Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28607 May 31, 1971

SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION, petitioner,
vs.
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
J.C. Espinas, B. C. Pineda, J. J. de la Rosa & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo & Ongsiako for respondent Company.

FERNANDO, J.:
The insistence on the part of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines to dissolve its security guard
section, stationed at its Pandacan Installation notwithstanding its being embraced in, and its continuance as
such thus assured by an existing collective bargaining contract, resulted in a strike called by petitioner Shell
Oil Workers' Union, hereinafter to be designated as the Union, certified a month later on June 27, 1967 by the
President to respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Against its decision declaring the strike illegal primarily
on the ground that such dissolution was a valid exercise of a management prerogative, this appeal is taken.
With due Recognition that the system of industrial democracy fostered in the regime of unionization and
collective bargaining leaves room for the free exercise of management rights, but unable to close our eyes to
the violation of a contract still in force implicit in such dissolution thus giving rise to an unfair labor practice,
we cannot sustain respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Consequently, the harsh and unwarranted
sanction imposed, the dismissal of the security guards and the officers of the Union, cannot stand. Insofar,
however, as individual liability is deemed incurred for serious acts of violence, whether committed by a leader
or member of the Union, we leave things as adjudged.
The deep-rooted differences between the parties that led to the subsequent strike were made clear in the
presidential certification. As set forth in the opening paragraph of the decision now on appeal: "Before this
Court for resolution is the labor dispute between the petitioner Shell Oil Workers' Union, Union for brevity, and
the respondent Shell Company of the Philippines Limited, Company for short, which was certified to this
Court on June 27, 1967 by the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the
provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. Said dispute ... 'was a result of the transfer by the Company
of the eighteen (18) security guards to its other department and the consequent hiring of a private security
agency to undertake the work of said security guards.'" 1
The respective contentions of the parties were then taken up. Petitioner "filed the petition on July 7, 1967
alleging, among others, that the eighteen (18) security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and
covered by the existing collective bargaining contract, and as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals
are illegal being done in violation of the existing contract. It, therefore, prayed that said security guards be
reinstated with full back wages from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement." 2
Then came a summary of the stand Of Shell Company: "For hours hereafter, respondent Company filed its
Answer [to] the material allegations in the Union's petition and adverted that the issues in this case are: (1)
whether or not the Company commits unfair labor practice in contracting out its security service to an
independent professional security agency and assigning the 18 guards to other sections of the Company; (2)
whether or not the dismissal of the 18 security guards are justified; and (3) whether or not (the strike called by
the Union on May 25, 1967 is legal. As special and affirmative defenses, the Company maintained that in
contracting out the security service and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it was merely performing
its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and economical method of operation; that said guards
were transferred to other sections with increase, except for four (4) guards, in rates of pay and with transfer
bonus; the said action was motivated by business consideration in line with past established practice and
made after notice to and discussion with the Union; that the 18 guards concerned were dismiss for wilfully
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refusing to obey the transfer order; and that the strike staged by the Union on May 25, 1967 is illegal.
Primarily, Company prayed, among others, for the dismissal of the Union's petition and the said Union's strike
be declared illegal followed by the termination of the employee status of those responsible and who
participated in said illegal strike." 3
The move for the dissolution of the security section by reassigning the guards to other positions and
contracting out such service to an outside security agency had its origins as far back as 1964. A study made
by the Shell Company for the purpose of improving the productivity, organization and efficiency of its
Pandacan Installation recommended its dissolution. If an outside agency to perform such service were to be
hired, there would be a savings of P96,000.00 annually in addition to further economy consequent on the
elimination to overtime an administration expenses. Its implementation was scheduled for 1965. 4 There was
then, in July 1966, a joint consultation by the Union and management on the matter. At that stage, it would
appear that there was no serious opposition to such a move provided it be done gradually and in close
consultation with the Union. There was even an offer if cooperation as long as a scheme for retirement of the
security guards affected or their redeployment would be followed. 5
The tentative character of such proposed dissolution was made evident by the fact however that on August
26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was executed between the Union and the Shell Company effective
from the first of the month of that year to December 31, 1969. It contained the usual grievance procedure and
no strike clauses. 6 More relevant to the case before this Court, however, was the inclusion of the category of
the security guards in such collective bargaining contract. This was stressed in the brief for the petitioner
where specific mention is made of the agreement covering rank and file personnel regularly employed by the
Company, included in which is the work area covered by the Pandacan Installation. 7 There was likewise
specific reference to such positions in the wage schedule for hourly-rated categories appearing in an
appendix thereof. 8 Mention was expressly made in another appendix of the regular remuneration as well as
premium pay and night compensation. 9 Nonetheless, Shell Company was bent on doing away with the
security guard section, to be replaced by an outside security agency. That was communicated to the Union in
a panel to panel meeting on May 3, 1967. A counter-offer on the part of the Union to reduce the working days
per week of the guards from six to five was rejected by Shell Company on the ground of its being unusual
and impracticable. Two days later, there was a meeting of the Union where a majority of the members made
clear that should there be such a replacement of the company guards by a private security agency, there
would be a strike. It was noted in the decision that when the strike vote was taken, of 243 members, 226
were for the approval of a motion to that effect. 10 On the afternoon of May 24, 1967, a notice of reassignment
effective at 8:00 o'clock the next morning was handed to the guards affected. At 10:00 o'clock that evening,
there was a meeting by the Union attended by ten officers and a majority of the members wherein it was
agreed viva voce that if there would be an implementation of the circular dissolving the security section to be
replaced by guards from an outside agency, the Union would go on strike immediately. 11 The strike was
declared at half-past 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 25, 1967 when security guards from an outside
agency were trying to pass the main gate of the Shell Company to their work. With the picket line established,
they were unable to enter. Efforts were made by the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor to settle
the matter, but they were unsuccessful. 12 It was not until June 27, 1967, however, that the Presidential
certification came. 13 There was a return to work order on July 6, 1967 by respondent Court, by virtue of
which pending the resolution of the case, the Shell Company was not to lockout the employees involved and
the employees in turn were not to strike.
The decision of respondent Court was rendered on August 5, 1967. It declared that no unfair labor practice
was committed by Shell Company in dissolving its security guards from an outside agency, as such a step
was well within management prerogative. Hence for it, the strike was illegal, there being no compliance with
the statutory requisites before an economic strike could be staged. Respondent Court sought to reinforce
such a conclusion by a finding that its purpose was not justifiable and that it was moreover carried out with
violence. There was thus a failure on its part to accord due weight to the terms of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. Accordingly as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion we view
matters differently. The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement by Shell Company. Even if it were otherwise, however, this Court cannot lend sanction of its
approval to the outright dismissal of all union officers, a move that certainly would have the effect of
considerably weakening a labor organization, and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act
to encourage unionization. To the extent, however, that the serious acts of violence occurring in the course of
the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a leader or a member of the Union guilty of their
commission, what was decided by respondent Court should not be disturbed.
1. It is the contention of Shell Company, sustained by respondent Court, that the dissolution of the security
guard section to be replaced by an outside agency is a management prerogative. The Union argues
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otherwise, relying on the assurance of the continued existence of a security guard section at least during the
lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. The second, third and fourth assignment of errors, while they
could have been more felicitously worded, did attack the conclusion reached by respondent Court as contrary
to and in violation of the existing contract. It is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope
of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated. The
growth of industrial democracy fostered by the institution of collective bargaining with the workers entitled to
be represented by a union of their choice, has no doubt contracted the sphere of what appertains solely to
the employer. It would be going too far to assert, however, that a decision on each and every aspect of the
productive process must be reached jointly by an agreement between labor and management. Essentially,
the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still has plenty of elbow room for making
its wishes prevail. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they
consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to management
equally being jealous of its prerogatives.
More specifically, it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of
what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should
be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. it is the opinion of the Court, that while
management has the final say on such matter, the labor union is not to be completely left out. What was done
by Shell Company in informing the Union as to the step it was intending to take on the proposed dissolution
of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency is praise-worthy. There should be mutual
consultation eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. Thereby, in the words of Chief
Justice Warren, there is likely to be achieved "peaceful accommodation of conflicting interest." 14 In this
particular case though, what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract certainly precluded
Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its prerogative if to do so would be
violative thereof.
2. The crucial question thus is whether the then existing collective bargaining contract running for three years
from August 1, 1966 to December 31, 1969 constituted a bar to such a decision reached by management?
The answer must be in the affirmative. As correctly stressed in the brief for the petitioner, there was specific
coverage concerning the security guard section in the collective bargaining contract. It is found not only in the
body thereof but in the two appendices concerning the wage schedules as well as the premium pay and the
night compensation to which the personnel in such section were entitled. 15 It was thus an assurance of
security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime of the agreement. Nor is it a sufficient answer, as set forth in
the decision of respondent Court, that while such a section would be abolished, the guards would not be
unemployed as they would be transferred to another position with an increase in pay and with a transfer
bonus. For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the terms of which should be binding of
both parties. One of them may be released, but only with the consent of the other. The right to object belongs
to the latter, and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs should continue during the existence
of the contract. Only thus may there be compliance with and fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting
agreement.
What renders the stand of Shell Company even more vulnerable is the fact that as set forth in its brief and as
found by respondent Court as far back as 1964, it had already been studying the matter of dissolving the
security guard section and contracting out such service to an outside agency. Apparently, it had reached a
decision to that effect for implementation the next year. In July 1966, there was a joint consultation between it
and the Union on the matter. Nonetheless on August 26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was entered
into which, as indicated above, did assure the continued existence of the security guard section. The Shell
Company did not have to agree to such a stipulation. Or it could have reserved the right to effect a dissolution
and reassign the guards. It did not do so. Instead, when it decided to take such a step resulting in the strike, it
would rely primarily on provisions in the collective bargaining contract couched in general terms, merely
declaratory of certain management prerogatives. Considering the circumstances of record, there can be no
justification then for Shell Company's insistence on pushing through its project of such dissolution without
thereby incurring a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
3. The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining
contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. Such a doctrine first found expression in Republic
Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, 16 the opinion of the Court being penned by Justice Castro.
There was a reiteration of such a view in Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust
Company. 17 Thus: "It being expressly provided in the industrial Peace Act that [an] unfair labor practice is
committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer' and this Court
having decided in the Republic Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution
of an agreement, being a continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the
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obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that
non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice." 18
4. Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. Rightly
labor is justified in making use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the
Industrial Peace Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of unionization and collective
bargaining would not be thwarted. It could, of course, file an unfair labor practice case before the Court of
Industrial Relations. It is not precluded, however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort
on the part of employer. So we have consistently held and for the soundest of reasons. 19
There is this categorial pronouncement from the present Chief Justice: "Again, the legality of the strike
follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from which is supported by
substantial evidence to the effect that the strike had triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the
terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the discrimination, resorted to
by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of employees due to union
activities, as well as the refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith." 20 As a matter of fact,
this Court has gone even further. It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing
factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice
of this Court: "As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners
were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that
petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before
staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their
status as employees of respondents herein." 21
5. It would thus appear that the decision now on appeal did not reflect sufficient awareness of authoritative
pronouncements coming from this Court. What is worse, certain portions thereof yield the impression that an
attitude decidedly unsympathetic to labors resort to strike is evident. Such should not be the case. The right
to self-organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." 22 From
and after June 17, 1953 then, there cannot be the least doubt that a strike as form of concerted activity has
the stamp of legitimacy. As a matter of law, even under the regime of compulsary arbitration under the Court
of Industrial Relations Act, 23 a strike was by no means a forbidden weapon. Such is the thought embodied in
the opinion of Justice Laurel in Rex Taxicab Company v. Court of Industrial Relations. 24 Thus: "In other
words, the employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when
so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations and after a dispute has been submitted thereto and pending
award or decision by the court of such dispute. It follows that, as in the present case, the employees or
laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an industrial dispute is submitted to the
Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the power of the latter, after hearing when public interest so requires
or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order them to return, with the
consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may authorize the employer
to accept other employees or laborers." 25 Former Chief Justice Paras, in a case not too long before
enactment of the Industrial Peace Act, had occasion to repeat such a view. Thus: "As a matter of fact, a strike
may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the Court of industrial Relations
has issued the proper injunction against the laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended).
Capital need not, however, be apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of
compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial Relations." 26
A strike then, in the apt phrase of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, is "an institutionalized factor of democratic growth." 27
This is to foster industrial democracy. Implicit in such a concept is the recognization that concerning the ends
which labor considers worth while, its wishes are ordinarily entitled to respect. Necessarily so, the choice as
to when such an objective may be attained by striking likewise belongs to it. There is the rejection of the
concept that an outside authority, even if governmental, should make the decisions for it as to ends which are
desirable and how they may be achieved. The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself
when the right to strike may be availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with
management. It is true that there is a requirement, in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must
file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. 28 Such a
requisite however, as has been repeatedly declared by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case
of unfair labor practice strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act
is to be rendered meaningful. What has been said thus far would demonstrate the unwarranted deviation of
the decision now on appeal from what is indicated by the law and authoritative decisions.
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6. Respondent Court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that attended
it. What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic
demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law
recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective. For
implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if
violent in character may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair
labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid
rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and
not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike
lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be
reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends it becomes illegal because of the means
employed.
Respondent Court must have unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the
effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and
twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on
the following day, with police officials stationed at the strike-bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the
streets were obstructed with wooden planks containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches of the
Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have
been inflicted on management personnel. Respondent Court in the appealed decision did penalize with loss
of employment the ten individuals responsible for such acts. Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the
certification on June 27, 1967, one month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike. Except on those
few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other
than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal.
This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives. It is only to show
awareness that is labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness
could break out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance, the
ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement
that it be conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp
the strike with illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence
that call for loss of employee status.
Such an approach is reflected in our recent decisions. As was realistically observed by the present Chief
Justice, it is usually attended by "the excitement, the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the
labor dispute, at the peak thereof ...." 29 Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association v. Insular life Assurance Co., Ltd., 30 there is the recognition by this Court, speaking
through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently explosive." 31 It is thus clear that not every form
of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty
party.
7. In the light of the foregoing, there being a valid unfair labor practice strike, the loss of employment decreed
by respondent Court on all the Union officers cannot stand. The premise on which such penalty was decreed
was the illegality of the strike. We rule differently. Hence, its imposition is unwarranted. It is to be made clear,
however, that because of the commission of specific serious acts of violence, the Union's President, Gregorio
Bacsa, as well as its Assistant Auditor, Conrado Pea, did incur such a
penalty. 32
On this point, it may be observed further that even if there was a mistake in good faith by the Union that an
unfair labor practice was committed by the Shell Company when such was not the case, still the wholesale
termination of employee status of all the officers of the Union, decreed by respondent Court, hardly
commends itself for approval. Such a drastic blow to a labor organization, leaving it leaderless, has serious
repercussions. The immediate effect is to weaken the Union. New leaders may of course emerge. It would
not be unlikely, under the circumstances, that they would be less than vigorous in the prosecution of labor's
claims. They may be prove to fall victims to counsels of timidity and apprehension. At the forefront of their
consciousness must be an awareness that a mistaken move could well mean their discharge from
employment. That would be to render the right to self-organization illusory. The plain and unqualified
constitutional command of protection to labor should not be lost sight of. 33 The State is thus under obligation
to lend its aid and its succor to the efforts of its labor elements to improve their economic condition. It is now
generally accepted that unionization is a means to such an end. It should be encouraged. Thereby, labor's
strength, what there is of it, becomes solidified. It can bargain as a collectivity. Management then will not
always have the upper hand nor be in a position to ignore its just demands. That, at any rate, is the policy
behind the Industrial Peace Act. The judiciary and administrative agencies in consrtruing it must ever be
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conscious of its implications. Only thus may there be fidelity to what is ordained by the fundamental law. For if
it were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be neglect or disregard. That is ito negate the
fundamental principle that the Constitution is the supreme law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations of August 5, 1967 is reversed, the
finding of illegality of the strike declared by the Shell Oil Workers' Union on May 25, 1967 not being in
accordance with law. Accordingly, the dismissal by the Shell Company on May 27, 1967 of the eighteen
security guards, 34 with the exception of Ernesto Crisostomo, who was found guilty of committing a serious
act of violence is set aside and they are declared reinstated. The continuance of their status such is,
however, dependent on whether or not a security guard section is provided for in the collective bargaining
contract entered into after the expiration of the contract that expired on December 31, 1969. The loss of
employee status of the officers of the Union, 35 decreed by respondent Court in its decision, is likewise set
aside, except as to Gregorio Bacsa and Conrado Pena, both of whom did commit serious acts of violence.
The termination of the employment status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Antonio Labrador
and Sesinando Romero, who committed acts of violence not serious in character, is also set aside, but while
allowed to be reinstated, they are not entitled to back pay. Ricardo Pagsibigan and Daniel Barraquel, along
with the aforesaid Gregorio Baesa, Conrado Pea and Ernesto Crisostomo, were legally penalized with
dismissal because of the serious acts of violence committed by them in the course of the strike. The rest of
the employees laid off should be reinstated with back pay to be counted from the date they were separated
by virtue of the appealed decision, from which should be deducted whatever earnings may have been
received by such employees during such period. The case is hereby remanded to respondent Court for the
implementation of this decision. In ascertaining the back wages to which the security guards are entitled, it
must likewise be ascertained whether or not the security guard section is continued after December 31, 1969.
Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

To be sure, a dissent from the opinion ably written by Our learned colleague, Justice Fernando, may not be
entirely without some degree of plausibility. To begin with, the basic conclusion of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations in the appealed decision, which by law and the previously unbroken line of decisions of
this Court on the point, We cannot lightly set aside, seem to be logical and supported by evidence not
seriously disputed. Withal, when it is considered that there is nothing in the record to show that in acting as it
did in this case, respondent Shell Company, Ltd. was not, actuated by any anti-union, much less anti-labor
motive but by purely economic reasons of sound management, and, in fact, petitioner does not even suggest
any such purpose, one must have to hesitate and deliberate long and hard before giving assent to a
pronouncement that this respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice, such as to legalize the strike declared by
petitioner against it. I take it, however, that in a larger sense this is a policy decision, and all things
considered, particularly the constitutional injunctions on social justice and protection to labor, I prefer to err,
since the juridical considerations and equities in this case appear to my mind and conscience to be in
equipoise, on the side of labor, who, as I see it, acted in the same good faith that management did. I must
hasten to add though, that in thus referring to labor, I do not have in mind the union leaders involved in this
case to whom the Court of Industrial Relations has attributed personal reasons for their attitude, but I am
thinking more of those security guards who felt uncertain about ultimate consequences of their transfer
ordered by respondent and naturally found nothing to hold on was the protection of the collective bargaining
agreement which they had a right to assume insured the substantial continuance of the terms and conditions
of their employment contemplated in said agreement at the time it was entered into.

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Contrary to the conclusion of the distinguished writer of the main opinion, I regret to say that the record amply
supports the finding of the Industrial Court that the transfer of the eighteen security guards concerned was
not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and said respondent. The more I go
over the considerations of the appealed decision, the more I am convinced not only that the move was never
tinged by any anti- labor hue but also that respondent had from the very beginning taken petitioner and its
duly authorities representatives in its long study and deliberation of the problem, which took years, and had,
in fact, consulted them on various aspects thereof. It is not denied that the maintenance of security is not the
only aspect of its multifarious departments it has decided to contract out; petitioner did not object to the
previous ones. Indeed, it is safe, to conjecture that petitioner has always seen the point of respondent,
principally the economy it would achieve and the consequent benefits labor might gain thereby. In this
connection, I particularly note that there is nothing in the record indicating that there is factual basis for
petitioner's claim that the security guards herein involved would surely suffer economic loss as a result of
their questioned transfer; respondent made it plain that overtime and other benefits accruing to them as
security guards would likewise be given to them in their new positions. And in answer to petitioner's almost
rhetorical question, why were said guards being given additional hourly pay and lump sum bonuses, if
respondent did not feel, that their rights were being violated, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose that
management simply felt that as the company was to save money by contracting out its security maintenance,
it was but proper that the affected sector of labor' should share a part of its savings.
All these, however, do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be
illegal. It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict
technicalities, whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values
involved which are beyond pecuniary estimation. As a general rule, labor's most potent and effective weapon
is the strike, and it is but natural that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor
should almost instinctively take a striking posture. In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality
of a strike, particularly in this enlightened era of progressive thinking on labor-management relations is
something that cannot be achieved by mere straight-jacketed legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the
process is broader and deeper than that, for to do justice in deciding such an issue, it is imperative that
utmost consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of each case, with a view to having the
most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the parties, in the light of human needs on the part
of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical conduct of business and industry, on the part of
management. In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that respondent has violated its collective
bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to conclude that for this reason,
the strike here in question was consequently illegal. I hold that the two strike votes taken by the members of
the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a legal breach of the
said agreement. That now I find, as the Industrial Court did, that technically and in truth, there was no such
infringement did not of necessity stamp the said strike with the stigma of illegality.
It may not be amiss to add at this juncture, to allay and disabuse possible apprehension that the main opinion
may conceivably produce in some quarters, that I do not discern in it any prejudice on the part of Justice
Fernando, strictly pro-labor and anti-management. Precisely, I am giving my concurrence to the judgment in
this case because I am convinced that, fundamentally he has also viewed the situation at hand in the light of
the above considerations, even if our respective approaches and articulation of views have to differ, since I
do not own all the perspectives whence he gives support to his conclusions, because I personally do not find
any necessity to resort to other authorities, when I feel that plain reasoning, predicated on commonly
accepted principles and reliance on one's proper sense of justice can suffice for the occasion.
I also concur in the sanctions ordered in the main opinion. The Court has individualized the respective
responsibilities of the strikers herein involved because such exactly is what the justice of the situation
demands. The reinstatement of those relatively innocent cannot be but only fair and equitable and the
approval of the lay-off of those found to have acted beyond the requirements of the circumstances is founded
on sound policy. In simple terms, I hold that the mere fact that a strike is not illegal, and I want to emphasize
here that there is, in my opinion, a large shade of difference between a strike that is really justified and legal
and one that is merely held not to be illegal, cannot be an excuse for resort to violence. Even picketing which
is the sister remedy of strikes is not supposed to be completely unrestrained and unrestricted, and
unprovoked violence, threats and duress of more or less grave nature employed by strikers against person
and property are twice removed from what can be judicially tolerated.

Page 7 of ___

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
To be sure, a dissent from the opinion ably written by Our learned colleague, Justice Fernando, may not be
entirely without some degree of plausibility. To begin with, the basic conclusion of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations in the appealed decision, which by law and the previously unbroken line of decisions of
this Court on the point, We cannot lightly set aside, seem to be logical and supported by evidence not
seriously disputed. Withal, when it is considered that there is nothing in the record to show that in acting as it
did in this case, respondent Shell Company, Ltd. was not, actuated by any anti-union, much less anti-labor
motive but by purely economic reasons of sound management, and, in fact, petitioner does not even suggest
any such purpose, one must have to hesitate and deliberate long and hard before giving assent to a
pronouncement that this respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice, such as to legalize the strike declared by
petitioner against it. I take it, however, that in a larger sense this is a policy decision, and all things
considered, particularly the constitutional injunctions on social justice and protection to labor, I prefer to err,
since the juridical considerations and equities in this case appear to my mind and conscience to be in
equipoise, on the side of labor, who, as I see it, acted in the same good faith that management did. I must
hasten to add though, that in thus referring to labor, I do not have in mind the union leaders involved in this
case to whom the Court of Industrial Relations has attributed personal reasons for their attitude, but I am
thinking more of those security guards who felt uncertain about ultimate consequences of their transfer
ordered by respondent and naturally found nothing to hold on was the protection of the collective bargaining
agreement which they had a right to assume insured the substantial continuance of the terms and conditions
of their employment contemplated in said agreement at the time it was entered into.
Contrary to the conclusion of the distinguished writer of the main opinion, I regret to say that the record amply
supports the finding of the Industrial Court that the transfer of the eighteen security guards concerned was
not a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and said respondent. The more I go
over the considerations of the appealed decision, the more I am convinced not only that the move was never
tinged by any anti- labor hue but also that respondent had from the very beginning taken petitioner and its
duly authorities representatives in its long study and deliberation of the problem, which took years, and had,
in fact, consulted them on various aspects thereof. It is not denied that the maintenance of security is not the
only aspect of its multifarious departments it has decided to contract out; petitioner did not object to the
previous ones. Indeed, it is safe, to conjecture that petitioner has always seen the point of respondent,
principally the economy it would achieve and the consequent benefits labor might gain thereby. In this
connection, I particularly note that there is nothing in the record indicating that there is factual basis for
petitioner's claim that the security guards herein involved would surely suffer economic loss as a result of
their questioned transfer; respondent made it plain that overtime and other benefits accruing to them as
security guards would likewise be given to them in their new positions. And in answer to petitioner's almost
rhetorical question, why were said guards being given additional hourly pay and lump sum bonuses, if
respondent did not feel, that their rights were being violated, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose that
management simply felt that as the company was to save money by contracting out its security maintenance,
it was but proper that the affected sector of labor' should share a part of its savings.
All these, however, do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner's strike should necessarily be held to be
illegal. It is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict
technicalities, whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values
involved which are beyond pecuniary estimation. As a general rule, labor's most potent and effective weapon
is the strike, and it is but natural that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor
should almost instinctively take a striking posture. In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality
of a strike, particularly in this enlightened era of progressive thinking on labor-management relations is
something that cannot be achieved by mere straight-jacketed legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the
process is broader and deeper than that, for to do justice in deciding such an issue, it is imperative that
utmost consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of each case, with a view to having the
most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the parties, in the light of human needs on the part
of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical conduct of business and industry, on the part of
management. In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that respondent has violated its collective
bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to conclude that for this reason,
the strike here in question was consequently illegal. I hold that the two strike votes taken by the members of
the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a legal breach of the
said agreement. That now I find, as the Industrial Court did, that technically and in truth, there was no such
infringement did not of necessity stamp the said strike with the stigma of illegality.
Page 8 of ___

It may not be amiss to add at this juncture, to allay and disabuse possible apprehension that the main opinion
may conceivably produce in some quarters, that I do not discern in it any prejudice on the part of Justice
Fernando, strictly pro-labor and anti-management. Precisely, I am giving my concurrence to the judgment in
this case because I am convinced that, fundamentally he has also viewed the situation at hand in the light of
the above considerations, even if our respective approaches and articulation of views have to differ, since I
do not own all the perspectives whence he gives support to his conclusions, because I personally do not find
any necessity to resort to other authorities, when I feel that plain reasoning, predicated on commonly
accepted principles and reliance on one's proper sense of justice can suffice for the occasion.
I also concur in the sanctions ordered in the main opinion. The Court has individualized the respective
responsibilities of the strikers herein involved because such exactly is what the justice of the situation
demands. The reinstatement of those relatively innocent cannot be but only fair and equitable and the
approval of the lay-off of those found to have acted beyond the requirements of the circumstances is founded
on sound policy. In simple terms, I hold that the mere fact that a strike is not illegal, and I want to emphasize
here that there is, in my opinion, a large shade of difference between a strike that is really justified and legal
and one that is merely held not to be illegal, cannot be an excuse for resort to violence. Even picketing which
is the sister remedy of strikes is not supposed to be completely unrestrained and unrestricted, and
unprovoked violence, threats and duress of more or less grave nature employed by strikers against person
and property are twice removed from what can be judicially tolerated.

Page 9 of ___