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Facts:
ISSUE:
Issue:
As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction
over
the
qualifications
of
presidential
candidates?
WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship
by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
RULING:
Ruling:
No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Valles v. COMELEC
Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not to any alien woman on
the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino "irrespective of moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions".4
The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a
natural born Filipino,5 a naturalized Filipino,6 or a Filipino by election.
2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and legal
provisions, as applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the
premise that such an alien woman does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire
Philippine citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised
Naturalization Law), we repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines" if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of
the Revised Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children
of persons naturalized under the law who were born in the Philippines "shall be
considered citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in
the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall
automatically become a Filipino citizen".7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship
of said minor children is conferred by the law itself, without further proceedings
and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino does not fit into either of
the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to make her a
citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino
citizenship.8 Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment
proceedings.9 And in one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman
married to a Filipino must be determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 10
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The
record of this case disclose that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the
determination of whether an alien woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed
a Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of
Immigration. 11 Conceivably, absence of clear legal direction on the matter could
have given rise to divergence of views. We should aim at drying up sources of
doubt. Parties interested should not be enmeshed in jurisdictional
entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore, suggest that a
clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen,
then she must have to file a "petition for citizenship" in order that she may
acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,shall file with the competent court" a
petition for the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen,
and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law
points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the petitioner has
resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given
the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts.
That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in
one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an alien woman
had directly sought naturalization in her favor. 12
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office,
agency, board or official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say
that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires
to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section
2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of
justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a
Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law,
a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the
petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to
prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as
one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petition "a citizen of the
Philippines".
We go to the merits of the petition.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that
her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at
Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she alsoresided in
Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5,
1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a naturalborn
citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed
in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section
1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining
the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3)
years
from
reaching
the
age
of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean
a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May
15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the
age of majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements
of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which
to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official,
cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching
cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were
(sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of
the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It
has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early
as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban
was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would
not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the
Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S.
vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543,
Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy
an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by
means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or
at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to
the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the
CID detention cell.
The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident
given to petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving
her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian
citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.
Thus this petition for certiorari
Issue:
whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings
Held :
Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
government.
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if
under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable
alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right
of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right
to
prohibit
and
prevent
their
entry
into
the
country.
However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940
of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification. Private respondent opposed contending that at the time
of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May
1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared
the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Issue:
WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective
office of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest
in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought
to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already
been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty
contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been
no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought
to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases,
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case,
at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified from running for an elective local position under par 40(d)
of R.A. No. 7160
LABO VS COMELEC
176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a
Public Officer Dual Citizenship Labo Doctrine
FACTS
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival,
Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as
Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the
Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will
of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in
the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented
against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his
marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian
passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as
an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to
Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino
citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his
lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not
tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have
voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city.
Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto
proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos
disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number
of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if acandidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.