Rule 128

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2.
3.
4.
5.

Reyes v. CA......................................................................................................................... 2
Agustin v. CA....................................................................................................................... 8
Salcedo v. CA.................................................................................................................... 23
Gaanan v. IAC.................................................................................................................... 27
Ramirez v. CA.................................................................................................................... 34

1. Reyes v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES,
respondents.

NOCON, J.:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent
Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the
agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990, 2 which ordered them and the other
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to
private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final
and executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall
be quoted verbatim and are as follows:
It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant
Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an
area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively.
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by
Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on
September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she
succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to
July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants,
prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and
that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and
surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed
for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or
appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied

interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and

defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots.
Claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and
impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the
dismissal of the case and claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage
of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also
demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer,
pp. 77-78).
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in
possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the same. Upon motion of
plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of
the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest
(after deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the
locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision
with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of
the action to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person
claiming under them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the
possession and cultivation of the landholding descriptive in paragraph 3 of the
complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay
Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area
of 23,969 square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan
Mendoza, and devoted principally to the production of palay, as
evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform issued on July 30, 1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in
question and to respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the
same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans
of palay or its equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of
1984, and every harvest time until defendants finally vacate and surrender
possession and cultivation of the landholding in question to plaintiff.

c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the
same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the
harvests ordered by the Court from which the planting and harvesting
expenses have been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said net
deposits with the Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are
insufficient, then the balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and
severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
present for the consideration of the Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and
severally, with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property,
Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof starting from the principal crop
years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter until the possession and
cultivation of the aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the private
respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2,
Psd-38453 of the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of
the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's
father, Juan, and which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga,
for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to their supposed
participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding,
petitioners present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M.
Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7
wherein private respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other defendants in the
agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 8 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's
"point is already settled and considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they were
included in the present controversy so that their political career would be destroyed. 10
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who
conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot
No. 46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where
they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed
by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at
least P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the
possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the
Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are
solidarily liable with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented
and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court.
Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of
fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual
findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition

for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

not obtain in the instant case. 13

12

absent the exceptions which do

We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to
dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots
Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or less .
. ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's testimony, she
clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000
square meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p.
5; May 8, 1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel,
Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is
subject of a pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15).
The inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony
of the witness should not only because there was no showing that she
intended to mislead defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter
of the suit. It would in the complaint since together with Lot 106 had been
include in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's
father.
We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other
appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate
the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio,
together with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from
entering the land through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records,
vol. II p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of
P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in
agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that
"In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence".
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more
than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in
section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS,
G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant
evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of
the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief. 14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22,
1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Nocon and Campos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Decision, CA-G.R. No. SP 20528 (CAR), penned by Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo
and concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Fortunato A. Vailoces.
2 Decision of the RTC, Branch XLVI, 3rd Judicial Region, San Fernando,
Pampanga acting as an agrarian court; penned by Judge Norberto C. Ponce.
3 Op cit., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 25-26.
4 Original Records, pp. 565-566.
5 Petitioners' Memorandum, p.7; Rollo, p. 62.
6 Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo, p.65.
7 Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, pp. 20-21.
8 Prescribing Penalties for the Unlawful Ejectment, Exclusion, Removal or
Ouster of Tenant-farmers from their Farmholdings.
9 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 65-66.
10 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p.17.
11 Private respondents' Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 73-74.
12 Decision, Misa vs. CA, G.R. No. 97291, August 5, 1992, pp. 4-5.
13 The case of Medina v. Asistio, G.R. No. 75450, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224
(1990) enumerates several instances when findings of fact may be passed
upon and reviewed by this Court, none of which obtain herein:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok,
74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond

the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil
401 [1958]; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]); Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);
and (10) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contraindicated by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Ibid., p.5.
14 Decision, CA-G.R. SP 20528 (CAR), pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 28-29.

2. Agustin v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005.]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE,
respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
At issue in this petition for certiorari 1 is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely
erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision 2 and resolution 3 upholding the resolution and order of the trial court, 4 which
denied petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondents' complaint for support and
directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
DACIHc
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin's alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106. 5
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday
on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel's insistence on abortion, Fe, decided otherwise and
gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical
Hospital in Quezon City. The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the
father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe's repeated
requests for Martin's support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to
have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001 while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe's leg.
This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and
has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued
Arnel for support. 6
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy
with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin's conception. He claimed that Fe
had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but
"he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a romantic
liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction
where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of
marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from
his wife and family. . . . Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel

terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential
customers to the car aircon repair shop" 7 where she worked. Later on Arnel found out that
Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the
United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling
people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because
their "last intimacy was sometime in 1998." 8 Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel's wife
and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club
parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could
not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to
move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body." 9 Finally, Arnel claimed that
the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martin's birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status, as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965
when it should have been 1964. 10
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but
expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. 11
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. 12
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 13
He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his
signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child
is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. 14 In his motion, Arnel
manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S.
Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martin's
birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was
forged. EaHcDS
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered
in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner's constitutional right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination. 15
The petition is without merit.

cdjur2005

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss because the
private respondents' complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against
the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff's primary right and the
defendant's corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. 16

In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the
petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer,
petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin,
claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the child's conception and birth. It is
undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship
between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship
produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be
supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and
Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. ScCEIA
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and
authenticity of the child's birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also
claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is
supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has
no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under
Article 283 17 in relation to Article 265 18 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 105 19 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioner's contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an
action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance
with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, 20 we allowed the integration of an action
to compel recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance:
. . . In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional
rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also
said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is
essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. cEDaTS
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is
an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763.
[1922]) wherein we said:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to
obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be
answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the
two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar
to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. . . .
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against
his coheirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the
estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been
thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who
might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate
to such proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) HEcTAI
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis
or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both
cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical
sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee 21 where the appellant was convicted of murder on
the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that "while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied)."
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe
Lim v. Court Appeals, 22 promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because
"DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by
our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father."

In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as

enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals: 23
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability
to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result into deny progress. AHDaET
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo 24 where the rape
and murder victim's DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were
admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile."
A year later, in People v. Janson, 25 we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of
evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes,
a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we
had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!"
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC 26 where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of
filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing. . . .
Moreover in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar, 27 we affirmed the conviction of the
accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results.
We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its
admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all
living organisms. A person's DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout
a person's lifetime; the DNA in a person's blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins. CaEIST

xxx

xxx

xxx

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de
Ungria's testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the
appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim's
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in
the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine
in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was
relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. SATDEI
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar,
the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen
recovered from a rape victim's 'vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel
"Kawit" Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample
for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as
embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.

Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the
person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, 28
hair, 29 and other bodily substances. 30 We have also declared as constitutional several
procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of
adultery, 31 expulsion of morphine from one's mouth 32 and the tracing of one's foot to
determine its identity with bloody footprints. 33 In Jimenez v. Caizares, 34 we even
authorized the examination of a woman's genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her
husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis.
Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them
were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar, 35 are now
similarly acceptable. cEASTa
Nor does petitioner's invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres, 36
where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied
in Administrative Order No. 308 we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. . . .
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, 37 and the
infringement of privacy of communication 38 where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioner's case involves neither and, as already stated, his
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that
they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at
stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the
same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first
official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread
general acceptance. 39 Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the
total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb 40 shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of
St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to
subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court, pointed out that, under the
law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner
had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests: 41
516-a.
Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand
one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability
for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to
writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth

certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are required to
ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity. aATCDI
(b)
An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k
of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law may be rescinded by either signator's filing of a petition with the court to vacate
the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the
acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a
proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a
party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding"
shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the
expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may
challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a party's challenge to an acknowledgment, the court shall
order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the child's paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither
signator's legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from the
acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except
for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and
if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court
finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of paternity
and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the
child's birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry operated by the
department of social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social
services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment
is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social
services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support
enforcement unit of the social services district, that provides the mother with such services.
HTSAEa
(c)
A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through
the parents' acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process,
must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act. (emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act: 42
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results; costs
of tests.
a)
The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or
DNA tests and, on the court's own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the mother,
her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a
type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated by the
secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed by a
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by
a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged father is or is

not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by
the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable
estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. The record or
report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section
or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be received in
evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the
civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and
that if such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall not be
heard by the court. If the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA
test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five, percent probability of paternity, the admission of
such record or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish,
if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article
and article four of this act. HEITAD
(b)
Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a,
report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence
pursuant to rule forty-five, hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by
any party.
(c)
The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the
first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay such
cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local
social services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost
of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities to
pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless
such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W., 43 a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used to
prove that H.W. previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and
C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, the time of conception,
maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G., 44 the 4th
Department of the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.'s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six
years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the child's father.
In this case,. G.G. only, requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six
years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.'s father, sought an increase in his support
obligation to her. aATHES
In Greco v. Coleman, 45 the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality of
a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was
because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such
support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has increased
significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement . . .
(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999%
accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed agreement,

proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child
support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985.
("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general
acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods could
exclude some males from being the possible father of a child, those methods could not
affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the settlement
agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a
far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often
no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every, contested paternity action,
obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative father was, in fact, the
child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother could prove to a court of law that
she was only sexually involved with one man the putative father. Allowing parties the
option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk
that the mother would be unable meet her burden of proof. ITSacC
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigan's Paternity law have included the use of DNA
testing: 46
722.716
Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child,
and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling;
qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert;
result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1)
In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on
behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged
father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not
limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court
may do either of the following:
(a)

Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.

(b)
If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is
shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2)
A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person
accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization,
including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks. AHCETa
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5)
If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in
subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or
higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in

subsection (4) paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material
from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting
laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative
fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have
identical DNA.
(6)
Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5),
either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules this section does not
abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if
applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty vs. Perkins, 47 the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results
showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born
during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test
eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's
father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W., 48 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for genetic
testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without
such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity
and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was only upon
appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case and ordered
the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld. CacISA
The case of Kohl v. Amundson, 49 decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the
adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case Kohl,
having excluded himself as the father of Amundson's child through DNA testing, was able to
have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering
Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support. The
Court said "(w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she
submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's
position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not
foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages."
In M.A.S v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services, 50 another case decided by the Supreme
Court of Mississippi; it was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier
agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA
testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. The
Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams. 51
The foregoing considered we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner's
motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any

plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 52 In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. the Court of Appeals 53 where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 we discussed at length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant
by "grave abuse of discretion":
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. IcEaST
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d'etre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by
a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not
the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error
subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice
or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As
we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in
law and jurisprudence, was correct.
EPILOGUE
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed
in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
STcHDC
Costs against petitioner.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2.
CA Decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961, penned by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division; Rollo, pp. 32-39.
3.
CA Resolution dated March 8, 2004 (affirming the January 28, 2004 CA Decision) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80961, penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in
by Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division.;
Rollo, pp. 41-43.
4.
Resolution dated November 8, 2002 and order dated February 5, 2003 in Civil Case
No. Q-02-46301, both penned by Presiding Judge Natividad Giron Dizon of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 106; Rollo, pp. 157-159 and 171-172.
5.

Docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46301, Rollo, pp. 55-60.

6.

Rollo, pp. 55-60.

7.

Rollo, p. 103.

8.

Rollo, p. 104.

9.

Rollo, p. 105.

10.

Rollo, pp. 101-109.

11.

Rollo, pp. 111-114.

12.

Rollo, pp. 132-137.

13.

Rollo, pp. 138-139.

14.

Rollo, pp. 140-143.

15.

Rollo, pp. 10-11 and 21.

16.
507.

Nicanor G. de Guzman, Jr. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 92029, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA

17.
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1)
In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2)
When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3)
When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4)
When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father.
(5)
18.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing
in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
19.
SECTION 1. Venue. Where judicial approval of a voluntary recognition of a minor
natural child is required, such child or his parents shall obtain the same by filing a petition to
that effect with the Court of First Instance of the province in which the child resides. In the
City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
20.

G.R. No. 95299, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 665.

21.

319 Phil. 128 (1995).

22.

336 Phil. 741 (1997).

23.

G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17.

24.

G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192.

25.

G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584.

26.

G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634, and 161824, 3 March 2004.

27.

G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004.

28.

People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).

29.

People v. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 (1999).

30.

U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912).

31.

Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920).

32.

U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917).

33.

U.S. v. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 (1913).

34.

109 Phil. 273 (1960).

35.

Supra.

36.

354 Phil. 948 (1998).

37.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, 407 SCRA 10;
People v. Valdez, 363 Phil 481 (1999); Aniag v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 104961, 7 October
1994, 237 SCRA 424; MHP Garments v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 86720, 2 September 1994, 236
SCRA 227; 20th Century Fox v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-76649-51, 19 August 1988, 164

SCRA 655; People v. Burgos, 228 Phil. 1 (1986); Villanueva v. Querubin 150-C Phil. 519
(1972).
38.
Waterous Drug v. NLRC, et al., 345 Phil. 982 (1997); Zulueta v. CA, et al., 324 Phil. 63
(1996).
39.

Greco v. Coleman, 615 N.W. 2d 218 (Mich. 2000).

40.

181 Misc 2d 1033 (1999).

41.

NYSCL, Ch. 686, Article 5, Part 1, Section 516.

42.

NYSCL, Ch. 686, Article 5, Part 3, Section 532.

43.

752 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1999).

44.

273 AD 2d 919 (NY 2000).

45.

Supra.

46.

MCCLA 722.716 6.

47.

757 So. 2d 992 (Miss. 2000).

48.

615 N.W. 2d 533 (ND 2000).

49.

620 N.W.2d 606 (SD 2001).

50.

842 So. 2d 527 (Miss. 2003).

51.

843 So. 2d 720 (Miss. 2003).

52.

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

53.

G.R. No. 129368, 25 August 2003, 409 SCRA 455.

3. Salcedo v. CA
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994.]
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA,
Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon city and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT AVAILABLE TO CHALLENGE
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF TRIAL COURT; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The extraordinary
writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court.
The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However,
where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress. In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the
evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. . . . . Clearly, respondents trial court
and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the
decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 entitle "Teresita SalcedoOrtanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez". prcd
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of
the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360 and raffled to
Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to "M"

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence
on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered
evidence. Cdpr
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present
petition, which in part reads:
"It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1)
Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can
be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the
even handed administration of justice.
(2)
A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in
admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither
does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the
appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari.
The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law,
properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive 'ping-pong' to and from the
appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby DISMISSED". 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating: Cdpr
"Grounds for Allowance of the Petition"
"10.
The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous
decisions of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court as the
question of admissibility in evidence of tape recordings has not, thus, far, been addressed
and decided squarely by the Supreme Court.
11.
In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same can still be [the]
subject of a petition for certiorari." 2

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory
order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
LLpr
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of
petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such
tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as
follows:
"Section 1.
It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . ."
"Section 4.
Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained,
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not
be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing
or investigation."
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of the same,
the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. prLL
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2
thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6)
years for violation of said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of
American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are
inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
Penned by Justice Emeterio C. Culi with Justices Jainal D. Rasul and Alfredo G.
Lagamon concurring.
1.

Rollo, pp. 24-25.

2.

Rollo, p. 11.

3.

Marcelo v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, 29 June 1982, 114 SCRA 657.

4.

TSN, 9 December 1992, p. 4.

5.
"Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause
to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates
the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or
causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than six months or more than six years and with accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of
the commission of the offense, and if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to
deportation proceedings."

4. Gaanan v. IAC
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-69809. October 16, 1986.]
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is
among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not
disputed by the petitioner.
"In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
"That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the
office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982,
pp. 4-5).
"When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following
conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault"
"(a)
the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to
P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to
wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in
persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
"(b)
Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
"(c)

P1,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

"(d)
transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
"(e)
Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of
desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

"(f)

Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

"(g)
Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass
media;
"(h)

P2,000.00 attorney's fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

"Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
"Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend
Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted
that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When
he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
"Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Act."
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were
each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard
such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the
extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device" as provided
in Rep. Act No. 4200. LLphil
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and
raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c)

whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation
and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed
in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
"Section 1.
It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described;
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in
the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof,
either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence
in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition."
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone
and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an
alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made
between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a
public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to
listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line.
Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the
alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct
assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that
another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the
criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can
force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It
would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and
the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone
users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to
pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform
police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own

telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely
the law was never intended for such mischievous results. LibLex
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of
the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months
to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public
officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses'
telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business
conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded
message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter, would a "party
line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in
1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate,
telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the
most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on
the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made
of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described."
The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted
from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or
portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of
a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of
a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from
one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the
desired communication coming from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. LLpr
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard
Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113, 120).

In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
"Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly,
Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of
them taken jointly.'
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph
5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not
be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that
`particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former'
is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to
comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which
the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis.
603, 607; 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed., pp.
180-181."
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be
moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138): prLL
"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell
to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation
takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another
to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any
privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception,
has not occurred."
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way
if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out
of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to
use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
"American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be `the tenderness of the law
of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177
US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State,
224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821, 63 SE 1080, all cited in
73 Am Jur 2d 452.) The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v.
Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp.
183-184)."
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or interpretation of a
legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of
the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited "device
or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the
act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly

objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno. Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment
would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With
this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in
fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and,
therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police
officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court
go with the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent
outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if
you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the
chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be
used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or
gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices
in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is
not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ ., concur.

5. Ramirez v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka
na, magus
mbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa
States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon icocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok
dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you
think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no
(sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka
bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala
ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa
labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na
hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala
yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga
sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap
sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated
October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation
of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez
not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder
secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to
other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A.
4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person
other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by
the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision
of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,
her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the
said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge
of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the

recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this
if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he
makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is
done secretly.

Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person not between
a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the abovequoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of
conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free
conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the
framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations
between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures
and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of
communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion
by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of
telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly
in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous
and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Branch 64.
2 Rollo, p. 48.
3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
4 Rollo, p. 9.
5 Rollo, p. 37.
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
9 Rollo, p. 14.
10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685
(1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
13 Rollo, p. 33.
14 Rollo, p. 67.

15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).

16 Id.
17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA
111 (1994).
19 Id., at 120.
20 Id., at 121.