Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
volume two
Table of Contents
How to Handle Hydrogen In Process Plants ......................................................................................... 4
Process-unit layout, piping, instrumentation/control and materials of construction are but a few of the technical
issues requiring special attention during the design or retrofitting of process plants that use hydrogen as a
raw material
Feature Report
Part 1
lease rate. In any case, the flame radiates very little heat, and is visually
imperceptible under artificial light or
daylight. Therefore, reliable methods
of fire detection must be provided in
facilities that handle hydrogen.
Deflagration consists of a flame that
propagates through a combustion
zone at a velocity less than the speed
of sound in the unreacted medium.
The flammability range is the same
as that for fire. The presence of confining surfaces such as piping, ducting or vessels can elevate the pressure and accelerate the flame speed.
If the flame speed exceeds the speed
of sound, the deflagration process can
transition into a detonation.
Detonations, propagating at a rate
greater than the speed of sound
within the unreacted media, generate
high pressures. Detonation requires a
richer hydrogen-oxidizer mixture and
a more-energetic source of ignition to
occur than does a deflagration. Very
high pressures can be generated in
a detonation when a pressure wave
is reflected from wall to wall inside
a building. Detonation is associated
with shock waves and an accompanying blast wave that can severely injure
personnel and damage property.
BLEVEs (boiling-liquid expanding-vapor explosions): Theoretically,
cryogenic containers with liquid hydrogen present are subject to BLEVE.
Under rapid heating (for example, due
to engulfment by fire), a vessel contain-
HYDROGENATION
IN CHEMICALS
MANUFACTURE
Hydrogenation of complex molecules is a
key reaction for organic synthesis of many
products. Examples of hydrogenation reactions that are commonly encountered in the
chemical industry include:
Saturation of unsaturated aromatics, olefins, fatty acids and esters
Reduction of nitro and nitroso compounds
to amines
Reduction of ketones, aldehydes, esters
and carboxylic acids to alcohols
The reaction typically involves an unsaturated organic compound with at least one
pair of carbon atom connected by double or triple bonds. In the reaction, hydrogen
breaks the bonds between the carbon atoms, resulting in a hydrogen atom attaching to
each carbon atom. The reactions are liquid-phase, heterogeneous and exothermic and
frequently occur at high pressures and temperatures in the presence of a catalyst. The
flow diagram shows a typical hydrogenation system.
Materials selection
Hydrogen embrittlement
Permeability and porosity
Compatibility between dissimilar
metals
In the design of low- and high-pressure
hydrogen systems alike, stainless steel
(Types 304, 316) is the most commonly
used material for equipment, tubing,
piping, fittings, and components. Other
construction materials that are satisfactory in hydrogen service include Monel,
Hastelloys, aluminum alloys, suitable
grades of carbon steel, glass-lined carbon steel and copper alloys. However,
the final selection should be based on
full awareness of all the raw materials,
catalysts and other substances that are
used in the process. Some process compounds can significantly affect materials suitability even when present only
in trace amounts.
Ordinary carbon steel, iron, low-alloy
steels, chromium, molybdenum, niobium, zinc, nickel, etc are not acceptable for use at cryogenic temperatures.
Cast iron is not acceptable for hydrogen service due to its porosity. Nickel
should not be used because it is subject
to severe hydrogen embrittlement.
Elastomers and plastics such as
polytetrafluoroethylene are in many
installations used for gasketing, Orings, packing, seats and other sealing
elements. Ideally, their usage in hydrogen service should be limited, because they can fail in the event of fire.
In a hydrogen environment, most
welds are susceptible to hydrogen em-
Outside is best
55
Feature Report
Damage-limiting construction
All buildings used in hydrogen services must be designed to limit personnel injury and facility damage in the
event of fire or explosion. The building
should be constructed in accordance
with the International Building Code,
the NFPA (e.g. 55, 68), the Code of
Federal Regulations 29CFR1910.103
(in the U.S.), as well as with any other
codes and insurance regulations that
have jurisdiction in the location. Damage-limiting construction for the building requires pressure resistant walls
to contain explosion and pressure-relieving panels to vent an explosion.
Both NFPA 68 and FM Globals
datasheet FM 1-44 provide useful
methods for sizing deflagration vent
panels. Under the FM 1-44 guidelines,
for example, the facility must meet the
following design criteria:
The ratio of the enclosure surface
area (As) to vent area (Av) should
equal less than 7.25.
A minimum of 1 ft2 of vent area is
required for every 15 ft3 of room volume. (Note, however, that this requirement results in large facilities,
which are costly in todays economy.
It is therefore recommended to consult with all stakeholders early in
the design, to establish the appropriate codes, guides and standards
for use in the design. This point
is particularly important because
other codes, such as NFPA 68, do
not require this ratio criterion.)
The pressure-resistant walls must
be designed to a minimum pressure
56
occur, per NFPA 68, it cannot be successfully vented. Also, there are currently no known pressure relief devices
that can react to a detonation speed.
The attributes of a piping system suitable for handling hydrogen are summarized in Table 1. Although some
of those attributes, such as the ones
relating to structural matters, are
shared by other piping systems, the
adherence to then is especially important with hydrogen.
The piping to convey hydrogen gas
from cylinders entails special considerations. If the cylinders cannot be
stored outside, then a well ventilated
storage shed is required. The temperature in the shed must be kept below
50C. Hydrogen cylinders must be
segregated from cylinders, tanks, silos
or other containers that store oxidant
gases or other oxidants.
Hydrogen cylinders supplying the
process must be connected through
approved gas manifold. The following
components and attributes are typical
in such a hydrogen supply line:
The gas manifold usually consists
of pressure regulators, pressure
gauges, relief valve(s), vent connections, and provision for automatic switchover between online
and standby cylinders. An alarm
for alerting operator to a switchover
must be provided. A supply of inert
gas, usually nitrogen, must be provided for purging the hydrogen lines
before and after use. Hydrogen detection sensors with alarms are also
required in the area
All instrumentation and wiring designed to meet the electrical hazardous area
classification of Class I, Division (I or II), Group B
Instruments designed with appropriate range, accuracy, reliability and response
time. The appropriate response times of the complete loop, from input device to
final control element, should be consistent with the fast process kinetics of most
reactions involving hydrogen
Critical safety instruments provided with redundancy
Computer control system provided with data acquisition capability, backup
power, and fail-safe action on the loss of electrical power or instrument air
Remote location for the control system provided. Design the process plant to operate without personnel in the reactor vicinity when a hydrogenation process is taking
place. However, controls should also be provided to permit local operation
TABLE 3. INTERLOCKS OFTEN USED WITH REACTORS
Upset Process Condition
Interlock Action
1. On high temperature in
the reactor
4. On hydrogen detection
in reactor room
Indoor process units that employ hydrogen should be supplied with fixed
and portable hydrogen sensors. Portable sensors are used by personnel
when entering an area where a leak
may have occurred. It is suggested
that the fixed detectors be located in
the following areas:
Reactor room, where hydrogen leakage, accumulation or spill is possible
Storage area, where hydrogen connections are routinely made and
separated
Building-air intake ducts, if hydrogen could be carried into the building
Building-air exhaust ducts if hydrogen could be released inside the
building
The appropriate response to a detection of the presence of hydrogen in
ambient air varies with the likely
degree of risk. Examples of common
responses include isolation of the hydrogen supply source, shutdown of
the hydrogen-handling and process
system, provision for issuing a visual
and audible warning, and/or increased
ventilation of the enclosed space. In
addition, remote television monitoring
should be considered for systems not
visible from the control room.
Fire detection: Because a hydrogen
flame in air is usually almost invisible
and because the emissivity of a hydrogen flame is low, the flame is hard to
see or feel. So, aside from the detection
of the gas itself, the design of a hydrogen-using facility must provide detection of a hydrogen flame in all areas
where leaks or hazardous accumulations omay occur. Infrared (IR) and
ultraviolet (UV) are two technologies
commonly used.
Process venting
57
Feature Report
Flare systems are equipped with pilot
ignition and a warning systems in case
of flameout The exhaust-gas header to
the flares is usually kept under slight
negative pressure, so extra care must
be taken to ensure that the vent systems is leaktight to avoid air intrusion
and possible detonation.
Although flare-system design technology is mature, flares continue to
pose hazards of flame stability, flame
blowoff, and flame blowout. To minimize the malfunction of flare systems,
it is important to keep the stack discharge velocity between 10 to 20% of
the sonic velocity in hydrogen at the
temperature prevailing in the exhaust
line. Velocities above the recommended
range may cause the flame to blow off
or blow out.
For roof venting, the main variables
to consider are such site-specific conditions as the prevailing-wind direction and speed, proximity to adjacent
buildings, vent stack height, and local
discharge limitations or other environmental restrictions.
In a roof-vent system for a process
plant in which hydrogen is used, it
is better to vent each major piece of
equipment (such as each of several
hydrogenation reactors) separately
instead of using an interconnected
collection header. The separate-vents
approach avoids the possibility of any
high-pressure, high-throughput discharges overpressurizing the low-pressure parts of the system. If, however,
collection headers cannot be avoided,
be sure to size the header to handle
the flows from all discharges with only
minimal back pressure developing at
the lowest-pressure equipment.
The roof-vent lines should be designed with inert-gas (usually nitrogen) purging and steam snuffing at the
end of each line. The purging takes air
out of the system before introduction
of hydrogen, and removes hydrogen at
the end of the process. The design activity must include a review of all piping and equipment system to ensure
that they can be adequately purged
and leak tested prior to admission of
hydrogen. The vent piping must be
designed with care to prevent steam
condensate from flowing back into the
process equipment. During plant operation, both nitrogen and steam flow
58
Room ventilation
In light of hydrogens wide flammability range and low ignition energy, hydrogen leaks or spills in a non-ventilated, confined space can readily form
an ignitable gas mixture. Accordingly,
all such spaces should be provided
with room ventilation, in addition to
the aforementioned hydrogen-concentration monitoring. Confined spaces
for hydrogenation systems are usually
designed for 15 to 20 air changes per
hour during normal conditions, and 30
to 40 when high hydrogen concentration has been detected. To accommodate the necessary ramped-up volumetric flowrate for emergencies, the
ventilation exhaust fan should be a
variable-speed or two-speed unit. Exhaust fans must be fabricated of nonsparking materials, and their motors
rated for the same electrical classification as that of the other motors in
the room.
Rooms in which hydrogenations or
other hydrogen-using operations take
place must be kept at a negative pressure with respect to outside areas to
prevent outward hydrogen flow. The
room pressure should be monitored,
with provision for an alarm to sound.
Electrical requirements
Fire protection
Safety sum-up
Author
Richard C Hachoose is a
Senior Principal Technologist
in the Somerset, NJ, office of
CH2M HILL Lockwood Greene
(Phone: (732) 868-2282; e-mail:
rhachoose@lg.com). He has
over 24 years of process engineering design experience in
the pharmaceutical, chemical
and metallurgical processing
industries. He is also an adjunct professor at Stevens Institute of Technology, where he teaches a course
on Chemical Technology Processes in API Manufacturing. He is a registered Chartered Engineer
in the U.K. He holds a B.Sc. (Hons) in chemical
engineering from the University of Manchester
Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST),
Manchester, England.
Circle 40 on p. 93 or go to
adlinks.che.com/5828-40
59
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
A Checklist for
Safer Chemical
Batch Reactions
A good understanding of the reaction
chemistry is needed for a safe process design
Richard Kwasny , Chilworth Technology Inc.
Runaway reactions
61
Environmental Manager
be maintained through controlled
addition of the reagent
For highly exothermic reactions,
avoid using temperature control
of the reaction mixture as the only
means for limiting the reaction rate
When scaling up a reaction, account
for the impact of vessel size on heat
generation and heat removal: The
volume of the reaction mixture increases by the cube of the vessel
radius but the heat-transfer area increases by the square of the radius
A comprehensive hazard evaluation should be conducted using appropriate estimation and experimental
techniques to identify potential reac-
Author
Richard Kwasny is the associate director of the Process Safety Laboratory at
Chilworth Technology Inc.
(250 Plainsboro Road, Building 7, Plainsboro, N.J. 08536;
Email: rkwasny@chilworth.
com; Phone: 6097994449),
where he has responsibility
for the quality, safety and
productivity of the thermal
hazard laboratory. His expertise encompasses all areas of chemical reaction
hazards and flammability of dusts, vapors and
gases. Kwasny completed his Ph.D. at London
South Bank University. His research developed,
in part, an assessment strategy to allow for the
safe scale up of reduction reactions. Before his
current position, Kwasny headed the Process
Safety & Hazard Identification group for Schering-Ploughs Chemical and Physical Services
Dept. Previously, he managed the Dow Chemical
Reactive Chemicals testing function for Canada.
Kwasny is a member of the ASTM Committee
E27 on hazard potential of chemicals.
References
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Hoppers
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Containe
Valves
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www.mueller-gmbh.com
Circle 20 on p. 76 or go to adlinks.che.com/7371-20
62
8
7
Feature Report
Engineering
Practice
Designing
5
4
3
Safer
2
1
Process Plants
Several often-overlooked strategies
to increase inherent safety are discussed here
Victor H. Edwards, P.E., Aker Solutions
any individuals and organizations have made important contributions to the creation of inherently safer (IS)
products, processes and process plants
[13]. A brief survey of successful case
histories shows that most reported
applications relied on only a few of
the core IS principles. This paper emphasizes the opportunities presented
by three particular and often-overlooked possibilities for inherently
safer processes.
The methods proposed here ensure
integration of IS methods beginning
with process conception and continuing through process plant engineering
design. Particular emphasis is given
to matching the IS principles with the
state of the project. For example, substitution is best applied during product and process research, while limitation of effects is most effective during
plot plan layout and equipment arrangement.
The chemical process industries
(CPI) face the challenge of working
with processes and products that
present many hazards, such as
the following:
The manufacture of fuels uses and
produces products that burn with
significant energy release
Certain basic chemicals, such as
mineral acids and halogens are toxic
and/or corrosive
Many manufacturing processes either release or require significant
44
1. Process design
2. Basic controls, process alarms and
operator supervision
3. Critical alarms, operator supervision
and manual intervention
4. Automatic action safety-instrumented
systems (SIS) or ESD
5. Physical protection (relief devices)
6. Physical protection (dikes)
7. Plant emergency response
8. Community emergency response
Layers of protection
Often-overlooked IS concepts
FIGURE 2. The Flixborough tragedy ushered in a new era in process safety [6]
Basic concepts
45
Engineering Practice
46
Btu/h
Qout
3
D
Qout
Qheat generated
Heat removed
Qout
O
ccupied building evaluation
and design
Area electrical classification
Safety integrity level assessments
and safety instrumented systems
Human factors reviews
Ergonomics reviews
Safety case development
The design process itself
47
Engineering Practice
Applying different IS principles
References
1. Kletz, Trevor A., and Amyotte, Paul, Process
Plants a Handbook of Inherently Safer Design, 2nd Ed., Taylor and Francis, Philadelphia, PA, 2010.
2. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS),
Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A
Life Cycle Approach, 2nd Ed., AIChE, New
York, NY, 2009.
3. Hendershot, Dennis C., An overview of inherently safer design, Process Safety Progress,
Vol. 25, No. 2, 98107, June 2006.
4. Dowell, III, Arthur M., Layer of protection
analysis and inherently safer processes, Process Safety Progress, Vol. 18, No. 4, 214220,
Winter 1999.
5. Chen, Jenq-Renn, An inherently safer process
of cyclohexane oxidation using pure oxygen
An example of how better process safety leads
to better productivity, Process Safety Progress,
Vol. 23, No. 1, 7281, March 2004.
6. Mannan, Sam, Ed., Lees Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries, 3rd Ed., Elsevier Butterworth Heinemann, Oxford, U.K., 2005.
7. Edgar, Thomas F., and others, Process Control,
Section 8 in Perrys Chemical Engineers Handbook, 8th Edition, Don W. Green, Editor-in-Chief,
McGraw-Hill Book, New York, NY, 2008.
8. Luyben, W.L., and Hendershot, D.C., Dynamic disadvantages of intensification in
inherently safer process design, Industrial
Engineering Chemistry Research, Vol. 43, No.
2 (2004) cited in CCPS, 2009.
9. Harriott, Peter, Process Control, McGrawHill, New York, NY, 1964.
48
Acknowledgments
I gratefully acknowledge the process safety insights from my colleagues at Aker Solutions and
at the leading operating companies whose facilities we have helped to design, from Professors
Sam Mannan, Trevor Kletz, Ron Darby, Harry
West and the Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety
Center at Texas A & M University, and from
many others in the community of process safety
professionals. The financial support of Aker Solutions is also appreciated.
Author
Victor H. Edwards, P.E.,
is director of process safety
for Aker Solutions Americas Inc., (3010 Briarpark
Drive, Houston, TX 77042;
Phone:
713-270-2817;
Fax: 713-270-3195; mail:
vic.edwards@akersolutions.
com). In his 28 years with
Aker, Edwards experience
includes process engineering,
safety management and process, biochemical and environmental technologies. He has received numerous accolades in the
areas of safety and environmental engineering,
including five DuPont awards, and has contributed extensively to the engineering literature.
His earlier experience includes assistant professor of chemical engineering at Cornell University, an assignment at the National Science
Foundation, pharmaceutical research at Merck,
alternate energy research at United Energy
Resources, visiting professor at Rice University
and process engineering at Fluor Corp. Edwards
earned his B.A.Ch.E from Rice University and
his Ph.D. in chemical engineering from the University of California at Berkeley. A registered
professional engineer in Texas, he is an AIChE
Fellow, and a member of ACS, AAAS, NFPA,
NSPE, and the N.Y. Academy of Sciences.
Note: This article is based on a paper presented
at the Mary Kay OConnor International Symposium, Texas A & M University, October 27-28,
2009.
4. Gupta, J.R., and Edwards, D.W., Inherently
safer design Present and future, Process
Safety and Environmental Protection Transactions of the Institution of Chemical Engineers
Part B, Vol. 80, 115125, May 2002.
5. Gupta, J.R., Hendershot, D.C., and Mannan,
M.S., The real cost of process safety A clear
case for inherent safety, Process Safety and
Environmental Protection Transactions of
the Institution of Chemical Engineers Part
B, Vol. 81, No. B6, 406413, November 2003.
6. Hendershot, Dennis C., et al., Implementing inherently safer design in an existing plant, Process
Safety Progress, Vol. 25, No. 1, 5257, March 2006.
7. Kletz, Trevor A., Inherently safer design: The
growth of an idea, Process Safety Progress,
Vol. 15, No. 1, 58, Spring 1996.
8. Lutz, William K., Take chemistry and physics into consideration in all phases of chemical plant design, Process Safety Progress, Vol.
14, No. 3, 153160, July 1995.
9. Lutz, William K., Advancing inherent safety
into methodology, Process Safety Progress,
Vol. 16, No. 2, 8688, Summer 1997.
10. Maxwell, Gary R. Edwards, Victor H., Robertson, Mark, and Shah, Kamal, Assuring process
safety in the transfer of hydrogen cyanide manufacturing technology, Journal of Hazardous
Materials, Vol. 142, pp. 677684, June 2007.
11. Overton, Tim and King, George M., Inherently safer technology: An evolutionary approach, Process Safety Progress, Vol. 25, No.
2, 116119, June 2006.
12. Study, Karen, A real-llife example of choosing an
inherently safer process option, Process Safety
Progress, Vol. 25, No. 4, 274279, December 2006.
Solids Processing
What is self-heating?
Not all particulate solids that are classified as combustible dust (in other
words, pose a dust explosion hazard)
will self-heat at normal processing
temperatures, and conversely, some of
the materials that do self-heat react
too slowly to pose a dust explosion
hazard. Some materials can self-heat
at ambient temperatures, especially
in large-scale storage, but for most
materials the hazards arise when they
are heated.
Self-heating can arise by one of two
different mechanisms: by exothermic
(heat releasing) chemical reactions
and by exothermic decomposition.
The chemical reactions are often the
same as what occurs during a fire or
explosion: an oxidation reaction with
the oxygen in the air. At the start of
the self-heating process, the reaction
is very slow, like steel that oxidizes
45
Solids Processing
Figure 5. Basket test sample holders, for testing at different scales, allow extrapolation to large-scale storage conditions. The baskets typically have sides of 25, 50 and 100 mm
heat generation rate, increases exponentially with temperature. Consequently, the heat generation rate will
exceed the rate of heat loss and the
temperature of the material will rise
higher. This process is referred to as
self-heating. Self-heating begins at a
temperature at which the rate of heat
generation is greater than the rate of
heat loss and this temperature is called
the exothermic onset temperature.
Subsequent effects
In one incident, the powder in a fluidized bed dryer caught fire when the
powder conveyer in the dryer was
turned off in order to fix clogging in
an upstream wet-product conveyer.
During this period, the hot air supply
was continued.
A screening test was conducted to
determine whether this powder could
self-heat under the conditions that ex-
450
Temperature, C
400
Oven
75% height
50% height
25% height
12.5% height
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
100
200
300
400
Time, min
500
600
700
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
10
12
Figure 8. Using Equation (1), the exothermic onset temperatures of layers of the powder at different thicknesses were
calculated and the results plotted here. As the thickness of the
powder layer was increased from 1 to 12 in., the exothermic
onset temperature decreased by 48C
(1)
Where
Ta = Exothermic onset temperature for a powder layer, K
r
= One half of the powder layer
thickness, m
c = Frank-Kamenetskii-parameter, dimensionless
M, N = Constants determined by properties of the powder material
Using Equation (1), the exothermic
onset temperatures of layers of the
powder at different thicknesses were
calculated and the results are plotted (Figure 8). As the thickness of the
powder layer was increased from 1 to
12 in., the exothermic onset temperature decreased by 48C.
The powder layer in the dryer before
the incident was on the order of 48
in. This suggests that the exothermic
onset temperature for the powder layer
was well below the hot air temperature.
Ignition would occur if the heating time
exceeded the induction time.
Concluding remarks
Suggested reading
Authors
Vahid Ebadat is the CEO
of Chilworth North America
(Chilworth Global, Princeton, NJ; Phone: 609-7994449; Email: safety-usa@
chilworthglobal.com; Website:
www.chilworth.com). He holds
a B.S. in electrical engineering
and a Ph.D. from Southampton University. He has worked
extensively as a process and
operational hazards consultant for the chemical, pharmaceutical and food
industries. Ebadat is a regular speaker at training courses on gas and vapor flammability, dust
explosions, and controlling electrostatic hazards.
He is a member of NFPA 77 Technical Committee on Static Electricity; NFPA 654 Standard for
the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from
the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of
Combustible Particular Solids; and ASTM E27
Committee on Hazard Potential of Chemicals.
Ebadats research has culminated in the publication of numerous technical articles and papers.
Pieter Zeeuwen, is a senior
process safety specialist at
Chilworth Global. He holds
a M.Sc. in applied physics
from Eindhoven University
of Technology and has more
than 30 years experience
in the gas and dust explosion fields, including materials testing, small and large
scale explosion research, and
consultancy for industry and
government agencies in a number of countries.
His areas of expertise include gas and dust explosion hazard assessment, gas and dust explosion
prevention and protection, electrostatic hazard
assessment, hazardous area classification, and
gas cloud explosions as well as incident investigations. Over the years, Zeeuwen has served on
many working groups including various standards
committees, both nationally and internationally, for instance, most recently CEN (European
Standards Committee) working groups on explosion protection methods and on test methods. He
regularly lectures on various aspects of explosion
safety and acts as seminar chairman and course
director. Zeeuwen has published numerous articles in scientific journals and presented many
papers at international conferences.
47
Gas Hazard
Definitions and Data
Department Editor: Scott Jenkins
Oxygen deficiency
Normal ambient air contains 20.8 vol.% oxygen. When oxygen concentration dips below
19.5 vol.% of the total atmosphere, the area
is considered oxygen deficient. Oxygen deficiency may result from O2 being displaced by
other gases, such as carbon dioxide, and can
also be caused by rust, corrosion, fermentation
or other forms of oxidation that consume oxygen. Table 3 outlines the physiological effects
of oxygen deficiency by concentration.
If oxygen concentrations in the air rise
above 20.8%, the atmosphere is said to be
oxygen-enriched. Higher oxygen levels can
increase the likelihood and severity of a flash
fire or explosion, because the oxygen-enriched
atmosphere tends to be less stable than air.
Combustible atmospheres
Physiological effect
19.5 to 16
No visible effect
16 to 12
14 to 10
10 to 6
Below 6
Source: MSA
LEL
UEL
Methane
5.0 vol. %
15 vol. %
Hydrogen
4.0 vol. %
75 vol. %
Propane
2.1 vol. %
9.5 vol. %
Acetylene
2.5 vol. %
100 vol. %
Source: MSA
References
1. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety
& Health Administration (OSHA), 29 CFR
1910.1000 Table Z-1.
2. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH). NIOSH Pocket Guide to
Chemical Hazards. www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg.
Accessed March 2013.
3. Mine Safety Appliances Co., Gas Detection
Handbook 5th ed. MSA Instrument Div.,
August 2007.
4. National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 325:
Guide to Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable
Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids, 1994.
Static Electricity
Discharge and Fire
Prevention
Static risk
Static electricity discharges are possible almost continuously in the chemical process industries (CPI), because
static electricity is generated whenever
surfaces come into contact and then
separate. In most cases, the charging
currents generated over time in industrial processes are small typically no
greater than 1 104 Amps. However,
in hazardous areas, even small charges
can be a problem when the allowed to
accumulate on objects that are not at
ground (earth) potential. If no ground is
present, voltages in excess of 30 kV can
develop. Depending on the capacitance
of the object, this may result in significant levels of energy being available
for discharge. If the energy equals or
exceeds the minimum ignition energy
(MIE) of the surrounding flammable atmosphere, the potential for an explosion
and fire exist. Many commonly used
solvents and other flammable chemicals
have MIEs that are relatively low on
the order of 1 mJ or less (Table 1).
Isolated conductors
Minimum
Ignition Energy
(MIE), mJ
Carbon disulfide
Methanol
Xylene
Toluene
Propane
0.009
0.14
0.20
0.24
0.25
Ethyl acetate
Zirconium
Epoxy resin
Aluminum
Sugar
Wheat flour
0.46
5.00
9.00
10.00
30.00
50.00
Feature
Cover
Story
Report
Part 1
Designing for
A Safe Process
Phil Leckner
CH2M Hill Lockwood Greene
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Incorporating safety
considerations
throughout process
design lowers the risk of
a hazardous event
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simple overview of the major steps in a process
Basic Engineering
Process flow diagrams
30-33 Ce 12-06.indd 30
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1
After the PFDs are created and approved for design, a preliminary safety
review (PSR) is undertaken.
The PSR is the gathering of documentation with an emphasis on process safety. Included are items such as
the project scope definition, the process design basis, the process description and a material safety data sheet
(MSDS) for each substance used. An
extensive list of documentation that
may be included in the PSR can be
found in Ref. [2].
The MSDS is an important docu-
ment that provides a wealth of information including the proper handling of a substance, special storage
requirements (such as keep out of the
sun) and required personal-protection
equipment (PPE), such as breathing
apparatuses.
The MSDS also provides basic physical-property and toxicity data, exposure limits and flammability ranges.
It may describe what to do in case of
spills. The manufacturer or supplier
of the raw materials and various websites on the Internet are sources for
MSDSs. If the facility is producing a
finished product, then the plant owner
will have to develop an MSDS for
that product and make the document
available to potential users. Table 2
lists information typically found in an
MSDS.
Once the documentation is gathered, the PSR is assembled into a
formal report and issued to all pertinent members of the design team for
comment. The report is given to project management for distribution as a
revision 0 issue. Note that the PSR
is a living document and is subject to
change as the design progresses. The
PSR document is issued as soon as
feasibly possible because it will form
the foundation for the balance of the
safety review of the project.
30-33 Ce 12-06.indd 31
31
11/22/06 4:36:16 Pm
Cover Story
equipment placement, the American
Petroleum Institute (API; www.api.
org) recommends that all equipment
with a ground area of 2,500 to 5,000
ft2 should be considered part of the
same fire-relief scenario [4]. Determine if larger-sized equipment can
be moved outside the common fire
zone to reduce overall relieving capacity. Also be cognizant of where
chemicals are stored in proximity to
each other. You may not want acids
stored near bases, for example.
Locating flares in safe areas, taking
into account their radiation effects
at ground level.
Evaluating the need for and placement of, fire and gas detectors (for
more, see p.18).
With the major pressure-relief devices located and the operating and
design conditions fully defined, it is
appropriate to evaluate modifications
that might make the system safer.
For example, determine if there are
safety advantages to changing storage requirements from concentrated
solutions to more dilute solutions, or
vise-versa. Evaluate the advantages
and disadvantages of breaking unit
operations into smaller, more discrete
pieces to make process equipment,
such as heat exchangers and reactors,
smaller.
Preliminary hazard analysis. Finally, some type of preliminary hazard
analysis (PrHA) should be undertaken
before moving into the detailed process engineering phase of the project.
During a PrHA, team members visualize ways in which a process design
can malfunction or be operated incorrectly. The PrHA can take one of many
forms, such as a pre-HAZOP, a what
if, failure mode-and-effects analysis
(FMEA) or FMEA check list. The various types of hazard analyses that are
acceptable to the U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) are outlined in Refs. [2] and
[5]. The PrHA is performed on the detailed PFD that is issued for design.
The documents collected during the
PSR and the PDD provide reference
materials. Note that a preliminary or
IFD issue of the P&ID may have been
developed by this time and if so, would
be part of the PrHA.
At the conclusion of the design safety
32
Detailed Engineering
Piping and instrument diagram
At the start of the detailed processengineering phase of design, all outstanding issues and especially those
brought up during the design safety
review are examined and addressed.
The P&IDs, PFDs and the PDDs are
updated as required. The P&IDs are
then reviewed in a formal setting as
a team, which should include the process, mechanical, and piping and instrumentation engineers.
The review will expose any last minute safety and design issues that must
be addressed before the more detailed,
and required, process hazard analysis
(PHA) is undertaken. Changes are
documented by again updating the
P&IDs and PFDs. I suggest that these
documents be issued with a separate
revision number established exclusively for the PHA.
Table 1.
A methodology to promote
a safe process design
I. Basic process engineering
Create the process flow diagram
Perform a formal review of the process flow diagram
Conduct a preliminary safety review
Perform a design safety review
30-33 Ce 12-06.indd 32
11/22/06 4:37:10 Pm
Remarks
Date of preparation or revision The date the MSDS was prepared or revised
List of contacts that can provide more information
Physical characteristics
Physical hazards
For example, if the substance is subject to violent reactions such as explosions or fires
Health hazards
Exposure limits
Carcinogenic status
Control measures
References
1. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board website (www.csb.gov)
2. The Center for Chemical Process Safety,
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures with Worked Examples, 2nd ed.,
AIChE, 1992.
3. National Fire Protection Association, NFPA
70, National Electric Code, Chapter 5,
2005.
4. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended
Management of change
Author
Phil Leckner is a senior
process engineer with CH2MHILL
Lockwood
Greene
(Phone: 732-868-2277; Email:
Philip.leckner@ch2m.com).
Phil has over 30 years experience in process design and
project engineering, and commissioning and startup for the
chemical, petrochemical, foodand-beverage and bio-pharmaceutical industries. Over the
past 10 years, he has been deeply involved with
process-safety issues with emphasis on reliefsystem design. He has been involved in a number
of PHAs, including serving as HAZOP and What
if? facilitator. Phil received his B.S.Ch.E. from
Lowell Technological Institute, which is now part
of the University of Massachusetts.
30-33 Ce 12-06.indd 33
33
11/22/06 4:38:02 Pm
Cover Story
Figure 1. When
engineering controls
are not enough to
reduce or eliminate
airborne hazards,
respirators are
needed for protection
Clearing the
Air About
Respiratory
Protection
Learn the basics about selection
and regulatory compliance for these
potentially life-saving devices
Dennis Capizzi
MSA Safety
What is a respirator?
The appropriate use of respiratory protection is not only important for worker
health and safety in the U.S., it is
the law. The U.S. Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) is
Establishing a program
FIgure 2. This is an example of a
full-facepiece respirator that covers the
wearers face from the hairline to below
the chin
29
Cover Story
Hazard assessment
sec (d)
Filtering facepiece
sec (c)(2)(ii)
Traditional facepiece
sec (c)(2)(i)
Program evaluation
sec (l)
Record keeping
sec (m)
breathing resistance.
SCBAs and some chemical canister respirators provide a warning of
remaining service time. This may be
a pressure gage or timer with an audible alarm for SCBAs or a color ESLI
on the cartridge or canister. The user
should understand the operation and
limitations of each type of warning
device. For the many gas masks and
chemical-cartridge respirators without ESLI devices, the employer must
establish and enforce a cartridge or
canister change schedule. Employees
should begin each work shift with new
canisters and cartridges.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
that every employee can select an acceptable respirator that fits properly.
Corrective eyeglasses worn by
employees can also present a problem when fitting respirators. Special
mountings are available to hold corrective lenses inside full facepieces.
A qualified individual must fit the
facepiece and lenses to provide good
vision, comfort and proper sealing.
Tight-fitting respirators cannot provide proper protection without a tight
seal between the facepiece and the
wearers face. Consequently, beards
and other facial hair, the absence of
normally worn dentures, facial deformities, jewelry or head gear that projects under the facepiece seal can also
seriously affect the fit of a facepiece.
To ensure proper respiratory protection, check the facepiece each time you
wear the respirator. You can do this by
performing either a positive-pressure
or negative-pressure user-seal check.
Detailed instructions for performing
these checks are in Appendix B-1 of
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134.
Qualitative versus quantitative
fit testing. Fit testing is required for
tight-fitting facepiece respirators. You
can test the effectiveness of the fit of
the facepiece two ways: qualitatively
and quantitatively.
Qualitative fit testing involves the
It is important to inspect all respirators for wear and tear before and
after each use, giving special attention to rubber or plastic parts that
can deteriorate or lose pliability. All
parts including the facepiece, headband, valves, connecting tube, fittings
and cartridges, canisters or filters
must be in good condition. A respirator inspection must include check-
31
Cover Story
a detergent solution and then disinfected by immersing them in a sanitizing solution. Cleaner-sanitizers
that effectively clean the respirator
and contain a bactericidal agent are
commercially available. Strong cleaning and sanitizing agents and many
solvents can damage rubber or plastic
respirator parts. Use these materials
with caution or after consultation with
the respirator manufacturer.
Store respirators in a manner that
provides protection against dust, sunlight, heat, extreme cold, excessive
moisture and damaging chemicals.
When packed or stored, each respirator should be positioned to retain its
natural configuration. Facepieces and
exhalation valves should rest in a normal position to prevent the rubber or
plastic from deforming.
Manufacturers tools
FigureS 4a and 4b. Supplied-air respirators are designed to provide breathable air
from a clean air source other than the surrounding work atmosphere. They include selfcontained breathing apparatus units (left) and air-line respirators (right)
References
1. A list of NIOSH-approved respirators can be
found at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/cel/
2. About ANSI Overview, http://ansi.org/about_
a n s i / o v e r v i e w / o v e r v i e w. a s p x ? m e n u i d
=1 (accessed September 18, 2012)
3. The ANSI/AIHA Z88.2 Standard Practices
for Respiratory Protection is available on
the ANSI website, www.ansi.org
4. Federal Register, p. 1272, col.1 OSHA
1910.134(d)(3)(iii)
Author
Dennis Capizzi is the product line manager for air purifying respirators at MSA
Safety
(1100
Cranberry
Woods Dr., Cranberry Twp.,
PA, 16066; Phone: 724-7768600; Email: dennis.capizzi@
MSAsafety.com), where he
has worked since 2007. He
serves as head of the North
American Air-Purifying Respirator Steering Team, and
has a seat on the International Safety Equipment Assn.s Committee for Respiratory Protective Escape Devices.
ThyssenKrupp Uhde
www.uhde.eu
Circle 16 on p. 60 or go to adlinks.che.com/40274-16
Chemical Engineering www.che.com December 2012
33
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Eye-and-Face Personal
Protective
Equipment
Gateway Safety
48
FIGURE 1.
Safety glasses help
shield eyes from impact hazards
OSHA compliance
Gateway Safety
Hazard type
Examples of hazard
Impact
Heat
Dust
Harmful dust
Optical
radiation
Chemicals
FIGURE 2. Face
shields protect the
entire face, but do not
protect the eyes from
impact hazards when
worn alone. Safety glasses
or goggles should also be worn
implementation
Hazard assessment
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), Eye and
Face Protection eTool, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/eyeandface/ppe/selection.html
PPE selection
49
Environmental Manager
Face shields (Figure 2) are intended
to protect the entire face or portions of
it, but they do not protect employees
eyes from impact hazards when worn
alone. Face shields should be used in
combination with safety spectacles or
goggles for additional protection. Faceshield windows are made of varying
types of transparent materials and
in varying thicknesses, both of which
should be considered when selecting
face shields for specific tasks. Window
and headgear devices are available in
various combinations to be compatible
with other PPE, such as hardhats.
Welding shields (Figure 3) provide
eye and face protection from flying
particulate matter during welding,
thermal cutting and other hot-work
activities. These shields are typically
equipped with shaded lenses that provide protection from optical radiation.
Heat hazards. Working with heat
requires goggles or safety spectacles
with special-purpose lenses and side
shields. However, many heat-hazard
exposures require the use of a face
shield in addition to safety spectacles
or goggles. When selecting PPE, consider the source and intensity of the
heat and the type of splashes that may
occur in the workplace.
Chemical hazards. Safety goggles
(Figure 4) protect the eyes, eye sockets, and the facial area immediately
surrounding the eyes from a variety of chemical hazards. The protective seal formed around the eyes is
especially important when working with or around liquids that may
splash, spray or mist. Several kinds
of cover-type goggles are available:
direct vented, indirectly vented or
non-vented. Its important to select
the right type. Vented goggles, for
example, may be less effective in protecting the eyes from splashes and
respiratory aerosols than non-vented
or indirectly vented goggles.
Face shields are intended to protect
the entire face from a variety of chemical hazards, particularly when pouring chemicals or where splashes may
occur. Face shields are considered secondary protection and must be used in
addition to safety goggles to provide
adequate protection.
Dust hazards. Working in a dusty environment can cause eye injuries and
50
Gateway Safety
Employee training
Emergency care
OSHA mandates that if a hazard exists, a means for flushing the eye must
be provided. The eye-and-face protection program should include considerations for emergency eyewash stations
that provide a full 15-min flush. There
is an ANSI standard (Z358) for eyewash stations. In the field, eyewash
bottles can be on hand for interim assistance until an eyewash station can
be reached. There are also portable
eyewash stations available that can
dispense water for 15 minutes.
Resources
Edited by Dorothy Lozowski
References
1. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Case and Demographic Characteristics for Work-related
Injuries and Illnesses Involving Days Away
From Work (2006), http://stats.bls.gov/iif/oshcdnew.htm
2. Occupational Safety & Health Administration Inspection Data, http://www.osha.gov/
pls/imis/industryprofile.html
3. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Employer Payment for Personal
Protective Equipment; Final Rule FR
72:64341-64430, Table XV-2 l, Vol. 72, No.
220, Nov. 15, 2007.
4. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, Compliance Guidelines for Hazard
Assessment and Personal Protective Equipment Selection, 29 CFR 1910, Subpart I, Appendix B .
5. Contact Lens Use in a Chemical Environment, Current Intelligence Bulletin 59,
NIOSH Publication No. 2005-139, June 2005.
Author
Victor DAmato is the director for Atrium Environmental,
Health and Safety Services,
LLC (11495 Sunset Hills Road
Suite 210, Reston, VA 20190;
Phone: 7036899482; Email:
vdamato@atriumehs.com). He
has been providing environmental, safety and industrial
hygiene support to manufacturing, research and development, utilities, telecommunications, aerospace, shipyard, facilities management
and defense industries for more than 20 years.
He has a B.S. in Environmental Health from Old
Dominion University, and a M.S. in Engineering
Management from The George Washington University. He is an American Board of Industrial
Hygiene Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) and
a Board of Certified Safety Professionals Certified Safety Professional (CSP). He is a member
of the American Industrial Hygiene Association
(AIHA) and has served as president of the AIHA
Potomac Section.
51
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Managing Compliant
MSDSs and Labels
Compliant MSDS programs
depend on inventory management,
regulatory knowledge and consistent authoring
Jytte Syska and Tamie Webber
3E Company
MSDS management
Figure 1.
The advent of GHS and R
EACH regulations brings new
challenges to the already demanding and mission-critical task of
authoring compliant MSDSs
longer possible unless the importer or manufacturer has registered under REACH. Many
of the substances that were
registered for the December 1, 2010 deadline have
exposure scenarios. The
registrant must attach the appropriate exposure scenarios to
their MSDSs, and the company
using these substances must
then include the information from the exposure scenarios when they prepare
and supply the MSDSs to their
customers. The European Chemical Agency (ECHA) has recommended a four-section exposure-scenario format, but
many different formats are
being used. Work is ongoing
to harmonize the information in
the exposure scenarios and to
establish a common XML format for data exchange.
As a step toward improved
compliance, companies should
obtain the necessary overview of
the current regulations and detailed
understanding of how they relate
to their chemicals and their
supply chain. Manufacturers,
users and distributors should
be aware not only of their own
obligations but also of those to
downstream customers and to employees. In addition, corporate
product-stewardship
staff
must understand when these
regulations are implemented
by country in order to know
how to properly plan.
43
Environmental Manager
GHS
GHS is the United Nations (UN) system for harmonization of classification and labeling of chemicals. GHS
has already been officially adopted by
certain countries in regions around
the globe. Countries can choose to
implement GHS in its entirety or
implement only certain parts of the
regulation, otherwise known as the
building block approach.
The true complexity of the standard is realized when reviewing its
implementation status in a sample of
countries around the world. For representative comparison purposes, we
have provided a brief overview of the
status of GHS in the following areas:
the U.S., Japan and the E.U.
The U.S. On September 30, 2009, the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Admin. (OSHA; Washington, D.C.;
www.osha.gov) released its proposal
to modify the current Hazard Communication Standard (HCS) to conform
with the GHS.
The proposed OSHA revisions include both philosophical and tactical
changes to hazard communications,
which have far-reaching implications
for MSDSs and the authoring, publishing, distribution and management
of labels. The proposal also includes
revised criteria for the classification
of hazardous chemicals, as well as
changes to definitions and terms used
in the standards, and new training
requirements for employees. When
the final rule is promulgated, companies will
face many challenges,
including re-evaluating how their substances and mixtures
are classified, re-issuing MSDSs and labels,
Figure 2.
Service providers
can help companies
stay ahead of the
regulatory compliance curve
44
REACH
ing, the compliance work for companies manufacturing in, importing into
or exporting from European countries.
As a result of the new legislation, all
companies manufacturing, importing,
distributing or using chemical substances (on their own, in mixtures or
in articles) in Europe, are required to
closely examine their chemical inventory for substances within the scope of
the regulation to ensure compliance.
Key components of REACH mandate the following:
Registration of manufactured/imported chemical substances
Increased information and communication throughout the entire supply chain
Evaluation of some registered substances
Authorization for use of substances
of very high concern
Restriction of the use of certain substances for specific applications
The scope of REACH is vast, and
there are several issues that could
impact a companys ability to meet
its obligations under REACH, including changes to the content of MSDSs.
Under REACH, additional information
from manufacturers is required and
the information must be aligned with
that associated with the registration of
the substance. When an exposure scenario has been required as part of the
REACH registration of a substance,
every safety data sheet for a product
containing this substance must have
the exposure scenario attached.
References
1. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), webpage, (www.csb.gov).
2. Center for Chemical Process Safety. Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures
With Worked Examples (2nd Ed.), AIChE,
1992.
3. American Equipment, Inc., Process Safety
Management Guidelines for Compliance,
OSHA document 3133, 1994 Appendix., copyright 1999 2005; www.exforklifts.com.
Authors
Jytte Syska is managing director of 3E Company Europe
ApS (Lyngbyvej 20, 3, DK
2100, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Phone: +1-760-602-8700; Email: jsyska@3ecompany.com)
and president of Ariel operations. Syska has more than 20
years of experience as an environmental, Health and Safety
(EHS) regulatory expert.
Prior to her present duties,
she spent several years as 3Es vice president of
international operations. Syska has also held the
position of director of occupational health and
toxicology for the prestigious Danish Toxicology
Center (DTC). Syska holds an M.S. degree in
civil engineering from the Technical University
of Denmark. She is fluent in Danish and English,
and reads and understands German, French,
Norwegian and Swedish.
Tamie Webber is director of
product management at 3E
Company and is responsible
for product management initiatives, product planning
and strategies and product
development for 3Es product
line, including MSDS distribution and management,
emergency response, regulatory reporting, training and
waste services. She joined 3E
after several years of marketing and product
management experience in the chemical distribution and high-tech industries. She has worked
for Great Western Chemical and Intel Corp. She
holds a B.S. degree in finance and marketing
from the University of Oregon.
45
Feature
Cover
Story
Report
Identify
raw materials
& intermediates
START
Background
Assess
hazard
potential
Measure
relevant
properties
Preliminary
process
configuration
Define operating
conditions /
window
Investigate alternate
unit operations, configuration
and raw materials
Shrikant Dhodapkar
Konanur Manjunath
Pradeep Jain
The Dow Chemical Company
hemicals, plastics, pharmaceutical, food, agricultural chemicals,
coal and bio-chemical industries
have a wide array of processes
where the raw materials, intermediates and products are in particulate
form. Hazards associated with particulate solids are unique, and in most
cases depend on the particle size. The
purpose of this paper is to present a
systematic framework for designing
particulate processes with appropriate pointers towards relevant sources
in the public domain. We hope to raise
safety awareness among chemical engineers dealing with particulate solids.
It is not possible to design and operate a process safely and reliably unless
the equipment suppliers, design team
and plant personnel are aware of the
potential hazards. Hazard awareness
should include material properties, process design and operational issues. The
readers are strongly encouraged to read
relevant references cited in this article.
Review
MSDS, tech
datasheets
Key Issues
No
OSHA standards
EPA regulations
Management of change
Employee training & documentation
Preventive maintenance vs.
predictive maintenance
Assess
severity of
process hazards
LO
PA
Process
risk
acceptable?
Identify measures
to reduce
hazard severity
Yes
Design
Installation
Operation &
maintenance
Key Issues
Proper
installation
of process
Testing and
inspection
Guidelines
for on-site
fabrication
The hazards associated with particulate process can be broadly categorized per the following:
12/26/06 5:22:55 PM
Fuel
Others
26%
Ignition
Dispersion
Confinement
Dust collector
26%
Mixers/
blenders 4%
Grinders /
pulverizers
13%
Oxygen
Dryers
9%
Conveying
systems
10%
Definition
ASTM Test
Method
Application
KSt
ASTM E
1226
Pmax
Maximum explosion
overpressure generated
in the test chamber
ASTM E
1226
(dp/dt)max
ASTM E
1226
MIE
ASTM E
2019
MEC
Minimum explosible
concentration
ASTM E
1515
LOC
ECT
Electrostatic charging
tendency
No ASTM
standard
Silos /bunkers
12%
35
12/26/06 5:23:22 PM
Cover Story
and CCPS Guidelines [1, 9] on reactivity hazard evaluation are excellent
resources. Other resources are listed
in Table 3.
Toxicity. Inhalation of fine particles
(typically 0.2 to 7 m [1]) poses respiratory hazard since the particles can
get lodged in the lungs. Other potential hazards include ingestion, dermal
contact and eye contact. It is also important to evaluate the carcinogenicity and allergenic properties of particulate solids. Relevant parameters are
summarized in Table 4.
Instability. Instability refers to materials susceptibility to release energy
either through decomposition or polymerization. NFPA 704 provides classification 0 to 4 in increasing order of
instability hazard. Many U.S.-based
companies include this information in
the MSDSs. Methods for measuring instability are described in Table 5.
Standard
NFPA 61
NFPA 68
NFPA 69
NFPA 654
NFPA 70
NFPA 499
NFPA 655
NFPA 664
Title
Standard for the Prevention of Fires
and Dust Explosions in Agricultural
and Food Processing Facilities
Coverage or Purpose
Applies to facilities that receive, dry,
handle, process, blend, use, mill, package,
store, or ship bulk dry agricultural material;
their products or dusts; or facilities that
handle or manufacture starch, or facilities
that handle and process oil seed
Guidelines for Deflagration Venting Provides technical guidance on designing,
sizing, installing, and maintaining deflagration vents
Standard on Explosion Prevention Addresses the design of explosion prevenSystems
tion, protection, and mitigation systems
Applies to the manufacturing,
It covers all combustible dusts, except those
processing, blending, conveying,
specifically addressed in other NFPA stanrepackaging, and handling of
dards, and is one of the most cited docucombustible particulate solids and ments for control measures for combustible
their dusts
dust hazards (OSHA, 2005; CCPS, 2005)
The National Electric Code 2005 Addresses electrical equipment and wiring
requirements for special situations, including those in which an explosive atmosphere may exist. Defines combustible-dust
classified locations
Recommended Practice for the
Provides guidance for classifying dust proClassification of Combustible
cessing locations for electrical equipment
Dusts and Hazardous (Classified) installation
Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas
Standard for the Prevention of Sul- Discusses facilities that handle, grind, profur Fires and Explosions
cess, pulverize, or crush elemental sulfur
Standard for the Prevention of Fires Discusses facilities that process or manuand Explosions in Wood Processing facture wood and wood products, or that
and Woodworking Facilities
create wood dust and particles
The EPA/NOAA Reactivity Worksheet defines 47 chemical groupings for reactivity hazard considerations. Representative groupings and combinations of groupings are shown in Table 2-10 of
Ref [1]
Coast Guard Chemical This chart has 22 primary reactive groupings, and another 14
Compatibility Chart
groups that may potentially react with some of the primary
groups. An X in a particular cell of the chart indicates that the
corresponding combination of groupings should be avoided because of reactivity problems
Chemical-Specific Com- These are matrices that provide summary descriptions or hazard
patibility Charts
ratings for pairs of specific chemicals, as opposed to chemical
groupings. The hazards of the individual materials are indicated
in the cells along the diagonal, while the hazards of binary combinations are indicated in the cells below the diagonal
Assess severity
of process hazards
12/26/06 5:23:49 PM
Governing body
American Conference of
Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)
OSHA
American Conference of
Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)
Amount
Maximum exposure concentration
recommended
Maximum permissible exposure limit
for systemic workplace 8-hour timeweighted average exposures
Concentration that poses a threat of
either death, adverse health effects,
or inability to escape danger without
respiratory protective equipment.
Limiting exposure concentration for
exposure durations up to 15 minutes,
of Particulate Materials
Parameter
Differential
Mackey test
Standard
ASTM
Self-accelerating
decomposition
temperature
Relative selfignition temperature
Coal dust adiabatic heating
Procedure
Open-top double chamber for test sample and
inert sample with a 10 g
of sample for up to 72 hrs
BAM SADT
0.5 liter Dewar in oven
with 400 ml of sample
size for 168 hrs
VDI 2263
Grewer oven with preheated air flow with 8 ml
sample for uptp 5.5 hrs
Bureau Mines AdiaOven with preheated air
batic Heating Oven (RI flow with 100 g
8473)
Application
In the case of
particulate materials prone to
self-heating and
possible spontaneous ignition, in unit
operations such as
drying at elevated
temperature, heating, and deposition
of solids on heated
surfaces.
Identify measures
to reduce hazard severity
Process safety system measures or design solutions can be grouped into the
following three categories:
1. Inherently safer processes / passive
2. Active
3. Procedural
Inherently safer processes refer to selection of alternate process conditions
or materials that are less hazardous. A
common example would be the use of
water as a solvent in paint formulation
as compared to an organic solvent. For
particulate processes, particles with
larger particle size can be produced
through agglomeration. However, the
feasibility of this approach depends on
the chemistry of the process and final
application of the product.
Other ideas include minimizing
hazardous material in the process,
designing the process with less severe
conditions (temperature and pressure)
and simplifying process configuration.
Passive systems rely on reducing the
frequency and consequences of an incident through process or equipment
design, and without the use of any ac-
37
12/26/06 5:24:16 PM
CC
A
ET
Sa
fe
t
Ch y re
ec vi
e
Re klis w
t
la
tiv
PH e
ra
A
nk
W
in
ha
g
t
W -if
ha
t
HA -if c
ZO he
FM P ckl
is
EA
t
FT
Cyclone
Solvent
recycle
Reactants
A
B
Solid-liquid
separation
Detailed engineering
Dust
collector
Silo
Construction / start-up
Reactor
Routine operation
Expansion or modification
Dryer
Additives
Incident investigation
Decommissioning
Mixer
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Commonly
used
Figure 5.
Pneumatic
Example of solids
conveying
processing plant with
some typical unit operations
FIBC
Process design
Installation
12/26/06 5:24:56 PM
Unit
Operation
Potential Failure
Scenario /
Process Hazard
Explosive concentration in headspace
Design Solutions
Procedural
Ground and
bond all conductors and personnel
Preventive maintenance; Monitor
vibrations
Frequent cleaning cycle
Ungrounded
Maintenance
Summary
Acknowledgements
References
1. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Safe Handling of Powders and Bulk
Solids, AIChE, 2005.
2. Eckhoff, R., Dust Explosion in Process Industries, Butterworth-Heinneman, 1997.
3. National Fire Protection Association, Bulletins 654 and 59.
4. Bartknecht, W., Dust Explosions: Course,
Prevention, Protection, Springer-Verlag,
New York, 1989.
5. Babrauskas, V., Ignition Handbook, Fire
Science Publishers, Society of Fire Protection
Engineers (NFPA), Quincy, MA, 2003.
6. Standard for Prevention of Fire and Dust
Explosion from the Manufacturing Processing and Handling of Combustible Particulate
Solids, NFPA 654, 2005.
Authors
Shrikant V. Dhodapkar is a
technical leader in the Process
Fundamentals Group at The
Dow Chemical Co. (B-4810, Dow
Chemical, Freeport, TX 77541;
Phone: 979-238-7940; Fax: 979238-7463; E-mail: sdhodapkar
@dow.com). He received his
B.Tech. in Chemical Engineering from I.I.T-Delhi (India) and
his M.S.Ch.E. and Ph.D. from
the University of Pittsburgh.
During the past 18 years, he has published numerous papers in particle technology and contributed
chapters to several handbooks. He has extensive
industrial experience in powder characterization,
fluidization, pneumatic conveying, silo design, gassolid separation, mixing, coating and the design of
solids processing plants. He is a member of AIChE
and chair of the Particle Technology Forum.
Manjunath Konanur is a
core technology discipline
leader for solids processing
at The Dow Chemical Co.
(APB/1624, Dow Chemical,
Freeport, Tx 77541. Phone:
979-238-1501; Fax: 979-2380688; E-mail: KManjunath@
dow.com. Previous to joining
Dow, he worked in Norway,
with
CMR/POSTEC
and
Norsk Hydro as a principal
scientist and group leader for solids processing.
He received B.E.(Hons.) from the University of
Mysore (India) in mechanical engineering and
Ph.D. in solids processing from the University
of Newcastle, Australia. He has about 20 years
of experience in solids processing focusing on
various aspects of characterization, storage,
conveying, drying including dust explosion and
electrostatics for integrated designs and has contributed more than 30 publications.
Pradeep Jain is a Sr. Scientist in the Performance Plastics & Chemicals process R&D
at The Dow Chemical Co. (B4810, Dow Chemical, Freeport, TX 77541; Phone:979238-2782; Fax:979-238-2347;
Email: pjain@dow.com). He
received his B.Tech. In Chemical Engineering with honors
from the Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University (India) and his M.S.ChE from the University
of New Mexico. Over the past 20 years, he has
led the process development for the properiatery
olefins polymerization technologies, including
INSITE* and INFUSE*. He has extensive industrial experience in reaction kinetics, reactor
design and heat transfer and has designed the
processes that helped launch several new products, including AFFINITY*, ENGAGE*, ELITE*,
VERSIFY* and more recently INFUSE*. He has
been awarded several patents for these breakthrough product and process technologies. He is
a member of AIChE.
7. Standard System for Identification of the
Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, NFPA 704, 2007.
8. Bretherick, L., Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, (4th Edition), Butterworths,
London, 1990.
9. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures With Worked Examples (2nd Edition), Center
for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE, 1992.
10. Sax, I. and Lewis, R., Hazardous Chemicals
Desk Reference, Van Nostrand Reinhold,
New York, 1987.
11. Iinoya, K, Masuda, H. and Watanabe, K.,
Powder and Bulk Solids Handling Processes, Marcel-Dekker, New York, 1988.
12. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Layer
of Protection Analysis Simplified Process
Risk Assessment, Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE, 2001.
39
12/26/06 5:25:23 PM
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Factors to Consider
FIGURE 1.
Nitrile gloves
are low cost and have
excellent physical
properties, providing
protection against
oils and grease,
xylene, perchloroethylene and
aliphatic
solutions
Glove types
Laminate
Nitrile
Neoprene
Polyvinyl
Chloride
PVC
NR
E
P
NR
E
P
Natural
Latex
Butyl
Viton
E
E
E
F
E
NR
Polyvinyl
Alcohol
PVA
P
NR
E
G
F
G
Acetone
Ammonium hydroxide
Butyl glycol ether
Ethyl acetate
Ethylene glycol
Gasoline (hi-test)
Hydrochloric acid,
concentrated
Hydrofluoric acid, 48%
Methanol
Methylene chloride
N-Methyl-2-Pyrrolidone
Mineral spirits, rule 66
Perchloroethylene
Sulfuric acid, concentrated
Xylene
>480
E
>480
>480
>480
E
NR
>480
E
NR
E
E
E
E
E
G
E
NR
>480
>480
>480
E
>480
F
P
>480
>480
NR
>480
>480
>480
>480
NR
>480
>480
>480
>480
E
>480
>480
>480
>480
>480
E
E
NR
NR
E
E
NR
G
>480
E
NR
NR
E
NR
F
NR
NR
NR
G
NR
E
E
NR
E
G
G
NR
NR
F
NR
G
NR
E
E
NR
E
NR
NR
NR
NR
>480
>480
G
>480
60
P
>480
P
180
F
E
NR
>480
E
>480
E
Fabric gloves
Chemical Barriers
53
Environmental Manager
against aldehydes and ketones.
Advantages: Low in cost, good physical properties, good cut protection in
heavy duty styles1, excellent dexterity
Disadvantages: Poor protection
against oils, greases and organic compounds; risk of protein allergies. Some
manufacturers use shortcuts that result in a poor quality product
Nitrile gloves (Figure 1) are generally available as disposable, mediumweight unsupported, or lightweight
supported styles. They protect against
oils and greases (including animal
fats), xylene, perchloroethylene and
aliphatic solvents. They also protect
against most agricultural pesticide
formulations, chemicals and biological components used in weapons, and
other chemicals.
Advantages: Low in cost, excellent
physical properties, good dexterity; excellent resistance to snags, punctures,
abrasions and cuts
Disadvantages: Poor protection
against many ketones, some aromatic chemicals, and medium-polar
compounds
Neoprene
54
medium-weight unsupported,
medium-weight supported and
heavy supported styles. Neoprene protects against a broad
range of oils, oxidizing acids
(nitric and sulfuric), polar aromatics (phenol and aniline),
glycol ethers, oils, greases and
many other chemicals. Other
types of gloves may, however,
offer better protection against
some of these chemicals.
Advantages: Medium cost,
FIGURE 2. Natural-rubber latex gloves are availmedium physical properties, able in many styles and provide excellent protecmedium but broad-ranging tion from bases, alcohols and dilute water solutions of many chemicals
chemical resistance
Disadvantages: Less resistant to snags, punctures, abrasions and Disadvantages: Poor resistance to
cuts than nitrile or natural rubber
certain solvents, including ketones,
esters and amines; poor physical properties, extremely expensive
Butyl rubber
Butyl rubber is used only in mediumweight unsupported gloves (Figure 3). Sealed-film (laminate) gloves
Advantages: Dexterity and out- Laminate is one of the most chemistanding resistance to moderately cally resistant materials available
polar organic compounds, such as and protects against almost anyaniline and phenol, glycol ethers, thing, including most chemicals and
ketones and aldehydes
biological compounds used in weapDisadvantages: Poor protection ons. Gloves made with this material
against non-polar solvents, including are excellent for hazmat applications.
hydrocarbons, chloro- and fluoro-car- Laminate gloves are often used as
bons; expensive
liners, which takes advantage of their
thinness and is often the best way to
address their disadvantages.
Polyvinyl alcohol (PVA)
PVA is used for medium-weight sup- Advantages: Moderate cost; thin;
ported gloves that provide a high level outstanding resistance to almost all
of resistance to many organic chemi- organic compounds
cals, such as aliphatics, aromatics, Disadvantages: No grip finish, poor
chlorinated solvents, fluorocarbons physical properties (very low resisand most ketones (except acetone), es- tance to physical damage), not as
form-fitting as dipped gloves
ters and ethers.
Advantages: Very rugged and highly
chemical-resistant; good physical Chemical
properties with resistance to snags, Resistance Tests
punctures, abrasions and cuts
Chemical-resistant gloves are typiDisadvantages: Will quickly break cally tested for degradation, permedown when exposed to water and ation-breakthrough times, and final
light alcohols, less flexible than many permeation rates.
other types of chemically resistant
Degradation is a deleterious change
gloves, expensive
in the physical properties of a glove
due to the effects of a chemical. It is
commonly evaluated by measuring
Viton
This compound is used primarily in weight or dimension changes upon
medium-weight unsupported gloves to exposure. Currently, no widely used
protect against aromatics, chlorinated standard degradation test exists for
gloves, although several groups have
solvents, aliphatics and alcohols.
Advantages: Good dexterity, out- tried to converge on one. The problem
standing resistance to many organic is that during actual use, only the outside of a glove is exposed to chemicals,
compounds
ASTM F 739
This is the permeation test most commonly used and represents the original permeation standard, although a
substantial amount of data has been
accumulated since it was first issued.
European-standards writers adopted
ASTM F 739 with minor modifications as EN 388. During testing, permeation test cells are filled once and
remain filled. The results typically
provide the time delay until the chemical breaks through, and the flowrate
through the material, which increases
to a final constant value.
Method F 739 does not realistically
simulate most end uses for chemically
resistant gloves. During actual use,
gloves are likely to be warmed by the
ASTM F 1383
show how much of a chemical permeates the glove barrier during continuous exposure. While lower ratings are
better, there is still no allowable skin
contact threshold limit value (TLV) for
any chemical. Most people who select
gloves tend to pay more attention to
the breakthrough time.
ConclusionS
Edited by Dorothy Lozowski
Notes
1. Kevlar is a registered trademark of Dupont.
Dyneema is a registered trademark of Royal
DSM, N.V. Lycra is a registered trademark of
Invista.
2. Neither this article nor any other statement
made herein by or on behalf of Ansell should
be construed as a warranty of merchantability or that any Ansell product is fit for
a particular purpose. Ansell assumes no responsibility for the suitability or adequacy of
an end users selection of gloves or clothing
for a specific indication. Upon request, Ansell
will provide a sample of material to aid you
in making your own selection to meet your
own individual safety requirements.
Author
Nelson Schlatter is a technical applications
chemist for Ansell Occupational Healthcare
(1300 Walnut St., Coshocton, OH 43812; Phone:
740-623-3591; Email: nschlatter@ansell.com;
Fax: 740-623-3556). He has worked with Ansell
for 30 years on the chemical interaction and processing of textiles, rubber and solvents. He presently answers technical inquiries and provides
recommendations regarding the proper use of
Ansell gloves and clothing. Schlatter holds a B.S.
degree from the University of Delaware. He is
an active member of ASTM Committee F-23 on
Protective Clothing and belongs to International
Safety Equipment Organization Committees on
hand protection and clothing.
55
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Figure 1.
The lack of proper
dust-control techniques can result in
catastrophic fires
and explosions in
many types of
facilities
Walter S. Kessler
Chilworth Technology, Inc.
Regulations
59
Environmental Manager
dards for specific industries and
processes, such as: NFPA 61 (Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Dust Explosions in Agricultural and
Food Products Facilities), NFPA 484
(Standard for Combustible Metals) and NFPA 664 (Standard for
the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Working Facilities). These standards
hold, as a top priority, the action
of minimizing and controlling dust
and particulate matter in processing industries from both a fire- and
explosion-hazard safety standpoint.
In addition to the human-health
impact, combustible airborne dust
and particulates in the right environment where confinement, dispersion, concentration, oxidants and
ignition are present or potentially
present can create explosions.
Combustible dust, according to both
OSHA (CPL 03-00-008) and NFPA
654, is defined as a particulate solid
that presents a fire or deflagration
hazard when suspended in air or
some other oxidizing medium over a
range of concentrations, regardless
of particle size or shape. The most
common industrial sources of combustible dust include: food (such as
candy, sugar, spice, starch, flour and
feed), grain, tobacco, plastics, wood,
paper, pulp, rubber, textiles, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, dyes, coal,
metals (such as aluminum, chromium, iron, magnesium and zinc),
and fossil-fuel power generation [3].
When these dusts are ignited, they
can produce a fireball 810 times
larger than the original volume of
the cloud in the absence of confinement. Conversely, in a confined environment, explosive pressures can
increase to as high as 810 times
the original pressure.
Control measures
Avoiding incidents
Figure 4. The dust explosion pentagon represents the conditions that can
lead to a catastrophic event
ing work area. This becomes especially problematic when employees may have direct contact with
powder or dusty materials, such
as when pouring bags into reactors or vessels (Figure 3). Also,
the employer did not prevent the
escape of dust from the packaging
equipment, creating a dust cloud
in the work area
Interior surfaces where dust accumulations could occur were not
designed or constructed to facilitate cleaning or to minimize combustible-dust accumulations. Regular cleaning frequencies were not
established for walls, floors and
horizontal surfaces, such as ducts,
pipes, hoods, ledges and beams
Compressed air was periodically
used to clean up the combustibledust accumulation in the presence
of ignition sources
Explosion vents on dust collectors and bucket elevators were
directed into work areas and not
vented to a safe, outside location away from platforms, means
of egress or other potentially
occupied areas
Process hazard analysis (PHA)
was not conducted to determine
whether the process hazards necessitated the installation of approved devices, such as explosionprotection systems, interlocked
rotary valves, deflagration vents
and flame-front diverters
The employer did not provide
adequate maintenance and design of dust-collector systems,
which created insufficient air aspirations, low duct velocities and
blocked ducts
Even with OSHA implementing the
NEP program, combustible-dust
related incidents continue to be a
major industrial problem in the U.S.
and globally. There were over 500
61
Environmental Manager
able individuals to provide testing,
hazard assessments, risk analysis
studies and engineered solutions
to minimize or control dangerous dusts and particulate matter
in manufacturing.
To achieve process-safety excellence, employees must be genuinely
proficient and competent in their
requisite technical disciplines, and
appropriate levels of knowledge
must be embedded in key positions
References
5. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Investigation Report: Combustible Dust Hazard Study, Report No. 2006-H-1,
November 2006.
6. OSHA General Duty Act of 1970, Sec. 5
Duties, 1970.
7. OSHA Status Report on Combustible Dust
NEP, October 2009.
8. National Fire Incident Reporting System.
(NFIRS) Combustible Dust Policy Institute,
2011 Combustible Dust Related Incidents
Fact Sheet, April 2013.
9. OSHA, Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire
and Explosions, SHIB 07-31-2005.
the workforce, facility and the environment, while maintaining stakeholder confidence and encouraging
compliance with all legislation and
avoiding regulatory intervention.
Eliminating or minimizing dust is
a small investment compared to the
costs of the harm that can occur if
not appropriately addressed.
Author
Walter S. Kessler is a senior process engineer and
safety specialist at Chilworth
Technology, Inc., a DEKRA
Company (113 Campus Drive,
Princeton, N.J. 08540; Phone:
609-799-4449; Email: walter.
kessler@dekra.com). He has
20 years of experience in process design, development and
improvement, process control,
logic-controller programming,
process-hazard analysis, layers-of-protection
analysis (LOPA), safety-integrity levels (SIL)
and process safety management in petroleum
refineries, gas and chemical plants, as well as
pharmaceutical, manufacturing and wastewater
facilities. Kessler holds a B.S.Ch.E. from Pennsylvania State University and is currently obtaining a Ph.D. at the University of Houston.
Environmental Management:
Air-Pollution Control
Environmental Management: Wastewater
and Groundwater Treatment
Fluid Handling
Gas-Solid and Liquid-Solid Separation
Liquid-Liquid and Gas-Liquid Separation
Managing Bulk Solids
17792
63
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Case in point
One major industrial fire at a totefilling operation at a chemical distribution facility in Des Moines, Iowa,
was investigated in 2008 by the U.S.
Chemical Safety Board (CSB; Washington, D.C.; csb.gov), and the cause
was determined to be static electricity.
(the full report is available at csb.gov).
CSB concluded that a combination of
technical and procedural factors led to
an uncontrolled static discharge, which
created a fire that spread rapidly to a
wood-framed warehouse, igniting a
large volume of flammable and com44
Minimum
Ignition Energy
(MIE), mJ
0.009
0.14
0.20
0.24
0.25
0.46
5.00
9.00
10.00
30.00
50.00
Hidden dangers
Additional considerations
45
Environmental Manager
a grounding clamp to a plant obRecommended
ject is always a physical action.
resources
Thus, there is always a risk that
Useful
guidance
on minimizing fire and
even if operators diligently carries
explosion hazards, and managing static
out their duties per the companyelectricity in process plants, can be found
recommended safety procedures,
at these websites.
no one can ever be sure that the
NFPA77, NFPA30
www.nfpa.org
clamp has made good enough
Chemical Safety Board
www.csb.gov
contact with the object. For inIchemE
www.icheme.org
stance, the clamp has to make
OSHA
www.osha.gov
a low enough resistance contact
with the conductive object to enable any static that is generated to be forming its intended function of safely
safely dissipated to ground before it dissipating any static electricity that
is generated.
can accumulate to dangerous levels.
These specialized clamps employ
The fact remains that many conductive objects that are capable of accumu- intrinsically safe electronic monitorlating high static charges also have in- ing circuits that are powered from a
sulating layers on their surfaces, which low-energy battery. The circuit is only
may prevent this low resistance con- completed when the clamp achieves
tact. Examples include paints and coat- a low resistance contact onto the obings on drums, tank vehicles and other ject to be grounded, and the operator
mobile plant equipment, or product receives visual confirmation of this
buildup caused by normal working con- via a light/indicator (usually a flashditions (for instance where insulating ing LED). The self-testing grounding
liquids, powders and other materials clamp also monitors cable condition
are part of the operation or process). As back to the designed ground point,
a result, many grounding and bonding and will also fail to register a permisclamps show very high resistance read- sive signal if the cable has worked
ings when clamped to conductive objects itself loose or is broken (Figure 1). In
with insulating surfaces. Worse still, if order to be safely used in hazardous
the company tries to cut costs by using locations, these clamps should be apstandard welding clamps or lightweight proved as intrinsically safe devices
alligator clips for static grounding and carry the appropriate Hazardous
(instead of purpose-designed clamps), Area Certification, for instance, from
these devices have an even higher Factory Mutual (FM), Underwriters
failure rate with potentially grave Laboratories (UL), or the Canadian
Standards Authority (CSA).
consequences.
To move to an even higher level of
During an internal audit (using an
approved Ohm meter) of ground con- security, static ground verification sysnections in its flammable-liquids area, tems are available that not only give
one major chemical company actually visual verification to the operator, but
determined that only 85% of the de- that provide interlock switching convices had acceptable low resistance tacts that may be linked to process
levels, or proper ground. Therefore, pumps, valves, alarm/shutdown/con15% of their ground connections failed trol systems, as well. This means that
to meet the proper levels, and as a re- the process cannot be started until
sult were at risk to the process area the conductive object has been safely
grounded, and, if at any time during the
and operating personnel.
To solve this problem, NFPA 77 sug- operation the condition changes (due to
gests that intrinsically safe, self-check- a clamp falling off or wire breaking for
ing grounding and bonding clamps be instance), the system automatically
used. From an operators point of view, switches to the non-permissive state
these devices are employed in exactly and shuts down the process.
Systems employing interlocks can
the same way as conventional grounding clamps. Where they differ is in also prevent accidents that would oththe way that they reassure the opera- erwise result when operators approach
tor that the clamp has not only been plant objects that are already carrying
physically attached, but is also per- accumulated static charges. In this
46
Environmental Manager
Avoiding Static Sparks In Hazardous Atmospheres (Cont. from p. 46)
tential may develop (especially in dry,
low-humidity atmospheres).
If the person now approaches a conductive material at either ground or a
lower electrical potential, a spark may
be promoted. It is generally thought
that sparks from people can reach energies as high as 30 mJ sufficient
to ignite almost all flammable vapors
and gases, and many sensitive combustible powder (dust) atmospheres.
In order to control this, it is necessary to ground the employees working
in sensitive hazardous areas. This can
take the form of ground wrist-straps
for sedentary workers, or specialized
static-dissipative (SD) safety shoes for
personnel who need to move around to
carry out their tasks. In the case of the
latter, it is also necessary for the floor
materials to be sufficiently conducting to allow a ground leakage path
to safely dissipate any static charge as
each foot contacts the ground.
In the U.S., SD footwear is manufactured according to ASTM F2413-05,
which specifies maximum and minimum levels for ground leakage via the
shoe. According to ASTM, it should be
sufficiently low to allow static charges
Author
Graham Tyers is president
of Newson Gale Inc. (www.
newson-gale.com), a manufacturer of static control equipment for hazardous areas (460
Faraday Ave., Unit B, Suite 1,
Jackson, NJ 08527). He has
worked in the specialist field
of electrostatic control and
hazardous atmospheres for
nearly 20 years. His industry
background is in monitoring
and control systems, and general electrical equipment for potentially explosive atmospheres. Tyers
is a member of the NFPA, ESDA, and ISA. He regularly conducts training and presents to industry
and safety groups on the subject of static electricity and hazardous areas. In addition to his technical subject background, he holds a Diploma in
Business Management (Open University, United
Kingdom). As part of the management team of
Newson Gale in the U.K., Graham was awarded
the Queens Award for Enterprise in 2005. He now
heads up Newson Gales North American Operations, based in New Jersey.
49
Feature Report
36
Fire-safe system
Incident No. 1
Valero-McKee Refinery,
Sunray, Tex., Feb. 16, 2007
ithout going into great detail as to the circumstances that led up to this incident, piping
handling liquid propane in a propane deasphalting (PDA) unit ruptured. The location of the rupture was in a section of isolated piping that had been
abandoned in place several years prior. A valve, intended to isolate the active flow of liquid propane from
the abandoned-in-place piping, had been unknowing left partially open due to an obstruction inside the
valve. Water had gradually seeped in past the valve
seat over the years and being heavier than the liquid Figure 1.
propane, settled at a low-point control station where
it eventually froze during a cold period. The expanding ice inside the pipeline subsequently cracked the
pipe. When the temperature outside began to warm,
the ice thawed allowing liquid propane to escape
from the active pipeline, through the partially closed
valve, and out the now substantial crack. The resultant cloud of propane gas drifted toward a boiler
house where it found an ignition source. The flame of
the ignited gas cloud tracked back toward its source
where the impending shockwave from the explosion
ripped apart piping attached to the PDA extractor
columns causing ignited propane to erupt from one
of the now opened nozzles on the column at such a
velocity as to create a jet fire.
The ensuing jet fire, which is a blow-torch like Figure 2.
flame, discharged toward a main pipe rack approximately 77 ft away, engulfing the pipe rack in the jet fire. As the
temperature of the non-fire-proofed structural steel of the pipe rack
reached its plastic range and began to collapse in on itself, the
piping in the rack, which contained additional flammable liquids,
collapsed along with it (Figure 1).
Due to the loss of support and the effect of the heat, the pipes in
the pipe rack, unable to support its own weight, began to sag. The
allowable bending load eventually being exceeded from the force
of its unsupported weight, the rack piping ruptured spilling its flammable contents into the already catastrophic fire. The contents of
the ruptured piping, adding more fuel to the fire, caused the flames
to erupt into giant fireballs and thick black smoke.
The non-fire-proofed support steel (seen on the left in Figure 1
and on the right in Figure 2) was actually in compliance with API
recommendations. Those recommendations can be found in Publication 2218 Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants; API Publications 2510 Design and
Construction of LPG Installations; and 2510A Fire-Protection
Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities. In these issues of the publications it was recommended that pipe-rack support steel within 50 ft
of an LPG vessel be fire proofed. The collapsed support steel was
approximately 77 ft from the extractor columns, which is beyond
the 50-ft recommended distance.
While the EOR was in compliance with the governing code, with
regard to fire proofing, there may have been a degree of complacency in defaulting to that minimum requirement. This goes back
to a point made earlier in which it was said that industry standards
are not intended to be design manuals. They instead provide,
the minimum requirements necessary to integrate safety into the
design, fabrication, inspection, installation, and testing of piping systems Proprietary circumstances make it the imperative
responsibility of the EOR or the owner to make risk assessments
based on specific design conditions and go beyond the minimum
requirements of an industry code or standard when the assessment
results and good engineering practices dictate.
37
Feature Report
ing standards, the codes and standards
mentioned above provide generalized
requirements that touch on such key
aspects of safety as relative equipment location, mass volume versus
risk, electrical classifications, valving,
and so on. They cannot, and they are
not intended to provide criteria and
safeguards for every conceivable situation. Designing safety into a particular
piping system containing a hazardous
liquid goes beyond what should be expected from an industry-wide code or
standard and falls to the responsibility of the owner or EOR. As ASME
B31.3 states in its introduction, The
designer is cautioned that the code is
not a design handbook; it does not do
away with the need for the designer or
for competent engineering judgment.
When designing piping systems to
carry hazardous liquids, the design
basis of a project or an established
protocol for maintenance needs to
incorporate a mitigation strategy
against two worse-case scenarios: (a)
A leak at a pipe joint containing a
hazardous liquid, and (b) The rupture
or loss of containment, during a fire,
of surrounding hazardous piping systems, not otherwise compromised that
would add fuel to the fire.
The occurrence of those two failures, one initiating the incident and
the other perpetuating and sustaining the incident, can be minimized or
eliminated by creating a design basis
that provides the following:
Added assurance against the potential for joint failure
Added assurance of containment
and control of a hazardous liquid
during a fire
Safe evacuation of a hazardous liquid from the operating unit under
distress
Piping joints. When designing piping systems to contain hazardous liquids, one of the key objectives for the
design engineer should be taking the
necessary steps to minimize the threat
of a leak, steps beyond those typically
necessary in complying with the minimum requirements of a code. There are
certainly other design issues that warrant consideration, and they will be
touched on much later. However, while
38
PTFE
envelope
Primary
sealing
element
Profiled
inner ring
Monel*
windings
Secondary
sealing element
Flexible
graphite filler
Carbon steel
outer ring
Figure 3. If flanged
joints are necessary, it is
suggested that fire-safe
spiral-wound type gaskets with graphite filler
be specified
(1)
(2)
Where:
c = sum of mechanical allowances
D = outside dia. of pipe
d = inside dia. of pipe
E = quality factor from Table A-1A
and A-1B
P = internal design gage pressure
S = stress value for material from
Table A-1
t = pressure design thickness
W = weld-joint strength-reduction
factor
y = coefficient from Table 304.1.1
Also found in Para. 304 of B31.3 are
wall thickness equations for curved
and mitered pipe.
With regard to circumferential
welds, the designer is responsible
for assigning a weld-joint reduction
factor (W) for welds other than longitudinal welds. What we can do, at
4-in. Propylene
product line
Column
Strainer
Pipe
nipple
2 ft
39
Feature Report
Discharge
to safe area
Line D
Slope
RD-1
XV-1
Line A
Flammable
liquid in
VA-1
Operating unit
battery limits
LT-1
SG-1
VA-6
VA-3
Flammable
liquid to
recovery
VA-4
PG-1
XV-2
VA-5
Flammable
liquid out
Line B
VA-2
Pump
Line C
XV-3
XV-4
High-temperature
n the design layout of a duplex heathydrogen to furnance
exchanger arrangement (Figure 7) in the
resid-hydrotreater unit of the BP Refinery in
Preheat gas
Texas City, Tex., the designer duplicated the
fabrication dimensions of the 90-deg fabricated elbow-spool assemblies shown in FigFigure 8. Severed 8-in.
Heat
ure 7 as Elbows 1, 2, and 3. While the pipe
NPS hydrogen piping
exchanger A
sizes and equipment nozzle sizes were the
Elbow 3
same, permitting an interchangeability of the
(failure location)
fabricated elbow spool assemblies, the service
Elbow 2
conditions prohibited such an interchange.
Bolted flange
The shell side conditions on the upstream
(typical)
side (at Elbow 1) were 3,000 psig at 400F.
The shell side conditions on the downstream
11/4 chrome
side (at Elbow 3) were 3,000 psig at 600F.
alloy piping
The intermediate temperature at Elbow 2
was not documented. In the initial design,
Elbow 1
the material for Elbow 1 was specified as carbon steel
carbon steel, Elbow 3 was specified as a
Heat
exchanger B
1 - 1/4 chrome/moly alloy. The reason for
the difference in material of construction
(MOC) is that carbon steel is susceptible to
Preheat gas
high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)
to separator
above ~450F at 3,000 psig, therefore the
Low-temperature
chrome/moly alloy was selected for the
3,000 psig
higher temperature Elbow 3.
hydrogen feed
11/4 Chrome alloy pipe
At 3,000 psig and temperatures above
Carbon steel pipe
450F hydrogen permeates the carbon steel
and reacts with dissolved carbon to form Figure 7. Heat exchanger flow diagram
methane gas. The degradation of the steels
The one thing you can take
tensile strength and ductility due to decarburization, coupled
with the formation of methane gas creating localized stresses, away from this incident is: Do
not dimensionally replicate
weakens the steel until it ultimately fatigues and ruptures.
In January 2005, scheduled maintenance was performed on the piping spools or assemblies of
heat exchanger assembly. The piping connected to the heat ex- different materials. The other
changers was dismantled and stored for the next 39 days. After underlying, but significant
maintenance was completed, the piping was retrieved from stor- component you can also take
away is this: In the initial de- Figure 9. Fragments of
age and reinstalled.
the failed 8-in. NPS carbonThe elbows of different material were not marked as such and sign of a plant facility the ensteel spool
gineer
of
record
will
routinely
the maintenance contractor was not warned of the different
MOC for the elbows. Elbows 1 and 3 were unknowingly in- hold formal design reviews
stalled in the wrong locations. On July 8, 2005, approximately that will include all key personnel with vested interest in the projfive months after re-installing the piping around the heat ex- ect. In doing so, include, among the attendees, key operations
changers, the elbow in the #3 position catastrophically failed as and management plant personnel from one of the owners operating facilities, if available. These individuals typically bring a
shown in Figure 8.
As you can see in Figure 9 the carbon steel, after becoming lot of insight and knowledge to a review. Whereas the designers
progressively weakened by HTHA, fractured on the inside of may not have the wherewithal to think along the lines of issues
the pipe and catastrophically failed. The incident injured one that might pertain to a facility turnaround, the plant personnel
person in operations responding to the emergency and cost the will. These are issues that they normally think long and hard
company $30MM.
about. Make use of this resource.
41
Kilo-Lab Conical
Vacuum Dryer-Mixer
Advanced technology
for real Kilo size
drying research
and development
www.heinkelusa.com
Tel: 856-467-3399
Circle 11 on p. 62 or go to adlinks.che.com/29251-11
42
Feature Report
pipeline that do not contain a relief
device from being blocked and isolated
during a fire. If the piping system for
flammable fluid service is designed
properly, the contents will be able to
drain or expand into a vessel where
over-pressurization can be relieved
and safely vented.
Point 7. It will be necessary to evacuate as much of the hazardous fluid as
possible from tanks and vessels in the
fire area to a safe location. The pumpout should continue until there is inadequate pump suction head, or until
the fusible link on XV-2 is activated.
At that time the pump interlocks
would shut down the pump.
With regard to tank farms, the following is a suggested minimum consideration for a safe design: Drain
valves should be of a fire-rated type.
Tank outlet valves should be of a firesafe type with a fusible link. Tank
nozzles used for gages or instrument
connections should have, at a minimum, valves containing stem packing and seal gasket material specified
as an acceptable form of graphite, as
mentioned above, or some other firesafe material. Gaskets used at nozzle
flange joints should be a fire-safe gasket similar to the spiral wound gaskets mentioned earlier or the gasket
shown in Figure 3.
Inline valves in piping downstream
of the tank outlet valve, such as pump
transfer lines and recirculation lines,
do not necessarily need to be firerated, but should have stem packing
and seal gasket material that is firesafe as mentioned earlier.
Situations will arise that do not fall
neatly into what has been described
above. If there is any doubt with regard
to valving then default to a fire-rated
valve. Each piping system identified
as needing to be fire-safe should be
designated as such. Where individual
fire-safe valves are to be strategically
located in a system, they should be
designated on their respective P&IDs
either by notation or through the assigned pipe material specification.
The pipe-material specification should
be indicated on each pipeline of the
P&ID. The specification itself should
therefore be descriptive enough for
the designer to know which valve to
apply at each location.
While this particular discussion is specific to piping leaks and joint integrity
it bares touching on a few subjects that
are integrally associated with piping
safety: pipe rack protection, protecting
piping from vehicle traffic, and designing for disaster (HAZOP).
In Incident Number 1 (box, p. 37),
the onset of a fire that might otherwise
have been quickly controlled becomes
a catastrophic event because piping
mounted on the unprotected structural
steel of a pipe rack, outside the extent
of the initial occurrence, becomes collateral damage adding more fuel to the
fire causing it to sustain itself, increase
in intensity and continue to spread.
In Incident Number 2 (box, p. 39), an
unprotected and protruding pipeline
component (Y-strainer) is damaged,
causing a major leak that operating
personnel were unable to stop. The ensuing fire lasted for five days.
In Incident Number 3 (box, p. 41),
two dimensionally identical spool
pieces were designed for a system in
which the two were fabricated from
different materials because their service conditions were very different. It
can only be assumed that this was an
erroneous attempt at trying to achieve
duplication of pipe spools in an effort
to assist the fabricator in their productivity of pipe fabrication. Instead it
ultimately caused injury to one person
and cost the plant owner $30MM.
Edited by Gerald Ondrey
Author
W. M. (Bill) Huitt has been
involved in industrial piping design, engineering and
construction
since
1965.
Positions have included design engineer, piping design
instructor, project engineer,
project
supervisor,
piping department supervisor,
engineering manager and
president of W. M. Huitt Co.
(P.O. Box 31154, St. Louis,
MO 63131-0154; Phone: 314-966-8919; Email:
wmhuitt@aol.com; URL: www.wmhuitt.com),
a piping consulting firm founded in 1987. His
experience covers both the engineering and
construction fields and crosses industrial lines
to include petroleum refining, chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper,
nuclear power, biofuel, and coal gasification.
He has written numerous specifications, guidelines, papers, and magazine articles on the
topic of pipe design and engineering. Huitt is
a member of ISPE (International Society of
Pharmaceutical Engineers), CSI (Construction
Specifications Institute) and ASME (American
Society of Mechanical Engineers). He is a member of three ASME-BPE subcommittees, several
task groups, an API task group, and sits on two
corporate specification review boards.
DuPont
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Chemical
Protective Clothing
ISO 16602 offers a much-needed,
common global language for expressing
protective clothing performance
Susan Lovasic, DuPont
Clothing selection
51
Environmental Manager
of a worker being exposed to potentially harmful chemicals increases.
Conversely, overprotecting a worker
with unnecessary clothing can be burdensome and result in heat stress, reduced field of vision, restricted mobility and increased physical exertion for
the wearer, as well as possibly higher
purchasing costs for the employer.
Every work situation is unique,
and the ISO 16602 Standard does not
consider all specific hazards that may
be present in the work environment.
Safety and occupational health professionals need to consider hazards that
are specific to their work conditions
and then look to ISO 16602 to find the
minimum requirements for chemical
protective garments for that type of
situation. ISO 16602 focuses exclusively on typical chemical hazards
and protective clothing requirements
for such hazards so the work situation
may also require additional forms of
PPE, such as footwear, gloves, face protection, fall protection and respirators.
When evaluating protective clothing
performance under ISO 16602, gloves,
footwear and respirators must be included in the whole-garment ensemble testing. It is important to validate
that any additional PPE components
will work properly with the chemical
protective clothing selected for use.
Types of clothing
Classes of clothing
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
Type 6
Limited
protection
against
liquid mist
Protection
against
airborne,
solid
particulate
chemicals
Protection
against
liquid
aerosols
Protection
against
pressurized
liquid
chemicals
Non
gas-tight
protection
Gas-tight
protection
against
chemicals
and vapors
and toxic
particles
Figure 1. Do not assume that the terms gas-tight and liquid-tight refer to absolute barrier performance in chemical protective clothing (CPC). They can oversimplify
the level of barrier provided by such garments. Instead, these terms should be considered as vapor-protective and liquid-protective, respectively
the specific chemical that is in the process piping. The mechanical durability
of the suit against the rigors of the job
would have been assessed with the
mechanical-strength laboratory tests
outlined in ISO 16602. The hazard assessment and experience of the safety
and occupational health professional
would lead to the selection of a garment with a specific performance class
in each of the barrier and mechanical
tests, plus the type requirement.
Another example can be found in
work situations where exposure to
hazardous particles might be likely
to occur, such as sanding lead-based
paints or mold-abatement work. For
protection against airborne hazardous
particles, a Type 5 ensemble would be
the obvious choice, barring any other
hazard or complications. Most likely,
the garment would be a one-piece coverall with an attached hood, but nothing in ISO 16602 precludes a multiplepiece ensemble, such as a separate
jacket, hood and pants. ISO 16602
does not specify the design of the ensemble; it specifies the level of performance. As with the previous case, the
nature of the work task will determine
the class of mechanical durability required for the work activity and environment. Note that the use of a respirator might also be required when
working near airborne particles.
Labeling
Edited by Dorothy Lozowski
Author
Susan Lovasic is a senior
research associate for DuPont Protection Technologies
(5401 Jefferson Davis Highway, Richmond, Va., 23234;
Phone: 804-383-5060; Email:
susan.l.lovasic@usa.dupont.
com). Since 1996, her research efforts have focused
on protective apparel applications to help protect wearers
against chemical, thermal
and fire hazards. In her role, Lovasic has conducted extensive research to assess the critical
properties of protective apparel ranging from
assessment of comfort and durability properties
of protective garments to instrumented, thermal
mannequin fire and electric-arc flash testing.
She has worked for DuPont since 1984 in both
research and marketing capacities across a variety of businesses. Lovasic holds four U.S. patents
associated with materials used for fabrics and
clothing for electric arc, flame and fire protection.
She is a member of several professional societies
including the AIChE, National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists (AATCC),
and the American Society of Safety Engineers
(ASSE). Lovasic received her B.S.Ch.E. from
Pennsylvania State University.
The Chemical
Engineering
bookstore offers
a variety of
industry topics
you will come
to rely on.
t &OWJSPONFOUBM
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17792
53
Solids Processing
Environmental
Manager
Material safety
data sheets are
an essential part
of hazard communication programs
Employee training
53
10/25/07 7:30:12 PM
Environmental Manager
Employee access to information
According to OSHA, all employees
must have direct access to MSDSs for
the hazardous chemicals that are in
their work areas during their normal
working hours. Employers must ensure that employees are provided with
an MSDS for every chemical to which
they may be exposed, and employees
must receive training on any new
chemicals before the chemicals are introduced into the workplace. MSDSs
may be provided to employees as paper
copies contained in centrally located
binders or through computerized systems. Alternatives to paper copies are
permitted, as long as employees have
immediate access to the MSDSs. Maintaining paper copies of MSDSs in a
back-up method to electronic systems
is often a good practice.
Information requirements
10/25/07 7:30:37 PM
meet the requirements for specific regions or countries is a must. All global
product information can be stored in
MSDS management software, allowing for the quick and easy production
of MSDSs for any country or region.
Rules or logic tools. Automated tools
can decrease the need for manual data
entry and manipulation. By using appropriate software, information can be
automatically entered into the MSDS
based on system rules or logic. This
not only increases the efficiency of
MSDS production but the consistency
of MSDS information as well.
Impact of regulatory changes. The
impact of changes in regulations can
be quickly determined through the
use of automated impact analyses
and update tools. These tools can ensure that all affected products are reviewed, and required changes are applied appropriately. These tools can be
configured to apply to local, regional,
state, federal and global changes, de-
Author
Looking forward
Requirements for MSDSs will continue to grow and change. New initiatives, regulations and health-effect
information make it necessary for regulatory professionals to continually be
on the lookout for anything that may
impact their MSDSs. New guidelines
or classification systems, such as the
Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals
(GHS), will impact how we communicate and classify information. Regulatory professionals must keep abreast
of not only the OSHA requirements for
MSDSs, but also global requirements.
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55
10/25/07 7:31:04 PM
yg
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Dust Explosions:
Prevention &
Protection
Feature
Cover
Story
Report
Ignition source
Amrit Agarwal
Pneumatic Conveying Consulting
Particle size of the dust, including its particle size distribution, if it has a range of different sizes
Does the material contain combustible gases such as hydrocarbons? This will result in hybrid mixtures that are
more explosive
Defining explosivity
dp 1/ 3
V
dt
Where:
p = Pressure in the test vessel, bar
t = Time, s
V = Volume of the test vessel, m3
(1)
dp
=R
ate of pressure rise in the test
dt
vessel
Are there gravity falls of material in the plant? These falls can cause
a dust cloud
Is grinding equipment being used? Grinders create dusts and unless
properly designed, can emit dust in the surrounding atmosphere
If the process can emit dust inside a building, does the building have
a dust collection system that prevents accumulation of dust on building surfaces?
explosion protection
and prevention
If the data on the material being handled show that its dust is explosive,
steps must be taken to prevent a dust
explosion. These steps are given below.
Precautionary methods
27
Cover Story
28
20,000
120
15,000
60
5,000
30
60
dp
dt
120
160
Time, ms
240
dt
10,000
dp
90
, psi/s
PMAX
Pressure, psi
150
-5,000
300
Figure 2. In typical tests results, Pmax is the top peak of the red line, while the
maximum rate of pressure rise (dp/dt) is used with Equation (1) to determine Kst
malfunctioning of equipment
Based on the physical characteristics
of the materials handled, flammable
vapors or gases are assigned to Groups
A, B, C or D, and combustible dusts are
assigned to Groups E or G.
Bonding and grounding: Energy
levels far greater than 15 mJ, easily sufficient to ignite some dusts, are
obtainable via spark discharges from
ungrounded conductors. To dissipate
static electricity, adequate bonding and
grounding must be provided for solids
handling equipment and components,
including conveying, feeding, blending
and storage systems. Bonding is the
process of electrically connecting conductive components together so that
these are at the same electrical potential, and no sparks can occur between
them. Equipment such as a baghouse
can be comprised of a number of individual components: bag cages, bag
clamps, bag grounding wire and so on.
In such cases, it is important that each
of the components is properly grounded
and integrity of the grounding system
is routinely checked. Resistance to
ground shall be measured and documented for each major component.
Equipment skin-temperature limi-
Design methods
1.5 Pmax
Fu
(2)
Where:
Fu = Ratio of ultimate stress divided
by the stress generated at the design pressure
Pr = Vessel design pressure to prevent
vessel rupture, psig
Pmax = Maximum deflagration pressure, psig
Note: If it is desired that the vessel
not be damaged as a result of the explosion, then Fy (the ratio of the yield
stress divided by the stress at the design pressure) should be substituted
for the ultimate stress in the above
equation. Yield stress is the stress at
which that the material deforms permanently; ultimate tensile stress is
the stress at which it breaks.
Inerting. This design method is used
to prevent dust explosions by reducing
29
Cover Story
damage to equipment and facilities by
properly venting a dust explosion to the
outside atmosphere. It assumes that oxygen, a combustible mixture and a sufficiently strong ignition source are present so that a dust explosion can occur.
Catastrophic vessel failure is prevented
by providing rupture panels on vessels
for pressure relief and for discharge of
the explosive material, and by designing rupture panels so that the peak explosion pressure is less than two thirds
of the vessel burst pressure.
The rupture panels are also called
vents. Vents are openings in a vessel
through which combustion-generated
gases can expand and flow out. These
vents serve to limit the deflagration
pressure so that damage to the enclosure is limited to an acceptable level or
is eliminated entirely. The area of the
vents must be large enough to limit
the explosion pressure to a safe level.
Vents are designed so that they rupture and blow out, thus reducing the
pressure inside the vessel to a level
that is below the rupture-pressure
rating of the vessel.
The rate of pressure rise is an important parameter in the venting of
an explosion. It determines the time
that is available for the products of
combustion to escape from the enclosure and for the pressure to dissipate.
The higher this rate, the greater the
venting area that is required.
The vessel or equipment must be
designed to withstand the maximum
pressure attained during the venting
process without catastrophic failure.
Some yielding of the vessel or equipment is acceptable during a vented deflagration. For example, partial failure
of the roof-to-shell seam of a vessel is
not considered catastrophic failure.
Maximum pressure during venting
(Pred) should not exceed two thirds of
the static burst pressure of the protected equipment. If Pred exceeds 10
psig, an ASME Code vessel is required.
The vent opening pressure (Pstat)
should be set as low as practical to
minimize the rise in internal vessel pressure before the explosion is
vented. This reduces the potential for
damage, and for a given vent size, will
result in a lower maximum pressure
during venting. However, Pstat must
be high enough to prevent premature
30
opening of the vent by the combination of normal vessel-operating pressures and wind loads.
The following method for calculating
required venting area (Av, m2) is given
in NFPA 68 and here in Equation (3):
Av = a V 2 / 3 ( K st ) ( Pred )
b
(3)
Where:
Av = Required venting area, m2
a = 5.71 104 exp(2 Pstat)
b = 0.978 exp(0.105 Pstat)
c = 0.687 exp (0.0226 Pstat)
V = Empty vessel volume, m3
Kst = Dust deflagration index, bar-m/s
Pred = The reduced pressure (the maximum pressure actually developed in
the vessel during a vented explosion),
barg. The maximum pressure developed during a vented deflagration
(Pred) should not exceed 2/3 burst of
the vessel burst pressure.
Pstat = Pressure at which the relief device opens, barg. This is the pressure
at which the vent is expected to open.
It should be at least 0.5 psi greater
than the peak operating pressure of
the equipment. The minimum Pstat
used in the venting equations is 0.1
barg (1.45 psig).
The following best practices should
be observed for vents:
Vents should be designed to give a
free, unobstructed opening during a
deflagration
Access of personnel to areas that could
be exposed to fireballs coming out
from the deflagration vents should be
restricted unless deflector shields are
provided. Shields should not interfere
with the venting process
Panels shall be adequately tethered
by using chains or cables, where practical, to prevent them from becoming
missiles during the venting process
Vent panels should be located so
that they are not obstructed by the
solids level in the vessel. For example, by ensuring that the vent panel
bottoms are at least 1 ft higher than
the maximum solids level
Where side vent panels are used,
they should be symmetrically arranged around the perimeter of the
vented vessel
All equipment using explosion relief
panels should be located outside of
closed structures or buildings. If this
Author
Amrit Agarwal is a consulting engineer with Pneumatic
Conveying Consulting (7 Carriage Road, Charleston, WV,
25314; Phone: 304-553-1350,
Email: polypcc@aol.com). He
started his consulting work
after retiring from The Dow
Chemical Co. in 2002 as a
senior research specialist. He
has more than 47 years of design and operating experience
in bulk solids handling and pneumatic conveying. He holds an M.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
and an M.B.A. from the West Virginia College of
Graduate Studies in Charleston.
Solids Processing
Martin Glor
Swiss Institute for the Promotion of Safety & Security
71
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mixtures can form a volatile vapor-pressure (VP) curve, the explosive range of
hybrid mixture.
its vapor and its flashpoint (FP) is similar to that
The presence of such ex- of most commonly used solvents. The majority of
plosion hazards, further common solvents have flashpoints below room temExplosive range of solvents also tends to
supported by incident sta- perature.
increase with increasing temperature. Note T(LEL)
tistics, corroborates the fact and T(UEL) are the respective temperatures at meththat this type of operation anols LEL and UEL
is clearly one of the most
hazardous within the CPI. Even if following basic principle: Prevent the
all effective ignition sources gener- formation of explosive atmospheres
ally considered common and insignifi- Where prevention due to the nacant, including those ignition sources ture of the process and materials is
related to electrical equipment, me- precluded, then the following criteria
chanical load, open flames, cutting, apply:
welding and smoking, have been ex- I gnition sources must be avoided
itigation of the detrimental effects
cluded through the introduction of M
precautionary measures, the hazard
of an explosion must be a priority to
of electrostatic ignition sources inherensure the health and safety of opent in the powder transfer will still
erators
remain a viable possibility for causing In conjunction with the above factors,
an explosion.
frequent reviews of the practices and
In short, the probability of an ex- processes in place must be carried
plosion occurring within the trans- out, the primary goal of which should
fer process is high. Furthermore the be to avoid propagating explosions. If
severity of such an explosion could any part of the process changes, then
be disastrous, especially when the additional reviews and precautionary
number of operators that would be di- measures should be introduced.
rectly exposed to the initial blast wave
and subsequent fireball are taken Probability and cause
into consideration. Serious, if not life Determining the risk of an explosion
threatening, burns are possible, espe- hazard is very important in assessing
cially in the presence of a dust cloud or how a process should be carried out
hybrid mixture explosion.
and whether adequate precautionIt is therefore paramount to ensure ary measures are in place. In order
that appropriate organizational, oper- to calculate the explosion risk assoational and technical systems relating ciated with charging a powder into a
to the nature of the process and the reactor already containing flammable
materials in use are in place in con- solvents, two main criteria need to be
junction with ATEX directives and the established:
9/29/07 5:46:49 PM
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$
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T
he ignition sensitivity of the explosive atmosphere, which is categorized by the minimum ignition
energy (MIE)
The probability of an explosion occurring at different locations (highest probability during transfer of
powder into a flammable solvent occurs in the reactor above the solvent
surface, such as where vapors exist,
and at the manhole where powder
is charged into the reactor and turbulence is high, coupled with vapor
release from within the reactor).
0DPODFOUSBUJPO WPM
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Problems with
poor flowing
powder or
bulk solids?
N
PRESSOFILTRO
Nutsche Filter-Dryer
High containment
OEL < 1 g/m
COMBER
No heel thanks to
Whirl Snake
high efficiency turbine
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Circle 67 on p. 122 or go to adlinks.che.com/6900-67
T 1 (978) 649-3300
F 1 (978) 649-3399
www.jenike.com
9/29/07 5:53:27 PM
Solids Processing
reactor, make up the powder characteristics, which can then be expressed
in terms of the lower explosion limit
(LEL), MIE and minimum ignition
temperature (MIT).
When a dust cloud mixes with flammable solvent vapors, which can happen within the reactor or at the manhole, a hybrid mixture is formed. The
explosion risks of hybrid mixtures
have been extensively reported [1].
However, the most relevant points
regarding their characteristics are as
follows:
A
solvents MIE is generally much
lower than that of a pure powder;
therefore, when a hybrid mixture is
formed, its MIE as a rule will be somewhere between the two and tends to
veer towards the lower range, even if
the flashpoint of the solvent is above
ambient temperature
Regardless of whether the concentrations of the dust cloud and solvent
vapor are below their own LELs,
C
Ma
Chem Show
BOOTH 1802
Filters, strainers,
and separators
to suit you
For flows to 10,000 gpm
Inlets and outlets where you want them
Electropolished surfaces
Carbon or stainless steel
Perforated stainless baskets
Wire mesh linings optional
Filter bags to 1 micron
Inner baskets/bags for
2-stage action optional
Centrifugal separator action
9/29/07 5:54:09 PM
.BOVBMMPBEJOH
4DSFXDPOWFZPS
&MFWBUPS
#JHCBH
EJTDIBSHF
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3PUBSZWBMWF
*TPMBUJPOWBMWF
*TPMBUJPO /
WBMWF
/
*TPMBUJPOWBMWF
4VDUJPOTZTUFN
XJUISPUBSZWBMWF
$POUBJOFS
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TZTUFN
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TZTUFN
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91
9/29/07 5:55:32 PM
Solids Processing
Table 1. advantages and disadvantages of the different powder transfer methods
Manual
transfer
Docking
Specially
Two
Bucket/ FIBC
Vacuum
Screw
station
Rotary
chain
disvalve
transfer
designed
conveyor
valve
for conconveyor charge system
with lock
system
tainers
++
++
++
++
++
+++
++
+++
+++
++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
++
+++
++
+++
+++
+
++
+++
++
++
++
++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+++
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
++
++
+
+
+
++
++
++
+
+++
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
++
+
++
+
++
+
++
+
+
+
++
+
++
+
+++
+++
+++
++
+++
Avoiding explosive
atmospheres
9/29/07 5:56:01 PM
$
$
$
$
7N
%LHN
%
LHN
$POUBJONFOU
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and containment
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Consideration of the
safety aspects related
154%$4
to the transfer of pow
ders into flammable
%PDLJOHTZTUFN
atmospheres must also
154
incorporate measures
-BNJOBSGMPXCPPUI
that take the toxic
3PUBSZWBMWF
ity and the reactivity
of the powder being
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1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
transferred into ac"NPVOUPGQPXEFSUSBOTGFSSFE
LH
count, especially within
the pharmaceutical inFigure 5. Oxygen enrichment during
Figure 6. Unlike specially designed powder
dustry. These factors,
transfer of powder into a preinerted vessel.
transfer systems, most contemporary methods
in addition to the everC1: Oxygen concentration in the reactor
for contained transfer of powders tend to be
before the transfer, V1: volume of the gas
more focused on the containment aspect and
more stringent quality
phase in the reactor before the transfer, D1:
do not incorporate the added need for improvcontrol and production
bulk density of the powder transferred, D2:
ing the safety of the process with regard to
standards, make the
skeletal density of the powder transferred
explosion risks
need for containment
fer System (PTS), as more powder is etal density) and/or large volumes of inevitable and should also make mantransferred into the reactor. Oxygen powders are being transferred. Figure ual handling obsolete.
enrichment is increasingly highlighted 5 illustrates the effect of oxygen enrichCurrently, the addition of powders
when products with low bulk density ment in the reactor due to the oxygen into reactors through open manholes
(apparent density as opposed to skel- entrained within the powder.
is still the norm in the CPI. The in*TPMBUPS
%$4
Rupture Discanoia!
Worker Hazards
Product
Loss
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Bursts
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Corrosion
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Downtime
93
9/29/07 5:57:12 PM
Extract Technologies
Extract Technologies
Solids Processing
troduction of alternatives to
this method (Figure 6) tend to
be more focused on the containment aspect and do not incorporate the added need for improving the safety of the process with
regard to explosion risks.
Most contemporary methods Figure 7. Containers may be equipped with
for contained transfer of pow- flexible intermediate bulk containers (FIBC) fitders use gravity as the impetus ted with docking devices that enable a receiver
to charge the powder into a re- to be connected or disconnected in an almost
airtight manner
actor, which requires that multistory facilities be built. The powder is acteristics or high moisture content.
delivered to a higher floor and falls Cleaning and validation is an inherthrough a chute (due to the natural ent problem and increases proportioneffects of gravity) directly into the ately with the length of the chute.
production equipment. The problem of
Gravity charging as a process, itcontainment around the loading zone self, can be a safety issue. The process
is addressed by incorporating a lami- cannot be rendered completely inert
nar flow booth, for example, into the and the problems associated with inarea and a drum-lifting system within creasing the oxygen concentration
that to avoid the need for manual han- within the reactor are, significant, as
dling. In these instances, operators previously discussed. The use of inert
must still wear personal protective gases to reduce the oxygen content
equipment including full body suits, introduced to the reactor via the powmasks and, depending on the toxicity der is costly as large volumes of gases,
of the powder, external respiratory ap- such as nitrogen, are required with
paratuses.
this system. To counterbalance these
Alternatively, containers may be inadequacies, more solutions are reequipped with automatic connect- quired. Sophisticated instrumentaing valves (active and/or passive) or tion may need to be incorporated into
flexible intermediate bulk containers the system to monitor oxygen levels,
(FIBC; Figure 7) fitted with docking for instance, but it in turn increases
devices that enable a receiver to be the cost, and affects the reliability of
connected or disconnected in an almost the process by requiring calibration,
airtight manner. These systems enable maintenance and other repairs that
large quantities of powder (in excess of necessitate downtime. Or, the system
100 kg) to be transferred and reduce itself may have to be modified; chargthe requirement for manual handling. ing the powder into an empty reactor
This method is also suitable for proc- may address most of the safety issues,
esses where intermediate products but the efficiency of the process will
that require storage or isolation be- be compromised. The following points
tween phases.
illustrate the detrimental effects of
A product with high toxicity will re- charging powder into a reactor in the
quire more containment. Glove boxes absence of solvents:
roduction of static electricity as
offer one of the few practical solutions P
to protect the operator, product and
powder is introduced under dry conenvironment (Figure 8). The cost, howditions
ever, of this solution can often be pro- Damage to the reactor lining due to
hibitive, especially considering that
abrasion or corrosion
most glove boxes are rigidly designed Risk of damage to the agitator seal
for a specific use, require a large dedior the agitator itself due to large
cated area within the plant and are
amounts of solids at the bottom of
not ergonomically designed, therefore
the reactor
Increased mixing cycle and problemcausing operators discomfort.
The chutes used for charging the
atic product homogenization due to
powder into the reactors often get
the formation of agglomerates
clogged, so bridging can occur, espeATEX and other applicable standcially if the powder has poor flow char- ards determine the delimitation of
94
9/29/07 5:57:44 PM
References
Author
1. Bartknecht, W., Explosionsschutz, Grundlagen und Anwendung, Springer Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1993.
2. BGR 132: Avoidance of Ignition Hazards
Due to Static Electricity, Hauptverband
der gewerblichen Berufsgenossenschaften,
Fachausschuss Chemie der BGZ, March
2003.
3. CENELEC: Technical Report CLC/TR 50404
Electrostatics Code of Practice for the
Avoidance of Hazards Due to Static Electricity, June 2003.
4. ATEX 95: Directive 94/9/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 March
1994 on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States concerning equipment and
protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, 1994.
5. ATEX 137: Directive 1999/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 1999 on minimum requirements
for improving the safety and health protec-
tion of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres (15th individual Directive
within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), 1999.
6. ESCIS (Expert Commission for Safety in the
Swiss Chemical Industry): Booklet 8, Inerting Methods and Measures for the Avoidance of Ignitable Substance-Air Mixtures
in Chemical Production Equipment and
Plants, 1993.
7. Fishwick, T., Loss Prevention Bulletin, 171,
7, 2003.
8. Glor, M., Journal of Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries, 14, pp. 123128, 2001.
9. Glor, M., Proceedings of the 11th Symposium
Loss Prevention 2004, Praha, Congress Centre, pp. 22332241, May 31June 3, 2004.
10. Hoppe, T. and Jaeger, N., Proceedings of 39th
Loss Prevention Symposium of the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, April 1014,
2005, Atlanta, Ga., 2005.
95
9/29/07 5:58:22 PM
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Preventing
Dust Explosions
Risk management programs are critical
for safe handling and processing of combustible dust
as well as for OSHA regulatory compliance
Geof Brazier and Mitch Rooker
BS&B Safety Systems, LLC
PAs current standards define best engineering practices and are designed to
protect both personnel and plant from
combustible dust explosions. These
standards are typically adopted by state
fire marshals, insurance companies,
consultants and their legal representatives and are referenced by the OSHA
NEP. OSHA can and does issue safety
citations in relation to combustible dust
risks. Its citations are based on the General Duty Clause whereby the owner/
operator of a facility shall provide a safe
workplace, as well as by reference to
specific NFPA standards including 61,
68, 69, 86, 484, 499, 654, and 664.
OSHAs NEP
of housekeeping and dust collectionand-filtration measures. These measures are combined with inspection to
ensure that they remain effective. A
layer of dust that is only 1/32-in. thick
is a concern when it covers 5% or more
of a workplace floor area that has
dust-laden structural members, such
as joists and I-beams. Successful dust
control reduces fugitive emissions of
combustible dusts, which in turn cuts
the dust explosion risk.
Quantification of a combustible
dust risk requires that the characteristics of the material be identified
by test. Key parameters include the
maximum explosion pressure (Pmax),
the deflagration index (Kst) and the
minimum ignition energy (MIE) of the
dust. Prevention and protection strategies must also be based on knowledge
of process conditions, such as dust concentration, airflow velocity, operating
pressure, temperature and humidity.
The higher the Kst value, the faster
the rate of pressure rise due to combustion. Kst values above 600 are
considered extremely explosive. Most
common plant dusts have Kst values
between 100 to 150. Even if a plant
owner/operator knows the characteristics of a particular dust, a sample must
be tested under NFPA 68. Particle size
can profoundly affect explosive properties, as the finer the dust, the higher
the Kst value. For example, sugar has
a recorded Kst value of about 138. Of
more concern with regard to the potential damage to process equipment
is the fact that a fine-sugar-dust explosion will generate a pressure in excess
of 100 psi within an enclosed volume in
less than 100 milliseconds. Other key
49
Environmental Manager
parameters include particle size, with
smaller particles equating to more
rapid combustion and easier ignition.
The reason is that more surface area
is freely accessible by the surrounding
air to support combustion.
Ignition control. Understanding and
monitoring for potential ignition hazards at a plant provides a first layer
of protection to the facility. Essential
measures include proper grounding
and bonding of equipment and ducting, appropriate wiring of electrical
equipment, the control of static electricity (see Avoiding Static Sparks in
Hazardous Atmospheres, CE, June
2009, pp. 4449) and monitoring of
process equipment hot spots (Figure
1). Preventive maintenance programs
ensure that such design safety measures remain effective.
Review of dust-explosion loss history
proves that it is important to consider
normal and potential abnormal circumstances while evaluating processes
within a facility. Many times a dust
explosion is the result of an abnormal
event, such as when an automated process fails and it is replaced by a temporary, manual activity. Other times
it could be a consequence of a change
in product packaging. For example, an
operator at a manual bag-emptying
station receives a shrink wrapped pallet of bags. Instinctively, he walks toward the pallet, across a concrete floor,
while wearing appropriately specified
conducting shoes. The surrounding
metal equipment is grounded. The operator stands on shrink-wrap-packaging material (an insulator) as it is unwrapped, tears open a bag of material
and empties it into an adjacent hopper.
As the dry powder flows, static charge
builds on the now insulated operator
until there is sufficient electrical potential to release a spark having sufficient energy to ignite the dust present
in the emptying station.
Injury and damage control. The
OSHA NEP anticipates the deployment of specialty technology to mitigate the effects of a dust explosion.
Referenced techniques fall into the
following four areas:
Prevention: Detection of sparks and
embers traveling through a dust
collection system can lead to their
quenching before reaching an area
50
The course of action to minimize combustible-dust-explosion hazards begins, preferably, in the planning stages
of a process by identifying the risks,
determining the explosive reactivity
of the combustible process dust, and
implementing a combination of both
prevention and protection measures.
Economic considerations favor the
use of explosion vent technology in
terms of cost of equipment and installation. However, many factors must be
considered before choosing explosion
vents. Consider the following application factors:
Can the flame ball that is ejected
from an open vent be accepted? It
will usually extend 30 to about 100 ft in
length and about half this in diameter.
An 1,800-ft3 vessel venting from a single
position will produce a flame ball over
100 ft in length and 50 ft in diameter.
Simple free venting must be directed to
a safe location where personnel will not
be present and other equipment cannot
be damaged (Figure 4).
If venting equipment is installed
Authors
Geof Brazier serves as president of Industrial Protection
Devices, LLC and as the director of product and market
development for BS&B Safety
Systems, LLC (7455 East
46th St., Tulsa, OK 74145;
Phone: 918622-5950; Email:
gbrazier@bsbsystems.com).
He holds more than 20 U.S.
patents in the areas of pressure-relief and industrial
wireless devices. Brazier also collaborates with
the Minnesota Workplace Safety Consultation organization in providing seminars about OSHAs
Combustible Dust NEP. He was educated at the
University of Bristol in England as a physicist.
Mitch Rooker is a senior
development engineer at
BS&B Safety Systems LLC
and along with his co-author,
serves as a member of the
NFPA Committee on Explosion Protection Systems. He
has more than 30 years of experience in research, design
and development of industrial
products and many patents in
the area of overpressure protection. He holds a degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Oklahoma.
Circle 31 on p. 66 or go to adlinks.che.com/23019-31
Chemical Engineering www.che.com October 2009
51
Feature Report
Engineering
Practice
Compressed Gases:
Managing Cylinders Safely
Richard Palluzi
ExxonMobil Research & Engineering
Cylinder basics
Gas cylinders have several major components, including the cylinder body,
a steel or aluminum cylinder with a
strengthened, threaded neck, a flat
bottom rim for standing level, the
valve assembly to control the gas flow,
and a protective cap. Each cylinder is
stamped with its design information,
as shown in Figure 1. Items of particular interest include the cylinder size
(which is required for calculating the
content volume), the cylinder maximum design pressure, and the cylinder test date.
If it is past the test date indicated
on the cylinder, the cylinder can be
transported and the contents can still
be used, but the unit cannot be refilled. Nearly all manufacturers label
their cylinders with a stick-on label
that provides the type of information
shown in Figure 2.
Different manufacturers refer to
their cylinders by a variety of different terms, and not all manufacturers
provide all sizes. The most common
sizes are shown in Table 1.
In the U.S., gas cylinder design and
construction is governed by DOT codes.
52
Pressure relief
Gas cylinders are protected from overpressure in several ways. A pressurerelief device is always installed in the
neck of the cylinder (Figure 1). A variety of such devices may be used, depending on the supplier and the gas:
A rupture disk (CGA code CG-1).
8
1a
1
1b
1c
Figure 2. The
manufacturers label
provides critical information to assist
the end user
3
4
6
5
DOT3AA-2265
AH-89694
MC
3 H 32
DOT
specifications
Average tare
weight, lb
Average
internal
volume, ft3
3AA2400
9 x 55
137
1.76
3AA2265
9 x 51
119
1.55
3A2015
7 x 33
57
0.56
D-1
3A2015
7 x 19
26
0.26
3AA2015
4 x 17
0.10
4X
3AA2015
4 x 13
6.6
0.075
L.B.I.
3E1800
2 x 12
0.015
L.B.
3E1800
2 x 12
0.015
Medical E
3AA2015
4 x 26
14
0.16
BX
3AA6000
10 x 51
300
1.49
BY
3AA3500
9 x 51
187
1.53
3A480
10 x 49
85
1.93
3A480
10 x 36
90
1.28
3A480
8 x 22
33
0.53
AA
4AA480
15 x 52
160
4.46
A1
4BW240
16 x 50
75
3.83
A-2
4BW240
22 x 48
167
7.64
8/8AL
12 x 41
185
2.36
3A1800
24 x 90
1,108
15.83
106A800X
30 x 82
2,254
25.82
106A500X
30 x 82
1,400
25.64
A(Al)
3AL2216
10 x 52
90
1.64
B(Al)
3AL2015
8 x 48
48
1.04
C(Al)
3AL2216
7 x 33
32
0.56
D-1(Al)
3AL2216
7 x 16
15
0.21
4X(Al)
3AL1800
4 x 10
3.3
0.057
3BN400
7 x 45
88
0.65
D-1
3BN400
7 x 22
48
0.28
D-2
3BN400
5 x 15
10
0.10
55 gal
UN1A1
24 x 45
175
7.35
10 gal
UN1A1
14 x 29
50
1.34
5 gal
UN1A1
9 x 24
25
0.67
High pressure
1
1a
1b
1c
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Low pressure
C2H2
A
Nickel
Stainless steel
*These dimensions are not exact. They should not be used for engineering
drawings or equipment specifications.
Chemical Engineering www.che.com October 2009
53
Engineering Practice
link, relief-valve or rupturedisk setting (8001,100F is
common) even when operating
at lower temperatures. Hence
the heating elements rely on
the control system (whether automatic or manual) to limit the
cylinder temperature to a value
below that required to initiate
the relief device. The Box on p.
58 shares some simple guidelines for safe hot-box design.
Wall
Adjustable bay
storage rack
Wall
Secured storage in
public access area
Eye bolt
Material
Unsprinklered areas
No gas cabinet, gas
room, or exhausted
enclosure
Sprinklered areas
Gas cabinet, gas
room, or exhausted
enclosure
Corrosive gas
Liquefied
68 kg (150 lb)
Non-liquefied
23 m3 (810 ft3)
46 m3 (1,620 ft3)
46 m3 (1,620 ft3)
92 m3 (3,240 ft3)
Flammable
0 L (0 gal)
Oxidizing
Cryogenic fluid
Flammable gas
Liquefied
Non-liquefied
28 m3 (1,000 ft3)
56 m3 (2,000 ft3)
56 m3 (2,000 ft3)
0 kg (0 lb)
2.3 kg (5 lb
0 kg (0 lb)
m3
(0
ft3)
0.6
m3
(20
ft3)
m3
(0
ft3)
Nonflammable gas
Liquefied
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
Non-liquefied
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
Oxidizing gas
Liquefied
57 L (15 gal)
Non-liquefied
43 m3 (1,500 ft3)
85 m3 (3,000 ft3)
85 m3 (3,000 ft3)
0 kg (0 lb)
0 kg (0 lb)
1.8 kg (4 lb)
3.6 kg (8 lb)
Pyrophoric gas
Liquefied
Non-liquefied
m3
(0
ft3)
m3
(0
ft3)
1.4
m3
(50
ft3)
Toxic gas
Liquefied
68 kg (150 lb)
Non-liquefied
23 m3 (810 ft3)
46 m3 (1,620 ft3)
46 m3 (1,620 ft3)
92 m3 (3,240 ft3)
0.5 kg (1 lb)
1 kg (2 lb)
0 kg (0 lb)
0
m3
(0
0 kg (0 lb)
ft3)
m3
(0
ft3)
0.3
m3
(10
ft3)
1 kg (2 lb)
2 kg (4 lb)
2 kg (4 lb)
4 kg (8 lb)
Non-liquefied
3 m3 (100 ft3)
3 m3 (100 ft3)
6 m3 (200 ft3)
m3
(750
ft3)
43
m3
(1,500
ft3)
43
m3
(1,500
ft3)
85 m3 (3,000 ft3)
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
Non-liquefied
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
Note: The maximum quantity indicated is the aggregate quantity of materials in storage and use combined.
*A gas cabinet or exhausted enclosure is required. Pressure-relief devices or stationary or portable containers shall be vented directly outdoors or to
an exhaust hood.
55
Flammable
6 scf
0.012 ft3
Oxidizing
6 scf
0.012 ft3
1.2 scf
0.0018 ft3
0.3 scf
0.0006 ft3
Lecture bottles
25 total
Engineering Practice
rate. If the flammable gas storage is
significant or the ventilation rate low,
it may be prudent to classify the area
as Class I Division 2. If only a small
quantity of flammable materials is involved, if the ventilation rate is high
or in an unenclosed exterior location
then General Purpose (ordinary) classification is usually adequate. Note
that in many cases, cylinder storage areas have only minimal electrical equipment and fixtures, typically
lighting. Hence, electrically classifying
the area as Class I Division 2, while
conservative, may be an appropriate
and very low-cost solution.
All storage areas should also have
easy access that is free of extended
ramps and enclosed spaces. Consider
that a release of even an inert gas
in an elevator, for example, could be
enough to cause asphyxiation.
Cylinder placement
Side view
Holes or
gaps for
cross
ventilation
Figure 4.
Proper ventilation is an important design
consideration
when storing
gas cylinders,
even in exterior
storage areas
Raised
floor
Cylinder piping
PR
PR
PI
Relief Vent
valve
Globe
valve
Check
valve
Excess flow
prevention
valve
Gas
cylinder
Globe
valve
Ball
valve Regulator
Regulator
Gas
cylinder
PI
Ball
valve
Check Ball
valve valve
Relief Vent
valve
PR
Relief Vent
valve
Globe
valve
Globe Check
valve valve
Excess flow
prevention
valve
PI
Purge
gas
supply
Regulator
often appear down the road and create problems if the check valve is
not installed.
The manual ball valve is intended
to provide a fast means to shut off the
gas cylinder in an emergency situation, and also allows the system to be
easily locked out and tagged for maintenance. In this case, both the gas cylinder shutoff valve and the ball valve
should be closed, and the manual vent
valve should be opened to vent the
system, completing the double blockand-bleed setup.
Many organizations like to add
a second block valve immediately
downstream of the gas cylinder and
before the regulator, to enable the
isolation of the system for change
out and maintenance. In this case,
the valve must be rated for the full
cylinder pressure.
Purge streams are also common
on higher-purity systems (Figure
6). Since purge systems are usually
lower-pressure gas supplies, it is important to provide the back flow and
relief protection shown. The purgesystem vent should also be treated as
a potentially hazardous stream and
piped to the same vent location as the
purged hazardous gas.
Piping should be run in areas where
it is to be expected. Routing pipe above
offices, personnel corridors and supply rooms can lead to unfortunate
incidents later, in the event that the
piping is assumed to be something
innocuous. At best it can lead to service interruptions; at worst to accidents. Similarly, piping should not be
run above suspended ceilings unless
the space is ventilated as part of the
laboratory. Small leaks can develop
into very hazardous situations over
extended periods in unventilated
areas. Even if ventilated, all welded
systems should be strongly considered
Cylinder connections
57
Engineering Practice
Adaptors are available to ensure a
proper fit between a CGA fitting and
the existing pipe thread. However,
these must be used with extreme care
as they essentially allow the bypassing of safeguards.
Labeling
Empty cylinders
Empty cylinders should be kept separately from full cylinders. Mark empty
cylinders as soon as possible; as a
rule-of-thumb (until the situation can
be verified), always assume a cylinder
is full and act accordingly to ensure
safety, even when it is marked empty.
Cylinders should not be used at pressures below ~25 psi, to prevent gases
from being drawn from the system
into the cylinder and creating an inadvertent hazard for the vendor when
refilling the cylinder. The remaining
useable volume in a cylinder can be
found from the following formula:
Actual volume = [(Actual pressure)
(Initial volume)]/Initial pressure
Emergency response
new small calibration-gas and mixedgas cylinders are designed for single
use, and are intended to be disposed of
when empty.
Gas cylinders are common and very
safe if installed and operated properly.
However, despite their widespread use
in research, they always hold the potential for accidents and injuries if not
properly handled.
Author
Richard Palluzi is a distinguished engineering associate at ExxonMobil Research
& Engineering Co. (1545
Route 22 East, Annandale, NJ
08801; Phone: 908-730-2323),
responsible for the design,
construction and support of
pilot plants and laboratories
for the firms research site in
Clinton, N.J., and consulting
on pilot-plant issues throughout ExxonMobil worldwide. The author of two
books, 30 articles and 40 presentations on all
phases of pilot plant and laboratory safety and
operations, he is a member of AIChE, ISA, the
American Soc. of Safety Engineers and the National Fire Protection Assn., and was recently
elected to the last-named organizations committee on NFPA-45 Fire Protection for Laboratories
Using Chemicals. He teaches three pilot-plant
training courses for AIChE, and is a past chair
of the AIChE Pilot Plant Committee, as well as
of the Clinton sites Safe Operations Team. Also,
he currently chairs ExxonMobils Pilot Plant and
Laboratory Safety Standards Committee. Palluzi
has consulted for both the U.S. Dept. of Energy
and Dept. of Defense on research-related issues.
He holds B.S.Ch.E. (1974) and an M.S.Ch.E.
(1976) from Stevens Institute of Technology.
Environmental Manager
Reduce Hazards in
Process Vacuum Systems
Stanley S. Grossel
Process Safety and Design
Consultant
Explosion-related hazards
47
Environmental Manager
1. Always use perfluoropolyether
(PFPE) lubricant in pumps that are
used to pump oxygen in concentrations above 25 vol.% in an inert gas.
Although PFPE lubricants are preferred, hydrocarbon-based lubricants
may be used if a suitable inert purge
is used to guarantee that the oil is not
exposed to unsafe levels of oxidant.
2. If it is not desired to use PFPE lubricants in oil-sealed rotary vane or
piston vacuum pumps, dilute the oxidant to a safe concentration using an
inert gas (dry nitrogen). However, this
approach is only feasible for relatively
low flowrates of oxidant gases.
3. One must install safety features in
a mechanical pump system to ensure
that the minimum flow of the dilution
gas required to reduce the oxidant
concentration to a safe level is always
available, and to ensure that the flow
of oxidant does not exceed the maximum allowed flowrate. The safety system must be designed so that the flow
of oxidant stops immediately if these
conditions are not met.
Flammable materials. Many gases
are flammable and can explode (deflagrate) if they are within the flammability limits, and there is an ignition
source of sufficient energy available
(for instance, from a localized heat
source). It may be possible to reduce
the explosion hazard if the concentration of flammable gases is lowered
by introducing an inert gas at several
points within the pump or system.
Another way to reduce the probability of an explosion is to eliminate potential ignition sources. It may be difficult to eliminate all ignition sources
because there is often a possibility of
static discharge or friction hot spots
where rotating machinery is used.
Where it is not possible under abnormal conditions to avoid the flammable
zone, the equipment must be designed
to contain any resulting explosion
without rupturing or transmitting a
flame to the environment. This is typically achieved by installing a flame arrester on the exhaust piping.
Pyrophoric materials. A number of
gases (such as silane, phosphine and
others) are pyrophoric that is, they
are spontaneously flammable in air at
atmospheric pressure, so combustion
could occur if the gases were to come
48
Many vacuum pumps are not designed to resist wet corrosive materials. Therefore, the following points
should be considered:
Anhydrous materials: The removal
of a liquid solvent (water) will prevent corrosion. However, special
care must be taken to prevent the
ingress of wet air from the exhaust
of the vacuum pump, especially
when the pump is stopped and air
is sucked back into the pump. An
inert purge should be used as part
of the shutdown procedure in order
to flush corrosive vapors out of the
system prior to shutdown
Dilution: Use a suitable dilution gas
to prevent condensation of corrosive
vapors and thus prevent the possible resulting corrosion
Temperature: Increase the pumpand exhaust-line temperature to
prevent condensation and, therefore,
corrosion. Where the low temperature of the incoming gas flow could
lead to condensation and subsequent
corrosion, an inert gas purge should
be used to avoid condensation
Corrosion of safety equipment: Where
safety critical equipment (such as
flame arrester elements, temperature sensors, safety relief valves and
so on) could be damaged by corrosive
products in the process gas flow, their
materials of construction must be selected to avoid this hazard
Phase changes: Unplanned phase
changes can result in condensation
and possible corrosion. Consideration
of changes in temperature and pressure is required to avoid this hazard
Unplanned reactions: These can lead
to the generation of corrosive products. Careful consideration should
be given to the possibility of cross
contamination when equipment is
used for more than one purpose
To minimize hazards from chemical
sources and to minimize explosion hazards, attention should be paid to the
items listed below to ensure safe operation of vacuum pumps and systems:
Consider all possible chemical reactions within your system
Make allowance for abnormal chemical reactions, including those that
could occur under fault conditions
Refer to material safety data sheets
when you assess the potential hazards associated with your process
materials
Use dilution techniques to minimize
reactions with oxidants and flammable materials
Use dry vacuum pumps if flammable
materials could enter the flammable
zone under abnormal conditions
Use the correct type of lubricant in
your pump when you pump oxidants,
and consider the use of a dry pump
Do not use heavy metals in the gas
path of your system if your process
uses or produces sodium azide
Take specific care when handling
toxic, corrosive, or unstable materials
Ensure that the concentration of
flammable materials in the vacuum
system does not permit these materials to enter the flammable zone.
During operation, there should be
a suitable supply of inert gas (nitrogen) to achieve dilution to a safe
level under all foreseeable operating
conditions and failure modes
Ensure that exhaust blockages cannot occur during operation, either
because of mechanical components
(such as valves or blinds) or because
of process materials or byproducts
depositing in pipelines, filters and
other exhaust components
Use only PFPE (perfluoropolyether)
oils to lubricate pump mechanisms
that are exposed to high concentrations of oxygen or other oxidants.
Other types of oils sold as nonflammable may only be suitable for
use with concentrations of oxidants
up to 30% v/v
Ensure that the accidental overpres-
49
Environmental Manager
sealed rotary vane and piston pumps,
dry pumps, and exhaust system design
are summarized below:
For oil-sealed rotary vane and piston
pumps, design the exhaust system
so that the pump is never subjected
to a back-pressure greater than 1
bar gauge (14.5 psig). Under normal operating conditions, the pump
should not run continuously with a
back-pressure of more than 0.35 bar
gauge (5.1 psig)
Many dry pumps also generate high
exhaust pressures when the exhaust
system is blocked or restricted. One
well-known dry-pump manufacturer
recommends that its dry pumps
should not be operated with an exhaust pressure higher than 0.3 bar
gauge (4.4 psig). If there is a risk of
high exhaust pressures occurring,
this vendor recommends that the
system incorporate an exhaust pressure switch to shut down the pump
and prevent the recommended pressure from being exceeded
It is recommended that the exhaust
system be designed to withstand
an internal pressure of at least 1.3
bar gauge (18.9 psig) for oil-sealed
pumps and at least 10 bar gauge
(14.5 psig) for dry pumps, unless
over-pressure relief is provided.
If a vacuum pump exhaust system
contains accessory components that
might cause restrictions or blockages
the protection methods shown in the
Table (p. 53) should be provided.
Inlet overpressure. The most common cause of over-pressure in vacuumpump inlet piping is the introduction of
compressed gas (such as purge gases)
when the pump is not operating. If
components in the inlet piping are not
suitable for the pressures that result,
the piping will rupture and process
gases will leak from the system.
Care must be taken before connecting compressed gas supplies to the
vacuum system through pressure regulators, which are designed to provide
a low-pressure flow so that the regulated pressure is within the pressure
rating of the vacuum system. The nonventing regulators most commonly
used will cause the pressure within
the vacuum system to rise to the pressure of the gas supply to the regulator, if operated under conditions where
50
Protection method
Interlock the valve so that its piping is always open when the pump is operating
Incorporate a pressure relief bypass
Incorporate a pressure relief bypass
Incorporate a pressure monitor or sensor and interlock this with the pump motor
so that the pump is shut down when the exhaust pressure is too high
Provide an exhaust pressure measurement or a differential-pressure measurement
Incorporate a pressure-relief device
51
Environmental Manager
tions, and ensure that any purge or
breather port connections can only
be used to introduce inert gas
Guard against reverse flow. Ensure
that the system operating procedures and protective equpment protect the system from any reverse air
flow that might result from a pump
failure. Ensure that any pumped
flammable gases are safely disposed of at the final vent from the
pump exhaust. Ensure that flammable gas mixtures cannot occur in
the exhaust piping. This is done by
using suitable inert-gas purging of
the piping before the start of, and
after the end of, the flammable gas
process, and by the use of adequate
inert-gas purging during operation,
to prevent turbulent back-mixing of
air down the exhaust
Maintain the flammable gas concentration above the UFL. Where the
flammable gas concentrations are
very high, operation above the UFL
can be used. Procedures for doing this
are given in NFPA 69 [2]. To maintain
the oxygen at a safe level, rigorous
exclusion of air and oxygen from the
process and pump system is required.
This can be accomplished by dilution
of the pumped gas with an inert gas
(usually nitrogen) or by addition of
enrichment flammable gas (NFPA
69 discusses the use of methane for
this), introduced into the pump inlet
and/or purge connections
Use of flame-arrester protection
systems. When dry vacuum pumps
are used for pumping gases or vapors
that could enter the flammable zone
under abnormal conditions, exhaust
flame arresters should be installed to
quench any resulting flame front in
the event of an ignition. Flame arresters should be closely coupled to the exhaust connections.
Where there is the possibility of continuous burning within a dry vacuum
pump, special precautions should be
taken. Such conditions could occur due
to a continuous ignition source resulting from the accidental pumping of a
gas or vapor with an auto-ignition temperature lower than the internal pump
temperatures. In this case, one must
use a PT100 or equivalent temperature-sensing device on the pump side
of each flame arrester to detect a burn
52
condition, and adopt a suitable flamesuppression strategy to make the system safe in the event of a burn being
detected. The suitable strategy depends
on the application, but could include
the following:
Stopping the supply of fuel. Closing
a valve located on the inlet of the
dry vacuum pump will prevent the
supply of fuel (process gas or vapor)
into the vacuum pump
Stopping the source of ignition. Stopping the pump by turning off power
to the motor will bring the pump to
a halt in approximately 10 seconds
Inerting the area of the burn. The
rapid addition of inert gas into the
area of the burn (typically, but not
always located in the exhaust manifold of the pump) will eliminate the
flame. Note that it is possible for a
flame to reignite if the source of ignition is not removed
Piping design
This section discusses design practices for piping components used with
mechanical vacuum pumps.
Bellows. Bellows are short, thinwalled components with deep convolutions. They are used to reduce the
transfer of vibration from a pump to a
vacuum system. They are available in
metal, rubber or plastic construction.
Always install bellows in a straight
line with both ends rigidly constrained. When installed correctly, the
bellows can withstand a small positive
internal pressure (refer to the Instruction Manual supplied with the bellows
for details). Note: Do not use bellows
on dry vacuum-pumps exhausts: use
braided flexible bellows (see below).
Braided flexible bellows. Braided flexible bellows are bellows with an outer
protective layer of woven stainlesssteel braid. They are suitable for use
as exhaust connections on dry pumps
and other applications where there is
significant gas pulsation or the possibility of high gas pressures.
Braided flexible bellows are intended
for installation in static systems. They
are not suitable for repeated flexing, as
this could cause fatigue failure. When
a braided flexible bellows is installed,
one must comply with the minimum
bend radius given in the manufacturerss instruction manual.
Physical over-pressure
protection
The control system should be designed so that both the pump and any
gas inlets (which are capable of pressurizing the system above its maximum operating pressure) are shut
down when the trip point is reached.
Purge systems. The correct use of
a purge (usually nitrogen) can ensure
that corrosive products are removed,
preventing them from damaging the
vacuum pump, and also from plugging
or damaging protective systems such
as flame arresters. In addition, the
removal of process gases ensures that
undesired and potentially dangerous
chemical reactions do not occur between process gases and vapors used
in different process cycles.
n
Edited by Suzanne Shelley
References
1. Edwards Ltd., Safety Manual-Vacuum Pump
and Vacuum (corporate manual).
2. NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention
Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Mass., 2008.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank J.L. Ryans of Eastman Chemical Co. (Kingsport, Tenn.) for his review of the draft of this article and for his helpful comments and recommendations. I should
also like to acknowledge the assistance of the
following people, who provided technical information used during the development of this article: Peter N. Lodal (Eastman Chemical Co.),
John Campbell (SIHI Pumps Americas), Mark
Nichols (Edwards Ltd.), and Eric Johnson (Graham Manufacturing Co.).
Author
Stanley S. Grossel is president of Process Safety
and Design, Inc. (4 Marble Court, Unit 9, Clifton,
N.J. 07013-2212; Phone: 973-779-3668; Email:
psadi28@aol.com). He provides consulting services related to process safety and loss prevention,
storage and handling of bulk solids and powders,
air pollution control, and process design of batch
plants. Prior to his 1993 retirement, Grossel spent
25 years in the Engineering Dept. of Hoffman-LaRoche, in a variety of roles. He was honored as the
only Senior Engineering Fellow ever to be designated by Hoffman-LaRoche. Grossel is a fellow of
AIChE, and holds AIChEs Norton Walton/Russell Miller Award for outstanding contributions to
loss prevention. He has lectured and been published widely, and has authored major standards
and guidelines. Grossel is also a contributor on
process safety to the 7th Ed. of Perry's Chemical
Engineers Handbook. He holds a B.S.Ch.E. from
City College of New York and an M.S.Ch.E. from
Drexel Inst. of Technology, and has completed
courses toward a doctoral degree.
Get Chemical Engineerings plant cost index to improve plant cost estimates
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521.7
734.7
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620.8
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441.4
437.2
379.5
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53
What is aN SIS?
Environmental Manager
Tolerable Risk
While determined risk is generally well understood, tolerable
risk can be the missing link to complete risk assessments
Mike Schmidt
Emerson Process Management
Recommended approach
To convert an existing matrix to an SILassignment matrix, the first step is to adjust the likelihood categories so they are
Risk Reduction
Factor (RRF)
Likelihood
Safety
Integrity
Level
SIL 4
SIL 3
SIL 2
SIL 1
f > High
N/R
SIL 1
SIL 2
SIL 3
N/R
N/R
SIL 1
SIL 2
N/R
f =Benchmark frequency
Chemical Engineering www.che.com September 2007
69
8/29/07 5:43:13 PM
Table 3. An example of a
Consequence categories
Likelihood
Environmental Manager
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
8
9
10
10
Severity (Consequence)
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
7
6
4
2
8
7
6
3
9
8
7
4
10
9
8
5
consequences
Fatalities
Serious injuries
Injuries (reportables)
First aids (non-reportables)
1.0x
0.1x
0.01x
0.001x
'BUBMJUJFT
%JTBCJMJUJFT
*OKVSJFT
'JSTUBJET
/FBSNJTTFT
FIGURE 1. The Accident Triangle or Safety
Pyramid depicts the simple observations of
H.W. Heinrich [1]
*OUPMFSBCMFSJTL
NBOZFBS
XPSLFS
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PSUPMFSBCMFSJTL
SFHJPO
NBOZFBS
XPSLFS
'BUBMJUJF
NBO
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FIGURE 2. The ALARP principle, developed
in the U.K., states that risks should be reduced
to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable
Government mandates
"VTUS
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8/29/07 5:43:54 PM
6O
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Likelihood
1. Frequent
(>1 event/1.5 years)
2. Occasional
(>1 event/15 years)
3/4. Seldom/Remote
(>1 event/150 years)
5. Unlikely
(<1 event/150 years)
'BUBMJUJFT
NBOZS
"VTUSBMJB
/48
)POH,POH
1
1 fatality
10 disabilities
$PNQBOZ
*
$PNQBOZ
**
$PNQBOZ
***
4NBMM
DPNQBOJFT
/FUIFSMBOET
6OJUFE
,JOHEPN
FIGURE 3. Government mandates defining
tolerable risk are often referred to as bright
lines. The color coding here refers back to
the 3 levels in the ALARP principle as shown
in Figure 2. The U.S. does not set tolerable
risk levels, nor offer guidelines
Automobile accident
Lightning strike
CPI benchmarks
Almost all major companies in the chemical process industries (CPI) have guidelines for tolerable risk, but they are
generally considered highly confidential.
No company is going to announce to the
public, for example, that they would tolerate up to one fatality per year per ten
thousand workers.
Some companies, especially smaller
ones, do not have explicit guidelines. However, the risk they tolerate can be inferred
from the risk reduction measures they
have in place. Smaller companies without explicit guidelines generally tolerate
greater levels of risk than their larger
counterparts and this isnt inappropriate.
A small company, struggling to establish
itself or to make payroll, is going to look at
the amount of risk that it can and must
tolerate to get through the next year very
differently from a company that is look-
Bioengineering
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the gentle way
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is clean, because mixing takes place in
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interchanged. The Inversina mixes a
diverse range of components rapidly
and in an extremely gentle way.
Segregation does not occur, even
after extended mixing times, by virtue
of the eversion phenomenon ( Paul
Schatz principle ) .
Applications for the Inversina: analytical labs, metal finishing shops, powder
metallurgy and nuclear industry,
manufacture of batteries, cement,
ceramics, cosmetics, dental products,
diamond tools, dyes and pigments,
electrical and electronic devices,
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homeopathic products, household
products, medicines and pharmaceuticals, plastics, printing inks and many
other products. The Bioengineering
Inversina is available with capacities
of 2, 20, 50, 100 and 300 L .
Bioengineering, Inc.
Waltham, MA 02451, USA
Bioengineering AG
8636 Wald, Switzerland
info@bioengineering.ch
www.bioengineering.ch
Circle 52 on p. 92 or go to
adlinks.che.com/6899-52
8/29/07 5:45:12 PM
Likelihood
Environmental Manager
1
fatality
10 disabilities
Redesign
SIL 3
SIL 2
SIL 1
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72
#% 7EB (OUSE !DINDD
!-
8/29/07 5:46:39 PM
those five hazards in establishing SIL selection criteria. Other hazards, although
not expected to be fatal, can then use the
same criteria. If total process safety risk
is 2 x 105 fatalities/man-year, then:
N/R: 4 x 106 fatalities/man-year
SIL 1: 4 x 105 fatalities/man-year
SIL 2: 4 x 104 fatalities/man-year
SIL 3: 4 x 103 fatalities/man-year
SIL 4 or re-design: > 4 x 102 fatalities/
man-year
1
fatality
10 disabilities
Redesign
, " / , / "
1 / , / , / "
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Variations to consider
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Circle 55 on p. 92 or go to
adlinks.che.com/6899-55
55,6x254_baer_engl.indd 1
8/29/07 5:49:12 PM
Environmental Manager
a larger matrix, the team doing risk assessment will probably spend more time
debating categories than is warranted. By
the same token, if the matrix is smaller
than 3 x 3, it is unlikely to have enough
detail to be worthwhile.
In general, it is a good idea to extend
the matrix far enough to the left to get a
column of all non-rated SIFs, or else all the
SIFs, regardless of risk, will end up being
SIL rated. By the same token, there is no
reason to extend the matrix farther to the
left than a column that is all N/R, or farther to the right than is all redesign.
Problems with
poor flowing
powder or
bulk solids?
MUELLER
T 1 (978) 649-3300
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74
385-3c
Circle 57 on p. 92 or go to adlinks.che.com/6899-57
8/29/07 5:50:14 PM
PI
Solids
Environmental
Processing
Manager
Cooling water
return
Condensate
Steam ejector systems are generally categorized into one of four basic
types: single-stage, multi-stage noncondensing, multi-stage condensing,
and multi-stage with both condensing
and non-condensing stages.
For many years, steam ejector systems dominated process applications
thanks to their simplicity, low purchase cost, good reliability and their
ability to be designed for very large capacities (in excess of 1,000,000 acfm)
and be operated at very low pressures
in the micron range (for instance, sixstage units are routinely designed for
suction pressures in the range of 310
microns). They also are available in a
variety of materials of construction.
Steam ejector systems are ideal for
wet-vacuum and highly corrosive applications. As a result, they are still
being used instead of mechanical
vacuum pumps in applications that
require a reliable vacuum system that
can tolerate corrosive chemicals, liquid slugs and solids carryover.
Safety considerations. In general, there are very few safety problems associated with the operation
of steam ejector vacuum systems.
However, one safety issue associated
with their design is the potential for
back-streaming of steam into the process equipment.
For instance, steam ejectors normally use a steam bleed to control
the suction pressure. If the process
TI
TI
To seal pot
Steam
supply
Condensate
Aftercondenser
Vacuum Systems:
Recommendations
For Safe Operation
PI
YZ intercondenser
Suction
Cooling water
supply
To seal pot
Gate valve
PI Pressure indicator
Four-way valve
TI Temperature indicator
Steam trap
Piccolo connection
59
Environmental Manager
In instances where suction gases,
or materials entrained in the suction
gases, might freeze inside the ejector,
ejectors with external heating jackets
can be specified.
Instrumentation. It is good engineering practice to provide adequate
instrumentation to monitor and control the operation of the steam ejector
system. The following instrumentation items are recommended for monitoring and controlling the vacuum
system, and to support troubleshooting efforts:
Control system for controlling the
steam bleed to maintain the desired
vacuum level
Pressure gage on the main steamsupply line
Steam pressure gage on each
ejector
Suction pressure gage on the inlet to
each ejector
Vacuum gage to monitor absolute
pressure at the process vessel
A flowmeter to monitor the water
flow to each inter-condenser
Temperature gages on the inlet and
outlet water lines to and from each
shell-and-tube inter-condenser
Temperature indicator in the barometric leg from each barometric
condenser
Blind or
base pressure
Single unit
capacity
range, ft3/min
Single ejectors
One stage
50 torr
75 torr
101,000,000
Two stages
4 torr
10 torr
Three stages
800 micron* 1.5 torr
Four stages
100 micron
250 micron
Five stages
10 micron
50 micron
Six stages
1 micron
3 micron
Liquid-ring pumps
60F water-sealed:
One stage
50 torr
75 torr
318,000
Two stages
20 torr
40 torr
Oil-sealed
4 torr
10 torr
Air ejector first stage
2 torr
10 torr
Rotary-piston pumps
One stage
5 micron
100 micron
3800
Two stages
0.001 micron 10 micron
Rotary-vane pumps
Operated as a dry compres20 torr
50 torr
206,000
sor
Oil-sealed, rough-vacuum
0.5 torr
20 torr
50800
pump
Oil-sealed, high-vacuum
pump:
One stage
5 micron
100 micron
3150
Two stages
0.001 micron 10 micron
Rotary-lobe blowers:
One stage
100 torr**
300 torr
3030,000
Two stages
10 torr**
60 torr
Integrated pumping systems
Ejector-liquid ring pump
1 micron
3 micron
100100,000
Rotary-blower, liquid-ring
1.0 torr
5 torr
10010,000
pump
Rotary-blower, rotary-piston
0.1 micron
0.10 torr***
10030,000
pump
Rotary-blower, rotary-vane
20 micron
200
10030,000
pump
micron****
* 1.0 micron = 0.001 torr
**Based on intercooled design that uses gas admitted to a trapped discharge pocket to cool the blower
***Based on using a two-stage, rotary-piston pump as the backing pump
****Based on a two-stage, rough-vacuum, rotary-vane design that exhibits a
base pressure of approximately 0.5 torr
Source: Ref. 1
Outlet
Seal
0.0001-in.
clearance
Separator
baffle with
screen
Inlet
Discharge
valve
Inlet
Rotor
Discharge
Vanes
Slide
pin
Oil level
view port
Piston
Cam
Automatic
decanting
arrangement
Stator
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Environmental Manager
(that ensures that the exhaust valve is
open before the pump can be started)
is recommended; in fact, this is a condition of the warranty for some vacuum-pump manufacturers.
A fine mist of oil drops is emitted
with the exhaust gases that are discharged from an oil-sealed pump. Exhaust filters are normally installed
to eliminate this oil mist. The most
popular design has removable filter
elements and can be mounted anywhere in the discharge line. Units are
available that can remove up to 99.9%
of the exhausted oil mist. Oil mist filters should not be allowed to become
blocked, as hazardous over-pressures
could occur. A differential pressure
sensor and alarm can be installed on
oil mist filters to monitor their operation and detect potential blockages.
If the oil mist is contaminated with
organic compounds from the process
gas, especially if they are toxic, then
an activated carbon filter should be installed after the oil mist filter. The activated carbon filter will remove these
contaminants by adsorption.
Pump cooling. Oil-sealed pumps must
be cooled to remove the absorbed heat
of compression. Both water- and aircooled models are available. Air-cooled
models should be installed in an area
that will allow an ample flow of fresh
air to reach the pump. The jackets on
water-cooled pumps usually contain
small clearances that can plug with
solids. A strainer or filter should be
installed in the cooling water supply
line to remove any solids. A regulating
valve should be installed in the cooling-water supply line to control the
pump operating temperature. A hightemperature cutout switch is sometimes installed to protect the vacuum
pump from overheating.
Movement of oil and flammable
vapor droplets from oil-sealed vacuum
pumps has been known to generate a
static charge, which could lead to a fire
or explosion [3]. To avoid or minimize
this potential hazard, it is critical to
inert the exhaust stream with nitrogen to eliminate oxygen or reduce it to
below the limiting oxygen concentration (LOC).
Also, in many cases, it is prudent to
use nitrogen to dilute the gas stream
upstream of the pump inlet to move it
62
out of the flammable range. It is critical that the nitrogen supply source be
free of oxygen. There have been a few
instances where the nitrogen supply
was compromised, allowing in air that
can lead to an explosion [3]. For pyrophoric gases, such as silane, special
care must be taken to prevent air or
oxygen from entering the system.
Inlet
connections
Body
Liquid
Inlet
port
Inlet
port
Rotating
liquid
compressant
Rotor
Discharge
ports
In this sector
compressed gas
escapes at discharge ports
Discharge
connections
FIGURE 3.
This figure
shows a crosssectional view
(above) and
general view of
assembly (right)
of a liquid-ring
vacuum pump
(Reprinted with
permission from
Ref. 1)
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Environmental Manager
Both the compressed gases and the
sealing liquid are discharged through
the pump discharge connection, and
the discharge piping must be sized
for two-phase flow. Piping of the same
diameter as the discharge connection
will usually be adequate, but a larger
line may be required if the distance
to the vapor-liquid separator is more
than a few feet. The discharge piping should never rise more than 23
ft above the pump before the gas and
liquid are separated. The discharge
piping should be designed so that it is
free to drain after a shutdown.
Pump draining. The pump casing
should be drained to the shaft level
before a liquid-ring pump is started.
Starting the pump when it is completely filled with liquid will overload
the motor and place undue mechanical
stresses on the shaft and rotor. Shaft
failure is not uncommon on large liquid-ring pumps operated in this way.
A solenoid valve installed in the sealant supply line to the pump is the best
way to stop the flow of sealant when the
pump is shut down. It will not be necessary to drain any residual liquid from
the casing. If sealant is recirculated
from the vapor-liquid separator, the
sealant will automatically drain to the
shaft level if the separator is designed
with an overflow nozzle at the pump
shaft level. The sealant may be manually drained to the shaft level through
a hole drilled in the pump casing or by
a drain in the sealant supply line.
If the pump is located outdoors or
in unheated buildings, it should be
completely drained for freeze protection during prolonged shutdowns.
Similarly, the pump must never be restarted dry; it must be partially filled
with sealant liquid. This may necessitate a bypass around the solenoid
valve in the sealant supply line.
Sealant piping. There are three possible arrangements for sealant flow
to liquid ring pumps: Once-through
(no recovery), closed loop (recirculated
sealant) and partial recirculation system (partial recovery).
Once-through arrangement. A oncethrough installation does not necessarily imply that none of the sealant
is recovered; rather, the term simply
refers to the absence of any return
piping from the vapor-liquid separa64
Edwards
Vacuum
65
Environmental Manager
They may discharge gases at high
temperatures, in some cases as high
as 350400C. Newer designs allow
running at lower temperatures and
have precise temperature control
Some models are difficult to repair
or rebuild
They may require a gas purge for
cooling or to protect the bearings
and seals from the process gas
Due to the high operating temperature, some process materials such as
monomers, may have a tendency to
polymerize
An excellent overview of dry vacuum
pumps is presented by Ryans and
Bays [6]. Two types of vacuum pumps
that are used in high and ultra-high
vacuum applications are the turbomolecular pump and diffusion pump.
However, they are not discussed in
this article.
Author
References
Acknowledgements
September 2012
Literature Review
CHE.COM
Featuring Brochures and Catalogs of Products and Services for the CPI
66
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