Case: 1:15-cv-00551 Document #: 47 Filed: 03/06/15 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:1550

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RIGHT FIELD ROOFTOPS, LLC,
d/b/a SKYBOX ON SHEFFIELD;
RIGHT FIELD PROPERTIES, LLC;
3633 ROOFTOP MANAGEMENT, LLC,
d/b/a LAKEVIEW BASEBALL CLUB; and
ROOFTOP ACQUISITION, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHICAGO BASEBALL HOLDINGS, LLC;
CHICAGO CUBS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC;
WRIGLEY FIELD HOLDINGS, LLC; and
THOMAS S. RICKETTS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 15cv551

Hon. Virginia M. Kendall
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The plaintiffs (collectively, the Plaintiffs), for their Reply in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, state as follows:
I.

Irreparable Harm
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm before trial.

[Doc. 27, pp. 9-15.] They argue there is no evidence customers will stop patronizing the
Plaintiffs businesses if there are no views. The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs can
survive for a year without any business, and reopen in 2016 if they win the trial. But these
arguments are premature as no evidentiary hearing has taken place yet. Furthermore, these
arguments are based on false assumptions and are easily disproven.
The Defendants are so focused on whether the Plaintiffs already sold some tickets for the
2015 season that they fail to see that the Plaintiffs might lose their entire product supply. Once
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the video boards are installed, the Plaintiffs will have nothing to sell. The Plaintiffs are in the
Rooftop Business. They charge customers money to watch baseball games and other live events
as those events take place inside Wrigley Field. They are not a tavern; they are not a nightclub;
they are not a restaurant. Without a view into Wrigley Field, there is no product to sell. Just as a
Ford dealer will necessarily be put out of business completely without a supply of vehicles from
Ford, the Plaintiffs will necessarily be put out of business without a supply of views from the
Defendants. See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (1970).
The Defendants seem to suggest that the Plaintiffs have an obligation to reinvent
themselves as a completely different type of business and operate without views. But the
Defendants do not cite a single case for this proposition. To the contrary, the cases cited by the
Defendants finding a lack of irreparable harm typically involved businesses with more than one
product or customer, and consequently the loss of just one contract would not spell certain doom.
For example, in Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984),
the appellate court found that the plaintiff would not go out of business absent injunctive relief.
Id. at 391. The court noted that the plaintiff was engaged in several other lines of business, and
that the plaintiff projected some of that other business to improve soon. Id. Because injunctive
relief is only concerned with the period before trial, the court thus concluded that the would
survive till trial, and injunctive relief was improper. Id.
Similarly, in Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.
1989), the appellate court reversed an injunction prohibiting the defendant from terminating its
air freight handling services contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 798. Irreparable harm was not
shown because: (i) the plaintiff only provided 80% of its business to the defendant, (ii) the
plaintiff always had the right to seek business from others and did in fact perform 20% of its

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business for others, and (iii) the plaintiff knew it was losing the subject contract in less than 19
months anyhow. Id. at 802.
These two cases are unlike Semmes, however, where the plaintiff only sold Ford vehicles
and Ford terminated its franchise during unrelated fraud litigation. 429 F.2d at 1197, 1205.
There, the court approved of injunctive relief where the only product supply was in jeopardy,
reasoning, But the right to continue a businessis not measurable entirely in monetary terms;
the Semmes want to sell automobiles, not live on the income from a damages award. Id.
Knowing full well that the Plaintiffs exist for the sole purpose of selling a single product,
tickets to live events, the Defendants attempt to question whether consumers will cease
patronizing Plaintiffs businesses if the views are blocked. In questioning this, the Defendants
incorrectly state that the Plaintiffs have sold over 60% of their 2015 tickets already. [Doc. 27, p.
12.] The Defendants assumption is erroneous.
Plaintiffs have only sold 5,929 tickets, or just 17.54% of their combined 33,800-ticket
supply for 2015. [Declaration of Marc Anguiano, Exhibit 1, 6-7, 15-16.] The Plaintiffs
websites only indicate that Online Tickets are Unavailable, and that customers should Call for
more info, because group sales and premium dates are the focus this early in the season. [Ex. 1,
17.] Selling premium dates to groups first, and then filling in extra capacity at a later date with
online ticket sales, maximizes overall sales volume and revenue. [Ex. 1, 17.]
The Defendants then speculate that since the Plaintiffs have supposedly sold 60% of their
2015 tickets, customers must not really care about views and will still patronize the Plaintiffs
rooftop businesses without any views into Wrigley Field. Thus the Defendants are lobbing
guesses in a misguided effort to place a heavier burden on the Plaintiffs to prove the utterly

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obvious. Once again, the Plaintiffs are rooftop businesses, nothing more. They sell views. If
people want a different product, they buy it from someone that sells that other product.
As of March 6, 2015, only one group customer, with just 20 tickets worth just $2,500 in
revenue, has advised the Plaintiffs that they would still have their event if the video board is
installed. [Ex. 1, 10.] This represents a mere 0.7% of groups of 10+ that want to proceed with
an event and no views. But 26 of the 31 groups of 10+ contacted, or 2,667 of 2,826 tickets,
intend to cancel their events if the video board is installed. [Ex. 1, 9.] Just four groups,
representing 139 tickets and $20,451.31 in non-discounted revenue, said they might still hold
their event if the video board is installed, but that they would need a large discount. [Ex. 1, 11.]
Therefore, the Plaintiffs are going to lose between 94.3% and 99.3% of group of 10+ sales. [Ex.
1, 12.]
Moreover, the Defendants theory that the Plaintiffs could just close down for a year, and
then come back in 2016 or 2017 if they win the trial, ignores commercial reality. The Plaintiffs
only significant source of revenue is ticket sales. [Declaration of Chris Bue, Doc. 39, 7, 18.]
Plaintiff Skybox must pay an average of $54,273.84 per month in mortgage and real estate tax
payments. [Doc. 39, 11.] Plaintiff Lakeview Club must pay an average of $20,876.25 per
month in mortgage and real estate tax payments. [Doc. 39, 22.] Neither Skybox nor Lakeview
Club has enough cash on-hand to make their mortgage and real estate tax payments, and without
new ticket revenue they will both become insolvent immediately. [Doc. 39, 13-16, 24-27.]
Moreover, the fact that some of Plaintiffs customers might not contractually be entitled to a
refund ignores the commercial reality of operating a service business, which has developed
substantial good will over a number of years. Maybe the Cubs would stab their own customers
in the back, but this does not mean that the Plaintiffs must, or should.

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Crane Kenney once said to Ed McCarthy, one of the Plaintiffs owners, once we put
up the signs you dont have a Rooftop Business. [Complaint, Doc. 1, 95.] Kenney stated to
McCarthy on another occasion, How hard is it going to be to sell tickets when you have no
glimpse of Wrigley Field. [Doc. 1, 96.] Now the Defendants change their tune because it suits
their litigation strategy, and spin these well-known facts, opportunistically arguing that the
Plaintiffs can just sit it out for a year, then come back after the trial and resume their business.
But the Defendants know full well that the video boards installation will destroy the Plaintiffs
business. Indeed, this is the very reason that the Defendants moved the video board away from
their newly-acquired rooftop businesses and placed it directly in front of their competition. [Doc.
1, 97, 101-102.] This warrants injunctive relief. See Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 968
F. Supp. 1227, 1246-47 (N.D. Ill. 1996). (Awarding preliminary injunction to save destruction of
business where defendants own testimony confirmed that he knew the plaintiff would have
difficulty surviving if it did not accede to the defendants illicit demands.) The Defendants also
clearly know that when someone misses mortgage payments, like a Rooftop Business, they get
foreclosed on, liquidated and sold for pennies on the dollar. [Doc. 1, 103.]
The Defendants do not deny that, economic loss that threatens the survival of a
plaintiffs business can amount to irreparable harm. Power Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F.
Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D.D.C. 2005); see also, Natl Mining Assn v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34,
50 (D.D.C. 2011); Semmes, 429 F.2d at 1205. Instead, they just cite to cases which denied
injunctive relief for entirely other reasons.
In Power Mobility, the plaintiffs sold power wheelchairs which were paid for by
Medicare reimbursements. 404 F. Supp. 2d at 192. The plaintiffs complained that new Medicare
billing requirements were burdensome and speculated they might result in a larger number of

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claim denials. Id. at 203. The court stated, The plaintiffs make this prediction without having
ever filed a claim for reimbursement and having the claim denied under the new rule, and
without adhering to the claim presentment requirement and the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Id. at 205.

Furthermore, the defendant testified that claim denial rates were

anticipated to decline under the new rule. Id. Unlike Power Mobility, here the Defendants want
to cut off all product supply to the Plaintiffs. There is not just a new set of billing guidelines,
administrative, or procedural rules for the Plaintiffs to follow in order to keep their supply of
views. There is a wholesale denial of access to supply taking place. This case is inapposite.
In Natl Mining, the plaintiff complained that the governments restrictive permitting
process for certain coal mining activity was slower than the law allowed. 768 F. Supp. 2d at 3940, 47. The plaintiffs president asserted that his company was surviving week-to-week, and
would be out of business in eighteen months absent injunctive relief and issuance of the permits.
Id. at 51. The plaintiff did not offer a projection of future losses, tie it into an accounting, or
otherwise explain his eighteen month conclusion. Id. at 52. This, according to the court, was
therefore speculative. Id. Here, by the end of an evidentiary hearing, there will be plenty of
evidence, unlike in Natl Mining. Some has already been presented. [Doc. 39; Ex. 1.] The
Plaintiffs have a single source of income: ticket sales. The tickets are for views of live events at
Wrigley Field. The Defendants are eliminating those views. The Plaintiffs have no other source
of revenue. The Plaintiffs have fixed monthly costs. These costs cannot be covered absent ticket
revenue. What additional facts do the Defendants desire?
The Defendants next claim that fixed-length contract disputes preclude injunctive relief.
[Doc. 27, p. 15.] This is not a valid proposition of law, and the Defendants cases support no
such thing. In Marketing Werks, Inc. v. Fox, 2013 WL 5609339 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2013), this

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Court denied an injunction because the harm to the plaintiff was not irreparable, and it was not
without an adequate remedy at law. Id. at *1.

Moreover, while the fixed-length contract

reflected an ability to calculate damages, the plaintiff was not claiming that it would be forced
out of business without that one-year contract. Id. at *3. To the contrary, this Court noted that
the monetary loss to the plaintiff was likely just a small portion of its annual revenues. Id.
Likewise, in Instant Air Freight, the plaintiff was only going to lose 80% of its revenue
without an injunction, always had the ability to seek other customers, and knew it would have to
find other customers in just 19 more months when its contract expired. 882 F.2d at 802. None of
these cases support the proposition of law that fixed-term contracts prohibit injunctive relief.
Furthermore, even if there was a rule that a fixed-length contract could not support
injunctive relief (and there is not), it would have no effect on the injunctive relief sought by the
Plaintiffs under the Sherman Act. As acknowledged by defense counsel at the TRO hearing, the
Plaintiffs Sherman Act claims are entirely independent of their 20-year contract. The nonrenewal of a contract does not come with the right to commit anticompetitive acts and attempt to
monopolize a market in violation of the Sherman Act.
II.

Adequate Remedy at Law

According to Roland, an award of money damages is inadequate if: (i) The damage

award may come too late to save the plaintiffs business, and (ii) The plaintiff may not be able
to finance his lawsuit against the defendant without the revenues from his business that the
defendant is threatening to destroy. 749 F.2d at 386. This is the correct, controlling Seventh
Circuit precedent to apply to this case.
The Defendants devote a substantial amount of time arguing that it is possible to calculate
the Plaintiffs damages under a number of different methods or formulas. [Doc. 27, pp. 15-24.]

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They even offer the affidavit of a proposed business valuation expert. [Doc. 27, Ex. 11.] But
none of this matters because the Plaintiffs are going to be destroyed in this case, and for that
reason it is well-settled that money damages are not an adequate remedy at law. Roland, 749
F.2d at 386; Semmes, 429 F.2d at 1197, 1205. Not a single case cited by the Defendants says
that it is okay to deny injunctive relief to prevent the destruction of a business because there is a
fixed-length contract. Moreover, the Sherman Act claim is not limited to nine years.
The Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs can be compensated with money, and that the
Plaintiffs have offered no explanation or analysis to support a contrary finding. [Doc. 27, p. 15.]
But the Defendants disregard the plainly obvious results that the video board will have on the
Plaintiffs businesses. As the Defendants own executives admitted, once we put up the signs
you dont have a Rooftop Business. [Doc. 1, 95.] They also acknowledged, How hard is it
going to be to sell tickets when you have no glimpse of Wrigley Field. [Doc. 1, 96.] This
constitutes irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated at law.
The decision cited by the Defendants, Milex Prods., Inc. v. Alra Labs., Inc., 603 N.E.2d
1226 (Ill. App. 1992), merely involved how to calculate money damages, not whether money
damages precluded injunctive relief. Id. at 1236. That case has literally nothing to do with
whether a party is entitled to injunctive relief. Indeed, the word injunction does not even
appear in the decision. The same applies for Excelsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound
Equip., Inc., 73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1934).

Marketing Werks also does not support the

Defendants adequate remedy argument. The monetary loss in that case was just a small portion
of the plaintiffs annual revenue. 2013 WL 5609339 at *3. There, the plaintiff was not even
arguing that it would be forced out of business without an injunction. Id. So too, the decision in
Lake in the Hills Aviation Group, Inc. v. Village of Lake in the Hills, 698 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. App.

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1998), is highly distinguishable. In that case, the court primarily denied injunctive relief to the
plaintiffs because, such relief is not warranted where there is no possibility of success on the
merits. Id. at 169. Moreover, the plaintiffs only argued that it would be difficult to find
another place to conduct their business without injunctive relief. Id. at 170. The case does not
discuss total and complete destruction of a business in the context of adequate remedies at law.
Lancaster Found., Inc. v. Skolnick, 1992 WL 211063 (N.D. Ill. 1992), is also not a
destruction of business case. The fact that those plaintiffs pled a claim for monetary damages
has no relevance to the Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief and money damages here. There is
no prohibition on seeking injunctive relief in a complaint to prevent future harm-the destruction
of a business-and at the same time seek money damages for harms that have already occurred
and will possibly occur until trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. There is also no prohibition in seeking
money damages in the event that a jury decides not to award a permanent injunction. Indeed, it
would be incredibly unwise to ask for less given the doctrine of res judicata.
Just because a plaintiff indicates in a complaint what its future damages might be, or just
because future damages might be calculable, does not mean that a defendant has the right to
destroy the plaintiffs business and just pay him some money instead. Semmes, 429 F.2d at 1197,
1205. And the decision cited by the Defendants, Five Mile Capital Westin N. Shore SPE, LLC v.
Berkadia Comml Mortg., LLC, 983 N.E.2d 95 (Ill. App. 2012), suggests no such thing. The
plaintiff in Five Mile argued that it would be difficult to calculate damages if a real estate sale
were not enjoined, but not impossible. Id. at 102. Also. That plaintiff did not argue that it would
be driven out of business. The Plaintiffs in this case are not claiming that a damages calculation
on their breach of contract claim is mathematically impossible they are claiming that they will
be totally destroyed before the case even gets to trial for that calculation to take place, and that

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they have the right to conduct a business, not live off a damages award. They also claim that
their Sherman Act rights do not expire in nine years.
Matrix Group Ltd., Inc. v. Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., Inc., 378 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.
2004), is also not a destruction-of-business case, and therefore the fact that a jury could calculate
future damages in that case is not applicable here. Likewise, the decisions in Kreg Therapeutics,
Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 2014 WL 1227311 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2014), United Airlines, Inc. v.
Pappas, 809 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. 2004), Willow Hill Grain, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd. of
the State of Illinois, 549 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. 1990), and In re Marriage of Perlmutter, 587
N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. 1992), only involved how to calculate the value of an asset, not whether
that was the plaintiffs sole asset or whether the loss thereof would drive the plaintiff out of
business. None of these cases are relevant here.
The Defendants quote Bremer Bank, N.A. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., stating, Courts
routinely determine damages in cases similar to this through the use of experts and comparable
sales. 2006 WL 1205604, *3 (D. Minn. May 2, 2006). But the phrase cases similar to this
means cases similar to Bremer, not the instant action. Id. The facts in Bremer, which involved
how to place a value on an aircraft, are dissimilar to the present action. Id. Bremer does not
support destroying a business if the loss can be monetized.
The Defendants also claim that the Agreement itself precludes injunctive relief because it
supposedly contains a formula for calculating damages. [Doc. 27, pp. 22-23.] This argument is
based upon an unintelligent reading of the Agreement. Damages are something that a party
gets when someone else breaches an agreement. Sections 6.1 through 6.4 of the Agreement have
nothing whatsoever to do with damages because those sections have nothing to do with
breaches. Sections 6.1 through 6.4 of the Agreement relate to an expansion of the Wrigley

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Field bleachers which was expressly permitted by the Agreement.

Those sections merely

provide that if the Cubs moved forward with their bleacher expansion (which took place in 2005
and was not a breach of contract), the Cubs would reimburse the Rooftop Businesses for some
portion of the construction costs incurred by the Rooftop Businesses to build higher rooftop
seats, and/or the Cubs would receive a lower royalty rate. [Agreement, Doc. 21 at Exhibit E-1.]
Thus, section 6 of the Agreement is not a damages provision, and it certainly could not be
considered an exclusive remedy or liquidated damages provision for breaches of contract.
Moreover, section 6 of the Agreement only applied to permitted expansions, and not to breaches
of contract such as the installation of barriers in the form of video boards. Therefore, if the
addition of a video board is a breach of contract, then the compensation mechanisms of section 6
would never have applied, whether years ago or now. Moreover, nothing in the contract says
that section 6 would be an exclusive remedy provision for a partys violation of antitrust laws.
The Defendants accounting witness adds nothing. [Doc. 27, Ex. 11.] The accountant
does not discuss valuing a business that is destroyed. The accountant even agrees that his
damages calculations will depend on facts and evidence adduced during the case, but does not
say how the Plaintiffs will fund the litigation if they are denied injunctive relief. The accountant
only focuses on a 1-year and 9-year damages period, based on the contracts duration, but
provides no explanation how to calculate damages if the Plaintiffs succeed on their Sherman Act
claims and are awarded a permanent injunction or treble damages.
III.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Plaintiffs respectfully refer the Court to their Response in Opposition to Defendants

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 41] to establish that there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits

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of their breach of contract and Sherman Act claims, and incorporate same herein by reference.
The Plaintiffs will also submit supporting evidence at an evidentiary hearing on this Motion.
IV.

Balance of Hardships
The Defendants balance-of-hardships argument is notably weak. It consists of two

components: (i) the Plaintiffs waited too long to sue, and (ii) the Defendants already spent a lot
of money on the project. [Doc. 27, pp. 35-37.] Neither argument holds water because the
Plaintiffs acted as quickly as possible after December 4, 2014, and the Defendants spent most of
their money on a prior version of the project that would not have forced the Plaintiffs to sue.
The argument that the Plaintiffs waited too long to sue is factually untrue.

The

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs threatened to take legal action in July, 2013 and again in
May, 2014. In doing so, the Defendants self-servingly ignore that they did not announce their
plan to move the 2,200-square-foot video board directly in front of the Plaintiffs until December
4, 2014. [Doc. 1, 106.] Before December 4, 2014, the gigantic video board was located up the
street and would have had a smaller impact on the Plaintiffs. [Doc. 21, Exs. A-10-1 and A-10-2.]
It was the Defendants that decided to move the video board after all their planning and expenses,
so that their newly-acquired buildings would not be blocked. This forced the Plaintiffs to sue.
Furthermore, the Defendants did not get permits for the sign until January 27, 2015. Their plans
changed so often, it was unclear whether the Defendants would really put the sign up until then.
The Defendants also argue that they spent nearly $2 million designing, constructing and
purchasing the video board. Once again, however, that money was already spent before the
Defendants decided to move the video board in front of the Plaintiffs buildings. There is no
evidence cited by the Defendants suggesting that they spent $2 million dollars on the video board
after December 4, 2014. There is also no evidence cited by the Defendants to suggest that they

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could not simply slide the video board back to its original location a very reasonable solution
that the Defendants choose not to undertake.
The Defendants also say that they have a contract with Budweiser which generates
income for a sign on top of the video board. However, the Defendants do not identify how much
Budweiser is paying for that sign, whether Budweiser agreed to pay for that sign before its
location was moved on December 4, 2014, or whether Budweiser had previously agreed to pay
the same amount to have a sign in the prior location. The Defendants have not presented any
hard evidence with respect to the supposed harm they are facing.
Enverve Inc. v. Unger Meat Co., 779 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ill. 2011), does not help the
Defendants. In that case, the defendant tendered evidence that it would suffer $174,581.72 in
economic harm if an injunction was issued. Id. at 845. On the other hand, there was minimal or
no indicia that the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable harm if the injunction was denied. Id.
Furthermore, the court only found a modest likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding on the merits
in that case. Id. Applying the sliding scale method, injunctive relief was not warranted. Id.
MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 1998), does not stand for the
proposition urged by the Defendants that an injunction should be denied if issuing it would cost a
defendant a significant amount of money. Quite the opposite, that court merely balanced the
harms at issue in that case. Id. at 360. The plaintiff wanted to stop the park district from
requiring permits and charging fees for free speech rallies until the case concluded. Id. This
could have meant thousands of applications not being filed, thousands of permit fees not being
collected, major scheduling problems, and danger to health or safety of park patrons. Id. On the
other side of the scale, the park district was not preventing the plaintiff from having his rally at

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all, even for free. Id. Thus, the harm to the defendant and the public was great the harm to the
plaintiff was minimal or non-existent. Id.
V.

The Public Interest

The Defendants also assert that the public will be harmed if a preliminary injunction is

granted. [Doc. 27, pp. 37-38.] The Defendants argue that public support for the renovation of
Wrigley is strong. The Defendants also argue that City Hall, Contractors and Chambers of
Commerce favor the renovations at Wrigley Field. But this argument ignores the narrow scope
of the Plaintiffs request. The Plaintiffs are not trying to stop the renovation of Wrigley Field;
they are not trying to stop construction of the outfield walls; they are not trying to stop any
expansion whatsoever. The only thing the Plaintiffs are trying to stop is the installation of a
single video board and any signage on top of it. This is an extremely narrow, focused and
carefully-tailored request. The Defendants supposed public interest facts are unavailing.
The Defendants also offer no explanation how the public would be harmed if a
Budweiser advertisement does not grace the beautiful, historic Wrigley Field. The Defendants
offer no explanation how the public would be harmed if the messages intended for the video
board were displayed on the jumbotron, or on some other signs placed elsewhere in the park.
The Defendants also do not explain how the public scraped by for 100 years without the video
board or Budweiser sign, but now suddenly need it so desperately that the destruction of four
businesses, dozens of jobs, and tens of millions in property values, is acceptable.
The Defendants also fail to circumvent that there is a strong public interest in enforcing
the Sherman Act. F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.D.C. 2008); Jackson v.
N.F.L., 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992). The Defendants also do not respond to the Plaintiffs
argument that the public will be harmed if injunctive relief is not granted, because there will be

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less competition, the Defendants ultimately want to control and raise prices, reduce competition,
and compete by overtaking or destroying, not by offering a superior product at a better price.
These are obvious, recognized forms of public harm, which serve as the cornerstone of the
Sherman Act.
VII.

Conclusion
Without an injunction, the Plaintiffs will become insolvent and will be destroyed almost

immediately, and certainly long before this case goes to trial. For all of the reasons set forth
above, in the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and adduced
at the forthcoming evidentiary hearing, a preliminary injunction is necessary, just and
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court enter a
Preliminary Injunction requiring that the defendants, Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC, Chicago
Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, Wrigley Field Holdings, LLC and Thomas S. Ricketts (collectively,
Defendants), immediately discontinue the installation of jumbotrons, video boards,
billboards, advertisements, and any other type of signage in front of Plaintiffs properties located
across from Wrigley Field, which signage will obstruct Plaintiffs views into Wrigley Field, and
grant any additional relief deemed just and appropriate.

Thomas M. Lombardo (6279247)

Abraham Brustein (327662)
Di Monte & Lizak, LLC
216 Higgins Road
Park Ridge, IL 60068
847-698-9600
tlombardo@dimontelaw.com
abrustein@dimontelaw.com

Respectfully Submitted,
Right Field Rooftops, LLC, d/b/a Skybox on
Sheffield, Right Field Properties, LLC, 3633
Rooftop Management, LLC, d/b/a Lakeview
Baseball Club, and Rooftop Acquisition,
LLC
/s/ Thomas M. Lombardo
One of their Attorneys
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