Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Alex L. Wangi
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Introduction
Background
Policy and Law on the Books
Challenges in Practice
Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION
............................................................................................................................................................
THE extraordinary growth of greenhouse gas emissions in China represents the single greatest
challenge to global climate change efforts in coming decades. China is the worlds leading
emitter of greenhouse gases, having surpassed the United States in 2006 (Olivier, et al., 2012).
Chinas greenhouse gas emissions accounted for nearly a third (29 percent) of the global total in
2011, slightly more than emissions of the United States and the European Union combined (27
percent).ii This state of affairs is the result of more than three decades of energy-intensive, coalfired economic growth, wherein Chinas GDP grew by an average of 10 percent a year.iii
And, while emissions in the developed world are steady or declining, Chinas greenhouse
gas emissions are expected to account for half of the global growth in energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions between now and 2030 (IEA, 2012). Without significant contribution from
China, efforts to find a solution to global climate change are unlikely to succeed.
Perhaps recognizing the urgency of the matter, Chinese leaders have begun to implement
a range of policies and laws aimed at improving the energy and carbon intensityiv (though not
absolute emissions) of its economy.v These moves were initially motivated by non-climate
objectives such as economic development, energy security, social stability, and international
reputation, but, since 2007 Chinese leaders have framed their actions explicitly as part of a
comprehensive national climate change program.
Chinas climate change program is designed to address the primary sources of
greenhouse gas emissions: fuel combustion and, to a lesser extent, industrial processes and land
use changes.vi The program attempts to address these sources primarily through (1) reduced
reliance on energy-intensive heavy industry; (2) greater energy efficiency and conservation; (3)
increased use of non-fossil energy and less carbon-intensive fossil fuels; and (4) expansion of
carbon sinks (e.g., through afforestation).
Chinas regulatory approach relies heavily on top-down, command-and-control
regulation, built around bureaucratic targets and controls for local officials and state-owned
enterprise leaders. This top-down control is nonetheless coupled with extensive leeway for local
experimentation and flexibility in implementation. More recently, leaders have pressed for
greater utilization of market measures and, to a more modest extent, transparency and public
supervision.
This chapter offers an overview of Chinas developing climate change response by
examining the framework on the books and significant implementation challenges in practice.
First, it offers background on Chinas contribution to global climate change and its positions in
international climate negotiations. Second, it describes Chinas formal framework of climate
change-related laws and policies. This body of authorities has expanded significantly since the
beginning of Chinas 11th five-year plan in 2006.vii This part also describes the preliminary
results as reported by official and third party sources.viii Finally, this chapter concludes by
discussing several dynamics that will influence the efficacy of Chinas climate change efforts in
practice. These include the evolution of various co-benefits (i.e., economic growth, pollution
reduction, social stability, and enhancement of international reputation) and their impact on
Chinas cost-benefit calculation for climate change action; the extent to which implementation
problems can be resolved; and whether Chinas still developing interior regions continue to be
the locus of carbon outsourcing (from wealthier coastal regions of China) or instead shift toward
a low-carbon growth path.
2. BACKGROUND
............................................................................................................................................................
investment in energy-intensive industries, such as cement and steel (Bergsten, 2008). This shift
reversed the two-decade long trend of year-over-year energy efficiency improvements. While the
trend toward greater energy efficiency resumed in the 11th five-year plan as the result of a
number of efforts discussed below, continued rapid economic growth has caused absolute energy
use and greenhouse gas emissions to rise sharply nonetheless.
example, the State Meteorological Administration was tasked with coordinating Chinas
involvement with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the State Science
& Technology Commission led the domestic National Climate Change Coordination Group,
created in 1990.xvii In practice, though, the development-oriented agencies, such as the State
Planning Commission, Chinas lead economic planning agency, and the Ministry of Energy, still
dictated the key Chinese negotiation positions in the meetings leading to the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol (Hatch, 2003).
The second phase of climate engagement from 1995 to 2007 was marked by growing
engagement and a gradual elevation of climate change as a policy priority. China actively
participated in the negotiations that led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and was designated a nonAnnex I country without binding emissions reduction targets under that agreement. The creation
of the high-level National Climate Change Countermeasures Coordination Group in 1998, led by
the powerful State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC),xviii reflected the increasing
policy priority of climate change. An alternative view is that this institutional elevation of
climate change was not primarily an attempt to strengthen state capacity to address climate
change, but rather an effort merely to signal to external and domestic observers alike Chinas
increased concern with climate change. Another view is that the elevation of climate change
reflected concern about the potential constraints climate change policy might place on economic
growth. Thus, the elevation could be seen as a defensive move to ensure that climate change
policy would not unduly hinder economic growth. The institutionalization of the SDPCs leading
role in climate change in 1998 formalized what had always been an implicit development focus
in Chinas climate change positions.
The third phase of climate engagement - beginning around 2006-07 - was marked by a
more comprehensive approach to climate engagement. This included the release of the first
national climate change program and the establishment of the National Leading Group on
Climate Change in 2007,xix led by the Premier of Chinas State Council. This Premier-led
National Leading Group signalled a further elevation of the policy priority of climate change
within the Chinese bureaucracy.xx
Chinas National Climate Change Program focused on four central goals related to
emissions mitigation: (i) adjusting the industrial structure, (ii) improving energy efficiency and
reducing energy consumption, (iii) optimizing Chinas energy structure through the use of
renewables and less carbon-intensive fossil fuels, and (iv) expanding carbon sinks.xxii The 2007
climate program (but not later editions) also listed Chinas family planning efforts as a major
climate initiative, noting that the approximately 300 million averted births from the one-child
policy were equivalent to 1.3 billion tons of avoided CO2 emissions reductions in 2005. While
the main objectives in Chinas national climate change program have not changed since the 2007
program, the number of implementation initiatives has increased significantly.xxiii
With respect to the choice of regulatory tools, policymakers have largely relied on
administrative measures (xingzheng shouduan). These include a range of command-andcontrol approaches organized around bureaucratic targets for carbon and energy intensity
improvements and pollution emissions reduction. More recently, Chinese authorities have
emphasized the need for market measures, and begun to implement subsidies, tax reform, and
pilot experiments with carbon trading.
3.1 Targets
At the heart of Chinas climate change program is a set of quantitative targets, including
carbon intensity, energy intensity, non-fossil energy, and afforestation targets. Like quarterly
earnings targets in a publicly traded corporation, these bureaucratic targets, created as part of the
five-year state planning process, become the focal point of leadership efforts and are supported
by a suite of laws, policies, and fiscal incentives. In theory, promotions, bonuses and other
rewards or punishments for local government officials are closely tied to target performance.xxiv
Economic growth, social stability, and one-child policy targets have been the most important
targets.
In 2006, however, Chinas central authorities elevated certain environmental and energy
efficiency targets at least on paper - to the highest level of state priority.xxv Specifically, the
plan established a target to reduce the energy intensity of the economy by 20 percent, and targets
to reduce absolute emissions of two key pollutants, sulphur dioxide for air and chemical oxygen
demand for water, by 10 percent.xxvi Previous five-year plans contained energy efficiency and
environmental targets, but they had always been lower priority non-binding targets. Also, in past
years, environmental targets were typically the responsibility of the specialized agencies. In
contrast, now the leading cadres the most senior officials at each level of government
would be personally responsible for environmental target achievement.
Extending this approach, in 2009, China expanded its national targets to encompass
climate-specific targets. A month before the Copenhagen climate change negotiations, President
Hu Jintao announced at the United Nations in New York that China would implement targets to
reduce carbon intensity by 40-45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, increase the percentage of
non-fossil energy in Chinas energy mix to 15 percent by 2020, and increase the afforestation
rate to 21.66 percent (State Forestry Administration, 2011). These targets were subsequently
incorporated into Chinas 12th five-year plan (2011-15). The key 12th five-year plan targets
included a 17 percent reduction in carbon intensity, a 16 percent reduction in energy intensity,
and a non-fossil energy target of 11.4 percent of total energy use by 2015.xxvii
-20%
-19.1%
-16%
Carbon Intensity
-17%
Non-Fossil Energy
10%
9.6%
11.4%
Afforestation Rate
20%
20.36%
21.66%
Pollution Reduction
Sulfur dioxide
-10%
-14.29%
-8%
COD
-10%
-12.45%
-8%
Nitrogen oxides
-10%
Ammonia nitrate
-10%
These efforts resulted in a reported energy intensity reduction of 19.1 percent during the
11 five-year plan, nearly meeting the target. Only interim performance figures have been
released for the 12th five-year plan targets.xxviii In 2013, officials announced air quality targets
and associated targets for absolute reductions in coal use in parts of the country (State Council,
2013b; MEP, et al., 2013; Guangdong EPB, et al., 2013; Stanway & Edwards, 2013; Stanway,
2013).
th
to accelerate energy efficiency improvements and pollution reduction through rapid shutdown of
backwards facilities and construction of larger, more efficient facilities.
In the 12th five-year plan, the campaign to shutdown backward production capacity has
continued. In 2011 alone, China shut down small thermal power generating units with a total
generating capacity of 8 million kw and millions of tons of obsolete production capacity in
iron smelting, steel, cement, coking, plate glass, paper, electrolytic aluminium, copper smelting,
lead smelting, and coal production (NDRC 2012a; USCBC, 2013).
Strategic Emerging Industries
Another way in which Chinese authorities are attempting to promote economic
transformation is through high-level support of seven low-carbon industries. Three of these socalled strategic emerging industries are energy and environmental industries (State Council,
2009, 2010):
Non-Fossil Energy
Consumption
8.3% (2010)
2015 Target
2020 Targetxxx
11.4%
15%
Installed Capacity
Hydropower
230 GW
290 GW
430 GW
Wind
47 GW
100 GW
200 GW
Nuclear
12.86 GW*
40 GW
58 GW**
Solar PV
6.5 GW
35 GW***
50 GW
State Council, 2012a; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012; China Security News, 2010.
IAEA, 2013; ** Xinhua, 2013; *** State Council, 2013a.
Policy measures include a mandatory connection and purchase policy, a national feed-in
tariff system, government investment and concession programs, and other measures (Schuman
and Lin, 2012: 90).
Mandatory Connection and Purchase Policy: The Renewable Energy Law sets forth,
among other things, a requirement for grid companies and oil companies to purchase,
respectively, renewable power and liquid bio-fuels (Schuman et al, 2012). Grid
companies are required to obtain, by 2010, 1 percent of total power generation from
non-hydropower renewable power; by 2020, 3 percent (NDRC, 2007b). Grid
companies are required to sign agreements with renewable energy generators to
purchase all electricity produced by these generators (Renewable Energy Law, 2009:
Art. 14).
Feed-in Tariff: The law requires establishment of a feed-in tariff that provides
renewable electricity generators a fixed subsidy over and above the wholesale
electricity price for coal-fired power (Renewable Energy Law, 2009: Art. 19, 20;
Schuman et al, 2012).
Cost-Sharing and Other Financial Support: Rules provide for an electricity price
surcharge to fund the feed-in tariff and other actions required by law (Renewable
Energy Law, 2009: Art. 21). Local governments are also required to set up renewable
energy funds and offer other forms of fiscal and tax support (Renewable Energy Law,
2009: Art. 24).
Less Carbon Intensive Fossil Fuels & More Efficient Coal Use
Chinas energy policy is also aimed at reducing the carbon intensity of Chinas fossil fuel
use through the development of natural gas and more efficient use of coal. Annual output of
shale gas, for example, is expected to increase to 6.5 billion cubic meters by 2015 (State Council,
2012a). National policy also promotes the installation of large-scale coal-fired power plants
based on the most efficient coal-fired power plant technologies (known as supercritical or ultrasupercritical). As of 2012, China had 40 ultra-supercritical power generating units with capacity
of 1 GW or larger, and large thermal power units with capacity greater than 300 MW accounted
for 74.4 percent of total thermal generating capacity in China (State Council, 2012a). This rapid
construction (at a pace of one a month) of advanced technology coal plants and the continued
policy of shutting down backward and small-scale coal-fired power capacity has caused the
overall efficiency of Chinas coal plants to surpass that of the coal-fired power plant fleet in the
U.S. (Seligsohn, et al., 2009; Bradsher, 2009).
According to official Chinese sources, non-fossil energy use avoided the equivalent of
600 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions as of 2011 (State Council, 2012a). The policy to
optimize Chinas energy structure is aimed at lowering the carbon intensity of Chinas energy
utilization. However, given that the overall percentage of Chinas energy mix from non-fossil
energy will remain relatively low for the foreseeable future, it is likely that transition fossil fuels
such as natural gas and more efficient coal technologies will play an important role in Chinas
overall climate strategy in the near-term.
D. Increasing Carbon Sinks
Carbon sinks are the fourth major component of Chinas National Climate Change
Program. These include afforestation, grassland protection and restoration, and agricultural sink
programs. In the 12th five-year plan, this includes, among other things, a target to increase the
forest coverage rate to 21.66 percent and to increase forest stock by 600 million cubic meters.
Chinas afforestation level is low compared to other major economies. By comparison, forest
cover in the U.S. is 33.3 percent; the E.U., 42 percent; Brazil, 61.2 percent; and Indonesia, 51.7
percent (World Bank, 2013). EU Forests and other wooded land now cover 155 million ha and
21 million ha, respectively, together more than 42 % of EU land area (European Commission,
2013).
Like other components of Chinas climate change program, these initiatives were initially
instituted to address more immediate concerns, such as flood prevention, desertification, as well
as loss of cropland and wetlands. For example, China instituted a broad-based ban on logging in
natural forests in 1998 in the wake of major floods on the Yangtze and other major rivers (Illegal
Logging Portal, 2004; FAO, 2001). The increasing prevalence of major sandstorms and
desertification drove afforestation efforts in northern China. However, the afforestation programs
are actually increasing environmental degradation in arid and semiarid regions. The planting of
trees unsuitable to these low precipitation regions has resulted in overall tree survival rates of
only 15 percent, reduced vegetation cover, decreased groundwater supplies, and increased wind
erosion of soil (Cao, 2008).
While Chinas National Climate Change Program documents set forth a range of figures
regarding the amount of land area involved in these carbon sink initiatives, the program does not
provide estimates of carbon mitigation impact (NDRC, 2013a).
Shenzhen (NDRC, 2011c). The goal is to establish the regional trading pilots by 2014 and a
national trading scheme near the end of the 13th five-year plan, though timelines have shifted
numerous times (Haas, 2013). The seven regional pilots alone would likely cover 800 million to
1 billion tons of carbon emissions. This would make Chinas the second largest GHG cap-andtrade program in the world after the European Unions Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).xxxi
In June 2013, Shenzhen became the first city to launch its carbon emissions trading pilot.
The Shenzhen pilot included 635 industrial and construction companies in 26 sectors, which
composed 31.7 million tons of GHGs or 38 percent of Shenzhens total emissions in 2010
(Hook, 2013). Initial trading has been light and the performance of this experiment remains to be
seen (Haas, 2013). All seven trading pilots commenced operation in 2013 and 2014.
A carbon tax proposal is reportedly under consideration; however, no firm announcement
has been made as to whether or when such a proposal would actually be deployed (Caijing,
2013).
through the state planning process and related targets and policy documents. It is unclear what
function legislation would serve that is not already served by state planning documents and their
related targets, policies and regulations. Legislation could serve to memorialize chosen
allocations of authority and regulatory mechanisms in a more permanent way, and the legislative
process could at a minimum provide another forum for competing interests to negotiate Chinas
climate policy.
4. CHALLENGES IN PRACTICE
Laws and policies on the books are one thing, but implementation is, of course, another.
As the Chinese saying goes, the heavens are high, and the emperor is far away. This part
focuses on three dynamics in the domestic context that will affect the implementation of Chinas
climate change framework in practice. First, the value that various levels of the Chinese state
place on a range of climate change co-benefits (such as developing a low-carbon economy,
improving environmental quality and public health, maintaining social stability, and building
Chinas international reputation) will in large part determine the level of political will available
for China to sustain and deepen its climate change program. Second, principal-agent problems of
policy implementation, caused by political, institutional, public choice, and capacity issues, are
rampant in China. The degree to which these problems can be resolved will be critical to the
success of Chinas climate program. Finally, the impact of Chinas regional economic disparities
has not been sufficiently appreciated. The path China chooses for the development of its poorer
interior regions i.e., whether it continues to replicate past models of pollute first, remediate
later or, instead, pushes forward with a low-carbon pathway supported by Chinas more
developed regions will have enormous implications for Chinas overall carbon pathway in the
future.
A. Economic Transformation
In public statements, Chinese officials have expressed concern about the durability of
Chinas three-decades long economic miracle. This has been the stated justification for
policies to transform Chinas model of economic growth from an export- and industry-based
economy to a consumption-based, services-oriented model (Balme, 2012). The result of such a
shift in economic structure would be a less energy-intensive model of growth. The effort at
economic transformation is an ongoing one, and experts hold sharply divergent views on the
ability of Chinas economy to shift in this way. This chapter will not attempt to predict
whetherthese efforts will succeed. The point is that the success of this shift and the speed at
which it occurs will have a significant impact on Chinas climate change program.
An economic slowdown could lead to a loosening of Chinese commitments to energy
efficiency, renewables, and lower carbon intensity and a clinging to old familiar ways of doing
business i.e., heavy industry and investment-led growth. Concerns about unrest due to
insufficient jobs and worsening economic well-being create pressure in this direction. But a
downturn could just as plausibly lead to further efforts to stimulate the development of lowcarbon industries and technologies, which generate GDP, mitigate energy security problems, and
create jobs.
Another area of uncertainty is the extent to which vested economic and political interests
will resist the proposed economic transformation. In some regards, carbon-intensive economic
interests are aligned with the interests of the climate program. The national power companies, for
example, have been heavy investors in Chinas renewables sector. Similarly, state oil concerns
are investing in shale gas. But powerful, largely state-owned, economic interests in the carbonintensive industries such as steel, cement, and chemicals - may also see the shift in economic
structure as a destabilizing reorganization of economic power, or even an existential threat.
B. Environmental Quality
Another significant co-benefit of climate mitigation is the reduction of traditional air
pollution. Thus, unlike in developed nations where the costs of responding to climate change are
being assessed at a time when traditional pollution problems have already been mitigated to a
large degree, in China, the cost-benefit balance is altered by the opportunity for a given
investment to provide both climate mitigation and pollution and health co-benefits.
Since the 1990s, various studies have attempted to quantify the costs of air pollution
health and otherwise in China and found them to be substantial (Ho and Nielsen, 2007; World
Bank, 1997). For example, a 2007 study by the World Bank and Chinas Ministry of
Environmental Protection found that the combined health and non-health cost of outdoor air and
water pollution for Chinas economy comes to around $100 billion a year (or about 5.8% of the
countrys GDP [at the time]) (World Bank, 2007). Outdoor air pollution was the cause of
approximately 1.2 million premature deaths in China in 2010 (Wong, 2013a). Current climate
change policies, which include plans to shut down outdated power plants, improve energy
efficiency through substitution of heavy industry, and increased reliance on renewable energy
have the potential to mitigate these environmental and health costs as well. Indeed, Chinas 2013
national Air Pollution Action Plan, issued in the wake of emergency levels of air pollution in
many regions of the country, contains measures that in significant part overlap with key elements
Nonetheless, Chinese leaders may find that that taking a stance of resistance to international
pressures on climate change action can garner support from nationalist constituencies
domestically, and protect Chinese politicians from accusations of being too compliant in the face
of foreign demands.
None of these four factors economic transformation, environmental quality, social
stability, and international reputation - inevitably push China toward more or less climate change
action. Yet it is critically important to understand how each of these factors may influence
Chinese climate change policies. Each is dynamic and subject to rapid, potentially dramatic
change, with resulting impacts on the shape and effectiveness of Chinese climate change policy.
The more climate change action supports other priorities important to Chinas self-interest, the
more likely it is that authorities will grant the necessary policy focus and resources to bring about
effective climate change mitigation.
monitoring in key state-controlled polluting facilities (Wang, 2011; Zhang and Schreifels, 2011).
Central government mandates and funding support have created incentives for substantial
investment in energy efficiency and pollution control as well. The installation of environmental
infrastructure is no guarantee of its proper use, but is a necessary first step in implementation.
Central authorities have also implemented a range of initiatives for improving top-down
control of local agents. Party authorities have been given greater authority to punish bureaucrats
and state-owned enterprise leaders for failing to meet energy, carbon, and pollution targets; in
practice, it is not clear that this authority is being utilized (van Aken, 2012/13; Landry, 2008).
To counter capacity problems, central agencies issued detailed implementation rules and offered
trainings to assist local government actors in implementation.xxxvi To counter information
problems and cheating on target implementation, central regulators developed multiple data
sources and more readily observable proxies for target implementation (Wang, 2013).
Authorities have apparently limited propaganda restrictions on reporting of environmental
problems and increased environmental information disclosure, possibly to encourage so-called
public supervision (shehui jiandu) or fire alarm supervision over environmental policy
implementation. Studies have shown that in practice enforcement is becoming more stringent
and legalistic in certain (typically wealthier) parts of China (van Rooij and Lo, 2010).
In addition to these efforts, greater Chinese government, business, and citizen
engagement with international actors has influenced enforcement in a number of ways, including
through government-to-government knowledge transfer, informal supply chain regulation, and
greater transparency of environmental information. For example, government researchers are
active in researching international experience (such as the EU emissions trading system, and
trading of sulphur dioxide emissions rights in the U.S.) to develop best practices for the Chinese
context. Various levels of the Chinese government have executed agreements with foreign
governments on policy design collaborations, such as the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic
Dialogue and the NDRC-State of California Memorandum of Understanding on Climate Change
(U.S. Dept. of State, 2013; Dearen, 2013).
The extraordinary amount of manufacturing within China for global supply chains
delivering finished goods to the U.S., E.U. and other developed regions has created an
opportunity for informal regulation of Chinese polluters by multi-national corporations and civil
society groups. These efforts are typically motivated either by corporate interest in cost reduction
(such as through energy efficiency improvements)xxxvii or public pressure that threatens multinational corporations with reputational damage (Plambeck, et al., 2012). This is an example of
what Julia Black has called decentered regulation, which emphasizes the role of nongovernmental organizations, businesses, technology, and other non-state factors in regulation
(Black, 2002).
These various efforts hold out the possibility that environmental enforcement and
implementation in China could improve substantially in coming years. But improvement is not
assured. Changing priorities, corruption, collusion, interest groups opposed to environmental
protection, and other factors could just as easily overwhelm initiatives to improve
implementation.
Third, coastal provinces benefit directly from support for the interior provinces in the
form of reduced conventional air pollution. There is already precedent in China for this sort of
payment for ecosystem services. Existing experiments in eco-compensation (shengtai
buchang) schemes involve transfer payments from more developed regions to subsidize pollution
reduction (mostly in the water pollution context) in developing parts of the country. A recent
example in the air pollution context concerns the substantial amount of pollution that interior
(and much less developed) Hebei Province contributes to developed Beijing. Commentators have
raised the idea of wealthier Beijing paying Hebei Province not to pollute (Jiang, 2013). A central
compensation scheme announced in late 2013 offers payments to poorer provinces around
Beijing as an incentive for air pollution reduction (that could also double as climate change
mitigation).
Thus, the rough foundations for a different (more efficient, lower carbon) development
model are in place in China, but at the same time the path of least resistance would likely be a
continuation of the so-called two highs, one resource (lianggao yizi) referring to high energy
consuming, high pollution, and resource-intensive production model of economic growth that
has driven Chinese economy for nearly four decades. How the battle between these two
approaches plays out will have major implications for climate mitigation in China in the coming
decades.
5. CONCLUSION
............................................................................................................................................................
China is without a doubt an indispensable component of any effective solution to climate
change. Chinese authorities have established a more extensive climate change program on the
books than is commonly recognized outside of China. However, questions remain as to whether
Chinas climate change policies will be properly implemented in practice, and whether they are
sufficiently ambitious to address global climate change even if fully implemented. What is clear
is that tremendous efforts must still be made if China is to reduce its contribution to global
climate change.
REFERENCES
Abebe, D. and Masur, J., (2010), International Agreements and Internal Heterogeneity: The
Two Chinas Problem, 50 VA. J. INTL L. 325.
Baeumler, A., Chen, M., Iuchi, K., and Suzuki, H., (2012), Eco-Cities and Low-Carbon Cities:
The China Context and Global Perspectives in Sustainable Low-Carbon City Development
in China - Directions in Development: Countries and Regions, World Bank, See
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/02/15879709/sustainable-low-carbon-citydevelopment-china.
Bailey, R., (2013), Warsaw Climate Change Conference Inconclusively Concludes, REASON.
Balme, R., (2012), Global Warming Politics: The EU, China, and Climate Change, in Europe
and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals, (Vogt R., ed.).
Bergsten, C., Freeman, C., Lardy, N., and Mitchell, D., (2008), Chinas Rise: Challenges and
Opportunities, 138-39.
Black, J., (2002), Critical Reflections on Regulation.
Bloomberg News, (2013), China Plans to Complete Climate Change Draft Law in Two Years,
See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-18/china-to-complete-climate-change-lawdraft-in-two-years.html.
Bradsher, K., (2009), China Outpaces U.S. in Cleaner Coal-Fired Plants, N.Y. TIMES, See
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/11/world/asia/11coal.html?_r=0.
Bradsher, K., (2012), 'Social Risk' Test Ordered by China for Big Projects, N.Y. TIMES, See
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/world/asia/china-mandates-social-risk-reviews-for-bigprojects.html.
Brahic, C., (2008), 33% of Chinas Carbon Footprint Blamed on Exports, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=5467388#.Uaf7BZW5gk8.
Caijing, (2013), China Works on Carbon Tax, See http://english.caijing.com.cn/2013-0731/113112824.html.
Cao, S., (2008), Why Large-Scale Afforestation Efforts in China Have Failed to Solve the
Desertification Problem, ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1826, See
http://image.sciencenet.cn/olddata/kexue.com.cn/upload/blog/file/2009/9/2009915172624609
730.pdf.
Chen, Q., Feng, F., Zhou F., and Wang Q., (2003), The Basic Structure of National Energy
Strategy [], See
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1045/2191153.html.
China Development Gateway, (2010), Chronicle of Events, See
http://en.chinagate.cn/features/Western_Development/2010-01/04/content_19175519.htm.
China Security News [], (Dec. 2010), 2020 Target for Hydropower in Operation
Increased to 430 GW [2020 4.3 ], See
http://www.chinaero.com.cn/rdzt/qjny/zxdt/12/79655.shtml.
ChinaFAQs, (2009), Chinas Ten Key Energy Efficiency Projects, See
http://www.chinafaqs.org/library/chinafaqs-chinas-ten-key-energy-efficiency-projects.
Clark, D., (2011), Which Nations are Most Responsible for Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN,
See http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/21/countries-responsible-climatechange.
Cohen-Tanugi, D., (2010), Putting it into Perspective: Chinas Carbon Intensity Target, Natural
Resources Defense Council, See
http://nrdcchina.org/phpcms/userfiles/download/201109/27/Putting%20it%20into%20Perspe
ctive%20China%E2%80%99s%20Carbon%20Intensity%20Target%202010%20Oct.pdf.
Dearen, J. (2013), CA, Chinese Officials Announce Climate Deal, SF GATE, See
http://www.sfgate.com/business/energy/article/CA-Chinese-officials-announce-climate-deal4813079.php.
Economy, E., (1997), Chinese Policy-Making and Global Climate Change: Two-Front
Diplomacy and the International Community, in The Internationalization of Environmental
Protection, (Schreurs M., and Economy E., eds.).
EIA, (2012), World Total Primary Energy Consumption by Region, See
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=IEO2013&subject=0-IEO2013&table=1IEO2013®ion=0-0&cases=Reference-d041117.
EIA, (2014a), China, See http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
EIA, (2014b), Country Analysis Brief Overview Total Primary Energy (Quadrillion Btu), See
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH#tpe.
EIA, (2014c), Country Analysis Brief Overview Carbon Dioxide Emissions (Million Metric
Tons of CO2), See http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH#cde.
Christian Ellermann et al., (2011), Differentiating Historical Responsibilities for Climate
Change, in China and global climate change: Ethics, responsibility and environmental
policy 71 (Harris P., ed.), See
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/Ellermannetal.pdf.
European Commission, (2013), EU Forests and Forest Related Policies, See
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/home_en.htm.
FAO Corporate Document Repository, (2001), Impacts and Effectiveness of Logging Bans in
Natural Forests: Peoples Republic of China, See
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x6967e/x6967e06.htm.
Farber, D., (2011), The Challenge of Climate Change Adaptation: Learning from National
Planning Efforts in Britain, China, and the United States, 23 J. ENVTL. L. (U.K.) 359.
Farber, D., (2013), Beyond the North-South Dichotomy in International Climate Law: The
Distinctive Adaptation Responsibilities of the Emerging Economies, 22 REV. OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY & INTL ENVTL. L. 42.
Feng, K., (2013), Outsourcing CO2 in China, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, See www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1219918110.
Guangdong Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau, Guangdong Provincial Development
and Reform Commission, Guangdong Provincial Economic and Informatization
Commission, Guangdong Provincial Public Security Bureau, Guangdong Provincial Finance
Bureau, and Guangdong Provincial Administration for Quality, Technology, and Supervision
(2013). Guangdong Province Pearl River Delta Clean Air Action Plan Second Phase (20132015), See http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006940060/201303/t20130328_370875.html.
Haas, B., (2013), China Carbon Permits Trade 22% Below Europe on Market Debut,
BLOOMBERG.
Han, G., et al., (2012), Chinas Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of Current
Development.
Harris, P., (2003), Fairness, Responsibility, and Climate Change, 17 ETHICS & INTL AFFAIRS
149, See http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/17_1/review_essays/899.html.
Hatch, M., (2003), Chinese politics, energy policy, and the international climate change
negotiations, in Global warming and East Asia: The domestic and international politics of
climate change, (Harris P., ed.).
Ho, M., and Nielsen, C., (2007), Clearing the Air: the Health and Economic Damages of Air
Pollution in China.
Hook, L., (May 2013), China reveals details of first carbon trading scheme, FIN. TIMES.
Houser, T., (2013), Chinas 2012 Energy Report Card, Rhodium Group, See
http://rhg.com/notes/chinas-2012-energy-report-card.
Hu, A., (2009a), Chinas Response to Global Climate Change [].
Hu, A., (2009b), A New Approach at Copenhagen (3), China Dialogue, See
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/2898-A-new-approach-at-Copenhagen3-.
IAEA, (Dec. 2013), Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation in 2012, See
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx.
Illegal Logging Portal, (2004), Asias Forests Head to China-Beijings Logging Ban Sparks
Fears of Deforestation Abroad, See http://www.illegal-logging.info/content/asias-forestshead-china-beijings-logging-ban-sparks-fears-deforestation-abroad.
IEA, (2012), Medium-Term Coal Market Report 2012.
Jiang, X., (June 2013), Clearing the Air, CHINA DAILY, See
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/13/content_16613054.htm.
Joint Research Centre, (2013), CO2 time series 1990-2011 per region/country, EDGAR Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, See
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2011.
Karlenzig, W., and Zhu, D., (2011), Chinas Provincial and City Low Carbon Pilot Programs: A
New Opportunity for Global Emissions Reductions from Low Carbon Accounting,
Management and Credit System.
Ke, J., Price, L., Oshita, S., Fridley, D., Khanna, N., Zhou, N. and Levine, M., (2012), Chinas
Industrial Energy Consumption Trends and Impacts of the Top-1000 Enterprises EnergySaving Program and the Ten Key Energy Saving Projects, 50 ENERGY POLY 562, See
http://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbl-5922e-ep-industrial-energy-trendoct-2012.pdf
Kostka, G. and Hobbs, W., (2010), Energy Efficiency in China: The Local Bundling of Interests
and Policies.
Landry, P., (2008), Decentralized Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge Univ. Press, ed.).
Levine, M. et al., (2009), The Greening of the Middle Kingdom: The Story of Energy Efficiency
in China, See http://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbl-2413e-china-greeningmay-2009.pdf.
Lewis, J., (2007), Chinas Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations,
THE WASHINGTON Q., Winter 2007-08, See http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energy-climategoals-china-twelfth-five-year-plan.pdf.
Liu, J., (2010), From Sham to Reality, Chinadialogue, See
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3916-From-sham-to-reality.
Ma, X., and Ortolano L., (1999), Environmental Regulation in China.
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Finance
(MOF), Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MOHURD), and National Energy
Administration (NEA) of the Peoples Republic of China, (2013), Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and
Surrounding Regions Implementing Details for the Carrying Out the Air Pollution Action
Plan [], See
http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201309/t20130918_260414.htm.
MOF, NDRC, (2012), Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Funds for Strategic
Emerging Industries [], See
http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefagui/201301/t20130124_729883.html.
MIIT, (2012a), Classification Catalogue of Strategic Emerging Industries.
MIIT, (2012b), Notice on the First Batch of Key Strategic Emerging Industry Technologies and
Products for Targeted Promotion.
Naughton, B., (2011), Chinas Economic Policy Today: The New State Activism, 52 EURASIAN
GEOGRAPHY AND ECON. 313, 324-5.
NDRC, (2007a), China National Climate Change Program, See
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/213624.htm.
NDRC, (2007b), Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China [
], See
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2007tongzhi/t20070904_157352.htm.
NDRC, (2008), 11th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy [],
See http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2008tongzhi/t20080318_198262.htm.
NDRC, (Nov. 2009), Chinas Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change The
Progress Report 2009, See
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File571.pdf.
NDRC, (2010), NDRC Notice Regarding Work on Developing Low-Carbon Provinces/Districts
and Low-Carbon City Pilots [
], See http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2010tz/t20100810_365264.htm.
NDRC, (2011a), NDRC Implementing Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding Private
Enterprises to Develop the Strategic Emerging Industries.
NDRC, (2011b), The Ten Key Energy Conservation Projects Made Significant Progress, See
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20110929_436216.htm.
NDRC, (2011c), NDRC General Office Notice on the Work of Establishing Carbon Trading
Pilots [], See
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2011tz/t20120113_456506.htm.
NDRC, (2012a), Chinas Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, See
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File1324.pdf.
NDRC, (2012b), Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China
[], See
http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CDM/UpFile/File2894.pdf; (English translation courtesy
of The Climate Group, See http://thecleanrevolution.org/_assets/files/The-InterimRegulation-of-Voluntary-Greenhouse-Gases-Emission-Trading-in-China.pdf).
NDRC, (2012c), 12th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy (),
See http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2008tongzhi/t20080318_198262.htm.
NDRC, (2013a), Chinas Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change.
NDRC, (2013b), NDRC Guiding Catalogue for Strategic Emerging Industries Key Products
and Services.
NDRC, (2013c), Overview of the National Leading Group on Climate Change, Climate Change
Department, See http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/ldxz/default.htm.
Nye, J., (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
Olivier, J., Janssens-Maenhout, G., and Peters J., (2012), Trends in global CO2 emissions: 2012
Report, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, See
http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/PBL_2012_Trends_in_global_CO2_emi
ssions_500114022.pdf.
Pan, J., Phillips, J. and Chen, Y., (2008), Chinas Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade:
Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility, 24 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POLY 354-376.
Peoples Daily, (2009), Confronting climate change ultimately depends on sustainable
development, (yingdui qihou bianhua zuizhong kao kechixu fazhan
), See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/25/content_11938321.htm.
Peoples Republic of China, (1986), National Economic and Social Development 7th Five-Year
Plan, See http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/22/20050720184239.htm.
Peoples Republic of China, (2006), National Economic and Social Development 11th Five-Year
Plan, See http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm.
Peoples Republic of China, (2011), National Economic and Social Development 12th Five-Year
Plan, See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/16/c_121193916.htm.
Peters, G. and Hertwich, E., (2008), CO2 embodied in international trade with implications for
global climate policy, ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 42(5): 14011407.
Pew Charitable Trusts, (2012), Whos Winning the Clean Energy Race?, at 7, 14-19, See
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/News/Press_Releases/Clean_Ene
rgy/clen-G20-report-2012-FINAL.pdf.
Plambeck, E., Lee, H. and Yatsko, P., (2011), Improving Environmental Performance in Your
Chinese Supply Chain, MIT SLOAN MGMT REV., Winter 2012.
PR Newswire, (2013), Walmart Highlights Efforts to Benefit APEC Economies, Reuters PR
Newswire, Walmart press release.
Price, L. et al., (2010), The Challenge of Reducing Energy Consumption of the Top-1000 Largest
Industrial Enterprises in China, 38 ENERGY POLY, See http://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/eptop1000-challengenov-2010.pdf.
Qi, Y., Li, H., and Wu, T., (2013), Interpreting Chinas Carbon Flows, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
Renewable Energy Law of the Peoples Republic of China, (2009), as amended.
Rogers, S., and Evans, L., (Jan. 2011), World carbon dioxide emissions data by country: China
speeds ahead of the rest, THE GUARDIAN.
Schuman, S. and Lin, A, (2012), Chinas Renewable Energy Law and Its Impact on Renewable
Power in China: Progress, Challenges and Recommendations for Improving Implementation,
15 ENERGY POLY 89-109 See
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512006660.
Seligsohn, D., Heilmayr, R., Tan, X., and Weischer L., (2009), China, the United States and the
Climate Change Challenge, WRI Policy Brief, See http://www.wri.org/publication/chinaunited-states-climate-change-challenge.
Shanghai Municipality, (2013), Shanghai Municipality Clean Air Action Plan (2013-2017), See
http://www.envir.gov.cn/info/2013/10/20131018001.pdf.
Stanway, D., (2013), China to Cut Coal Use in Key Industrial Regions-Sources, Reuters
Stanway, D., and Edwards, N., (2013), Update 1-China to Cap Total Energy Use at 4 Bln T Coal
Equivalent by 2015, Reuters, See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/china-energycap-idUKL4N0AT0OS20130124.
State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, [] (2007), State Council Approves
NDRC, Energy Bureau Notice on Several Suggestions Regarding Accelerating the Shutdown
of Small Coal-Fired Units [
], See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-01/26/content_509911.htm.
State Council, (Oct. 2008), Chinas Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, See
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File419.pdf.
State Council, (Sept. 2009), Wen Jiabao Convenes and Presides over Third Symposium on
Development of Strategic and Emerging Industries [
], See http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-09/22/content_1423493.htm.
State Council, (2010), State Council Decision on Accelerating the Development of Strategic
Emerging Industries [], See
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-10/18/content_1724848.htm.
State Council, (Feb. 2011a), 12th Five-Year Work Plan on Controlling Greenhouse Gas
Emissions [], See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/201201/13/content_2043645.htm.
State Council, (Nov. 2011b), Chinas Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, See
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-11/22/content_2000272.htm.
State Council, (2012a), Chinas Energy Policy 2012, See
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-10/24/c_131927649.htm.
State Council, (2012b), 12th Five-Year Plan on the Development of the Strategic Emerging
Industries [], See
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-07/20/content_2187770.htm.
State Council, (2013a), State Council Several Suggestions Regarding Promoting the Healthy
Development of the Photovoltaic Industry [
], See http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-07/15/content_2447814.htm.
State Council, (2013), Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan [], See
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm.
State Forestry Administration, (2011), Forestry Development 12th Five-Year Plan [
].
Steinberger, J., Roberts, J., Peters, G. and Baiocchi, G., (2012), Pathways of human development
and carbon emissions embodied in trade, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 2(2):8185.
Swartz, S., (2010), China Tops U.S. in Energy Use, WALL ST. J..
The Climate Group and HSBC, (2011), Delivering Low-Carbon Growth: A Guide to Chinas
12th Five Year Plan.
U.S.- China Business Council, (2013), Chinas Strategic Emerging Industries: Policy,
Implementation, Challenges & Recommendations, See
https://www.uschina.org/files/public/documents/2013/03/sei-report.pdf
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Economic Research Service, (Oct. 2013), International
Macroeconomic Data Set, See http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/internationalmacroeconomic-data-set.aspx#.UfexK1OydZl.
U.S. Department of State, (2013), U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the
Strategic Track, Press Release, See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm.
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), (1992), Art. 3.1.
United Press International, (2013), China launches first carbon trading scheme.
van Aken, T., (2012/13), Making the Grade: Performance Targets and Industrial Energy Policy,
China Environment Series 12, 121-26.
van Rooij, B., (2006), Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Lawmaking, Compliance, and
Enforcement Theory and Cases.
van Rooij, B., and Lo, C., (2010), A Fragile Convergence, Understanding Variation in the
Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law, 32 L. & POLY 14-37.
Wang, A., (2013), The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy
in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365.
Wang, A., (2014), Regulating Domestic Carbon Outsourcing: The Case of China and Climate
Change, 61 UCLA L. REV. __ (forthcoming).
Wang, E., (Dec. 3, 2012), NDRC Sets Second Batch of 29 National Low-Carbon Pilots [
29 ], 21st Century Economic News [21 ], See
http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2012-12-3/3ONDE3XzU3NTk3OA.html.
Wang, S., (2011), Introduction of Air Quality Monitoring in China, presentation slides, See
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_nov_2011/12%20Introduction%20of%20Ambient%20Air%20Quality%20Monitoring%20Program%20i
n%20China1.pdf.
Wang, Y., (2010), Chinas renewable energy contributes to 9.6 percent of total energy
consumption, (in Chinese), See Xinhua, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/201012/15/content_1766566.htm.
Wen, J., (2011), Report on the work of the Government, delivered at the Fourth Session of the
Eleventh China National Peoples Congress, See
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/05/china-npc-2011-reports-full-text.
Wiener, J., (2008), Climate Change Policy, and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1805.
Wiener, J., (2010), A Response to Daniel Abebe and Jonathan Masur, Opinio Juris.
Wong, E., (2013a), Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Million Premature Deaths in China, N.Y TIMES.
Wong, E., (2013b), As Pollution Worsens in China, Solutions Succumb to Infighting, N.Y.
TIMES, See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/asia/as-chinas-environmental-woesworsen-infighting-emerges-as-biggest-obstacle.html?pagewanted=all.
World Bank, (1997), Clear Water, Blue Skies: Chinas Environment in the New Century.
World Bank, (2007), Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages.
World Bank, (2007), Statement from World Bank China Country Director on 'Cost of Pollution
in China' Report, See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2007/07/11/statement-world-bank-china-country-director-cost-pollution-china-report.
World Bank, (2011), World Development Indicators China and World GDP (current US$).
World Bank, (2013), Forest area (% of land area), See
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.FRST.ZS.
Xinhua, (2010), Developed Nations Should Take Responsibility for Climate Change, See
http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2010-08/03/content_20631505.htm.
Xinhua, (2013), China Targets 20-Percent Growth in Nuclear Power Installation, See
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/12/c_132227231.htm.
Xinhua, (2013), Historical Responsibility of Developed Countries Unevadable, See
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/04/content_16474610.htm.
Xu, N., and Zhang C., (2013), What the World is Getting Wrong about China and Climate
Change, Chinadialogue, See http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5711What-the-world-is-getting-wrong-about-China-and-climate-change.
Xu, W., and Stanway D., (2013), China's carbon intensity falls over 3.5 percent in 2012,
Reuters, See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-china-carbon-intensityidUSBRE9090I220130110.
Yang, C., and Jackson R., (2013), Chinas Synthetic Natural Gas Revolution, See
http://people.duke.edu/~cy42/SNG.pdf.
Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. The author is grateful to the editors of this volume,
and to Edward Parson, Jonathan Zasloff, Tim Malloy, Sam Bray, Christina Ho and Alvin Lin for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
ii
Excluding land use change and forestry (LUCF), as well as emissions from flaring gas during oil and
gas production and underground coal fires. The U.S. accounted for 16 percent, E.U. for 11 percent (Joint
Research Centre EDGAR, 2013).
iii
This growth resulted in a nearly 20-fold increase in overall GDP between 1978 and 2010 (DOA, 2010).
iv
Intensity refers to the amount of energy or carbon emitted per unit of economic output.
v
China is not subject to an internationally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction target.
vi
In China, fuel combustion causes 91 percent of non-land use emissions; industrial processes 9 percent
(Cohen-Tanugi, 2010).
vii
Five-year plans, a feature of the planned economy era, remain an important governance tool in China.
These plans set forth essential guidance on the direction of economic and social development. In
practice, priorities set forth in the plan receive significant financial, policy, and legal support (Wang,
2013).
viii
It can be difficult to verify the accuracy of official Chinese data sources and commentators have raised
questions about the quality of such data in a number of contexts. See Wang (2013): 424-429 for a fuller
discussion of these issues.
ix
Chinas total primary energy consumption was 17.29 quadrillion BTU in 1980 and 109.62 quadrillion
BTU in 2011, a 6.34-fold increase (EIA, 2014b). Over the same period, U.S. total primary energy
consumption increased by 1.25 times, albeit from a much higher baseline (78.07 quadrillion BTU in
1980; 97.47 in 2011) (EIA, 2012).
x
Fossil fuels accounted for 91 percent of total energy consumption in 2011 (69 percent coal; 18 percent
oil; 4 percent natural gas) (EIA, 2014a). This compares to 80 percent of primary energy consumption
from fossil fuels in the U.S. in 2011 (20 percent coal; 35 percent oil; 25 percent natural gas).
xi
Chinas annual carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption increased from 1.448 to 8.715
billion metric tons of CO2 from 1980 to 2011 (EIA, 2014c).
xii
10.3 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2011).
xiii
20.53 percent in 2011 (EIA, 2012).
xiv
China's Chief Negotiator Su Wei warned developed countries that their historical responsibility for
climate change is unavoidable [sic] (Xinhua, 2013; Xinhua, 2010; Ellerman, 2011).
xv
This was the idea that developed countries, due to more than 150 years of industrial activity, were
principally responsible for the current levels of GHGs in the atmosphere, and would thus take the lead
in combatting climate change through binding emissions reduction commitments, and support for
developing countries in the form of funding and technology transfer (UNFCCC: Art. 3.1).
Note that in 2011, Chinas average per capita carbon dioxide emissions increased by 9 percent to
7.2 tonnes CO2 [T]his is similar to the per capita emissions in the European Union of 7.5 tonnes in
2011 China is now well within the 6 to 19 tonnes/person range spanned by the major industrialised
countries (Olivier et al, 2012).
xvii
National Climate Change Coordination Group - guojia qihou bianhua xietiao xiaozu,
(Peoples Daily, 2009). This group was under the State Councils State Environmental Protection
Commission (Guowuyuan huanjing baohu weiyuanhui, ). The State Science &
Technology Commission was reorganized as the Ministry of Science & Technology in 2003.
xviii
National Climate Change Countermeasures Coordination Group guojia qihou bianhua duice xietiao
xiaozu, (Peoples Daily, 2009). The State Planning Commission was
reorganized as the State Development and Planning Commission in 1998. The SDPC was restructured as
the National Development and Reform Commission in 2003.
xix
The National Leading Group on Climate Change guojia yingdui qihou bianhua lingdao xiaozu
(NDRC, 2013c).
xx
See endnote [xviii], supra, for caveats regarding the policy significance of such institutional
restructuring.
xxi
Chinese authorities have released new editions of the Program annually, except for 2010 (NDRC
2007a, 2009, 2012a, 2013a; State Council 2008, 2011b). This document has no legal or otherwise binding
force on its own, but is rather a summary document issued pursuant to Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC.
xxii
Although this Chapter focuses on climate mitigation, China also has an extensive policy framework on
adaptation to climate change (NDRC 2013a; Farber, 2011).
xxiii
These elements of the program were formalized in a range of domestic planning, policy, and legal
documents during the 11th and current 12th five-year plan periods; they were first framed as a climate
change program during the 12th five-year plan. See the 12th five-year plan (PRC, 2011), the State Council
12th Five-Year Work Plan on Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions (State Council, 2011a) and a
range ancillary official documents pursuant to these.
xxiv
Poor performance, however, typically does not result in commensurate punishments in practice
(Landry, 2008).
xxv
These were known as the energy saving, emissions reduction (ESER, or jieneng jianpai) targets,
which in the 11th five-year plan were designated as binding hard targets.
xxvi
Reductions from 2005 levels by 2010.
xxvii
The intensity targets refer to reductions from 2010 levels by 2015. Non-fossil energy (nuclear and
renewables) made up 9.6 percent of Chinas energy mix in 2010 (Wang, 2010).
xxviii
Carbon intensity fell by 3.5 percent in 2012 (Xu and Stanway, 2013). Energy intensity fell by 1.9
percent in 2011 and 3.6 percent in 2012 the first two years of the 12th five-year plan (Houser, 2013).
xxix
The Pew definition of clean energy includes: solar, wind, small hydro, geothermal, marine, and
biomass energy. It does not include large hydropower and nuclear, which are included in official Chinese
definitions of new and renewable energy or non-fossil energy.
xvi
xxx
Chinese planning is primarily operationalized around five-year planning cycles. The state does engage
in longer term planning exercises that result in publicly announced medium- or long-term targets such as
the ones in this chart. Interim five-year and annual targets are typically set with these longer term goals in
mind, but short-, medium- and long-term goals are all subject to change and in practice it is not unusual
for targets to be modified.
xxxi
The E.U. ETS covers 2.1 billion tons from 31 countries. Australias carbon trading system covers 380
million tons. Californias system covers 165 million tons (UPI, 2013).
xxxii
Five provinces: Guangdong, Liaoning, Hubei, Shaanxi, Yunnan. Eight cities: Tianjin (provincelevel), Chongqing (province-level), Shenzhen (Guangdong), Xiamen (Fujian), Hangzhou (Zhejiang),
Nanchang (Jiangxi), Guiyang (Guizhou) and Baoding (Hebei).
xxxiii
Interview with central government environmental official (noting that local officials found
achievement of central targets to be difficult in the absence of specific implementation guidance).
PR Newswire (2013) a Walmart press release notes efforts that reduced greenhouse gas
emissions in Walmart stores by 11.3 percent in 2012 compared to a 2005 baseline.
xxxvii
Wang (2013) notes Chinas common but differentiated responsibilities approach to allocation of
provincial pollution reduction targets). Abebe & Masur (2010) argue that severe income disparities may
lead to growing GHG emissions for longer than predicted by many extant models. Hu (2009a, 2009b)
proposes a framework for allocating carbon reduction targets among Chinese provinces according to their
Human Development Index level and emissions volume.
xxxviii
xxxix
xl
At the international level, countries have attempted to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions, while
also taking this economic disparity into consideration, according to the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol creates binding reduction targets for developed
countries but not developing countries, and developed countries support mitigation in developing
countries through funding and technology transfers. This approach has failed to stem the growth of
emissions and has led to gridlock in the treaty negotiations process.