KIDA V SENATE

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No.

10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections
and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law
reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May
2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to
coincide with the countrys regular national and
local elections. The law as well granted the
President the power to appoint officers-incharge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that
became RA No. 10153 already spawned
petitions against their validity; House Bill No.
4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged
in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions
multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation
of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand,
directed Congress to enact an organic act for

these autonomous regions to concretely carry

into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an
organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. A plebiscite was held on November
6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X
of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The initially assenting provinces were
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawitawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM
on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No.

6734, entitled An Act Providing for the

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended) was the next legislative act
passed. This law provided further refinement in
the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM
RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law
reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26,
2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA
No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held
on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted
to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by
Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections
to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA
No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was
not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of
Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146,
seeking the postponement of the ARMM
elections scheduled on August 8, 2011.
On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one
hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its
favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it

adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756
(SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13)
Senators voted favorably for its passage.
On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative
concurred with the Senate amendments, and
on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No.
10153 came through a petition filed with this
Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB
No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the
constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153,
the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to
the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed
by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the
House of Representatives against Paquito
Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as
a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed
as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by
Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC
and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
docketed as G.R. No. 197392; and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed
by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of
Representatives against Executive Secretary

Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,

docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu
Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from
the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with
candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against
the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280,
to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List,
Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and
Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
own Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for
Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention
dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court
granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the
Court ordered the consolidation of all the
petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB
No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9,
2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the
parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering
the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to
continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term
on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140,
RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that
these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have
to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements prescribed under
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in
order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153

further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM, as well as the failure to
adhere to the elective and representative
character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President
of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular
elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily,
they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control
over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section
16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties submissions, the
following issues were recognized and argued by
the parties in the oral arguments of August 9
and 16, 2011:
I.
Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM
regular elections constitute an amendment to
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority
vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.
9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary
doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply
only in the creation of autonomous regions
under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the
1987 Constitution?

IV.
Whether RA No. 10153 violates the
autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint
OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special
elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they
are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and
thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized
constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) argues that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, and in support of
this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date
to be determined by the President, which may
be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the
election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House
of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992,
the first twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of

synchronization of elections, hereby extended

to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state
that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
[10]
which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common
termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms
of the twelve winning senators with the least
number of votes, is to synchronize the holding
of all future elections whether national or local
to once every three years. This intention finds
full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations.
These Constitutional Commission exchanges,
read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate
to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May,
1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local
elections as a constitutional mandate.
In Osmea v. Commission on Elections,[14] we
explained
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the
1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives, the local officials, the
President and the Vice-President have been

synchronized to end on the same hour, date

and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the
above-mentioned Sections that the term
of synchronization is used synonymously as the
phrase holding simultaneously since this is the
precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years (Bernas, the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be
synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM
elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that
the words used should be understood in the
sense that they have in common use and given
their ordinary meaning, except when technical
terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As
this Court explained in People v. Derilo, [a]s the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, its language should be understood in
the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the
word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district,
often a community or minor political
subdivision. Regional elections in the ARMM for
the positions of governor, vice-governor and

regional assembly representatives obviously fall

within this classification, since they pertain to
the elected officials who will serve within the
limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled Local
Government. Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to
21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region
is considered a form of local government is also
reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and
the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention that the
synchronization mandated by the Constitution
does not include the regional elections of the
ARMM unmeritorious. We shall refer to
synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the
consideration of the various issues posed in this
case and must be recalled time and again for its
complete resolution.
II. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency
of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also
challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its
alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution which provides that
before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents

certification of necessity in the following

manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days
and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the
President, the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution
can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice. For example, the
bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
passed on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the same day
[May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified
by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity
existed for the immediate enactment of these
bills since there was no public calamity or
emergency that had to be met, again we hark
back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or

the existence of a national emergency justifying

the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject
to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard. But the factual
basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress,
certainly should elicit a different standard of
review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate
in the exercise of their legislative discretion
gave full recognition to the Presidents
certification and promptly enacted RA No.
10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion
under our power of judicial review.
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us
with any cause or justification for this course of
action. Hence, while the judicial department
and this Court are not bound by the acceptance
of the President's certification by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate,
prudent exercise of our powers and respect due
our co-equal branches of government in matters
committed to them by the Constitution, caution
a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the Presidents certification,
the two-fold purpose that underlies the
requirement for three readings on separate
days of every bill must always be observed to
enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently
respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with
respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to
inform the legislators of the matters they shall
vote on and (2) to give them notice that a
measure is in progress through the enactment
process.
We find, based on the records of the
deliberations on the law, that both advocates

and the opponents of the proposed measure

had sufficient opportunities to present their
views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA
No. 10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not
amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 has also been challenged because they
did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article
XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law.
These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution, this Organic Act may be
reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this
Organic Act shall become effective only when
approved by a majority of the vote cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA
No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an
examination of these laws will show, RA No.
9054 only provides for the schedule of
the first ARMM elections and does not fix the
date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which
it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter,
RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 cannot be considered amendments to
RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise
any provision in the latter law; they merely filled
in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the
law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.

This view that Congress thought it best to

leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative
discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law
passed that rescheduled the ARMM
elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734
not only did not fix the date of the subsequent
elections; it did not even fix the specific date of
the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be
fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176,[ RA
No. 8746,[ RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were
all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not
change or modify any part or provision of RA
No. 6734, they were not amendments to this
latter law. Consequently, there was no need to
submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which
lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided
that the first elections would be held on the
second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9140[30] to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while
RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for
the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA
No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among
the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the
date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this
law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear
intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix
the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring
compliance with the amendment prerequisites

embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article

XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement
unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required
under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054has
to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring
more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution
provides that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business. In other
words, as long as majority of the members of
the House of Representatives or the Senate are
present, these bodies have the quorum needed
to conduct business and hold session. Within a
quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient
to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting
separately, in order to effectively amend RA No.
9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is
higher than what the Constitution requires for
the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or
repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts
pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on
this subject best explains the basis and reason
for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to
democratic principles for a legislative body to
have the ability to bind the actions of future
legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary
powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future

amendments or repeals of its enactments labors

under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making
power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or
repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by
implication by the federal constitution or limited
or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or
its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative
body may modify or abolish the acts passed by
itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal
may be exercised at the same session at which
the original act was passed; and even while a
bill is in its progress and before it becomes a
law. This legislature cannot bind a future
legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban
against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of
what the Constitution requires on the passage
of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious
because it significantly constricts the future
legislators room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement
found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only
required an unwarranted supermajority, but
enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as
embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that
Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the
plebiscite requirement required under Section
18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive
to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of
the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states
that the plebiscite is required only for the

creation of autonomous regions and for

determining which provinces, cities and
geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. While the settled rule is
that amendments to the Organic Act have to
comply with the plebiscite requirement in order
to become effective,[35] questions on the extent
of the matters requiring ratification may
unavoidably arise because of the seemingly
general terms of the Constitution and the
obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory
amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly
states that The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by the
majority of the votes case by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. With these wordings as standard, we
interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
require ratification through a plebiscite. These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that
relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government; (b) the regions judicial
system, i.e., the special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the
grant and extent of the legislative powers
constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall
under any of the matters that the Constitution
specifically mandated Congress to provide for in
the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that
the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date
of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that

would require compliance with these

requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of
national and local elections is a constitutional
mandate that Congress must provide for and
this synchronization must include the ARMM
elections. On this point, an existing law in fact
already exists RA No. 7166 as the
forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of
local elections with the national and
congressional elections. Thus, what RA No.
10153 provides is an old matter for local
governments (with the exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections
where the terms are not constitutionally
provided) and is technically a reiteration of what
is already reflected in the law, given that
regional elections are in reality local elections
by express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization,
Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011
based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule
of the national and local elections (fixed by RA
No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to
allow the elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant
to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until
those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office;[38](2) to hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the
President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section
3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion

below, Congress, in choosing to grant the
President the power to appoint OICs, chose the
correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a
completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain
underlying material premises must be fully
understood. The first is the extent of the
powers of Congress to legislate; thesecond is
the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and the third is on
the concept of autonomy as recognized and
established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general and comprehensive.[39] The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government.[40] Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
[41]
Except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to all matters
of general concern or common interest
The constitutional limitations on legislative
power are either express or implied. The
express limitations are generally provided in
some provisions of the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies (Article 2) and in the
provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other
constitutional provisions (such as the initiative
and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1
and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article
X) provide their own express limitations. The
implied limitations are found in the evident
purpose which was in view and the
circumstances and historical events which led to
the enactment of the particular provision as a
part of organic law
The constitutional provisions on autonomy
specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the

Constitution constitute express limitations on

legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power of
Congress to legislate on the governance of the
autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the
present case are the limitations posed by the
prescribed basic structure of government
i.e., that the government must have an
executive department and a legislative
assembly, both of which must be elective and
representative of the constituent political units;
national government, too, must not encroach on
the legislative powers granted under Section 20,
Article X. Conversely and as expressly
reflected in Section 17, Article X, all powers
and functions not granted by this Constitution or
by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X
should likewise serve as a standard that
Congress must observe in dealing with
legislation touching on the affairs of the
autonomous regions. The terms of these
sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or
self-government, in particular, the power to
legislate on a wide array of social, economic
and administrative matters. But equally clear
under these provisions are the permeating
principles of national sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed
in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section
15. In other words, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperioin the
relationship between the national and the
regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy
and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established
constitutional mandates, with one being as

compelling as the other. If their compelling

force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize
the powers and limitations of Congress when it
acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe
the legal situation that faced Congress then, its
decision to synchronize the regional elections
with the national, congressional and all other
local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang
kabataan elections) left it with the problem
of how to provide the ARMM with governance in
the intervening period between the expiration of
the term of those elected in August 2008 and
the assumption to office twenty-one (21)
months away of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
The problem, in other words, was for interim
measures for this period, consistent with the
terms of the Constitution and its established
supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect
due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange
phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape.
The Constitutions Transitory Provisions
themselves collectively provide measures for
transition from the old constitution to the
new and for the introduction of new
concepts. As previously mentioned, the
adjustment of elective terms and of elections
towards the goal of synchronization first
transpired under the Transitory Provisions. The
adjustments, however, failed to look far enough
or deeply enough, particularly into the problems
that synchronizing regional autonomous
elections would entail; thus, the present
problem is with us today.

The creation of local government units also

represents instances when interim measures
are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur
and Dinagat Islands, the creating statutes
authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan although these
positions are essentially elective in character;
the appointive officials were to serve until a new
set of provincial officials shall have been elected
and qualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is
provided in the transition of a local government
from a sub-province to a province.
In all these, the need for interim measures is
dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or
used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in
sight in a manner that does not do violence to
the Constitution and to reasonably accepted
norms. Under these limitations, the choice of
measures was a question of wisdom left to
congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts,
these concepts shall serve as the guideposts
and markers in our discussion of the options
available to Congress to address the problems
brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim
measures that Congress had to provide. The
proper understanding of the options as interim
measures assume prime materiality as it is
under these terms that the passage of RA No.
10153 should be measured, i.e., given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that
cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely
abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution
when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of
elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those
who were elected in executive and legislative
positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011

term as an option that Congress could have

chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials,
they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. As
this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC:[
It is not competent for the legislature to extend
the term of officers by providing that they shall
hold over until their successors are elected and
qualified where the constitution has in effect or
by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which
the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office
beyond that period, even though the successors
fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as
follows:
It has been broadly stated that the legislature
cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill
an office the term of which is limited by the
Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent
beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmea ruling, the
primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law
of the land dictates that where the Constitution
has itself made a determination or given its
mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the
Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
repeal through the applicable constitutional
process. A necessary corollary is that none of

the three branches of government can deviate

from the constitutional mandate except only as
the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all,
Congress may only pass legislation filing in
details to fully operationalize the constitutional
command or to implement it by legislation if it is
non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate if an
interpretation is appropriate and called for.[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials,
their term has been fixed clearly and
unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution
and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover
period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to
create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view like the extension
of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it
cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint
the occupant of the position for the new term.
This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the
President.[56] Hence, holdover whichever way
it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option
that Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without

examples of cases where the question of
holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The
present case though differs significantly from
past cases with contrary rulings, particularly
from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v.
Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec,
[59]
where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold
over capacity.
All these past cases refer to
elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office
are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the
other hand, refers to local elective officials the
ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly whose terms fall within the threeyear term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Because of their constitutionally
limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were
originally elected.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis
for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember
that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it
explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that
is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative

powers; this Court cannot pass

upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation,[62] except where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order
special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in
G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel
COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature, as evident from,
and exemplified by, the following provisions of
the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the
legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall
be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but
applicable solely to the President and VicePresident, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by
law, the regular election for President and VicePresident shall be held on the second Monday
of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government,
provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for xxx the

qualifications, election, appointment and

removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no
elections may be held on any other date for the
positions of President, Vice President, Members
of Congress and local officials, except when so
provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress
may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM
elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date May
13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized
with the presidential, congressional and other
local elections. By so doing, Congress itself
has made a policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom thatit shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the
Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at
the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion.[64] But our power
rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not
to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have
done in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in

G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot compel

COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the
constitutional power of the COMELEC, in
contrast with the power of Congress to call for,
and to set the date of, elections, is limited to
enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power
to call for the holding of special elections unless
pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True,
Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP
881, COMELEC with the power to postpone
elections to another date. However, this power
is limited to, and can only be exercised within,
the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for
any serious cause such
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in
any political subdivision, the Commission, motu
proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and
hearing, whereby all interested parties are
afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date
which should be reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for
such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date

fixed, or had been suspended before the hour

fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after
the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals
that it is meant to address instances
where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but have to
be postponedbecause of (a) violence, (b)
terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and
(e) other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any
political subdivision. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, the term analogous
causes will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that
prevent the holding of the scheduled elections.
These analogous causes are further defined
by the phrase of such nature that the holding of
a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible.
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to
those situations where elections have already

been scheduled but do not take place because

of (a) force majeure, (b)violence, (c) terrorism,
(d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6
addresses instances where the elections do not
occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpectedand unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the
ARMM elections is by law i.e., by
congressional policy and is pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. By no stretch of the
imagination can these reasons be given the
same character as the circumstances
contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP
881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that
obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be
sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute
under the guise of interpretation, nor include
situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor
Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present
case and this Court has absolutely no legal
basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special
elections.

elected in the synchronized elections shall have

assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to
adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on
the Constitution, the power to fix the term of
office of elective officials, which can be
exercised only in the case of barangay officials,
[67]
is specifically given to Congress. Even
Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the
terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least
votes,[68] and extended the terms of the
President and the Vice-President[69] in order to
synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is
that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be
changed by mere statute.[70] More particularly,
not even Congress and certainly not this Court,
has the authority to fix the terms of elective local
officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the
constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this
tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled
in Osmena.

D. The Court has no power to shorten the

terms of elective officials

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective

ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three
(3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of
less than two years if a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the
cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for

the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections, no legal basis likewise exists
to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
shall hold office only until the ARMM officials

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the

tenure of those officials to be elected in the
ARMM elections instead of acting on their term
(where the term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as of right
and fixes the interval after which the several

incumbents shall succeed one another, while

the tenure represents the term during which
the incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As
with the fixing of the elective term, neither
Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and
gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress
chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and
the appointment by the President of OICs to
govern the ARMM during the presynchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4
and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself,
however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to
be recognized.[73] The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other

officers lower in rank in the President alone, in

the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis
ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the
officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.[74]
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the
petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that
the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be elective
and representative of the constituent political
units. This requirement indeed is an express
limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this

alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that
changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What
RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
As we have already established in our
discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite
requirements, the legal reality is that RA No.
10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that
must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how
RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it
was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms.[75] Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments
that the synchronization requires.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether
the interim measure is an unreasonable move
for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation
that the synchronization unavoidably brought
with it. In more concrete terms and based on
the above considerations, given the plain

unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover

and the unavailability of constitutional
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice
of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed
and specific period as an interim measure, and
as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution an unconstitutional or
unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the
President under other situations or where the
power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be
to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. For then, the peoples right to
choose the leaders to govern them may be said
to besystemically withdrawn to the point of
fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the
grant that would frontally breach the elective
and representative governance requirement of
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the
very limited circumstances contemplated in RA
No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more
importantly, the terms of governance both
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
and RA No. 9054 will not systemically be
touched nor affected at all. To repeat what has
previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in
accordance with the Constitution, save only for
the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective,
synchronization will temporarily disrupt the
election process in a local community, the
ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of
leaders, but this will take place under a situation
of necessity and as an interim measure in the
manner that interim measures have been

adopted and used in the creation of local

government units[76] and the adjustments of subprovinces to the status of provinces.[77] These
measures, too, are used in light of the wider
national demand for the synchronization of
elections (considered vis--vis the regional
interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from
the exercise by Congress of the inherent police
power of the State, where one of the essential
tests is the reasonableness of the interim
measure taken in light of the given
circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of
the chosen leaders need not necessarily be
affected by the appointment of OICs as this
requirement is really a function of the
appointment process; only the elective aspect
shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly
seeks to address concerns arising from the
appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the
Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure
of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA
No. 10153 viewed in its proper context is a
law that is not violative of the Constitution
(specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one
that is reasonable as well under the
circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been
argued during the oral arguments that upholding
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set
a dangerous precedent of giving the President
the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective
officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an

across-the-board cancellation of elections is a
matter for Congress, not for the President, to
address. It is a power that falls within the
powers of Congress in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Even Congress, as
discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.

transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be

reckless to assume that the presence of an
acting ARMM Governor, an acting ViceGovernor and a fully functioning Regional
Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment
of OICs under the present circumstances is an
absolute necessity.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August

2011 elections, it was for a very specific and
limited purpose the synchronization of
elections. It was a temporary means to a
lasting end the synchronization of elections.
Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the
Court gives this legislation are likewise clear
and specific, and cannot be transferred or
applied to any other cause for the cancellation
of elections. Any other localized cancellation of
elections and call for special elections can occur
only in accordance with the power already
delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as
above discussed.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the

power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel
nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective

officials cannot continue to act in a holdover
capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and
this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to
conduct special elections, the Court now has to
deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in
governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum
brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of
21 months or close to 2 years intervenes
from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective
officials terms expired and the time the new
ARMM elective officials begin their terms in
2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many
developments, some of them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim
areas in this span of time in the way they

10

[79]

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act

No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling
of vacancies in appointive positions. However,
in the absence of any contrary provision in the
Local Government Code and in the best interest
of public service, we see no cogent reason why
the procedure thus outlined by the two laws
may not be similarly applied in the present case.
The respondents contend that the provincial
board is the correct appointing power. This
argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the
vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in
favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and
finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of

representation and governance in their own

local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority
rules through their chosen few, and if one of
them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs is, to that
extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there
will be a consequent delay in the delivery of
basic services to the people of Leyte if the
Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80]
(Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM
Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21
months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic
services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise. When viewed in
this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized
appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our
judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization
may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be
used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that
the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased
in this manner, one would presume that there
exists a conflict between two recognized
Constitutional mandates synchronization and
regional autonomy such that it is necessary to
choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that
violates a basic principle in constitutional
construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that
the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,
[81]
and one mandate should not be given

importance over the other except where the

primacy of one over the other is clear.[82] We
refer to the Courts declaration in Ang-Angco v.
Castillo, et al.,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be
construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently, conflicting provisions should be
reconciled and harmonized in a manner that
may give to all of them full force and
effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as
constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court
should reconcile and give effect to, in the way
that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which
provides the measure to transit to synchronized
regional elections with the least disturbance on
the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will
be respected instead of being sidelined, as the
law does not in any way alter, change or modify
its governing features, except in a very
temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that
the ARMM elections should not be synchronized
with the national and local elections in order to
maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and
insulate its own electoral processes from the
rough and tumble of nationwide and local
elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while
autonomous regions are granted political
autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never
equated autonomy with independence. The
ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State

and is still subject to the national policies set by

the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for
regional autonomous determination. As
reflected during the constitutional deliberations
of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a
complete separation from the central
government, but rather an efficient working
relationship between the autonomous region
and the central government. We see this as an
effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is
not really thought of as complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of selfgovernment within the larger political framework
of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly
reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article
X of the Constitution, and by the express
reservation under Section 1 of the same Article
that autonomy shall be within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution
initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article
X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the
enumeration of powers granted to autonomous
regions in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers
decided to reinstate the provision in order to
make it clear, once and for all, that these are
the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government. Those not enumerated are actually
to be exercised by the national
government[.][85] Of note is the Courts
pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre[86] which we quote:

11

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy,

the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose
of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal.
Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis
ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the
ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national
policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a
regional concern but a national one, the ARMM
is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to
the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region
from having to act in accordance with a national
policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant
to a constitutional mandate the
synchronization of national and local elections
when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court
cannot question the manner by which Congress
undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and
cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we
can only interpret and apply the law and,

despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot

repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means
by which Congress should address what is
essentially a legislative problem. It is not within
the Courts power to enlarge or abridge laws;
otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping
the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The
petitioners, in asking this Court to compel
COMELEC to hold special elections despite its
lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking
us to venture into the realm of judicial
legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the
most basic principles of a republican and
democratic government the separation of
powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act
because Congress acted with grave abuse of
discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave
abuse of discretion is such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No.
10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted
within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the
necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a
refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no
reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims
of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is

unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the
established rule that every statute is presumed
valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and
the party challenging the validity of a statute has
the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.
[92]
Any reasonable doubt about the validity of
the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared
in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon each
department a becoming respect for the acts of
the other departments. The theory is that as the
joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied
and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
[95]
[Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA
No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we DISMISS the consolidated petitions
assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of
merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this
law. We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining
order we issued in our Resolution of September
13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002]
HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE
(Executive Judge, Branch 28), ULRIC R.

CAETE (Presiding Judge, Branch 25),

AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge,
Branch 56), HON. MTC JUDGES
TEMISTOCLES M. BOHOLST (Presiding
Judge, Branch 1), VICENTE C. FANILAG
(Judge Designate, Branch 2), and WILFREDO
A. DAGATAN (Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all of
Mandaue City, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT,respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule
64 to annul the decision[1] and resolution[2],
dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996,
respectively, of the respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the
Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the
monthly additional allowances received by the
petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
stationed in Mandaue City.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue
City started receiving monthly allowances
of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue
City increased the amount to P1,500 for each
judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) issued the disputed
Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
provided that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the
local government units under the Local
Government Code to provide for additional
allowances and other benefits to national
government officials and employees assigned in
their locality, such additional allowances in the
form of honorarium at rates not exceeding
P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00

12

in municipalities may be granted subject to the

following conditions:
a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of
the LGUs;
b) That all contractual and statutory obligations
of the LGU including the implementation of R.A.
6758 shall have been fully provided in the
budget;
c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations
under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should
be satisfied and/or complied with; and
d) That the LGU has fully implemented the
devolution of functions/personnel in accordance
with R.A. 7160.[3] (italics supplied)
xxx
xxx
xxx
The said circular likewise provided for its
immediate effectivity without need of
publication:
5.0 EFFECTIVITY
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City
Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein
petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges
Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin
R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles
M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A.
Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by
LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the
additional monthly allowances of the petitioner
judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They
were also asked to reimburse the amount they
received in excess of P1,000 from April to
September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the
City Auditor a protest against the notices of
disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the
protest as a motion for reconsideration and
indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office
No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred
the motion to the head office with a
recommendation that the same be denied.
On September 21, 1995, respondent COA
rendered a decision denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration. The COA held that:

The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is

whether or not the City Ordinance of Mandaue
which provides a higher rate of allowances to
the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed
by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55
dated March 15, 1994.
xxx xxx
xxx
Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation
ordinance of local government units is subject to
the organizational, budgetary and compensation
policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind.,
dated March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique;
COA letter dated May 17, 1994 re: Request of
Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental
Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to
Administrative Order No. 42 issued on March 3,
1993 by the President of the Philippines
clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation
and classification of local government positions
under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions of RA
No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA.
Section 1 of said Administrative Order provides
that:
Section 1. The Department of Budget and
Management as the lead administrator of RA
No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and
Position Classification Bureau, continue to have
the following responsibilities in connection with
the implementation of the Local Government
Code of 1991:
a) Provide guidelines on the classification of
local government positions and on the specific
rates of pay therefore;
b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of
all allowances and additional forms of
compensation to local government employees;
xxx. (underscoring supplied)
To operationalize the aforecited presidential
directive, DBM issued LBC No. 55, dated March
15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
5.0 EFFECTIVITY
This Circular shall take effect immediately.

It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules

and regulations promulgated by administrative
or executive officer in accordance with, and as
authorized by law, has the force and effect of
law or partake the nature of a statute (Victorias
Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalos
Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice
Cruzs Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed., p. 103;
Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137
SCRA 314; Antique Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17
SCRA 316).
xxx
xxx
xxx
There being no statutory basis to grant
additional allowance to judges in excess of
P1,000.00 chargeable against the local
government units where they are stationed, this
Commission finds no substantial grounds or
cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City
Auditor, Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the
allowances in question. Accordingly, the abovecaptioned appeal of the MTC and RTC Judges
of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not
covered by Circular Letter No. 91-7, is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
xxx
xxx
xxx[4]
On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the
petitioner judges, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a
resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied
the motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by the
petitioner judges, submitting the following
questions for resolution:
I
HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND
ASSIGNED TO THE CITY?
II
CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR OR
GUIDELINE SUCH AS LOCAL BUDGET

CIRCULAR NO. 55 RENDER INOPERATIVE

THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF
A CITY BY SETTING A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT
OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER?
III
HAS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORRECTLY INTERPRETED LOCAL BUDGET
CIRCULAR NO. 55 TO INCLUDE MEMBERS
OF THE JUDICIARY IN FIXING THE CEILING
OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND
BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED TO JUDGES
STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO
MANDAUE CITY BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT
AT P1,000.00 PER MONTH
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN
RECEIVING ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00
MONTHLY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS?
IV
IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED
MARCH 15, 1994 ISSUED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE
CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT DULY
PUBLISHED IN ACCODANCE WITH LAW?[5]
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for
infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue
City by dictating a uniform amount that a local
government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein. They
maintain that said circular is not supported by
any law and therefore goes beyond the
supervisory powers of the President. They
further allege that said circular is void for lack of
publication.
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation
ordinance providing for additional allowances to
judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi],
of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and

13

appropriate funds for the general welfare of the

city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx
xxx
(xi) When the finances of the city government
allow, provide for additional allowances and
other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public
elementary and high school teachers, and other
national government officials stationed in or
assigned to the city; (italics supplied)
Instead of filing a comment on behalf of
respondent COA, the Solicitor General filed a
manifestation supporting the position of the
petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues
that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review
and determine whether the disbursements of
funds were made in accordance with the
ordinance passed by a local government unit
while (2) the COA has no more than auditorial
visitation powers over local government units
pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which
provides for the power to inspect at any time the
financial accounts of local government units.
Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that the
DBM and the respondent are only authorized
under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget
Operations Manual for local government units,
to improve and systematize methods,
techniques and procedures employed in budget
preparation, authorization, execution and
accountability pursuant to Section 354 of RA
7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC
55 was not exercised under any of the
aforementioned provisions.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists
that the constitutional and statutory authority of
a city government to provide allowances to
judges stationed therein is not absolute.

Congress may set limitations on the exercise of

autonomy. It is for the President, through the
DBM, to check whether these legislative
limitations are being followed by the local
government units.
One such law imposing a limitation on a local
government units autonomy is Section 458, par.
(a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, which authorizes the
disbursement of additional allowances and
other benefits to judges subject to the condition
that the finances of the city government should
allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing
the condition of the law when it sets a uniform
maximum amount for the additional allowances
that a city government can release to judges
stationed therein.
Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void,
respondent COA maintains that the provisions
of the yearly approved ordinance granting
additional allowances to judges are still
prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by
Congress every year. COA argues that
Mandaue City gets the funds for the said
additional allowances of judges from the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). But the
General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995
do not mention the disbursement of additional
allowances to judges as one of the allowable
uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said
ordinance granting additional allowances, taken
from the IRA, to herein petitioner judges are
void for being contrary to law.
To resolve the instant petition, there are two
issues that we must address: (1) whether LBC
55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President and for not
having been published and (2) whether the
yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the
City of Mandaue that provides for additional
allowances to judges contravenes the annual
appropriation laws enacted by Congress.
We rule in favor of the petitioner judges.

On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null

and void.
We recognize that, although our
Constitution[6] guarantees autonomy to local
government units, the exercise of local
autonomy remains subject to the power of
control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Section 4 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that:
Sec. 4.
The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre[7], we defined the
supervisory power of the President and
distinguished it from the power of control
exercised by Congress. Thus:
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa,[i][5] the Court contrasted the President's
power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It
was emphasized that the two terms -supervision and control -- differed in meaning
and extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter."[ii][6]
In Taule v. Santos,[iii][7] we further stated that the
Chief Executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether local governments or

their officials were performing their duties as

provided by the fundamental law and by
statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. "Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such
body,"[iv][8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[v][9] the
difference between control and supervision was
further delineated. Officers in control lay down
the rules in the performance or accomplishment
of an act. If these rules are not followed, they
may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to
do it themselves. On the other hand,
supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it
that the rules are followed, but they themselves
do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such
rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government,
executive power is vested in the President.[vi]
[10]
The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of
the President, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[vii]
[11]
In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions
are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to whom
they are directly accountable. By constitutional
fiat, they are subject to the Presidents
supervision only, not control, so long as their
acts are exercised within the sphere of their

14

legitimate powers. By the same token, the

President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the
Presidents supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any
of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local
affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of
the law and the Constitution. Any directive
therefore by the President or any of his or
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a
law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a
local government unit is a patent nullity because
it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to
implement? Yes.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly
allowances to be given by a local government
unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that
supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to
judges when the finances of the city
government allow. The said provision does not
authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Thus,
we need not belabor the point that the finances
of a city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the
revenues of the said city government exceed its
annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual
revenues of P40 million and expenditures
of P35 million can afford to grant additional

allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say,

ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city
can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of
additional allowances is an inappropriate way of
enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par.
(a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped
its power of supervision over local government
units by imposing a prohibition that did not
correspond with the law it sought to implement.
In other words, the prohibitory nature of the
circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its
lack of publication, in violation of our ruling
in Taada vs. Tuvera[8] where we held that:
xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of an administrative agency and the
public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instruction issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Respondent COA claims that publication is not
required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely an
interpretative regulation applicable to the
personnel of an LGU. We disagree. In De
Jesus vs. Commission on Audit[9] where we
dealt with the same issue, this Court declared
void, for lack of publication, a DBM circular that
disallowed payment of allowances and other
additional compensation to government officials
and employees. In refuting respondent COAs
argument that said circular was merely an
internal regulation, we ruled that:
On the need for publication of subject DBMCCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative.
Following the doctrine enunciated in Taada v.

Tuvera, publication in the Official Gazette or in a

newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10
is in the nature of an administrative circular the
purpose of which is to enforce or implement an
existing law. Stated differently, to be effective
and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go
through the requisite publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is
decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances
and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative
or internal regulation. It is something more than
that. And why not, when it tends to deprive
government workers of their allowance and
additional compensation sorely needed to keep
body and soul together. At the very least, before
the said circular under attack may be permitted
to substantially reduce their income, the
government officials and employees concerned
should be apprised and alerted by the
publication of subject circular in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines to the end that they be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their
stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and
rudiments of fairness and
transparency. (emphasis supplied)
In Philippine International Trading Corporation
vs. Commission on Audit[10], we again declared
the same circular as void, for lack of publication,
despite the fact that it was re-issued and then
submitted for publication. Emphasizing the
importance of publication to the effectivity of a
regulation, we therein held that:
It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC
No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and

submitted for publication in the Official Gazette

per letter to the National Printing Office dated
March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent
publication thereof cure the defect and retroact
to the time that the above-mentioned items
were disallowed in audit?
The answer is in the negative, precisely for the
reason that publication is required as
a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law
to inform the public of the contents of the law or
rules and regulations before their rights and
interests are affected by the same. From the
time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit
up to the filing of herein petition the subject
circular remained in legal limbo due to its nonpublication. As was stated in Taada v. Tuvera,
prior publication of laws before they become
effective cannot be dispensed with, for the
reason that it would deny the public knowledge
of the laws that are supposed to govern it. [11]
We now resolve the second issue of whether
the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by
Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for
judges contravenes any law and should
therefore be struck down as null and void.
According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55
were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue
City granting additional allowances to the
petitioner judges would still (be) bereft of legal
basis for want of a lawful source of funds
considering that the IRA cannot be used for
such purposes. Respondent COA showed that
Mandaue Citys funds consisted of locally
generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989 to
1995, Mandaue Citys yearly expenditures
exceeded its locally generated revenues, thus
resulting in a deficit. During all those years, it
was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to
incur a surplus. Respondent avers that
Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said
additional allowances and this violated
paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions, page
1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations

15

Act of 1995)[12] and paragraph 3 of the Special

Provision, page 1225, of RA 7663 (The General
Appropriations Act of 1994)[13] which specifically
identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA.
Nowhere in said provisions of the two budgetary
laws does it say that the IRA can be used for
additional allowances of judges. Respondent
COA thus argues that the provisions in the
ordinance providing for such disbursement are
against the law, considering that the grant of the
subject allowances is not within the specified
use allowed by the aforesaid yearly
appropriations acts.
We disagree.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue
City used the IRA to spend for the additional
allowances of the judges. There was no
evidence submitted by COA showing the
breakdown of the expenses of the city
government and the funds used for said
expenses. All the COA presented were the
amounts expended, the locally generated
revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA
received each year. Aside from these items, no
data or figures were presented to show that
Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances
from the IRA. In other words, just because
Mandaue Citys locally generated revenues
were not enough to cover its expenditures, this
did not mean that the additional allowances of
petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and
not from the citys own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal
review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue
Citys appropriation ordinances, in accordance
with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and
327 of RA 7160 which provide that:
Section 326. Review of Appropriation
Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized
Cities, Independent Component Cities, and
Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila
Area. The Department of Budget and
Management shall review ordinances

authorizing the annual or supplemental

appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized
cities, independent component cities, and
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila
Area in accordance with the immediately
succeeding Section.
Section 327. Review of Appropriation
Ordinances of Component Cities and
Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan
shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or
supplemental appropriations of component
cities and municipalities in the same manner
and within the same period prescribed for the
review of other ordinances.
If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies
of such ordinance, the sangguniang
panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same
shall be deemed to have been reviewed in
accordance with law and shall continue to be in
full force and effect. (emphasis supplied)
Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the
appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have
taken positive action. Otherwise, such
ordinance was deemed to have been properly
reviewed and deemed to have taken effect.
Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did
not follow the appropriate procedure for
reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue
City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it
can no longer question the legality of the
provisions in the said ordinance granting
additional allowances to judges stationed in the
said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the assailed decision and
resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May
28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on
Audit are hereby set aside.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79956 January 29, 1990

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 82217 January 29, 1990
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA,
assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D.
YARANON and DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR.,
respectively; JAMES BRETT and SINAI C.
HAMADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary,
HON. VICENTE JAYME, Secretary of Finance,
HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of
Budget and Management, and HON.
ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC National
Treasurer, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
In these consolidated petitions, the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220,
dated July 15, 1987, which created the
(Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on
the primary ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by the Congress
and the creation of' the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of
the act through a plebiscite.
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions,
the constitution, in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and

responsibilities not granted Constitution or by
law to the autonomous regions shall be vested
in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic
act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from
a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the
executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units.
The organic acts shall likewise provide for
special courts with personal, family and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this
Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
the time of organization of both Houses, pass
the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development ;
(7) Educational policies;

16

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural

heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order
within the regions shall be the responsibility of
the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.
A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete
Without reference to its historical background.
In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr.
Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
ideological grounds from the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm the
New People's Army. (NPA).
After President Aquino was installed into office
by People Power, she advocated a policy of
national reconciliation. She called on all
revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The
CPLA heeded this call of the President. After the
preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data
in the Mountain Province on September 13,
1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg
(As Commander of the CPLA and Ama Mario
Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong
Administration, the civil government of the
CPLA a ceasefire agreement that signified the
cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O.
220).
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle:
the Cordillera people shall not undertake their
demands through armed and violent struggle
but by peaceful means, such as political
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a
continuing process until the demands of the
Cordillera people shall have been substantially
granted.

On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting

as Chief Negotiator of the government], in
pursuance of the September 13, 1986
agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio
City, and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman
of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:
Par. 2- Work together in drafting an Executive
Order to create a preparatory body that could
perform policy-making and administrative
functions and undertake consultations and
studies leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3- Have representatives from the Cordillera
panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in
drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O.
220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the
Cordillera people.
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
signed the joint draft into law, known now as
E.O. 220. [Rejoinder G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3].
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the
President in the exercise of her legislative
powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution, created the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) , which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, KalingaApayao and Mountain Province and the City of
Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to
accelerate economic and social growth in the
region and to prepare for the establishment of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec.
3]. Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and
services in the region, particularly, to coordinate
with the local government units as well as with
the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and
accepting projects and activities in the region
[sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation

of all ongoing national and local government

projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall
have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
policy-formulating body and a Cordillera
Executive Board as an implementing arm [secs.
7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shall exist until such time as
the autonomous regional government is
established and organized [sec. 17].
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O.
No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first
Congress and the enactment of the organic act
for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an
urgent need, in the interest of national security
and public order, for the President to reorganize
immediately the existing administrative structure
in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political
realities therein and the Government's
legitimate concerns in the areas, without
attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of
the first Congress to undertake the creation of
an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act
No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A.
No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the
Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all offices
and agencies created under Execute Order No.
220 shall cease to exist immediately upon the
ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly shall automatically be transferred to
the Cordillera Autonomous Government.
I
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that
respect for the inherent and stated powers and

prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as

faithful adherence to the principle of separation
of powers, require that its enactment be
accorded the presumption of constitutionality.
Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute, the burden of clearly and
unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality
always rests upon the challenger. Conversely,
failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the
challenge.
We shall be guided by these principles in
considering these consolidated petitions.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that
by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the
exercise of her legislative powers prior to the
convening of the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress
from its mandated task of enacting an organic
act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. We have carefully studied the
Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have
come to the conclusion that petitioners'
assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent
to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out
this conclusion.
1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal
that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of
the National Government in the areas covered
by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act
and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This
does not necessarily conflict with the provisions
of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as
we shall show later.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure
for the creation of an autonomous region in the

17

Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission

shall first be created. The President shall then
appoint the members of a regional consultative
commission from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the
Congress in preparing the organic act for the
autonomous region. The organic act shall be
passed by the first Congress under the 1987
Constitution within eighteen months from the
time of its organization and enacted into law.
Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for
the approval of the organic act [Art. X, sec. 18].
Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite,
shall the autonomous region be created.
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The
President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet
convened, saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act
had not yet been passed and the autonomous
region created. These measures we find in E.O.
No. 220. The steps taken by the President are
obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly
petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as
capitulation to the Cordillera People's Liberation
Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the
Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the
measures taken by the President, We can only
inquire into whether or not the measures violate
the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier,
they do not.
2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR
does not necessarily mean that it is, as
petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts,
"the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25].
The Constitution provides for a basic structure
of government in the autonomous region
composed of an elective executive and
legislature and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec.
18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No.

220 did not establish an autonomous regional

government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning
and implementation of programs and services
[secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only
for a five-day regular session, tasked with,
among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs [sec. 9]. To serve as an
implementing body, it created the Cordillera
Executive Board composed of the Mayor of
Baguio City, provincial governors and
representatives of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and nongovernmental organizations as regular
members and all regional directors of the line
departments of the National Government as exofficiomembers and headed by an Executive
Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies created
by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments,
the agencies of the National Government, the
ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and nongovernmental organizations in a concerted effort
to spur development in the Cordilleras.
The creation of the CAR for purposes of
administrative coordination is underscored by
the mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President
and appropriate national departments and
agencies to make available sources of funds for
priority development programs and projects
recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the
power given to the President to call upon the
appropriate executive departments and
agencies of the National Government to assist
the CAR [sec. 24].
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220,
the Congress, after it was convened, enacted
Republic Act No. 6658 which created the

Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission.

The President then appointed its members. The
commission prepared a draft organic act which
became the basis for the deliberations of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. The
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic
act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which
was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A
plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to
be conducted shortly, shall complete the
process outlined in the Constitution.
In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in
force and effect for more than two years and we
find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras is still to be created,
showing the lack of basis of petitioners'
assertion. Events have shown that petitioners'
fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the
creation of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
Clearly, petitioners' principal challenge has
failed.
II
A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the
nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
territorial and political subdivision. The
Constitution provides in Article X:
Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the

autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution, Thus, we now
address petitioners' assertion that E. 0. No. 220
contravenes the Constitution by creating a new
territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O.
No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision.
1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or
a territorial and political subdivision. It does not
have a separate juridical personality, unlike
provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to
sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose
of property, the power to create its own sources
of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the
purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization
Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the
law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later
increased to twelve (12), with definite regional
centers and required departments and agencies
of the Executive Branch of the National
Government to set up field offices therein. The
functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the
department or agency in the regional areas; (2)
to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area;
(4) to coordinate with local government units in
the area; and (5) to perform such other

18

functions as may be provided by law. [See Part

II, chap. III, art. 1, of the Reorganization Plan].
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same
genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under
E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires
the participation not only of the line departments
and agencies of the National Government but
also the local governments, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations in
bringing about the desired objectives and the
appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision
exercised by the President over the CAR and
the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and
considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the
National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a
regional coordinating agency of the National
Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may
create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14].
These councils are "composed of local
government officials, regional heads of
departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the region for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate
the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In
this wise, the CAR may be considered as a
more sophisticated version of the regional
development council.
III
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the
creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy
for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and
city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

We find first a need to clear up petitioners'

apparent misconception of the concept of local
autonomy.
It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to
the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government
authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004,
January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy
is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being
guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution
[Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express
guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the
Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act
(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act
(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible
march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country [Villegas v.
Subido, supra.]
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in
the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of
an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction in each of
the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere
transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into
an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.

Anent petitioners' objection, we note the

obvious failure to show how the creation of the
CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy
of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be
over-emphasized that pure speculation and a
resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause
the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result because with the
enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No.
6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220
has been superseded. The basic issues have
become moot and academic. The Cordillera
Regional Consultative Commission and the
Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over
the functions of the Cordillera Administrative
Region. The latter office has becomefunctus
oficio. Moreover, there can be no question
about the validity of its acts because if it is
not de jure, at the very least it is a de
facto office.
I make these observations because I have
grave doubts about the authority of the
President to create such an office as the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere
executive fiat. The office has to be created by
statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond
ordinary planning and preparation for the real
office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic
Act 6658 for this purpose. CAR was an agency
which accelerated economic and social growth
in the Cordilleras, coordinated the

implementation of programs, accepted projects

and activities in the Cordilleras, and discharged
basic administrative functions. It was a de
facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de
jure or fully valid creation.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the result because with the
enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No.
6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220
has been superseded. The basic issues have
become moot and academic. The Cordillera
Regional Consultative Commission and the
Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over
the functions of the Cordillera Administrative
Region. The latter office has becomefunctus
oficio. Moreover, there can be no question
about the validity of its acts because if it is
not de jure, at the very least it is a de
facto office.
I make these observations because I have
grave doubts about the authority of the
President to create such an office as the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere
executive fiat. The office has to be created by
statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond
ordinary planning and preparation for the real
office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic
Act 6658 for this purpose. CAR was an agency
which accelerated economic and social growth
in the Cordilleras, coordinated the
implementation of programs, accepted projects
and activities in the Cordilleras, and discharged
basic administrative functions. It was a de
facto agency whose acts are valid but not a de
jure or fully valid creation.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs.
Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN

in her capacity as Secretary of the Department

of Budget and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution vests the President with the
power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables
him to see to it that LGUs and their officials
execute their tasks in accordance with
law. While he may issue advisories and seek
their cooperation in solving economic difficulties,
he cannot prevent them from performing their
tasks and using available resources to achieve
their goals. He may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the law. Thus,
the withholding of a portion of internal revenue
allotments legally due them cannot be directed
by administrative fiat.
The Case

Before us is an original Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to
annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 372, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent
of their authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the
Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan,
through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion
for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for
Intervention,[1] attaching thereto his Petition in
Intervention[2] joining petitioner in the reliefs
sought. At the time, intervenor was the
provincial governor of Bulacan, national
president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments. In a
Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court
noted said Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments

19

On December 27, 1997, the President of the

Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with
emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as
follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN
GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties
brought about by the peso depreciation requires
continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and
sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government
agencies adopt cash management measures to
match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and
agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and controlled
corporations and local governments units will
identify and implement measures in FY 1998
that will reduce total expenditures for the year
by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items,
along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the
streamlining policy on organization and staffing
by deferring action on the following:
a.
Operationalization of new agencies;
b.
Expansion of organizational units and/or
creation of positions;
c.
Filling of positions; and
d.
Hiring of additional/new consultants,
contractual and casual personnel, regardless of
funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a.
Implementation of new
capital/infrastructure projects, except those
which have already been contracted out;
b.
Acquisition of new equipment and motor
vehicles;

c.
All foreign travels of government
personnel, except those associated with
scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d.
Attendance in conferences abroad where
the cost is charged to the government except
those clearly essential to Philippine
commitments in the international field as may
be determined by the Cabinet;
e.
Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars,
except those conducted by government training
institutions and agencies in the performance of
their regular functions and those that are funded
by grants;
f.
Conduct of cultural and social
celebrations and sports activities, except those
associated with the Philippine Centennial
celebration and those involving regular
competitions/events;
g.
Grant of honoraria, except in cases where
it constitutes the only source of compensation
from government received by the person
concerned;
h.
Publications, media advertisements and
related items, except those required by law or
those already being undertaken on a regular
basis;
i.
Grant of new/additional benefits to
employees, except those expressly and
specifically authorized by law; and
j.
Donations, contributions, grants and gifts,
except those given by institutions to victims of
calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies
to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of
fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other
utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering
significant implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and
the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility
to identify the specific sources of cost-savings,

provided the 25% minimum savings under

Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings
generated from these measures shall be
submitted to the Office of the President, through
the Department of Budget and Management, on
a quarterly basis using the attached format.
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the
internal revenue allotment to local government
units shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget
Coordination Committee shall conduct a
monthly review of the fiscal position of the
National Government and if necessary, shall
recommend to the President the imposition of
additional reserves or the lifting of previously
imposed reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall
take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain
valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of
December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to
five percent (5%) the amount of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the
LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in
issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs. The Constitution
vests in the President, however, only the power
of general supervision over LGUs, consistent
with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
further argues that the directive to withhold ten
percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and
of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of

20

these units its share in the national internal

revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the
respondents, claims on the other hand that AO
372 was issued to alleviate the "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise
of the President's power of supervision over
LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local
governments to identify measures that will
reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does
not violate the statutory prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is
"temporary in nature pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation."
The Issues

The Petition[3] submits the following issues for

the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed
grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS
to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in
violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
"B.
Whether or not the president
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1
of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce
their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b)
Section 4 of the same issuance, which
withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local
governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the
question whether petitioner had the locus
standi to bring this suit, despite respondents'
failure to raise the issue.[4] However, the

intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has

rendered academic any further discussion on
this matter.
The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned

Before resolving the main issue, we deem it

important and appropriate to define certain
crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the
President's power of general supervision over
local governments and (2) the extent of the local
governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution

confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It
reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,
[5]
the Court contrasted the President's power of
supervision over local government officials with
that of his power of control over executive
officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision
and control -- differed in meaning and
extent. The Court distinguished them as
follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter."[6]

In Taule v. Santos,[7] we further stated that the

Chief Executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by
statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. "Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such
body,"[8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[9] the
difference between control and supervision was
further delineated. Officers in control lay down
the rules in the performance or accomplishment
of an act. If these rules are not followed, they
may, in their discretion, order the act undone or
redone by their subordinates or even decide to
do it themselves. On the other hand,
supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it
that the rules are followed, but they themselves
do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such
rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no
discretion on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government,
executive power is vested in the President.
[10]
The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of
the President, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[11] In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are
directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they

are subject to the Presidents supervision only,

not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By
the same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by
the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy

Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on

the President's power over local governments is
the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.[12]
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[13] we said
that local autonomy signified "a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is
intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local
governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence
between the central administration and local
government units x x x." Paradoxically, local
governments are still subject to regulation,
however limited, for the purpose of enhancing
self-government.[14]
Decentralization simply means the devolution of
national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain
accountable to the central government as the
law may provide.[15] The difference between
decentralization of administration and that of
power was explained in detail in Limbona v.
Mangelin[16] as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make
local governments 'more responsive and
accountable,'[17] and 'ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the

21

pursuit of national development and social

progress.'[18] At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision'[19] over them, but only to
'ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.'[20] He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.[21]
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to
'self-immolation,' since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable
not to the central authorities but to its
constituency."[22]
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy,
the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is
to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn,
economic, political and social development at
the smaller political units are expected to propel
social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to
develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country
still lies in the President and Congress. As we
stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of
the national government.[23]

The Nature of AO 372

Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential

precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO
372. As its preambular clauses declare, the
Order was a "cash management measure"
adopted by the government "to match
expenditures with available resources," which
were presumably depleted at the time due to
"economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation." Because of a looming financial
crisis, the President deemed it necessary to
"direct all government agencies, state
universities and colleges, government-owned
and controlled corporations as well as local
governments to reduce their total expenditures
by at least 25 percent along suggested areas
mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in
addition to having administrative autonomy in
the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that
local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released
by the national government, as well as the
power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local officials
in turn have to work within the constraints
thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments,
whether they are relevant to local needs and
resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a
balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization
of proposals from both local and national
officials,[24] who in any case are partners in the
attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule
out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. Significantly, the President, by

constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic

and planning agency of the government,
[25]
primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans
and programs[26] for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the
formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code
provides:[27]
"x x x [I]n the event the national government
incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby
authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but
in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before
the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit
of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in
the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national

internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year

preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to
comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At
the very least, they did not even try to show that
the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did
they claim having conducted consultations with
the different leagues of local
governments. Without these requisites, the
President has no authority to adjust, much less
to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal
revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO
372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies
and instrumentalities to undertake costreduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing
economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the
powers of the President. Since it is not a
mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of
control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have
a rather commanding tone, and while we agree
with petitioner that the requirements of Section
284 of the Local Government Code have not
been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the
solicitor general's
assurance that the directive to "identify and
implement measures x x x that will reduce total
expenditures x x x by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriation" is merely
advisory in character, and does not constitute a
mandatory or binding order that interferes with
local autonomy. The language used, while

22

authoritative, does not amount to a command

that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to
prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic
difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to
heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is
understood, however, that no legal sanction
may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials
who do not follow such advice. It is in this light
that we sustain the solicitor general's contention
in regard to Section 1.

In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be

upheld as an advisory effected in times of
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of
validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was
well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold
the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that
even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and
the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.

Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from

our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1)
the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within
the powers of the President as chief fiscal
officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA
is implied in the President's authority to adjust it
in case of an unmanageable public sector
deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent,
when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been
adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality
of the executive action in advance of its
immediate adverse effect involves too remote
and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise
of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people
should await the implementing evil to befall on
them before they can question acts that are
illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered
that the real issue here is whether the
Constitution and the law are contravened by
Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are
violated by the acts implementing it. In the
unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,
[33]
this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, settling the

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be

upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy
is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs
in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
[28]
The Local Government Code[29] specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to
the LGU concerned within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose."[30] As a rule, the term "shall"
is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning.[31] The provision is,
therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the
withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution
and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means
"something held back or withheld, often
temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of
the retention by the national government does
not matter. Any retention is prohibited.

Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent

controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By

the mere enactment of the questioned law or
the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court x x x , it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound
by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]
xxx
xx
x
xxx
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly
emphasized in many cases,[36] it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought
before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of
the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy:[37]
"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty
of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of government. The courts, as

guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute
enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. Where the
statute violates the Constitution, it is not only
the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare
such act unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the
President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as
in the present case, settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature
has not been raised by the parties; hence it is
deemed waived. Considerations of due process
really prevents its use against a party that has
not been given sufficient notice of its
presentation, and thus has not been given the
opportunity to refute it.[38]
Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal
officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits
that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the
President's role as chief fiscal officer, who
allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers
to ensure the observance of safeguards and
auditing requirements, as well as the legal
prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs,
taking into account the constitutional and
statutory mandates."[39] He cites instances when
the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal
affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent
have specifically been authorized by law and
have not been challenged as violative of the
Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of
AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes
explicit provisions of the Local Government
Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other
words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are
indeed authorized by law; but, quite the

23

opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any

legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the
IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public
sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in
striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is
not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs
of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make
necessary adjustments in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in
the main part of this Decision, and in line with
Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan
cites. He, however, merely glances over a
specific requirement in the same provision -that such reduction is subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and, more importantly, with the
presidents of the leagues of local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need
for "interaction between the national
government and the LGUs at the planning
level," in order to ensure that "local
development plans x x x hew to national
policies and standards." The problem is that no
such interaction or consultation was ever held
prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the
petitioner and the intervenor (who was a
provincial governor and at the same time
president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments) have protested
and instituted this action. Significantly,
respondents do not deny the lack of
consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section
287[40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the
President to withhold the IRA of an LGU,
pending its compliance with certain
requirements. Even a cursory reading of the
provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to
the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate
in their annual budgets 20 percent of their
respective IRAs for development projects. It

speaks of no positive power granted the

President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at
all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED. Respondents and their
successors are hereby
permanently PROHIBITED from implementing
Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43,
respectively dated December 27, 1997 and
December 10, 1998, insofar as local
government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J.
Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:
In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal
Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 ("AO
No. 372"), the majority opinion posits that the
President exercised power of control over the
local government units ("LGU), which he does
not have, and violated the provisions of Section
6, Article X of the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a
just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
and Section 286(a) of the Local Government
Code, which provides:
SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit
shall be released, without need of any further
action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end
of each quarter, and which shall not be subject
to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever purpose.

The share of the LGUs in the national internal

revenue taxes is defined in Section 284 of the
same Local Government Code, to wit:
SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes.
- Local government units shall have a share in
the national internal revenue taxes based on the
collection of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this
Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%)
percent; and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty
percent (40%).
Provided, That in the event that the national
government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with
the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but
in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year: Provided,
further, That in the first year of the effectivity of
this Code, the local government units shall, in
addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal
revenue allotment which shall include the cost
of devolved functions for essential public
services, be entitled to receive the amount
equivalent to the cost of devolved personal
services.
xxx
The majority opinion takes the view that the
withholding of ten percent (10%) of the internal
revenue allotment ("IRA") to the LGUs pending
the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee

of the emerging fiscal situation as called for in

Section 4 of AO No. 372 transgresses against
the above-quoted provisions which mandate the
"automatic" release of the shares of the LGUs in
the national internal revenue in consonance
with local fiscal autonomy. The pertinent
portions of AO No. 372 are reproduced
hereunder:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372

ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN

GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties
brought about by the peso depreciation requires
continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and
sustain the countrys growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government
agencies adopt cash management measures to
match expenditures with available resources;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and
agencies, including x x x local government units
will identify and implement measures in FY
1998 that will reduce total appropriations for
non-personal services items, along the following
suggested areas:
xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation the amount equivalent to 10% of the
internal revenue allotment to local government
units shall be withheld.
xxx
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada issued
Administrative Order No. 43 (AO No. 43),
amending Section 4 of AO No. 372, by reducing
to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld from
the LGUs, thus:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43

24

AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.

372 DATED 27 DECEMBER 1997 ENTITLED
"ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN
GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998"
WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated
27 December 1997 entitled "Adoption of
Economy Measures in Government for FY
1998" was issued to address the economic
difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation in 1997;
WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order
No. 372 provided that the amount equivalent to
10% of the internal revenue allotment to local
government units shall be withheld; and,
WHEREAS, there is a need to release
additional funds to local government units for
vital projects and expenditures.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby order the reduction of the
withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of
local government units from ten percent to five
percent.
The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld
for 1998 shall be released before 25 December
1998.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of
December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety eight.
With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the
majority opinion.
Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a
case ripe for adjudication. The language of
Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on
its face, the constitutional provision on the
automatic release of the IRA shares of the
LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded,
expresses the idea that the withholding is
merely temporary which fact alone would not
merit an outright conclusion of its
unconstitutionality, especially in light of the
reasonable presumption that administrative

agencies act in conformity with the law and the

Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet
occurred and the challenged construction has
not yet been adopted by the agency charged
with administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality
of the executive action in advance of its
immediate adverse effect involves too remote
and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise
of judicial function. Petitioners have not shown
that the alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs that was
temporarily withheld has not yet been released,
or that the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) has refused and continues
to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court
should not decide as this case suggests an
abstract proposition on constitutional issues.
The President is the chief fiscal officer of the
country. He is ultimately responsible for the
collection and distribution of public money:
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The
Department of Budget and Management shall
assist the President in the preparation of a
national resources and expenditures budget,
preparation, execution and control of the
National Budget, preparation and maintenance
of accounting systems essential to the
budgetary process, achievement of more
economy and efficiency in the management of
government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification
systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or
organizational implications.1
In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer
is directed towards "the nation's efforts at
economic and social upliftment"2 for which more
specific economic powers are delegated. Within
statutory limits, the President can, thus, fix "tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national

development program of the government,3 as

he is also responsible for enlisting the country in
international economic agreements.4 More than
this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations," the
President is empowered to create appropriation
reserves,5 suspend expenditure
appropriations,6 and institute cost reduction
schemes.7
As chief fiscal officer of the country, the
President supervises fiscal development in the
local government units and ensures that laws
are faithfully executed.8 For this reason, he can
set aside tax ordinances if he finds them
contrary to the Local Government
Code.9 Ordinances cannot contravene statutes
and public policy as declared by the national
govemment.10 The goal of local economy is not
to "end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units,"11 but to make local
governments "more responsive and
accountable" [to] "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social
progress."12
The interaction between the national
government and the local government units is
mandatory at the planning level. Local
development plans must thus hew to "national
policies and standards13 as these are
integrated into the regional development plans
for submission to the National Economic
Development Authority. "14 Local budget plans
and goals must also be harmonized, as far as
practicable, with "national development goals
and strategies in order to optimize the utilization
of resources and to avoid duplication in the use
of fiscal and physical resources."15
Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the
exercise by the President not only of his power
of general supervision, but also in conformity

with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country

in the discharge of which he is clothed by law
with certain powers to ensure the observance of
safeguards and auditing requirements, as well
as the legal prerequisites in the release and use
of IRAs, taking into account the
constitutional16 and statutory17 mandates.
However, the phrase "automatic release" of the
LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of
the funds is mechanical, spontaneous, selfoperating or reflex. IRAs must first be
determined, and the money for their payment
collected.18 In this regard, administrative
documentations are also undertaken to
ascertain their availability, limits and extent. The
phrase, thus, should be used in the context of
the whole budgetary process and in relation to
pertinent laws relating to audit and accounting
requirements. In the workings of the budget for
the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures
are supported by existing funds in the national
coffers and by proposals for revenue raising.
The money, therefore, available for IRA release
may not be existing but merely inchoate, or a
mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the
Executive Department's proposals for raising
revenue in the form of proposed legislation may
not be passed by the legislature. As such, the
release of IRA should not mean release of
absolute amounts based merely on
mathematical computations. There must be a
prior determination of what exact amount the
local government units are actually entitled in
light of the economic factors which affect the
fiscal situation in the country. Foremost of these
is where, due to an unmanageable public sector
deficit, the President may make the necessary
adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as
expressly provided in Article 284 of the Local
Government Code:
x x x (I)n the event that the national government
incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit,
the President of the Philippines is hereby

25

authorized, upon the recommendation of

Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management and subject to consultation with
the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the "liga," to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but
in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year. x x x.
Under the aforecited provision, if facts reveal
that the economy has sustained or will likely
sustain such "unmanageable public sector
deficit," then the LGUs cannot assert absolute
right of entitlement to the full amount of forty
percent (40%) share in the IRA, because the
President is authorized to make an adjustment
and to reduce the amount to not less than thirty
percent (30%). It is, therefore, impractical to
immediately release the full amount of the IRAs
and subsequently require the local government
units to return at most ten percent (10%) once
the President has ascertained that there exists
an unmanageable public sector deficit.
By necessary implication, the power to make
necessary adjustments (including reduction) in
the IRA in case of an unmanageable public
sector deficit, includes the discretion to withhold
the IRAs temporarily until such time that the
determination of the actual fiscal situation is
made. The test in determining whether one
power is necessarily included in a stated
authority is: "The exercise of a more absolute
power necessarily includes the lesser power
especially where it is needed to make the first
power effective."19 If the discretion to suspend
temporarily the release of the IRA pending such
examination is withheld from the President, his
authority to make the necessary IRA
adjustments brought about by the
unmanageable public sector deficit would be

emasculated in the midst of serious economic

crisis. In the situation conjured by the majority
opinion, the money would already have been
gone even before it is determined that fiscal
crisis is indeed happening.
The majority opinion overstates the requirement
in Section 286 of the Local Government Code
that the IRAs "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose" as proof that
no withholding of the release of the IRAs is
allowed albeit temporary in nature.
It is worthy to note that this provision does not
appear in the Constitution. Section 6, Art X of
the Constitution merely directs that LGUs "shall
have a just share" in the national taxes "as
determined by law" and which share shall be
automatically released to them. This means
that before the LGUs share is released, there
should be first a determination, which requires a
process, of what is the correct amount as
dictated by existing laws. For one, the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government
Code allows deductions from the IRAs, to wit:
Article 384. Automatic Release of IRA Shares of
LGUs:
xxx
(c) The IRA share of LGUs shall not be subject
to any lien or hold back that may be imposed by
the National Government for whatever purpose
unless otherwise provided in the Code or other
applicable laws and loan contract on project
agreements arising from foreign loans and
international commitments, such as premium
contributions of LGUs to the Government
Service Insurance System and loans contracted
by LGUs under foreign-assisted projects.
Apart from the above, other mandatory
deductions are made from the IRAs prior to their
release, such as: (1) total actual cost of
devolution and the cost of city-funded
hospitals;20 and (2) compulsory
contributions21 and other remittances.22 It

follows, therefore, that the President can

withhold portions of IRAs in order to set-off or
compensate legitimately incurred obligations
and remittances of LGUs.
Significantly, Section 286 of the Local
Government Code does not make mention of
the exact amount that should be automatically
released to the LGUs. The provision does not
mandate that the entire 40% share mentioned in
Section 284 shall be released. It merely
provides that the "share" of each LGU shall be
released and which "shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." The
provision on automatic release of IRA share
should, thus, be read together with Section 284,
including the proviso on adjustment or reduction
of IRAs, as well as other relevant laws. It may
happen that the share of the LGUs may amount
to the full forty percent (40%) or the reduced
amount of thirty percent (30%) as adjusted
without any law being violated. In other words,
all that Section 286 requires is the automatic
release of the amount that the LGUs
are rightfully and legally entitled to, which, as
the same section provides, should not be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the
national revenue taxes. So that even if five
percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) is either
temporarily or permanently withheld, but the
minimum of thirty percent (30%) allotment for
the LGUs is released pursuant to the
President's authority to make the necessary
adjustment in the LGUS' share, there is still full
compliance with the requirements of the
automatic release of the LGUs' share.
Finally, the majority insists that the withholding
of ten percent (10%) or five percent (5%) of the
IRAs could not have been done pursuant to the
power of the President to adjust or reduce such
shares under Section 284 of the Local
Government Code because there was no
showing of an unmanageable public sector

deficit by the national government, nor was

there evidence that consultations with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
and the presidents of the various leagues had
taken place and the corresponding
recommendations of the Secretary of Finance,
Secretary of Interior and Local Government and
the Budget Secretary were made.
I beg to differ. The power to determine whether
there is an unmanageable public sector deficit is
lodged in the President. The President's
determination, as fiscal manager of the country,
of the existence of economic difficulties which
could amount to "unmanageable public sector
deficit" should be accorded respect. In fact, the
withholding of the ten percent (10%) of the
LGUs' share was further justified by the current
economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation as shown by one of
the "WHEREASES" of AO No. 372.23 In the
absence of any showing to the contrary, it is
presumed that the President had made prior
consultations with the officials thus mentioned
and had acted upon the recommendations of
the Secretaries of Finance, Interior and Local
Government and Budget.24
Therefore, even assuming hypothetically that
there was effectively a deduction of five percent
(5%) of the LGUs' share, which was in
accordance with the President's prerogative in
view of the pronouncement of the existence of
an unmanageable public sector deficit, the
deduction would still be valid in the absence of
any proof that the LGUs' allotment was less
than the thirty percent (30%) limit provided for in
Section 284 of the Local Government Code.
In resume, the withholding of the amount
equivalent to five percent (5%) of the IRA to the
LGUs was temporary pending determination by
the Executive of the actual share which the
LGUs are rightfully entitled to on the basis of the
applicable laws, particularly Section 284 of the
Local Government Code, authorizing the

26

President to make the necessary adjustments in

the IRA of LGUs in the event of an
unmanageable public sector deficit. And
assuming that the said five percent (5%) of the
IRA pertaining to the 1998 Fiscal Year has been
permanently withheld, there is no showing that
the amount actually released to the LGUs that
same year was less than thirty percent (30%) of
the national internal revenue taxes collected,
without even considering the proper deductions
allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law
Offices for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section
7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the
petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal,
prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution
No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.
The dispositive portion of the questioned
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it
hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor
Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the
approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose
as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld.
(Rollo, p. 32)
The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150
reiterates CSC's position upholding the private
respondent's appointment by denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial
Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal
was left vacant by its former holder, a certain
Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner
informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed
office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988
pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the
petitioner who further requested Director Abella
to endorse the appointment of the said Ms.
Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO
of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal
Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she
discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988
addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director
Abella of Region IV recommended the
appointment of the private respondent as PBO
of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of
all Municipal Budget Officers of the said
province which included three nominees of the
petitioner. According to Abella, the private
respondent was the most qualified since she
was the only Certified Public Accountant among
the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary
Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment
papers of the private respondent as PBO of
Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of
Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to
Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his
request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos
to the contested position unaware of the earlier
appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director
Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that
Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees
did not meet the minimum requirements under
Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of

a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether

or not through oversight further required the
petitioner to submit at least three other qualified
nominees who are qualified for the position of
PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after
having been informed of the private
respondent's appointment wrote Secretary
Carague protesting against the said
appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as
DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to
appoint the PBO; that the private respondent
lacks the required three years work experience
as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31;
and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the
Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director
or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through
its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative
Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a
Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letterprotest is not meritorious considering that public
respondent DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up the contested position
since none of the petitioner's nominees met the
prescribed requirements.
On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.
On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary
denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public
respondent CSC protesting against the
appointment of the private respondent and
reiterating his position regarding the matter.
Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued
the questioned resolutions which prompted the
petitioner to submit before us the following
assignment of errors:
A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT

SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA

ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.
B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.
C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT
QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.
D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT
ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW
NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE
REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 78, Rollo, pp. 15-16)
All the assigned errors relate to the issue of
whether or not the private respondent is lawfully
entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of
Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by
public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon
the recommendation of then Director Abella of
DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and
privilege to recommend the nominees to the
position of PBO and that the appointee should
come only from his nominees. In support
thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112 which provides that:
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities
and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth
by the Minister of Budget and Management
upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned, subject to civil service
law, rules and regulations, and they shall be
placed under the administrative control and
technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget
and Management.
The petitioner maintains that the appointment of
the private respondent to the contested position
was made in derogation of the provision so that
both the public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's
appointment.

27

There is no question that under Section 1 of

Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power
to recommend is subject to the qualifications
prescribed by existing laws for the position of
PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing
authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public
respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.
In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free
to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue
before us.
Before the promulgation of Executive Order No.
112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code vested upon the Governor,
subject to civil service rules and regulations, the
power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216,
subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further
enumerated the qualifications for the position of
PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of
the same code states that:
(2) No person shall be appointed provincial
budget officer unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of
a degree preferably in law, commerce, public
administration or any related course from a
recognized college or university, a first grade
civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has
acquired at least five years experience in
budgeting or in any related field.
The petitioner contends that since the
appointing authority with respect to the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in
him before, then, the real intent behind
Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to
recommend nominees to the position of
Provincial Budget Officer is to make his
recommendation part and parcel of the
appointment process. He states that the phrase
"upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory

application in consonance with the state policy

of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power
to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a
mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to
fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the
qualification requirements as embodied in public
respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31
dated February 9, 1988.
The questioned ruling is justified by the public
respondent CSC as follows:
As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM
Secretary may choose from among the
recommendees of the Provincial Governor who
are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to
the position of the PBO of Rizal.
Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the
local chief executive is merely directory and not
a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the
Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative.
To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or
E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or
construction not intended therein, taking into
consideration that said officer has been
nationalized and is directly under the control
and supervision of the DBM Secretary or
through his duly authorized representative. It
cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has
a similar role in the local government unit, only
on another area or concern, to that of a
Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to
preserve and maintain the independence of said
officer from the local government unit, he must
be primarily the choice of the national
appointing official, and the exercise thereof
must not be unduly hampered or interfered with,
provided the appointee finally selected meets
the requirements for the position in accordance
with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations. In other words, the appointing

official is not restricted or circumscribed to the

list submitted or recommended by the local
chief executive in the final selection of an
appointee for the position. He may consider
other nominees for the position vis a vis the
nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC
Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)
The issue before the Court is not limited to the
validity of the appointment of one Provincial
Budget Officer. The tug of war between the
Secretary of Budget and Management and the
Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the
application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power
in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.
The exercise by local governments of
meaningful power has been a national goal
since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of
constitutional provisions and, as in this case,
legislation mandating greater autonomy for local
officials, national officers cannot seem to let go
of centralized powers. They deny or water down
what little grants of autonomy have so far been
given to municipal corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7,
1900 to the Second Philippine Commission
ordered the new Government "to devote their
attention in the first instance to the
establishment of municipal governments in
which natives of the Islands, both in the cities
and rural communities, shall be afforded the
opportunity to manage their own local officers to
the fullest extent of which they are capable and
subject to the least degree of supervision and
control which a careful study of their capacities
and observation of the workings of native

control show to be consistent with the

maintenance of law, order and loyalty.
In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the
Commission which combined both executive
and legislative powers was directed to give top
priority to making local autonomy effective.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on
local autonomy. However, in distinguishing
between presidential control and supervision as
follows:
The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)
the Constitution clearly limited the executive
power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
The President controls the executive
departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that
supervision is both general and circumscribed
by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970),
this Court stated:
. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with
the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion
as the ponente, clarified matters. As was
pointed out, the presidential competence is not
even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law. He
could not thus go beyond the applicable
statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his
discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been
earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice
Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143
[1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice
in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision
goes no further than "overseeing or the power
or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such

28

action or step as prescribed by law to make

them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148)
Control, on the other hand, "means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." It
would follow then, according to the present
Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion,
that the President had to abide by the then
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
on suspension and removal of municipal
officials, there being no power of control that he
could rightfully exercise, the law clearly
specifying the procedure by which such
disciplinary action would be taken.
Pursuant to this principle under the 1935
Constitution, legislation implementing local
autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act
No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing
Local Governments by Increasing Their
Autonomy and Reorganizing Local
Governments" was passed. It was followed in
1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving
"further autonomous powers to local
governments governments."
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved
the country further, at least insofar as legal
provisions are concerned, towards greater
autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic
principle of government:
Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
An entire article on Local Government was
incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a
local government code defining more
responsive and accountable local government
structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or
substantial boundary alteration cannot be done
except in accordance with the local government

code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The

power to create sources of revenue and to levy
taxes was specifically settled upon local
governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even
more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of
local governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local
Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making
local autonomy more meaningful. Thus,
Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions
shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted
the recommending power of the Provincial
Governor as purely directory, it went against the
letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions
on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary
jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary
powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and
resoluteness in the handling of their own funds,
the goal of meaningful local autonomy is
frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31
which states:
Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up
any existing vacancy where none of the

nominees of the local chief executive meet the

prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no
one meets the legal requirements and ask for
new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work
with DBM. More important, however, is the
proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local
level. Provincial and municipal budgets are
prepared at the local level and after completion
are forwarded to the national officials for review.
They are prepared by the local officials who
must work within the constraints of those
budgets. They are not formulated in the inner
sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and
unilaterally imposed on local governments
whether or not they are relevant to local needs
and resources. It is for this reason that there
should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of
viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals
from both the local and national officials. It is for
this reason that the nomination and
appointment process involves a sharing of
power between the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy
the procedure followed in the appointments of
Justices and Judges. Under Article VIII of the
Constitution, nominations for judicial positions
are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
President makes the appointments from the list
of nominees submitted to her by the Council.
She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all
the Council nominees, and appoint another
person whom she feels is better qualified. There
can be no reservation of the right to fill up a
position with a person of the appointing power's
personal choice.

The public respondent's grave abuse of

discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director
Galvez required the Provincial Governor to
submit at least three other names of nominees
better qualified than his earlier
recommendation. It was a meaningless
exercise. The appointment of the private
respondent was formalized before the Governor
was extended the courtesy of being informed
that his nominee had been rejected. The
complete disregard of the local government's
prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM
has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion
are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law"
Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of
local governments as institutions of democracy
is measured by the degree of autonomy that
they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that
"local assemblies of citizens constitute the
strength of free nations. . . . A people may
establish a system of free government but
without the spirit of municipal institutions, it
cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp.
705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply
with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit
of liberty upon which these provisions are
based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The
appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is
nullified. The Department of Budget and
Management is ordered to appoint the
Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among
qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial
Governor.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130775. September 27, 2004]

29

THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY,

represented by ALEX L. DAVID in his
capacity as National President and for his
own Person, President ALEX L.
DAVID, petitioners, vs. HON. VICTORIA
ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan
City, and THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
and LOCAL GOVERNMENT, represented the
HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS
and MANUEL A. RAYOS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131939. September 27, 2004]
LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO
LACWASAN and BONY TACIO, petitioners,
vs. DILG Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS
and DILG Undersecretary MANUEL
SANCHEZ, respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
At bottom, the present petition inquires into the
essential nature of the Liga ng mga
Barangay and questions the extent of the power
of Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the
President. More immediately, the petition
disputes the validity of the appointment of the
DILG as the interim caretaker of the Liga ng
mga Barangay.
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A.
Rayos [as petitioner therein], Punong
Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5,
District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan,
[1]
alleging that respondent therein Alex L.
David [now petitioner], Punong
Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan
City and then president of the Liga Chapter of
Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga
Barangay National Chapter, committed certain
irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of

the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga

Barangay elections in 1997. According to the
petition, the irregularities consisted of the
following: (1) the publication of the notice in
the Manila Bulletin but without notifying in
writing the individual punong barangays of
Caloocan City;[2](2) the Notice of Meeting dated
08 June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan
City did not specify whether the meeting
scheduled on 14 June 1997 was to be held at
8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the meeting
was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan;[3] and
(3) the deadline for the filing of the Certificates
of Candidacy having been set at 5:00 p.m. of
the third day prior to the above election day, or
on 11 June 1997,[4] Rayos failed to meet said
deadline since he was not able to obtain a
certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate
of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning
Candidate, which were needed to be a
delegate, to vote and be voted for in
the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the
Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72)
hours, enjoining the holding of the general
membership and election meeting
of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June
1975.[5]
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly
served on herein petitioner David, and so the
election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan
was held as scheduled.[6] Petitioner David was
proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and
thereafter took his oath and assumed the
position of ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a
second petition, this time for quo warranto,
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages, against David,
Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City,

and Secretary Barbers.[7] Rayos alleged that he

was elected President of the Liga Caloocan
Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997
by the members of the Caloocan Chapter
pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.
[8]
On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted
the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David,
Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding
with the synchronized elections for the
Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of
the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for
the purpose of maintaining the status quo and
effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two
(72) hours.[9]
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner
Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No.
C-512 pending before Branch 126 was
consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending
before Branch 124.[10]
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25
July 1997, the DILG through respondent
Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512
an Urgent Motion,[11] invoking the Presidents
power of general supervision over all local
government units and seeking the following
reliefs:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of the muchneeded delivery of basic services to the people,
the maintenance of public order and to further
protect the interests of the forty-one thousand
barangays all over the country, herein
respondent respectfully prays:
a) That the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), pursuant to its delegated
power of general supervision, be appointed as
the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer
the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the
new set of National Liga Officers shall have
been duly elected and assumed office; ...[12]
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored
on the following grounds: (1) the DILG
Secretary exercises the power of general
supervision over all government units by virtue

of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18

February 1992; (2) the Liga ng mga Barangay is
a government organization; (3) undue
interference by some local elective officials
during the Municipal and City Chapter
elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay; (4)
improper issuance of confirmations of the
elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David
and the National LigaBoard; (5) the need for the
DILG to provide remedies measured in view of
the confusion and chaos sweeping the Liga ng
mga Barangay and the incapacity of the
National Liga Board to address the problems
properly.
On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the
DILGs Urgent Motion, claiming that the DILG,
being a respondent in the case, is not allowed
to seek any sanction against a co-respondent
like David, such as by filing a cross-claim,
without first seeking leave of court.[13] He also
alleged that the DILGs request to be appointed
interim caretaker constitutes undue interference
in the internal affairs of the Liga, since
the Liga is not subject to DILG control and
supervision.[14]
Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on
28 July 1997, and before it was acted upon by
the lower court, the DILG through then
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.[15] It cited the
reported violations of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David
and widespread chaos and confusion among
local government officials as to who were the
qualified ex-officio Liga members in their
respective sangunians.[16] Pending the
appointment of the DILG as the Interim
Caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay by the
court and until the officers and board members
of the national Liga Chapter have been elected
and have assumed office, the Memorandum
Circular directed all provincial governors, vice
governors, city mayors, city vice mayors,

30

members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional
directors and other concerned officers, as
follows:
1. All concerned are directed not to recognize
and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the
Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as exofficio members of the sanggunian concerned
until further notice from the Courts or this
Department;
2. All concerned are directed to disregard any
pronouncement and/or directive issued by Mr.
Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the
affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until further
notice from the Courts or this Department.[17]
On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge
Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued the assailed
order,[18] the pertinent portions of which read,
thus:
The authority of the DILG to exercise general
supervisory jurisdiction over local government
units, including the different leagues created
under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) finds basis in Administrative Order No.
267 dated February 18, 1992. Specifically,
Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order
provides a broad premise for the supervisory
power of the DILG. Administratively, the DILGs
supervision has been tacitly recognized by the
local barangays, municipalities, cities and
provinces as shown by the evidences presented
by respondent David himself (See Annexes A
to C). The fact that the DILG has sought to
refer the matters therein to the National Liga
Board/Directorate does not ipso facto mean that
it has lost jurisdiction to act directly
therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and
cannot be claimed or lost through agreements
or inaction by individuals. What respondent
David may term as interference should
caretakership be allowed, this Court would
rather view as a necessary and desirable
corollary to the exercise of supervision.[19]

Political motivations must not preclude, hamper,

or obstruct the delivery of basic services and
the perquisites of public service. In this case,
the fact of confusion arising from conflicting
appointments, non-action, and uninformed or
wavering decisions of the incumbent National
Liga Board/Directorate, having been
satisfactorily established, cannot simply be
brushed aside as being politically motivated or
arising therefrom. It is incumbent, therefore,
that the DILG exercise a more active role in the
supervision of the affairs and operations of the
National Liga Board/ Directorate at least until
such time that the regular National Liga
Board/Directorate may have been elected,
qualified and assumed office.[20]
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Urgent Motion of the DILG for appointment as
interim caretaker, until such time that the
regularly elected National Liga Board of
Directors shall have qualified and assumed
office, to manage and administer the affairs of
the National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.
[21]

On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an

urgent motion for the reconsideration of the
assailed order and to declare respondent
Secretary Barbers in contempt of Court.
[22]
David claimed that the 04 August 1997 order
divested the duly elected members of the Board
of Directors of the Liga National Directorate of
their positions without due process of law. He
also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in
contempt for having issued, through his
Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. 97176, even before respondent judge issued the
questioned order, in mockery of the justice
system. He implied that Secretary Barbers
knew about respondent judges questioned
order even before it was promulgated.[23]
On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,[24] providing

supplemental guidelines for the 1997

synchronized elections of the provincial and
metropolitan chapters and for the election of the
national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized
elections for the provincial and metropolitan
chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the national
chapter on 06 September 1997.
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a
Certificate of Appointment[25] in favor of
respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng
mga Barangay of Caloocan City. The
appointment purportedly served as Rayoss
legal basis for ex-officio membership in
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City
and to qualify and participate in the forthcoming
National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga
Barangay.[26]
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the
synchronized elections of Provincial and
Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06
September 1997, the National Liga Chapter
held its election of officers and board of
directors, wherein James Marty L. Lim was
elected as President of the National Liga.[27]
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge
denied Davids motion for reconsideration,
[28]
ruling that there was no factual or legal basis
to reconsider the appointment of the DILG as
interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and
to cite Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.[29]
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Certiorari[30] under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public
respondent judges orders of 04 August 1997
and 01 October 1997. They dispute the latters
opinion on the power of supervision of the
President under the Constitution, through the
DILG over local governments, which is the
same as that of the DILGs as shown by its
application of the power on the Liga ng mga
Barangay. Specifically, they claim that the
public respondent judges designation of the

DILG as interim caretaker and the acts which

the DILG sought to implement pursuant to its
designation as such are beyond the scope of
the Chief Executives power of supervision.
To support the petition, petitioners argue that
under Administrative Order No. 267, Series of
1992, the power of general supervision of the
President over local government units does not
apply to the Liga and its various chapters
precisely because the Liga is not a local
government unit, contrary to the stance of the
respondents.[31]
Section 507 of the Local Government Code
(Republic Act No. 7160)[32] provides that
the Liga shall be governed by its own
Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners posit that
the duly elected officers and directors of the
National Liga elected in 1994 had a vested right
to their positions and could only be removed
therefrom for cause by affirmative vote of twothirds (2/3) of the entire membership pursuant
to the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not
by mere issuances of the DILG, even if
bolstered by the dubious authorization of
respondent judge.[33]Thus, petitioners claim that
the questioned order divested the then
incumbent officers and directors of the Liga of
their right to their respective offices without due
process of law.
Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under
the term local governments, over which the
President, through the DILG Secretary, has the
power of supervision,[34] petitioners point out that
still there is no legal or constitutional basis for
the appointment of the DILG as interim
caretaker.[35] They stress that the actions
contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker
go beyond supervision, as what it had sought
and obtained was authority to alter, modify,
nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga Board
of Directors and even to substitute its judgment
over that of the latter which are all clearly
one of control.[36] Petitioners question the

31

appointment of Rayos as Liga-Caloocan

President since at that time petitioner David was
occupying that position which was still the
subject of the quo warranto proceedings Rayos
himself had instituted.[37] Petitioners likewise
claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97193, providing supplemental guidelines for the
synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced the
implementing rules adopted by
the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and Bylaws.[38] In fact, even before its appointment as
interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all
heads of government units from recognizing
petitioner David and/or honoring any of his
pronouncements relating to the Liga.[39]
Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,
[40]
which, they claim, already passed upon the
extent of authority of the then Secretary of
Local Government over the katipunan ng mga
barangay or the barangay councils, as it
specifically ruled that the Secretary [of Local
Government] has no authority to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the election of officers of
the katipunan.[41]
For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since
the Secretary of the DILG supervises the acts of
local officials by ensuring that they act within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions
and since members of the various leagues,
such as the Liga in this case, are themselves
officials of local government units, it follows that
the Liga members are subject to the power of
supervision of the DILG.[42] He adds that as the
DILGs management and administration of
the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct
of the elections, its actions were consistent with
its rule-making power and power of supervision
under existing laws.[43] He asserts that in
assailing the appointment of the DILG as interim
caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision
of positive law in support of their stance. Thus,
he adds, if a law is silent, obscure or
insufficient, a judge may apply a rule he sees fit

to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen

is in harmony with general interest, order,
morals and public policy,[44] in consonance with
Article 9 of the Civil Code.[45]
On the other hand, it is quite significant that the
Solicitor General has shared petitioners
position. He states that the DILGs act of
managing and administering the affairs of the
National Liga Board are not merely acts of
supervision but plain manifestations of control
and direct takeover of the functions of the
National Liga Board,[46] going beyond the limits
of the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments.[47] Moreover,
while the Liga may be deemed a government
organization, it is not strictly a local government
unit over which the DILG has supervisory
power.[48]
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James
Marty L. Lim, the newly elected President of the
National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File
Comment in Intervention,[49] with his Comment
in Intervention attached,[50] invoking the validity
of the DILGs actions relative to the conduct of
the Liga elections.[51] In addition, he sought the
dismissal of the instant petition on the following
grounds: (1) the issue of validity or invalidity of
the questioned order has been rendered moot
and academic by the election of Liga officers;
(2) the turn-over of the administration and
management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers;
and (3) the recognition and acceptance by the
members of the Liga nationwide.[52]
In the interim, another petition, this time
for Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, [53] was filed by several
presidents of Liga Chapters, praying that this
Court declare the DILG Secretary and
Undersecretary are not vested with any
constitutional or legal power to exercise control
or even supervision over the National Liga ng
mga Barangay, nor to take over the functions of
its officers or suspend its constitution; and

declare void any and all acts committed by

respondents therein in connection with their
caretakership of the Liga.[54]The petition was
consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it was
eventually dismissed because the petitioners
failed to submit an affidavit of service and proof
of service of the petition.[55]
Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner
David died and was substituted by his legal
representatives.[56]
Petitioners have raised a number of issues.
[57]
Integrated and simplified, these issues boil
down to the question of whether or not
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing the DILG
as interim caretaker to administer and manage
the affairs of the National Liga Board, per its
order dated 04 August 1997.[58] In turn, the
resolution of the question of grave abuse of
discretion entails a couple of definitive issues,
namely: (1) whether the Liga ng mga
Barangay is a government organization that is
subject to the DILG Secretarys power of
supervision over local governments as the alter
ego of the President, and (2) whether the
respondent Judges designation of the DILG as
interim caretaker of the Liga has invested the
DILG with control over the Liga and whether
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, issued
before it was designated as
such interim caretaker, and DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-193 and other acts which the
DILG made in its capacity as interim caretaker
of the Liga, involve supervision or control of
the Liga.
However, the Court should first address the
question of mootness which intervenor Lim
raised because, according to him, during the
pendency of the present petition a general
election was held; the new set of officers and
directors had assumed their positions; and that
supervening events the DILG had turned-over
the management and administration of

the Liga to newLiga officers and directors.

[59]
Respondent Rayos has joined him in this
regard.[60] Forthwith, the Court declares that
these supervening events have not rendered
the instant petition moot, nor removed it from
the jurisdiction of this Court.
This case transcends the elections ordered and
conducted by the DILG as interim caretaker of
the Liga and the Liga officers and directors who
were elected to replace petitioner David and the
former officers. At the core of the petition is the
validity of the DILGs caretakership of
the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as
such caretaker which exceeded the bounds of
supervision and were exercise of control. At
stake in this case is the realization of the
constitutionally ensconced principle of local
government autonomy;[61] the statutory objective
to enhance the capabilities of barangays and
municipalities by providing them opportunities
to participate actively in the implementation of
national programs and projects;[62] and the
promotion of the avowed aim to ensure the
independence and non-partisanship of the Liga
ng mga Barangay. The mantle of local
autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an
empty buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and
unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of the local
governments are tolerated and left unchecked.
Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that
its territorial and political subdivisions should
enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals.[63] In the case of De Leon v.
Esguerra,[64] the Court ruled that even
barangays are meant to possess genuine and
meaningful local autonomy so that they may
develop fully as self-reliant communities.[65]
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet

32

evading review.[66] For the question of whether

the DILG may validly be appointed as interim
caretaker, or assume a similar position and
perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to
resurrect again, and yet the question may not
be decided before the actual assumption, or the
termination of said assumption even.
So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of
mootness could lead to the wrong impression
that the challenged order and issuances are
valid. Verily, that does not appear to be the
correct conclusion to make since by applying
opposite precedents to the issues the outcome
points to invalidating the assailed order and
memorandum circulars.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga
ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG
supervision, and whether the questioned
caretakership order of the respondent judge
and the challenged issuances and acts of the
DILG constitute control in derogation of the
Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of
the barangay, as the lowest LGU, and the Liga,
as a vehicle of governance and coordination.
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves
as the primary planning and implementing unit
of government policies, plans, programs,
projects and activities in the community, and as
a forum wherein the collective views of the
people may be expressed, crystallized and
considered, and where disputes may be
amicably settled.[67]
On the other hand, the Liga ng mga
Barangay[68] is the organization of all barangays,
the primary purpose of which is the
determination of the representation of
the Liga in thesanggunians, and the ventilation,
articulation, and crystallization of issues
affecting barangay government administration
and securing solutions thereto, through proper
and legal means.[69] The Liga ng mga
Barangay shall have chapters at the municipal,
city and provincial and metropolitan political

subdivision levels.[70] The municipal and city

chapters of the Liga are composed of
the barangay representatives from the
municipality or city concerned. The presidents
of the municipal and city chapters of
the Liga form the provincial or metropolitan
political subdivision chapters of the Liga. The
presidents of the chapters of the Liga in highly
urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro
Manila area and other metropolitan political
subdivisions constitute the National Liga ng
mga Barangay.[71]
As conceptualized in the Local Government
Code, the barangay is positioned to influence
and direct the development of the entire
country. This was heralded by the adoption of
the bottom-to-top approach process of
development which requires the development
plans of the barangay to be considered in the
development plans of the municipality, city or
province,[72]whose plans in turn are to be taken
into account by the central government[73] in its
plans for the development of the entire country.
[74]
The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this
new development approach materialize and
produce results.
The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city
and provincial levels, automatically become exofficio members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as
such only during their term of office as
presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no
case shall be beyond the term of office of
thesanggunian concerned.[75]
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal
aim, namely: to promote the development
of barangays and secure the general welfare of
their inhabitants.[76] In line with this, the Liga is
granted the following functions and duties:
a) Give priority to programs designed for the
total development of the barangays and in

consonance with the policies, programs and

projects of the national government;
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents
for peoples participation in local government
administration in order to promote untied and
concerted action to achieve country-wide
development goals;
c) Supplement the efforts of government in
creating gainful employment within the
barangay;
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of
barangay officials;
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to
forge linkages with government and nongovernmental organizations and thereby
promote the social, economic and political wellbeing of the barangays; and
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions which will bring about
stronger ties between barangays and promote
the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.[77]
The Ligas are primarily governed by the
provisions of the Local Government
Code. However, they are empowered to make
their own constitution and by-laws to govern
their operations. Sec. 507 of the Code provides:
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga
and the Leagues. - All other matters not herein
otherwise provided for affecting the internal
organization of the leagues of local government
units shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws which are hereby made
suppletory to the provision of this
Chapter:Provided, That said Constitution and
By-laws shall always conform to the provision of
the Constitution and existing laws.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code,
the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its own
Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the
corporate powers of the Liga, expressed or
implied, shall be vested in the board of directors
of each level of the Liga which shall:
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors
and committees of the said Liga; including the

power of appointment, assignment and

delegation;
b) Have general management of the business,
property, and funds of said Liga;
c) Prepare and approve a budget showing
anticipated receipts and expenditures for the
year, including the plans or schemes for funding
purposes; and
d) Have the power to suspend or remove from
office any officer or member of the said board
on grounds cited and in the manner provided in
hereinunder provisions.[78]
The National Liga Board of Directors
promulgated the rules for the conduct of
its Ligas general elections.[79] And, as early as
28 April 1997, the Liga National Chapter had
already scheduled its general elections on 14
June 1997.[80]
The controlling provision on the issues at hand
is Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, which
reads in part:
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
uniformly differentiate the Presidents power of
supervision over local governments and his
power of control of the executive departments
bureaus and offices.[81] Similar to the
counterpart provisions in the earlier
Constitutions, the provision in the 1987
Constitution provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.[82]
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,
[83]
this Court defined supervision as
overseeing, or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties, and to take such action as
prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and

33

to substitute the judgment of the former for that

of the latter.[84] In Taule v. Santos,[85] the Court
held that the Constitution permits the President
to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether a local government or its officers
perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments.[86] Supervisory power, when
contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body.
[87]

The case of Drilon v. Lim[88] clearly defined the

extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees
to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the
prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see that the
rules are followed[89]
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution
applicable to the Liga ng mga
Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally
susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v.
Fernandez,[90] where the Court ruled that the
Presidents power of the general supervision, as
exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as
hisalter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga
Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general
supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41,
Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled
that the liga ng mga barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation,
league or union created by law or by authority of
law, whose members are either appointed or
elected government officials. The Local

Government Code defines the liga ng mga

barangay as an organization of all barangays
for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians,
and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing
issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and
legal means, solutions thereto.[91]
The rationale for making the Liga subject to
DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from
the perspectives of logic or of
practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment
of barangays which are in turn represented
therein by their respective punong
barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit
in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city
and provincial sanggunians. As such, they
enjoy all the powers and discharge all the
functions of regular municipal councilors, city
councilors or provincial board members, as the
case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle
through which the barangay participates in the
enactment of ordinances and formulation of
policies at all the legislative local levels higher
than the sangguniang barangay, at the same
time serving as the mechanism for the bottomto-top approach of development.
In the case at bar, even before the respondent
Judge designated the DILG as interim caretaker
of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing
local government officials not to recognize
David as the National Liga President and his
pronouncements relating to the affairs of
the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it
even smacked of superciliousness and
injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost
government agency which maintains
coordination with, and exercises supervision
over local government units and its multi-level
leagues. As such, it should be forthright,
circumspect and supportive in its dealings with
the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga

Barangay. The indispensable role played by

the latter in the development of the
barangays and the promotion of the welfare of
the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the
full support and respect of the other agencies
of government. As the Court held in the case
of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,[92] our
national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon
which these provisions are based.[93]
When the respondent judge eventually
appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to
manage and administer the affairs of
the Liga, she effectively removed the
management from the National Liga Board and
vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a
cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for
appointment as interim caretaker of
the Liga to manage and administer the
affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new
set of National Liga officers shall have been
duly elected and assumed office reveals that
what the DILG wanted was to take control over
the Liga. Even if said caretakership was
contemplated to last for a limited time, or only
until a new set of officers assume office, the fact
remains that it was a conferment of control in
derogation of the Constitution.
With his Department already appointed as
interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers
nullified the results of the Liga elections and
promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No.
97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid
down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997
synchronized elections of the provincial and
metropolitan chapters and for the election of the
national chapter of the Liga ng mga
Barangay; scheduled dates for the new
provincial, metropolitan and national chapter
elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as
president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.

These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere

of general supervision and constituted direct
interference with the political affairs, not only of
the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay
as an institution. The election of Liga officers is
part of the Ligas internal organization, for which
the latter has already provided guidelines. In
succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and
jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued
supplemental guidelines for the election, and
nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted
elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was
the power of control which even the President
does not have.
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it
appointed respondent Rayos as president of
the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly
scheduled general Liga elections, although
petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The
DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos,
over the choice of majority of the punong
barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent
President, petitioner David. The latter was
elected and had in fact been sitting as an exofficio member of the sangguniang
panlungsod in accordance with
the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the
DILG extended the appointment to respondent
Rayos although it was aware that the position
was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding
instituted by Rayos himself, thereby preempting
the outcome of that case. It was bad enough
that the DILG assumed the power of control, it
was worse when it made use of the power with
evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over
the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs authority
over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the

34

rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such

rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to
modify or replace them. In this particular case,
the most that the DILG could do was review the
acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the
conduct of the elections to determine if they
committed any violation of the Ligas
Constitution and By-laws and its implementing
rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers
had violatedLiga rules, the DILG should have
ordered the Liga to conduct another election in
accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in
obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither
had the DILG the authority to remove the
incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them,
even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
Like the local government units, the Liga ng
mga Barangay is not subject to control by the
Chief Executive or his alter ego.
In the Bito-Onon[94] case, this Court held that
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar
as it authorized the filing of a petition for review
of the decision of the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a
post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the
exercise of control as it in effect amended the
guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. The
decision reads in part:
xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is
discretionary on his part to order the act undone
or redone by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. Supervising officers
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done to conform for to

the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his

own manner the doing of the act.
xxx
xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is
more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of
control, which the President does not have over
the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power
to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its
authority to merely monitoring compliance by
local government units of such issuances. To
monitor means to watch, observe or check and
is compatible with the power of supervision of
the DILG Secretary over local governments,
which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the
power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with
local affairs should be resolved in favor of the
greater autonomy of the local government.[95]
In Taule,[96] the Court ruled that the Secretary of
Local Government had no authority to pass
upon the validity or regularity of the election of
officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or
barangay councils. In that case, a protest was
lodged before the Secretary of Local
Government regarding several irregularities in,
and seeking the nullification of, the election of
officers of the Federation of Associations of
Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes.
Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos
issued a resolution nullifying the election of
officers and ordered a new one to be
conducted. The Court ruled:
Construing the constitutional limitation on the
power of general supervision of the President
over local governments, We hold that

respondent Secretary has no authority to pass

upon the validity or regularity of the officers of
the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary
to do so will give him more power than the law
or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give
him control over local government officials for it
will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at
strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved. In fact, his order that the new
elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct
interference by the Department with the political
affairs of the barangays which is not permitted
by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments.[97]
All given, the Court is convinced that the
assailed order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion while the acts of the respondent
Secretary, including DILG Memorandum
Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are
unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all
entailed the conferment or exercise of control
a power which is denied by the Constitution
even to the President.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum Circulars No.
97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for
being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.