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Name: Alexios Braoudakis

Student Code: 109028017


ab1566@york.ac.uk
Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PEP)
Ethics I Year One
Group 13: Elisabeth Thorsson

Question:
Does Hume have a good reason for denying that moral distinctions
are determined by reason?
InthebookAtreatiseofthehumannatureDavidHumetriestoanalysethat
moraldistinctionsandvalues(ofgoodandevil)arenotmerelydeterminedbyour
reasoning.Hismainconcernistoanswer:whetheritbepossible,fromreasonalone,
todistinguishbetwixtmoralgoodandevil,orwhethertheremustconcursomeother
principlestoenableustomakethatdistinction.Reasonisausefultooltoexplain
them, but insufficient to create viable grounds for their justification. His main
argumentisthatmoraldecisions,specificallymoraldistinctions,arenotdetermined
byourreasonbutbyourpassions;passions,whichcanbeillustratedthroughreason
butnotfullyunderstoodwithoutunderlyinghumannatureandthushumanfeelings.In
thisessayIwilltrytoexplainandevaluatethekeyconceptsandideasaboutmoral
distinctionsthatHumeproposesintheTreatiseofHumanNature.
Humestartshisargumentbyanalysingthatmoraldistinctionsaffecteveryday
actions.Thesedecisions(i.e.onhowweidentifysomethingasmorallycorrectornot)
donotaffecteverydayactions.Thus,asheargues,moralvaluesmoralityitselfis
notbasedonreason,butratherinsomethingmoredifficulttodetermine.Passion
itself.Thecausationanddirecteffectofourbeliefsandactionsareanintertwined
withobjectsthatweexperience.Theyareinawayobjectsthatweareinterestedin;
theyarethuseitheraresultofpleasureorpain.
Humeaddsthatactionscannotbeexplainedinareasonbasedcriteriaprocess
(thus,wecannotjudgewhetheractionsarereasonableorunreasonable)asactionsare
affectedbyourpassions,andpassionisaffectedbyourpainand/orpleasure.Ashe
arguesreasonisandshouldbetheslaveofpassions.

Humeascribesmoraldecisionstothepassionsforseveralreasons. Inorderto
illustratehisargumenthepresentsexamplesas:theexistenceofGod,theimmortality
of the soul, murder. He turns down the idea of reason been a reliable way by
examiningthecaseofmurder.Takeanyactionallowdtobevicious:Wilfulmurder,
forinstance.Humeexamineshisfeelingsaboutmurder.Heexplainsthathecannot
distinguishbetweenhisfeelingsaboutitandaclearanddistinctopinionaboutit.That
iswhathappenstoeachandeveryoneofus.Inadeepintroversivesearchofour
feelingswefindthatwedislikemurderjustbecausewefeelpain.Asaresulthe
argues,aswewouldargueaswell,thatmoralvaluesareinterrelatedwithpassions,
withoutexcludingreasontobeahelpfultooltoidentifyfeelingspassionsorigins.
Murderisjustifiedasabadactionatauniversallevel.
In his description of passions, Hume explains analytically both direct and
indirect passions.Inthe firstclass he adds desire,joy,hope, fearwhereas in the
secondpride,love,hatred.Forhimpassionsareneithersomethingrealintheirnature,
nor can cause contradictions and thus they are completely different from reason.
Hence,wecannotcategorizethemasreasonableorunreasonable.Moralityinthat
senseisnotaccompaniedbyourGodgivenreason.Reasonworksintwoways:either
directingpassionstofocusintoobjectsorbydiscoveringconnectionsbetweenevents,
whicheventuallycreatepassions.Judgmentonacting,thus,mightbereasonableor
notbutjudgmentmustbebasedonpassionsorfeelingstobefullycomplete.
Butareouractionsalwaysbasedonpassions?AsD.D.Raphaelwouldargue
moral judgments are based on reason. In order to identify an action as moral or
immoralwedonothavetoperformit,wecouldbeinthatsensejudgersofothers
actions. In that sense the premise that Hume made (i.e. that morality influences
actions)isrejected.Hencewecanrejectthatmoralityismightbebasedonreasonas
well.Butwecouldcounterarguethatwemightusereasontojudgebutweneed
somethingmoretounderstandit.
Eventhoughwecanfullyunderstandtheobjections thatcameup,wecan
arguethatHumesideaoftranscendenceofmoralitythroughourpassionsisindeeda
clearandprecise.Itinvolvesacombinationofreason,beenanecessarytooltoexplain
andanalysemoralrightandwrong,butalsopassionswhichcreatethegroundsof
universalmoralvaluessuchasrepulsionoftheactionmurder.ItisforHumeandme

thatmoralvaluesarebasedtoourpassions,ourpain,ourhappiness.
WordCount:740

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