G.R. No.

L-2068

October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First

Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo
L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court
for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the
peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the
accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel
the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at
the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We
called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be
confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings'
nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be
done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused
under the due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went
farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the
justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs
against the petitioner.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the

Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by
counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the
justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded
guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking
section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the
accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to
present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the
corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for the
purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace
had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the
complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they
might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said
that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of
the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing
in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to
pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
truth."chanrobles virtual law library

G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant, vs. TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for

herself and in representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and
TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL JALAGAT,
defendants-appellees.

the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So
ordered]" 2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in
accordance with law.

FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K.
Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is
whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial
notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment
relied upon. Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance
is thus called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed
by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on
March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the
argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly
unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574
filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now
deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said Civil Case No.
1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of
Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the
same parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus
the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No.
1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already
been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this
Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]." 1 There was an opposition on the
part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment
or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face
of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint
from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966,
came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss
filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which
this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's
complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat,
defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in
an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new
Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby
[dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be
pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over

1.
The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be
raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of
the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in
conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was no
denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a
previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-ininterest of defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the
deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was no denial
either of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decsion
in the previous case which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any
support in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the
case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant.
What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being
engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was
predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of
Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility.
It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower
court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case
that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was
done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran
is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration." 3
2.
There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could
be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention
the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which
appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the
valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless
find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v.
Villamor, 4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at
the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties,
and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our
legal system in mind. 5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed.
With costs against plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-17885

June 30, 1965

GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO, JR.,
defendants-appellees.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for plaintiff-appellant.
Quijano and Azores and J. P. Arroyo for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Gabriel P. Prieto appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 4280.
Since only questions of law are involved the appeal has been certified to this
Court.
In 1948 Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
a petition for registration of several parcels of land, including Lot No. 2, Plan
Psu-106730 (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025). After the proper proceedings
Original Certificate of Title No. 39 covering said lot was issued in his name. The
same year and in the same Court Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration
of an adjoining parcel of land, described as Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-117522 (L.R.C.
No. 173; G.L.R.O. No. 1474). As a result Original Certificate of Title No. 11 was
issued in his name.
After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., Original Certificate of Title No. 39 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 227 was issued in
the names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, namely Meden Jack, Joker,
Nonito and Zeferino, Jr., all surnamed Arroyo.
On March 6, 1956 said heirs filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
a petition (L.R.C. No. 144; G.L.R.O. No. 1025; Special Proceedings No. 900) in
which they claimed that the technical description set forth in their transfer
certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor did not
conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court, and
was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore prayed that said
description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act;
that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one issued to them
containing the correct technical description. The petition was filed in the
registration record but was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 900.
On May 23, 1956 the court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 227 of Lot 2 in Plan Psu-106730 so as to make it conform
to that embodied in the decision of the Court on March 8, 1950, and to correct
therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to
'Meden Arroyo'.

On November 29, 1956 Prieto filed against the defendants in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur (in the original registration records of the two lots) a
petition to annul the order of May 23 in Special Proceedings No. 900. At the
hearing of the petition on July 12, 1957 neither he nor his counsel appeared.
Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order dismissing the
petition for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration of that order was
denied on September 5, 1957.
On September 2, 1958 Prieto filed against the same defendants the present
action for annulment of Special Proceedings No. 900 and the order therein
entered on May 23, 1956. He also prayed that the 157 square meters allegedly
taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Plaintiff opposed, and on January 15, 1959 the court granted the motion. It is
from the order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its reconsideration,
that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant maintains that the institution of Special Proceedings No. 900 was
irregular and illegal mainly because he was not notified thereof and the same
was instituted almost six years after the issuance of the decree and title sought
to be corrected, and hence the order of the court dated May 23, 1956 for the
correction of the technical description in appellees' title is void ab initio.
The issue here, however, is not the validity of said Special Proceedings No. 900
but the propriety of the dismissal of appellant's complaint on the ground of res
adjudicata. The validity of the said proceedings was the issue in the first case he
filed. But because of his failure and that of his counsel to attend the hearing the
court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Since no appeal was taken
from the order of dismissal it had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
the court not having provided otherwise (Rule 30, Section 3).
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment
because the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did not file any
opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand,
allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they
were served copies of the petition. This allegation finds support in the record,
particularly in the following statement of appellant in his brief:
This petition was originally set for hearing on December 8, 1956, but was
postponed to January 14, 1957, due to lack of notice to the respondents. Upon
motion for postponements of respondents, now defendants-appellees, the
hearing of January 14, 1957 was postponed to May 16, 1957. The hearing set for
May 16, 1957 was again postponed upon motion of the respondents to July 12,
1957.
Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his
first petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to
support it, the matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No.

144, G.L.R.O. No. 1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well
within the judicial notice and cognizance of the said court.
In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro,
Laguna, et al. v. Colegio de San Jose, et al., 65 Phil. 318). Secondly, if appellant
had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should
have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of
sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which
the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic,
as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said
order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is
untenable.
Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both
appellant seeks that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside.
Of no material significance is the fact that in the complaint in the instant case
there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters of land,
taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For that area would
necessarily have reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief
asked for by him being that "the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered
to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by incorporating therein only and solely the
description of Lot No. 2, plan Psu-106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165
and maintaining consequently the description limits and area of the adjoining
land of the herein petitioner, Lot No. 3, plan Psu-117522, in accordance with
Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The claim for damages as well
as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not
materially different from his prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable
in the premises" contained in the former one.
There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the
two cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the
institution of the second.
The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

G.R. No. 85423

May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not
have taken into account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440
square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for
recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by
the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was
required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to
the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's
instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she
requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all
her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,
which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her
death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta,
Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made
upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot,
which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II
and had been living thereon since then and until they died. Also disbelieved was
his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a
different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by
the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its
factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B"
and "C", which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in
evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the
subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October
4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the
letter indicating that the amount of P600.00the first P300.00 and then another
P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the
letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by
Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of
Exh. "C".

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the
allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in
evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted
at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by the trial court of
testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the
above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings,
which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of
probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not include Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits "A-1,
"A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits formally
offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of
the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A,"
"B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted
transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is
true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the pre-trial of the case
below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. They
were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific
Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to
formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then
again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
patties at the trial. 4
We did say in People vs. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an
exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the
said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been
formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified
on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel.
We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the

documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of

the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
LEGASPI:
A

That is this Exh. "A" about ?

The translation of the letter.

Q
What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan
Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court:

The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error
in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard
which was closely connected with the case before it. It conceded that as a
general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending b before the same judge. 7 Nevertheless, it applied the
exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its
archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence
of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or
with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or
part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and
"admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions
have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the
trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the
matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him,
leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly
took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not
be fatal to the plaintiff's cause because "the said testimony was merely

corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What "other

evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to
corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been
formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we
feel that the complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure
of the plaintiff to substantiate its allegations. It has failed to prove that the
subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo
Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming
it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta,
Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court,
"there is no question that before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa
Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly conveyed title to property that
did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner.
No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we
have held in many cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to
the accepted and well-known exception. In the case at bar, it is not even
disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted
fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling
evidence of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the
land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in
supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the
subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for
more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of
land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property
and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at
least require her to pay the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation
given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with the property,
being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America.
That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that
unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in the first
place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of
payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On the other
hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not
have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by

Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in
her own name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that
they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed,
she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid the realty taxes thereon in
her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14
He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to
two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote
ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent's claim that the
petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by
Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of
the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no
showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such
findings do not conform to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have
no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have
been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also
erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took
judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in
violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged
are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained
by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court,
failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence
properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is
substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that
should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-26053

February 21, 1967

CITY
OF
MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO
NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN,
AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE

AYUDA LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA

RIPARIP, JOSE
BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1 ELENA
RAMOS,
ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO,
MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA
VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ
(MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD
MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

9. Jose Barrientos

SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area,
bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered
by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from
1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building
permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been
discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno,
Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania
Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan
and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by
Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract" to
occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth.
Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A.
Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January
29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none.

39.53

4.74

744.18

10.
Cecilia
Manzano
in
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased)
46.65

5.60

Paid
up
Feb. 1962.

11. Elena Ramos

34.80

2.78

186.26

12. Estefania Nepacina

41.80

3.34

504.34

13. Modesta Sanchez

33.48

2.68

444.88

14. Marcial Lazaro

22.40

1.79

688.32

15. Marciana Alano

25.80

2.06

255.44

16. Honorio Berio

24.00

1.92

188.16

17. Gloria Velasco

32.40

2.59

56.98

18. Wilarico Ricamata

45.83

3.67

739.68

19. Benedicto Diaz

40.20

4.82

Paid
up
March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan

64.26

7.71

30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang

45.03

5.40

437.40

22. Juan N. Pecayo

25.52

3.06

30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda

48.02

5.76

132.48

to

to

P7,580.69
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.1wph1.t
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

NAME

Area
in
sq.m.

Monthly
Rental

Amt.
due
from
date of delinquency
to Feb. 1962

1. Gerardo Garcia

66.00

P7.92

P1,628.97

2. Modesta C. Parayno

87.75

10.53

379.08

3. Juan Asperas

39.00

4.68

9.36

4. Maria Tabia

35.20

5.76

570.24

54.00

4.32

99.36

6. Laureano Dizo

35.00

2.80

22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda

39.60

3.17

323.34

8. Isabelo Obaob

75.52

9.06

208.38

5.
Aquilino
(Leonora Ruiz)

Barrios

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On
September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive
to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30)
days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in
February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the
occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this
suit to recover possession.2
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the
amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their
monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the
costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court
properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.
The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites
that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the
1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of

the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the
court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But
then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views.
He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises
for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is
within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. 3 Such was done
here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its
contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case
solely for this purpose.4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken
because the was duty bound to take judicial notice 5 of Ordinance 4566. The
reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to
take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of
Manila.6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional
building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.
Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that
they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are
recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused
to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the
premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area
cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If
error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is
harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below. 7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants.
They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without
the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city
permits.
These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters:
Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has
become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose
problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They
constitute proof that respect for the law and the rights of others, even those of
the government, are being flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the
pernicious act of occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to
their interests without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the
owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief that they could
violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up
the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from recovering
possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by
them. They know, of course, that intrusion into property, government or private,
is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers

who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the
day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly,
is abetted by the apathy of some public officials to enforce the government's
rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by
official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters
have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them,
violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much
to the detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and
the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we look into the validity
of the permits granted defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the
mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and
when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades
have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they
wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that
they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal,
without permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands"
of the City of Manila.9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in
question. It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot
legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving
permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city
officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry
and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of
conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral
decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It
has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting
should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an
orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give
permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are
null and void.
3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the
premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school
purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing
school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial
problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the
general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is
paramount.10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid

constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and
impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the
prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. 11 They shackle the hands of
the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained
obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public
nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities
themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
They say that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They
prop up their position by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only
served in September, 1961, and suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal
ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. We have reached the
conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947.
That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to
remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year limitation
set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction.14
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against
defendants-appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 152392

May 26, 2005

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI).

ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference
without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order5 dated
August 8, 2000.

The Antecedents
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic
of South Korea and licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general
manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was
Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against
ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the
principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorneys fees and exemplary damages.
The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal
counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo
was not authorized to execute the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the
motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was
registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that
Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said
opposition was the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was
the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had
been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of
Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his
motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the
said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently
filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.

ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the
RTC. In its comment on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
SECRETARYS/RESIDENT AGENTS CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and appointed
Corporate Secretary and Resident Agent of KOREAN AIRLINES, a foreign
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Korea and also duly registered and authorized to do business in the
Philippines, with office address at Ground Floor, LPL Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro
St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a special meeting
of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on June 25, 1999 at which a
quorum was present, the said Board unanimously passed, voted upon and
approved the following resolution which is now in full force and effect, to wit:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates
or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever
legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert
Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate,
defend, sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-Trial Proceedings and enter
into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of
January, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines.
(Sgd.)

Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit3 of even date, executed by

its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors
conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference, the
board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute
the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim
also alleged, however, that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid
resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 denying the motion to
dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that
the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999,
during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.

MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Resident Agent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January, 1999, Atty.
Mario A. Aguinaldo exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No.
14914545, issued on January 7, 2000 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 119;
Page No. 25;
Book No. XXIV
Series of 2000.
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA

Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition,
ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by
Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to
the appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board
resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As
such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said
teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied.
Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the Court by way of petition for review
on certiorari and raises the following issue:
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS
QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS QUESTIONED RESOLUTION,
ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?7
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Court can be determined only from the contents of the complaint and not by
documents or pleadings outside thereof. Hence, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, and the CA erred in
considering the affidavit of the respondents general manager, as well as the
Secretarys/Resident Agents Certification and the resolution of the board of
directors contained therein, as proof of compliance with the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner also maintains that the
RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said teleconference without prior hearing,
nor any motion therefor. The petitioner reiterates its submission that the
teleconference and the resolution adverted to by the respondent was a mere
fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern technology
is used in the field of business is a factual issue; hence, cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On the
merits of the petition, it insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident agent and
corporate secretary, is authorized to sign and execute the certificate of nonforum shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top of the
board resolution approved during the teleconference of June 25, 1999. The
respondent insists that "technological advances in this time and age are as
commonplace as daybreak." Hence, the courts may take judicial notice that the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. had provided a record of
corporate conferences and meetings through FiberNet using fiber-optic
transmission technology, and that such technology facilitates voice and image
transmission with ease; this makes constant communication between a foreignbased office and its Philippine-based branches faster and easier, allowing for
cost-cutting in terms of travel concerns. It points out that even the E-Commerce
Law has recognized this modern technology. The respondent posits that the

courts are aware of this development in technology; hence, may take judicial
notice thereof without need of hearings. Even if such hearing is required, the
requirement is nevertheless satisfied if a party is allowed to file pleadings by
way of comment or opposition thereto.
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of
teleconferencing as a means of conducting meetings of board of directors for
purposes of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is recognized
as a legitimate means of gathering a quorum of board of directors, such cannot
be taken judicial notice of by the court. It asserts that safeguards must first be
set up to prevent any mischief on the public or to protect the general public
from any possible fraud. It further proposes possible amendments to the
Corporation Code to give recognition to such manner of board meetings to
transact business for the corporation, or other related corporate matters; until
then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing cannot be the subject of judicial
notice.
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting on
June 25, 1999 through teleconferencing where Atty. Aguinaldo was supposedly
given such an authority is a farce, considering that there was no mention of
where it was held, whether in this country or elsewhere. It insists that the
Corporation Code requires board resolutions of corporations to be submitted to
the SEC. Even assuming that there was such a teleconference, it would be
against the provisions of the Corporation Code not to have any record thereof.
The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by the
respondent in its pleadings were mere fabrications foisted by the respondent
and its counsel on the RTC, the CA and this Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect

contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and

criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory8 and that the failure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party,
an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.
Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he
has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware of
such facts.9 Hence, the requisite certification executed by the plaintiffs counsel
will not suffice.10
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be
signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized
person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be established by the documents. The reason was explained by the
Court in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 as follows:

Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the

complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule is
that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the dismissal
of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is impermissible.
However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow subsequent
compliance with the rule.12 If the authority of a partys counsel to execute a
certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the adverse party, the former is
required to show proof of such authority or representation.
In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority
of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the requisite verification and certificate of nonforum shopping as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent. It was,
thus, incumbent upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and establish
that Atty. Aguinaldo had such authority to execute the requisite verification and
certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to do so.
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which was incorporated
in the complaint and signed by Atty. Aguinaldo reads:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Suite 210
Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini cor. P. Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila, after having
sworn to in accordance with law hereby deposes and say: THAT -

Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through
properly delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.

1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the above
entitled case and have caused the preparation of the above complaint;

2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained therein are
true and correct based on the records on files;

The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are
incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through
its board of directors and/or its duly-authorized officers and agents. Physical
acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons
duly-authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the
board of directors. "All acts within the powers of a corporation may be
performed by agents of its selection; and except so far as limitations or
restrictions which may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or statutory
provisions, the same general principles of law which govern the relation of
agency for a natural person govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of
whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the corporation; and
agents once appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the
same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private
persons."

For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its
own retained counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and president,
may not even know the details required therein.

3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If I
subsequently learned that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any tribunal or agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or agency
within five (5) days from such notice/knowledge.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 1999, affiant
exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 00671047 issued on January
7, 1999 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 1005;
Page No. 198;
Book No. XXI

Series of 1999.
(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913
As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that Atty.
Aguinaldo had been authorized to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping
by the respondents Board of Directors; moreover, no such board resolution was
appended thereto or incorporated therein.
While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines,
this does not mean that he is authorized to execute the requisite certification
against forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code, the authority of the resident agent of a foreign corporation
with license to do business in the Philippines is to receive, for and in behalf of
the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in all actions and
other legal proceedings against such corporation, thus:
SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. A resident agent may either be an
individual residing in the Philippines or a domestic corporation lawfully
transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an
individual, he must be of good moral character and of sound financial standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and Exchange
Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license
to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such
corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power
of attorney designating some persons who must be a resident of the Philippines,
on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all actions
or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service
upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon
the duly-authorized officers of the foreign corporation as its home office.14
Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a
certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of actions filed
against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines),
such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its principal, whether in
the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the
country where such corporation was organized and registered, against a
Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent, was
not specifically authorized to execute the said certification. It attempted to show
its compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its complaint by
submitting, on March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to have been approved by

its Board of Directors during a teleconference held on June 25, 1999, allegedly
with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance. However, such attempt of
the respondent casts veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a
teleconference was held, but also on the approval by the Board of Directors of
the resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset
of modern technology, persons in one location may confer with other persons in
other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and
Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents Board of Directors in
South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave credence to the
respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the
affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldos certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide
in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true
and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which
are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of
man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence
of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.17
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that
business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing.
Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in
two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they
are separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may
be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video
conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2)
computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals,

and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with

optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings.
It was first introduced in the 1960s with American Telephone and Telegraphs
Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new technology.
Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly
service charge for using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a
novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication.20 In time,
people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business
and corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other
advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a
distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little
expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are
shorter and more oriented to the primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference
from any location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate
teleconferencing.

and/or

unreliable

transportation

may

necessitate

5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.

6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person
monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not
alter the complexity of group communication. Although it may be easier to
communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate.
Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of
meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board
of directors of private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792.
The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No.
15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related
to such conferences.24 Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the
Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea
relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in
a teleconference along with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is
not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is
not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping.

7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.

8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information
exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences
than an FTF meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences
because of the following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation
or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and
meeting skills.

The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, on its
contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in
its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty.
Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the identification
card25 of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely
showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional
Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the
teleconference only during the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then
prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the board
resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the
required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion.26
The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more
days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its main office in
Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order27 dated February 11, 2000.
The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said

resolution, until March 6, 2000.28 It was on the said date that the respondent
submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia,
that he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999,
where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates
or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever
legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert
Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate,
defend, sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and
prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial Proceedings and enter
into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.29

The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on
June 25, 1999 never took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by
the respondents Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a mere
concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the
dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice,
the complaint of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent
"do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no records
of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept. This belied the
respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of
time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main
office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the impression that it
needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later
(via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover,
Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was embodied in the
Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no
such resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a
teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved the said resolution (with Atty.
Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such
allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been
approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent
should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy
thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the
respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the
Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a
copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later that
no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent
alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the Board of Directors where the
resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had
signed a Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate alleging that the board of
directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was
appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More
importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was signed
by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year
later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not explain its failure to append the said
certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It
was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment in the CA
that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate30 dated January
10, 2000.

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO

S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,
Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS),
Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel
respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November
28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to
local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from
Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:

Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the
operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and
integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and
operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by
the OIL COMPANIES.

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta.
Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land
bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata
St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the
west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest.
The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St.,
Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer
zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL
COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and
intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down program.

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of

which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period
of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to
cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the
Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with
the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the
following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.

Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the
safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a
period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution
No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4,
2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under
Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the
MOU and the resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that the
ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has
not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full
force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from
enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered
as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may
be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that
is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty
that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it
must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to
be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The
principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not
to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ
to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established.
Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party
registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as
it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has
no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we
stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have
made the respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or
uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that
is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the
Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made
it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest
of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation
that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals.
No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the
right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he
was then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special
Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they
are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge
Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee
nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales
for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased
[Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married
on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate
children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest
among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the

administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.

107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1)
Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo,
pp. 49-64;]
(2)
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3)
Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are
the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah
as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp.
68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the
probate court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1)
Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita SyBernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat
with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage for many years:
(2)
Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat
to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China (sic);
(3)
Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in
favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the
Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said
property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4)
Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12;
Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective
appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v.
Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen"

questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition
and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment
was made in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was
initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the
petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the
denial and decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign
the following as errors:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA
SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS
NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 6.]
I.
Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance
with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this
argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice
during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and
in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an]
agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she
and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were
sent out; that the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children
with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah,
Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already
38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and
her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the
Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her
marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of
the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in
China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who
is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if
the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law,
then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the
parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the
bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the
wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19,
1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic)
where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride

would give the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed
by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines;
that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the
bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves
do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage
where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching
the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her
wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many
persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old
ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy
Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she
and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in
China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in
the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years and because
they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after
her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines
sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went
to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went
back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to
China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated
that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister
with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the
trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to
Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife
whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p.
54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on
October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status
Married"; "If married give name of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of
marriage1931"; and "Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12,
1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried";
and, 'If married, state name and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China"
[Exhibit "4".]

And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the
Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the
information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs.
Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien,
the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and
Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said
marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the
Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta,
Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL
Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state
that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence,
if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid
foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the

Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette
Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative
to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not
only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law
or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with
said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.

pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the

contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds
true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case
did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the
oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage
in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should
be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the
Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was
celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her
marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong
Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II.
The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not
duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had
been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137
(1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle
that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be
alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30
Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial
letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential
requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his
testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on
the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of
whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly
proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed
taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case,
petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still
the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or
eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)]
as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial

(1)
Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living
in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2)
the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze
Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3)
an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a
marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter
[Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her
he has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze
Kai Choshe knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269,
Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy
Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho
and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twentyfive (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their
father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into
by and between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on
February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children
by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future
inheritance, thus:

2.
The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and
wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to
definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children,
namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953;
Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3.
With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... ,
the parties mutually agree and covenant that
(a)
The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall
be divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall
own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b)
the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat.
However, it shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount
of One Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors
of the same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
(5)
With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real
estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion
Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates
and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely,
Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage
to Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been
ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of
the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:

SEC. 91-A.

Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.

The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

(2)
Cases involving custody, guardianship,
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3)
Annulment of marriages, relief from
separation of spouses, and actions for support;

adoption,

marital

revocation

obligations,

of

legal

(4)
Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven,
chapters one to three of the civil code;
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA
1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the
Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v.
Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no
longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in
Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the
main case.
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976,
72 SCRA 307]:
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a
case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident
in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215,
July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration
proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings
on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72
SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly,
this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8200

March 17, 1914

LEONARD LUCIDO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GELASIO CALUPITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Pedro Guevara for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
In this case it appears that some chattels and real estate belonging to the
plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold at an execution sale on February 10, 1903,
to one Rosales, who the text day transferred a one-half interest in the property
of Zolaivar. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed and signed by
all of the above parties and the defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was
stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights
had obligation pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan for the
amount of the purchase price together with 1 per cent per month interest
thereon up to the time of redemption, or 1,687 Mexican dollars, plus 33.74
Mexican dollars, the amount of the interest. It will be observed that the
computation of the transfer price is in accordance with section 465 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. On the same day Lucido and Calupitan executed the following
document:
I, Gelasio Calupitan y Agarao, married, certify that I have delivered this
statement to Leonardo Lucido y Vidal to witness that his lands, which appear in
the instrument I hold from the deputy sheriff and for which he has accepted
money from me, I have ceded to him all the irrigated lands until such time as he
may repurchase all said lands from me (not only he irrigated ones), as also the
Vienna chairs, the five-lamp chandelier, a lamp stand, two wall tables, and a
marble table; no coconut tree on said irrigated land is included. Apart from this,
our real agreement is to permit three (3) whole year to elapse, reckoned from
the date of this instrument, which has been drawn up n duplicate, before he
may redeem or repurchase them from me.
The lower court held that this document constituted a sale with the right to
conventional redemption set forth in articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. The
present action not having been instituted until February 17, 1910, the fur the

question arose as to whether the redemption period had expired, which the
lower court decided in the negative. The lower court further found as a fact that
Lucido had prior to the institution of the action offered the redemption price to
the defendant, who refused it, and that this offer was a sufficient compliance
with article 1518 of the Civil Code. The decision of the lower court was that the
property in question should be returned to the plaintiff. From this judgment the
defendant appealed, and all three of the above rulings of the court are assigned
as errors.
1.
Considerable doubt might arise as to the correctness of the ruling of
the lower court upon the first question, if the document executed by the
execution purchasers and the parties to this action stood alone. In that
document it appears that Calupitan acquired the rights and obligations of the
execution purchasers pertaining to the property in question. These rights and
obligations are defined in the Code of Civil Procedure to be the ownership of the
property sold, subject only to the right of redemption on the part of the
judgment debtor or a redemptioner, within one year from the date of the sale.
(Secs. 463-465, Code Civ. Proc.) Were this the nature of the transaction between
the parties, however, the intervention of Lucido in the transfer would be wholly
unnecessary. Hence, the fact that he intervened as an interested party is at
least some indication that the parties intended something more or different by
the document in question than a simple assignment of the rights and
obligations of the execution purchasers to a third person.
Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the
agreement entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In this
document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is
preserved to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The
right to repurchase must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale
with the right to conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to
the complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff
over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper, especially in view
of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was the time acting as
his own attorney.
Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the earlier cases were
not in harmony on the point, says:
Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were
based on the theory that most of the allegations were merely pleader's matter
-- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern
tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as statements of the real
issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight
according to the circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still
hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some proof
that he has authorized it.

On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations
in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original
pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence.
In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of
sale with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et
seq. of the Civil Code.
It further appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff that he
furnished $20 Mexican of the account necessary to redeem the property from
the execution purchasers. It therefore appears beyond dispute that the
redemption of the property from the execution purchasers was made by the
plaintiff himself by means of a loan furnished by the defendant Calupitan, who
took possession of the major portion of the land as his security for its
redemption. The ruling of the lower court the transaction between Lucido and
Calupitan was one of purchase and sale with the right to redeem was therefore
correct.
2.
By the terms of his agreement with Calupitan the plaintiff could not
exercise his right to redeem the property within three years from March 30,
1903; and the lower court arrived at the date upon which the right to redeem
expired by computing five years from March 30, 1906, on the ground that there
was no express agreement as to how long the right to repurchase, once
available, should continue. Counsel for the appellant admits in his brief that the
complaint was filed forty-three days before the expiration of this period. In
accordance with our decision in Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep.,
495), we hold that this ruling of the court was correct.
3.
The court held that the plaintiff had actually tendered the redemption
price to the defendant Calupitan. After an examination of the evidence of record
as to this finding of fact, we concur therein. We discussed the legal sufficiency
of such tender in the above-cited case of Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza, and
held that it was sufficient. This assignment of error must therefore be held to be
unfounded.
4.
The defendants Oreta and Bueno have no interest in the subject matter
of this action. it appears that the defendant Dorado purchased the land from his
codefendant Calupitan subsequent to the tender of the redemption price to the
latter by the plaintiff. It does not appear that the property was ever registered
by any one, nor was the document of sale with the right to repurchase
registered by either Calupitan or Lucido. No evidence of the purchase of the
land from Calupitan by Dorado is of record with the exception of the oral
testimony although it may be taken as established that such a sale actually took
place, since all the parties interested agree on this point. Dorado himself
testified that he purchased the property with the knowledge that Calupitan had
purchased the property from Lucido subject to the right of redemption and
insists that he purchased with the knowledge and consent of Lucido. Lucido
denies that he was aware of the sale of Dorado until after it had taken place.
Upon this state on facts, it is clear that the following provisions of article 1510
of the Civil Code are applicable:

The vendor may bring his action against every possessor whose right arises that
of the vendee, even though in the second contract no mention should have
been made of the conventional redemption; without prejudice to the provisions
of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons.
The provisions of the Mortgage Law with regard to third persons are clearly not
applicable to Dorado. (Manresa, vol., 10, p. 317.)
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
5.
The lower court ordered the redelivery of the land to the plaintiff upon
his payment to Calupitan of P1,600, plus the costs entailed in the execution of
the document of repurchase. The amount paid to the purchaser at the execution
sale for the redemption of the property was $1,720.74 Mexican. Of this amount
the plaintiff furnished $120 Mexican, and Calupitan the balance of $1,600.74
Mexican. No amount is fixed in the document of purchase and sale above set
forth, but the amount borrowed from Calupitan to redeem the land from the
execution sale being thus clearly established no objection can be or is made to
the plaintiff's paying this amount. In ordering the payment of this amount to the
defendant the lower court failed to reduce it to Philippine currency. On this
appeal plaintiff alleges that this amount in Mexican currency exceeds the
amount he actually owes to the defendant by about P100, but that rather than
spend the time and incur the expense attendant to new trial for the purpose of
determining the equivalent of his amount in Philippine currency he is agreeable
to pay the defendant P1,600.74 Philippine currency, as the redemption price of
the property. In view of this offer and in case it is accepted by the defendant it
will be unnecessary to go through formality of a new trial for the purpose of
ascertaining the amount of the fact that it is claimed that Calupitan has sold the
land in question to his codefendant, Macario Dorado, and it not clearly
appearing to whom the plaintiff should pay the P1.600.74, we think this amount
should be turned over to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Laguna to be held by him until it is determined in the proper manner who is
the owner of this amount, Calupitan for Dorado.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered directing the defendants
Calupitan and Dorado to deliver the possession of the land in question to the
plaintiff upon the plaintiff's depositing with the clerk of the court the sum of
P1,600.74, to be disposed of in the manner above set forth. In all other respects
the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants
Calupitan and Dorado.

MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO,
AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO,
BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO,
ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO,
respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays
that the judgment rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated
cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R
entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et
al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The
Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in the
alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private
respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the
friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square meters.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the name of the
legal heirs of Margarita Torres.

The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres,
during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina
were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina
married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero
Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to
Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with
Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the
institution of the cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957, 2 during the
pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu
Arbole, without benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria
Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and
baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest
of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father
and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C"
Another Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while
her father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909,
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived
with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December
20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14,
1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been
leased temporarily by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who
was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the lease cannot be determined
with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government,
through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No.
222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual
installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited
to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid
the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands,
Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936,
or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and
transferred in a notarial deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of
Lot No. 551 and asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with
the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands issued the
corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.

petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the
daughters of Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against
petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Cavite,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551
before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No.
5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the
spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated
child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged
exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the
complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on
November 20, 1958 with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property
of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of
the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed.
Pending its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in
the complete destruction of the records of the two cases, which, however, were
later partially reconstituted.
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued
an Order granting reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20,
1958. The positive portion thereof reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1)
Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2)
Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a
conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3)
Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate
to Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children
and heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already
dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness,
however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot
where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case
the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.

On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for

Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that
petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent,
constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part,

Without costs in both cases. 5

In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:

It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her
parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each
other. There was no legal impediment for them to marry It has also been
established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and
reared by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also
shows that Macaria Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also
the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her father is Leon Arvisu
and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents
were married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated daughter of on
Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6

Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter,
children shall be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when
they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement
of a natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public
document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment
of a natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism of Macaria A. Torres
(Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This article of
the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a will
or other public document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other
words, in the civil register (Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9

Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7

rendered the judgment sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which
states:

A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed
by petitioner. In support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn
Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita
Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:

SWORN STATEMENT
(1)
Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the
spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2)
Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a
conjugal partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
and
(3)
Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children
and heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the
parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners
to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or
after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in
their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her
parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows
that she was given the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the
status of an acknowledged natural child.

We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority
age, and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after
being duly sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of
wedlock on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was
legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married
without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that
of her mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her
father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper
remedy be made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as
desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th
day of March 1930.

(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU
MARGARITA TORRES

Signed in the prsence of:

(Sgd.) Illegible

(Sgd.) Macaria Bautista

x----------------------------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS )
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon
Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going
over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate
being exempt on account of her sex.

overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente

Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria
A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters
with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and
nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court
of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of
Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and the
heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that,
without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be
considered a legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of the
status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc. will not amount to
automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still
necessary, which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the
putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12

Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
Not. Reg. No. 56
P. No. 2
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial
was that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A.
Bautista, among the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente
Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have attempted to
suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and
contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been
produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three,
composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente.
When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial was considered, there was
disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial should be granted in
respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was
then formed, composed of Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes
P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or
having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the
Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both reconsideration and new
trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two
assignments of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not
the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has

The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents'

original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and
nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20,
1931. (Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and
is controlling in the determination of her participation in the disputed property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents
in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the
statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who
died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The
latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a
pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered
it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character
as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became
merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence,
required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can
be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for
failure to offer it in evidence. 14
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer
(parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:

[G.R. No. 108028. July 30, 1996]

Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous
in view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part
of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered
as it was found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse
party, after his death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible
miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the
Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural
due process, a new trial would resolve such vital considerations as (1) whether
or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed in
Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of
acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as
required by Article 121 of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's
signature as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the consent
necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that
Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon petitioner the status of a
legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights
to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the
document she should be chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and,
therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our view,
the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered evidence, which
could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due
diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an
adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by
respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate
Court for new trial, and depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve
the respective participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of
the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ,

accused-appellant.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in
relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code,[1] committed as
follows:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between December 14, 1988
to December 24, 1988, inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad
to the following persons to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI,
SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P.
VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD T.
CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (hereinafter known as
private complainants) without first having secured the required license or
authority from the POEA."[2] (underscoring supplied.)
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
Of the fourteen (14) private complainants, four (4) were presented as witnesses
for the prosecution, namely: Benito L. Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P.
Mendoza and Arnel Mendoza. They testified to the following essential facts:
Private complainants' first encounter with the appellant was on December 12,
1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the office of the Philippine
Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet the appellant.
Introducing herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant
asserted that her company recruited workers for placement abroad and asked
private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipeh.
Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per month
salary, private complainants applied. Appellant required private complainants to
pay placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per
applicant, to be paid in three installments, to wit: P1,500 on December 14,
1988, P10,000.00 on December 16, 1988, and P11,000.00 on December 22,
1988. When the complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they
were issued receipts by Liza Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai
signed by the latter in the presence of the appellant. The receipts for the last
installment paid by them were signed by Liza Mendoza, and the appellant. After
having received the entire amount[3] from the witnesses, appellant assured
them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of
December, 1988. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses
were unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money
but to no avail. Appellant's unfulfilled promise of employment and her refusal to

return the money that had been paid by way of placement and passport fees,
triggered the filing of the complaint.
For its part, the defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose
testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges against her. Appellant
claimed that she never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit
any of them. She likewise denied having received money from anyone and
asserted that she did not know any Liza Mendoza who is the alleged treasurer of
Philippine-Thai. Appellant maintained that although she had an office in Ermita
Building located at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the said office belonged to
B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was engaged in the logging
business. However, when questioned further, appellant admitted being the
president of Philippine-Thai but only in a nominal capacity, and claimed that as
nominee-president, she did not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant
likewise insisted that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog
business.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED "LIABLE OF (sic) ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN A LARGE SCALE AND BY A SYNDICATED (sic)" FOR
HAVING "MAINTAINED OFFICE WITHOUT LICENSE OR REGISTRATION FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THRU ITS OFFICE, THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)."
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE "FACT THAT
ACCUSED CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN CHARGED x x x OF ANOTHER
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT x x x DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88-62599" AND
IN CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE "SCHEME AND
STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED x x x AND PRACTICED WITH THE HELP
OF HER AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER THE SHADE OF HER
PROTECTION."
III

After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, the court a quo rendered a decision holding that the defense of
"denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over the positive and clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.[4] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby finds that the accused
CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment, committed in large scale, as defined in Article 38(a) & (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 1412, x x x in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) x x x,
accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
(RECLUSION PERPETUA) with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay
a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE
the amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500.00)
PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND AND
FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount of
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL
MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OR WEIGHT TO THE

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[6]
The first assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the prosecution
failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment
-- that the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.[7] The aforementioned
element, specifically the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai was
licensed or authorized to recruit workers as shown by the records of the POEA,
was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted by
the defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by
the prosecution on the said stipulation of facts in dispensing with the
presentation of evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not
tantamount to an admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of
the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission
that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify
to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary to
law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her
contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty
to present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end
that the guilt of the accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, November 29, 1991."[5]
Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of conviction
assigning the following errors against the lower court:
I

At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the arguments
are insignificant in view of the fact that records disclose that the prosecution
had in fact presented evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of
the POEA, attesting to the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is
licensed/authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad, was offered and
admitted in evidence without the objection of the appellant.[8]

Although appellant's arguments find no significant bearing in the face of the

existence of "EXHIBIT I", they nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear
response for future application. Hence, the following discussion.
Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness
if presented in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts
themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated on between the
prosecution and defense counsel at the hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely
that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be to the
effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers",[9] Thus:
"Prosecutor
x x x Before we call on our first witness, we propose some stipulations
regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA that
Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the Department of
Labor to recruit workers abroad.
Court
Would you agree?
Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor."[10]
She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial
admission of the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather a mere
admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. This being
the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence of
such fact. To buttress her position, the following was cited to note the
distinction:
"Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves for a continuance
because of the absence of W, an important witness. His opponent, who is
anxious to go to trial; asks what are the facts to which W would testify. The
other attorney tells him, adding: 'If I consent to the overruling of my motion, will
you stipulate that those are the facts?' The attorney who is pressing for trial
says: 'No but I will stipulate that if W were called in this case as a witness, he
would so testify.' What is the difference between the two stipulations?
In the first stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission of the facts, and
they cannot be contradicted. But the second stipulation proposed will only have
the same effect as if the witness had testified to the facts. Such testimony the
party is free to contradict."[11]
The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at bar.
Conveniently omitted from the appellant's reply brief is the ensuing statement
made by the court after counsel for the accused, Atty. Ulep agreed to the
stipulation proposed by the prosecution, to wit:
Atty. Ulep (counsel for the accused): Agreed, Your Honor.

Court
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the
record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and
Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. x x x is neither licensed
nor authorized by that office to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the
duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration is to take the
witness stand, he will confirm to this fact as borne by the records.[12]
(Underscoring supplied .)
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel
stipulated on two things: that "x x x from the record of the POEA, x x x accused
Cristina Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. x x x is neither licensed nor authorized by
that office to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized
representative from the POEA Administratin (sic) is to take the witness stand, he
will confirm to this fact x x x."[13]The claim that the lower court mistakenly
interpreted defense counsel's acquiescence to the prosecution's proposed
stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the requisite POEA license or
authority is belied by the fact that after the above enunciation by the court, no
objection was interposed by defense counsel.
Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in
fact agreed to the above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being
contrary to the well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in
criminal cases. To bolster this contention, appellant cited the consistent ruling of
this Court on the matter. Thus, as held in the case of U.S. vs. Donato:[14]
"Agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense in
criminal cases, by which it is stipulated that certain witnesses, if present, would
testify to certain facts prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court
and are in violation of the law."[15]
The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused was
convicted solely on the basis of an agreement between the fiscal and the
counsel for the accused that certain witnesses would testify confirming the
complaint in all its parts. In reversing the judgment of conviction, this Court held
that:
"It is neither proper nor permissible to consider a case closed, or to render
judgment therein, by virtue of an agreement entered into between the
provincial fiscal and the counsel for the accused with reference to facts, some of
which are favorable to the defense, and others related to the prosecution,
without any evidence being adduced or testimony taken from the witnesses
mentioned in the agreement; such practice is not authorized and defeats the
purposes of criminal law; it is an open violation of the rules of criminal
procedure x x x."[16]
The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the
fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,

and the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being
duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may not be relieved of this
obligation by the mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a
matter constitutive of an essential element of the crime charged.

"x x x [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The
declarations constitute judicial admissions, which are binding on the parties, by
virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional
evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of
the statements contained in the exhibits."[21] (underscoring supplied .)

The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between
prosecution and defense was enunciated in the case of U.S. vs. Manlimos:[17]

American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of

stipulating during the trial of criminal cases, and categorically stated in People
vs. Hare[22] that:

"It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to

predict what a proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the
test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere
conjecture. Nor is it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the
contradictory declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its
observation and its judgment as to their credibility."[18]
However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure,
particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a
stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the
following:
"Section 1.
Pre-trial; when proper To expedite trial, where the accused and
counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters
enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.
Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects x x x The pre-trial conference shall consider
the following:
(a)

Plea bargaining;

(b)

Stipulation of facts;

By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now

expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial
by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is
willing to admit, a stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial
but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself. Parenthetically,
although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of
facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties. In
the case of People vs. Mapa[19] where the accused was charged with illegal
possession of firearms, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the fact
that the accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite permit
or license. More at point is the case of People vs. Bocar[20] wherein the fiscal
proposed the admission by the accused of the affidavits and other exhibits
already presented by the prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the
matter. Holding that the admissions made by the parties were binding, this
Court stated that:

"That record discloses that the defense counsel stipulated to what certain
witnesses would testify if they were present in court. x x x
x x x The defendant contends that it was error for his counsel to make these
stipulations. This court has held that an accused may by stipulation waive the
necessity of proof of all or any part of the case which the people have alleged
against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in this Court of
evidence which he has stipulated into the record.[23]
The corollary issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not
Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the
accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the
accused -- equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial. We
resolved this issue in the negative.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel
during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in
the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the
accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of
the fact that: "x x x an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct
of a lawsuit x x x has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by
pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, x x x which unless allowed to be
withdrawn are conclusive."[24] (underscoring supplied.)
In fact, "judicial
admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is,
for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are
made x x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, x x x they
bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."[25]
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of
his counsel who represents him.[26] For all intents and purposes, the acts of a
lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even
to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such
mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client.[27] No cogent reason
exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep,
appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts
proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously
because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's theory
of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial,
appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business

either in her personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but

logical to admit that the POEA records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai
was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of
the accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.[28] But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused
is a personal privilege which may be waived.[29] Thus, in the case of U.S. vs.
Anastasio,[30] this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the
admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts
stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.[31]
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right
of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to present
evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection
of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.[32] This is in
consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that "x x x everyone
has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it
can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large."[33]
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar.
Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the
stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the
defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during
trial was a waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict
the stipulation of facts and establish her defense.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by
prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the accused to be heard
thereon.
It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.[35]
However, this rule is subject to the exception that:
"x x x in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties,
a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed
in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with
the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated, x x
x"[36] (underscoring supplied .)
The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above exception
in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced evidence on
the matter when she testified in open court as follows:
"Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where (sic) were you at the NBI when Mrs.
Cinco inquired from you about placement abroad?
A:
I was just invited by the personnel of the NBI and I was not allowed to go
home.
Q: Why were you invited by the NBI?
A:

They told me that there was a complaint against me.

Q: Complaint about what?

A: The same case.
Q: You mean illegal recruitment also?

"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the

proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made."
We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her second
assignment of error, appellant makes much ado of the "judicial notice" taken by
the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged with another illegal
recruitment case,[34] and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of
the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused. Appellant cites a violation of
Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court
may take judicial notice of any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower
court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the pendency of

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: You made mention than an illegal recruitment case which was supposed to
be the cause of your detention at the NBI. . . .
I am not referring to this case, Mrs. Hernandez -- what happened to that case,
what is the status of that case?
A:

It is also in this sala.

COURT: It is already submitted for decision.[37]

Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of
the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error
would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction was
not based on the existence of another illegal recruitment case filed against
appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the overwhelming
evidence against her in the instant case.
Anent the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that we do not find any
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's
bare denials cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses against her.
Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[38] That she
did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her
appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt at
exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed against
the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who executed
the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00). As previously held by this Court,

life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.[39] The lower
court erred in imposing "the penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua)
with the accessory penalties provided for by law; x x x"[40] (Underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale is hereby AFFIRMED, and the penalty imposed MODIFIED as follows: the
court sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L.
BERNABE the amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P28,500.00) PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the
amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to
ARNEL MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Y6

Finally, under Article 39 of the New Labor Code, the penalty for illegal
recruitment committed in large scale is life imprisonment and a fine of ONE