G.R. No.

L-5279

October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private
schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the
Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides
that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for
state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to
wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of
the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

222. TAN VS, MACAPAGAL

judicial review for adjudication
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Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the LAUREL LEIDO
RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to declare that it has no
power to consider and adopt proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the adoption of a new form
of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to propose amendments to the Consti,
without altering the general plan.
The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR.
The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial interest in the case.

ISSUE: Whther the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of the resolution of the Con-Con.

SC: NO.
The rule is, Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon the theory that the expenditure
of public funds for purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Hence,
it may be enjoined at the instance of taxpayers.

Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayers suit. In the Gonzales case, it was held
that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It was only then
that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The judiciary will
neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of powers).

Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for judicial oversight. Until
then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.

Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts of the Con-Con. However, it is a
pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before court may inquire. What the ConCon did was merely to propose an amendment to the Consti.

There is no room for judicial review.

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MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the
constitutionality of the law)
FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same
attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously
served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).
ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.
HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They
are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
---------------------------------FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52
of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H.
Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions

2.

Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent
mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

3.

Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment
cannot be made by a special law
HELD/RULING:
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1.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on
the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds
was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.
Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

1.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election
is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will
acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

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No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a
resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.
1.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more
than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law.

G.R. No. 152295

July 9, 2002

Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render
them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK
elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to
respondents.

Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to
a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to
July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement
in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less
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than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section
424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be
applicable on the July 15 2002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition
presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

Gonzales v NarvasaG.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts:
On December 9, 1999, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed assailing theconstitutionality of the
creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission
on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential
consultants,advisersandassistants. Petitioner also prays that the Executive Secretary be compelled
through amandamus to furnish the petitioner with information requesting the names of executive officials holding
multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by
the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner did not in fact
show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to
maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does not present to be of a direct and personal character.
Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.As taxpayers, petitioners cannot attack the EO. There is no appropriation granted fromCongress but
only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner
cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. The petitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in
interest.With regards to the petitioners request of disclosure to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may
invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen. The Supreme
Court dismissed the petition with the exception that respondent Executive Secretary is ordered to furnish petitioner
with the information requested
0-------------------0-------------------------------0------------------------0---------Gonzales v. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835 (August 14, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of
executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles
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previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this
petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.
HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of
public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to
allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers.
Alunan et al. vs Mirasol et al. July 31, 1997
G.R. No. 108399
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Manila nullifying an order of the DILG, which cancelled the general elections for the SK dated December
4, 1992 in the City of Manila on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of
the first SK under the LGC of 1991 (R.A. 7160).
On September 18, 1992, the DILG issued a resolution through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III
exempting the City of Manila from holding its SK election on December 4, 1992. This was issued in relation to the
letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila. In its resolution, the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt
from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which
may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly
extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila, which then issued an
injunction ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the DILG.
Trial of the case ensued and a Decision was issued holding that the (1) the DILG had no power to "exempt"
the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution
the power to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall" is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect
determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in every
barangay without exception; and (3) the "exemption" of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because, according to the DILG's records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections were held between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897 barangays, was there no
elections held on December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted
elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their
contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sangguniang
shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been
elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections
for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this
Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be
extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code.
Issue: Whether the case has been moot and academic.
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Held: The Supreme Court held that the issue is not moot and it is necessary in fact to decide the case on the issues
raised by the parties. The case comes with the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if
it is capable of repetition and yet evade review.
Rejecting the contention of being moot and academic, the Supreme Court in the Southern Pacific Terminal
case held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing
(as are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they
might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and at one time
the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission
without a chance of redress.
Moreover in Roa vs. Wade, the US Supreme Court explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant
fact the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before
the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will
survive. Our laws should not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.
It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case
filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED
Akbayan vs Aquino - digest
Akbayan vs Aquino July 16 2008
FACTS:
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers,
requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right to
information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision
making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic
negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure
of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that
occurred?
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege?
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Held:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the
contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties, public disclosure of the text of the
JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot
and academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic
to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the full text thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but
also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not
mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim
is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the
Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation
and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
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not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have
no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

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On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-inChief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate
cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without
warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the
Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and
seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her
constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
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2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT
valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust
Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the
Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner

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David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP
1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.
------------0--------------------0--------------------0------------------------0--------------------------------0-----------In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued
for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided
and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of
martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by
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reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions
of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo
Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed
was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of
PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon
the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the
Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
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the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the presidentdeclared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power tothe President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos
legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune
without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such
exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.

ABS-CBN vs Philippine Multi-Media System Inc

Philippine Multi-Media System Inc (PMSI) is a signal provider which has cable and satellite services. It is providing its
satellite services through Dream Broadcasting System. PMSI has its Free TV and Premium Channels. The Free
TV includes ABS-CBN, GMA-7 and other local networks. The premium channels include AXN, Jack TV, etc which are
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paid by subscribers before such channels can be transmitted as feeds to a subscribers TV set which has
been installed with a Dream satellite.
ABS-CBN is a television and broadcasting corporation. It broadcasts television programs by wireless means to Metro
Manila and nearby provinces, and by satellite to provincial stations through Channel 2 and Channel 23. The
programs aired over Channels 2 and 23 are either produced by ABS-CBN or purchased from or licensed by other
producers. ABS-CBN also owns regional television stations which pattern their programming in accordance with
perceived demands of the region. Thus, television programs shown in Metro Manila and nearby provinces are not
necessarily shown in other provinces.
In May 2002, ABS-CBN sued PMSI for allegedly engaging in rebroadcasting and thereby infringing on ABS-CBNs
copyrights; that the transmission of Channels 2 and 23 to the provinces where these two channels are not usually
shown altered ABS-CBNs programming for the said provinces. PMSI argued that it is not infringing upon ABS-CBNs
copyrights because it is operating under the Must-Carry Rule outlined in NTC (National Telecommunications
Commission) Circular No. 4-08-88.
ISSUE: Whether or not PMSI infringed upon the copyrights of ABS-CBN.
HELD: No. The Must-Carry Rule under NTC Circular No. 4-08-88 falls under the limitations on copyright. The
Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and
entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a
well informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth. The very intent
and spirit of the NTC Circular will prevent a situation whereby station owners and a few networks would have
unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public
issues, people, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed contrary to the state policy that the
(franchise) grantee like ABS-CBN, and other TV station owners and even the likes of PMSI, shall provide at all times
sound and balanced programming and assist in the functions of public information and education.
PMSI was likewise granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 8630, Section 4 of which similarly states
that it shall provide adequate public service time to enable the government, through the said broadcasting stations,
to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote
public participation such as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education.
The Must-Carry Rule favors both broadcasting organizations and the public. It prevents cable television companies
from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by signal. Also, the rule
prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs available to
city viewers.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
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FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary
of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months
and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity
and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
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To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security
and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at
two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year
or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
About et
these
adsPCGG
Joya,
al. vs.
GR No. 96541. August 24, 1993
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Facts: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres. Aquino, signed a
Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18 th and 19th
century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in
behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless
proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the paintings and silverware are public properties
collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have
been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain
the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec.
14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.
Issue: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over
this case.
Held: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become
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publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a nonprofit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the
Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after the fulfilment of
a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of mandamus to be
issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from private sources
and not with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy one which involves a conflict
of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes
moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which had
long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount
public interest is involved. However, there is no such justification in this petition.
Petition dismissed.
In law, the real party in interest is the one who actually possesses the substantive right being asserted and has a
legal right to enforce the claim (under applicable substantive law). Additionally, the "real party in interest" must sue in
his own name. In many situations, the real party in interest will be the parties themselves
(i.e., plaintiff and defendant).
KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

1.
2.
3.

4.

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a
national network system that will in turn expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded
in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:
PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian
firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity;
The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law
(Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up
such;
PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to
install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive
Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the

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building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the
contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
1.
On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though.
2.
On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company
or entity, whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not
merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation
they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense
shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online
lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily,
the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 384
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3
which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential
in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
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enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.
If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
G.R. No. 155336 November 25, 2004
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CHREA), petitioner VS
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR), respondent
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:
September 4, 1998 CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the commission and ordering its Human Resources Department Division to prepare the
necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and other appropriate documents to implement the resolution
October 19, 1998 CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading and raising of salary grades of
certain positions in the commission. According to the same resolution, savings under Personnel Services would be
used to support the implementation of the scheme.
November 17, 1998 CHR issued Resolution No. A98-062 collapsing vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but
the then DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request with the justifications that
-

The upgrading scheme involved elevating the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and elevating
services to offices
Section 78 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1998 says that no organizational unit or changes
in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the president, and there
is no existing law which the CHR can use as a legal basis for their proposed scheme.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6758 known as the Compensation Standardization Law, provides that the DBM is
directed to establish and administer a unified compensation and position classification system in the
government. And the Supreme Court ruled in Victorina Cruz vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119155 that the
DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of
the National Government.
Though the CHR may be a member of the CFAG (Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group), it is not vested
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade and create positions without the approval of the DBM. The members
of the CFAG may formulate and implement organizational structures but these must be within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under R.A. 6758.

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In light of the DMBs disapproval, the CSC-NCR Office recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected. The petitioner CHREA also requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation.
However, the CSC-Central Office denied the petitioners request in a resolution dated December 19, 1999 and
reversed the recommendation of the CSC- NCR. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration with the CSC-Central
Office but this was denied. CHREA, therefore, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. When the court of Appeals
affirmed the resolution of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading scheme, CHREA filed a
petition in the Supreme Court.
In this petition, CHREA contends that the Court of Appeals and CSC-Central Office erred in approving of the CHRs
alleged authority to upgrade, classify and create positions when the DBMs approval is indispensable for such
scheme. CHREA also contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that, according to the constitution, the
CHR enjoys Fiscal Autonomy.
In their answer, the respondent questioned the locus standi of the CHREA considering that it is not a recognized
bona fide organization of its employees and that its president, Marcial Sanchez has no authority to sue the CHR.
Respondent also contends that it has the authority to implement the scheme it proposed even without the approval of
the DBM because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi on the case.
2. Whether or not the approval of the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading,
reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantillas in the CHR.
HELD:
1. Petitioner which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR is in imminent danger of sustaining
injury as a result of the proposed scheme. Only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission
will benefit from the said scheme, which when found valid will eat up a big portion of the Commissions
savings that can otherwise be allocated to Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees
are derived. The personality of the CHREA was also recognized by CSC when it took cognizance of the
petitioners request to affirm the recommendations from the CSC-NCR Office.
2. The court held that without the approval of the DBM, the resolutions issued by the CHR are disallowed.
Wherefore the petition was granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside, and the ruling
of the CSC-NCR reinstated.
RATIO:
RA 6758 provides that the DBM shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System. The coverage of this authority includes all positions in the government, government-owned and controlled
corporations and government financial institutions. Government refers to the Executive, Legislative, and the Judicial
Branch and even the Constitutional Commissions that supposedly have fiscal autonomy.
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Jurisprudence also supports this power granted to the DBM. PRA vs Jesusito L. Bunag, Victorino Cruz vs Court of
Appeals, Intia Jr., vs COA
On the mistaken premise that CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions, the Constitution and
Chapter 5 sections 24 and 26 Book II of the Administrative code mention only 3 constitutional commissions, the CSC,
the COMLEC and the COA. In fact, the CHR is considered as Other Bodies. Its being member of the CFAG does
not grant it fiscal autonomy because fiscal autonomy can only be granted by the Constituion.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, all government offices must, all the same kowtow
to the Salary Standardization Law, for which its administration has been given by Congress to the DBM.
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) vs. RomuloG.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005
Facts:
The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed apetition for Supreme Court
to exercise its power of judicial review to declare ExecutiveOrder No. 185 unconstitutional.The petitioners contended
that EO 185 violated their rights and interests as labor unionsand as taxpayers. By the said EO, the administrative
supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel
including theexecutive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairpersonto the Secretary
of Labor and Employment.Claiming that the issues does not pose an actual case or controversy, respondentscontend
that the petitioners have not specifically cited how EO No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights
and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers.Furthermore, they argued that the petitioners lacked legal standing
to challenge the validity of said EO, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt
from paying taxes.
Issue:Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.
Ration Decidendi:
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." Since
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury due to EO No.
185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned EO will prejudice their rights and interests. OnlyNLRC personnel, the
subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary authority, have adirect and specific interest in this issue.In their
capacity as taxpayers, petitioners also do not have legal standing on this
issuesince there is no mention of an established disbursement of public funds incontravention of law or the
Constitution.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The challenging of EO 185sconstitutionality
have to wait for the proper party in a proper case before the court mayintervene and entertain.

23 | J o h a n
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L AW 1