HossbachMemorandum

BERLIN,November10,1937.
MinutesofaConferenceintheReichChancellery,Berlin,November5,1937,
FROM4:15to8:30P.M.
Present:
TheFuehrerandChancellor,FieldMarshalvonBlomberg,WarMinister,
ColonelGeneralBaronvonFritsch,CommanderinChief,Army,
AdmiralDr.h.c.Raeder,CommanderinChief,Navy,
ColonelGeneralGoring,CommanderinChief,Luftwaffe,
BaronvonNeurath,ForeignMinister,
ColonelHossbach.
TheFuehrerbeganbystatingthatthesubjectofthepresentconferencewasofsuchimportancethatits
discussionwould,inothercountries,certainlybeamatterforafullCabinetmeeting,buthetheFuehrer
hadrejectedtheideaofmakingitasubjectofdiscussionbeforethewidercircleoftheReichCabinetjust
becauseoftheimportanceofthematter.Hisexpositiontofollowwasthefruitofthoroughdeliberationand
theexperiencesofhis41/2yearsofpower.Hewishedtoexplaintothegentlemenpresenthisbasicideas
concerningtheopportunitiesforthedevelopmentofourpositioninthefieldofforeignaffairsandits
requirements,andheasked,intheinterestsofalongtermGermanpolicy,thathisexpositionberegarded,
intheeventofhisdeath,ashislastwillandtestament.
TheFuehrerthencontinued:
TheaimofGermanpolicywastomakesecureandtopreservetheracialcommunity[Volksmasse]andto
enlargeit.Itwasthereforeaquestionofspace.
TheGermanracialcommunitycomprisedover85millionpeopleand,becauseoftheirnumberandthe
narrowlimitsofhabitablespaceinEurope,constitutedatightlypackedracialcoresuchaswasnottobe
metinanyothercountryandsuchasimpliedtherighttoagreaterlivingspacethaninthecaseofother
peoples.If,territoriallyspeaking,thereexistednopoliticalresultcorrespondingtothisGermanracialcore,
thatwasaconsequenceofcenturiesofhistoricaldevelopment,andinthecontinuanceofthesepolitical
conditionslaythegreatestdangertothepreservationoftheGermanraceatitspresentpeak.Toarrestthe
declineofGermanism[Deutschtum]inAustriaandCzechoslovakiawasaslittlepossibleastomaintainthe
presentlevelinGermanyitself.Insteadofincrease,sterilitywassettingin,andinitstraindisordersofa
socialcharactermustariseincourseoftime,sincepoliticalandideologicalideasremaineffectiveonlyso
longastheyfurnishthebasisfortherealizationoftheessentialvitaldemandsofapeople.Germany's
futurewasthereforewhollyconditionaluponthesolvingoftheneedforspace,andsuchasolutioncouldbe
sought,ofcourse,onlyforaforeseeableperiodofaboutonetothreegenerations.
Beforeturningtothequestionofsolvingtheneedforspace,ithadtobeconsideredwhetherasolution
holdingpromiseforthefuturewastobereachedbymeansofautarchyorbymeansofanincreased
participationinworldeconomy.

Autarchy:
AchievementonlypossibleunderstrictNationalSocialistleadershipoftheState,whichisassumed;
acceptingitsachievementaspossible,thefollowingcouldbestatedasresults:

A.Inthefieldofrawmaterialsonlylimited,nottotal,autarchy.
1)Inregardtocoal,sofarasitcouldbeconsideredasasourceofrawmaterials,autarchywaspossible;
2)Butevenasregardsores,thepositionwasmuchmoredifficult.Ironrequirementscanbemetfromhome
resourcesandsimilarlywithlightmetals,butwithotherrawmaterialscopper,tinthiswasnotthecase.
3)Synthetictextilerequirementscanbemetfromhomeresourcestothelimitoftimbersupplies.A
permanentsolutionimpossible.
4)Ediblefatspossible.
B.Inthefieldoffoodthequestionofautarchywastobeansweredbyaflat"No."
Withthegeneralriseinthestandardoflivingcomparedwiththatof30to40yearsago,therehasgone
handinhandanincreaseddemandandanincreasedhomeconsumptionevenonthepartoftheproducers,
thefarmers.Thefruitsoftheincreasedagriculturalproductionhadallgonetomeettheincreaseddemand,
andsodidnotrepresentanabsoluteproductionincrease.Afurtherincreaseinproductionbymaking
greaterdemandsonthesoil,whichalready,inconsequenceoftheuseofartificialfertilizers,wasshowing
signsofexhaustion,washardlypossible,anditwasthereforecertainthatevenwiththemaximumincrease
inproduction,participationinworldtradewasunavoidable.Thenotinconsiderableexpenditureofforeign
exchangetoinsurefoodsuppliesbyimports,evenwhenharvestsweregood,grewtocatastrophic
proportionswithbadharvests.Thepossibilityofadisastergrewinproportiontotheincreaseinpopulation,
inwhich,too,theexcessofbirthsof560,000annuallyproduced,asaconsequence,anevenfurtherincrease
inbreadconsumption,sinceachildwasagreaterbreadconsumerthananadult.
Itwasnotpossibleoverthelongrun,inacontinentenjoyingapracticallycommonstandardofliving,to
meetthefoodsupplydifficultiesbyloweringthatstandardandbyrationalization.Since,withthesolvingof
theunemploymentproblem,themaximumconsumptionlevelhadbeenreached,someminormodifications
inourhomeagriculturalproductionmightstill,nodoubt,bepossible,butnofundamentalalterationwas
possibleinourbasicfoodposition.Thusautarchywasuntenableinregardbothtofoodandtotheeconomy
asawhole.

Participationinworldeconomy:
Tothistherewerelimitationswhichwewereunabletoremove.TheestablishmentofGermany'sposition
onasecureandsoundfoundationwasobstructedbymarketfluctuations,andcommercialtreatiesafforded
noguaranteeforactualexecution.InparticularithadtoberememberedthatsincetheWorldWar,those
verycountrieswhichhadformerlybeenfoodexportershadbecomeindustrialized.Wewerelivinginan
ageofeconomicempiresinwhichtheprimitiveurgetocolonizationwasagainmanifestingitself;inthe
casesofJapanandItalyeconomicmotivesunderlaytheurgeforexpansion,andwithGermany,too,
economicneedwouldsupplythestimulus.Forcountriesoutsidethegreateconomicempires,opportunities
foreconomicexpansionwereseverelyimpeded.
Theboominworldeconomycausedbytheeconomiceffectsofrearmamentcouldneverformthebasisofa
soundeconomyoveralongperiod,andthelatterwasobstructedaboveallalsobytheeconomic
disturbancesresultingfromBolshevism.Therewasapronouncedmilitaryweaknessinthosestateswhich
dependedfortheirexistenceonforeigntrade.Asourforeigntradewascarriedonoverthesearoutes
dominatedbyBritain,itwasmoreaquestionofsecurityoftransportthanoneofforeignexchange,which
revealed,intimeofwar,thefullweaknessofourfoodsituation.Theonlyremedy,andonewhichmight
appeartousasvisionary,layintheacquisitionofgreaterlivingspaceaquestwhichhasatalltimesbeen

theoriginoftheformationofstatesandofthemigrationofpeoples.Thatthisquestmetwithnointerestat
Genevaoramongthesatiatednationswasunderstandable.If,then,weacceptthesecurityofourfood
situationastheprincipalquestion,thespacenecessarytoinsureitcanonlybesoughtinEurope,not,asin
theliberalcapitalistview,intheexploitationofcolonies.Itisnotamatterofacquiringpopulationbutof
gainingspaceforagriculturaluse.Moreover,areasproducingrawmaterialscanbemoreusefullysoughtin
EuropeinimmediateproximitytotheReich,thanoverseas;thesolutionthusobtainedmustsufficeforone
ortwogenerations.Whateverelsemightprovenecessarylatermustbelefttosucceedinggenerationsto
dealwith.Thedevelopmentofgreatworldpoliticalconstellationsprogressedbutslowlyafterall,andthe
Germanpeoplewithitsstrongracialcorewouldfindthemostfavorableprerequisitesforsuchachievement
intheheartofthecontinentofEurope.ThehistoryofallagestheRomanEmpireandtheBritishEmpire
hadprovedthatexpansioncouldonlybecarriedoutbybreakingdownresistanceandtakingrisks;setbacks
wereinevitable.Therehadneverinformertimesbeenspaceswithoutamaster,andtherewerenonetoday;
theattackeralwayscomesupagainstapossessor.
ThequestionforGermanyran:wherecouldsheachievethegreatestgainatthelowestcost.
Germanpolicyhadtoreckonwithtwohateinspiredantagonists,BritainandFrance,towhomaGerman
colossusinthecenterofEuropewasathornintheflesh,andbothcountrieswereopposedtoanyfurther
strengtheningofGermany'spositioneitherinEuropeoroverseas;insupportofthisoppositiontheywere
abletocountontheagreementofalltheirpoliticalparties.Both'countriessawintheestablishmentof
Germanmilitarybasesoverseasathreattotheirowncommunications,asafeguardingofGerman
commerce,and,asaconsequence,astrengtheningofGermany'spositioninEurope.
BecauseofoppositionoftheDominions,Britaincouldnotcedeanyofhercolonialpossessionstous.After
England'slossofprestigethroughthepassingofAbyssiniaintoItalianpossession,thereturnofEastAfrica
wasnottobeexpected.Britishconcessionscouldatbestbeexpressedinanoffertosatisfyourcolonial
demandsbytheappropriationofcolonieswhichwerenotBritishpossessionse.g.,Angola.French
concessionswouldprobablytakeasimilarline.
Seriousdiscussionofthequestionofthereturnofcoloniestouscouldonlybeconsideredatamoment
whenBritainwasindifficultiesandtheGermanReicharmedandstrong.TheFuehrerdidnotsharethe
viewthattheEmpirewasunshakable.OppositiontotheEmpirewastobefoundlessinthecountries
conqueredthanamonghercompetitors.TheBritishEmpireandtheRomanEmpirecouldnotbecompared
inrespectofpermanence;thelatterwasnotconfrontedbyanypowerfulpoliticalrivalofaseriousorder
afterthePunicWars.ItwasonlythedisintegratingeffectofChristianity,andthesymptomsofagewhich
appearineverycountry,whichcausedancientRometosuccumbtotheonslaughtoftheGermans.
BesidetheBritishEmpirethereexistedtodayanumberofstatesstrongerthanshe.TheBritishmotherland
wasabletoprotecthercolonialpossessionsnotbyherownpower,butonlyinalliancewithotherstates.
How,forinstance,couldBritainalonedefendCanadaagainstattackbyAmerica,orherFarEastern
interestsagainstattackbyJapan!
TheemphasisontheBritishCrownasthesymboloftheunityoftheEmpirewasalreadyanadmissionthat,
inthelongrun,theEmpirecouldnotmaintainitspositionbypowerpolitics.Significantindicationsofthis
were:
(a)ThestruggleofIrelandforindependence.
(b)TheconstitutionalstrugglesinIndia,whereBritain'shalfmeasureshadgiventotheIndiansthe
opportunityofusinglateronasaweaponagainstBritain,thenonfulfillmentofherpromisesregardinga
constitution.

(c)TheweakeningbyJapanofBritain'spositionintheFarEast.
(d)TherivalryintheMediterraneanwithItalywhounderthespellofherhistory,drivenbynecessityand
ledbyageniuswasexpandingherpowerposition,andthuswasinevitablycomingmoreandmoreinto
conflictwithBritishinterests.TheoutcomeoftheAbyssinianWarwasalossofprestigeforBritainwhich
ItalywasstrivingtoincreasebystirringuptheintheMohammedenworld.
Tosumup,itcouldbestatedthat,with45millionBritons,inspiteofitstheoreticalsoundness,theposition
oftheEmpirecouldnotinthelongrunbemaintainedbypowerpolitics.Theratioofthepopulationofthe
Empiretothatofthemotherlandof9:1,wasawarningtousnot,inourterritorialexpansiontoallowthe
foundationconstitutedbythenumericalstrengthofourownpeopletobecometooweak.
France'spositionwasmorefavorablethanthatofBritain.TheFrenchEmpirewasbetterplaced
territorially;theinhabitantsofhercolonialpossessionsrepresentedasupplementtohermilitarystrength.
ButFrancewasgoingtobeconfrontedwithinternalpoliticaldifficulties.Inanation'slifeabout10percent
ofitsspanistakenupbyparliamentaryformsofgovernmentandabout90percentbyauthoritarianforms.
Today,nonetheless,Britain,France,Russia,andthesmallerstatesadjoiningthem,mustbeincludedas
factors[Machtfaktoren]inourpoliticalcalculations.
Germany'sproblemcouldonlybesolvedbymeansofforceandthiswasneverwithoutattendantrisk.The
campaignsofFredericktheGreatforSilesiaandBismarck'swarsagainstAustriaandFrancehadinvolved
unheardofrisk,andtheswiftnessofthePrussianactionin1870hadkeptAustriafromenteringthewar.If
oneacceptsasthebasisofthefollowingexpositiontheresorttoforcewithitsattendantrisks,thenthere
remainstilltobeansweredthequestions"when"and"how."Inthismattertherewerethreecases[Falle]to
bedealtwith:

Case1:Period19431945.
Afterthisdateonlyachangefortheworse,fromourpointofview,couldbeexpected.
Theequipmentofthearmy,navy,andluftwaffe,aswellastheformationoftheofficercorps,wasnearly
completed.Equipmentandarmamentweremodern;infurtherdelaytherelaythedangeroftheir
obsolescence.Inparticular,thesecrecyof"specialweapons"couldnotbepreservedforever.Therecruiting
ofreserveswaslimitedtocurrentagegroups;furtherdraftsfromolderuntrainedagegroupswerenolonger
available.
Ourrelativestrengthwoulddecreaseinrelationtotherearmamentwhichwouldbythenhavebeencarried
outbytherestoftheworld.Ifwedidnotactby194345'anyyearcould,inconsequenceofalackof
reserves,producethefoodcrisis,tocopewithwhichthenecessaryforeignexchangewasnotavailable,and
thismustberegardedasa"waningpointoftheregime."Besides,theworldwasexpectingourattackand
wasincreasingitscountermeasuresfromyeartoyear.Itwaswhiletherestoftheworldwasstillpreparing
itsdefenses[sichabriegele]thatwewereobligedtotaketheoffensive.
Nobodyknewtodaywhatthesituationwouldbeintheyears194345.Onethingonlywascertain,thatwe
couldnotwaitlonger.
OntheonehandtherewasthegreatWehrmacht,andthenecessityofmaintainingitatitspresentlevel,the
agingofthemovementandofitsleaders;andontheother,theprospectofaloweringofthestandardof
livingandofalimitationofthebirthrate,whichleftnochoicebuttoact.IftheFuehrerwasstillliving,it
washisunalterableresolvetosolveGermany'sproblemofspaceatthelatestby194345.Thenecessityfor
actionbefore194345wouldariseincases2and3.

Case2:
IfinternalstrifeinFranceshoulddevelopintosuchadomesticcrisisastoabsorbtheFrenchArmy
completelyandrenderitincapableofuseforwaragainstGermany,thenthetimeforactionagainstthe
Czechshadcome.

Case3:
IfFranceissoembroiledbyawarwithanotherstatethatshecannot"proceed"againstGermany.
Fortheimprovementofourpoliticomilitarypositionourfirstobjective,intheeventofourbeing
embroiledinwar,mustbetooverthrowCzechoslovakiaandAustriasimultaneouslyinordertoremovethe
threattoourflankinanypossibleoperationagainsttheWest.InaconflictwithFranceitwashardlytobe
regardedaslikelythattheCzechswoulddeclarewaronusontheverysamedayasFrance.Thedesireto
joininthewarwould,however,increaseamongtheCzechsinproportiontoanyweakeningonourpartand
thenherparticipationcouldclearlytaketheformofanattacktowardSilesia,towardthenorthortowardthe
west.
IftheCzechswereoverthrownandacommonGermanHungarianfrontierachieved,aneutralattitudeon
thepartofPolandcouldbethemorecertainlycountedonintheeventofaFrancoGermanconflict.Our
agreementswithPolandonlyretainedtheirforceaslongasGermany'sstrengthremainedunshaken.Inthe
eventofGermansetbacksaPolishactionagainstEastPrussia,andpossiblyagainstPomeraniaandSilesia
aswell,hadtobereckonedwith.
OntheassumptionofadevelopmentoftheSituationleadingtoaction:onourpartasplanned,intheyears
194345,theattitudeofFrance,Britain,Italy,Poland,andRussiacouldprobablybeestimatedasfollows:
Actually,theFuehrerbelievedthatalmostcertainlyBritain,andprobablyFranceaswell,hadalready
tacitlywrittenofftheCzechsandwerereconciledtothefactthatthisquestioncouldbeclearedupindue
coursebyGermany.DifficultiesconnectedwiththeEmpire,andtheprospectofbeingoncemoreentangled
inaprotractedEuropeanwar,weredecisiveconsiderationsforBritainagainstparticipationinawaragainst
Germany.Britain'sattitudewouldcertainlynotbewithoutinfluenceonthatofFrance.AnattackbyFrance
withoutBritishsupport,andwiththeprospectoftheoffensivebeingbroughttoastandstillonourwestern
fortifications,washardlyprobable.NorwasaFrenchmarchthroughBelgiumandHollandwithoutBritish
supporttobeexpected;thisalsowasacoursenottobecontemplatedbyusintheeventofaconflictwith
France,becauseitwouldcertainlyentailthehostilityofBritain.Itwouldofcoursebenecessaryto
maintainastrongdefense[eineAbriegelung]onourwesternfrontierduringtheprosecutionofourattack
ontheCzechsandAustria.Andinthisconnectionithadtoberememberedthatthedefensemeasuresofthe
Czechsweregrowinginstrengthfromyeartoyear,andthattheactualworthoftheAustrianArmyalso
wasincreasinginthecourseoftime.Eventhoughthepopulationsconcerned,especiallyofCzechoslovakia,
werenotsparse,theannexationofCzechoslovakiaandAustriawouldmeananacquisitionoffoodstuffsfor
5to6millionpeople,ontheassumptionthatthecompulsoryemigrationof2millionpeoplefrom
Czechoslovakiaand1millionpeoplefromAustriawaspracticable.TheincorporationofthesetwoStates
withGermanymeant,fromthepoliticomilitarypointofview,asubstantialadvantagebecauseitwould
meanshorterandbetterfrontiers,thefreeingofforcesforotherpurposes,andthepossibilityofcreating
newunitsuptoalevelofabout12divisions,thatis,1newdivisionpermillioninhabitants.
ItalywasnotexpectedtoobjecttotheeliminationoftheCzechs,butitwasimpossibleatthemomentto
estimatewhatherattitudeontheAustrianquestionwouldbe;thatdependedessentiallyuponwhetherthe
Ducewerestillalive.

ThedegreeofsurpriseandtheswiftnessofouractionweredecisivefactorsforPoland'sattitude.Poland
withRussiaatherrearwillhavelittleinclinationtoengageinwaragainstavictoriousGermany.
MilitaryinterventionbyRussiamustbecounteredbytheswiftnessofouroperations;however,whether
suchaninterventionwasapracticalcontingencyatallwas,inviewofJapan'sattitude,morethandoubtful.
Shouldcase2arisethecripplingofFrancebycivilwarthesituationthuscreatedbytheeliminationofthe
mostdangerousopponentmustheseizeduponwheneveritoccursfortheblowagainsttheCzechs.
TheFuehrersawcase3comingdefinitelynearer;itmightemergefromthepresenttensionsinthe
Mediterranean,andhewasresolvedtotakeadvantageofitwheneverithappened,evenasearlyas1938.
Inthelightofpastexperience,theFuehrerdidnotseeanyearlyendtothehostilitiesinSpain.Ifone
consideredthelengthoftimewhichFranco'soffensiveshadtakenuptillnow,itwasfullypossiblethatthe
warwouldcontinueanother3years.Ontheotherhand,a100percentvictoryforFrancowasnotdesirable
either,fromtheGermanpointofview;ratherwereweinterestedinacontinuanceofthewarandinthe
keepingupofthetensionintheMediterranean.FrancoinundisputedpossessionoftheSpanishPeninsula
precludedthepossibilityofanyfurtherinterventiononthepartoftheItaliansoroftheircontinued
occupationoftheBalearicIslands.AsourinterestlaymoreintheprolongationofthewarinSpain,itmust
betheimmediateaimofourpolicytostrengthenItaly'srearwithaviewtoherremainingintheBalearics.
ButthepermanentestablishmentoftheItaliansontheBalearicswouldbeintolerablebothtoFranceand
Britain,andmightleadtoawarofFranceandEnglandagainstItalyawarinwhichSpain,shouldshebe
entirelyinthehandsoftheWhites,mightmakeherappearanceonthesideofItaly'senemies.The
probabilityofItaly'sdefeatinsuchawarwasslight,fortheroadfromGermanywasopenforthe
supplementingofherrawmaterials.TheFuehrerpicturedthemilitarystrategyforItalythus:onher
westernfrontierwithFranceshewouldremainonthedefensive,andcarryonthewaragainstFrancefrom
LibyaagainsttheFrenchNorthAfricancolonialpossessions.
AsalandingbyFrancoBritishtroopsonthecoastofItalycouldbediscounted,andaFrenchoffensive
overtheAlpsagainstnorthernItalywouldbeverydifficultandwouldprobablycometoahaltbeforethe
strongItalianfortifications,thecrucialpoint[Schwerpunkt]oftheoperationslayinNorthAfrica.The
threattoFrenchlinesofcommunicationbytheItalianFleetwouldtoagreatextentcripplethe
transportationofforcesfromNorthAfricatoFrance,sothatFrancewouldhaveonlyhomeforcesather
disposalonthefrontierswithItalyandGermany.
IfGermanymadeuseofthiswartosettletheCzechandAustrianquestions,itwastobeassumedthat
BritainherselfatwarwithItalywoulddecidenottoactagainstGermany.WithoutBritishsupport,a
warlikeactionbyFranceagainstGermanywasnottobeexpected.
ThetimeforourattackontheCzechsandAustriamustbemadedependentonthecourseoftheAnglo
FrenchItalianwarandwouldnotnecessarilycoincidewiththecommencementofmilitaryoperationsby
thesethreeStates.NorhadtheFuehrerinmindmilitaryagreementswithItaly,butwanted,whileretaining
hisownindependenceofaction,toexploitthisfavorablesituation,whichwouldnotoccuragain,tobegin
andcarrythroughthecampaignagainsttheCzechs.ThisdescentupontheCzechswouldhavetobecarried
outwith"lightningspeed."
InappraisingthesituationFieldMarshalvonBlombergandColonelGeneralvonFritschrepeatedly
emphasizedthenecessitythatBritainandFrancemustnotappearintheroleofourenemies,andstatedthat
theFrenchArmywouldnotbesocommittedbythewarwithItalythatFrancecouldnotatthesametime
enterthefieldwithforcessuperiortooursonourwesternfrontier.GeneralvonFritschestimatedthe
probableFrenchforcesavailableforuseontheAlpinefrontieratapproximatelytwentydivisions,sothata
strongFrenchsuperioritywouldstillremainonthewesternfrontier,withtherole,accordingtotheGerman

view,ofinvadingtheRhineland.Inthismatter,moreover,theadvancedstateofFrenchdefense
preparations[Mobiolmachung]mustbetakenintoparticularaccount,anditmustberememberedapart
fromtheinsignificantvalueofourpresentfortificationsonwhichFieldMarshalvonBlomberglaid
specialemphasisthatthefourmotorizeddivisionsintendedfortheWestwerestillmoreorlessincapable
ofmovement.Inregardtoouroffensivetowardthesoutheast,FieldMarshalvonBlombergdrewparticular
attentiontothestrengthoftheCzechfortifications,whichhadacquiredbynowastructurelikeaMaginot
Lineandwhichwouldgravelyhamperourattack.
GeneralvonFritschmentionedthatthiswastheverypurposeofastudywhichhehadorderedmadethis
winter,namely,toexaminethepossibilityofconductingoperationsagainsttheCzechswithspecial
referencetoovercomingtheCzechfortificationsystem;theGeneralfurtherexpressedhisopinion.that
underexistingcircumstanceshemustgiveuphisplantogoabroadonhisleave,whichwasduetobeginon
November10.TheFuehrerdismissedthisideaonthegroundthatthepossibilityofaconflictneednotyet
beregardedasimminent.TotheForeignMinister'sobjectionthatanAngloFrenchItalianconflictwasnot
yetwithinsuchameasurabledistanceastheFuehrerSeemedtoassume,theFuehrerputthesummerof
1938asthedatewhichseemedtohimpossibleforthis.InreplytoconsiderationsofferedbyFieldMarshal
vonBlombergandGeneralvonFritschregardingtheattitudeofBritainandFrance,theFuehrerrepeated
hispreviousstatementsthathewasconvincedofBritain'snonparticipation,andthereforehedidnotbelieve
intheprobabilityofbelligerentactionbyFranceagainstGermany.ShouldtheMediterraneanconflict
underdiscussionleadtoageneralmobilizationinEurope,thenwemustimmediatelybeginactionagainst
theCzechs.Ontheotherhand,shouldthepowersnotengagedinthewardeclarethemselvesdisinterested,
thenGermanywouldhavetoadoptasimilarattitudetothisforthetimebeing.
ColonelGeneralGoringthoughtthat,inviewoftheFuehrer'sstatement,weshouldconsiderliquidatingour
militaryundertakingsinSpain.TheFuehreragreestothiswiththelimitationthathethinksheshould
reserveadecisionforapropermoment.
Thesecondpartoftheconferencewasconcernedwithconcretequestionsofarmament.
HOSSBACH
CertifiedCorrect:
Colonel(GeneralStaff)
Source:
DocumentsonGermanyForeignPolicy19181945
SeriesDVolume1
FromNeurathtoRibbentrop
(September1937September1938)
Washington,UnitedStatesGovernmentPrintingOffice,1949.