body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National
Finance Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the
country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6)
that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and
since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national
liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the
decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such
plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also of the
HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB
from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations
for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of
the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in
May, 1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26,
1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August
19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950;
March 29, 1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had
taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been
committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct
participation in the commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases
have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution
and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the
organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the

absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts
when the National Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven
permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist
Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of
which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates
was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party
and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia,
which is one of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays
its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of
help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done
by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of the educational department as well as
researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader,
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the
CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It
seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions
which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant
the same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the
CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist
Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he
dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy
to overthrow by force the constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If,
as testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures,
meetings and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely
allowed Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the

CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also
indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by
making demands from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the
same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out
and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would
intervene and carry the revolution it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no
function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It
was only a preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the
CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the
actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the
rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and
indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by
the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground,
with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it
was decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The
court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the
Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The
seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went
underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among
all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he
took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone
underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused
to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial
and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches
of Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of
revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive
Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise
that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no
evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the
resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the
uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.

And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda,
making speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders
directed him to publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of
the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the
CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista
Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to
want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational
procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field.
But the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p.
49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not
been received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had
come from a crew member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a
portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine
received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President
Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts
in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions
as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information. And his refusal to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned by
his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the
Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the
Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his
Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the
Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal
case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per serender Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision
reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. The conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a

criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy
of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As
a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does
he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must
be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an
organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized
by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may
indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical
impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part
of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a
conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated
in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor
leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the
CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to
support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he
was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to
advance his political aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor
has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated
action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the
leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding,
evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with
said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.

Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he
acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not
appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or
to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster
the rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and
rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there
was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in
arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia
que se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque
fuera preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera
responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la sedicion? El Tribunal Supreme ha
resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo
contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay
conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un delito y
resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que
se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de
induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo
de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso,
resulta evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de
Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of
their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere
membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or
of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual
rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.

On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising
or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by
such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such
membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of
the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he
commits rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the
"Katipunan", the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the
defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held
that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and
not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the
crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each
of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy
by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et
al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of
the CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of
the CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of
letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.
Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion
that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of
the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.

We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these
facts being corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist,
Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters
at Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies
of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk
rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is
for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber
Unions and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the
use of the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that
by giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government
and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his
house at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of
the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with
the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court

was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a coconspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a
member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party,
when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted
in court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the
PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government
and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as
courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that
not having actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga,
under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella"
and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a
son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva
Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the
Central Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the
mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.
Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We
are satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB
from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and
considering that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there
cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the
constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been
apprehended at the time of the trial.

PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
aims against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under
Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against
appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held
guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership
in any organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the
appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the
commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act
punishes participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendantsappellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and
the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R.
No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay their proportional share of the costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Barrera and Regala, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS
V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer,
PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as
the elected representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify
them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons
arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as
those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed
by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court
before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without
warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law,
would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by
law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon
which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them

apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has
just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old
of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member
("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable

and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural;second a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later,
"Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded
man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was
thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers).
On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were
found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore,
caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule
113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests
without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within
judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to
remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former
NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain
house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by
court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,
radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP. 16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and
she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject
of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence
and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya.20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information
given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and
the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information
as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or
occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine,
who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members.
In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court against said
arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do
not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say
that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest.
That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action
against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting
the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in
the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed
guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the

reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest
without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press
Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus
drivers) on 23 November 1988.28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest(not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14)
days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same
trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,
Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition
for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in
Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in
the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It
pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and
all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution,
are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met,
then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the
end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some
groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive
evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the,
majority's resolution on said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo
Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to

sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that
Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the
authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless
arrests provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be
considered as having "just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious
remarks at the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly
seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp.
23-24). Under these circumstances, the law enforcement agents had time, short though it might
seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be considered as
covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact
just been committed."
The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days
after the commission of the crime imputed to him.
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular
provision of law had beeri violated by the person arrested. True it is that law en.orcement agents and
even prosecutors are not all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude
among their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be
tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits"
(Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary
to law, is beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the
law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.
Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a
warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others to commit any
of the acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable
for inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a
question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that any of
the prohibited acts in Article 142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and
expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests; those of the State as
against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is
made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to
sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in
view of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should consist not in warrantless
arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be
underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator
is knowing member of a subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs.
Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if
has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as bombing of government offices
trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the
roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the accused to prove membership by
force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll without undergoing the concious act of
enlistment.
It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in
fact just been committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old

rule where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must
have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just
'reasonable ground believe that the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting
opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without
warrants. In People vs.Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court
considered as illegal the warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's
personal knowledge such subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be
strictly construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was provided by the
Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually (has just) been
committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough
to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Supra,
at p. 15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out
the procedure to be observed the moment a person is arrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person shall have
the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121
SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned: the military and civilian
components of the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who
faces a situation wherein civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a
political or ideological element. Such abuses are more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in
finding evidence that could stand judicial scrutiny to pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually
have to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly administration of government
and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good faith should be reposed on the officials
implementing the law. After all, we are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable
both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties. Victims of abuses
should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.
If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government may be exhorted
peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. This Court, mandated b the Constitution to

uphold the law, can only go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them.
Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is
disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction of order instead of liberty in har cases coming
before us.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom
and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing order
through constraints on freedom is deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values
Govenment pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the world who are fast
liberating themselves.
I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
xxx xxx xxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the
tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the
petitioners were arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and
ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their
motions for reconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was
arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that
that was inciting to sedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech.
"Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied
to actual cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who
would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the
liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of
the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are
asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we
consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of
speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously;

(3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what constitute
the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we
allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the
ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all
pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is freedom of
expression. At the very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is
essential in this type of offense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations
regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is
to give a license for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or
sedition are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence
to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming
around, he may be arrested. But until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump
to a personal conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever
seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be
validated, it should be Congress and not this Court which should draw strict and narrow standards.
Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up
with those actually taking up arms against the Government.
The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on past events, that the
petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom he may meet does not validate warrantless
arrests. I cannot understand why the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's
surfacing from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of securing warrants
of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not the
warrantless arrest.
In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The information that Narciso
Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention of peace officers only on December 28, 1988
or fourteen (14) days later. To say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days
have lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A warrant of arrest is
essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back into the past and
render legal what was illegal. The violation of the constitutional right against illegal seizures is not
cured by the fact that the arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A
government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:
(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No. 84583-84; and G.R. No.
83162;
(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;
(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and
(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the petitions of those who were
arrested inflagrante, or subsequently posted bail or chose to remain in the custody of the military, or
voluntarily permitted the search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable
circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being unlawfully detained.
But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and detention of the other petitioners on the ground that
they were apprehended for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes.
We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was quoted with approval
in the originalponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence
of probable cause before the issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense
is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govenment
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only when a recognition of
beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application of
the laws of war in the regulation of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to
be treated as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate
government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that the processes of the local courts are
not observed and the rebels cannot demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed
to have renounced by their defiance of the government.
But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate govenment must treat the
rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder,
including and especially those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these in our
country are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those guaranteeing due process,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing bail, and presuming the innocence of the
accused. The legitimate government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the
"exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed exclusively by
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders or combatants is not justified in the
present situation as our government continues to prosecute them as violators of our own laws.
Under the doctrine announced in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are by
such suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the unceremonious capture
of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no
impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the "continuing
offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is thus substituted for
municipal law in regulating the relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic
matter.

As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following pronouncement which this
Court has also adopted as its own:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature ofcontinuing offenses which
set them apart from the common offenses, aside front their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude. (Emphasis supplied.)
The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the authorities, usually by simply
placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so
placed, he may at any time be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the
process of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be actuallly doing at the
time is a perfectly innocent act.
In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of
undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in
his sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification,
the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the
hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the
determination of the officers that there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a
warrant, not todispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing
the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.
In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly
seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the
Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed
to continue their effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as having
been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the
considerable time lapse.
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less
than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day
of his arrest that he was identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a
warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of
the Identification of the suspect.
Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense
"has in fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just,"
which, according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made
almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting
officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense was committed.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be
the start of another dangerous doctrine:
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,

ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as

revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported
by probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt,
G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The conclusion that there was probable cause may
have been influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug.
This is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession
that retroactively established the probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was
the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the tree itself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to justify the illegal arrests
made in the cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were
wantonly and systematically violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short
memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so soon. As the ultimate
defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss over the abuses of those who, out of
mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national security. Whatever
their ideology and even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the Bill
of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That is what democracy is all
about.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.
At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority
principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests
without warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite
unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily
pointed out in my very brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the
Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated,
which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the
majority Resolution has taken the time and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes"
doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements are obiter,
they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of
the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional rights explored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of
persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual
members of society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the
rendition of which complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests
made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure,
are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.
2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are
unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in Section
5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an
officer of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously
securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113 follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that
judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they
are: they areexceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to
such a norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional
rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and
seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such
provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are cast fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision, rather than the exception. 1This rule
must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional
guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language s o to
keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 3 this Court, stressing
that:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties
should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual,
to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured
by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965;
237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that
statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353;
Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis supplied)

held that:
. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable. 4
In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described
as subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule
which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would
be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the
cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis
supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the
presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to
commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under
the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need
for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach
of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen
to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The
term "presence" in this connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking
place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt, recognizably
criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all
that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological
phenomena, not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in
our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the
presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magist rate and ask for a
warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the
crime being committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification i n law of warrantless
arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be
sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting
officer arrived in the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha
the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first
requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still
visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person staggering
around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual
shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to have been committed
"in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a
requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense perception the
arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another person, no matter

what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be.

9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on

the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts
which render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in oth er words, perceive
through his own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has
"just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time
interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be
brief indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the
second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously
render pointless the requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the
presence" of the arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was charged along with other persons, cannot
by any standard be justified under Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without
warrant while being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was
suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be substantially different from 14-days, still it
must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not
reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the Court require it,
that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and
ending the next day in the hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who
is determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the
standard imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers,
ascertains "probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer
must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of
the witnesses examined by or for him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the
majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in
the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the
arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without
a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right. That the person
unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty of the offense he was suspected
of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier
crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact
committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust
committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes,"
shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that
the offense "has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the
person to be arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion
of the majority Resolution reads:
. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF
ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of
his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion
like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other
so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversionand rebellion are anchored on an ideological base

which compels the repetition of the same acts oflawlessness and violence until the
overriding objectives of overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis
supplied)
9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in
our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine,
in my submission, does notdispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in
character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed
when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes"
doctrine in our case law (before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of
person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two
(2) problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of determining
whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is
raised.
10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or
elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other
ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or
malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the
essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very
nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing," then the court
within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a
person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed to be continuing
because some or all of the elements constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the
second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The
criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the
defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be
shown to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of whether
one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually
alleged and proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same
crime, the defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed
covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused constituted
discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a distinct and separate offense, the double jeopardy
defense is non-available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of
offense committed, the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate
function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving
the constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some
of the elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested
without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a
crime, begun or committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the
presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing
crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous
criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of
a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic offenses as
membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association or organization.
For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the

unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for
instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:" 13
a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form
whatsoever;
c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues,
assessments, loans or in any other forms;
xxx xxx xxx
f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in
furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication
to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of
such association or organization;
xxx xxx xxx
It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and
seizures makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our
Court's function, however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces
but rather to protect the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live
with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply
with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness
or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.
REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:
While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such
concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No.
86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing
a peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of

authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid
section consisted in imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just
been committed.
Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."
Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the
suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the
person making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the
complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal
knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being
effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who
merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not
necessarily founded on truth.
Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant
may result from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have
just been committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless
arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact
committed, and not the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such
commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests
could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the
arresting officer received information only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now
required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by
reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring
personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily
enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his
obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of
a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting
officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal
knowledge thereof after such verification.
It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable
cause and it was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions
affecting national security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons
above elucidated, I take exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113
had been complied with in this case. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against
Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the
rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan
as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution,

1 the majority has not shown why the

arrests in question should after all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant
and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule
113, of the Rules of Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense
(subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal
knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly
no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly
reasonable:
. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilty of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2
As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by
Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is made up of "overt acts." 4 In People
vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic
objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal
means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has
taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to
make the accused liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that
above "overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise
the accused can not be said to be committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean mere
"membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere membership.
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would interpret it,
as no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual
facts . . . [and] founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge
means exactly what it says that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a
subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6)
spoke of simple "reasonable ground" which would have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith"
referred to by the majority. Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to give to "personal
knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had
been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural.

Clearly, what we have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not
personal knowledge.
I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of lack of
personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entiret y from the
information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not see how We can act differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos involved
a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of
the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in
good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that
notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite
evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information, and
that it was reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the
alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species
of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not even know who that informant was.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential
Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to
"government health authorities" not to the military.
I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have
personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the
military to ignore the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants.
As People vs. Burgos held:
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through
the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there
was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape.
Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo,
Ramon Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up
under similar circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tipthe military had no personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I
do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As
Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that
Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and precisely, the
subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the
petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the
petitioner's arrests.
More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military,
and evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest
simply because the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway") that would
be abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious
"confidential information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a
"sparrow man" and having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."
It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial
that the guilt of the accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the accused are in
fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the
majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative measure").
I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R.
Nos. 85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering
supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the following:
Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13
Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to
sedition" a continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:
. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then,
Espiritu has not lost the right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was just
exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing.
In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all,
protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense;
(2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case,
titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.
First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind, it is
a question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's
constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words"
recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Courtwhether or not the statement in question
constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I am wondering w hy we can not
answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a
continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of course,
the majority would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have
stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not think this is the c ontemplation of the
Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or escape" 19 and there was
no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as there was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved, instant police action can not be justi fied.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in
favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because
it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and second, because this Court has leaned, by
tradition, on the side of liberty as the custodian of the Bill of Rights even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this
case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases are
apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases
involved, incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's
arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the
arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988
that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23
With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its
pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am
appropriately concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my
colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an
indefensible pronouncement.
Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and
the authorities must have "personal knowledge."
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact
(allegedly) committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two
weeks thereafter; whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal
knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is
necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.
In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of
the Rules.
I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I
am saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if
he can not be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all but that the military should
first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called
law enforcers.
As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have
purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the
Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority
has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even
judges 24 today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would n ot be in fact
unreasonable, following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as t he majority did not
find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
Bunye II" 25and none of us can possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alonewe
are talking ofarrests, of depriving people of libertyeven if we are not yet talking of whether or not
people are guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully
submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament.
With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia
Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled
confession) was precisely, the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully
submit, to approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because
Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely, pounced on him. I am not to be
mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can
not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was an NPA
courier so that the military could pounce on him.
I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better days. I do not see
how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly challenged perhaps wit h greater vigor from
the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists."
The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat the
dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third, Garcia and
Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime that respects the rule of law that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan).
Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests under Section
5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent
jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer
be defended, if they could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.
"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality,
via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply,
to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing
for which the public should be elated.

A Final Word
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate one
principle: The State has no right to bother citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State
action. "The right of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State," the Charter likewise states, "values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." 32 The Constitution states the general rule the majority would make the exception the rule, and
the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are, in the first place,
doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information"
(manufactured or genuine, we have no way of telling) and in the second place, any information with
which the military (or police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal, information. I
submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority insists on can not justify the arrests in
question under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso
Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section 5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was
arrested one day after the act, allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen days
after it (allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions nonetheless because

the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a
provision that has not been written there.
"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what is
important is that the Court be right." 33
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability.
Umil is a question, on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests
assailed, had complied with the requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of
whether or not this Court, in approving the military's actions, is right.
In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture,
hamletting, bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase in alarming
rates. In its update for October, 1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:
An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;
Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September,
1990, 4,419, illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated
salvage, and 109 remained missing after their arrest;
Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were
wounded;
The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;
Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;
From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;
One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of
bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34
It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also
disappointed that it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that
despite my departure, it will not be too late.
Motions denied.
# Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 61388, April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.
2 G.R. No. 70748, October 21,1985,139 SCRA 349.
3 Section 1, Rule 102: "To what habeas corpus extends. Except otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of

illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by

which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
4 Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778.
5 Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
6 Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948).
7 Republic Act No. 1700 known as the "Anti-Subversion Act" titled "An Act to outlaw
the CPP and similar associations, penalize membership therein and for other
purposes." (1957); and the subsequent related decrees such as Presidential Decree
No. 885, entitled "Outlawing subversive organizations, penalizing membership
therein, and for other purposes." (1976); and Presidential Decree No. 1835 entitled
"Codifying the various laws on anti-subversion and increasing the penalties for
membership in subversive organizations."
8 G.R. No. 61388. April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472.
9 US vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 (1917).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Records of G.R. No. 81567, affidavit dated 4 February 1988.
13 Rollo, pp. 311-312 (G.R. No. 81567).
14 Presidential Decree No. 169 requires attending physicians and/or persons treating
injuries from any form of violence, to report such fact to the Philippine Constabulary
and prescribing penalties for any violation thereof.
15 Decision dated 9 July 1990, pp. 19-20.
16 Decision, pp. 10-11.
17 Ibid., p. 12.
18 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
19 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
20 Decision, p. 18.
21 United States vs. Sanchez, No. 9294, March 30,1914, 27 Phil, 442.
22 Ibid: "The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but
. . . upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be

inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the
decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.
"In People vs. Ancheta, it was held that "the legality of detention made by a person in
authority or an agent thereof ... does not depend upon the juridical and much less the
judicial fact of crime which, at the time of its commission, is not and cannot
definitively be determined for the lack of necessary data and for jurisdiction but upon
the nature of the deed. . . . ."
23 United States vs. Santos, supra.
24 Ibid.
25 Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART. 124. Arbitrary detention. Any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds. detains a person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
maximum period, if the detention has not exceeded three
days. . . .
26 Damages for the impairment of rights and liberties of another person.
27 Affidavit of Avelino Faustino dated 23 November 1988; Return of the Writ dated
25 November 1988; Decision dated 9 July 1990, pp. 23-24.
28 Joint Affidavit of 5 police agents, dated 23 November 1988; Decision, supra.
29 Affidavit of police agents, dated 28 December 1988, marked Exhibit "A" at the
RTC, Bian, Branch 24.
30 Decision of 9 July 1990, pp. 9 and 12.
31 Decision of 9 July 1990. p. 13.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Salaysay vs. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956).
2 Realty Investments Inc. vs. Pastrana. 84 Phil. 842 (1949)-l Sayo vs. Chief of Police
of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 (1948)
3 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
4 64 Phil. at 44.
5 144 SCRA 1 (1986).
6 144 SCRA at 14.

7 See e.g., U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 (1910).

8 In People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988), the Court, in nullifying a
warrantless arrest, said, through Mr. Justice Cruz:
"In the many cases where tills Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators
on the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught redhanded, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him." (163 SCRA at 409-410) (emphasis supplied)
9 People vs. Burgos, 114 SCRA 1 (1986).
10 121 SCRA 472 (1983).
11 Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, 22 SCRA 638 (1968); U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil.
376 (1913); U.S. vs. Santiago, 27 Phil. 408 (1914); U.S. vs. Laureaga, 2 Phil. 71
(1903).
12 E.g. People vs. Zapanta and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 688 (1951) where the Court held
that each instance of sexual intercourse constitute a separate crime of adultery,
though the same persons and the same offended spouse are involved, and that a
second information may be filed against the same accused for later acts of sexual
intercourse.
13 Section 6, P.D. 1835, 16 January 1981.
Sarmiento, J.: dissenting:
1 Resolution, 1.
2 Supra; emphasis in the original.
3 The majority cites Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 1835 and "related decrees;"
both Presidential Decrees Nos. 885 and 1835 have been repealed by Executive
Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 267.
4 Please note that under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1835, "[t]the following
acts shall constitute prima facie evidence of membership in any subversive
organization: (a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the

lists, records, correspondence, or any other document of the organization; (b)

Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form
whatsoever; (c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in
dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms; (d) Executing orders, plans, or
directives of any kind of such association or organization; (e) Acting as an agent,
courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any other capacity, on behalf of
such association or organization; (f) Conferring with officers or other members of
such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof; (g)
Transmitting orders, directives, or plans of such association or organization orally or
in writing or any other means of communication such as by signal, semaphore, sign
or code; (h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of
publication to promote the objectives and purposes of such association or
organization; (i) Mailing, shipping, circulating, distributing, or delivering to other
persons any material or propaganda of any kind on behalf of such association or
organization; (j) Advising, counselling, or in other way giving instruction, information,
suggestions, or recommendations to officers, or members or to any other person to
further the objectives of such association or organization; and (k) Participating in any
way in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or
organization." Please note that none of these are alleged by the military in this case,
assuming that the Decree still exists.
5 Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382; emphasis supplied. In Taruc
vs. Ericta (No. L-34856, Nov. 29, 1989, 168 SCRA 63, 66-67), I held that People vs.
Ferrer is no longer a good basis for sustaining the Anti-Subversion Act. I am not here
invoking Ferrer to sustain it, but to discuss its elaboration of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1700.
6 Resolution, supra.
7 G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
8 Supra, 14.
9 36 Phil. 853 (1917).
10 Resolution, supra, 10.
11 People vs. Burgos, supra, 15.
12 Supra.
13 Resolution, supra, 15.
14 Supra, 16.
15 Supra.
16 See United States vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422 (1907).
17 Resolution, supra; emphasis supplied.

18 Supra.
19 At 15.
20 G.R. No. 74869, July 6, 1988, 163 SCRA 402.
21 Resolution, supra.
22 Supra, 17.
23 Supra.
24 See RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 112, sec. 5, on the number of days a judge
may act.
25 Resolution, supra.
26 G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.
27 G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
28 Resolution, supra, 18-19.
29 Resolution, supra, 19.
30 Except for Rolando Dural, the rest of the petitioners have been acquitted by the
lower courts trying their cases.
31 CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
32 Supra, art. II, sec. 11.
33 Resolution, supra, 19.
34 Manila Chronicle, October, 1990.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once
more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar
cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of
arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this
case and in G.R. No. 92164 7Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very
simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et
al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of theHernandez ruling, and
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the
Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the

course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced
by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes
penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense
in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado

francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal

Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso
de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran
los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal
Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable
to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information.14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary
to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the
initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest
issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factualmilieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case
No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1,
1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violationthey claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.

Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ ofHabeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But
where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed
of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31
SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ ofhabeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director
of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.

If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to
its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court
is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a
"creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the
lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine
re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers

results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- beenacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a wellknown Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly nonexistent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have
ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its
duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from
Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,

an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the

judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other
two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in
the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of
Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought
was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the
law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA
226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a coconspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing
of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,

malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental nonretroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).

It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in
terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48
(e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here
proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or
counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.

With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an
offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter,
the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be
deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous
events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to
bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith
be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it
has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger,
illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance, of as a
necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be
complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because
exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.

I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In theHernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down theHernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ ofHabeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But
where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed
of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31
SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].

The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ ofhabeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director
of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to
its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court
is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a
"creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the
lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.

Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine
re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- beenacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a wellknown Supreme Court ruling.

All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly nonexistent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have
ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its
duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from
Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,
an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the
judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other
two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in
the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of
Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought
was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the
law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA
226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.

The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a coconspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing
of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may

rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-

retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in
terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48
(e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here
proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or
counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an
offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter,
the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be
deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous
events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to
bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith
be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it
has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger,
illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance, of as a
necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be
complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because
exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In theHernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to

bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down theHernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.

Footnotes
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956);
People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659
(1960).
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq.
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359.
7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court, upon motion of
the petitioners, resolved to treat as a petition for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No.
92164, pp. 128-129.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411.

9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Cortes and Grino-Aquino, JJ.

10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J.
10-A Two Members a on leave.
11 Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987.
12 People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543.
13 Id., at 551.
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 78-79 and 73-76.
14 Supra, footnote 4.
15 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394.
17 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47.
18 Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
19 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125.
Melencio-Herrera, J., Opinion
1 "ART. 142-A-Cases where other offenses are committed.-When by reason or on
the occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute
offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."
Sarmiento, J., Concurring
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 Supra, 520.
3 Supra, 521.
4 US v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 793 (1917).