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Psychomusicology: Music, Mind, and Brain
2014, Vol. 24, No. 3, 000

2014 American Psychological Association

0275-3987/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pmu0000052

Music in the Flesh: Embodied Simulation in Musical Understanding

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Andrea Schiavio

Damiano Menin

University of Sheffield

University of Ferrara

Jakub Matyja
Polish Academy of Sciences

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The embodied paradigm recently applied to music cognition advocates the crucial role of the agents
body for musical understanding (Leman, 2007; Reybrouck, 2006). This standpoint holds that a basic form
of musical meanings ascription is action-based, radically entwined with the level of motor knowledge
of the listener or performer (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). Traditional music psychology often
employs computational models to investigate musical comprehension, where an agents mind is seen as
a computer that processes the musical signal thanks to species-specific brain mechanisms (Lyon &
Shamma, 1996). In contrast, the embodied perspective assumes that cognition depends on processes that
are intrinsically connected to the organisms body, thus being widely distributed beyond the boundaries
of the brain (Shapiro, 2010). In this article, we underline the need of deepening such perspective by
referring to the closely related notion of Embodied Simulation and have a close look at its main
applications in the psychology of music.
Keywords: mirror neurons, embodied simulation, embodied music cognition, musical understanding

listener or performer (Schiavio, 2012). Traditional music psychology often employs computational models to investigate musical
comprehension, where an agents mind is seen as a computer that
processes the musical signal thanks to species-specific brain mechanisms (Lyon & Shamma, 1996). In contrast, the embodied perspective assumes that cognition depends on processes that are
intrinsically connected to the organisms body, thus being widely
distributed beyond the boundaries of the brain (Shapiro, 2010).
In this article, we emphasize the need of deepening such perspective by referring to the closely related notion of Embodied
Simulation (ES) and have a close look at its main applications in
the psychology of music. ES is a basic functional mechanism that
exploits, not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional organization
of the motor system (Gallese, 2011, p. 37). ES has been first
introduced in the current debates on intersubjectivity to posit that
the basic skills of social cognition (understanding others sensations and emotions) do not require any kind of explicit mindreading (Gallese, 2001, 2005). This position has been interpreted as a
nonpropositional, unconscious, form of mental simulation (Goldman, 2006), based on the unmediated processes underlining the
mirror-neurons activity1 (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti,
1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, Fogassi, 1996), which accounts
for basic social interactions by means of a neurobiologically plausible and theoretically unitary framework (Gallese & Sinigaglia,
2011, p. 1).

The embodied paradigm, originally developed in the fields of

theoretical biology (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), holds that human cognition,
even in its highest level inferential processes, is rooted in sensorimotor processes that link the agent to the world in which she is
embedded. As Phillips-Silver and Trainor (2007) point out, empirical studies show not only how perceptual and motor representations influence peoples cognitive processing, but how sensorimotor representations are tied to symbolic information about the
self and the body (p. 543; see also Barsalou, 2003; Markman &
Brendl, 2005). Recent attempts to apply this perspective to music
cognition, whose first examples were the seminal works by Hatten
(2004) and Zbikowski (2002), advocate the crucial role of the
musicians as well as the perceivers bodies for musical understanding (Leman, 2007; Reybrouck, 2001, 2006). This standpoint
holds that a basic form of musical meanings ascription is actionbased, radically entwined with the level of motor knowledge of the

Andrea Schiavio, Department of Music, Music Mind Machine Research

Centre, The University of Sheffield; Damiano Menin, Department of
Human Studies, University of Ferrara; Jakub Matyja, Institute of PhilosoAQ: 7 phy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.
The authors are grateful to Renee Timmers for her time to read our first
draft and for her suggestions. Moreover, we wish to thank the anonymous
reviewers for their comments. Jakub Ryszard Matyjas involvement in this
project was financed by the resources of the National Science Centre
(NCN), granted under decision number DEC-2011/03/N/HS1/01703.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Andrea
Schiavio, Department of Music, Music Mind Machine Research Center,
Department of Music, University of Sheffield, 34, Leavygreave Road,
AQ: 8 Sheffield, S3 7RD UK. E-mail: a.schiavio@sheffield.ac.uk

1
[W]hen we observe goal-related behaviours . . . . specific sectors of our
pre- motor cortex become active. These cortical sectors are those same
sectors that are active when we actually perform the same actions. In other
words, when we observe actions performed by other individuals our motor
system resonates along with that of the observed agent (Gallese, 2001,
p. 38).

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SCHIAVIO, MENIN, AND MATYJA

An application of this conceptual framework to the realm of

music experience has been posited by Overy and Molnar-Szakacs
(2009). They have suggested a representational equivalence between the perception of a givenmusical-directedmotor act and
its neural simulation, which would allow the listeners to experience a musical feedback as if (Damasio, 2003) they were actually performing the sound-producing action themselves. This
action-simulation mechanism is consistent with the idea that subjects can reenact their own motor experience through an automatic,
unconscious, process in order to give sense with their own body to
a musical surface. Two implications can be drawn from this
assumption
(a) Perceiving music consists in the implicit knowledge of the
sensorimotor contingencies2 of the heard sound-producing actions
(Reybrouck, 2006).
(b) The neurons recruited during this simulation are the same as
the ones involved while performing or listening to the related
sound(s) of the same (chain of) goal-directed action(s) (Kohler et
al., 2002; see also Bangert & Altenmller, 2003; Chen, Penhune,
& Zatorre, 2008; Maes, Leman, Palmer, & Wanderley, 2014).
This view is supported by empirical studies concerning the activation of sensorimotor networks during the observation of musicians
performances or during passive listening (see DAusilio, 2007, 2009;
Novembre, Ticini, Schtz-Bosbach, & Keller, 2014). Among others, Haslinger et al. (2005) found that the simple observation of
meaningful musical acts elicits a stronger activation for musicians
in the fronto-parietal-temporal network when compared with nonmusicians, reflecting the operation of a mirror-matching system
(ib., p. 289). A stronger activity for the musicians primary motor
cortex has been also reported during a passive music listening task
in a study by Haueisen and Knsche (2001). These are only two
representative indications of the growing amount of literature
investigating the activation of sensorimotor networks during musically relevant tasks (Altenmller, Wiesendanger, Kesselring,
2006).
Although the authors do not explicitly refer to ES, these studies
might suggest that the auditory-motor mapping implemented by
the mirror-like activities requires an appropriate repertoire of acts
to be successfully fulfilled. If we are to take ES seriously, in fact,
we should assume that the development of the ability to play an
instrument builds up, in the performers motor system, a vocabulary of (musical-directed) motor acts that allow the agent to understand the actions, emotions, and intentions behind the musical
signal via simulation (see Blsing et al., 2012; Iyer, 2002, 2004;
Keller, Knoblich, & Repp, 2007; Snger, Mller, & Lindenberger,
2012; Varni & Camurri, 2008). However, meaningful aspects of a
musical piece could obviously be grasped also by individuals who
(a) dont have any musical training or (b) dont have that particular
chain of acts in their motor repertoire (i.e., though being musicians, they dont know how to play that particular piece, musical
instrument, or phrase).
These assumptions and implications certainly need further development in order to provide a solid theoretical framework deeply
grounded into the empirical results that we have previously exemplified. In particular, the reconceptualization of musical
sense-making in light of an embodied paradigm should provide
a coherent phenomenological description of such processes.
The following two examples give a more detailed idea of how
simulation and embodiment are applied in musical contexts and

how they can play a key role in musical understanding. On the

other hand, in our opinion, they present some intrinsic problems
when compared with the version of ES we have briefly delineated.
Tom Cochrane (2010) provided what he dubbed the simulation
theory of musical expressivity, in which music is seen as hijacking
the simulation mechanism of the brain (p. 20). Interestingly,
drawing on works by Damasio (2003) and Prinz (2004), he suggests that musical empathy is grounded in the recognition of
others emotions by perceiving their expressive behavior. Cochranes argumentation is based on three main steps. At the beginning of the causal process there is (a) the triggering of a brains
emotion detecting simulation mechanism, which is done either by
belief or imagination of the agency generating the sound. Next, (b)
the intermodal connection between sound and bodily movements
is utilized, leading to (c) the mirroring of these movements from
a first-person perspective, which elicits a simulation of emotions in
the listener. Cochranes contribution is certainly fascinating, having the advantage of unifying the listeners sense-making abilities,
where memory, imagination, and other cognitive functions can be
integrated in a motor-grounded framework. However, we think
that a few aspects of his model should be reconsidered. First, it
relies on an autonomous domain to simulate emotions, which
according to ES is not necessary. An embodied approach to sensemaking, in fact, holds that imagination is an instantiation of ES
among others (Gallese, 2011). Second, the entire process of musical simulation is described more as a matter of mental states
rather than as a motor-grounded phenomenon. Cochrane posits
that, because a musical stimulus was deliberately constructed by
a human being, we proceed to interpret that work as the product
of certain mental states, and derive the nature of those mental
states from the characteristics of the work (Cochrane, 2010,
p. 19). Besides music listening, other examples of the fundamental
role played by embodied patterns of perception and action include
musical learning (Brown & Palmer, 2013) and musical imagery
(Meister et al., 2004). While learning music is an activity immersed in the dynamics of action from early infancy (Schiavio,
Gerson, Timmers, Bekkering, Hunnius, in preparation), recent
studies have highlighted that imagination, execution, and perception of music share neural correlates (Kristeva, Chakarov, SchulteMnting, & Spreer, 2003; Lotze, Scheler, Tan, Braun, Birbaumer,
2003), showing the cross-modal and dynamical nature of embodiment.
Second, Gody (2003) proposed that sound-producing actions
(hitting, stroking, blowing, etc.) largely influences the formation of
our images of musical sounds. He posits that we mentally imitate
sound-producing actions when we listen attentively to music, or
that we may imagine actively tracing or drawing the contours of
the music as it unfolds (p. 318). Following the trends in crossmodal research, Gody hypothesizes that the motor-mimetic element translates musical sound to visual images by a simulation of
sound producing actions . . . forming motor programs that recode
and help store musical sounds in our minds (2003, p. 318). This
framework presents similarities with the experiment proposed by
Schutz and Lipscombs (2007) on musical illusion. In particular,
2

ORegan & No (2001) defended what they named sensorimotor

contingency theory stating that the knowledge of the ways movements
affects sensory stimulation is necessary for experience (ivi, p. 1055).

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the authors showed how visual recognition of longer gestures

would impact the listeners recognition of sounds, causing in them
the illusion of longer lasting sounds. We understand Godys
framework as an interesting attempt to integrate ES theory with
music studies on cross-modality and perception. However, we
argue that his proposal needs certain theoretical developments. In
particular, the action-perception cycle he portrays is meant as a
feedback loop of an incessant process of top-down hypothesisgeneration followed by bottom-up driven comparison with what
we assumed in our hypothesis, successively adjusting and refining
our top-down generated hypothesis by each period of the
perception-action cycle (Gody, 2009, p. 212). From the ES
perspective, at least two explanatory gaps can be identified here.
First, it is unclear how his proposition addresses the intrapersonal
character of the resemblance primarily involved in the simulation
process (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011, p. 513). Second, he seems to
incorporate propositional aspects into the core mechanism of
action understanding (ib.), which ES explicitly rejects.
These examples are meant to show that while ES still represents
a controversial topic in philosophy of mind (Clark, 1998), cognitive neuroscience (Gallagher, 2012), as well as other domains,
more work is needed in music research. A coherent implementation of ES into musical contexts would delineate a more parsimonious model for defining the complex mutuality between an agent
and the auditory feedback, when compared with other simulationlike theories. Another attempt to provide a unitary framework to
understand ES in the context of music research has been made by
Leman (2007), whose research received many positive reviews
thanks to his thought-provoking and original ideas (Keller &
Janata, 2009). However, focusing on his interpretation of ES,
Schiavio and Menin (2013) highlighted a series of problematic
assumptions in his perspective, showing that Lemanlike the
previously described contributions in this articleseems to take
for granted options and interpretations that not only should be
deeply discussed, but that also contrast with classic ES theory. In
general, the positions we briefly analyzed seem to reject the
following basic statements of ES
ES does not involve any kind of mental states/cognitive involvement.
The acts mirrored in ES are goal-directed acts within the
motor repertoire of the perceiving subject.
The resemblance on which ES relies should be characterized
as intrapersonal, as the perceiving subject doesnt have direct
access to the others mental states or acts.
The diluted versions of ES as it appears in current debates are,
in our opinion, unsuitable for providing the much-needed reconceptualization of musical understanding in light of an embodied
perspective (Menin & Schiavio, 2012). We argue that such an
achievement would require at least a closer attention toward these
basic theoretical issues implicit in the adoption of an ES theory,
even before considering the problems in applying this framework
to musical understanding. Taking these considerations into account
would strengthen the parsimoniousness of the embodied perspective on music cognition and face the challenge of developing a
post-Cartesian psychology of music (see Schiavio, 2014). For
post-Cartesian psychology of music, here we intend a research
field in which music cognition is studied by focusing on how the
bodily power of action and its situated coupling with the environment play a key role in mental processes (Krueger, 2014; Phillips-

Silver & Trainor, 2007). ES, with its constitutive link with Mirror
Neuron Theory can represent an important step in developing such
a new way (with a decentralization of mental processes, which are
distributed across the whole body of the subject rather than skullbound) to think of the musical mind. However, a too nave approach to simulation, in our opinion, would substantially compromise such an aim. In league with research already addressing
similar tenents of ES (including goal-directed actions and precognitive processes), we hope to encourage scholars to provide a more
coherent theoretical paradigm, reinforced by empirical data, conceptual analyses, and phenomenological interpretations to develop
a framework in line with current advances in cross-disciplinary
research in mind and cognition.

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Received January 11, 2014

Revision received August 16, 2014
Accepted August 23, 2014