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Politics,
and
Ideas,Bureaucratic
Policy
ofForeign
theCrafting
ofChicago
DanielW.Drezner University
relain theinternational
prominence
deashavetakenon a renewed
Thereareseveralmechanismsthroughwhichideas are
tionsliterature.
and outcomes,but one ofthemost
supposedto influencepreferences
Scholarsthatemphais thattheyareimplantedintoinstitutions.
important
(Finnemore1996; Checkel1997), epistemiccommusize constructivism
nities (Hall 1989; Haas 1992), or other approaches (Goldstein 1993;
in
the role of institutions
Goldsteinand Keohane 1993) have highlighted
pursuingideationalagendas.
Whilethisis a plausibleexplanationforhow ideas persistand determine foreignpolicy,it is incomplete.Nothingis said about the strategies
mustpursuein orderto surviveand thrivein a worldof
theseinstitutions
Such an explanationassumesthatonce
competingideas and institutions.
are created,the storyis over.The bureaucraticidea-infusedinstitutions
Bloomfieldnotes,
politicsparadigmsuggeststhatthestoryis just starting.
"Foritis thenthatan idea,howevermorallypowerfuland howeverauthenencounterstheinticallygroundedin thenationalpoliticalepistemology,
theforces,and thefallible(or obstreperous)humanbeingswho
struments,
implement(or thwart)... foreignpolicyprograms"(1982,2).
surviveand thrive?How successful
How do idea-infusedinstitutions
aretheyat promotingtheirideasaftertheirpoliticalsponsorspass fromthe
in theforscene?This articlewill arguethattheplacementof institutions
helpsto determinetheirabilityto surviveand thrive,
eign-policystructure
posways.Idea-infusedor "missionary"institutions
but in contradictory
insulationfromtheinfluenceof otherorganizationsare
sessingstructural
withtheirfoundingideas.Inmorelikelyto survivein a mannerconsistent
culturededicated
an
to
organizational
develop
the
sulationpermits agency
the introductionof competingideas or
to the foundingidea, preventing
ininstitution's
tactics.However,thisinsulationalso lessensthemissionary
bureaucracieswill
fluenceoverthe craftingof foreignpolicy.Preexisting
of newactorsintothepolicymixand
resisttheintroduction
automatically
ofChicago,5828
Professor
ofPoliticalScience,University
DanielW.DreznerisAssistant
SouthUniversity
Avenue,Chicago,IL 60637(ddrezner@uchicago.edu).
StudiesAssoat the1999International
Previousversionsofthisarticlewerepresented
at theUniversity
D.C. and at thePIPES workshop
Washington,
ciationannualmeeting,
MelanieKayAndersonfortheir
Kehland especially
to Jenny
ofChicago.I am grateful
M. Scott,Amy
I thankDelia Boylan,Don Moon,RolandParis,James
assistance.
research
referees
Alexander
SvenSteinmo,
Wendt,GregCaldeira,andthreeanonymous
Searight,
Theusualcaveatapplies.
andsuggestions.
fortheircomments
Vol.44,No. 4, October2000,Pp. 733-749
American
ofPoliticalScience,
Journal
?2000 bytheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
733
734
DANIEL
impose constraints.
The developmentof a strongorganizationalculturewillpreventthenew missionaryinstitutionfromcompromisingwithotheragencies.An insulated institutionwill be hard-pressedto overcome
bureaucratic
divisionsin spreadingitsideas.
In contrast,idea-infused institutionsembedded
withina morepowerfulbureaucracyhave a lowerprobabilityof survivalin theiroriginalform.Theymustcope
withgreaterpressuresthan insulatedagenciesand are
preventedfromdevelopinga strongorganizationalculture.Embeddedinstitutions
arelessimmuneto competing ideas. However,iftheydo survive,embeddedinstitutions have a greaterchance of thrivingover time.
Close interactionwithotherbureaucraciescan lead to
an increasein sharedideas and sharedunderstandings.
This may alterthe goals of the institution,but it also
transforms
the identityof the otherbureaucraticunits
by convertingthemto theirfoundingidea. Ideational
thusfacea tradeoffin establishinginstientrepreneurs
tutionsthatembodydearlyheldideas.Theycan increase
the odds forsurvivalat the cost of greaterinfluence,or
theycan gamble at enhancingtheirinfluencebut risk
extinction.
To testthismodifiedideationalapproach,I develop
twocase studiesof missionary
institutions
withdifferent
placementsin thefederalgovernment.
Bothinstitutions
are imbued witha set of ideas distinctfromthe restof
the foreignpolicybureaucracy:the UnitedStatesPeace
Corps and the State Department'sBureau of Human
Rightsand HumanitarianAffairs
(HA).'
This articleis intendedto contributeand critique
boththeideasand thebureaucratic
and
politicsliterature
to begina dialoguebetweenthetwo.The ideas literature
has been unable to disentanglethe effectof ideas from
theeffect
of materialinterests(Jacobsen1995). Previous
studiesof foreignpolicyideas,such as thecultof theoffensive (Van Evera 1984) or strategictrade theory
(Goldstein 1993), have been unable to separatethe intrinsiceffectof new ideas fromtheinfluenceof interest
groupsthatmateriallybenefitedfromthose ideas. The
casespresentedhereareselectedto separatethoseeffects.
Anotherproblemwiththeideas literature
has been
itsfailureto examinehow foreignpolicyis craftedwhen
cases
competingideascoexist.Too oftenin thisliterature,
are presentedwherepowerfulideas simplyoverwhelm
beliefsor values,leadingto a changein policy
preexisting
(Rohrlich1987). Commonsensesuggeststhatnewideas
W. DREZNER
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
735
Ideas,Bureaucratic
Politics,
andForeignPolicy
but
theideationalapproach,
4Structuralrealismhas also critiqued
to thecasesdiscussedin
thesecritiquesaresomewhattangential
thisarticle.See Posen (1984) and Krasner(1993) fortherealist
take.
736
DANIEL
W. DREZNER
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
737
agency'schancesforsurvivalwhiledecreasingitschances
ofthriving.8
Embeddedagenciespossessa different
set of disadvantagesand advantagesin propagatingideas. Embedded agenciesarelocatedwithina largerand morepowerfulbureaucracy.
This typeof agencyshould,potentially,
have greateraccess to theinformationand resourcesof
thelargerentity.
A new agencycan manipulateagendas
and routinesto harnessthepowerofthewholeorganization by introducingnew practices and procedures.
Kaarbo (1998,81) notesthatifa minority
factioncan secure a decision rule of unanimityinstead of majority
rule,it can use itsvetopowerto blockinitiatives.
The most importanttool of an embedded agency,
however,
is itsabilityto proselytize
itsnormsand values,
initiating
othersin thelargerorganizationto itspointof
viewovertime.This is perhapsthemostdistinctadvantageof an idea-basedbureaucracyoveran interest-based
bureaucracy.
Interest-based
bureaucraciescan pushtheir
endsthroughbargainingand theaccumulationofpower.
Idea-based bureaucraciescan push theirends through
thepersuasionofothergroupsto theirprincipledbeliefs,
iftheycommunicatethepsychicor material
particularly
benefitsof usingtheirideas.Bothconstructivists
and ratheorists
that
if
staffers
are
tional-choice
argue
capableof
expressingtheirprincipledbeliefsin a waythatis conceptuallyamenableto otherindividuals'rolesand beliefs,
theirabilityto minglewithotherbureaucratsencourages
a broadershiftin preferences(Brehmand Gates 1997;
Johnston1999). In Rhodes' (1994) studyof the U.S.
Navy,he foundthatAlfredThayerMahan'sideas ofnaval
warfaretrumpedthenarrowerparochialinterests
among
thesubmariners,
airmen,and surfacesailorsin explaining weapons procurement.Ideas that resonate with
broadervaluesor goalscan spreadacrossthelargerorganizationalentity.
Of course,embeddedagenciesalso facesignificant
problemsin theirabilityto spreadtheirideas.Unlikean
insulatedagency,embeddedagenciesare unableto fashion a separateorganizationalculture.They mustdraw
one
theirpersonnelfromthelargerorganizational
entity,
thathas a previouslyestablishedbureaucraticculture.
This putsthenew missionaryinstitution
at a significant
disadvantage;agencyheads cannot createan organizational cultureconsistentwiththeirfoundingideas if a
strongculturealreadyexistswithinthe largerbureaucracy.The absenceof a distinctive
organizationalculture
increasesthelikelihoodofan embeddedagencythriving,
inconflict
willoftenserveto strengthen
thisexternal
8Ironically,
culture.
organizational
tra-groupcohesionthrougha reinforced
See't Hart(1994).
738
DANIEL
but it simultaneously
reducesthechancesof the agency
skirmishes
surviving
withothersubunits.
Embeddedagenciesmustalso cope withless control
over resourcesthan insulatedagencies. Superiorscan
choose to denymaterial,informational,or human resourcesto thenewagency,cutit out fromorganizational
decisionmaking,or simplycoercebureaucratsintoconformingwiththe organizations'statusquo ante goals.
Embedded agenciesalso face an acute problemof adverseselection;theycannotbe sureif new staffwill act
in a mannerconsistentwiththe foundingideas. Over
time,thiscan lead to an absorptioninto the largerentity,extinguishing(or at the veryleast,mutating)the
foundingideas.
Insulated and embedded agencies face a tradeoff.
Embeddedagencieshavethebetterchanceof spreading
theirideas overtimeacross a significant
sectionof the
foreignpolicybureaucracy,but theyalso have a better
chanceof beingideologicallyabsorbedby thelargerorganizationalunit.Insulatedagencieshavea betterchance
of implementingtheirdesired policies,but over time
mustcope withcountervailingpolicies establishedby
otheragenciesand hostileexecutives.
Giventhesetradeoffs,
how should missionaryinstitutionsbe expectedto perform?
Insulatedagenciesthat
maximizethe advantagesof autonomyensuresurvival.
This means establishinga strongbureaucraticculture
thatcan sustainthefoundingidealsof theinstitution.
A
strongculturecan also thwarthostileexecutivesor legislatures. Although politicians can weaken agencies
throughbudgetcuts and personnelshifts,a strongbureaucraticculturecan encourage operatorsto pursue
goalsthatmightruncontraryto a hostilemonitor.Such
a strongculturewill also makeit moredifficult
forthat
agencyto convertotherpartsof the foreignpolicymachineryto itssetof principledbeliefs,or to logrollother
bureaucracies.
Thus,an insulatedagencyshouldsucceed
in implanting
strongnormswithinitsstaff,
sustainingits
organizationalmission.On theotherhand,it shouldbe
expectedto havelessinfluenceoverthebroadercontours
offoreignpolicy,and itspolicyoutputswillbe dilutedby
thepoliciesofotheragencies.
Embeddedagenciesfacea different
setof incentives
to propagatetheirideas.Theywillbe unableto developa
strongorganizational
culture,makingthemmorevulnerable to absorptionby the largerorganizationalentity.
Theseagenciesfacean immediatethreatto theirsurvival
fromhostilebureaucratsand superiors.Theiroverriding
goal mustbe to encouragepracticesand routinesthat
spreadideas to the restof thelargerorganization.This
couldbe donethroughtraining
or newstandard
regimens
operatingproceduresthatexposeothersto theideas the
W. DREZNER
Case SelectionandPrediction
in quantifying
theindependent
Because of thedifficulty
and dependentvariables,case studieswill be used. The
subsequent sections conduct a plausibility probe
(Eckstein1974) of thehypothesesdelineatedin theprevious sectionby examiningthe Peace Corps underthe
and
and Nixon/Fordadministrations,
Kennedy/Johnson
theStateDepartmentBureauof Human Rightsand HumanitarianAffairs(HA) underthe Carterand Reagan
These cases wereselectedon theindeadministrations.
pendentvariableto allowvariationin agencyplacement.9
Such an approach reducesthe chance of selectionbias
that is ever present in qualitative research (King,
Keohane,and Verba1994,chapter4).
The Peace Corps is nominallyunderthe controlof
the StateDepartment,but it has much greaterinstitutionalautonomythantheHA Bureau.The Corps'budget
is a separatelineitemfromtheStateDepartment;itsstaff
does not come fromthe Foreign Service. The Peace
statedthatitsoperatorswere
CorpsActof 1961explicitly
not obligatedto agreewithor defendU.S. foreignpolicy
(Schwartz1991, 19). It meetsthe definitionof an insuideationalapproachhasonlyoneindependent
9Sincethemodified
to predegreesoffreedom
sufficient
variable,twocasesgenerates
ventunderdetermination.
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
TABLE I
Typeof
Agency
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
739
POLICY
PredictedOrganizational
Strategy
PredictedOutcome
Insulated
agency
Controlover
personnel,budget,
promotion
criteria
Generation
ofa strong
organizational
cultureto
ensuresurvival
Survivallikely;not
likelytothrive
Embedded
agency
Greateraccess to
otherbureaucracies
Attempt
to change practices
and proceduresto persuade
otherbureaucrats
Survivalless likely;
ifsurvival,
then
thriving
likely
740
DANIEL
TABLE 2
W. DREZNER
Predicted
Outcomes
Approach
Predicted
performance Predicted
performance Predicted
performance Predicted
performance
ofPeaceCorpsunder
ofPeaceCorps
ofHA
ofHA
Kennedy/
Johnson
underNixon
underCarter
underReagan
Modified
ideational
Highprobability
of
Highprobability
of
Lowprobability
of
surviving;
lowprobabilitysurviving;
lowprobabilitysurviving
andthriving
ofthriving
ofthriving
Lowprobability
of
surviving;
ifsurvival,
of
highprobability
thriving
Presidential
dominance
Highprobability
of
surviving
andthriving
Lowprobability
of
orthriving
surviving
Highprobability
of
surviving
andthriving
Lowprobability
of
orthriving
surviving
Material
resources
Highprobability
of
surviving
andthriving
Highprobability
of
surviving
andthriving
Lowprobability
of
surviving
orthriving
Lowprobability
of
surviving
orthriving
Becauseoftheacuteinterest
in boththePeace Corps
and humanrightsin general,I relyon secondarysources
in buildingthecase studies.Thisinevitably
leadsto questionsof codingreliability
of qualitativevariables.Space
constraintspreventan exhaustivedetailingof minute
disagreements
amongthesourcesabouttheoutcomesin
eachcase.However,a reviewoftheliterature
has revealed
a surprisingdegreeof consensuson most of the points
coveredin thecase studies.In each case,plausiblealternativeexplanationsare discussed,and significantdisagreements
amongsecondarysourcesarealso noted.
ThePeace Corps:1961-1976
Thereweretwofoundingideas of thePeace Corps.First,
thewayto alleviatepovertyand promotedevelopment
was throughthedirectactionof thePeace CorpsVolunteers(PCVs). This was the qualitythroughwhich the
PeaceCorpsdistinguished
itselffrommoretechnicalU.S.
aid organizationssuch as theAgencyforInternational
Developmentor PointFour.Unlikethoseagencies,which
dispatchedaid,thePeace Corpswas designedto puta humanfaceto thataid (Anderson1998;Shriver1964,71-72;
Ashabranner
1971,44-45).One quasi-official
guideto the
Peace Corps observedin 1965:"thePeace Corps saysto
theworldas no privateagencyor technicalassistanceorganizationcould sayit,thattheAmericanpeople themselveswantto help the people of the emergingnations
fightthe poverty,disease,and ignorancewhichare the
greatest
obstaclesto progress....Thisconceptofthedoer,
as opposedto theadvisoror teacher,
is thedistinguishing
featureofthePeace Corps"(Hoopes 1965,82, 100).
U.S.
Second,thePeaceCorpswas designedto reorient
foreignpolicyin thethirdworldtowardsproblemsofde-
velopmentand in theprocesscreatealliesamongthemass
of newlydecolonized states.Memos betweenKennedy
R. SargentShriver,
in
and thefirstPeace Corps director,
1961 stressedthe foreign-policy
advantagesthatwould
accrueto theUnitedStatesfromthegoodwillgenerated
withrespectto theCold
bythePeace Corps,particularly
Warcompetition
withtheSovietUnion (Cobbs 1996,90first
tripabroadto
94; CobbsHoffman1998,29).Shriver's
targeted
sellthePeace Corpsto hostcountriesspecifically
third-world
countries,includingNigeria,India,
strategic
Pakistan,and the Philippines(Amin 1992,40).12 However,thePeace Corps'creatorswerealso awareof thefact
thattheonlywayto obtainthatadvantagewas to denude
sincethiswould
U.S. policyofblatantanti-communism,
conflictwiththe revolutionaryideology of these new
countries.In short,thefoundersofthePeace Corpshad a
causal beliefthatby focusingon development,theU.S.
would build up goodwillamong thedecolonizedstates.
theUnitedStateswould help
Throughsuch idealpolitik,
stemcommunism(Shriver1964,72).
DespitepressurefromAID to placethenewmissionwithinitsorganizational
Kennedy
purview,
aryinstitution
establishedthePeace Corpsas an insulatedagency.'3The
wereconscious thattheiraufirstPeace Corps staffers
tonomousstatuspermitteda strongorganizationalculturethatwould perpetuatethe foundingideals.Shriver
observed,"The organizationalchartswould havelooked
betterif we had become a box in a single foreignaid
agency.Butthethrustofa newidea wouldhavebeenlost.
wrotein a memoran'2After
a June1961tripto Guinea,Shriver
to movea countryfroman
dum:"Herewe havean opportunity
oreven
clearBlocorientation
to a positionofneutrality
apparently
I
suchopportunity
to theWest.Thisis thefirst
one oforientation
world"(quotedinAmin1992,44).
knowofin thedeveloping
(1971,44-47) formoreon thisdecision.
"3SeeAshabranner
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
741
742
DANIEL
W. DREZNER
TABLE3
and Staffof
Appropriations
thePeace Corps
Year
Appropriations
(in1963dollars)
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
2000
59,000,000
94,552,000
100,596,000
107,116,000
100,159,000
93,810,000
85,012,000
77,907,000
67,711,000
52,325,000
55,346,000
48,278,000
44,519,000
43,999,000
51,850,000
ofPeaceCorps
Number
Volunteers
andTrainees
6,646
10,078
13,248
15,556
14,698
13,823
12,131
9,513
7,066
6,894
7,341
8,044
7,015
5,752
7,000
Source:CobbsHoffman
(1998,262);http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/
.
facts/index.
html
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
743 -
TheHABureau,1976-1988
In October1977,theBureauof Human Rightsand HumanitarianAffairs
was established.Createdby congres-
744
DANIEL
W. DREZNER
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
POLICY
745
apartheid
in SouthAfrica(Geyerand Shapiro1988,387). ThisexReaganresisted
anychangeinhis
ceptionprovestherule,however;
untilCongressoverrodehis
engagement
policyof constructive
Act.
vetoofthe1986Anti-Apartheid
746
DANIEL
W. DREZNER
Conclusions
has failedto examThe international
relationsliterature
ine thecausal mechanismsthroughwhichideas are convertedintopolicies.It has been unclearhow missionary
institutions
surviveand thrivein a worldofbureaucratic
politics.Thisarti'cle
arguesthattheplacementofthemissionaryinstitution
vis-a-vistherestof theforeignpolicy
determines
theabilityof theseinstitutions
organizations
to surviveand thrive.Insulatedagenciescan createorganizationalculturesweddedto theirfoundingideas.This
makesinsulatedagenciesrobustto challengesfromother
organizationsand increasestheodds of survival.Such a
strongculturedecreases its abilityto influenceother
agencies,restricting
itsabilityto manipulatethebroader
foreign-policyagenda. Embedded agencies are constrainedfromcrafting
a separateorganizationalculture,
makingthemmorevulnerableto manipulationby the
If theydo survive,however,theyare
largerbureaucracy.
morelikelyto thrive.Alteringroutinesand practicesbecomesa wayofspreadingtheirideasto thelargerorganization.ComparingtheabilityofthePeace Corpsand the
bureauto susStateDepartment'sHumanitarianAffairs
taintheirideationalagendastestedthishypothesis.
to thisstudy.The cases
Thereare severallimitations
wereselectedusinga "most-similar
systems"
(Przeworski
and Teune 1970) in orderto show the existenceof the
causal mechanisms.These cases controlledfortheeffect
of materialinterestsand the structuraldistributionof
willhavesincereor
power.Most missionaryinstitutions
therelationship
strategic
supportfrommaterialinterests;
Laterwork
betweenthetwoneedsto be exploredfurther.
needsto use a most-different
systemsapproachin order
to estimatetherelativeexplanatorypowerof themodifiedideational approach. Other empiricalavenues include potentiallydisconfirming
cases, such as the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,and nonAmericancases.
the resultssuggesta need forthebuTheoretically,
reaucraticpoliticsparadigmto movebeyonddescription
towardspositivetheoriesof action.Organizationaltheoriescan borrowfromtheideas approachin formulating
the originsof bureaucraticpreferences,
as well as the
setavailableto organizations.
bureauSimilarly,
strategy
craticpolitics is a crucial interveningvariable forthe
ideas approach and should be integratedinto thatresearchprogram.The resultsalso suggestthefruitfulness
of combiningrationalistand constructivistmodes of
analysis.The cases demonstratethe effectof organizacalculationsmade by
tionalnormsas wellas thestrategic
actorsto spreadthosenorms.
IDEAS,
BUREAUCRATIC
POLITICS,
OF FOREIGN
Finally,thisarticlesuggeststhatideationalentreprein institutionalizing
neursfacea tradeoff
ideas.An insulatedagencyhas theadvantageof makingan immediate
effect,
butovertimethateffect
is muchlesslikelyto grow.
An embeddedagencyis much less likelyto havean immediateimpactand overtimemightnothaveanyimpact
at all. However,it mightalso acquiremuch moreinfluencethana horizontally
autonomousagency.How entrepreneursmake thisdecision is a subject forfutureresearch.
Manuscript
submitted
June16,1999.
Final manuscript
received
April17,2000.
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