Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v.

Palomar
Case No. 45
G.R. No. 19650 (September 29, 1966)
Chapter V, Page 137, Footnote No. 211
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants
have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be
paid, nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the
contest. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications,
Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non-mailable matter under the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprise
which is banned by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lottery is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2) chance,
and (3) prize. The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind
means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the
prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of
the law is preserved.

Santiago v. Comelec G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997

Facts: Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for
an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2)
Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3)
Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of
initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an
enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin petition. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition
under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known
that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did
not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the petition for
prohibition filed by Santiago notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even
act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a nation
in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be recalled that
intervenorRoco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments
of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or
specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by
ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing.

Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under
Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Since the SangguniangKabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May
2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to
include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory

4.Federation of Free Farmers vs. CA

FACTS: There are 4 parties in this case: a. FFF (union representing the
farmers) b. Planters (the group which harvests the lands where the farmers
work) c. Santos and Tikol (individual planters) d. Central or Victorias (milling
corp, Planters bring their harvest here to be milled).

The law, Sugar Act of 1952 - RA 809 stipulates that any increase in the share
of proceeds of milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by planters from
the Central, 60% of said increase should be paid by planters to their
respective laborers.

1.
FFF alleged that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the
10% increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. CA ruled planters
and Victorias jointly and severally liable. FFF claimed too that Planters and
Victorias entered into an agreement when they have no legal right because
the law has already provided the ratio of division.
2.
Victorias claimed that they should not be held jointly and severally
liable. The action filed was not founded on torts but on either an obligation
created by a contract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has
prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the
one sued.
3.
Planters claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might
agree. And that they have paid the laborers.

Issue: a. WON Planters and Victorias should be severally liable

Held: NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which does not impose upon
Centrals any liability, whether expressly or impliedly, any joint and several
liability. No contract bet sugar mill and the laborers. Principal liability on
Planters and secondarily on Dept or Labor.

Furthermore, the literal import if given effect will defeat the purpose of the act which is to
grant laborers share in sugar produce. Legislative meaning is to give laborers share for
as long as sugar is produced and planters receive increased participation. Thus,
legislative intent is to make the act operative irrespective of whether there exists a
milling agreement between central and sugar planters.

5.Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

FACTS
Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed,with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific
Performance and damages filed by Lacap against RP
Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap
and two other contractors were pre-qualified
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and
thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product
and fount it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment
of the DPWH
DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of
funds duetoLacaps license as contractor having expired
Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the
Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a
contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits
or declares void such a contract
DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Endorsement on July 20
1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no
payment was issued
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against petitioner before the RTC.14
On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since
respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove
the claim.
Following the submission of respondents Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated
May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to
payLacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and
the costs of the suit
CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE
WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
RULING
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does
not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566
explicitly provides:
SEC. 35.Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or
assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of
this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license,
impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be

deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verbalegis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine
prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.
Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed
under the law.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,

versus
PHILIPPINE
GAMING
JURISDICTION
INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No. 7903 was enacted into law, to which it conceived the
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f) Section 7. (f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities,
including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities; In the exercise of
its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority approved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming
Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the economic zone. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the present petition for Prohibition which assails the
authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the
operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
WoN ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate of authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of
chance within the economic zone.
Held
No. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE
and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and
regulate the operation of any games of chance. The words "game" and "amusement"
have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly different from "game
of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;
while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather
than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a
play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of value." The
plain meaning rule or verbalegis, derived from the maxim index animi sermoest (speech
is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from
construing it differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verbalegis non estrecedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude" games of chance"
and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it
defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the
words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant
the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.

Agencia Exquisite vs CIR G.R. No. 150141

February 12, 2009
FACTS: On March 11, 1991, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jose U. Ong
issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91 classifying the pawnshop
business as akin to the lending investors business activity "which is broad enough to
encompass the business of lending money at interest by any person whether natural or
juridical" and imposing on both a 5% lending investor's tax based on their gross income,
pursuant to then Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended.
Since pawnshops are considered as lending investors effective January 1,
1991, they also become subject to documentary stamp taxes prescribed in
Title VII of the Tax Code. BIR Ruling No. 325-88 dated July 13, 1988 is hereby
revoked.
Pursuant to these issuances, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued
Assessment Notice No. 84-PT-13-95-98-5-0-63, dated April 20, 1998, against
Agencia Exquisite of Bohol, Inc. (AEBI) demanding payment in the sum
of P106,538.59 representing the 5% lending investors tax for 1995, plus
interest and charges.
AEBI argue that there are no specific provisions in the Tax Code that subject
pawnshops to 5% lending investors tax. They claim that there is a big
difference between the nature of a pawnshop business and that of a lending
investor. They also contend that RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 violate
the Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws and that they are unconstitutional as they encroached on the legislative
prerogative.28
Moreover, AEBI argue that applying the principles of stare decisis, this Court
in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lhuillier has already held
that pawnshops are not considered lending investors for the purpose of
imposing the 5% percentage tax. Pursuant to the ruling in the Lhuillier case,
the BIR through the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has issued RMC No.
36-2004 ordering the cancellation of all lending investors tax assessments
on pawnshops.
Issue : WON AEBIs contentions are tenable
Held: In view of the foregoing, RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 4391 are hereby
declared null and void. Consequently, Lhuillier is not liable to pay the 5%
lending investors tax.
Under the doctrine of stare decisiset not quietamovere it behooves the Court
to apply its previous ruling inLhuillier and Trustworthy to the cases under
consideration. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case
involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present consolidated
cases, should be decided in the same manner.
Stare decisiset non quietamovere. Courts are bound by prior decisions.
Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have no choice but to
resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.

Ordillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 Gutierrez, J.

FACTSJanuary 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the
people of the provinces of Benguet,Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected
by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up
only 11% of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of
inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.- February 14, 1990, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act forthe Region has
been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province
of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President
reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the only
province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes
CAR.- March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting
elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.- Even before
COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a
memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive
Order No. 220.- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No.
160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220
were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.- Petitioners: there
can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.- Petitioners therefore pray that
the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of
the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.
6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same
and spending public funds for the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in
force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall
have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters
in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably
for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.a.The keyword in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
connote that region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit.
The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in

common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be
given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed.

Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.

Case No. 90
G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2,
Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition
based on the argument that the constitutional provision on peoples initiative can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD:
NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

People v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)

Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people for
squatting which waspunishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations were
raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. TheJudge dismissed the five informations
before the accused could be arraigned. One of the Judge'sgrounds for the
dismissal was that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to
thecultivation of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be
reconsidered.
Issues: Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands.
Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands
because its preambleshows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegalconstructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involvespasture lands in rural
areas.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING CORPORATION v MACRO-ASIA

G.R. No. 169080
December 19, 2007
FACTS:
On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered
into a Mining Lease Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to September
23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering an area of 216 hectares at
SitioLinao, Ipilan, Brooke's Point, Palawan.
Infanta's corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on
January 26, 1994 and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia
Corporation, on November 6, 1995.
Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining
lease contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those
covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR. The
petition was docketed as DENR Case No. 97-01.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas
contiguous to Infanta's (now Macroasia) mining lode claims.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia's lease contracts on the
following grounds: (1) the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational
fees and municipal taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of
Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of Macroasia to provide
improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the concentration of Macroasia
on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of
nickel ore from Celestial's property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the
mining areas to commercial production; and (7) the willingness of Celestial
to pay fees and back taxes of Macroasia.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
* POA: the POA found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically
abandoned their areas/mining claims but likewise had lost all their rights to
the mining claims. The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the
following Mining Lease Contracts * MAB: affirmed POA. The MAB found that
Macroasia did not comply with its work obligations from 1986 to 1991.
However, contrary to the findings of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue
Ridge that had prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of
Macroasia, and not Celestial. In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial could
exercise the secondary priority and preferential rights, and subsequently, in
case Celestial also defaults, other qualified applicants could file.
(motion for reconsideration) Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration,
reiterated that it did not abandon its mining claims, and even if mining was
not listed among its purposes in its amended Articles of Incorporation, its
mining activities were acts that were only ultra vires but were ratified as a

secondary purpose by its stockholders in subsequent amendments of its

Articles of Incorporation.
(special motion for reconsideration) Macroasia averred that the power and
authority to grant, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively
lodged with the DENR Secretary. Macroasia further pointed out that in
arrogating upon itself such power, the POA whimsically and capriciously
discarded the procedure on conferment of mining rights laid down in
Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and DENR
Administrative Order No. (AO) 96-40.
* MAB (on issue of jurisdiction): The MAB further held that the power to
cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR
Secretary; that a petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the
POA could only adjudicate claims or contests during the MPSA application
and not when the claims and leases were already granted and subsisting.
IRONIC DECISIONS OF THE CA
* CA (Celestial appeal): affirmed the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution
which declared Macroasia's seven mining lease contracts as subsisting;
rejected Blue Ridge's claim for preferential right over said mining claims; and
upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel,
and revoke mineral agreements.
* CA (Blue Ridge's appeal): granted Blue Ridge's petition; reversed and set
aside the November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB; and
reinstated the October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 05797. The Special Tenth Division canceled Macroasia's lease contracts; granted
Blue Ridge prior and preferential rights; and treated the cancellation of a
mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve
mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser
power to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE: who has authority and jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral
agreements under RA 7942 in relation to PD 463 and pertinent rules and
regulations?
HELD: DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing
mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following
reasons:
1.
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements
emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and
control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987;
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that a. manages, supervises, and
regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country; b.
has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain,
which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands; c. has the

power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include
mineral resources.
Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary
under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral
agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
2. RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral
resources.
To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations
implementing PD 463 was issued. Sec. 44 of the CMAO provides:
SEC. 44. Procedure for Cancellation.Before any mining lease contract is
cancelled for any cause enumerated in Section 43 above, the mining lessee
shall first be notified in writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given an
opportunity to be heard, and to show cause why the lease shall not be
cancelled.
If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the
former may warn the lessee, suspend his operations or CANCEL THE LEASE
CONTRACT (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463 and its implementing
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the executive order, continue in
force and effect.
When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was no provision on who
could cancel mineral agreements. However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of
the CMAO implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and DENR AO
96-40, not being contrary to any of the provisions in them, then it follows
that Sec. 44 serves as basis for the DENR Secretary's authority to cancel
mineral agreements.
Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve mineral
agreements or contracts and the implied power to cancel said agreements.
3.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR
Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral
rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or
approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.
Sec. 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau (MGB). e.
To CANCEL
OR TO RECOMMEND CANCELLATION AFTER DUE PROCESS, MINING RIGHTS,
mining applications and mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent
laws, rules and regulations.
It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the
authority to cancel mineral agreements based on the recommendation of the
MGB Director. As a matter of fact, the power to cancel mining rights can
even be delegated by the DENR Secretary to the MGB Director. Clearly, it is

the Secretary, not the POA, that has authority and jurisdiction over
cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral agreements.
4.
The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or agreements
through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO
96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral
agreement/ FTAA.
As the MGB is under the supervision of the DENR Secretary, then the logical
conclusion is that it is the DENR Secretary who can cancel the mineral
agreements and not the POA nor the MAB.
5.
Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the
Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52,[50] the cancellation of
which they sought from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that the
parties are the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now DENR Secretary) as lessor, and
Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. [which declares that the lessor can order the
lease cancelled)
RATIO: (1) RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on March 3,
1995, repealed the provisions of PD 463 inconsistent with RA 7942. Unlike
PD 463, where the application was filed with the Bureau of Mines Director,
the applications for mineral agreements are now required to be filed with the
Regional Director as provided by Sec. 29 of RA 7942. The proper filing gave
the proponent the prior right to be approved by the Secretary and thereafter
to be submitted to the President. The President shall provide a list to
Congress of every approved mineral agreement within 30 days from its
approval by the Secretary. Again, RA 7942 is silent on who has authority to
cancel the agreement.
Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by the Bureau of Mines
Director whose decisions were appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to
the President, RA 7942 now provides for the creation of quasi-judicial bodies
(POA and MAB) that would have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the
applications and mineral agreements. Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay down the
procedure, thus:
SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators.There shall be a panel of arbitrators in the
regional office of the Department composed of three (3) members, two (2) of
whom must be members of the Philippine Bar in good standing and one [1]
licensed mining engineer or a professional in a related field, and duly
designated by the Secretary as recommended by the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Director. Those designated as members of the panel shall serve as
such in addition to their work in the Department without receiving any
additional compensation. As much as practicable, said members shall come
from the different bureaus of the Department in the region. The presiding
officer thereof shall be selected by the drawing of lots. His tenure as
presiding officer shall be on a yearly basis. The members of the panel shall
perform their duties and obligations in hearing and deciding cases until their
designation is withdrawn or revoked by the Secretary. Within thirty (30)
working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for decision,

the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on
the following:
(a)

DISPUTES INVOLVING RIGHTS TO MINING AREAS;

[NOTE: The phrase disputes involving rights to mining areas refers to any
adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an APPLICATION FOR MINERAL
AGREEMENTS. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral
agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the MGB.
Clearly, POA's jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas
has nothing to do with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements.]
(b)

DISPUTES INVOLVING MINERAL AGREEMENTS OR PERMITS;

[A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an

area applied for by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the
terms thereof, is not a dispute involving a mineral agreement under Sec.
77 (b) of RA 7942. It does not pertain to a violation by a party of the right of
another. The applicant is not a real party-in-interest as he does not have a
material or substantial interest in the mineral agreement but only a
prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area. He has no legal
right to such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between the
applicant and the parties to the mineral agreement. The court rules
therefore that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on
the breach thereof even if filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like
Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary
and not POA. Such petition is excluded from the coverage of the POA's
jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral agreements under Sec. 77 (b) of
RA 7942.]
(c)
Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d)
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date
of the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 78. Appellate Jurisdiction.The decision or order of the panel of
arbitrators may be appealed by the party not satisfied thereto to the Mines
Adjudication Board within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof which must
decide the case within thirty (30) days from submission thereof for decision.
SEC. 79. Mines Adjudication Board.The Mines Adjudication Board shall be
composed of three (3) members. The Secretary shall be the chairman with
the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the Undersecretary
for Operations of the Department as members thereof.
(2) SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.The Department shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the States mineral resources including those
in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. THE

SECRETARY SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO MINERAL

AGREEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT UPON THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR, promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of
this Act.
SEC. 29.Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.x xx.
The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall give the proponent the
prior right to areas covered by the same. THE PROPOSED MINERAL
AGREEMENT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY and copies thereof shall
be submitted to the President. Thereafter, the President shall provide a list to
Congress of every approved mineral agreement within thirty (30) days from
its approval by the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied.)
OBITER DICTA:
(1) a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority
in the grant of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a
legal and vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. Even
if Blue Ridge has a preferential right over the subject mining claims, it is still
within the competence and discretion of the DENR Secretary to grant mineral
agreements to whomever he deems best to pursue the mining claims over
and above the preferential status given to Blue Ridge. Besides, being simply
a preferential right, it is ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting
mining lease contracts of Macroasia.

Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez

Facts: On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. In their
Return of Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision dated January 7,
1999, the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release. In its January 29, 1999
0rder, it denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: whether Sec.18 Rule 41 of the pre-1007 Rules of Court, which provided the
appeal in habeas corpus cases to be taken within 48 hours from notice of judgment, has
been replaced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in Sec. 3 Rule 41
thereof, that appeal from judgment or final order shall be taken within 15 days from
receipt thereof, in view of the fact that the Sec. 18 was repealed, in accordance with the
well-settled rule of statutory construction that provisions of an old law that were not
reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed repealed and
discarded
HELD: SC in this case to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not
reproduced in the revised statute or Code.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that itcrosses that thin but distinct line which divides
the valid from the constitutionally infirm. Hiscontentions are mainly based on
the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and itabolishes
the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Codesaying that it
violates the fundamental rights of the accused.T h e f o c a l p o i n t o f
the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the
t e r m s i t u s e s . Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted.
Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of
the law usingthe facial challenge.
Ruling:On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. Thepetitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning
and sufficient notice of what the
lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intellige
nce can understand whatconduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against that specie of legislation thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by
a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said doctrine may not invoked
in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statuteto be upheld, not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.On the other hand, overbreadth
doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not
bea c h i e v e d b y m e a n s w h i c h s w e e p u n n e c e s s a r i l y b r o a d l y a n d t h e r e b
y i n v a d e t h e a r e a o f protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statuteand to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfullysince the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are
analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly itmight
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
applicationmight be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues
results in striking them downentirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident
that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than real.The crime of
plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congressdecision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death.Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

PEOPLE VS. PAGPAGUITAN

September 17, 1999
Facts: The judge convicted A for raping X. One of errors assigned by A in his appeal is
that the judge ordered X to write something in open court after A claimed that X is his
girlfriend and submitted love letters allegedly written by X. The judge determined that X
did not write those letters. A contended that such conclusion should have been
determined by a handwriting expert and not a judge.
Issue: Whether the judge acted properly in comparing the handwriting himself.
Held: Yes.
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in
evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized
that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and
dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth. Thus, it has
been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For,
the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the
genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer
becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task
by experts.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V CAMPOS RUEDA & CTA

Facts:
Campos Rueda imported 46 cartons or 27,000 pieces of Tungsol flashers. Before the
goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos Rueda filed with the Collector of Customs
of Manila a request for value information for the declaration of the imported flashers
under Tariff Heading No. 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 30% ad
valorem duty, for classification purpose. The Customs appraiser however, re-classified
the goods under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad
valorem.
When the goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos Rueda immediately filed a
Customs Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration under Tariff Heading No.
85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad valorem but, under protest and paid
duties and taxes on the goods, also under protest. It then filed a timely protest against
the re-classification resulting in the payment of additional customs duty and advance
sales tax and prayed for the refund of the said.
The Collector of Customs dismissed the protest. Campos Rueda appealed to the
Commissioner but was denied, and then appealed to CTA which modified the
Commissioners decision by ordering the refund to Campos Rueda of the sum of the
additional customs duty but not the advance sales tax. The Commissioner now appeals
via petition for review the said decision.

Issue: W/N Campos Rueda should pay 30% or 50% ad valorem duty

Held:
30%. TH No 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:
85.09. Electrical lighting and signalling equipment and electrical windscreen wipers,
defrosters and demisters, for cycles or motor vehicles ad val. 30%.
On the other hand, the same Code provides under TH No. 85.19:
85.19. Electrical apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits, for the
protection of electrical circuits, or for making connections to or in electric circuits (for
example, switches, relays, fuses, lighting arresters, surge suppressors, plugs, lampholders and junction boxes); resistors, fixed or variable (including potentiometers),
other than heating resistors, printed circuits, switch boards (other than telephone
switchboards) and control panels:

In finding for Campos Rueda, CTA found that it has adduced sufficient evidence to
establish the general purpose or predominating use to which flashers are applied, and
for which petitioner imported them, is precisely as electrical equipment for signalling
purposes for motor vehicles; that is, to signal or indicate a right or left hand turn by
means of electrical flashes in front and at the rear of motor vehicles and not merely as
electrical apparatus as the Commissioner claims.
It is the predominating use to which articles are generally applied or used
that determines their character for the purpose of fixing the duty, and not
the specific or special use which any particular importer may make of the
articles imported.
Parts of machines, apparatus of appliances which are suitable for use solely or
principally with a particular kind of machine or with a number of machines falling
within a specific heading, as a rule, are to be classified with the machines in the same
heading. Also, the law does not provide that an article imported for electrical lighting
and signalling equipment for motor vehicles falling under Tariff Heading No. 85.09,
if imported alone, shall be classified under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 as electrical
apparatus for making and breaking electrical circuits that provision should not be read
into the law per the circular of the former Acting Customs Collector. Petition denied.
CTA decision affirmed.

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner,VS.INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT AND JOSE M. ALEJANDRINO, respondents,
FACTS:The case is an appeal to reduce
the amount of moral and exemplary damages in Civil CaseNo. 8882-P of the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, to P240,000and P100,000
respectively, and the latter, dated April 29, 1985, restoring the amount of thedamages
awarded by the trial court: P2,000,000 as moral damages and P400,000 as
exemplarydamages with interest thereon at 12% per annum from notice of judgment,
plus costs of suit.In November 1979, petitioner mailed to Alejandrino at his Philippine
address a bill for US $70(joining fee of US $35 and a December 1979 account of US
$35). When it did not receive anypayment, petitioner sent Alejandrino another statement
of account in January 1980. As therewas still no remittance made, petitioner cancelled
Alejandrino's account in February 1980.Alejandrino knew of this cancellation. However,
on May 2, 1980, Alejandrino received from theManila office of petitioner, thru a private
courier service, another statement of account. Thishappened because the Hongkong
office did not inform the Manila office of the status ofAlejandrino's account. Alejandrino
sent to petitioner a check for US $70. Petitioner received theamount but it did not
reinstate Alejandrino's account. Instead it merely entered the payment as acredit in said
account. Alejandrino was not informed about this action taken by petitioner.
InAugust 1980, Alejandrino received the July 1980 statement of account for US
$70.Having previously paid a similar bill in May 1980, and not having ever used his
creditcard before, Alejandrino wrote petitioner inquiring what the bill was for. He did
notreceive any reply.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's
motion, filedon May 15, 1985, for extension of time to file a petition for review of the
Court of Appeals'resolution dated April 29, 1985, in view of Section 39 of B. P. Blg. 129,
in relation to Section5(2), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
(b) whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain thepetition for review filed in this case,
without leave of court, -by waiving the requirement ofSection 2, Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court, and without the petition containing an assignment oferrors.
RULING: On May 7, 1985, petitioner received a copy of the, Court of Appeals' resolution
dated April 29,1985 which am . the original decision of February 7, 1985 by restoring the
damages granted bythe trial court. Eight (8) days afterwards on May 15, 1985, within
the reglementary period,petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of 30 days
counted from May 16, 1985within which to file its petition for review on June 10, 1985.
This Court gave due course to thepetition for review in its resolution dated October 28,
1985.The petition for review was seasonably filed. There is no infirmity in its filing. The
appeal onquestions of law to this Court thru a petition for review on certiorari is
governed by Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, and not
by B.P. Blg. 129. In fact, theSupreme Court is outside the scope of B.P. Blg. 129.
Besides, there is nothing sacred about theprocedure of pleadings.This Court may go
beyond the pleadings when the interest of justice sowarrants. It has the prerogative to
suspend its rule for the same purpose. In the language of Mr.Justice Moreland, "a
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooledand skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It israther, a
contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts
inissue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and

technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Technicality, when
itdeserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy,deserves scant consideration from courts."WHEREFORE, the assailed decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) is herebySET ASIDE, and a new one is
hereby rendered, ordering petitioner to pay private respondentthe sum of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, with six (6%)percent interest
thereon computed from the finality of this decision until paid. No costs.