John Cabot University

Department of Political Science

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
Minor in Philosophy

Shifting Paradigms: Walter Mignolos Decolonial Project through Michel

Foucault

Florencia Garcia de Onrubia

First Reader
Tom Bailey

Second Reader
Lars Rensmann

Spring 2013

Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the tension between Walter Mignolos
decolonial theory and how it uses and/or rejects Michel Foucaults studies on power, both
sovereign power and biopower. I will look at the differences between disciplinary power
and biopolitics and Mignolos approach to both concepts, and to what extent these can be
applied in Latin American resistance to hegemony. As a de-colonial author, Mignolo may
seem to reject Foucault initially because he comes from a hegemonic locus of
enunciation, but there is an evident influence of Foucault in Mignolos work that creates
a more complex discourse worthy of investigation. Furthermore, Mignolos concept of
border thinking provides a way to slip between the borders of academic knowledge,
creating a unique tension between being inside and outside of coloniality.

Table of Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 3
2 Walter Mignolo................................................................................................................ 6
I. The Decolonial Approach............................................................................................ 6
II. Modernity and the Colonial Difference ..................................................................... 8
III. Democracy as an Imperial Project .......................................................................... 13
IV. Border Thinking ..................................................................................................... 16
V. Pluriversality as a Universal Project ........................................................................ 18
3 Michel Foucault ............................................................................................................. 21
I. Sovereignty, Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics ..................................................... 21
II. The De-colonial Rejection of Europe ...................................................................... 28
III. Subjugated Knowledge ........................................................................................... 31
4 Conclusions.................................................................................................................... 37
I. Resistance to Imperial Hegemony: Mujica, Chavez, and the Zapatistas .................. 38
II. Conclusion................................................................................................................ 43
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 44
Appendix 1 ....................................................................................................................... 46

1 Introduction
Dependency theory originated in Latin America as an anti-colonial response to
the position of Western economic hegemony. The literature on dependency theory had its
boom in the seventies, after the publication of various scholarly writings on the
relationship between the core, developed countries and the underdeveloped periphery.
Cardoso and Faletto, the pioneers of dependency theory in Latin America, introduced the
concept of colonial enclaves. In enclave economies, foreign invested capital originates
in the exterior, is incorporated into local productive processes and produce(s)
goodssold in the external markets1. This process is what, according to dependency
theorists, maintains a developed core and an exploited periphery. The term enclave
economy becomes fundamental to explain the condition of dependency of the periphery,
abundant in raw materials, on the wealthy industrialized core.
According to dependency theorists, the position of underdevelopment arises with
the spread of free market policies applied to a global economy that provides unequal
access to markets. Dependency theory originates as a response to this imperialist
mechanism and focuses on the binary relationships such as the aforementioned
core/periphery, first/third world, and the us/them relationship that in post-colonialism
results in an exclusion of the Other and the creation of subaltern knowledge and
identities.

Qtd. in Conning, Jonathan H. Robinson, James H. Enclaves and Development: An

Empirical Assessment. Pg. 361.

Post-colonialism, then, builds on dependency theory and improves it by

developing the binary, structural relationships and evolving them into a complex matrix
of coloniality and power mechanisms focusing on a cultural perspective. Dependency
chooses a structuralist and socioeconomic perspective, seeing imperialism and
development as tied to the unfolding of capitalism, whereas postcolonial theory favours a
post-structuralist and cultural perspective, linking imperialism and agency to discourse
and the politics of representation2. Whereas dependency theory focuses on the economic
aspects of dependency, thus limiting the relationship between the colonized and their
dominators to a mere economic domination, post-colonialism focuses on the cultural
aspects of such domination that takes control not only of the resources but manipulates
the subjects ontologically.
Argentine professor at Duke University, Walter Mignolo, writes about the modern
day implications of imperialism and coloniality. His theory is based on the idea that the
expansion of democracy on a global level is for the United States today, what the empire
was for the great powers (France, Germany and England) in the past. He believes that
capitalism in the form that is being spread today is not applicable to all countries and the
model of democracy should be able to develop in different forms. Mignolo argues that
the North American model of democracy and capitalism is not the only model that can
obtain equality and justice, in fact he does not believe the United States model achieves
these values3.
Mignolo proposes a path towards epistemological and ontological freedom from
the mechanisms of coloniality today. To understand Mignolo in depth it is necessary to
2

Kapoor, I. (2002). Capitalism, Culture, Agency: Dependency versus Postcolonial

Theory. Pg.1.
3
Mignolo, Walter. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Page 55.

erase some prepositions that have been instilled throughout a lifetime of Western
education. When Mignolo says that Latin America needs our modernity, instead of
another modernity, he means just this. Instead of looking at the world from the standpoint
of the US or Europe, Mignolos reader must abstract himself from value judgments that
consider the first world the most developed and the example to follow.
The concept of well-being must also be revisited, as it is not used by Mignolo to
mean economic prosperity or technological progress. Well-being for Mignolo goes hand
in hand with the word dignity. Well being means providing the basic needs for a life lived
with dignity, fostering human happiness. Politics of well-being means focusing on
equitable distribution of wealth and resources instead of production and consumption at
the cost of excluding large sectors of the population who have less.

2 Walter Mignolo
I. The Decolonial Approach
The two main anti-colonial theories that emerged in Latin America, therefore, are
dependency and post-colonial theories. It is fundamental to note that Mignolo does not
consider himself belonging to either of the two categories since his aim is quite different
from post-colonialists. Understanding his distance from the school of post-colonialism
will also help in understanding his main concepts, and in general, the de-colonial
approach. Mignolo calls his proposal de-colonization, or rather, de-linking from the
colonial structures and their subsequent implications. Mignolos de-colonial approach
refers to the dissociation of the individual, non-European realities from the European
context, thus focusing on unique colonial histories.
For this reason he prefers to use the term de-colonial instead of postcolonial.
De-colonial thinking and doing, emerged from the sixteenth century on, as responses to
the oppressive and imperial bent of modern European ideas projected to, and enacted in,
the non-European world4. De-colonial thinking departs from the idea of coming simply
after colonialism. It separates itself, ontologically and epistemologically from the
structures of modernity and acknowledges the phenomenon of the colonial difference.
De-colonial thought attempts to break with the imposed position of difference and
attempts to liberate any remaining ties with Europe through the process of border
thinking. In order to decolonize being, says Mignolo, you must first decolonize
knowledge.
4

Mignolo, Walter. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. Page 39.

Along with other Latin American scholars such as Anibal Quijano and Enrique
Dussel, Mignolo rejects the idea of being part of the school of post-colonial thinkers. In
fact, Dussel himself refers to post-modernity as a trans-modernity in the sense that he is
not interested in coming after modernity but instead in transcending it. In the same
way, Mignolo does not simply come after colonialism, instead, he proposes an entirely
different thought process that has different origins and is outside the sphere of European
thought. What Mignolo supports is an epistemic delinking, or as he calls it, a decolonial epistemic shift5. This epistemic shift calls for a rejection of the subaltern
position while transcending and going beyond that difference.
The term de-linking was originally coined by Quijano and is translated from the
Spanish word desprenderse, a reflexive verb that means to detach oneself from. The
use of the word de-linking implies an attempt to detach oneself from a constant tension
between the hegemony of Europe or the United States and a subordinated position. What
Mignolo hopes for is the possibility of an-other modernity respected equally in value, yet
pertaining to a different geo-political space, instead of an Other modernity, that is seen as
an inferior Other compared to the Western standards and judged by its value system as
an absolute. The idea behind the de-colonial approach lies in this precise distance from
the Western world and creates a new sphere for autochthonous ideas and identities.
Although this distance may seem like a negation of anything external, it is in fact
attempting to do something else, such as fostering a different way of doing things that
arises from local necessities instead of relying on importing other models.

Mignolo, Walter. Delinking: the Rhetoric of Modernity.

II. Modernity and the Colonial Difference

Mignolo associates modernity and coloniality as two sides of the same coin, of
which the darker side of modernity is coloniality. He says that the period of modernity,
which broadly includes the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, marks a decisive shift in
the structure of European society from feudalism to capitalism. He notes that this precise
moment when democracy resurges is when capitalism, depending on colonial expansion
for surplus goods, is at its peak6. For this reason, he proposes that colonialism is deeply
embedded in the structure of modernity. At the core of Mignolos thesis lies this idea that
modernity and colonialism are intertwined in a circular relationship.
Mignolo published a book in 2011 entitled The Dark Side of Modernity, in which
he goes into depth about the correlation between modernity and colonialism, specifically
how one is constitutive of the other and therefore modernity cannot exist without
colonialism. Modernity is presented as the period of European history that witnessed the
most significant cultural and scientific achievements, yet the face it hides is that this
enlightenment masks a rationality of superiority that was implied through the exclusion
explicit in the domination of colonies.
Mignolo views modernity as a major turning point in European history that
becomes the underlying source of coloniality and the tool for its persistence. First of all,
with modernity comes a shift from the feudal society of the Middle Ages to a capitalistic
one with the rise of modern man and his mastery of the seas, that allow him to go beyond
all known borders. In this period there is an increase in trade and reliance on colonies for
raw materials and goods. The power mechanisms at play here are direct and violent,

Ibid. Page 42

through the domination and acquisition of colonies in order to secure material goods that
were functional to the capitalist system. The riches that this new surplus of goods brings
to the European empire produces a situation of economic well being, allowing the ideas
of the Enlightenment and the resurgence of Greek ideals of democracy to arise in the
intellectual sphere.
Whereas the acquisition of colonies was a form of direct domination, the ideals of
democracy were a form of ideological domination that excluded those who did not give
democratic values the same recognition. The period of modernity saw the return of Greek
ideals in art, such as the standards of beauty of ancient Greece, and in theory, with the
appraisal of democratic values in philosophy. This ideological domination that assigned
value to ideas based on specific standards begins a certain kind of epistemic hegemony,
that excludes and rejects other forms of knowledge.
Mignolo stresses that democracy is a value that comes from ancient Greece, thus
from far away, and that there can be many other roads to obtain similar goals of equality
and justice. He claims that the indigenous people of Latin America are not descendents of
this thought or culture and therefore should not be expected to adopt any of their ideals,
nor be excluded or criticized for not adhering to these values. Furthermore, the
imposition of this model is a form of modern day coloniality.
Things only get worse, for Mignolo, with the Enlightenment and the obsession
with reason and rationality initiated by Descartes that create a new standard of thought.
The rejection of religion as the source of knowledge and the creation of the institution of
the university as a place of truth and reason, generated what is today a body of accepted
and thus valid knowledge, contrasted to a mystical or mythical, folk, indigenous,

traditional knowledge. All these adjectives demonstrate how the mere word knowledge
implies academic, whereas everything else is Other, accompanied by a connotation of
less than and the exclusion of the outside.
The strong claim in Mignolos work is that we still have this structure today. The
forms of direct colonialism have evolved into power mechanisms of coloniality that work
in a subtle manner through the rhetoric of modernity. This is the hidden face lying in
words like development and progress. Mignolo says these forces are comparable to
the oppressive logic of colonialism, such as the salvation of barbaric tribes and the
necessity of their conversion to Catholicism that occurred during the colonial period.
Today, we see a similar attempt of salvation through processes of development
guided by experts from Harvard, or international organizations led by the major
economic and military powers. They begin development projects to shape these
developing countries in their own image and with their technology. I am not saying that
no good has come out of such projects, but the idea that US experts believe they can
really decide what is good and what is bad for developing countries only irritates the
colonial wound further and emphasizes the colonial difference7.
It does so by adopting a position of superiority that implies that Western experts
know the way to modernity and will lead the developing world to it. To get there, though,
developing countries will be fully dependent on first world technology and expertise
and have to follow directives from abroad in home affairs. There is an inherent
inequality that is veiled by apparently attractive development projects. They hide the
perverse logic behind such offers, and for this reason MIgnolo claims that we must
change the terms of the conversation . In order to do so, we must first recognize the
7

Mignolo, Walter. Epistemic Disobedience. Pg. 15.

10

diagnosis, a condition of sickness that we must begin to combat if we want to transcend

the colonial matrix of power.
The condition afflicting Latin America is that of the colonial difference.
According to Mignolo, the colonial difference operates by converting differences into
values and establishing a hierarchy of human beings ontologically and epistemologically.
Ontologically, it is assumed that there are inferior human beings. Epistemologically, it is
assumed that inferior human beings are rational[ly] and aesthetically deficient8. The
colonial difference is established by a Western-imposed standard that judges what is to be
accepted and what is to be excluded. This difference creates perspectives that emerge
out of the conditions of the colonial wound, the feeling of inferiority imposed on human
beings who do not fit the predetermined model in Euro-American narratives9. It creates
the position of the Other as subordinate, and allows for indigenous knowledge to become
subaltern. These aspects will be further developed in the following chapters on
knowledge and power.
In any case, the colonial difference is established through a complex web of
coloniality, a term that is to be distinguished from colonialism. Mignolo stresses this
distinction on the basis that colonialism was the direct domination of the colonies by one
imperial power for the extraction of resources, whereas coloniality is backed by a pursuit
of ontological domination, based on the inferiority of the other10. Whereas colonialism
can be understood as a historical, visible relationship, coloniality implies a more subtle
form of hegemonic control over a population.

Mignolo, Walter. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. Page 39. Originally
epistemically (sic).
9
Mignolo, Walter. The Idea of Latin America. Preface xxi
10
Ibid. Pg 7.

11

The operation of the colonial matrix is invisible to distracted eyes, and

even when it surfaces it is explained through the rhetoric of modernity
that the situation can be corrected with development, democracy, a
strong economy, etc. What some will see as lies from the US
presidential administration are not so much lies as part of a very wellcodified rhetoric of modernity, promising salvation for everybody in
order to divert attention from the increasingly oppressive consequences
of the logic of coloniality11.
Such logic of coloniality gives rise to the colonial difference, the subaltern
position of developing countries that are considered the same yet different
contemporarily. Recognizing the existence of the colonial difference is a way to expose
the logic of coloniality through which the Europeans have represented others. NonEuropeans are seen as existing on the same historical trajectory, but further behind; their
goals are the same, but not achieved to the same degree; their knowledge is subject to the
same justificatory procedures, but it is less well-developed, comments Linda Alcoff12.
This is the logic that Mignolo tries to detach from, where detachment does not
mean negation of the past or colonialism itself, but an attempt to transcend and heal the
colonial wound. It means no tolerance for the logic that created subjugated or alternate
knowledge and caused them to be evaluated as less-than scientific knowledge or simply
non-academic. Modern society has valued rationality and has discarded the spiritual,
mythical and indigenous knowledge from educational institutions based on the
perspective of a modern value judgment that classifies them as different. Alcoff claims
11

Ibid. Pg 7.
Alcoff, Linda Martn. Mignolos Epistemology of Coloniality. Project MUSE. Page
87.

12

12

that Mignolo seeks both to reveal the way in which power has been at work in creating
that differenceas well as the way in which colonial power represents and evaluates
difference. The coloniality of power, in other words, produces, evaluates, and manages
the colonial difference13.
III. Democracy as an Imperial Project
History tells that Mahatma Gandhi was asked what he thought of civilization.
Gandhi answered and said civilization was a good idea. The same can be said of
democracy, says Walter Mignolo14. Today, the Western ideal of development is
embraced by the fatherly-like figure of the United States that sets out to develop what it
considers undeveloped countries, in most cases to further their own economic advantage.
Free market liberal policies are implemented whenever possible in a one-size-fits-all
model to open up more possibilities for outsourcing of US companies or simply
beneficial trade agreements.
The appraisal of democratic values coming from Europe and the United States led
to what would be known as the Western model of democracy. Although a major
component of modern values, Mignolo analyzes how the concept of democracy was
appropriated in an authoritative manner, where the Western model of democracy would
become the only acceptable form.
Today, democracy is considered one of the core values of the United Nations, and
the spread of democracy is supported by its 193 member states. The problem Mignolo
sees in this apparently positive goal is that in this expansion of democracy there is only

13
14

Ibid. Page 87.

Mignolo, Walter. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Pg. 41. Qt. appears in English.

13

one possible form of interpreting democracy. The imposition of this model is

accompanied by a with us or without us rhetoric that does not allow for a plurality of
models of democracy adapted to individual local necessities. The points brought up in
Mignolos thesis underline the subordinate position of the global south in importing
political structures established by the global North that are irrespective of local cultures,
histories, languages and political culture.
In Latin America, specifically, countries that have had long histories of
colonialism and thus are tainted with a colonial wound, still remain in the position of
inadequacy vis--vis the north if they do not apply the western model of democracy
systematically. Expressions such as alternative modernities, subaltern modernities and
peripheral modernities were introduced to account for modernity or, if you wish, assume
one modernity of reference and put themselves in subordinate positions15. The
subordinate role of Latin American underdeveloped countries provides a support for
complex mechanisms such as the of coloniality of power, as it deepens the colonial
wound in countries with intense histories of oppression.
The concept of democracy as an ideal of justice and equality is understood by
Mignolo as a horizon, something we aim for yet still remains at a distance. The paths to
such a horizon must be diverse given the various cultures, languages and histories that
have adopted the democratic model of government. When democracy is exported to
other countries under the wing of the United States through international organizations
such as the United Nations, democratic values are being projected on countries that do
not necessarily have the same democratic tradition. Furthermore, Mignolo advances that
such an expansion of democracy on a global scale is comparable to the colonial
15

Mignolo, Walter. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. Pg. 42.

14

expansion of the Empires. It is therefore aimed at furthering the self-interest of the

imperial country through the rhetoric of human rights and democracy.
Mignolo quotes Harvard professor Noah Feldmans article in the New York
Times Magazine, entitled Democratosis. He presents this professor as one who has
realized the absurd aspects of the democratizing global mission of the United States.
Feldman writes, It seems strange to the rest of the worldbut we Americans cant seem
to stop talking about how other countries should be democratic like we areThe
expansion of democracy is for us what empire was for the great world powers before us:
a rallying cry that makes us proud and keeps us unified while also serving our
interests16. He quotes this professor due to the apparent resemblance to his own thesis on
the imperial aspects of democracy.
However, Feldmans article reveals that he is nothing other than a zealous
supporter of the freedom of a self-governing democratic system that overthrows
oppressive dictatorships. Feldman only reinforces the widespread idea that the United
States has a duty to develop the rest of the world according to their own model. The
mention of this article is useful for a different reason than Mignolo suggests. Feldman
does not condone imperial expansion through democracy, he simply believes the US
should not be selective, and therefore commit itself further to intervention in the name of
democracy.
The imposition of this one and only model of democracy is proposed as a vestige
of imperial expansion and, at an abstract level, comparable to the Stalinist single model
of communism. According to Mignolo, there is an arrogant presumption that democracy
16

Qtd. in Mignolo, Walter. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Pg. 55. (Feldman, Noah.

NYT Magazine. Oct. 7, 2007)

15

is something that belongs to the United States (along with some European nations), and
that therefore they believe it necessary and just to imperially democratize the world17.
Because this model of democracy today derives mainly from the United States, the
countries that attempt to build a local form of democracy that functions within the nature
of their local reality will constantly be struggling against the imperial aspects of
democracy. They will constantly be subjected to a salvationist rhetoric by which the
modern hegemonic powers attempt to maintain control of their authority and control of
the economy.
Mignolo claims that the Western rediscovery of democratic values in the age of
modernity does not necessarily mean that the rest of the world has to interpret the concept
of democracy in the same way, nor accept this model. He argues that when democracy
becomes a justification for imperial expansion or the furthering of individual benefit it
ceases to be democratic18. On plenty of occasions the West has advocated and supported
free elections as an essential tool of democracy. However, Mignolo points out that when
free, democratic elections bring to power figures like Hugo Chavez, the United States
delegitimizes the validity of the democratic process. Several annual reports blame
Venezuela for not adhering correctly to democracy, and regard Chavez as a dictatorial
figure comparable to another American enemy, Fidel Castro.
IV. Border Thinking
As previously stated, the ailment afflicting Latin America is that of the colonial
difference. Mignolo proposes a cure to initiate the healing process and gain liberation

17
18

Mignolo, Walter. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Page 55.

Ibid. Page 43.

16

from this condition. The cure is called border thinking. It is one that will allow for
Mignolos final solution, pluriversality as a universal project. Border thinking accounts
for the knowledge that comes from the colonial wound and does not belong to either the
pure indigenous or European culture. It emerges at the border, therefore, it does not
belong to any one side. This unique aspect allows for border thinking to reside in a
double consciousness.
Border thinking is the consequence of the power differential under
modern/colonial conditions, a power differential that constitutes the colonial
difference19. In other words, border thinking emerges from the colonial difference to try
and modify this disparity and step away from this imposed difference, which as stated
previously, is a consequence of the colonial matrix of power.
In Mignolos words, border thinking structures itself on a double consciousness,
a double critique operating on the imaginary of the modern/colonial world systemit
marks the irreducible difference of border thinking as a critique from the colonial
difference all theoretical articulations of border thinking [are] breaking away from
eurocentrism as an epistemological perspective20. The double critique of modernity is
possible only through the perspective of coloniality, from the experience of the colonial
wound. This point will be essential to analyze Mignolos discourse with Foucault, given
that he comes from the same European center of knowledge that Mignolo attempts to
distance himself from. I will attempt to prove that despite this, Mignolo actively engages
with his theories.

19
20

Mignolo, W. The Idea of Latin America. Page 10.

Mignolo, W. Local Histories/Global Designs. Page 87

17

The concept of border thinking does not necessarily imply a rejection of European
ideals on the basis of inferiority. Rather, border thinking is based on distance and
detachment from Europe as a hegemonic center of culture, knowledge, and truth. It
allows for the creation of local knowledge, autonomous and even indigenous knowledge
that originates from a local source with the colonial wound at its basis. The knowledge
that comes from the colonial difference is unique in its precise position from the point of
view of the excluded, and not from a European or American hegemonic center. It is from
the perspective of the colonized.
V. Pluriversality as a Universal Project
The resistance to the hierarchy of values imposed by the expansion of democracy
on a global scale presents the beginning of de-colonial options for the future. We are
observing many non-official (rather than non-governmental) transnational organisations
not only manifesting themselves against capitalism, globalization and questioning
modernity, but also opening up global but non-capitalist horizons and de-linking from the
idea that there is a single and main modernity surrounded by peripheral or alternative
ones21. Naturally, different paths are met with resistance from the established
mechanisms that support capitalism.
Mignolos solution is based on the acceptance of a pluri-form version of the
economy, where the sole purpose is not the relentless accumulation of capital but rather
wellbeing. The economy of growth, says Mignolo, is the economic system that tries to
reproduce more at ever decreasing costs of production at the risk of the population, while
at the same time giving the illusion that democracy is measured merely on the right to
21

Mignolo, W. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. Page 39

18

vote22. Once citizens vote for a representative, the rest seems to be out of their hands.
There is no participatory or direct democracy, rather the right to vote that seems to act as
a veil that legitimizes the whole process.
On the other hand, economics of wellbeing would be based on managing scarcity
rather than producing more, in which political decisions are made from the bottom up,
they do not go from the state to the people but rather from political society to the state23.
Global futures need to be imagined and constructed through de-colonial options; that is,
working globally and collectively to de-colonise the colonial matrix of power; to stop the
sand castles built by modernity and its derivatives24.
The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZNL) in Mexico is an example
of a new modernity that is not following the current accepted form of democracy. This
group speaks of justice, equality and reciprocity without adopting a democratic system,
but rather an individual and local form of progress that tries to further the fundamental
rights of man. Mignolo thinks that democracy does not carry with it the right to silence
those who do not adapt the concept in the same manner, or who chose another road to
values such as equality and justice25. The EZLN have been repressed in various occasions
while protesting the government for matters such as indigenous rights and more equitable
allocation of public housing.
Mignolo denounces the effects of modern day capitalism that allow for the
enrichment of a few at the cost of others. The general opinion of supporters of capitalism
leaves families without housing or healthcare, while maintaining a middle class that

22

Mignolo, W. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Page 56.

Ibid. Page 54.
24
Mignolo, W. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. Page 49.
25
Mignolo, W. Hermenutica de la Democracia. Page 46. Translated.
23

19

serves as the consumers necessary to maintain those at the top where they are. Mignolos
pluri-versality allows for individual systems with various aims. The one he particularly
proposes, is the proper allocation of scarce resources that grants the basic freedoms to all
without leaving large factions of the population behind.

20

3 Michel Foucault
I. Sovereignty, Disciplinary Power and Biopolitics
In order to understand Foucaults studies on power it is pertinent to clarify his
major distinction between old and new power. The shift from the old to the new marks
a clear difference in modes of understanding government, sovereignty, the state, and
moreover, the relationship between the sovereign and the population. The old is located
in the historical period preceding the Enlightenment, in the feudal system of the Middle
Ages where the sovereign is the king who rules over his subjects and claims his
sovereignty based on inheritance or acquisition of territory, through war or other means.
An example of this kind of sovereignty could be the many principalities in Italy in the
sixteenth century, under the domination of noble families.
The aim of the sovereign at this time was drastically different from what it is
today, where mechanisms of power are applied to bodies and what they do, instead of
the land and what it produces26. The relationship between the sovereign and the people
was one of direct domination, the king was not interested in what people did inside their
homes, but rather, that they pay their dues and obey the law. The sovereign in the
principality was only concerned with wealth and the land. This form of power then
transformed to one concerning the individual body, thus disciplinary power, and what it
had to do to remain in the norm, and finally the preservation of bodies and life, or
biopolitics, that took the State as the predominant means for such maintenance of life,
thus legitimizing its access to the body.
26

Foucault, M. Society Must Be Defended. Pg. 35-36. 1976

21

In other words, the kind of power of the Middle Ages, which Foucault calls
sovereign power, undergoes two different shifts. The first is disciplinary power exerted
upon single bodies through mechanisms of surveillance and normalization, and the
second is a biological control of life in general through the states role in protecting life,
known as biopolitics. These two forms of power, disciplinary and biopolitics, together
make up the new form of governmentality which is biopower. Disciplinary power,
which departs from sovereign power, applied to a mass scale of population and life in
general (bodies in the plural) creates biopolitics, which may have aspects of disciplinary
power yet functions through other mechanisms. Biopolitics overlaps with disciplinary
power in certain areas such as sexuality and madness, where normalization and discipline
occur at both an individual level (disciplinary power) and at a mass societal level
(biopolitics) where power is concerned with data collection of the practices of its
subjects.
This [biopolitical] technology of power does not exclude the former, does
not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate
it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it,
embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques. This new technique
does not simply do away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists
at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different
bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments27.
This different form of power is biopolitcs. Foucault presents the two faces of
biopower, in which one (BP) is derived from the other (DP) but functions under different
rules and has other aims. The first is the use of the body as a machine, the discipline of
27

Foucault, M. Society Must be Defended. 1976. Pg. 242.

22

the body in terms of usefulness and docility, also known as the anatomo-politics of the
body, or disciplinary power. The other is the control of the body on biological grounds,
including the control of births and mortality rates, health and life expectancy, or
biopolitics. In Foucaults words, after a first seizure of power over the body in an
individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but,
if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but man-as-species28. These
two aspects make up the concept of biopower, a new kind of governmentality that is
different from sovereignty, subjugates bodies and controls the population29.
In a lecture from the Collge de France on sovereignty entitled Security,
Territory, Population, Foucault shares his findings on the study of the art of government,
or what is its specific end and how power has evolved from the Middle ages from matters
concerning the body (torture) to matters concerning the soul (prison and rehabilitation).
The art of government, or what Foucault calls gouvernamentalite, is understood
through an analysis of its semantic construction that unites gouverner (to govern) and
mentalit (modes of thought), thus connecting the art of government to the rationality
behind government in controlling the subjects it governs30. Foucault notices a shift in this
rationality of government and finds the change in a phrase by Guillaume La Perrire,
dating back to 1555, that states that government is the right disposition of things that one
arranges so as to lead them to a suitable end31.
This definition breaks with the idea proposed by Machiavelli that power is
fundamental in how a prince must act in order to maintain, strengthen and protect his

28

Foucault, M. Society Must be Defended. Pg. 243.

Foucault, M. History of Sexuality: Volume 1. Pg. 140
30
Lemke, T. The Birth of Biopolitics. Pg. 191.
31
Foucault, M. Security, Territory, Population. Pg. 90-91.
29

23

principality, or rather, the old sovereign form of power32. Foucault maintains that the
end of government in the Middle Ages was to strengthen its own power. He also calls this
notion one of national interest, or raison dtat. If the growth of power of the state
becomes its ultimate goal, the end of power becomes circular, and thus an end in itself. If
the original end of sovereignty was to obtain the common (public) good, and in order for
the common good to exist all subjects must obey the law without fail, then the end of
sovereignty is thus the ultimate submission and obedience to the law. The good proposed
by sovereignty is therefore, that people obey it. What is unique in La Perrires definition
is that it provides a variety of suitable ends and uses tactics of arrangement of things
rather than the imposition of laws.
Therefore the old form of power was based on the theory of sovereignty that
required the physical presence and domination of the sovereign, not on individual bodies,
but on the accumulation of goods and wealth as products of the land that belonged to the
sovereign. This type of power was interested in commodities, not on people as a source
of labor. The shift to disciplinary power surfaces with the rise of the bourgeoisie and the
capitalist system that introduces mechanisms of discipline and surveillance to control the
workers in regards to efficiency and accumulation of wealth for the dominating class.
This shift witnesses the disappearance of the sovereign as a centralized source of power
and law, that gives rise to a dispersed form of power whose aim is the organization of a
population.
Disciplinary power is not applicable to sovereign power, it arises after the shift of
the way of governing that changes sovereignty into governmentality. Disciplinary power
is enacted through a multiplicity of institutions and cannot be justified in terms of
32

Ibid. Pg. 90-91

24

sovereignty. The presence of the sovereign becomes irrelevant and sovereignty becomes
an idea in the theory of right and the judicial system to mask the apparatus of discipline,
giving the illusion that the state can guarantee that everyone could exercise his or her
own sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of the State33.
The transformation is seen, returning to classical sovereign power, in the
sovereigns right to kill. As the highest form of authority, the sovereign could decide to
take life or let live, and so the subjects were paradoxically, neither dead nor alive, but
the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the
sovereign34. The sovereign has the ultimate decision in taking life or letting live. The
new right, the biological control of the population implies quite the opposite, to make live
and let die. This new form of technical power that makes live and lets die is biopolitics,
but it is again a sphere that touches upon disciplinary power as well. The actions a
government takes to make live, to prolong the life of man as species, is an abstract form
of normalization and control at the individual level. For example,
Due to the fact that the transition to a new mode of governmentality occurs at the
turning point of modernity (and capitalism), Foucault refers to the modern state that
Mignolo feels is a colonial concept in itself. He does not consider that Latin America has
passed through the same transformation to modernity, and as such the modern state
Foucault speaks of is strictly European. The transition to modernity introduces more
complex power mechanisms and, after the eighteenth century, there is a rise of this new
governmental practice. He explains this change through an analysis of the market and a
historical analysis of German neo-liberalism after World War II.
33
34

Foucault, M. Society Must be Defended. 1976. Pg. 37.

Ibid. Pg. 240.

25

This shift in government has been, according to Foucault, a neo-liberal one. The
marketplace was previously understood as a site of justice, because price was set in
relationship to the value of the work performed and the state regulated the price of the
market to protect the consumer. With the rise of capitalism and laissez-faire policies,
there was widespread belief that the market should be left alone and, if untouched, would
produce natural or true prices based on laws of supply and demand. According to
Foucault, the market is transformed from a site of justice into a site of veridiction. The
birth of the free market economy creates e new relationship between the citizens and the
state where the unregulated market is regarded as a place of truth, the market must tell
the truth (dire il vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to governmental practice, says
Foucault35.
It is helpful to first explore the rise of neo-liberalism in order to then understand
biopolitics, since they evolved through consequent mechanisms in which one influenced
the shift of the other. Once liberal policies of free markets were established, the reason of
the state was no longer based on strengthening its own power (raison dtat), but rather
the opposite. The new governmental practice is a frugal form of government that
functions under entirely new mechanisms, considering the art of government as the art of
the least possible government of the limits to governmental intervention in the sphere
of the economy36.
By using the concept of biopower, Foucault attempts to describe how the
government apparatus groups together and controls a population. He maintains that there
is a triangle composed of sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which
35
36

Foucault, M. The Birth of Biopolitics. Pg. 32.

Ibid. Pg. 28.

26

has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential
mechanism37. Foucault focuses on domination and the exercise of biopower within a
state and against its people, and this is a phenomenon that can also occur on a global
scale. Modern day imperialism is embedded in a similar kind of unbalanced power
relationship with regards to central hegemonic powers and those inferior to such power.
Whereas Foucault talks about the exercise of power by the state on its subjects,
the same can be abstracted to the level of relationship between the first world and the
third. Needless to say, Mignolo objects. The differences between bio-politics in Europe
and bio-politics in the colonies lie in the racial distinction between the European
population and the population of the colonies: less human, sub-humans38. The statesubject relationship does not entail the racial element that is present in the first-third
world, or imperial/subjugated relationship. However, they do share common ground in
matters of control and discipline. In the European sphere of power, the state adopts a
father-like figure through the re-education and rehabilitation of the body by means of
surveillance, prison and mental institutions.
In the international sphere, the imperial countries lead the way to development
and well-being that the so called underdeveloped countries are unable to succeed in
without guidance. Mignolo maintains that the response cannot come from the
US/Europe, however, the source of the colonial difference is the US and Europe,
especially the United States in the second half of the twentieth century and today. The
possible solution proposed by Foucault to transgress this power through subjugated
knowledge works well with Mignolos project of de-linking as a universal project.
37
38

Foucault, M. Security, Territory, Population. Pg. 107-108.

Mignolo, W. Epistemic Disobedience. Pg. 16

27

II. The De-colonial Rejection of Europe

It would seem that adhering to decolonial theory and border thinking requires an
absolute distance from European sources of knowledge, in order to cultivate and let thrive
local ideas emerging from the colonial difference. The perspective of the colonized,
therefore, should not rely on imperial or first world sources of knowledge in the practice
of border thinking, in order to remain true to its fundamental ideals. One could say, given
that border thinking recognizes the subaltern position created by the colonial difference,
any point of view that comes from the perspective of the colonized will reject ideas that
come from a hegemonic locus of enunciation, the geographic area from which the
enunciator speaks.
However, this would be a superficial analysis of the purpose of border thinking.
De-linking does not call for an automatic and immediate rejection of any idea that does
not come from a geographic area that has experienced oppression and the colonial
wound. Instead, it recognizes that certain ideas have to be put in their geo-political
context with the consciousness that they emerge from a specific (regional) experience and
cannot always be applied on a global scale. Mignolo exposes the tension implicit in his
own use of certain European authors. De-colonial authors do, in fact, maintain a dialogue
with philosophy that emerged within Europe, but recognize that such authors lack the
experience of the colonial wound and many times fail to represent the perspective of the
colonized.
For this reason, Mignolo criticizes Foucault directly and sometimes severely.
Mignolo mentions that the only tie between Europe and Latin America is the colonial
experience, and any further interference from Europe will only aggravate the colonial

28

wound. He discards Foucaults concept of biopower on the basis that it is a European

solution. However, post-colonial scholars (or de-colonial) are often guilty of the same
sin they claim to be victims of by excluding any source of knowledge that comes from a
hegemonic center, while at the same time this exclusion is an attitude they criticize
extensively. For some, this negation of any discourse that comes from a hegemonic
center, as if it came from those who actively participated in colonialism, is a superficial
and indiscriminate closure to other points of view and an unjustified idealization of the
excluded. Many like Foucault were, in fact, a voice of dissent in regards to modern day
mechanism of oppression. In reference to the colonial experience, Mignolo writes,
After all of that importation you do not want again to import
biopolitics and biopower to deal with the problems that Europe created
[they] are important regional critical concepts that cannot be converted
into a single story as if Europe has the God will [sic] to create the
problems and the solutions while the rest of the world will watch the
unfolding, like watching a tennis match where you do not participate39.
Mignolo insists that biopower and biopolitics are regional, not universal concepts
that can account for only a portion of the mechanisms of the colonial matrix of power.
However it is a rash judgment to disqualify Foucault on the sole basis that he is working
with European concepts of authority and structures of power. At times, Mignolo seems to
be confusing Foucault, and any European thinker, with the Spanish/Portuguese/ British
colonizer. Regardless of the fact that Foucault has elaborated his theory from within
Europe, his ideas are still worth exploring. Mignolo, of course, recognizes this but is
hesitant in allowing biopower to become a relevant concept in Latin America. At first
39

Mignolo, W. The Prospect of Harmony and the Decolonial View of the World. Pg 3.

29

glance it seems that MIgnolo is directly rejecting Foucault, but what is the actual
justification for this distance?
There are two ways of interpreting Mignolos explicit rejection of biopower. First,
one could argue that Mignolo is right in rejecting the idea of biopower because the
enunciation of the solution comes from a hegemonic source. Foucault has not
experienced the colonial wound and thus cannot possibly understand the complex power
mechanisms at stake in the post-colonial world. Second, one could be more flexible and
view Mignolos stubbornness in his own example. In the aforementioned tennis game,
it is as if Mignolo takes the position of a child excluded from the game and therefore
refuses to play ever again, even if he is invited by different players that have no
relationship with the previous bullies. However, Mignolos initial refusal is not entirely
groundless.
Mignolo maintains a firm position based on the idea that, since Europe created all
the problems of colonialism and the colonial wound, we (Latin America) cannot permit
Europe to propose the solution (biopower). In this he may be right, and thus rejecting
Foucault directly will remain coherent with his theory and appeal to a Latin American
sentiment of autonomy, pride and independence. Nevertheless, European structures of
power have already been imposed during the colonial period and many of these
mechanism are still present today, especially considering that the model of democracy
that has been adopted by Latin American countries comes from Europe and the United
States. If this is the case, it would make sense to use certain mechanisms to subvert an
imperial structure that comes from within that structure itself, to then allow for the
growth of local solutions.

30

In order to establish the validity of the distance Mignolo takes from Foucault and
his theories, we must first evaluate Foucaults claims to then see how they may be
applicable in a Latin American context. Also, whether Mignolo is correct in claiming that
Foucaults theories are mainly regional and, at most, can only account for a limited slice
of the complex matrix of coloniality. Although Mignolo explicitly rejects importing
biopower as a solution, he seems to be influenced by other concepts that Foucault himself
proposed, such as the subjugation of knowledge.
III. Subjugated Knowledge
The subject of knowledge is one in which Mignolo converges with Foucault to a
much greater extent. The similarities are initially evident in the labeling of the terms
used. Foucault speaks of subjugated knowledge whereas Mignolo calls it subaltern
knowledge. It is important to make note of this difference. The verb to subjugate means
to bring under domination or control, especially by conquest while subaltern is
associated to an exclusion, being of lower status. It derives from the Latin word
subalternus, meaning below every other40. Although both are used to explain the same
role of epistemic hegemony, the difference in word choice implies a different source of
origin. One is referring to a domination based on power mechanisms, while the other is
intent on demonstrating the imposition of a hierarchy of value where exclusion and
inclusion determine what is knowledge.
Foucaults definition of subjugated knowledge, however, is entirely coherent with
Mignolos discourse. By subjugated knowledge, Foucault means a whole set of
knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently
40

Dictionary. Apple Inc. 2007.

31

elaborated: nave knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required
level of cognition or scientificity41. The hierarchy of knowledge is formed by widely
accepted set of standards in the West that establish what the required characteristics for
knowledge are.
Mignolo quotes this exact definition of subjugated knowledge to support his own
argument and engages in a friendlier dialogue with Foucault. My intentionis to move
subjugated knowledge to the limits of the colonial difference where subjugated become
subaltern knowledges in the structure of coloniality of power42. Here, Mignolo is
directly referring to the Foucauldian term of subjugation, wanting to translate it to
subaltern and locating it at the core of the power mechanisms of coloniality. This
indicates Mignolos unofficial use of Foucaults legacy against his official rejection
based on the geographical location of the source. It also clarifies what seemed to be a
contradiction in his claim that biopower cannot be the solution because it is a regional
concept, while at the same time, subjugated (subaltern) knowledge is the fulcrum of the
colonial matrix of power. Mignolo seems to officially disagree with adopting the concept
of biopower, yet secretly accept disciplinary power regarding the hierarchical
classification and normalization of knowledge.
Furthermore, biopower is not proposed by Foucault as a solution. Biopower is a
tool of the new form of governmentality that has the population as both an integral part
and receiver of the effects of power mechanisms; it is the control and regulation of life
and population. In fact, as we have seen in the case of the market as a sight of truth, the
modern form of power is a triangle between power, right and truth; between sovereignty,
41
42

Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Pg. 82.

Mignolo, W. Local Histories/Global Designs. Pg. 20.

32

discipline and management. Power has often achieved its right through the legitimacy of
sovereignty. Today, that position of power is correlated to the production of discourses of
truth, or in other words, through the control and creation of knowledge in the singular
disregarding the plural of knowledges as contemporarily viable sources of truth.
According to Foucault, the word science in the singular did not exist until the
eighteenth century43. The regularization of knowledge in the singular form occurs
through four specific steps, the first being the elimination and disqualification of small
knowledges that entails a selection of what is valid and what is not. This is possible
through the monopoly over knowledge for example on behalf of the university that
creates an elite of knowledge holders. The second step is the normalization of dispersed
knowledge, or rather the communication of set standards that allow for the sharing of
technical knowledge. The third, and probably the most pertinent for Mignolo, is the
hierarchical classification of knowledge.
The only transgression possible from this triangle of power is to create a nondisciplinary form of power, one must turn towards the possibility of a new form of right,
one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the
principle of sovereignty44. Foucault is not interested in the why or how of power, but
rather, on its visible effects on society and how it is possible to overcome that
subjugation. It is here that subjugated knowledge becomes a fundamental tool for
critique. Only through the re-emergence of the disqualified forms of knowledges can we
begin to resist power. Only through a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and
which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything
43
44

Foucault, M. Society Must be Defended. Pg. 182.

Foucault, M. Power, Right, Truth. Pg. 550.

33

surrounding it that it is through the reappearance of these knowledge, of these local

popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work45.
The idea that it is through these kinds of subjugated knowledges that we can resist
and begin to criticize biopower has a striking resemblance to Mignolos concept of
border thinking. As previously stated, border thinking emerges from the colonial
difference imposed by the West through coloniality, and whoever takes part in border
thinking does so from the perspective of the colonized, from the feelings of the colonial
wound. In fact, Foucault recognizes that such knowledge comes out of the colonial
wound by saying that these knowledges were concerned with historical knowledge of
struggles and in them lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day
have been confined to the margins of knowledge46. Therefore, there is concrete evidence
to support the influence of Foucaults work in terms such as border thinking and
Mignolos solution of pluri-versality.
The relationship between knowledge and power lies in the fact that the validity of
knowledge as a discourse of truth is power. Foucault maintains that power cannot exist
without a discourse. Power is no longer based on the right to sovereignty as in the Middle
Ages. Once knowledge is established as power, it can disqualify or include on the basis
of a determinate set of standards. Relations of power cannot exist without the production
of a discourse of truth, and so it is an inherent characteristic of power that delimits what
is necessary to take part in the avant-garde and elite groups who form the discourse of
what is knowledge.

45
46

Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Pg. 82.

Ibid. Pg. 83.

34

The best example of this is in the sciences. Foucault refers to the question of
including Psychoanalysis or Marxism in the list of sciences, but we can easily expand this
to indigenous medicine or other doctrines of thought. Wherever there are standards that
classify knowledge there is power. If one attempts to establish if Marxism can be
considered a science, Foucault says that in doing this, you are investing Marxists
discourses and those who uphold them with the effects of power which the West since
Medieval times has attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged in scientific
discourse. Giving a discourse the label of science, you immediately bestow upon it the
power of knowledge, enclosing it in specific limits associated to the effects of such
power.
In order to understand power we must first acknowledge that its essential
mechanism is repression. Not in the sense of physical repression that we associate to
power today but in the sense of the control of bodies; it is the mere effect and
continuation of a relation of domination47. Going back to border thinking, we
established it as the cure for both the colonial difference that arises from relations of
domination and the repression of power mechanisms. Therefore, subjugated knowledge
(or border thinking) should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical
knowledges form that subjection, to render them capable of opposition and of struggle
against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse48.
Mignolo would object to Foucaults use of the word emancipation because
emancipation implies remaining within the system, whereas liberation is more often used
to entail an absolute freedom from the root of oppression itself. The irony Foucault
47
48

Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Pg. 92.

Ibid. Pg. 85.

35

notices in the expansion of such knowledges is the risk of them being institutionalized
and, once put into circulation, become an integral part of the dominating sciences. He
asks, can they be isolated by these means from every subjugating relationship?49 He
notices that in the act of protecting these knowledges they may be accredited by the
enemy and colonized as such to form part of the discourse of truth. The tension lies in
maintaining the exclusion while at the same time giving a voice to the struggle against
the institutionalization of knowledge and the effects of the power in the knowledge of a
scientific discourse.

49

Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Pg. 86.

36

4 Conclusions
There are several examples that demonstrate how Mignolo and Foucaults
theories could be applied contemporarily to current affairs in Latin America. Whereas
Foucaults concept of biopower reflects the relationship of power between a hegemonic
country and a developing one, Mignolos concept of border thinking and de-linking
provides the cure for Latin American liberation and resistance to such forms of power.
The control of the population through mechanisms of biopower can be expanded to the
relationship between the first world and the third, instead of from the state to its citizens.
Of course, these aspects may also be seen at the local level, when such mechanisms of
power exist between the state and the people within a developing country, but my focus is
rather the relationship that exists between the privileged and the subaltern.
Mignolo mentions the necessity of a Latin American awakening to the aspects
of coloniality today coming from hegemonic sources of power, and how this should no
longer be tolerated. Healing the colonial wound means resisting an imposed position of
inferiority through the rhetoric of coloniality. The following examples echo Mignolos
claim to epistemological and ontological equality that can be obtained through the
development of our modernity and not another, lesser modernity. The ways to reach that
modernity must come from Latin America, and should not be a pathway designed by
those who cause the position of sub-alternity.

37

I. Resistance to Imperial Hegemony: Mujica, Chavez, and the Zapatistas

The speech delivered by the current President of Uruguay, Jose Mujica, took
place in the G20 meeting in Rio on sustainable development in 2012 (see appendix for
full text). This kind of intervention in a formal diplomatic meeting demonstrates a
stunning act of courage and is worthy of reflection. Mujicas words, following many
discussions about what ought to be done to eradicate poverty, shed light on a
discomforting reality that is inherent in adopting a way of life based on the western
model of consumption and production, or the liberal economy in general. Although
Mujicas speech appeals to emotion and may sound impracticable in the short term, it
should not be disregarded for this reason. The points brought up in his speech adds to a
growing desire for a different modernity that has well-being and human happiness at its
center, instead of individual advantage and success at the cost of others.
Mujica makes the claim that the capitalistic model of society based on the market
economy is ruining essential aspects of life where people are at the mercy of the market
and subject to forces that they can no longer control. Here, he echoes Foucaults claim
that biopolitics functions alongside a lean state, where the sphere of the economy must be
left free from government intervention. Modern society, in an age of globalization,
depends desperately on hyper-consumption. Consequently, the idea of happiness and
fulfillment has been adapted to fit the needs of society. The collective image of a
successful man or woman has become associated to economic affluence and the level
obtained in the hierarchy of the labor market. What we fail to realize is that this is only
one part of life, not life itself.

38

The unpredictability of the market and our dependence on it for survival and
consumption is a culture imported, so to say, from the US and neoliberal policies applied
through the IMF in Latin America. With regards to the market, Mujica says, Today, man
does not govern the forces he has unleashed, but rather, it is these forces that govern man;
and life. Because we do not come into this planet simply to develop We come into this
planet to be happy, because life is short and it slips away from us. And no material
belonging is worth as much as life, and this is fundamental. Mujicas message rings in
the ears of the many over-worked that take multiple jobs just to purchase superfluous
consumer goods. His warning: if you spend an entire life obsessed with work you will
arrive at his old age and see that your life has flown by before your eyes. However, he is
not advocating anarchy nor the abolition of the market, certainly.
Im not talking about returning to the days of the caveman, or erecting a
monument to backwardness. But we cannot continue like this,
indefinitely, being ruled by the market, on the contrary, we have to rule
over the market*. This is why I say, in my humble way of thinking, that
the problem we are facing is political. The old thinkers, Epicurus, Seneca
and even the Aymara put it this way, a poor person is not someone who
has little but one who needs infinitely moreThe cause is the model of
civilization that we have created. And the thing we have to re-examine is
our way of life.
Mujica acknowledges that the problem is cultural, and that another option must be
possible. In a similar way, Mignolo calls for an economy based on the management of
*

For Foucault, being ruled by the market is characteristic of biopower, whereas ruling the
market belongs to sovereign medieval rule.

39

scarce resources with a security for all of basic needs. Mignolos idea of the future is
based on this exact concept of well-being and a local form of participatory democracy.
Despite the fact that human happiness is an ambiguous concept and can be widely
interpreted to mean different things, it remains a fundamental aspect to be dealt with in
each society and should be left open to individual interpretation. Of course, this claim
brings to the surface many counter-arguments such as is there a consensus on what is
happiness even within any one culture? or matters of conflicting interests within
societies, regarding different ways to obtain that happiness. However, it is not my aim to
investigate the philosophical understanding of happiness, or the various interpretations of
its meaning and societal consequences.
For the sake of this argument, happiness as intended by Mignolo and Mujica
means having the basic necessities fulfilled to live a life with dignity. Mujica adds to this
by saying it is also having time at your disposal to enjoy of life and human relationships.
At the political level, it means making policy that is aimed towards the improvement of
standard of living for all, not hyper-consumerism at the cost of excluding those at the
bottom of the social strata.
This speech is one of many voices of dissent towards the status quo of an
economic and social model that belongs to the west. The idea of development itself is one
that must be revisited as it is unclear whom such development benefits. The relevancy of
Mignolos argument is evident in the current practices and attitudes emerging from Latin
America, both at the official and local level.
In his Twenty Theses on Politics, Enrique Dussel mentions, like Mignolo, the
EZLN of Chiapas, Mexico. This liberation movement aims at a form of governing that

40

holds the citizens at the center. In fact, they go by the phrase command obeying, which
means that the people command and the government obeys. The actions of those who
govern within this group are held accountable by the citizens, where those in a position of
power must fight in favor of the empirically possible happiness of the political
community, of the pueblo50. The role of the government must be one that is truly
representative, considering the well-being of the people the utmost goal. The governor
must be in service of the people, given that they serve a public function, and only then
will they gain the respect of the people.
The EZLN, however, are perceived by the Mexican government and the majority
of international institutions as a rebel group that is hostile to the state even though they
are fighting for indigenous rights. The growth of this resistance movement against
policies that are not directed towards well-being indicate that there is a growing need for
a shift in the political paradigm. This need for change has, by now, taken root. It exists at
the local level against the established government as in the EZLN example, and at the
national level against imperial forms of coloniality as is the case with the Uruguayan
President.
Besides these single examples, there is a general strengthening of Latin American
resistance to different kinds of imperial hegemony and foreign interference in local
affairs. Several states are uniting to form, not necessarily an anti-American force, but a
political intolerance of imposed directives from abroad or anything that can be perceived
as modern-day coloniality. The death of Hugo Chavez, for example, provided an
opportunity for Latin American presidents to express their position in regards to a man
who was characteristically against US imperialism. For many presidents and Latin
50

Dussel, E. 20 Tesis de Politica. Translated.

41

American citizens, Chavez represented a hero-like figure of resistance and autonomy. In

fact, the presidents from Brasil, Argentina, Uruguay and many others were present at his
funeral to pay respects to a man that changed Venezuela. For better or worse, this will not
be argued, but undoubtedly one who redistributed the wealth from oil profits to the poor
through social programs that would otherwise have gone in private hands as profit.
I will not argue whether the policies applied in Venezuela were in fact positive,
nor is my claim intent on praising nor condoning the two terms served by President
Chavez, but rather, to what extent do first world countries continue to manipulate affairs
in the developing world and to whos advantage. Recently, the elections in Venezuela
were subject to scrutiny in the international arena because of the small margin of the
electoral victory for Chavez successor Nicols Maduro. In the United States, the
constitution calls for the Vice President to automatically take office for the remainder of
the term in the absence of the incumbent President, without further elections. In
Venezuela, the constitution entitles the citizens to vote within 30 days of the death of the
President in favor or against the continuation of the Vice President.
When elections take place in Venezuela and the margin is small, as was the case
in the United States elections of 2000, and the winner turns out to be Madero, then the
opposition (with the support of the United States) declares they do not recognize the
results and claimed a recount of every single ballot. However, the opposition did not
make any official claim and has no evidence of voting irregularities other than rumors
and speculations. Given that elections took place in Venezuela, as stated in the
constitution, the validity of democracy is questioned. One could argue that the process in
Venezuela is more democratic than it would be in the US, where the Vice President

42

simply takes over the Presidential position. The claim made by US officials that the
elections were dubious and should be recounted is a severe intrusion into a countrys
affairs that endangers democratic and political stability. A presidential election based on
majority vote declares the winner even if obtained by just one vote.
The fact that a close vote divides a population in half, in which the losing half
feels unrepresented is a problem that is inherent to any kind of democratic presidential
election and is not a problem that solely pertains to Venezuela, as has been the case in the
elections that brought George W. Bush to presidency in the United States. The problem
arises when a super-power claims, without proof of the mishandling of electoral votes,
that the elections results should be reconsidered and the votes recounted. These claims by
the US administration demonstrate an arrogant and imperial intrusion to delegitimize the
democratic process in a Latin American country.
II. Conclusion
Mignolo states in an interview that coloniality and biopolitics are two major
concepts of contemporary intellectual debates. Again, he hesitates in saying they are the
same thing. Although they can be comparable, coloniality functions through racism and
exclusion whereas biopolitics was used as a tool of emerging nation/states. In fact,
biopolitics imported to Latin America becomes coloniality, where coloniality could be
interpreted as the Latin American counterpart of biopolitics. Although both are power
relationships, they do not work the exact same way, coloniality/racism is a decolonial
concept while biopolitics/biopower is a posmodern concept51.

51

Mignolo, W. The Prospect of Harmony. Pg. 2

43

The resistance of Latin America as seen in the previous examples are directed
towards liberation from coloniality. Today, it is difficult for scholars and people in
general to recognize coloniality and imperial bias that deepens the colonial wound. It is
difficult for someone external to the experience of coloniality to understand it in depth.
No one in Europe was thinking coloniality, they did not see it, they did not feel it.
They can understand colonialism but coloniality is another matter. It is more difficult
to see, they only see modernity and invent concepts like alternative, peripheral, subaltern
etc. modernities52. As with biopolitics, coloniality is not something obvious to the
distracted eyes. It is a subtle mechanisms that, however, has deep effects on society.
For this reason, this thesis is an attempt to add to the literature on decolonization
and detachment from mechanisms of coloniality, ideas that are already spreading
throughout Latin America and uniting in resistance to hegemonic domination of being,
culture, language, knowledge, the economy, and way of life. At the beginning of my
research, my original hypothesis predicted that Mignolo would agree with Foucault in all
aspects. I then realized it was not as simple as I imagined, and the way Mignolo uses and
rejects Foucault contemporarily reflects the complex tension that exists today between
the developing world and the first world. Just as Jaques Derridas work can be interpreted
to be a method of reading, or a philosophy in itself, Mignolo also teaches the reader
how to read, and think, from a different perspective. After reading Mignolo, the aspects
of coloniality become much more evident and easier to point out.
This has altered the original intention of my thesis, and has made it all the more
so, interesting and complex. Due to the lack of time, I was not able to properly engage
with Derridas concept of deconstruction that would have given Mignolos argument
52

Ibid. Pg. 3.

44

much more strength, since border thinking relies on a double consciousness that could
have been interpreted through what Derrida would call presence and absence. Also, I
innocently approached the topic of this thesis choosing two European authors, Foucault
and Derrida, unaware that de-colonial authors maintained a distance from European
thought. Once confronted with this obstacle that initially seemed contradictory, I took the
opportunity to explore this tension. Finally, to proceed with a more in depth analysis of
de-colonial scholarship, one could further investigate Mignolos work in light of similar
work published by Quijano, Dussel, Marategui and other inspiring authors from Latin
America.

45

Bibliography
Alcoff, Linda Martin. Mignolos Epistemology of Coloniality. The New
Centennial Review, 7(3), . 2007. Retrieved from Project MUSE.
Conning, Jonathan H. Robinson, James H. Enclaves and Development: An
Empirical Assessment.
Dussel, Enrique. 20 Tesis de Politica. 2006.
Feldman, Noah. Democratosis. New York Times Magazine. Oct. 07 2007.
Web.
Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France,
1975-76. Trans. David Macey. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
---. History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge. Volume 1. Trans. Robert Hurley.
New York: Penguin Books, 1998.
---. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Trans.
C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, K. Soper. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1980.
---. Power, Right, Truth. Excerpt from Power/Knowledge. 543-550. PDF.
---. Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the College de France.
Palgrave: New York. 1977-78. pg.88-114.
---. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79. Trans.
Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Grosfoguel, Ramon. Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of
Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global
Coloniality. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production
of the Luso-Hispanic World. 1(1). Berkley: U California P, 2011
Kapoor, I. (2002). Capitalism, Culture, Agency: Dependency versus Postcolonial
Theory. Third World Quarterly, 23(4), 647-664. Retrieved from JSTOR.
Lemke, Thomas. The Birth of Biopolitics: Michel Foucaults Lecture at the
College de France on Neo-liberal Govenrmentality. Economy and Society
30, no.2 (2001): 190-207.

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Mignolo, Walter. Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity. PDF

---. Delinking: the Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality, and the
Grammar of De-coloniality. Duke U P. Cultural Studies Vol. 21, Nos. 23 March/May 2007, pp. 449 -514.
---. Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Though and De-colonial Freedom.
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 26(7-8): 1-23. SAGE.
---. Hermenutica de la Democracia: El Pensamiento de los Lmites y la
Diferencia Colonial. 2008. PDF
---. Local Histories/Global Designs. Princeton: Princeton U P, 2000.
---. The Darker Side of Western Modernity. Durham: Duke U P, 2011.
---. The Idea of Latin America. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
---. The Prospect of Harmony and the Decolonial View of the World: An
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com/2012/09/22/the-prospect-of-harmony-and-the-decolonial-view-of-theworld/>. Web.

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Appendix 1

All afternoon weve been talking about sustainable development, and weve

been talking about bringing huge numbers of people, huge amounts of people out of poverty. So
what are we thinking about in all of this? The patterns of production and consumption that we
have at the moment are those of affluent societies. Now, what would happen to the planet, I ask
myself, if the people of India had the same number of cars per family as the Germans? How much
oxygen would there be left for us to breathe? More clearly, does the world today have the material
resources to enable 7 or 8 billion people to enjoy the same level of consumption and squandering
as the most affluent Western societies? Will that ever be possible? Or will we have to start a
different type of discussion one day? Because we have created this civilization in which we live:
the progeny of the market, of competition, which has begotten prodigious and explosive material
progress. But the market economy has created market societies, and it has given us this
globalization, which means being aware of the whole planet. Are we ruling over globalization or is
globalization ruling over us? Is it possible to speak of solidarity and of being all together in an
economy based on ruthless competition? How far does our fraternity go? I am not saying any of
this to undermine the importance of this event. On the contrary, the challenge ahead of us is of
colossal magnitude and the great crisis is not an ecological crisis, but rather a political one. Today,
man does not govern the forces he has unleashed, but rather, it is these forces that govern man, and
life. Because we do not come into this planet to simply develop, just like that, indiscriminately.
We come into this planet to be happy, because life is short and it slips away from us. No material
belonging is worth as much as life, and this is fundamental. But if life is going to slip through my
fingers, working and over-working in order to be able to consume more, and the consumer society
is the engine because ultimately, if consumption is paralyzed, the economy stops, and if you stop
the economy, the ghost of stagnation appears for each one of us. It is this hyper-consumption that
is harming the planet, and this hyper-consumption needs to be generated, making things have a
short, useful life, in order to sell more. Thus, a light bulb cannot last longer than 100 hours,
although there are light bulbs that can last 100,000 hours! But these cannot be manufactured
because the problem is the market, because we have to work and we have to sustain a civilization

48

of use and discard and so, we are trapped in a vicious cycle. These are problems of political
nature, which are showing us that its time to start fighting for a different culture. Im not talking
about returning to the days of the caveman, or erecting a monument to backwardness, but we
cannot continue like this, indefinitely, being ruled by the market. On the contrary, we have to rule
over the market. This is why I say, in my humble opinion, that the problem we are facing is
political. The old thinkers, Epicurus, Seneca and even the Aymara put it this way: a poor person is
not someone who has little but one who needs infinitely more and more. This is a cultural issue.
So I salute the efforts and agreements being made, and I will adhere to them as governor. I know
some things Im, saying are hard to digest, but we must realize that the water crisis and the
aggression to the environment is not the cause. The cause is the model of civilization that we have
created, and the thing we have to re-examine is our way of life. I belong to a small country well
endowed with natural resources for life. In my country, there are a bit more than 3 million people,
but there are about 13 million cows, some of the best in the world, and about 8 or 10 million
excellent sheep. My country is an exporter of food, dairy, meat. It is a low relief plain and almost
90% of the land is arable. My fellow workers fought hard for the 8 hour word day, and now they
are making it 6 hours. But the person who works 6 hours gets two jobs, therefore, he works longer
than before. But why? Because he needs to make monthly payments for the motorcycle, the car,
more and more payments, and when hes done with that, he realizes he is an old man like me, and
his life is already over. And one asks this question: is this the fate of human life? These things I
say are very basic, development cannot go against happiness. It has to work in favor of human
happiness, of love on Earth, human relationships, caring for children, having friends, having our
basic needs covered. Precisely because this is the most precious treasure we have; happiness. Then
we fight for the environment, we must remember that the essential element of the environment is
called human happiness.

49