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and Dreaming:ImplodingtheDemon
Scepticism
CRISPIN WRIGHT
Much literature
on thetopicof externalworldscepticismproceedsas if then
werea singlegeneralformofproblemthathastobe confronted.
In fact,however
forepistemological
arguments
scepticism
come in a variety
of significantly
different
formsand,whilegenerality
is ofcoursea meritin a response,thereis nc
reasonto expectthattheyshouldsuccumbto a uniform
treatment.
My concern
hereis withthelargebutnotcomprehensive
groupof scepticalarguments
that
make play witha purportedly
undetectable
but cognitively
disablingstatevictimisation
dreaming,
pervasivehallucination,
bytheCartesiandemon,Brainin-a-vathood,
etc.I believethesearguments
do sharea best-mostchallengingform,whichI shalldelineatebelow.' I also believethat,so delineated,
theycan
be madetosuccumbtoa head-on,rationalresponse-something
ofwhicha subI shallfocus
stantialamountofdistinguished
recentcommentary
has despaired.2
on theexampleofdreaming;
butitwillbe possibleto substitute
throughout
any
oftheotherfamiliar
fantasies
without
important
change.
' The formof argument
in questionwas,nearenough,thefirstof twohighlighted
in
my"FactsandCertainty"
(1985). Buttheoverallapproachadoptedthere-ofarguing
that
successfulscepticalargument
shouldbe seennotas callingintoquestionourrightto acas "Thereis a materialworld","Thereare manyminds","The
cept suchpropositions
worlddidnotfirst
comeintobeinglessthanfiveminutes
ago",etc.,butrather
as showing
forwhichtheyqualifyallows
their"unfactuality",
i.e. as disclosingthatthenotionoftruth
forthemneednotdemandsupportwithreasons-thisapproachwas
thatclaimingtruth
incases,like"I am notnowdreaming",
neverentirely
comfortable
"I am nota brainin a
of thescepticaldoubtis notthatthethought
vat",etc.,wherethethrust
expressedis beyondanyone'sjustifiedappraisalbutconcernsa predicament
peculiarto thesubjectconcerned.How can what I now expressby "I am not now dreaming"be a "hinge
proposition",
beyondtheneedforjustification,
ifitcoincidesin itstruth-conditions
with
whatyoucan nowexpressby"Wright
is notnowdreaming"
andthelatteris a perfectly
ordinary
empiricalproposition?
Thedifficulty
is thatbeinga "hinge",ontheaccountof"FactsandCertainty",
is a functionofa statement's
No provisionis madefortheidea of
place inourschemeofthought.
wouldseemingly
a "personal"hinge,ofthekindwhich"I am notnowdreaming"
haveto
be. To be sure,theproblemis notimmediately
lethalfortheapproachto thefirst
class of
describedin"FactsandCertainty".
scepticalarguments
(Anditdoes notbearatall on the
prospects
ofso approaching
theotherclassofarguments,
on whichinanycase thelecture
Butmaintaining
theapproachis goingtorequiresomeradicalmoves:one
concentrated.)
sufficient
ofourrespecwayoranother,
distancewillhavetobe putbetweenthecontents
of"I am notnowdreaming"
and"Wright
is notnowdreaming"
toallow
tiveaffirmations
whichthelattercannotassumein
theformer
to assumea statusin mythought
justifiably
wouldbe toarguethatwhatI nowexpressby"I amnotnow
yours.(A stepinthisdirection
at all.)
cannotbe an objectofyourthought
dreaming"
In anycase, theproposalsketchedbelowis independent
andmaynicelycomplement
treatment
ofthesecondformofscepticalargument
the"FactsandCertainty"
highlighted
inthelecture.
2
SirPeterStrawson
ofpessimism
instance,
(1985) providesaneloquentexpression
aboutthepowersofreasoninthefaceof scepticaldoubt.AndBarryStroud(1984,p. 20)
ifwe letourselvesacceptthetermsin
thattheCartesianChallengeis unanswerable
grants
whichitis framed.
Mind,Vol. 100 . 397 . January1991
? Oxford University
Press 1991
88
CrispinWr-ight
l
ifwe reflect
such
thataneffective
Thedespairmayseemonlytoounderstandable
tworelatively
responsehas to be givenwithintheconfinesof threeconstraints,
exigentintheextreme.
obvious,thethirdless so, andtheircombinedeffect
that,odd as itmightat firstseemto
The firstderivesfromtheconsideration
say so, knowledgeis notreallythepropercentralconcernof epistemologicoin theclaim
scepticalenquiry.Thereis notnecessarilyany lastingdiscomfort
we have no genuineknowledgein some
that,contrary
to our preconceptions,
science.Wecan livewith
broadareaofourthought-sayintheareaoftheoretical
knowsomeofthethingswe believedourtheconcessionthatwe do not,strictly,
thatwe arefullyjustifiedin
selvesto know,providedwe can retainthethought
call theRussellianRetreat.
For
them.Thatconcessionis whatwe might
accepting
Russell(1912, Chs. I and 11)proposedthatsuchis exactlythemessagewhich
hasforus: we mustcontent
ourselveswith
generally
philosophical
epistemology
we had
wherestandardly
defeasibility
andinconclusive
justifications
probability,
wantedto claimmore.What,however,is nottolerableis thethesisthat,among
thematerialworld,otherminds,orthepast,we
propositions
about,forinstance,
correjustified
opinion;thatno realdistinction
neveractuallyattaintogenuinely
sponds to thatwhich we are accustomedto draw betweengroundedand
and mereprejudiceor dogma.Butjust
ungrounded
beliefs,earnedinformation
to deliver(cf.
thisclaimis whatthebest-radical-sceptical arguments
purport
Dancy 1985,pp. 8-9).
to a sceptical
then,is thatone mustnot,in responding
The firstconstraint,
andhave
be content
torelyon pointswhicharespecifictoknowledge
argument,
no evidentanaloguefortheweakerepistemicnotionsattackedbyradicalsceptitoreformulate
toattempt
cism.One is obliged,morespecifically,
scepticalarguto know-ledgein termsof such weakernotions;onlyif it
mentsantagonistic
tomarshala theory
ofknowlsucceedsis itgermane
emergesthatno suchattempt
edgeinone's response.3
is motivated
thatscepticalarguments
are
The secondconstraint
bythethought
' So formulated,
maywell seemtoo obviousto be worthstating.But
theconstraint
forinstance,
somewidelydebateddiscussionsviolateit.RobertNozick's(1981) attempt,
theprinciple
byquestioning
to castdoubton thecogencyof certainscepticalarguments
fromknownpremissesvia knownentailments,
depends
thatknowledgeis transmissible
towit,roughly,
X's
on hisclaimthatknowledgeis subjecttoa tracking
condition;
entirely
be covariant
knowingthatP requiresthatherbelievingthatP and thefactof P's truth
or notknowledgeis indeedsubjectto such
acrossnearbypossibleworlds.Well,whether
a condition,
no non-factive
epistemicnotioncan be so subject,sincetheapplicationof
in questionin the
of theproposition
sucha notiondoes notso muchas requirethetruth
ones.Butthescepticalarsimilarcounterfactual
actualworld,letalonein all sufficiently
in termsofnonifre-tooled
guments
whichNozickhad inmindcan all rununhampered
claimthanitmayseem.Itis implicitly
factivenotions.(Thatis actuallya moresubstantial
who
I suggest,
bythediscussionin?111below.)Ofcourse,therearephilosophers
justified,
in thecase of e.g. reasonablebeliefalso (see foothavewantedto querytransmissibility
at all, needsthesupportof
note13 below).Butthatproposal,ifitcan be wellmotivated
thesphereofNozick'sdiagnosis.
considerations
quiteoutwith
Scepticism
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 89
notproperly
rebutted
byconsiderations
whoseforcedependson theassumption
ofan adversarialstance:a scenarioin whichtheobjectis to defeata realphilosophicalopponent,
theSceptic,in rationaldebate.Thereareno realsuchopponents.That generations
of philosophershave feltimpelledto grapplewith
scepticalarguments
is notattributable
to a courtesy
due toan historically
distinguishedsponsorship
buttothefactthatthesearguments
areparadoxes:seemingly
validderivations
fromseemingly
well supported
premissesof utterly
unacceptableconsequences.
inwhichonecould
And,ofcourse,noteverykindofsituation
properly
claimto havewona debatewitha sponsoris one in whichone would
havedisposedoftheparadoxwhichthesponsored
Consider
argument
presented.
themythical
glass-chinned
scepticwhoclaimsthatthereis no reasonto believe
at all. Nothing
anything
easierthantoconfound
suchan opponent
indebate.But
ifyouyourself
areled,incamera,as itwere,tothatabsurdconclusionbya seeminglywell-motivated
route,itis no intellectual
comfort
toreflect
thattheposition
is self-defeating;
on thecontrary,
thatsimplyintensifies
theembarrassment.
The
whatspecifically
and in detailshouldbe concludedaboutthe
questionis rather,
illusionofcogencywhichthereasoning
somehowwas able toconjure?
The secondconstraint,
then,is thatone mustnot,inresponding
to a sceptical
be contentto relyon attackson thestability
argument,
of theconclusion,or on
themutualcoherenceofthepremisseswhichareusedto support
it.Thatis good
butdefusing
strategy
againstanopponent;
a paradoxdemandsa properly
detailed
diagnosisandexposeofitspowerto seduce.
is imposedbythereflection
The thirdconstraint
that-torevert
harmlessly
to
theordinary
adversarial
rhetoric-theScepticdoes notneedto winbutonlyto
draw.Thatis: theconclusionofa scepticalargument
whichpurports
to shownot
indeedthatnoneof ourcherished
beliefsaboutsomesubjectmatter
is justified
butmerelythatthereis nojustification
forthinking
loses littlein disotherwise,
claim.IfI findittotallyunacceptable
quietingpowertothestronger
tothinkthat
noneofmyopinionsabouttheexternal
for
has
itis
world, instance, anyground,
to be toldthatthecase has beenoverstated-that
it is merely
hardlya comfort
thatI havenojustification
forthinking
thatthesituation
is anybetter
thanthat.
To see howthisreflection
imposesa definite
we
constraint,
suppose arepreFsentedwitha validentailment,
where
B
is
an
A,,
conunacceptable
{A,,
IAn B,
thatthereis nojustification
forbelievinganything
clusion-say,precisely,
about
theexternal
world.Then,as justremarked,
"Thereis nojustification
forbelieving
thatB is false"is hardlya morepalatableresult.Butwe willhavethatresultprovidedthat{A,, . . ., An)are suchthat,evenifnoteachpositively
there
justified,
is atleastnojustification
fordenying
theirconjunction.4
Result:thepremisses
of
4The pointassumesthatjustification,
reasonablebelief,etc.,aretransmissible
across
entailment.
The thought
thenis simplythat,whereIA,, . . . A, I v
F B,
(i) not:B v not:{AI & ... & A,};
hence,
(ii) justified[not:B] F-justified[not:IA, & ... & A, I ), bytransmissibility
ofjustification;
hence,
(iii) notjustified[not:{Al& ... & A,} ] H notjustified[not:B].
90
Crispin
Wright
an interesting
scepticalargument-onethereis no livingwith-do notstandin
needofjustification;
itis enoughthatwe lackanyjustification
forthedenialthat
theyareall true.
The consequential-atfirstblush,surprising-constraint
is,accordingly,
that
onemustnot,inresponding
toa scepticalargument,
be content
torelyonconsiderationsthattendto showthatits premisseshave notbeen convincingly
supported.Forevenifthatis true,thefactis thatinteresting
scepticalarguments
do
notneedto support
theirpremisses,
butcan fallbackon thethesisthatwe have
no convincingcase fortheirconjointdenial. More generally:a satisfactory
responsetoscepticism
mustdeal withscepticism
atbothfirstandsecond-order.5
The constraints
are indeeddemanding,
expeciallythethird.But,as I said,I
thinkwe can playbythemandstillwin.
II
Descarteswrote:
I mustremember
thatI am a man,andthatconsequently
Nevertheless,
I am accustomed
to sleepandinmydreamsto imaginethesamethings
thatlunaticsimaginewhenawake,or sometimes
thingswhichareeven
lessplausible.How manytimeshasitoccurred
thatthequietofthenight
mademedreamofmyusualhabits:thatI washere,clothedina dressing
gown,and sitting
by thefire,althoughI was in factlyingundressed
in
bed! It seemsapparentto me now,thatI am notlookingat thispaper
withmyeyes closed,thatthishead thatI shakeis notdruggedwith
sleep,thatit is withdesignand deliberateintentthatI stretch
outthis
handandperceiveit.Whathappensinsleepseemsnotatall as clearand
distinct
as all this.But I am speakingas thoughI neverrecallhaving
beenmisled,whileasleep,by similarillusions.WhenI considerthese
I realiseso clearlythatthereare no conclusiveindimatters
carefully,
cationsbywhichwakinglifecan be distinguished
fromsleepthatI am
is suchthatitis almostable to
and mybewilderment
quiteastonished,
convinceme thatI am sleeping.(FirstMeditation,
1968,pp. 145-6;my
italics)
That"thereareno conclusiveindications"
todistinguish
wakingfromdreamingdoes notimpress,
at firstsight,as a particularly
damagingscepticalthought.
The Cartesianquestforcertainty,
Whyshouldwe wantconclusiveindications?
no doubt,cannotbe satisfiedby less thanconclusiveness;
butthereseemsno
shoulddemandso much.
goodcause whya questforjustification
Thatis a pointerto thefactthatsome workwill be wantedto massagethe
intoa radical scepticalargument.
We will come to thatin ?IV.
quotedthought
itis as welltoemphasisehowstrongis thebasisfortheclaimthat
First,though,
Descartesis making.His claimis thatordinary
waking-perceptual-experience
is in no essentialway phenomenologically
fromdreamexperidistinguished
order.
ofarbitrary
5And indeed,withscepticism
theDemon 91
Scepticism
andDreaming:Imploding
marksof thedistinction
ence-that,notwithstanding
thevarietyof contingent
andqualityofan episode
whichwe areinpracticecontent
torelyon,thecontent
to classifyit as dreamor perception.
of experienceis neverlogicallysufficient
is
Thisis true,andfundamental
to ourconcerns.It is truebecausethedistinction
thatthemanifest
conoftheconceptofdreaming
ctiological:itis characteristic
is dominantly
tentofdreamexperience
causedin waysappropriately
dissociated
environment.
By contrast,
expefromcurrent
eventsin thesubject'sperceptible
contentis dominantly
causedby
riencecountsas perceptual
onlyifitsmanifest
in wayswhichensurethatthereis a subeventsin theperceptible
environment
betweenthem.Thisdoes notprecludeexamples
stantialmeasureofcongruence
whereaspectsofthecontent
ofa dreamdo seembestexplainedas responsive
to
environment
(cf.Wittgenstein
On Cerelementsin thesubject'scontemporary
Buttocometothinkthatenough,sustained
tainty,
1969,concluding
paragraph).
detailofa dreamwas so responsive
wouldbe tocometo havereasontothinkof
perception.
itnotas a dreamat all butas someformofdormitory
experienceby considerations
Dreaming,then,is markedofffromperceptual
whichconcernitscausalorigin.Thereis a lotmoredetailto fillin aboutthedistinctionso drawn,but thisis enoughforDescartes'purpose.Dreamingonly
is
becausecausedin waysin whichperceiving,
countsas dreaming
necessarily,
thatexperience
cannotdisthought
notcaused.Butitis a completely
compelling
close itsowncausalprovenance
as partof itspropercontent.
Knowledgeofthe
hastobe theproduct
ofinference,
forwhichthatexpeofan experience
xetiology
thushasno ingressintotheterritory
riencecanatbestsupplya datum.Experience
in whichthedistinction
andperceptual
is made.
experience
betweendreaming
Descartes'italicisedclaimis thussecure.Buthowexactlydoesitleadtoa generalisedscepticaldoubt?BarryStroud'sanalysis(1984,pp.9-24)involvesgrantingDescartesthat
at thattime,
(a) Atno timedoes anyoneknowthattheyarenotdreaming
also
is a consequenceoftheitalicisedclaim,andgranting
does Descartesknowthathe is clothedin a
(b) Onlyifhe is notdreaming
dressinggown,andsitting
bythefire,etc.
Thelatter
is plausibleenoughifwe takeitthat,inthescenariodepicted,
Descartes
and
couldknowthathe is clothedin a dressinggown,etc.,onlybyperceiving,
are governedby incompatible
reflectonce morethatdreamingand perceiving
Butstill,howis scepticaldamagetobe donewith(a) and(b)?
causalconstraints.
withtheknowledgethat(b) is true,andproSupposewe creditDescarteshimself
ceed to invokewhatwe maycall
Descartes' Principle:
In orderto knowanyproposition
any
P, one mustknowto be satisfied
whichone knowstobe necessaryforone's knowingP.
condition
Thenitimmediately
followsthat
gown,andsitting
bythe
(c) Descartesknowsthathe is clothedina dressing
fire,etc.,onlyifhe knowsthathe is notdreaming.
Andnow(a) and(c) setup a modustollenstotheconclusionthatDescartesdoes
92
CrispinWright
Iterativity
entailsDescartes'Principle.The Principlesays thatifK(Kp -o q),
thenKp -- Kq. SupposeKp; then,byiterativity,
KKp. Supposetheantecedent
ofthePrinciple,
andthatitis knownthat{Kp,Kp -- q } e q. Thenbothpremissitselfareknown.So, bytransmissibilies ofthatentailment,
andtheentailment
ty,its consequentis known:Kq. Two applicationsof conditionalproofthen
yieldthePrinciple.
entailsiterativity.
Take "q" as "Kp".
(ii) Descartes'Principle
thattheknowingsubjectmight
It is,bytheway,nota relevant
objectiontoiterativity
belief.Likewise,itis no objectiontotransmissisecond-order
simplylacktheappropriate
ofanentailment,
andknewthattheentailment
bilitythata subjectwhoknewthepremisses
was good,mightsimplynothaveformedanybeliefin theconclusion.The acceptability
ingeneral,does
rulesforknowledge,
andindeedforepistemic
ofproof-theoretic
operators
The germanequestionis rather
not hold out hostagesto psychologicalcontingency.
whether
satisfaction
ofthepremisses
foran application
oftheruleensurestheavailability
to thesubjectoftheepistemicstatedepictedin theconclusion.
(i)
fora satisfactory
inanycase. The wholedrift
responsetoscepticism
oftheexternalistresponseis to seeka constitutive
accountofknowledgewhichallowsthe
thatwe knowtobe unimpugned
possibility
underscepticalpresbyourinability,
sure,tomakea case thatwe do.8Ifiterativity
indeedfailsas a consequenceofthis
aspectoftheaccount,thenitsfailureis boughtatthecostoflayingouraspirations
to knowledgewideopento second-order
Andifitdoes notfail,the
scepticism.
objectionlapses.
A better
objectionto Stroud'sCartesianargument
has,ineffect,
alreadybeen
noted.It concernspremise(a). Whyshouldthelackof"conclusiveindications"
inthecontent
ofexperience-thefactthatitis alwaysconsistent
withthecontent
ofan experiential
episodethatitbe dreamor waking-be thought
for
sufficient
thethesisthatno-oneeverknowsthattheyarenotthendreaming?
The premise
is eitherunjustified
or-if knowledgeis deemedto demandsuch conclusive
grounds-theweakerclaim,thatwe veryoftenarecertain,
withamplejustification,thatwe arenotthendreaming
andareveryoftenright,
is leftuntouched
by
theargument,
whosestingis consequently
drawn.
Ourtask,then,is tofinda versionoftheargument
whichcan warrant
(at least
agnosticism
about)itsanalogueofpremise(a) whilesimultaneously
keepingits
witha typeofepistemic
sting-working
claimwhichwe aresimplynotprepared,
intherelevant
cases,toforgo.
111
It is muchmoredifficult
toaccomplishsuchan argument
thanhasbeengenerally
A formulation
intermsofknowledge,
howeverinternally
acknowledged.
impressive,merelyinvitesevasionby RussellianRetreat.But an evidentdifficulty
in
to runthesortof argument
sketchedin termsofreasonablebeliefis how
trying
anyanalogueof premise(b) is to survive.Granted,if Descartesactuallywere
as he seemingly
sitsin frontof his fire,etc.,he wouldnotknowthe
dreaming
propositions
whosetruth
he thentakeshimself
toperceive.Butmighthe notstill
reasonably
believethem-precisely
because,in circumstances
of suchfocussed
phenomenological
lucidity,he reasonably(but wrongly)takeshimselfto be
awake?Itappearsthatneither
norreasonablebeliefcanservetheconknowledge
struction
ofa radicalscepticalargument
alongthelinesconsidered.
One response,as faras premise(b) is concerned,
wouldbe to restrict
attentionto appropriate
demonstrative
beliefs-beliefsde re concerning
perceptually presenteditems.For theseare beliefs,accordingto currently
influential
theveryentertaining
of whosecontentdemandsconcurrent
orthodoxy,
perceptualcontactwiththeobjectstheyconcern;theyarehencesimplyunavailableto
a dreamingsubject,and thusprovidesecurecases foran analogueof premise
(b) in termsof reasonablebelief.It is unclear,moreover,
thattherestriction
8 Nozick,forinstance,
is veryclearaboutthis(1981,n. 5, p. 197andfollowing).
94
CrispinWright
Scepticism
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 95
conduciveness
ofthecircumstances
inwhichthebeliefwasformed.9
Letthepedigreeof a beliefembraceitsholder'sgroundsifany,hercognitivecondition
as
sheformsitandthecircumstances
surrounding
itsformation.
Considerthesituationof a belief,whether
trueor false,and whatever
thecharacter
of evidence
bearingon itwhichhas notyetbeengathered,
whichis as a matter
offactindefeasibleinthesecondway-a beliefwhosepedigreeis flawless.Forsucha belief
therewillno feature
ofitspedigreesuchthatitwouldbe rational,
ifoneknewof
thatfeature,
toregardtheprobability
ofthebelief'sbeingtrueas unenhanced
by
thefactofthesubject'sholdingit.Thatwillbe a keyfeature
ofthesortofnotion
we want.
Let us saythattheholdingbya subject,x, ofa particular
beliefat a particular
timeis warranted
justincase thefollowing
twoconditions
aremet:
(i) x has sufficient
reason,all thingsconsideredwhichshe is in a position
to holdthebelief;and
toconsider,
ofitspedigreeinx's thought
(ii) one whoknewofall features
wouldnotbe
placedina positionwhere,independently
ofanyreasonbestowedtherebytoregardthebeliefas false," itwouldbe rationalto viewtheprobaas beingunimproved
bilityofitstruth
bythefactofx's holdingit.
Warranted
beliefis an interesting
notion.Unlikeknowledgebutlikereasonable belief,itis notfactive-doesnotrequirethetruth
ofpropositions
to which
it applies.(Thoughonlyconsistent
setsof beliefscan be simultaneously
warranted.'
butunlikereasonablebelief,warrant
1) Likeknowledge,
is senhowever,
sitivetoreal,as opposedtoreasonably
supposed,aspectsofpedigree.SupposeI
believequitereasonably
thata proposition
is true forinstance,
"Itis raining
outside"-which merelyreflectsthe contentof a vivid and unusuallycoherent
dream.Suppose,even,thattheproposition
inquestionis actuallytrue.Anyone's
intuition
willbe thatthewaymybeliefis arrivedatprevents,
inordinary
circumas knowledge.
Butitalso prevents
itscounting
stances,itscounting
as warranted;
forifyouknowthatmybeliefis inspired
be ratiobya dream,youwillcertainly
ceterisparibus,toregardmyholdingitas doingnothing
toprobanallyentitled,
Thatwarranted
beliefis analogousto knowledgein thisrespect
bilifyitstruth.
inmotivating
suggeststhatthereshouldbe no insuperable
an analogue
difficulty
forpremise(b) in termsofit.Moreon thatina moment.
Butthecrucialpoint,of course,is whether
beliefis at theserviceof
warranted
in contrastwithknowledge,strictly
radical scepticalarguments-whether,
ofourbeliefsis something
we cannottolerably
thewarrantedness
simregarded,
I Stephen
Yablohassuggested
thetwotypesofdefeatmightmemorably
be calledoverridingandundercutting
respectively.
"Undercutting"
is JohnPollock'sterm(1986).
' The qualification
is, of course,essentialif,as we are,we are in searchof a notion
whichcontrasts
withknowledgein theclearestpossibleway,i.e. a non-factive
notion.
Without
it,no falsebeliefcouldbe warranted;
forthata beliefis falseis certainly
a feature
in whichitis formedwhich,ifone knewof it,wouldconferreason
ofthecircumstances
toreFardtheprobability
ofthebelief'sbeingtrueas beingunimproved...
etc.
' Sincethereis no havingsufficient
reason,all things
considered
whichone is ina positiontoconsider,
bothtobelievea proposition
andto believeitsnegation.
Eitherone set
ofreasonsdominates
theother,orneither
sufficient.
is, incontext,
96
CrispinWright
IV
It is plausible,then,thata radicalversionofStroud'sCartesianparadoxneednot
forwantofa suitableepistemicnotionon whichtobuild.Andwarranted
founder
whichis not
beliefdoes indeedgeneratea versionof theDreamingArgument
ofthebest
buthas,itseemstome,a goodcase tobe thedistillate
merelyarresting
Let us setitup.
inthevicinity.
scepticalthought
to believeP at t. So read,
We read"Rxt[P]" as: x has available a warrant
believesP. The notionthat
"Rxt[P1"does notimplythatx actuallywarrantedly
thatofx's beinginpositionto
roughly,
bestservesthescepticalpurposeis rather,
abilitieswhichheactuallyposbythebestexerciseofcognitive
acquirea warrant
changein his actual
sesses at t and whoseexercisewill notinvolvesignificant
forinstance,
atthetime.So moderate
inebriation,
modeofcognitive
functioning
intellectual
andrecwitha measureofnormalperceptual,
to a degreeconsistent
suchthatRxt[P], since
willnotlimittheclass ofpropositions
ollectivefunction,
involvingthosefaculties;but
we are permitted
to idealiseto bestperformance
and
of anybutthemostelementary
dreaming
mathematics,
deafness,ignorance
unconsciousness
all will,sinceeach is a statewhicheitherplaces limitson the
willinvolvesigabilitieswhichx actuallyhasorwhosediscontinuation
cognitive
modeofcognitivefunctioning.
nificant
changeinhiscurrent
theidea of availablewarrant-ofinformaCharacterised
onlyto thisextent,
as itwere-whileitmayseemintuitive
enough,is
tionbeingthereforx's taking,
after
you thinkthatmatters
vague.You shoulddecidewhether
unquestionably
has twopreto follow.The argument
youhavereviewedthescepticalargument
belief.The first
rulesspecificto warranted
misses,and deploystwo inference
thatthey
forthesupposition
premiseis thatno-oneeverhas availablea warrant
Scepticism
andDr-eaming:
Imploding
theDemon
97
x andt,where"Dxt"expressesthatx
arenotthendreaming;
thatis,forarbitrary
is dreaming at t:
(A,.. .,A,,}
Rxt[B],
to believeeach of
where"RxtIA, .
A,J"says thatx has availablewarrant
A, . . ., A, (and"e " as throughout,
expressesentailment).
Wecan supposethatx is a normally
reflective
rationally
subjectwho,via best
exerciseof ordinary
inferential
abilities,can cometo see thatIA, . . ., A,,} - B.
believesa particular
The rulethenaversthatsucha subjectwhowarrantedly
set
foranyof theirconsequences.Well,
of propositions
can alwaysget a warrant
trueif,as we ordinarily
likethatmustbe generally
obviously,
something
suppose,
itis possibleto extendtheclass of beliefswhichwe arejustifiedin holding-a
fortiorithosewhichwe areflawlesslyjustifiedin holding-byvalid inference.
has to be exceptionless?
Butis itobviousthatthegenerality
Surely,at anyrate,
thereis spaceforan enquiry;or so ithas seemedto some.12
12
thereasonableness
towhich,forinstance,
ofa beliefis a matter
Anyviewaccording
relativetoa framework
of"relevant
is goingtohavea moofreasonableness
alternatives",
thatreasonsareinvariably
transmissible
acrossentailment;
tivefordenying
merelytakea
oftheentailment
inquestionis a condition
case whereconsistency
withtheconsequent
on
as "relevant".
an alternative's
counting
Suppose,forexample,a theorist
attracted
to such
inwhichothers'behaviour
is beingtreated
a viewholdsthat,inanycontext
as makingpar-
98
CrispinWright
A strong
motivefortheruleis providedbythereflection
thatpossessionofa warrantoughtto be an at leastweaklydecidablematter:
thatifx has a warrant
forP
at t,thatoughtto be something
forwhichshecan accumulategood thoughperhapsdefeasibleevidence-which,naturally,
needinvolveno flawofpedigree13Andthethought
without
significant
changeinmodeofcognitive
function.
that
thereshouldbe weakdecidability
in thissenseis in turnencouraged
bytheidea
is to be a normativenotion,guidingourpracticesof beliefformathatwarrant
tion-a roleitcan hardlydischargeifwe cannottell,evenweakly,whenbeliefs
arewarranted
and whentheyarenot.Once again,one wouldnothaveto refuse
all forceto theseconsiderations
in orderto wonderwhether
therule,so motivated,wouldhavetobe exceptionless.
Butonce again,we can forourpurposes
cutoffthedebatewiththereflection
that,at worst,we thereby
bestowa provisionalcharacter
on thetreatment
tofollow.
oftheparadoxis immediate.
The derivation
Suppose
(i) Rxt [P];
then
(ii) Rxt [Rxt[P]],
Since {Rxt [P], If Rxt [P], thennot:Dxt} F not:Dxt, itfolby (i) andIterativity.
lowsfrom(ii) and(P2) byTransmission
that
(iii) Rxt [not:Dxt],
Thisconclusion
intolerable.
Itsaysthat,
nomatter
is,evidently,
whenandwhoyou
is availabletoyouforanyproposition
are,no warrant
a warrant
forwhich
getting
ticularbeliefsabouttheirmentalstatesreasonable,theassumption
thatthereare other
mindsbesidesmineincorporates
sucha condition
on relevant
alternatives.
Others'behaviour,thatis to say,is aptto makesuchbeliefsreasonableonlyin a contextin whichthe
idea thatI am theonlymindabroadis alreadydismissedas an irrelevant
possibility.
Plainly,on sucha view,myreasonstoregardyouas hopingfora 'phonecall arenottransmissibledowntothethesisthatthereareothermindsbesidesmine.
The earlieststatement
of thispointknownto me is in FredDretske's(1970). Butthe
centralclaim-thatsometimes
thetruth
oftheconsequent
ofan entailment
is a presuppositionoftheevidential
forceofdatastandardly
takento support
one ofthepremisses-is
independent
ofanycontextualism
aboutjustification,
andprovidesthebasisofone ofthe
mostarresting
yetsimplescepticalstrategies:
thatwhichtookcentrestageinmy
precisely
(1985).
13 Forexample,
ifitis possiblebya mixture
ofperception
andrational
reflection
toget
groundsforA, thenit shouldbe possible,bya mixture
ofperception
andrationalreflection,torecognisethatthatis so.
theDemon 99
andDreaming:Imploding
Scepticism
So percepfunction.
requireperceptual
circumstances,
would,in yourepistemic
beliefsthat,in thecirforso farunwarranted
tionis nevera sourceof warrants
cannotget
anyotherway.Crudely,perception
cannotbe warranted
cumstances,
it.Butthatis justto saythatalmostall our
youcannotgetwithout
youanything
relianton perception
bymeansessentially
beliefs-whicharewarranted
worldly
at all-are unwarrantable.
ifwarranted
version,
wouldbe thesecond-order
as I havestressed,
Hardlyless intolerable,
to discountthisconclusion.It meritsnotice,therefore,
thatthereis no warrant
than
for(P1), justthatwillbe theresultif,rather
that,assumingthereis warrant
formulations
andIterativity
as rules,we takeappropriate
workwithTransmission
willbe, thereis at leastno
ofthemas premisseswhich,thescepticalcontention
in
seemto be no point,in thiscontext,
to deny.14Therewouldtherefore
warrant
conceivedas rules
or Iterativity
aboutTransmission
developinganyreservation
of
aboutthetruth
torejectevenmereagnosticism
unlessitalso provideswarrant
premisses.Mere misgivingsabout theirvalidityas rules,
the corresponding
willnotbe tothepurpose,so itseems.
bycounterexample,
unsupported
as rules,and (P2) accepted,it is likewise
and Iterativity
WithTransmission
availablefordenialof
enoughfora scepticalparadoxthattherebe no warrant
thanwe haveso farreviewed.
(P1). Butmorecan be donetojustify(P1) directly
point,which,on
The Cartesianidea was merelythe"no conclusiveindications"
thefaceof it,simplyfailsto engagetheclaimthatI mighthave a genuinebut
A betterline,
thatI am notnowdreaming.
forthinking
justification
inconclusive
to be found,perhaps,in Stroud(1984, pp. 21-3), wouldreflectthat,assuming
thereis a difprocedures,
havetobe earnedas theproduceofcognitive
warrants
couldleadonefroma stateinwhichone
inseeinghowanysuchprocedure
ficulty
toposthatone was notthendreaming
forthesupposition
so farhadno warrant
is possibleinatleast
forthatclaim.Andonlyifthattransition
sessionofa warrant
williteverbe true,forsomex andt,thatRxt[not:
circumstances
someepistemic
Dxt].
seemscompelling:
Thatthefollowing
principle
Whatis thedifficulty?
ExecutionPrinciple(PEP):
Pr-oper
dependson the
to believea proposition
If theacquisitionof warrant
cantheprocedure
thenexecuting
properexecutionofsomeprocedure,
in questo believetheproposition
a warrant
notgiveyouanystronger
forbelievingthatyouhaveexecuted
tionthanyouhaveindependently
theprocedure
properly.
a
Forexample,ifgetting
(PEP) is apttoimpressas barelymorethana platitude.
boardis twelvefeet
justification-tobelievethata skirting
warrant-flawless
on measuring
it,thenI cannotgeta stronger
longdepends,inmycircumstances,
forthinking
up thanI have independently
forthatbeliefby measuring
warrant
thinkthat
care.If I (warrantedly)
was donewithappropriate
thatthemeasuring
was slipshod,I oughttoregardtheresultas vitiatedinproportion,
themeasuring
to regarditas correct-inwhichcase, acquiwarrant
unlessI haveindependent
28 below.
infootnote
established
The pointdependson theprinciple
100 CrispinWright
Scepticism
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 101
Anyoneencountering
Cartesianscepticism
forthefirsttimeis likelyto feelthat
thereis something
dubiouslyeclecticaboutit-that,by comparisionwithhis
treatment
ofperception,
Descartesgoes suspiciously
esseneasyon thefaculties
cumstances
areotherwise
butsomehowso fashioned
as deceptively
tosustaintheappearance thatI am. (This is notto endorsean inference-to-the-best-explanation
responseto
themainproblemwithwhichis precisely
tomaketheneededconnection
scepticism,
with
probability-to
explainwhywhatwe countas bestexplanations
aremorelikelytobe true.
All thatI am granting
is thattheacceptanceofbestexplanations
hadbetter
be, in at least
one legitimate
senseoftheword,reasonable.)
for(P1), andI shalltry
Obviouslythereis muchmoretosayaboutthe(PEP) argument
to saysomeofitbelow.
16 Albeittransmission
notas above butin theformthatrequiresthebridging
entailmentstobe known,orreasonably
believed,etc.
17 I do notknowhowtoprovethisto a readerwho,havingworked
through
theStroud
oftheabovefromit,remainsunconvinced.
discussionandthedevelopment
Sucha reader
willnot,presumably,
following
as theessentialintuitive
sequence:
regard,the
(1) I haveno wayofdetermining
thatnot:H;
(2) IfH, thenI am notperceiving;
hence,
(3) I haveno wayofdetermining
thatI am perceiving;
hence,
toanyofwhatI normally
(4) I am notentitled
regardas perceptually
grounded
beliefs.
On theotherhand,a readerwhoacceptsthatthisis theintuitive
sequencewillfindthat,
on analysis,ittakeson essentially
theshapedescribed.
Andifsuchis nottheintuitve
sequence,howexactlydoes theparadoxwork?
102 CrispinWright
thinkthatwe merely
tiallyinvolvedinhisreflective
project.One mightnaturally
thescopeofthescepticism
thematter.
Butthefact
bypursuing
standtogeneralise
of theDreaming
is, on thecontrary,
thatthereinlies thekeyto thedissolution
Argument
andall itsilk.
betweendreamingand
The paradoxpresented
leans on theincompatibility
Butis dreaming
toproperintellectualfunctionperceiving.
anylessantithetical
Mathematicians
and logicianssometimes
to reasoningand comprehension?
problems,
only
reportdreamsin whichtheyhavehiton "proofs"ofoutstanding
ofthesort-and sometimes
even
torealiseon wakingthattheyhaddonenothing
were not so muchas well-formed.
thattheirdreamedconstructions
Surely,
dreamscan produceillusionsof cogentthought
no less thanof perception.
But
another
cannotwe generatea
then,can we notconstruct
paradox?Specifically,
totheabove,anddiffering
onlyinthat(P2) is replacedbya
paradoxisomorphic
therelation
betweendreaming
andtheharvest
notofperceppremiseconcerning
excludescompetent
intellectual
functionbutofintellection?
Thus,ifdreaming
which
tionas itexcludesperception,
then,foranyx andt,ifQ is anyproposition
to believeat t
x had no groundsforbelievingbeforet and can acquirewarrant
onlybycompetent
intellection,
surelywe mayaffirm
IfRxt[Q], thennot:Dxt.
(2*)
Bearinginmindtherestriction
ontherangeof"Q", (2*) is apttoseemacceptable
forreasonsexactlyanalogousto thosesupporting
(2) above.ForifQ is a propositionwhichx can acquirewarrantto believeat t onlyby intellection,
then,
excludesdreaming,
andthatthe
granted
that,likeperceiving,
genuineintellection
to intellection
is a significant
shiftfromdreaming
changein modeof cognitive
tox at t of warrant
to believeQ mustenjointhatsheis
function,
theavailability
forrefusing
Andthen,as before,thereseemsnojustification
notthendreaming.
tox at t,andthereby
thistrainofthought
generating
Rxt [IfRxt [Q], thennot:Dxt].
(P2*)
Theupshot,
willbe a scepticalargument
fromtheDreaming
differing
accordingly,
Argument
onlyin that(P2*) replaces(P2), whoseconclusion-Not:Rxt [Q]itcanclaimedaboutperception:
claimsaboutourintellect
justwhatitsprecursor
thatcannot
it-generatesno warrants
notgetyouanything
youcannotgetwithout
be generated
anyotherway.
for
Once again,countlesspropositions
comewithinthescopeoftheargument
time-all propositions,
in fact,which
anyintellective
subjectat anyparticular
forhimatthatstageofhislifewhich,inthelightoftheir
encodenewinformation
is accessibleto himonlyif he reasonsand
contentand his epistemichistory,
is that(2*) aboveis itselfan admissiblesubstituend
reflects.
Butthekeythou-ght
for"Q" so restricted:
a proposition
warranted
acceptanceof whichcan onlybe
function.
The secondparadoxaccordingly
basedon intellective
yields
Rxt
then
not:
Not:Rxt [If
Dxt];
[Q],
thenegationofitsownpremise(P2*).
as
How is thisanyhelp?In thepresenceofa result-Not:Rxt [Q], interpreted
and Dreaming:Imploding
Scepticism
theDemon 103
of ourabilitytojustifyanybeliefat all by
above-which is totallydestructive
meansrelianton rationalreflection,
howcan we so muchas proceedto address
thescepticalproblem-howdo anyofourthoughts,
aboutanything
at all,retain
anycredibility?
Well,butwe do nothavethatresult.Thatwouldrequirethepremissesto remainin force.But since theconclusionof thesecondparadoxis
inconsistent
withitspremise,(P2*), the"paradox"is merelya reductioof the
All itshowsis that(P1) and(P2*) cannotbe simulofitspremisses.
conjunction
true.
taneously
Now reflect
that(P1) is commonto bothparadoxes;and that(P2) and (P2*)
areestablished,
or so itwas argued,byexactlyparallelconsiderations-the
case
for(P2) is cogentifandonlyifthatfor(P2*) is. Thatwouldseemtoenjointhat
if(P1) and (P2) weresimultaneously
true,so wouldbe (P1) and (P2*). But,as
justnoted,(P1) and(P2*) cannotbe simultaneously
true.Itfollowsthat(P1) and
(P2) cannotbe simultaneously
trueeither-theDreamingArgument
proceeds
fromunsatisfiable
premisses.
Thethought
maypersist:ifthereis a standing
scepticaldoubtaboutmyreason,
howcan I avail myselfof anyof this?Andtheansweris: thereisn'ta standing
second paradox
scepticaldoubtabout yourreason-only the self-defeating
which,rather
thangenerating
stablereductio
anysuchdoubt,issuesina perfectly
ofitspremisses.
(Andiftherewerea standing
scepticaldoubtaboutyourreason,
evenforthereasoningwhichgoes intotheconyouwouldnotbe in themarket
struction
of scepticalparadoxes,letalonetheirresolution.)
VI
demonstrates
thesimultaneous
unsatisfiSuppose,then,thatthistrainofthought
oftheparadoxbythe
abilityof(P1) and(P2). Oughtthattocountas a resolution
lightsof thethreeconstraints?
Well,we have workedhardto complywiththe
first-toensurethatourresponseis notknowledge-parochial.
Andwe havethe
bestpossiblelineopen in connection
withthethird.A demonstration
that(P1)
confersa warrant
forthenegationof
and (P2) arenotsimultaneously
satisfiable
the premise- Not:Rxt [not:
theirconjunction.
And thatdirectlycontradicts
Butfurther
workwill
((P1) & (P2))] -of thesecond-order
scepticalargument.
thatwe notcontentourselves
be neededto complywiththesecondconstraint,
withrefuting
"The Sceptic"butdevelopa properly
dissolution
ofthe
diagnostic
paradox.
thediagnosiswouldbestproceed.
Howeverit seemsclearin whatdirection
For(P2) was,surely,
established:
itis,simply,
a consequenceoftheincompatible
demandedby theconceptsof perceiving
and dreaming
rtiologies
respectively,
the interpretation
of "Rxt [...]", and the restrictionon the range of "P". So (P1)
in believing
wouldhaveto befalse: it is nottruethatno-oneis everwarranted
Buttheargument
thattheyare notthendreaming.
fromthe(PEP), thatno-one
forthatbelief-could workfroma positioninwhich
couldeveracquirewarrant
104 CrispinWr-ight
Perthebeliefwas unwarranted
toone inwhichitwas not-remainsimpressive.
hapsitcan be punctured.
Butifnot,theconclusionis clear:we havetodropthe
thattheavailability
ofa warrant
consistsinthepossibility
ofacquirassumption
ingit.Warrants-atleastsomewarrants-canbe unearned.
This is an intriguing
twist.The prospectis of a sharpvindication,
usingthe
veryapparatusof thescepticalargument
itself,of one of thecentralthemesof
theideathatamongourbeliefstherearesome
Wittgenstein's
notesOn Cer-tainty:
whichwe are warranted
in acceptingnotas a resultof somespecificcognitive
butrather
as a product
ofa specialplacetheyholdinourframeaccomplishment
workof thought
and enquiry.I believethatWittgenstein's
pointhereis logical18-thattherehavetobe suchbeliefs-andthatitcoversa variety
ofcases of
whichthepresent
sortofexample-thatI amnotnowdreaming,
notnowa brainin-a-vat,
notnow thedupeof Descartes'demon,etc.-is onlyone.19The fascinatingpossibility
is thattheparadoxwe generalised
is in effecta demonstration
thatwe arecommitted
toan important
class ofexamplesofthisideabytheother
inthescepticalreasoning.
characteristics
assignedto thenotionofwarrant
We shouldnotlightly
letgo ofthisprospect.
readerwill
But,as theperceptive
to object,the"demonstration"
of thesimultaneous
havebeenwanting
unsatisfiThe
of
on
it
is
based
was
flawed.
fact
is
that
itsimply
and
which
ability (P1)
(P2)
Thereason
isn'ttruethatthecasesmadefor(P2) and(P2*) standorfalltogether.
notexcludecompetent
is thatdreaming-arguably--does
intellectual
function
as
itexcludesperception.
Dreamingis,itwas claimed,necessarily
exclusiveofperceptionbecausethetwomodesofconsciousness
imposedifferent,
incompatible
constraints
on thecausalprovenance
oftheiringredient
experiences.
By contrast,
inthecase ofdreaming
andintellection
all thatwas remarked
is thatdreamscan
producean illusionofthelightofreason;thatindreamswe sometimes
succumb,
in completeconviction,to inferential
monstrosities
and othersolecismsof
It thusfallsfar
Butthisis an empiricalclaim.Anditlacksgenerality.20
thought.
shortofwhattheallegedparalleldemands,thatdreaming
shouldnecessarily
and
earnedbyoperations
of theintelgenerally
precludetheacquisitionof warrants
lect,justas itprecludeswarrants
earnedbyperception.
And,withhindsight,
perhapswe shouldnothaveexpectedanything
else. We
we do notperceive,evenifnot
are intuitively
quiteclearthat,whendreaming,
abouttheexact natureof theexclusion.Surely,if accordingto our ordinary
intellectual
function
was excludedby dreamingin just thesame way,
thought
in theattempt
therewouldbe a strongintuitive
senseofabsurdity
toconstruct
a
aroundthesupposition
scepticalargument
that,forall I know,I couldbe dreamingnow.The replywouldleap to mind:"Well,ifso, youare in no conditionto
18
This aspectof theinterpretation
of On Certainty
is well emphasisedin Williams
(1991).
19Themainfocusof"FactsandCertainty"
(Wright
1985)is on another
important
type
of example,typified
by "Thereis an externalworld","Thereare othercentresof consciousness","The worlddid notfirstcomeintobeingfiveminutesago, repletewithapparenttracesofa muchmoreancienthistory".
20 The importance
ofthispointwas urgedon mebyGideonRosen.
Scepticism
andDreanming:
Imploding
theDemon 105
106 CrispinWright
unlessthereis an appropriate
tune,itcountsfornothing
causalrelationbetween
thephenomenological
ofthetune.
episodeanda relevant
priorexperience
The same goes forcertainsub-inferential
of theintellect
accomplishments
whichare always implicatedin the acquisitionof a prioriknowledge-for
instance,theratification
of principles
of inference
as "primitively
obvious",in
Peacocke's(1987) terminology,
Christopher
andofjudgements
a cleargenerally
headedgraspofwhosecontent
is sufficient,
without
inference,
topersuadeus of
theirtruth.
orjudgement
inmind,andbeingapproHavingtherelevant
principle
priately
smitten
withconviction,
countsas an accomplishment
oftheappropriate
kindonlyiftheaetiology
oftheconviction
dependson one'sapprehension
ofgermanefeatures
ofcontent
andstructure.
Descartes'claimthat"...thereareno conclusiveindicaEarlier,in sustaining
tionsby whichwakinglifecan be distinguished
fromsleep...",we appealedto
whatI describedas the"completely
thatexperiencecannot
compellingthought
as partofitspropercontent".
discloseitsowncausalprovenance
Buttheidea is
no less compelling
forepisodesofthought.
That,as a trainofthought
develops,
theingredients
arecausedincertainwayscannotitselfbe manifested
bytheircollectivecontent(thoughitmay,ofcourse,be partofit).Descartes,whenhe ventured to regard cogent intellectionas markedoff by phenomenological
characteristics
ofclarity
anddistinctness-whatever
exactlytheyare-missed an
insightwhosecounterpart
in thecase of perceiving
he seemingly
did notmiss.
For thefactis thatepisodesof apparently
no less thanepicogentintellection,
sodesofapparent
perceptual
experience,
may,forall thatis phenomenologically
evidentto thesubject,havean etiologyinconsistent
withtheirbeinggenuinely
intellective/perceptual.
Say thata stateor seriesof statesof consciousnessis phenomenologically
smooth(cf.footnote
15 above)justincase anynormally
andreflecexperienced
tivesubjectwouldfindno causetherein
tosuspectthathe was notperceiving
and
thinking
perfectly
normally.
Dreams,even phenomenologically
smoothones,
excludeperceiving.
Butourfirst
alwaysandnecessarily
responsetothesceptical
foundered
ontherealisation
that-atleastforall thathasbeenshownargument
doesnot,alwaysandnecessarily,
dreaming
excludecogentintellection,
thoughit
do so. However,itnowseemsthatitis merelya workofdefinimaysometimes
tiontorestore
theresponse,at leastin essentials.Say that
x is maundering
at t
justincase x is thenina phenomenologically
smoothstatewhich,likedreaming,
forperception
necessarily
precludesthecausal conditions
but,in addition,likewiseprecludesthecausalconditions
ofcompetent
To stress:I do not
intellection.
knowwhether
andam notclaimingthatanyofouractualdreamsarealso mauninvolvedisruption
oftheatiderings.(Of course,as noted,theynotinfrequently
But it does not seem unlikely.In any case, any
ologyof soundintellection.)
smoothepisodemay,as faras thephenomenology
phenomenologically
is conThe crucialthought,
cerned,be a case of maundering.
now,is thatthereis no
basisforaccepting
via the(PEP), but,
(P1) oftheDreaming
Argument,
supported
andDreaming:Imploding
Scepticism
theDemon 107
108 CrispinWright
showed-does
thatoneis notnowdreaming-ifthatis whatthe(PEP) argument
is everpossessed.
notimplythatno suchwarrant
VIII
objection.OursecondresponseinvolvesthefolButthereis,ofcourse,a further
lowingclaims:
bythecase madeforthem,then(P1**)
(i) If(P1) and(P2) wereestablished
analogouscase which
and(P2**) wouldbe established
bytheprecisely
can be madeforthem.
so couldnotbe so es(ii) But (P1**) and (P2**) arejointlyunsatisfiable,
tablished.
(iii) (P1) and(P2) arealso jointlyunsatisfiable.
Wemaybe satisfied
ofthecorrectness
of(i) and(ii), buthowexactlyis (iii) supposedto follow?Oughtnottheconclusiontobe merelythat(P1) and(P2) were
notestablished
bythecase madeforthem?Thatis notwhat(iii) says.
itseems,tocarrythrough
conclusion,
The troubleis thatwe needthestronger
sceptic.A proofthat(P1) and(P2) are
thecanvassedresponsetothesecond-order
abouttheir
entitles
us,as notedabove,todismissagnosticism
jointlyunsatisfiable
truth;buta proofmerelythat-necessarily-theywerenotestablishedby the
withsuchagnostiadvancedto supportthemis quiteconsistent
considerations
tohaveshownthat(P1) and(P2) cannot
cism.Not,ofcourse,thatitis noprogress
be so supported.
Ourfinding
is thattheconceptofwarranted
belief,
convincingly
be suchthatthe
cannot,on painof contradiction,
iftransmissible
and iterative,
are simultaneously
warranted
on the
premissesof the DreamingArgument
foritsconclusion;
has beenprovided,therefore,
groundsdeployed.No warrant
thereis in anycase no
anditerative,
beliefis nottransmissible
and ifwarranted
againsttheordinary,
warrant
fortheconclusion.Thisis a tellinglineofthought
toimpose:a scepwhichtheDreaming
purports
Argument
scepticism
first-order
theidea thatperception
is
torepudiate
ticismaccordingtowhichthereis warrant
can conButno-onewhois mindful
ofthethirdconstraint
a sourceof warrants.
there.How now,ifithasnotbeenshownthatthepremisses
leavematters
tentedly
arejointlyunsatisfiable,
do we resisttheclaimthat
of theDreamingArgument
to rejectthem-thattheymaybe trueforall we are
thereis at leastno warrant
fortheconclusion
inbelieving-andthatthesamegoes,accordingly,
warranted
too?
we wouldneedas a lemmathat(PI)
theresponse,
In orderdirectly
toreinstate
and(P2) aretrueonlyifestablished
bythecase madeforthem.Itis notoutofthe
we mighttryto arguethatany
questionthatthatmightbe argued.Alternatively,
(P1) and (P2) wouldhave to have analogues
supporting
cogentconsiderations
of(P1**) and(P2**),andthat(P1) and(P2) couldnotbe true
equallysupportive
ButI shallreviewa different,
and
intheabsenceofall supporting
considerations.
I thinkbetter,
rangeofmancuvres.
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 109
Scepticism
this second-order
scepticalconclusionto the original.For the conclusion,
expandedandharmlessly
is that
re-bracketed,
Not: Rxt [not:not: Rxt [P]].
Andthis,via doublenegation
elimination
andcontraposing
on Iterativity,
entails
Not: Rxt [P].
Thusthesecond-order
is in positionto
sceptic,despitehis weakenedpremisses,
arguefortheverysameconclusionas hisfirst-order
counterpart!
Thatreflection
hardlyseemsto help.(In fact,though,
itdrawson something
whichwe willlaterputto serviceagainstthesceptic.23)
Butthecrucialquestion
nowconcernsthestatusofthematerialconditional
Axt[(P1)] ->Axt [(P1**)].
(I)
In orderto see why,reflect,
to beginwith,thattheearlierdemonstration
of the
of {(P I**), (P2**) I maybe presumed
availabletox att,so thatwe
inconsistency
mayaffirm
(II)
Rxt[not:{ (P1**), (P2**)I].
thatit has
Granted,then,that(P2**) is, as arguedabove,true,and reflecting
"Rxt"in initialposition,we can securebyIterativity
that
Rxt[(P2**)]
(III)
andhencethat
Rxt[not:(P1**)]
(IV)
from(II) and(III) byTransmission.
(IV), ofcourse,yields
Not:Axt[(P1**)],
(V)
andfrom(V) and(I) we mayinfer
Not:Axt[(P1)],
(VI)
acrossentailment,
whence,since"Axt"is transmissible
Not:Axt[(P1), (P2)].
(VII)
22
23
Remember
thatRxt[A]precludesRxt[not:A].
See thetextannotated
27.
byfootnote
110 CrispinWright
and Dreaming.Imploding
Scepticism
theDemon 1]]
112 CrispinWr-ight
}-
Axt[B]8
See footnote
23.
Proof:
(i) Suppose{Al, . . . A, I v- B. Then {Al, . . ., An,-,
not:B I F not:A.
27
28
So
So
So
andDreaming:Imploding
theDenion 113
Scepticism
its agnosticisation:
(,)A
Axt [Axt[(P1)] --+Axt[(P1**)]].
And so much surelyis vindicatedby the considerations
we have already
reviewed.(,)A saysthatthedenialof(I) is unwarrantable.
Well,getting
a warrant
to deny(I) willinvolveexplaining
howAxt[(P1)], andhence,fornowfamiliar
reasons,(P1) itself,
mightbe truewhileAxt[(P1**)],= not:Rxt[Rxt[not:Mxt]],
might
be false.Evenwithout
theobligation
is therefore
Thinning,
toexplainhow,
whilethethought
is indeedunwarrantable,
thatI am notnowdreaming
warrant
is nevertheless
availableto believein thewarrantability
ofthethought
thatI am
notnowmaundering.
Thatwillinvolvefirst
howthe(PEP) argument
explaining
failedforthecase ofmaundering;29
andthenexplaining
eitherhow,despitethe
verytightapparent
analogy,thecorresponding
doesnotfailinthecase
argument
ofdreaming,
or how,forquitedifferent
to thinkI am notnow
reasons,warrant
is impossible.
Wearenot,nodoubt,inanypositionconclusively
dreaming
torule
outall possibility
of suchan explanatory
package.But we are surelyrationally
entitled
toregardtheprospects
as dim.Andthatis enough(defeasibly)
perfectly
to warrant(,)A.
At theend,then,second-order
scepticismis confounded,
ironically,
by an
instanceof theverykindof move whichis its own stock-in-trade
and which
tomakeitso awkwardto deal with:theretreat,
intheabsenceofproof
promised
ofa neededpremise,
totheclaimthat,forall anyoneis inpositiontoaffirm
tothe
thereis no prospectofsufficient
contrary,
groundsforitsdenial.
Ix
Itremainstoconsiderhowmatters
nowstandinrelation
tothesecondoftheorigin effect,
inalthreeconstraints:
theconstraint,
thatanydissolution
ofa sceptical
paradoxmustbe appropriately
diagnostic.Recall thatour first,unsuccessful
responsetotheDreamingArgument
ofa cogentandpreopenedup theprospect
cise exegesisof one of thecentralthemesof On Certainty:
theidea thatwe are
in acceptingcertainofourmostbasicbeliefs,including,
warranted
foreach subnotas a resultofsomespecificcogject,thebeliefthathe is notnowdreaming,
nitiveaccomplishment
butrather
as a productofa specialplace theyholdin our
The diagnostic
can we but
cognitiveframework.
proposalalliedto thisfinding,
makeit stick,will be thatit is preciselybecausewe failto recognisethispoint
thattheSceptic'skeypremise-thatnoneof us can have any warrant
forthe
beliefthathe is notnowdreaming,
or maundering,
or a brain-in-a-vat,
etc.,-is
We illicitly
convert
theperceivedimpossibility
ofearninga warrant
compelling.
29 Since ifit succeeded,we shouldhaveRxt[(P1**)], whichis inconsistent
withthe
falsity
ofAxt[(P1**)].
114 CrispinWright
forbeliefsofthiskindwiththeirunwarrantability
toutcourt,failingtorecognise
is imposedby theveryapparatusof thescepticalargument
thatthisdistinction
itself.Butis anything
ofthisprospectstillin view?
Indeed.The firstresponsehad it that(P1) was actuallyrefuted.
If thatresult
hadstood,we wouldhaveno optionbuttoallowthatthereis sucha thingas warrantedly
believingthatone is notnowdreaming,
maundering,
etc.But theconclusionof the firstresponsegives way to weakerfindingson eitherof the
responses-via (I) or, as seems to me moresolid,via (I)A- whichwe just
reviewed.If we go via (I), ourresultis thatRxt[not:[(P1), (P2)]], andhencegrantedRxt [(P2)]-that Rxt [not:(P1)]. If we go via (,)A, our resultis that
Not:Rxt[Axt[(P1),(P2)]]whence-granted
againRxt[(P2)]-we obtainthestill
weakerNot:Rxt[(P1)].30Fromeach of theseconclusions,
however,it stillfollows that(P1) was notdemonstrated
bytheplaymadewiththe(PEP). Andthe
fromthe(PEP) wouldaccomplish
thought
maystillconvincethattheargument
itsobjectwerethefurther
correctthatwarrants
forbeliefsoftheilk
assumption
we are concernedwith-I am notnow dreaming,
etc.-had to be earned.The
invitedmoralthusremainsthat,forthisclass of belief,thereis sucha thingas
in whicha fulldiagnosisandfinalresounearned
andthatthedirection
warrant;
stillas earliersuggested-intothe
lutionoftheparadoxshouldgo is,accordingly,
territory
somewhat
lastnotes.
impressionistically
mappedinWittgenstein's
Butwe shouldnotoverstate
It has notbeenshown
ourconstructive
findings.
inthinking
Ithasnotbeenshown
thatI amwarranted
thatI amnotnowdreaming.
in denying
thatI am warranted
thatthereis no warrant
forthinking
thatI am not
nowdreaming.
It has notevenbeenshownthatthereis no warrant
forthinking
thattheclaimthatI am notnowdreaming
is unwarranted.
What,precisely,
has
beenshownis thatinthepresenceofcertain
principles-(I),or(I)A-which may
in theapparatus
thereareelements
ofthesortofsceptical
wellseemcompelling,
withwhichwe havebeenconcerned-specifically,
theclaimthat(P2)
argument
is verifiable
reflection
byrational
(whencethesamegoesfor(P2**)),thepresupavailabletorationalreflection
available
positionthatanything
maybe presumed
to x at t, and the transmissibility
and iterativity
of the epistemicoperator
thescepticalargument
or secondinvolved-which,whether
proceedsat first30 Proof:
(i) SupposeRxt[(P1)].
Thengiven
(ii) Rxt[(P2)],
we get
(iii) Rxt[(P1),(P2)] byTransmission;
andhence
(iv) Rxt[Rxt[(P1),(P2)]] byIterativity.
We have
(v) Rxt[(P1),(P2)]e Axt[(P1),(P2)];
fromwhich,with(iv),
tothecitedresult.
(vi) Rxt[Axt[(P1),(P2)]] followsbyTransmission,
contrary
Notice,bytheway,thattheavailability
ofNot:Rxt[(P1)] from(I)A generalises
andconsolidatesourresponseat thebeginning
of ?VIII to thefirst-order
sceptic:(P1) is unwarin itssupport
rantable
notjustbythesortsofconsideration
offered
buttoutcourt.
andDreaming:Imploding
theDemon 115
Scepticism
ofjustification
oftheconjunction
ofitspremisses
order,undercut
all possibility
of thatpremisewhichconcernsdreaming
or someother
and,morespecifically,
notionofcognitiveimpairment.
If,as I earlier.suggested,
an effective
argument
fromDreaming,or fromBrain-in-a-Vathood,
etc.,cannotproceedwithoutall
theseelements-ifouranalysisdoes indeedcapturetheessentialimplicitdetail
we mayindeeddrawa largebut
ofthiskindof scepticaltrainof thought-then
negativeconclusion:thatthereis actuallyno methodofsceptically
undermining
ourrightto relyon anyofour cognitive
facultiesusinga fantasy,whateverits
of the
undetectable
Endorsement
exactnature,offirst-personally
impairment.
needsto deploywillbe inconsistent
withthe
apparatuswhichsuchan argument
ofone ofitspremisses-theanalogueof (P1), orofitsagnosticisajustifiability
conclusionaboutthe statusof that
tion.But a positive,Uber Gewissheitlich,
intheapparatus.
premiseconsequently
awaitsvalidation
ofall theotherelements
here.31
ThatprojectliesbeyondthepurelyimplosivebriefI haveundertaken
Department
ofLogic andMetaphysics
University
ofSt.Andrews
St.Andrews
FifeKYJ69AL
Department
ofPhilosophy
University
ofMichigan
AnnArbor,
MI 48109
'USA
CRISPIN WRIGHT
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31The argument
presented
herebeganto takeshapein myundergraduate
Knowledge
andRealitylecturesgivenin Michiganin theSpringandFall semesters
of 1989.Thanks
to thestudents
Thanksalso to thosewhoattended
whoparticipated.
colloquiaat McGill,
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I am grateful
ticipants
at the1990Discipuliconference
to Paul BoghossianandGideonRosenforinteresting
discussion,
to Bob Hale forhisusualperceptive
and constructive
criticalreactions,
to Jonathan
Dancy,JohnSkorupskiand MarkSainsonan earlierdraft,
andespeciallytoStephenYabloforpointing
buryforhelpfulcomments
outa confusion
inthewayI was atone pointreading"Axt{AI, . . . ",A, andfornoticing
itoutmightactuallystrengthen
theargument.
I didnotintheendunrehowstraightening
servedly
backhissuggestion,
but?VIII hasturned
out,I think,
substantially
thebetter
for
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