SPEC PRO

FULL TEXT
GUARDIANSHIP

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184528

April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,

vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA." The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order 3 dated September 27, 2006 and
the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City,
Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for
guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition
for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father,
the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to
Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1,
2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident
after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had
lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due
to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and

has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma.
Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing,
and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her
report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3,
2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his
sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case.
The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant
leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. 5 (Citations
omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish
that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED. 6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide
sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent
to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order
dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. 7

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed
through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED. 8
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED
UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP9
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be
set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous
decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by
him showing respondents incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the
following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his
own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control,
guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is
proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care
of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,
positive and definite evidence."12 We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must
be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his
stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a
loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had
substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and
management;
d. The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner
and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that
the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold,
respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned
from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his
daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself
upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and
furniture, despite protests from his children.14
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material
evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In
fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is
indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said
document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent in his
Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in
conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in
a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was
able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs
using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x
x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to
problem situations. x x x.17
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming
interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who
admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and
instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of
evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties
registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts
showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to
his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is
the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the
view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
persons state of mental sanity will suffice."18
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted
the fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise,
the trial court made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states
that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is
still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance of questions of fact in
certain exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also
long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and
respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and
rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes
a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as
he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought."241wphi1
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship
without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a
demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant
from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109557

November 29, 2000

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying reconsideration2 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring
void the special proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L.
Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the
approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter
and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business and medical
expenses of her incapacitated husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the one hand, against
his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda
Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft
of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about
to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the
R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter
of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently
administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real
and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.
It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent
Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed that in the
meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated
to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio
Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition
docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding
the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration
of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L.
Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for
intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her
desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her
husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several
hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property,
specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to
sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an Order (Annex "C")
finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the
hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by

therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered its Decision (Annex
"D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the
improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and
Hospitalization. The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.
Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x
x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13, 1991, the Court
hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated and unable to
participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in
Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L.
Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the proceedings
before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that
a decision has already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He
propounded the argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted
in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code.
It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other
hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted by summary proceedings, there was still
a failure to comply with the basic requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691
a defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had
acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced
without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties through mere

summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be
consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements
thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve to
Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also
pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of
sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had
other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash,
Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can be off-set against the cost of
medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said
hospital which allows him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s
attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement to his motion for
reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly
applied. He also noted that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family
Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which
contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were
one spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made to
apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot
No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them
(p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of
sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until
the final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the
sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would
have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court, who had penned the
decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in
this case (Annex "I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration and approving respondent Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of
absolute sale. The said court ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through

counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del
Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed the
procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her
decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor" Teodor L. Jardeleza does
not have the personality to oppose the instant petition considering that the property or properties,
subject of the petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda
Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L. Jardeleza, is hereby
denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among others, authorized Gilda
L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the
building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale,
executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma.
Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is
directed to register the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the appealed
decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale,
which was also declared void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,6 however, on March 29, 1993,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the
decision.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental
faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel
of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in
a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of
eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on
summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr.
Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness

that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of
the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as
a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the
spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot
be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular
accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. 9 In such
case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to
the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole
powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. 10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians
under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Court.1wphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision
rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by

this Court is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch
of the government the impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio
and may be attacked directly or collaterally.12 "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a
result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." 13 "A void decision may be assailed or
impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting
such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." 14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936,
in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all
surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamed
LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon 1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less,
situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca,
Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, 2 who thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was

their contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court on June 2,
1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship
proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and
Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question, 3 intervened in such
action. In the lower court decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion
of the property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void insofar as they were
concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the
three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery and
Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the
deed of sale executed by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon
as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the children demanding from their mother
their participation in the amount paid for the sale of such property. It thus ignored the grave
jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting with the two elder children not
being notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as pointed out and
stressed in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective power of this
Court. The original decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights
of the children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court,
there is a corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So we decide.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After hearing the
evidence, the lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship
proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the minors who were not notified
of the petition, at least 2 of them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the
guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the real
property of the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of the
requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant, Martin S.
Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of the land
belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not
sign the deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest
relatives, the third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not
prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party
complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of the
land in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla,
1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to their
children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares." 4
Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this way: "It is
unquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his three
sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino, that
is, on December 6, 1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was
executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda and married to Bienvenida de
la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely
acquired the participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said land, and became a

co-owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said document and, therefore,did not sell
her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed, upon her demise in
1952, to her nearest relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica,
Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased sister,
Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this purchase made
by her deceased husband, and she had no right to mortgage the whole land which, for taxation
purposes was declared in her husband's name, without the consent of aforenamed successors-ininterest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to the defendant spouses, Martin S.
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship court, said authority having
been granted upon her misrepresentation, contained in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her minor
children, the plaintiff's herein, were the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the
other 1/2 pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the owners in
common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other 1/2, to their mother and guardian,
the orders of the guardianship court authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the minors,
and approving the deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority must be construed as
referring to the correct real property of the said minors." 5
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed judgment is hereby
modified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the
defendants valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to
which portion, the defendants are declared owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario,
Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed Lorenzo, are declared
owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In all other respects, the
appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs." 6
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo
and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being satisfied with the above decision instituted the
petitions for review. As noted at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due
weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in its
judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio
Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower
court decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any infirmity.
1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was the lower court and
not the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is
worded thus: "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of
age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." 8
The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These are his words:
"Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." 9
The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a 1915
decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need for interpretation or construction of the word

in the case before us. Its meaning is so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary.
Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning with which the English language has endowed
the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would accord to it on reading a
sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as
to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful.
That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the
unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and
contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what
the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it
has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction.' " 11
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption that the probate court
could have authorized the sale in question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be
overcome. It was the lower court that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do
considering that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is
quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its solicitude is made manifest.
The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every
procedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have a claim could
be adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811, in
Salunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an
"interest opposed to that of her children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in this
case, but certainly from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have
been better protected if they were notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then why
there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they
have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It
cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether
that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves." 14
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals
as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer 15 being entitled to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo
ever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity of trustee for them. At the time then
that the settlement of his estate was pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla,
the vendor, could not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late husband. Respondent

Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a member of the bar, he could
not have been unaware that his vendor could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose
of. It is much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee being
incapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced in Severino v.
Severino. 16 That is in conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and conscience. He
should thus be held to the strictest degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open to welldeserved criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery spouses ought to be
aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its authoritative force whenever called for.
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its inapplicability by the two
principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back
as 1943 and that even if it were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face of such
alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded from inquiring into their
veracity as on such a matter what was decided by respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us.
Moreover, as to the alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court in
this fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because from
the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3,
1958, barely six years had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence that
Leoncio Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open
possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion corresponding to Silvestra
Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive prescription." 17 Consequently, it was appropriate for the
Court of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights of the
heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto,
Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the
three-fourths of the property in question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio,
JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45622

May 5, 1939

JUAN GOROSTIAGA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUELA SARTE, defendant-appellant.

Calleja and Sierra for appellant.

Bonto and Gutierrez Lora for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
On May 27, 1936, Juan Gorostiaga, plaintiff-appellee, institutes an action against Manuela Sarte to
recover the sum of P2,285.51. An answer was filed by Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater in the name of
the defendant, wherein a general denial was made, and several defenses interposed, among them,
that the defendant was physically and mentally incompetent to manage her estate. At the trial, the
defendant did not appear in court and her non-appearance had no been accounted for. On
September 21, 1996, judgment was rendered sentencing the defendant to pay the amount claimed.
On December 23, 1936, a motion under section 113 of Act No. 190 was filed by the general guardian
of the defendant, praying that all the proceedings had against the defendant be declared null and
void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The motion was denied; hence, this appeal.
There is no question about the facts. On May 18, 1936, that is, nine days prior to the institution of the
action against the defendant, a petition for guardianship was filed with the lower court in favor of the
defendant, on the ground that she was incompetent to manage her estate by reason of her physical
and mental incapacity. After hearing the petition, wherein the depositions of alienists were presented,
the court issued an order declaring that the defendant Manuela Sarte "se halla ficica y mentalmente
incacitada para administrar sus bienes poe razon de debelidad senil, cuya inteligencia si bien le
permite sostener una conversacion por algunos minutos de una manera satisfactoria, no tiene la
consistencia necesaria para atender a sus necesidas y administrar sus propios bienes."
Although this order was issued on December 3, 1936, it relates to the incapacity alleged in the
petition of May 18, 1936. Consequently, the incapacity thus declared existed at least at the date of
the filing of the petition, that is, on May 18, 1936, nine days prior to the institution of the action in the
present case. In fact, according to the evidence relied upon by the lower court, the defendant was
incompetent to manage her affairs for about two or three years prior to her examination by the
alienists. It appears thus clear that during all the proceedings in the case at bar, from the time of the
filing of the complaint to the rendition of the judgment, the defendant was physically and mentally
unfit to manage her affairs, and there having been no summons and notices of the proceedings
served her and her guardian, because no guardian was then appointed for her, the court trying the
action acquired no jurisdiction over her person (sec. 396, No. 4, of Act No. 190).
It is argued that Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater appeared for the defendant in the case and filed an
answer in her behalf and that the attorney's authority is presumed as well as the capacity of the
defendant giving the authority. But this presumption is disputable and it is here entirely rebutted by
no less than an order of the same court declaring the defendant physically and mentally unfit to
manage her estate since at least May 18, 1936. If the defendant was thus incompetent, she could
not have validly authorized the attorney to represent her. And if the authority was given by her
relatives, it was not sufficient except to show the attorney's good faith in appearing in the case.
It is contended that the issue as to the incapacity of the defendant was pleaded in defendant's
answer and was squarely decided and that therefore it cannot be reopened unless on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. That answer was, however, filed by an attorney not validly authorized to
appear for the defendant who had never been in court except when her guardian filed a motion to
quash all the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In matters of this kind, affecting the jurisdiction of
the court and the validity of all proceedings, the court, instead of observing a passive attitude, should
take the initiative of, and exercise utmost care in, ascertaining the facts. And although the evidence
gathered at the trial is insufficient, if, after judgment, the lack of jurisdiction is clearly shown, and
there has been no waiver thereof, as in this case where a waiver could not have been possible, it is

the duty of the court to set aside all the proceedings, take the necessary steps to acquire jurisdiction,
and grant a new trial. The position taken by the lower court in this case can hardly be reconciled with
its position in the guardianship proceedings.
Appellee contends that in the motion filed by the guardian under section 113 there is no showing of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negligence as grounds for relief provided therein. It is,
however, more than a surprise to the defendant that she be tried and sentenced without valid
summons or notice. And as to the affidavits of merit required to be attached to a motion under
section 113, they are not necessary, as we have already held, where the court acted without
jurisdiction over the defendant's person. (Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446.)
Judgment is reversed, all the proceedings had in the lower court are hereby declared null and void,
and the case is remanded to the court below for new trial after the guardian making him a party
defendant. With costs against appellee.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27962

February 14, 1928

VICENTE G. SINCO, PILAR G. SINCO, assisted by her husband

JOSE E. ROMERO, and MARIA DESAMPARADOS G. SINCO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
AGAPITO LONGA and AGUEDA LONGA, assisted by her husband
MANUEL TEVEZ, defendants-appellants.

Del Rosario & Del Rosario and DeWitt, Perkins & Brady for appellants.
Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado & Recto, Manuel Briones, Vicente G. Sinco and Jose E. Romero for
appellees.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted on July 16, 1926, in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros by
Vicente G. Sinco, Pilar G. Sinco, and Maria Desemparados G. Sinco with whom is joined Jose E.
Romero, as husband of Pilar G. Sinco, against Agapito Longa and Agueda Longa, with whom is
joined the latter's husband, Manuel Tevez, for the purpose of annulling a sale of an undivided third
interest formerly pertaining to the three first-named plaintiffs in the hacienda Rosario, situated in the
municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, said sale having been effected with judicial approval in
November, 1910, by the then guardian of said plaintiffs, one Emilio Tevez, and for the purpose of
compelling the defendants, who are now the registered owners of said hacienda, to convey to the
plaintiffs the undivided third of the hacienda claimed by the plaintiffs, or in default thereof to pay the
just value of the same property, and in either case to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P160,000, with lawful interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs.
Upon hearing the cause the trial judge resolved the controversy in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered
a division of the hacienda into three equal parts one of which should be delivered to the plaintiffs. He
also ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P2,000, as a third part of the
estimated value of machinery and improvements on the hacienda at the time of the sale, and further
ordered that the defendants deliver to the plaintiffs certain live-stock, or its equivalent in money to
the extent of P833.33, and to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P71,162.08 as indemnization for the
produce harvested by the defendants from the plaintiffs' third of the land since the sale referred to
was consummated. From this judgment the defendants appealed.
It appears that the hacienda Rosario was originally owned by Don Rafael Sinco y Librado, the
plaintiffs great grandfather, from whom, it passed to his son Escolastico G. Sinco who died prior to
1901, probably during the troubled period of the Filipino revolution under the Spanish regime.
Escolastico G. Sinco left a widow, Saturnina Lopez, and three children, namely, Sergio, Maria Paz,
and Coloma Sinco. Of these Sergio and Maria Paz are still living, but Coloma died in 1904, leaving
the three children who are the plaintiffs in the present case, namely, Vicente, Pilar, and
Desemparados.
The estate off Escolastico G. Sinco appears to have been encumbered with debts to the extent of
some P14,000; and in order to liquidate this indebtedness, the widow and the three children, in the
year 1901, leased the property for seven years at an annual rental of P3,000 to Agapito Longa and
Trinidad Diago, widow, with the understanding that the lessees would assume the indebtedness then
existing against the estate and apply the rent due under the lease to the satisfaction of said
indebtedness until it should be completely paid. In July, 1903, the seven-year lease was extended by
the same parties at the same stipulated rent for a further period of two years. On October 7, 1907,
the same lessors, with the exception of Coloma, who had died in 1904, entered into an agreement
with the Longas for a further extension of the lease for one year. This contract also called for P3,000
as rent for the additional year, and of this amount the sum of P1,500 was advanced to meet pressing
needs of the lessors. In August, 1909, Saturnina Lopez died, and she is supposed to have left a will
acknowledging an encumbrance to the extent of P3,000 on the hacienda Rosario in favor of her
three grandchildren, the present plaintiffs. Proceedings for the probate of this will were at one time
contemplated or begun but were subsequently abandoned. Sergio and Maria Paz, uncle and aunt of
the plaintiffs, appear to have questioned the right of their nephew and nieces, the present plaintiffs,
as heirs to the share of their mother Coloma, but in the end the claims of the three children
maintained and the opposition on the part of uncle and aunt subsided. Nothing more was done in the

matter of enforcing their claim to the P3,000 mentioned in the will of their grandmother. Part
explanation of this may possibly be found in the fact that the hacienda in question had been the
separate property of Escolastico G. Sinco, and the widow's share therein was less than it would
have been had the property been of a ganancial character between her and her deceased husband.
After the death of Saturnina Lopez, her son Sergio Sinco was hard pressed for money to sustain a
numerous family, and he proposed to Agapito Longa to sell to the latter his one-third undivided
interest in the hacienda. Longa appears at first to have taken languid interest in the suggestion and
told Sergio that the guardian of the three children would have to be consulted. Finally, Longa, in
conjunction with his kinswoman, Trinidad Diago, widow of Mateo Longa, agreed to buy the property
if Maria Paz, the sister of Sergio, would join in selling her share, it being understood furthermore that
the part of the three minors would also be sold by the guardian, upon the approval of the sale by the
court. The assent of Maria Paz and her husband, Tiburcio Chavez, having been obtained to this
suggestion, steps were taken for the consummation of the sale. One reason why the Longas insisted
in acquiring the whole undivided interest in the property, instead of the undivided third of Sergio, was
that he was Longas looked to the Tabacalera Company for funds to purchase the property, and this
entity was averse to lending its money upon the security of an undivided third in the property. As
regards the sale of the portions pertaining to Sergio and Maria Paz the transaction was
consummated in February, 1910, while as regards the interest of the minors the sale was not
consummated until November 17, 1910, owing to the fact that the approval of the court to the sale
was not obtained until immediately before said date.
The deed of sale (Exhibit 1) executed in favor of the Longas by Sergio Sinco and his sister, Maria
Paz, bears date of February 12, 1910, For the purposes of said conveyance it is therein declared
that the hacienda, with its improvements, is valued at P23,600; and since the two grantors were
respectively conveying only their undivided thirds, the consideration of the conveyance was declared
to be two-thirds of the above-mentioned sum, or P15,733.32, which is acknowledged to have been
received by the grantors.
On the same date a number of other documents were executed by Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz
which have a bearing upon the principal transaction. Among these we note a contract by which
Sergio and Maria Paz agree to sell the remaining one-third of the hacienda to the Longas in case it
should be judicially determined that they are the owners of said third. This instrument of course has
reference to the controversy between Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz Sinco on the one hand and their
minor nephew and nieces on the other, with respect to the right of the minors to inherit the undivided
third of the hacienda which had pertained to their mother Coloma (Exhibit G). In another document
the same grantors (Sergio and Maria Paz) enter into an undertaking with the Longas to the effect
that the undivided two-thirds sold by them to the Longas as already started shall not be adversely
affected by any judicial decision which might be reached with respect to the title of the hacienda
(Exhibit A). In still another document, Sergio Sinco and Maria Sinco guarantee that they will
interpose no obstacle to the sale of the remaining third part of the hacienda, in case the court should
decide that the minor children of Coloma Sinco are owners of the same, and they agree to answer in
damages for breach of this guaranty (annotation 335, Exhibit C).
In addition to the foregoing documents the Longas issued two receipts (Exhibits H and I), which
cannot be understood without reference to certain past financial occurrences between the Sincos
and the Longas which have not as yet been mentioned. After Coloma had died but while her mother,
Saturnina Lopez, was still living, the latter united with her son Sergio and daughter Maria Paz in the
execution of a mortgage on the hacienda Rosario in favor of Trinidad Diago, widow of Mateo Longa,
to secure a sum of money, and on February 3, 1909, the court authorized Emilio, Tevez, guardian of
the minors, to join in said instrument, thereby binding the plaintiffs' share to the extent of said

mortgage. At the time the mortgage amounted to P8,800, and the debt bore interest at the rate of 10
per cent per annum.
After the death of Saturnina Lopez, her son Sergio fell into embarassed circumstances; and since he
could not look to the hacienda Rosario for means of support, owing to the fact that the rent was tied
up for years ahead, he was driven to borrow money from Agapito Longa. As lessee of the hacienda
Longa doubtless looked ahead, and he must have considered his advances to Sergio Sinco safe, as
he probably counted upon future extensions of the lease to recover such indebtedness. The amount
of these advances was apparently considerable as may be inferred from the first of two receipts
executed by Agapito Longa on February 12, 1910, or contemporaneously with the sale to the Longas
of the interests of Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz in the hacienda. In the document now referred to
(Exhibit H) Agapito Longa acknowledges having received from the Sincos the sum of P10,000 owing
to him by reason of the cancellation of a lease of the hacienda Rosario extending to 1915. The
language of this document is doubtless intentionally obscure, but the insinuation is that the mother
(Saturnina Lopez) and her three children had made a lease of the hacienda until 1915 for the
purpose of securing an indebtedness. The only actual lease of the hacienda known to this record is
that executed first in 1901 for the period of seven years and later extended for the additional periods
of two and one year, as already mentioned in this opinion. The suggestion in Exhibit H that a lease of
the hacienda had been made for the period from 1911 to 1915 thus appears to be false; but it is of
course possible that the grantors of the supposed lease may have had some sort of understanding
with Longa that his advances would be secured in this way. Such an agreement, if made, was of
course not binding upon the minors. The Exhibit H accordingly states that the sum of P10,000
therein mentioned had been paid by Sergio and Maria Paz exclusively. It is then declared that, in so
far as they were concerned, the contract of lease was cancelled for the future. But as to the other
third it was stated to be still encumbered by said lease and would so remain until the conflicting
claims between the two Sincos and the minors should be adjusted. Meanwhile the part of the rent
pertaining to said undivided third of the uncancelled portion of the lease was to be left with Longa for
future delivery to the person to whom it might lawfully belong. It was further stipulated that if Sergio
and his sister should win in the controversy, Longa would pay them the sum of P7,333.33 for said
undivided third and that they in turn would pay the proportionate part of the mortgage encumbering
the same.
In the other receipt (Exhibit I) Agapito Longa as attorney-in-fact of Trinidad Diago, acknowledged that
he had received from Sergio Sinco and Maria Paz Sinco the sum of P7,333.33 in full payment of the
two-thirds part of the mortgage encumbering the hacienda. From this it will be seen that the amount
of the mortgage was then estimated at P11,000, a sum somewhat in excess of the amount which
would have been due had the principal truly been P8,800, as elsewhere stated in this opinion, with
interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. The payment of this P7,333.33 left, so the receipt
states, leaves a mortgage for P3,666.66 upon the undivided third pertaining to the minors.
The documents above mentioned completed the sale, of the hacienda Rosario, in so far as relates to
the interest of Sergio Sinco and his sister Maria Paz. In order to accomplish the transfer of the
remaining third it was necessary to obtain a deed from the guardian, Emilio Tevez; and to this end a
petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros by the guardian on November 7,
1910. Among the substantial recitals of this petition we note the presence of the following
statements, namely, first, that the undivided interest of the minors was encumbered by its
proportional share of the mortgage for P8,800, with interest at 10 per cent; secondly, that in addition
to said mortgage, the hacienda was rented to Agapito Longa as far into the future as 1915 and that
the rent up to that date had been received by the predecessor in interest of the minors and the
coowners, to the extent of P11,900, with the result that the estate was encumbered, by the obligation
just mentioned and that of the mortgage, to the extent of P21,000; thirdly, that Saturnina Lopez,
grandmother of the minors, died intestate in the municipality of Bais, Oriental Negros, in the month of
August 1909, and that the minors had inherited from her and their father an undivided third interest

in the hacienda; fourthly, that the true value of the hacienda is P33,600 and that after deducting the
encumbrances chargeable to the property, there would remain a balance of P12,600, of which onethird, or P4,200 would belong to the minors; fifthly, that in view of the fact that interest on the
indebtedness was increasing and of the further fact that the owners could not themselves cultivate
the property, owing to lack of capital, the two adult owners had decided to sell the part of the
hacienda pertaining to them, and had in fact sold the same, for the sum of P22,400 leaving the share
of the minors untouched; sixthly, that the minors have no cash assets to meet their subsistence and
education and that one of them was in fact then being maintained in Silliman Institute by one of his
kinsmen; and seventhly, that it is convenient and in the interest of the minors to sell the part of the
hacienda pertaining to them on the basis of a valuation of P33,600 in order to free said share from
the mortgage and rent encumbrance, and that thereby the minors would obtain a liquid capital which
would be put out at interest in order to take care of their education and subsistence.
On November 16, 1910, or nine days after the filing of the application, the court issued its order
authorizing the guardian to make the sale as requested; and on the next day a deed of conveyance
was executed by the guardian in favor of the Longas (Exhibit 2). The order authorizing this sale
recites that Sergio Sinco, Maria Paz Sinco, and the latter's husband, Tiburcio Chavez, coowners of
the property and next of kin of the minors, had appeared before the court and ratified the facts
alleged by the guardian, and stated that it would be in the interest of the minors that the sale be
made. It is also stated therein that Vicente Sinco, the elder of the three minors, he being then 16
years of age, had appeared and testified in similar terms. Vicente Sinco, it may here be stated,
admits that he was brought into court from the Silliman Institute, which he was then attending, and
that he was asked some questions in which he took title interest and about which he had less
knowledge, relative to the property and his situation.
It should be stated that all the records of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros were
destroyed by fire, after the order above-mentioned was made and only fragmentary portions of the
proceedings in the guardianship have been subsequently collected, fortunately a copy of the petition
and the decree.
A little reflection upon the foregoing incident is suggestive to the effect that the rights of the present
plaintiffs, then minors were really in a dangerous position, since no one intervened in the transaction
who could have had any real and unbiased interest in protecting them. Sergio Sinco was being
urged by his supposed necessities to sell his own share in the property, a purpose that could only be
consummated by his attaining a sale of the whole. The Longas were of course interested in securing
the property since they would thereby collect the mortgage of Trinidad Diago and the advances that
had been made to Sergio and probably his sister Maria Paz. If we may accept the statements of
Sergio Sinco, even the guardian, Emilio Tevez, was not a disinterested protector, since he is said to
have been anxious to get the minors' share in cash into his hands in order to meet some urgent
claims against himself; and it is fact that after he had obtained the money, he applied it to his own
uses, instead of lending it upon interest to some third person. But he appears to have been solvent,
and the money thus retained was paid out of the estate of Tevez to another guardian of the minors
after Tevez had died.
The statements in the petition for leave to sell the property are untrue uncandid in more than one
particular as may discovered by comparing the statements contained in said petition with the data
already supplied in this opinion. In particular, the petition erred in exaggerating the necessities of the
minors, for they had inherited other property from which subsistence for them could be obtained. In
fact they got along in the succeeding years without any help from what had been obtained in the sale
now in question. In the light of the proof before us it seems undeniable that the sale was unwise and
was accomplished to some extent without a fair and true exposition to the court of the actual
situation. But it must be remembered in this connection that the shares of the elder owners were

sacrificed by adults in the full possession of their powers, and we see no reason to doubt why Maria
Paz Sinco at least and her husband, Tiburcio Chavez, should not be considered competent to deal
for themselves in this matter. Years after this sale was effected the Bais Sugar Central was
established in the neighborhood of the hacienda Rosario and the values of agricultural property in
this section then increased enormously. In the light of these events anyone case see that the sale of
the minors' share was unwise in the extreme. Indeed, from a perusal of the testimony of Sergio
Sinco, in connection with the documents above referred to, it is not difficult to conclude that sinister
forces were at work against the true interest of the minors in bringing about this sale, and for the
purposes of this decision it may be admitted that there was an imposition on the court, and that the
sale may have been tainted by fraud.
We are of the opinion, however, after a careful study of the documents, in connection with the
testimony of Sergio Sinco, that this fraud, if fraud it be, has not been brought home to the Longas.
The plaintiffs place much emphasis upon the notarial annotation 335, of Exhibit C, wherein Sergio
Sinco and Maria Paz Sinco (in conjunction with her husband Tiburcio Chavez) agreed to interpose
no obstacle to the sale of the share of the minors in the hacienda Rosario. From it is argued that the
purpose of Agapito Longa in securing this document was to tie the hands of the uncle and aunt of
the minors who were the very persons who should, in contemplation of law, be looked to for advice
with respect to the interest of the minors, and that this act was preparatory to the carrying into effect
of the conspiracy by which the Longas would obtain the children's share of the hacienda. But the
name of Longa does not appear in annotation 335 as that of the person in whose favor the
instrument was executed. It may be true, as stated by Sergio Sinco, that said instrument may have
been made at Longa's request; but it looks very much as if it might have been made by anxious
sellers angling for any purchaser who could be induced to take the property off of their hands. The
testimony of Sergio Sinco is rambling and confused, as might perhaps be expected from a person
testifying about acts that had occurred nearly seventeen years previously of which he had become
heartily ashamed. His insinuation that the sale was obtained by fraudulent conspiracy instigated by
the Longas cannot be accepted as the true interpretation of the transaction. The real source of
danger to the children in those days, it must be remembered, was the attitude of their uncle and
aunt, who had steadily opposed the claim of the children to share in the hacienda and who were only
too anxious to be rid of all connection with the property.
In passing upon controversies of this character experience teaches the danger of accepting lightly
charges of fraud made many years after the transaction in question was accomplished, when death
may have sealed the lips of the principal actors and changes effected by time may have given a
totally different color to the cause of controversy. In the case before us the guardian, Emilio Tevez, is
dead. The same is true of Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendant Agueda Longa; while Agapito
Longa is now living in Spain. It will be borne in mind also that, in so far as oral proof is concerned,
the charge of fraud rests principally of the testimony of a single witness who, if fraud was committed,
was a participant therein and who naturally would now be anxious so far as practicable, to put the
blame on others. In this connection it is well to bear in mind the following impressive language of Mr.
Justice Story:
* * * But lenght of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes
from the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it
operates by way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It
would be unreasonable, after a great lenght of time, to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty,
real or apparent, with which it may be incumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in
such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human infirmity, is that
the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are
dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements the most that we can hope
is to arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact

knowledge. Fraud, or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the
legal presumption is the other way; and as to the dead, who are not here to answer for
themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate
the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U. S.], 481, 498.)
The attorneys for the appellees criticize the order of the court of November 16, 1910, authorizing the
sale of the share of the minors in the hacienda as irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
We are unable to concur in this view. The petition presented by the guardian stated a case, we think,
for a sale of a portion of the guardianship estate for reinvestment, as contemplated in section 569 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it was clearly set forth that the income of the children's
property was insufficient property to maintain and educate them and that it was for their benefit that
their share should be sold. It was also therein stated that the property was encumbered. Admitting
that these statements of the petition were untrue the jurisdiction of the court to authorize the sale
was not thereby affected, because the jurisdiction of the court rests on the averments of the petition
and not upon the truth of those averments (28 C. J., 1178; Scott vs. Gypsy Oil Co., 112 Okla., 13;
239 Pac., 887). The suggestion that the order was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court
because publication was not made over the whole period required by law losses its force in view of
the fact that the next of kin of the minors are stated in the order to have personally appeared in
court.
In the view we take of the decisive points above discussed it becomes unnecessarily to consider the
bearing of the statute of limitations on the right of action in this case and certain other important
questions that would have acquired solution if the plaintiffs' right of action against the purchasers
had been considered to have been established.
The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendants absolved from the complaint. It is
so ordered, without costs.
Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real JJ., concur.

SPEC PRO
FULL TEXT
TRUSTEES

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 46390

September 30, 1939

Testate estate of Petrona Francisco, deceased. CASIMIRO TIANGCO and MARIA TIANGCO,
fiduciaries-appellants,
vs.
PROCESO FRANCISCO, petitioner-appellee.
Ortega and Ortega for appellant.
Clemente E. Felix for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
Petrona Francisco provided in her last will that the income derived from the one-half portion of her
fishpond in the barrio of Gasak, Navotas, Rizal, shall be devoted to the celebration of the "Flores de
Mayo" in Malabon, Rizal, and for other religious activities mentioned in the will. Upon probate of the
will the Court of First Instance of Rizal appointed Casimiro Tiangco as trustee. Shortly afterwards, on
March 16, 1922, Maria Tiangco was also appointed co-trustee to act with Casimiro Tiangco in
supervising the affairs of the trust. The records of the case disclose that from the beginning the
submission of annual reports to the court was very irregular. When the accounts for the year 1935
were submitted, Proceso Francisco, the herein oppositor-appellee, filed an opposition. Meanwhile,
the court appointed the clerk of court as commissioner to make a detailed examination of the
accounts already submitted, and declared its order of January 30, 1937, approving the said accounts
over the objection of Proceso Francisco, of no legal force and effect. The trustees entered an
opposition to this decree. Upon the other hand, the oppositor-appellee, on March 22, 1937,
requested for the temporary substitution of the trustees. The report for the year 1936 having been
filed on April 13, 1937, an order for the joint hearing of the two annual accounts was issued. Again,
Proceso Francisco made several objections to the accounts for the year 1936 with reference to
certain items. In the meantime, the clerk of court submitted his report. On April 26, 1938, the court
issued the following order requiring the resignation of the trustees within ten days, and appointed
Father L.R. Arcaira as temporary trustee:
It appearing from the evidence submitted by the commissioner, regarding the account of the
trustees, that the said trustees have not faithfully discharged their duties and that their
continuance in office would cause further prejudice to the estate under trusteeship, they are
hereby given ten days within which to submit their resignation. It is understood that action on
the resignation will be taken by the court upon the filing and settlement of their account to be
submitted by the trustees pursuant to the order of this court dated April 20, 1938. In the
meantime, the parish priest of Malabon, Father L.A. Arcaira is hereby appointed temporarily
trustee to take immediate possession of the property under trust and manage the same until
regular trustee is duly appointed. So ordered.
Pasig, Rizal, Philippines, April 26, 1938.

SIXTO DE LA COSTA
Judge

Appellants assign various errors, the principal bearing on the power of the lower court to require the
resignation of the trustees and the legal sufficiency of the above-questioned order for this purpose.
The will of the deceased, Petrona Francisco, created a continuing trust, but no particular persons
were named as beneficiaries. The appellants themselves did not have anything to do with the trust
until their appointment by the lower court, and they were so commissioned not because of any
beneficial interest they had in the estate but t because their selection was approved by the lower
court in the belief that they would faithfully perform their obligations. The same court found later that
they "have not faithfully discharged their duties and that their continuance in office would cause
further prejudice to the estate under trusteeship," and we cannot, on appeal, override the action of
the lower court by reversing its finding, and indirectly sanction the violation of an unquestioned and
legally existing trust.
It is also contended that the order appealed from does not contain a finding of facts, as required by
section 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and for this reason, the order is ineffectual. We find that
the order read in conjunction with the report of the clerk of court as commissioner, exhibits a finding
upon all the evidence presented during the trial, and is sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the law. (Aringo vs. Arena, 14 Phil., 263, 266.)
The appellants likewise contend that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the resignation of the trustees-appellants. The power to appoint a trustee is discretionary with the
court before whom application is made, and this court will decline to interfere except in case of clear
abuse. Thereafter, upon proper showing that the interests of justice would be adequately served with
the removal of the incumbent trustees, it is likewise within its discretion to do so (section 587, Code
of Civil Procedure), and this court will refuse to interfere in the absence of a showing of grave abuse
or whimsical and capricious exercise of that discretion.
The order appealed from is confirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17809

December 29, 1962

RESURRECCION DE LEON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

Cornelio R. Magsarili for plaintiffs-appellees.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Resurreccion De Leon, et al. filed on November 13, 1958 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
a complaint seeking to compel Emiliana Molo-Peckson, et al. to convey to the former ten parcel of
land located in Pasay City with an area of 1,749 sq. m. upon payment of P1.00 per parcel upon the
plea that said lots were willed or donated in 1948 to the latter by their foster parents Mariano Molo y
Legaspi and Juana Juan with the understanding that they should sell them to the plaintiffs under the
terms above-stated.
Defendants, in their answer, disclaimed any legal obligation on their part to sell the above properties
to the plaintiffs for the nominal consideration of P1.00 per lot alleging that if they executed the
document on which the complaint is predicated it was on the mistaken assumption that their foster
parents had requested them that they executed on August 9, 1956 a document revoking said
donation which was acknowledged before Notary Public Leoncio C. Jimenez.
No testimonial evidence was presented by either party. Instead, both agreed to submit the case
upon the presentation of their respective exhibits which were all admitted by the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered on September 21, 1960 a decision wherein it held
that, under the facts established by the evidence, trust has been constituted by the late spouses
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan over the ten parcels of land in question in favor plaintiffs as
beneficiaries and, as a consequence concluded:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders:
1. The defendants, jointly and severally to free the said ten (10) parcels of land from the
mortgage lien in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of
the Philippines) and Claro Cortez, and thereafter to sign and execute in favor of the plaintiffs
a deed of absolute sale of the said properties for and in consideration of TEN (P10.00)
PESOS already deposited in Court after all conditions imposed in Exhibit A have been
complied with;
2. That in the event the defendants shall refuse to execute and perform the above, they are
ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the value of said ten (10) parcels of land in
question, the amount to be assessed by the City of Pasay City as the fair market value of the
same, upon orders of the Court to assess said value;
3. The defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs' Attorney's fees in the amount of
P3,000.00, as defendants acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs' plainly valid, just and demandable claim, under Article 2208 sub-paragraph 5 of the
New Civil Code;
4. The defendants to render an accounting of the fruits of said ten (10) parcels of land from
the time plaintiffs demanded the conveyance of said parcels of land on August 11, 1956 as
per Exhibits B and C, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1164, New Civil Code
which provides that the creditor has a right to the fruit of the thing from the time the obligation
to deliver it arises; and

5. The defendants to pay the costs.

Defendants took the present appeal.
On January 24, 1941, Mariano Molo y Legaspi died leaving a will wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife, Juana Juan. This will was probated in the Court of First Instance of Pasay City,
Rizal, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 26, 1956 (G.R. No. L-8774). On May
11, 1948, Juana Juan in turn executed a will naming therein many devisees and legatees, one of
whom is Guillermo San Rafael, mother of the plaintiffs and defendant Pilar Perez Nable. On June 7,
1948, however, Juana Juan executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Emiliana Molo-Peckson and
Pilar Perez Nable of almost all of her entire property leaving only about P16,000.00 worth of property
for the devisees mentioned in the will. Among the properties conveyed to the donees are the ten
parcels of land subject of the present action. Juana Juan died on May 28, 1950.
On December 5, 1950, Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable executed a document which
they called "MUTUAL AGREEMENT" the pertinent provisions of which are:
That the above named parties hereby mutually agree by these presents . . . that the following
lots should be sold at ONE (1) PESO each to the following persons and organization:
xxx

xxx

xxx

TO JUSTA DE LEON and RESURRECCION DE LEON, several parcels of land located at

Calle Tolentino (South of Tenorio and Kapitan Magtibay), Pasay City, share and share alike
or half and half of TEN (10) LOTS described in:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28157 and allocated as follows:
(a) To JUSTA DE LEON Five (5) Lots.
(b) To RESURRECCION DE LEON, the remaining Five (5) Lots.
That this agreement is made in conformity with the verbal wish of the late Don Mariano Molo
y Legaspi and the late Dona Juana Francisco Juan y Molo. These obligations were
repeatedly told to Emiliana Molo Peckson, before their death and that same should be
fulfilled after their death.
On August 9, 1956, however, the same defendants, assisted by their husbands, executed another
document in which they revoked the so-called mutual agreement mentioned above, and another
relating to the same subject matter, stating therein that the parties, "after matured and thorough
study, realized that the above-mentioned public instruments . . . do not represent their true and
correct interpretation of the verbal wishes of the late spouses Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and
Dona Juana Francisco Juan y Molo." But after the execution of this document, that is, on August 11,
1956, the beneficiary Resurreccion de Leon and Justa de Leon, thru their counsel demanded the
conveyance to them of the ten parcels of land for the consideration of P1.00 per parcel as stated in
the document of December 5, 1950. And having the defendants refused to do so, said beneficiaries
consigned on July 8, 1957 the amount of P10.00 as the consideration of the ten parcels of
land.lawphil.net
In this appeal, appellants assign the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SPOUSES, MARIANO MOLO AND
JUANA JUAN, CONSTITUTED A TRUST OVER THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
PETITION WITH PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AS BENEFICIARIES.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1440, 1441, 1449, 1453 AND 1457
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES' EXHIBIT "A" TO BE
A DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST AND AN ADMISSION BY DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HAD NO
RIGHT TO REVOKE EXHIBIT "A".
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN ORDERING APPELLANTS TO RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING OF THE FRUIT OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANTS TO FREE THE PROPERTIES
FROM THE MORTGAGE LIENS IN FAVOR OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND CLARO CORTEZ.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLEES.
VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
There is no merit in the claim that the document executed on December 5, 1950 does not represent
the true and correct interpretation by appellants of the verbal wish of their foster parents relative to
the conveyance for a nominal consideration to appellees of the ten parcels of land in question
considering the circumstances obtaining in the present case. To begin with, this document was
executed by appellants on December 5, 1950, or about two years and six months from the time they
acquired title to the lands by virtue of the donation inter vivos executed in their favor by their foster
mother Juana Juan and six months after the death of the donor. There is nobody who could cajole
them to execute it, nor is there any force that could corce them to make the declaration therein
expressed, except the constraining mandat of their conscience to comply with "the obligations
repeatedly told to Emiliana Molo Peckson," one of appellants, before their death, epitomized inthe

"verbal wish of the late Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and the late Doa Juana Francisco Juan y
Molo" to convey after their death said ten parcelsof land at P1.00 a parcel to appellees. In fact, the
acknowledgement appended to the document they subscribed states that it was "their own free act
andvoluntary deed."1awphi1.net
Indeed, it is to be supposed that appellants understood and comprehended the legal import of said
documents when they executed it more so when bothof them had studied in reputable centers of
learning, one being a pharmacist and the other a member of the bar. Moreover, they have more than
ample time the six months intervening betwen the death of the donor and the execution of the
document to ponder not only wish of their predecessors-in-interest but also on the propriety of
putting in writing the mandate they have received. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that that
document represents the real wish of appellants' predecessors-in-interest and that the only thing to
be determinedis its real import and legal implications.
That the document represents a recognition of pre-existing trust or a declaration of an express trust
impressed on the ten parcels of land in question is evident. A declaration of trust has been defined
as an act by which a person acknowledges that the property, title to which he holds, is held by him
for the use of another (Griffith v. Maxfield, 51 S.W. 832, 66Ark. 513, 521). This is precisely the nature
of the will of the donor: to convey the titles of the lands to appellants with the duty to hold them
intrust for the appellees. Appellants oblingly complied with this duty byexecuting the document under
consideration.
True it is that to establish a trust the proof must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. It cannot rest
on vague, uncertain evidence, or on a loose,equivocal or indefinite declaration (In re Tuttle's Estate,
200 A. 921, 132 Pa. Super 356); but here the document in question clearly and
unequivocallydeclares the existence of the trust even if the same was executed subsequent to the
death of the trustor, Juana Juan, for it has been held that the right creating or declaring a trust need
not be contemporaneous or inter-parties (Stephenson v. Stephenson, 171 S.W. 2d 265, 351 Mo. 8;
In re Corbin's Trust Orhp., 57 York Leg. Rec. 201). It was even held that an express trust maybe
declared by a writing made after the legal estate has been vested in the trustee (Kurtz v. Robinson,
Tex. Civ. App. 256 S.W. 2d 1003). The contention, therefore, of appellants that the will and the
donation executed by their predecessors-in-interest were absolute for it did not contain a hint that
the lots in question will be held in trust by them does not merit weight because the fact that an
express trust was created by a deed which was absolute on its face may be shown by a writing
separate from the deed itself (Mugan v. Wheeler, 145 S.W. 462, 241 Mo. 376).
The fact that the beneficiaries were not notified of the existence of the trust or that the latter have not
been given an opportunity to accept it isof no importance, for it is not essential to the existence of a
valid trustand to the right of the beneficiaries to enforce the same that they had knowledge thereof
the time of its creation (Stoehr v. Miller, 296 F. 414).Neither is it necessary that the beneficiary should
consent to the creation of the trust (Wockwire-Spencer Steel Corporation v. United Spring Mfg.
Co.,142 N.E. 758, 247 Mass. 565). In fact it has been held that in case of a voluntary trust the assent
of the beneficiary is not necessary to render itvalid because as a general rule acceptance by the
beneficiary is presumed (Article 1446, new Civil Code; Cristobal v. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810).
It is true, as appellants contend, that the alleged declaration of trust was revoked, and having been
revoked it cannot be accepted, but the attempted revocation did not have any legal effect. The rule is
that in the absence of any reservation of the power to revoke a voluntary trust is irrevocable without
the consent of the beneficiary (Allen v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.of Baltimore, 7 A. 2d 180, 177 Md.
26). It cannot be revoked by the creatoralone, nor by the trustee (Fricke v. Weber, C.C.A. Ohio, 145
F. 2d 737;Hughes v. C.I.R., C.C.A. 9, 104 F. 2d 144; Ewing v. Shannahan, 20 S.W. 1065,113 Mo.
188). Here, there is no such reservation.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in applying the provisions of the new Civil Code on
trust. This is correct. The express trust was constituted during the lifetime of the predecessor-ininterest of appellants,that is, before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, although the
instrumentrecognizing and declaring such trust was executed on December 5, 1950, afterthe
effectivity of said Code. The Civil Code of 1889 and previous laws andauthorities on the matter,
therefore, should govern the herein trust under the provisions of Article 2253 of the new Civil code.
But the Civil Code of 1889 contains no specific provisions on trust as doesthe new Civil Code.
Neither does the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 for thesame merely provides for the proceeding to
be followed relative to trustsand trustees (Chapter XVIII). This silence, however, does not mean that
thejuridical institution of trust was then unknown in this jurisdiction, for theprinciples relied upon by
the Supreme Court before the effectivity of thenew Civil Code were those embodied in AngloAmerican jurisprudence as derivedfrom the Roman and Civil Law principles (Government v. Abadilla,
46 Phil. 42).And these are the same principles on which we predicate our ruling heretoforestated
and on which we now rely for the validity of trust in question.
The trial court ordered appellants to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties in question
even if appellees did not expressly ask for it intheir prayer for relief. We, however, believe that this is
covered by the general prayer "for such other relief just and equitable under the premises."What is
important is to know from what what date the accounting should bemade. The trial court ordered that
the accounting be made from the time appellees demanded the conveyance of the ten parcels of
land on August 11, 1956, in accordance with Article 1164 of the new Civil Code which provides that
the creditor has a right to the fruit of the thing from thetime the obligation to deliver it arises. But this
cannot be done without first submitting proof that the conditions stated in the mutual agreement
hadbeen complied with. And this only happened when the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
L-8774 became final and executory. The ruling of the trialcourt in this respect should therefore be
modified in the sense that the accounting should be made from the date of the finality of the said
decision.
We find no error in the directive of the trial court that appellants shouldfree the lands in question from
the encumbrance that was created thereon by them in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines and one Claro cortez, for as trustees it is their duty to deliver the properties to the cestui
que trust free from all liens and encumbrances.
To recapitulate, we hold: (1) that the document executed on December 5, 1950 creates an express
trust in favor of appellees; (2) that appellants had no right to revoke it without the consent of the
cestui que trust; (3) that appellants must render an accounting of the fruits of the lands from the
datethe judgement rendered in G.R. No. L-8774 became final and executory; and (4)that appellants
should free said lands from all liens and encumbrances.
WHEREFORE, with the modification as above indicated with regard to accounting,we hereby affirm
the decision appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs.
Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Concepcion, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-16185-86

May 31, 1962

TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA and ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y
TUASON,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Judicial Guardian, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, trustee-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO M. PEREZ, judicial guardian-appellant.
Araneta and Araneta for trustee-appellee.
Alfonso Felix, Jr. for judicial guardian-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
These are two (2) incidents of the trusteeship of the minors Benigno, Angela and Antonio, all
surnamed Perez Y Tuason. The issue in G.R. No. L-16185 is whether or not the trustee, J. Antonio
Araneta hereinafter referred to as the appellee may be allowed to pay a sum of money to the
law firm, Araneta & Araneta, of which he is a member, for services rendered to him, in his
aforementioned capacity as such trustee, in several judicial proceedings, whereas G.R. No. L-16186
concerns the question whether the purchase of certain shares of stock nude by the appellee for the
benefit of the trusteeship merits judicial approval. Both questions were decided by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) in the affirmative. Hence, this appeal by Antonio M. Perez
hereinafter referred to as the appellant as guardian of the person of said minors.
With respect to G.R. No. L-16185, it appears that the law firm Araneta & Araneta, through its
assistant, Atty. Francisco T. Papa, had rendered services, as counsel for the appellee, in connection
with the following:
1. The approval of his accounts for January to March, 1956, which were objected to by the
appellant. Said objection was, on October 19, 1956, overruled by the lower court, the action
of which was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-11788, on May 16, 1958, on appeal taken
by appellant.
2. The appellee's accounts for April to June, 1957; which were approved by the lower court
on July 13, 1957, despite appellant's objection thereto. Although appellant appealed to the
Supreme Court, he, subsequently, withdrew the appeal.
3. In 1958, appellant instituted CA-G.R. No. 22810-R of the Court of Appeals for a writ of
certiorari and mandamus against the appellee and the lower court, the latter having
sustained the action of the appellee in withholding certain sums from the shares of the
minors aforementioned in the net income of the trust estate for July to September, 1957, in
view of the appellant's refusal to reimburse to said estate identical sums received in the form
of allowances for the period from April to June, 1957, in excess of the shares of said minors
in the net income for that period. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision on June 25, 1958, dismissing said petition.
The lower court authorized the payment of P5,500.00 for the services thus rendered by Araneta &
Araneta, which appellant assails upon the ground that, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court:
When the executor or administrator is an attorney he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
that the services above referred to inured to the benefit, not of the trust estate, but of the trustee; that
the amount of the award is excessive; and that the lower court should have required the introduction
of evidence on the extent of the services rendered by the aforementioned law firm before making
said award.

Appellant's pretense is untenable. Said Section 7 of Rule 86 refers only to "executors or

administrators" of the estate of deceased persons, and does not necessarily apply to trustees. It is
true that some functions of the former bear a close analogy with those of the latter. Moreover, a
trustee, like, an executor or administrator, holds an office of trust, particularly when, as in the case of
appellee herein, the trustee acts as such under judicial authority. Hence, generally, the policy set
forth in said Section 7 of Rule 86 basically sound and wise as it is should be applicable to
trustees. The duties of executors or administrators are, however, fixed and/or limited by law, whereas
those of trustee of an express trust like that which we have under consideration are, usually,
governed by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, if established by contract (Art. 1441, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Besides, the duties of trustees may cover a much wider range than those
of executors or administrators of the estate of deceased persons. Again the application of Section 7
of Rule 86 to all trusteeships without distinction may dissuade deserving persons from accepting the
position of trustee and consequently have a deterrent effect upon the establishment of trusts, at a
time when a sizeable part of the burden to undertake important and even essential activities in
advanced and/or developing communities or states, particularly in the field of education, science and
social welfare, is borne by foundations or other similar organizations based upon the principles of
trust. We believe it, therefore, to be the better policy to acknowledge the authority of courts of justice
to exercise a sound judgment in determining, in the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case, whether or not a trustee shall be allowed to pay attorney's fees and charge the same
against the trust estate, independently of his compensation as a trustee.
In the case at bar, considering that the appellee was merely defending himself in the proceedings
that required the services of counsel; that in each case the stand taken by the appellee was upheld
by the court; that the will creating the trust and designating the appellee as trustee explicitly grants
him the right to collect for his services such reasonable fees; that, in view of the nature of the
relations between the trustor and the trustee, on the one hand, and the trustor and appellant on the
other, there can be little doubt but that the trustor would have sanctioned the payment of the
attorney's fees involved in this incident; and that it may have been more costly for the trust estate to
engage the services of a law firm other than that of Araneta & Araneta, we are not prepared to hold
that the lower court has erred in authorizing the payment of said attorney's fees by herein appellee.
For the rest, it is well settled that "a trustee may be indemnified out of the trust estate for his
expenses in rendering and proving his accounts and for costs and counsel fees" in connection
therewith (54 Am. Jur. 415-416), apart from the fact that the nature of the professional services in
question appeared in the records before the lower court and that the amount of P5,500 fixed by the
same as compensation for such services is not excessive.
Referring now to G.R. No. L-16186, it appears that from July to September, 1958, the appellee had
bought for the trust estate, through a broker (Pedro Nolasco da Silva & Co.), a total of 118 common
shares of stock of the Philippine-American Drug Co. at P100 each, and that, upon submission of
appellee's accounts for said period, appellant objected to the items of expenses relative to the
acquisition of said common shares, upon the ground that the investment therein is "unwise in that
(the operation of) said company has not, to our knowledge, proved profitable and unlawful in that it is
actually an act of self-dealing between the trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust", because the
former (appellee) is, also, a stockholder of said company. After the introduction of the evidence of
both parties, the lower court overruled the objection and approved said accounts.
It is not disputed that appellee holds, in his individual capacity, 199 out of 30,000 common shares of
stock of the Philippine-American Drug Co., whereas his children own 270 out of 5,000 preferred
shares of stock of the same enterprise. As a consequence, the interest of appellees and his children
in said company is not such as to warrant the charge that the purchase of 118 common stocks for
the trust estate amounts to self-dealing by the appellee with himself. What is more, said purchase by

the trustee may be considered as an indication that he had displayed in the management of the trust
estate the same interest he had in the protection of his own property.
Upon the other hand, it has, also, been established that the book value of each of said 118 common
shares of stock, purchased by the trustee at P100 each, is P202.80; that in 1954 the PhilippineAmerican Drug Co. had paid a cash dividend of 6%, side from declaring a 33-1/3% stock dividend
for its common shares; and that 6- % and 4% cash dividends were paid in 1955 and 1957,
respectively. Furthermore, the statement of accounts of the company for the years 1954, 1955, 1956
and 1957, satisfied the lower court that the enterprise "is financially stable and sound". Under the
circumstances, we cannot say that the investment in question is unwise.
Appellant's allegation to the effect that shares of stock of the San Miguel Brewery pay higher returns,
even if true, does not establish his pretense. Whether an investment is good or not does not depend
upon the general, abstract possibility of better investments. Again, one factor that should be taken
into account is the degree of influence that the investor may have upon the management of the
enterprise concerned, which appellee admittedly has in the Philippine-American Drug Co., but which
it is not claimed he wields in the San Miguel Brewery Co.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is
so ordered.
Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33626

March 2, 1931

ANA CALLEJON SALINAS, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FELISA ROMAN TUASON and JOSE MORENO ROMAN, defendants-appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and N. B. Villanueva for plaintiffs-appellants.
Araneta and Zaragoza for defendants-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced on the 26th day of March, 1928 in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila for the purpose of recovering the sum of P30,000 with interest at 10 per cent from
November 24, 1918. The plaintiffs were residents of the Kingdom of Spain, represented in this action
by the Consul General of Spain in the Philippine Islands.
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the heirs of Francisco Callejon Salinas, who died in Spain in
1911; that the amount of P30,000 which they claimed from the defendants was the proceeds from
the sale of two parcels of land situated in San Antonio, Province of Nueva Ecija, particularly
described in paragraph four of the complaint; that said lands belonged to their predecessor
Francisco Callejon Salinas, who had been a resident of the Philippine Islands; that said lands were
administered by Jose Moreno Lahaba, also a Spaniard, resident of the Philippine Islands, who died
in Manila on May 2, 1920; that on November 24, 1918, said Moreno Lahaba sold said parcels of land
for the sum of P30,000, but failed and refused to account for that sum to his principal or the heirs of
the latter; that said sum passed by way of inheritance to the heirs of Moreno Lahaba, the defendants
herein; that said defendants, as such heirs, likewise refused to account to the plaintiffs for said sum
of P30,000.
The defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) res judicata
and (c) prescription. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendants filed an answer
denying generally and specifically each and every allegation of the complaint, and also containing
the following special defenses: (a) That the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b)
that the plaintiff's claim was res judicata; (c) that the action has prescribed; (d) that the deceased
Jose Moreno Lahaba, as agent or representative of Francisco Callejon Salinas, had accounted to his
principal for the proceeds from the sale of the lands in question, resulting from said accounting a
balance of P2,500 in favor of his principal; (e) that said amount was paid to the heirs of his principal;
and ( f ) that Moreno Lahaba had spent P16,000 for clearing said lands and for the survey and
registration thereof. The defendants prayed that they be absolved from the complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs.
Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence and on
March 10, 1930, Simplicio del Rosario, judge, arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover said sum of P30,000 from the defendants after deducting therefrom the expenses
incurred by Moreno Lahaba for the survey and registration of said lands and also for attorney's fees
and taxes, all amounting to P3,491.60; and rendered a judgment ordering the defendants to pay to
the plaintiffs said sum of P30,000 after deducting therefrom said expenses of P3,491.60, with legal
interest on the balance from the date of the commencement of this action. The dispositive part of the
decision reads as follows:

SE CONDENA a los demandados al pago de la cantidad de treinta mil pesos (P30,000) a

favor de los demandantes, de las que se deben descontar los gastos de medicion, titulacion,
honorarios de abogado y pagos de amillaramiento que sumados ascienden a P3,491.60,
mas los interes legales de la cantidad remanente a contar desde la presentacion de la
demanda en causa.
From that judgment both parties appealed.
The defendants-appellants make the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not declaring that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
litigation;
2. The court erred in holding that the claim of P2,500 filed by the plaintiffs before the
committee on claims does not constitute res judicata of this action;
3. The court erred in holding that the present action has not prescribed;
4. The court erred in finding that Jose Moreno Lahaba was indebted to plaintiffs for more
than P2,500; and
5. The court erred in overruling the demurrer, and in sentencing the defendants to pay to the
plaintiffs the amount stated in the judgment.
The plaintiffs-appellants make the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in allowing in favor of the defendants the sum of P3,491.60, representing
alleged expenses incurred by Moreno Lahaba in connection with the lands in question;
2. The court erred in not ordering the defendants to pay legal interest on the amount of the
judgment from the 24th day of November, 1918; and
3. The court erred in not ordering the defendants to pay the costs and also damages by
reason of their misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of lands.
A careful examination of the record shows that the following facts were established by a large
preponderance of the evidence.
Francisco Callejon Salinas, the plaintiffs' predecessor, a former resident of the Philippine Islands,
died in Spain on May 31, 1911. The record does not disclose the date when he left the Islands. In
1900 he appointed Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez as his attorney in fact to administer his properties
here, with express authority to delegate his powers as such attorney, or to appoint his successor. On
April 24, 1905, Teodosio Pintado y Fernandez appointed Jose Moreno Lahaba as attorney in fact or
agent for Callejon Salinas.

Jose Moreno Lahaba administered the properties of Callejon Salinas and rendered accounts of his
administration from April 24, 1905 up to the time of the death of his principal in 1911. His last letter to
his principal is dated June 31st (30th), 1911. He died on May 2, 1920, but from July, 1911 up to the
time of his death in 1920 he had not rendered any report of his administration in spite of inquiries
made by the heirs of his principal, Francisco Callejon Salinas. Among the properties administered by
him were included the two parcels of land in question.
Sometime before the death of Jose Moreno Lahaba, the Spanish Consul in the Philippine Islands,
Vicente Palmaroli, at the request of the plaintiffs, as heirs of Francisco Callejon Salinas, made
inquiries from Moreno Lahaba about the properties administered by him. Prior thereto said heirs had
made direct inquiries from Moreno Lahaba but received no reply whatsoever. Moreno Lahaba told
the Spanish Consul that he had only P2,500 in his possession belonging to his principal, which he
was ready to deliver to the consul upon his production of written authority from said heirs to receive
the same in their behalf. Pending the receipt of said authority, Jose Moreno Lahaba died. So the
consul presented a claim for P2,500 to the commissioners in the intestate proceedings of the
deceased Moreno Lahaba. Said claim was allowed and paid and delivered to the said heirs of
Francisco Callejon Salinas.
After the receipt of said amount the heirs of Callejon Salinas requested the Spanish Consul to make
further inquiries about other properties under the administration of Moreno Lahaba. The Spanish
Consul, with the assistance of attorney Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, found that on November 24,
1918, Moreno Lahaba had sold in the name of Francisco Callejon Salinas the two parcels of land in
question to Tomas Ortiz Luis for P30,000 (Exhibit D). According to the deed of sale the whole price
was paid in cash; but according to the evidence, only the sum of P5,000 was paid at the time of the
sale, and the balance was paid in annual installments of P5,000. Five days after the sale, or on
November 29, 1918, the vendee executed a mortgage on said lands in favor of Jose Moreno Lahaba
(Exhibit H) for P25,000 to secure the unpaid balance of the price of said lands.
When Moreno Lahaba died on May 2, 1920, a balance of P20,000 of said mortgage was still unpaid.
Said amount was entered in the inventory of his estate (Exhibit A) as conjugal property, and in the
settlement of that estate it passed to the defendants as heirs of Moreno Lahaba. Said mortgage
credit was paid to them long before the commencement of this action.
The defendants-appellants in their first assignment of error contend that the lower court did not have
jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action. Their theory is that the plaintiffs' claim for P30,000 is a
claim against the estate of Jose Moreno Lahaba, and said claim not having been presented before
the commissioners of said estate, is now barred, and the lower court did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for the recovery of said amount.
This contention cannot be sustained. The amount of P30,000 which the plaintiffs are seeking to
recover is not a claim against the estate of Moreno Lahaba. It is not an indebtedness of Moreno
Lahaba or his estate. Said amount represents the price of trust property administered by him, of
which he and his heirs failed and refused to account. The only appropriate manner to recover said
trust property, in view of the trustee's failure and refusal to account for it, is by an action in court, and
the lower court acted correctly in taking jurisdiction of the case.

In their second assignment of error the defendants-appellants contend that the payment to the heirs
of Callejon Salinas of the sum of P2,500 constitutes res judicata. It does constitute res judicata as to
that amount only, but not as to the amount of P30,000 claimed in this action.
With reference to third assignment of error of the defendants-appellants, to wit, that the lower court
erred in holding that the present action has not prescribed, it may be said that there is absolutely no
evidence in the record to show that the plaintiffs failed to demand from time to time from Moreno
Lahaba and his heirs all the trust property in his or their possession belonging to Callejon Salinas. As
a matter of fact, the plaintiffs, through the Spanish Consul General, time and again requested
Moreno Lahaba and his heirs to return to them all of said trust property, but Moreno Lahaba and his
heirs denied and concealed the existence of the P30,000 in question. As soon as the plaintiffs
secured positive knowledge of the existence of said amount as trust property belonging to their
predecessor, they commenced this action for the recovery thereof.
As a general rule, a trust estate is exempt from the operation of the statute of limitations. A trustee,
however, may acquire the trust estate by prescription provided there is repudiation of the trust and
this fact is known to the cestui que trust. The repudiation must be clear, open and unequivocal. In
that case the statute will commence to run from and after said repudiation and the knowledge
thereof by the cestui. Furthermore, prescription in order to be available as a defense, the trustee
must prove that there was a direct repudiation of the trust and that the cestui que trust or beneficiary
had knowledge thereof. Such is the rule as found in Vol. 37, C. J., secs. 249, 295 and 296, pp. 923926.
SEC. 294. (2) Repudiation of Trust and Assertion of Adverse Claim (a) In General. In
the case of an express trust limitations do not start to run in favor of the trustee until the trust
is repudiated. A doctrine, the validity of which has been questioned, applying to all express
trusts, regardless of the manner in which the trust was created, is that if the trustee openly
repudiates the trust and asserts an adverse claim to the trust property, these facts being
known to the cestui que trust, the statute begins to run in the trustee's favor, although not
until then, and even though the trust is a resulting one, or a trust ex maleficio, . . . . And the
general rule above stated applies in favor of persons who become trustees by construction
of law, and in case of a voluntary constructive trust. As the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense to be alleged and proved, it is incumbent upon the trustee to show that
there was a direct repudiation of the trust and that the cestui que trust had knowledge
thereof. Every intendment and presumption is against a repudiation.
SEC. 295. (b) Necessity for Notice But a trustee's repudiation of an express trust, or a
trust subject to the rule governing express trusts, and his assertion of an adverse interest will
not be sufficient to start the statute of limitations in motion, unless knowledge or notice of
such repudiation and claim is brought home to the cestui que trust, and the statute begins to
run when and only when the cestui que trust acquires the knowledge or receives the notice.
SEC. 296. (c) Character and Circumstances of Repudiation and Notice To set the statute
in motion the trustee's repudiation and adverse claim, whether by acts or words
repudiation may be proved by circumstances must be clear, open and unequivocal, and
must be so clearly and fully made known to the cestui que trust as to make it incumbent

upon him to assert his equitable rights. Mere failure of the trustee to respond to repeated
inquiries addressed to him by the cestui que trust is not enough. To constitute a repudiation
there must be something said or done by the trustee in open contravention of the terms of
the trust, and of such character that the relations of the parties will become and continue
hostile.
Under the facts hereinbefore stated, the defense of prescription is not available to the defendants.
There was no open, clear and unequivocal repudiation of the trust by Jose Moreno Lahaba. Neither
was there any knowledge on the part of Callejon Salinas and his heirs of any such repudiation. On
the contrary, there was concealment and misappropriation on the part of Moreno Lahaba of the
property entrusted to his administration and care.
The last two assignments of error of the defendants-appellants are sufficiently answered by the
foregoing arguments and the facts above stated.
With reference to the assignments of error of the plaintiffs-appellants, we are of the opinion that
none of the alleged errors were committed by the lower court. The amount of P3,491.60 was
correctly allowed by the lower court in favor of the defendants. It represented expenses actually
incurred by Moreno Lahaba for the survey and registration of the lands in question and for taxes paid
thereon.
The judgment appealed from is in accordance with the facts and the law, and the same should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendants-appellants. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.