Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II

Author(s): Arthur O. Lovejoy
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jan. 16,
1908), pp. 29-39
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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VOL. V. No. 2.

THE

JANUARY

16, 1908.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC

THE

THIRTEEN

METHODS

PRAGMATISMS.

THE

II.

purpose of this paper, as indicated at the beginningof the

formerinstalment,is to discriminateall the more important
doctrinesgoing under the name of pragmatismwhich can be shown
to be not only distinct, but also logically independent inter se.
Three such divergent pragmatist contentionshave thus far been
noted. "Pragmatism" was primarily a theory concerning the
"meaning" of propositions;but this theory,because of a latent ambiguity in its terms,breaks up into two: (1) The meaning of a
propositionconsistsin the future consequencesin experiencewhich
it (directly or indirectly) predicts as about to occur, no matter
whetherit be believed or not; (2) The meaning of a proposition
consistsin the futureconsequencesof believingit. The firstof these
was seen to suggest (though it by no means necessarilyimplies) the
third variant of pragmatism,namely, a doct.rineconcerningthe
natare of truth; viz., that the truthof a propositionis identicalwith
the occurrenceof the series of experienceswhichit predicts,and can
be said to be knownonly after such series is completed. "Its truth
is its verification." This contention,that judgments acquire truth
only in the degree in which they lose predictivecharacterand practical be.arings,ha.sbeen shownto be whollybarren and useless,since
it affordsno answer to the real epistemologicalquestion concerning
the criterionof the truthof propositionswhose,specificpredictiveimplicationshave not yet been experienced.
to see throughwhat associationsof
4. It is, however,not difficult
ideas somepragmatistsha.vebeen led to emphasizethis notionof the
ex post facto characterof all truth. Largely, it would appear, it
derives its plausibility from its resemblanceto the ordinary empirical doctrinethat those general propositionsare to be regarded
as true which,so far as theyhave been applied, have been found to
be realized in past experience. This latter doctrine,from which
the formeris often not clearly distinguished,may be set down as
anotherof the thingsthat pragmatismis frequentlysupposed to be.
It is the doctrinesometimessententiouslyexpressedby the observa29

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t.ionthat those propositionsare true which "will work" or "which

you can live by." What the evolutionaryempiricistswho are fond
of this observationalmost always really mean by it, is that those
judgmentsare true which hit.hertohave worked; in otherand more
precise words, that I am, in advance of the actual realization or
verificationof the future experienceswhich may be predicted by
a given judgment, entitledto regard it as true if it is similar to,
or is a special application of, a general class of judgmentswhichmy
memorytellsme have thus far had theirimpliedpredictionsrealized.
But this is by no means identical with the principle mentionedin
the precedinginstalment,and vigorouslyinsistedupon by somepragmatists, that each individual judgment can become true only
with,the presentationin consciousthrough,and contemporaneously
ness of those specificsubsequent experienceswhich it points to and
prognosticates.
5. If, now, we are to set down this evolutionaryempiricistcriterionof truthas one expressionof pragmatism-at least as that is
popularly understood-it is necessaryto add that this formula.,too,
suffersfrom ambiguity,and thereforebreaks up into two quite
distinct criteria. The ambiguity is analogous to that already
pointed out in the pragmatist's theoryof meaning. A belief may
senses,eitherby having its actual pre"-'work"in two very different
dictions fulfilled,or by contributingto increase the energies or
or chanc.eof survival of those who believe it. The Jews,
efficiency
for example,believedpersistentlyformany centuriesthat a national
Messiah would come in the next generationto restore the independence and establishthe supremacyof Israel. In one sense, this
belief did not work; for the eventswhich it predicteddid not occur.
But biologically considered it worked wonderfullywell; for it
assuredly did much t.o produce the extraordinarypersistencyof
the Jewish racial cha.racter,and the exceptional energy,self-confidence,and tenacity of purpose of the individual Jew. Many
beliefs involving false predictions are biologically unfavorable,
namely,if theylead to physicalconductill adapted to the conditions
of the believer's physical environment. You can not "live by" the
belief that fire will not burn. But, also, some false or neverrealized predictions,and many beliefs having apparently no predictive character-and no capacity for empirical verification-have
shownthemselvesto be excellentthingsto live by. And if we are to
take the doctrinethat the true is the "livable" in its second and
more unquestionablypragmatisticsense-if we are to identifythe
validity of beliefs with their biological serviceableness-we should
apparentlyhave to classifyas "true" many judgmentswhich pre-

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PSYCHOLOGY

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31

diet nothing,and many which confessedlypredictwhat is not going

to occur.
6. Partly, however,what I have called the theoryof the ex post
facto nature of truth is a somewhatblurred reflectionof a certain
metaphysicaldoctrine,which, alt.houghnot always very explicitly
put forward,appears to,me to have a. rather fundamentalplace in
the characteristicmode of thoughtof most representativesof pragmatism. This is the doctrineof the real futurityor "open-ness" of
the future,and of the determinativeor "creative" efficacyof each
process of conscious judg"present" momentin the ever-transient
ment,choice,and action. The two parts of the doctrineobviously
enough go together:if the process truly brings into being at each
of reality,then,
new momenta genuinelynew and unique increment.
so long as any moment'sincrementhas not yet been broughtforth,
it can not yet be called in any intelligiblesense real; and if, similarly, the thingthat is to be is a sheernonentityuntil it entersinto
actual, temporalexperience,t.hemomentin which it becomesan experience must be creditedwith the creation "ex nihilo" of a new
item of being. This doctrine of what M. Bergson calls a, devenir
reel, and of the creative function of consciousness,which is the
pregnant ontologicalpreconceptionfrom which a great variety of
confusedpragmatisticideas have proceeded,unquestionablyhas certain epistemologicalimplications. Such a metaphysicsappears to
imply the partial contingencyand (from the standpoint of any
of the future contentof
"present" knowledge) indeterminateness
reality. But theseimplicationsare not synonymouswiththe ex post
facto theoryof truthin the generalitywith which that has usually
been expressed. The futuremay bec-and by the same pragmatists,
when they adumbrate this sort of metaphysics,apparently is-regarded as presentingto our understandingonly a narrowmarginof
the unpredictable;its general character,and the greatermass of its
content,may be supposed,withoutdepartingfromthe conceptionin
question.,to be predeterminedby the accumulated and crystallized
resultsof realityup to date, of which any possible futureand novel
incrementof being must be the child, and to which it must be
capable of accommodation. And at all events,there is nothingin
this sort of thoroughgoingmetaphysicaltemporalismwhich justifies
the denial of the possibilityof the making of "true" judgments
about contemporaneousor past (but not yet consciouslyverified)
realities.
7. It is a frequentlyrepeated observation of pragmatists,in
momentswhen they are more mindfulof the psychologicalthan of
the metaphysicalantecedentsof their diversely descended conceptions,that the true, in its most generalizedcharacter,is "the satis-

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OF PHILOSOPHY

factory"; it is, says James,that which"gives the maximal combination of satisfactions." Or, in Perry's careful formulation-withan
amendmentwhich we have recentlybeen told, upon good authority,
would make it entirelyacceptable to a pragmatist- "the criterion
of the truth of knowledgeis the satisfyingcharacter of the pracor the resotical transitionfromcognitiveexpectationto fulfillment,
lution of doubt into practical immediacy."1 Now this doctrine
which identifiesthe truthwith the satisfactorinessof a given judgmentmay mean any one of threethings. It may, in the firstplace,
be a simple psychological observation-from which, I fancy, few
would dissent-indicating the genus of feelingsof which the "emotion of conviction" is a species. To doubt,to inquire,to have before
the mind certain potential materialof judgmentthat is not yet accepted as true, is, of course,to experiencedissatisfaction;a specific
is the emotional consense of discomfortand of non-fulfillment
comitantof the doubtingor the deliberativemoment,and is doubtless
the principal spring Nvhichpromptsmen's search for truth. And
to believe,to hold true,whatevermore it may be, is always at least
to be satisfied in some degree with one's mental content of the
moment,to findit good,or at all eventsnot so bad as some contrary
satisfyingness,has been
judgment which,for its sin of insufficient
shut away into the outer darknessof non-acceptance.
8. But this psychologicalt.ruism,that to pass from doubt to
belief is to pass from dissatisfactionto a relative satisfaction,is
quite a differentthing from the firstof the pragmatistepistemological contentionsthat appear to be based upon it. This asserts
that the way to determinewhethera propositionis true is to apply
the testof "satisfyingness"; and to a.pplyit directlyand simpli-citer.
There is, accordingto this version of the nature of truth,to be no
attemptto determinethe differentiawhich distinguishesthe species
" conviction" from the genus "satisfaction," or the subspecies
"highest discoverabletype of certitude" from"conviction" in general; and thereis to be no arrangingof satisfactionsin a hierarchy
and no pretensionto definethe conditionsunder which a maker of
rational judgments o'ughtto be satisfied. From many expressions
of pragmatistwritersit would appear that, while the term "satisfaction" is "many dimensional," one dimension is as good as
another; and that the final and decisive warrant for belief-the
mark of the valid judgment-is the capacity of the judgment to
in
yield the maximumbulk of satisfaction,measured indifferently
any of its dimensions. But since the dimensionsare many, it ma.y
manifestlyturn out that the greatesttotal volume may not give the
potentialmaximumof any givendimensiontaken singly. The liking
1A. W. Moore, in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 576.

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PSYCHOLOGY

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33

for luminosityof meaning,or for conceptualconsistency,or for completenessof empirical verification,may fail to get full satisfaction
in a judgment; but the judgment may, it would seem, still be
"true," if it compensatesfor these limitationsby a preponderant
satisfactorinesswith referenceto other desires or interests: by its
congruencywith our habitual ways of belief, or its charm for the
or its tendencyto beget a cheerfulframe of mind in
imaogination,
those who accept it.
I think it possible that some pragmatistsmay at this point protest that they know of no one who seriouslyholds this view; certainly,it appears to me to be a curious view to hold. But I think
one is justifiedin calling upon all of the name who reject this doctrine to take (and faithfullyobserve) an oath to abstain from a
fashionof language which theyhave much affected;to refrainfrom
to cease speakidentifyingthe true with the satisfactorysimnpliciter,
ing of satisfactionas a "criterion" of validity,and to confinetheir
assimilation of the two concepts to t.hemuch more qualified and
commonplacethesiswhichfollows.
9. This is pragmatismnumberseven plus a more or less explicit
admissionthat our "theoretic" satisfactionshave a special character
and special epistemologicalpretensions;that our "intellectual" demands-for clear meanings,for consistency,for evidence-are not,
and can not be, satisfied,unless their peculiar claim to precedence
in the determinationof belief is recognized; and that this claim
is a legitimateone, to whichmen should (thoughthey oftendo not)
subordinatetheir impulse to accept any conclusionsthat have any
kind of satisfactoriness. According to this view, "satisfaction" is
still insisted upon as an essential mark of the apprehension of
"truth"; but it is precisely a satisfactionwhich is not to be had
except upon conditionthat other possible satisfactionsbe ignored
or, in many cases, flatlyrejected. Between this and the preceding
(eighth) doctrinesome pragmatistwritersseem to waver. James,
for example,oftenuses expressions(some of whichhave been quoted
in the two foregoingparagraphs) implyingthe doctrineof the commensurabilityand equivalenceof all satisfactions. But he elsewhere
(e. g., in a controversywith Joseph in Mind, 1905) expresslydistinguishesthe "theoretic" from the "collateral" satisfactionsconnectedwiththe processesof judging thought;and he does not appear
to deny that the formermay conflictwith the latter,or that, in the
eventof such conflict,theyoughtto be preferred. To the objection,
offeredby his critic,that if such admissionsbe made the pragmatist's
criterionof validityis not practicallydistinguishablefromthe intellectualist's,James opposes nothingmore relevant than a sketch of
the genesis and evolution of the demand of the human mind for

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consistency.2This.sketchpurportsto show-if I understandit-that

the desire (more characteristicof some minds than of others) to
avoid self-contradiction
is historicallyengenderedthroughthe crystallization of repeated experiencesof uniformityin "things" into
fixedsubjective habits of expectingspecificuniformities-habitsso
fixed that when such an expectationis disappointed "our mental
machineryrefusesto run smoothly." How the transitionfromthe
idea of uniformityto that of consistencyis accomplishedhere, remains obscure to me; but even supposing the evolutionof the one
into the otherto be completelyand convincinglytraced,these interesting historicalspeculationsdo not show, they do not even tend to
suggest,that the demand for consistencyin our judgments,as we
now findit-playing its captious and domineeringrole among our
mental cravings-is not quite distinctfromall its fellowsand their
rightful,thoughtheir oftenflouted,overlord. In the presentsense,
then, the pragmatist's criterionof truth,whetherright or wrong,
seemsentirelydestituteof any distinctivecharacter; it is simplythe
old, intellectualistcriterion,supplementedby the psychologically
undisputable,but,the logicallyfunctionless,remarkthat, after all, a
"theoretic" satisfactionis a kind of satisfaction.
10. Anotherpragmatism,and one that undoubtedlyha.sreal epistemologicalbearings,is the doctrineof radical empiricismconjoined
with the doctrineof the necessityand legitimacyof postulation;the
doctrine,in otherwords,that "axioms are postulates" and that postulates are as valid as any human judgment ever can be, provided
they be the expressionof a genuine "practical" need. This may
look like our eighth kind of pragmatismover again, expressed in
otherterms; but in certain importantparticularsit is really a distinct theory. It contains,in the firstplace, a special negative contention: namely, that there are no strictlycompulsiveor "necessary" general truths,no universalpropositionsthat can foreethemselves upon the mind's acceptance apart froman uncoereed act of
voluntary choice. And on its positive side, it identifiesthe true,
not with those judgmentswhich slip so easily into the mind that
they afforda presentemotionalstate of satisfaction,but with those
that man's active nature requires as workingpresuppositionsto be
followedin its reactionupon present experienceand its instinctive
endeavorto shape futureexperience. This doetrineseems to me to
be quite unequivocallyexpressedby Schiller in a well-knownessay
in "Personal Idealism." " The 'necessity' of a postulate," we are
told, "is simplyan indicationof our need. We want it, and so must
have it, as a means to our ends. Thus its necessityis that of intelligent,purposivevolition,not of psychical,and still less of physical,
2 Mind,

N. S., Vol. XIV., p. 196.

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mechanism." " Behind the 'can't' therealways lurks a 'won't'; the

mind can not stultifyitself,because it will not renounceconceptions
it needs to orderits experiences. The feelingof necessity,therefore,
is at bottoman emotional accompanimentof the purposive search
for means to realize our ends."3
11. A kindredbut a much less thoroughgoingdoctrineseems to
constituteone of the pragmatismsof James. The author of "The
Will to Believe" would, I suppose, still vigorouslydeny the possibility of reaching " necessary" conclusions with respect to many
issues, including some of the greatest importancein relation both
to the purelyutilitarianrequirementsof our living and to our higher
interests; and he would, clearly, still maintain the proprietyand
the practical inevitablenessof voluntarypostulation in such cases.
But that thereare some truly coerciveand indubitabletruths,some
items of a priori knowledgeinheringin the native constitutionof a
rationalmind,Jamesprettyfullyand franklydeclares,in his recently
published volume of lectures. "Our ready-madeideal framework
for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structureof
our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstractrelationsthan we can withour sense experiences. They coerce
us; we must treat them consistently,whetheror not we like the
results."14 This, obviously,is no doctrinethat axioms are postulates,
or that behindevery"can't" therelies a "won't"; it is the doctrine
that axioms are necessitiesand that the action of voluntarychoice
in belief is always limitedby a permanentsystemof a priori principles of possibilityand impossibilityinheringin the nature of intellect, at least as intellectis now evolved. It is compatible,at most,
with the opinion that there are not so numerous,nor so useful,
axioms as some dogmatic philosophershave supposed, and that,
when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases be resortedto.
12. A point of pragmatistdoctrineseparable from (though not
inconsistentwith) eitherof the two last mentioned,is the assertion
of the equal legitimacyof those postulates (such as the uniformity
of causal connection,the general "reliability" of nature, and the
like) which appear indispensable as presuppositionsfor effective
dealing with the world of our physical experience, and of those
which, though lacking this sort of "physical" necessity as completely as they do the logical sort, yet seem demanded in order to
give meaning to, or encouragementin, men's moral strivings,or to
satisfy the emotional or esthetic cravings of our complex nature.
It is conceivable enough that some pragmatistsshould refuse to
recognizethe equal standingof thesetwo classes of postulates,should
"Axioms as Postulates," ? 11, in " Personal Idealism."
4James, "Pragmatism," p. 211.

'Schiller,

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accept the firstwhile rejectingthe second; and it is a fact that not

all who find a place for both agree as to the numberand range of
the second sort. The more extremelyliberal formsof the doctrine
of the right to postulate freely and to treat postulates as truths,
tend to lapse into identitywith the eighth variety of pragmatism,
which identifiesthe true with the "maximally satisfying"; but in
its morecautious and criticalforms,the argumentfromthe practical
inevitablenessof certainscientificto the legitimacyof certainethicoreligious postulates must be regarded as a distinct type of pragmatist epistemology,and perhaps the one which-if pragmatism
ought to have practical bearings-best deservesthe name.
13. Lastly, there remains a second pragmatist theory of the
meaning of concepts or judgments-which brings us back to the
topic, thoughby no means to preciselythe doctrine,with which our
enumerationbegan. It may be expressedthus: an essentialpart of
our idea of any object or fact consists in an apprehensionof its
relationto some purpose or subjective intereston our part; so that
no object of thoughtwhatevercould be just what, for our thought,
it is, except throughthe mediationof some idea of purpose or some
plan of action. The language of some pragmatistwriters might
lead one to suppose that they consider the whole meaning to be
reducibleto thisteleologicalreference;but such a view does not seem
to me intelligible,and it does not appear certainthat any one really
intends to maintain it. But it is evident that there are several
logicians who think it both true and importantto declare that a
relation to a purpose constitutesan intrinsicand a determinative
elementin the connotationof any notion. It is, I suppose, such a
principle that Moore intendedto illustratein recentlypointing out
that, however objective the virtues of a given candidate for office
may be, he could neitherbe "clean" nor a candidate were therenot
present in the mind of every one so representinghim the idea of
possiblevotingto be done. And I suppose the same view is, in part,
at least, what Schiller has sought to enforce in these columns,in
insistingthat nobodycan be "lost" except with the aid of the existence in the universe of some purpose in some mind, requiring the
presence of the "lost" person (or of the persons fromwhom he is
lost) in some place or relation fromwhich he is (or they are) excluded by virtueof his "lostness."5 Schiller appears to me to have
entangled this theory of meaning in a confusingand illegitimate
mannerwith questionsabout "truth" and "reality"; but to pursue
this distinctionwould involve a somewhat long and complicated
analysis,which may not here be undertaken.
These thirteenpragma.tisms
have been set down,not in a topical
rhiS JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 42, and pp. 483, 488.

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order, but according to the leading of those associations of ideas

through which the ambiguities of the several doctrines,and the
transitionsfromone to another,become relativelyintelligible. But
it may be useful to arrange them here in a more logical manner,
while still retainingthe originalnumbering. Those formsof theory,
the separate enumerationof which results from distinctionsmade
by this paper, but overlookedby pragmatistwritersthemselves-in
otherwords,the doctrinesformulatedby pragmatistsin more or less
equivocal terms-are indicated by the sign (a); each group of doctrineshithertoimproperlytreatedas single and univocal has a common superiornumber:
I.

Pragmatist Theories of Meaning.

1. The "meaning" of any judgmentconsistswhollyin the future

consequencespredictedby it, whetherit is.believedor not (a').
2. The meaning of any judgment consists in the future consequences of believingit (a').
13. The meaningof any idea or judgmentalways consistsin part
in the apprehensionof the relation of some object to a conscious
purpose (a').
II.

Pragmatismas an EpistemologicallyFunctionless Theory concerningthe "Nature" of Truth.

3. The truth of a judgment "consists in" the completerealization of the experience (or series of experiences) to which the judgment had antecedentlypointed; propositions are not, but only
become,true (a2).
III.

Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i. e., of the Criterionof

the Validity of a Judgmentt.

4. Those general propositionsare true which so far, in past experience,have had their implied predictionsrealized; and there is
no othercriterionof the truthof a judgment (a2).
5. Those generalpropositionsare true whichhave in past experience provenbiologicallyserviceableto thosewho have lived by them;
and this "livableness" is the ultimate criterionof the truth of a
judgment (a2).
7. All apprehensionof truth is a species of "satisfaction"; the
true judgment meets some need, and all transitionfrom doubt to
convictionis a passage froma state of at least partial dissatisfaction
to a state of relativesatisfactionand harmony(a3) .-This is strictly
only a psychological observation,not an epistemologicalone; it

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becomes the latter by illicit interpretationinto one of the two

following.
8. The criterionof the truthof a judgmentis its satisfactoriness,
as such; satisfacti.onis "many dimensional,"but all the dimensions
are of commensurableepistemologicalvalues, and the maximum
bulk of satisfactionin a judgmentis the mark of its validity (a8).
9. The criterionof the truthof a judgmentis the degreein which
it meetsthe "theoretic" demands of our nature; these demands are
special and distinctive,but their realization is none the less a kind
of " satisfaction" (a3).
10. The sole criterionof the truthof a judgmentis its practical
serviceablenessas a postulate; there is no general truthexcept postulated truth,resultingfrom some motivateddeterminationof the
will;" necessary" truthsdo not exist.
11. There are some necessarytruths; but these are neithermany
nor practically adequate; and beyond them the resortto postulates
is needful and legitimate.
12. Among the postulates which it is legitimateto take as the
equivalent of truth,those which subservethe activities and enrich
the contentof the moral,esthetic,and religiouslife have a coordinate
place with thosewhich are presupposedby commonsense and physical science as the basis of the activitiesof the physical life.
IV.

Pragmatismas an Ontological Theory.

6. Temporal becomingis a fundamentalcharacterof reality; in

this becomingthe processesof consciousnesshave theiressentialand
creative part. The future is strictlynon-realand its characteris
partly indeterminate,dependent upon movementsof consciousness
the nature and directionof which can be whollyknownonly at the
momentsin whichtheybecomereal in experience. (Sometimesmore
or less confusedwith 3.)6
Each pragmatismof the thirteenshould manifestlybe given a
name of its own, if confusionin futurediscussionsis to be avoided.
The presentwriterhas neitherthe necessaryingenuitynor the ambition to devise a nomenclatureso extensive. But howeverthe several
theoriesbe designated,the fact of theirdifference,
and of the incompa.tibilityof some of themwithsome others,can hardly,just now,be
too muchinsistedupon-in the interestof pragmatismitself. What
the movementcommonlyso named mostneeds is a clarificationof its
formulasand a discriminationof certainsound and importantideas
" It is impossible to bring out the nature, motives, and reciprocal relations
of dependence or incompatibility of these theories in any such condensed formulas. I hope no reader will attempt to take the above recapitulation as a
substitute for the analytical discussion contained in the preceding paragraphs.

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lying behind it from certain other ideas that are sound but not
important,and certain that would be importantif only they were
not unsound. The present attemptto list the chief varieties,and
to clear up the hidden ambiguities,of a doctrinenominallyone and
indivisible,is accordinglyofferedas a species of Prolegomena zu
einemjeden kiinftigenPragmatismus.
ARTHUR 0. LovEjoY.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

DISCUSSION
SUB SPECIE

?,ETERNITATIS

IT

is worthwhile for philosophersto ask themselveswhetherthe

or the
questionstheyare talkingabout are vital and significant,
opposite. The article by Dr. Bush in a recent number of this
JOURNAL raises the questionin an interesting
form. He theremaintains that the significant,the live problems of philosophy do not
concerntimelesstruth,or any reality "sub specie afternitatis,"but
have to do with straighteningout the tangles of this our ever changing human experience. When philosopherstake over ancient problems which arose in other ages of culture and life, and deal with
themas if theywerethe really pressingproblemsof philosophy,they
are dealing only with "secondary," defunctproblenms.Their task
is no longer vital.
There is certainlymuch in this essentiallypragmatictreatment
of the great historicproblemsof metaphysicsto commendit to our
overpragmaticculture. Yet we may well hesitate to accept the
doctrinecompletely.
Suppose we turn fromthe questions of metaphysicsto those of
science. Now I take it that a scientistbelieves that he is gettingat
the veritable constitutionand structureof some sort of "reality."
His problem arises because the reality presentedto his experience
can not be made to,square with some systemof conceptspreviously
accepted as valid, in otherwords,because it can not be completely
rationalized. And we are here interestedin pointing out that the
problems of science which arose in formerperiods of culture are
not meaningless or insignificantto-day. Their formulationmay
have been inadequate because less was then known about that
reality- "that experience," if you please-which set the problems
then,and still sets them.
Moreover,the scientistbelievesthat while the realitystudied may
be subject to flux and developmernt,
yet the systemof truthsabout

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