Foreign Relations and The End of Byzantium

Foreign Relations and the End of Byzantium: The Use of Personal Diplomacy
during the Reign of Constantine XI Palaiologos (1448 1453)

by
Adam William Hellebuyck
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors
Department of History
University of Michigan
March 27, 2006
Advised by Professor Rudi Lindner
For Mom and Dad

Thanks for Everything
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Figures
ii
Acknowledgements
iii
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: On the Sources
19
Chapter Three: Constantine and the Ottomans
27
Chapter Four: Constantine and the Papacy
51
Chapter Five: Constantine and the Venetians
76
Chapter Six: Conclusion
98
Bibliography
103
FIGURES
Figure 1: Constantinople during Constantine XIs Reign (1448 1453)
16
Figure 2: A Silver Quarter-Hyperperon Minted by Constantine XI
87
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Over the past year, many people have greatly contributed to the creation of this
thesis. First, I would like to thank my parents, William and Roseann Hellebuyck, for their
support of my education. While this undoubtedly extends to financial support, a burden
they undertook without hesitation, it also extends to the encouragement, care, and fine
example they have provided me throughout my entire life. I am especially grateful to
them for helping me develop into the person I am today. Their example showed me that it
is never enough to simply do the bare minimum. Rather, one must always work their
hardest. That belief helped motivate my decision to write an honors thesis. I would also
like to thank the rest of my family for their support and encouragement. I truly am
fortunate to have such a wonderful group of people around me.
I would also like to thank several faculty members of the University of Michigan
for their support of this thesis. First, I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor
Rudi Lindner. He voluntarily took time from his busy schedule to work with me, offering
his expertise and reading several drafts to help me improve this work. With his
assistance, I have learned strategies that will help me continually grow and develop as a
writer. In addition, his encouragements during our meetings helped to make the difficult
but rewarding process of writing a thesis much more bearable. I would also like to thank
Professor Beate Dignas, who recommended me for admission to the honors program in
the Department of History, and also for introducing me to Greek history. Furthermore, I
am grateful to Professors Farina Mir and Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof for their efforts in the
iii
history honors colloquiums, helping me both to understand the intricacies of historical

research and to structure the writing process so that work on this thesis progressed
smoothly and efficiently. Special thanks also to Professor Matthew Herbst, who
encouraged me to study Byzantium by showing me many of its political, cultural,
religious, and economic marvels through fascinating courses in Byzantine history three
years ago. Without his courses, I might not have studied the history of this vibrant and
influential empire.
I am also extremely indebted to the University of Michigans library system,
especially the staff of the Interlibrary Loan office in the Harlan Hatcher Graduate
Library. They were instrumental in quickly locating and acquiring many important and
specific sources for this thesis from libraries around the country. I offer many thanks to
the librarians of Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library as well for their efforts in locating
several sources and studies in libraries around the University of Michigan.
I would like to also thank my friends for offering their support throughout the past
year. Their interest in my work, and especially their insistence that I update them often on
my research and ideas, helped me to develop and organize my thoughts and present my
work in a clearer fashion. I would especially like to thank Christopher Cunningham,
Amanda McAllister, Ashley Andreotta, and Byron Hauck for their encouragement
throughout the writing process. In addition, many thanks to Caitlin Kleiboer for her
artistic and technical expertise, helping create the map of Constantinople found in
Chapter One. The support of everyone, here at the University of Michigan and beyond,
has made working on this thesis an enjoyable and rewarding experience.
iv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The study of Byzantine diplomacy often focuses upon the empire at the height of
its power and influence, when emperors and their extensive bureaucracies could use their
vast resources to neutralize any opponents.1 Even after the sack of Constantinople and the
empires reconstitution in 1261, such Byzantine emperors as Michael VIII Palaiologos
used the states legacy and resources to their advantage in diplomatic negotiations.2
However, the later period of Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy, especially under
the final emperor, Constantine XI Palaiologos, has received less attention. In fact, each of
the major works detailing Constantines life places very little emphasis upon his
diplomatic activities. Instead, scholarship of Byzantiums final years portrays the
emperor and his advisors as merely victims of the events surrounding Constantinoples
fall. Therefore, this thesis will show how Constantine XI and his court created foreign
policy toward other powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire, the Papacy, and the
Venetian Republic, centering on the imperial administrations use of personal diplomacy.
When the emperor and his councilors had access to the expertise of foreigners, they were
able to create cohesive, effective policies toward other states. However, when the Greeks
did not have access to foreign elites who could both advise the court and intercede on
their behalf within their respective states, Byzantine foreign policy faltered.
Jonathan Shepard. Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 800 1204: Means and Ends. Byzantine Diplomacy.
Eds. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1992) 41-70.
2
N. Oikonomides. Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 1204 1453: Means and Ends. Byzantine Diplomacy.
Eds. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1992) 73-88.
Each of the three main works on Constantine XI Palaiologos life overlooks his
diplomatic practices and his administrations construction of foreign policy. Chedomil
Mijatovich, author of Constantine Palaeologus (1448 1453) or The Conquest of
Constantinople by the Turks, wrote his analysis of the final Byzantine emperor with a
very specific intention. In 1892, when Mijatovich authored his work, tensions between
the fledgling Kingdom of Greece and the Ottoman Empire were rising, and war appeared
to be a likely possibility. Therefore, Mijatovich, who was sympathetic to Greek interests,
wrote his biography of Constantine XI as a form of propaganda to build support for the
Greek cause. In fact, the diplomat even dedicates his work to the young Prince
Constantine, who was the heir to the Greek throne. The author explains in his preface that
Constantinople may soon again change masters, alluding to the possibility of the Greek
nation re-conquering the Ottoman capital city.3 As a result of these motives, Constantine
XI is portrayed as a tragic victim of the events around him. Mijatovich even describes
him as such: Constantine Draga was in fact rather a simple, honest soldier than a
skillful diplomatist.4 Since he wanted to maintain an image of Greek helplessness to
motivate his contemporary readers, Mijatovich only cursorily examines the reasons
behind Constantines actions and their effects upon the fall of Constantinople in 1453. As
a result, Mijatovichs biography neither analyzes the emperors diplomatic relations nor
discusses the development of Byzantine foreign policy during his reign.
Sir Steven Runcimans The Fall of Constantinople 1453 follows the Serbian
diplomats example by characterizing Constantine through the siege of Constantinople.
The British historian used this tactic before as he characterized Emperor Michael VIII by
3
Chedomil Mijatovich. Constantine Palaeologus (1448 1453), or The Conquest of Constantinople by the
Turks (Chicago: Argonaut, 1892) xii.
4
Mijatovich 108.
analyzing his participation in the Sicilian Vespers of the thirteenth century. Unlike
Chedomil Mijatovich, Runciman was not interested in creating a work of propaganda
intended to spur Greek nationalism. However, Runcimans narrative does portray the
emperor primarily as a tragic figure through detailed descriptions of his diplomatic efforts
to save the empire from destruction. His account does not dismiss Constantine XIs
responsibility for antagonizing the Turks, eventually leading to their assault upon
Constantinople. He states: The emperor himself was to blame for a worsening of the
relations between the empire and the Turks.5 Like Mijatovichs monograph, Runciman
is not concerned with the historical background of the emperors decisions, but merely
that they were a part of his larger story involving the fall of Constantinople.
The most recent analysis of Constantine XI, Donald Nicols The Immortal
Emperor, departs from the previous works structures. Instead of characterizing the
emperor through the lens of the siege of Constantinople in 1453, Nicol highlights some
themes and trends that appear throughout Constantines life. Using source material from
Constantines reign as despot of the Morea before his accession to the imperial throne,
Nicol thoroughly analyzes the various trials that the last Byzantine emperor faced.
However, like the other accounts, his work does not explain how Emperor Constantine
XI and his court formulated foreign policy actions while attempting to end the Ottoman
threat to Constantinople. Nicol places less emphasis upon the impact that individuals,
aside from the emperor, had on Byzantine policy during this period.
This thesis intends to help fill a gap in the scholarship of Byzantine Emperor
Constantine XI Palaiologos. The major works on the last emperor do not focus upon the
creation of diplomatic discourse or foreign policy during his reign. Each of them uses the
5
Steven Runciman. The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 64.
events surrounding the end of Byzantium for different purposes. Mijatovich uses them for
propaganda, Runciman weaves them into an engaging narrative detailing
Constantinoples fall, and Nicol places them into the context of the emperors life in
general. None of them analyzes or acknowledges the importance that personal diplomacy
played in Byzantium under Constantine XI. In addition, the three works overlook the
successes that the imperial administration had during this period because of that personal
diplomacy. Therefore, this thesis will examine the events surrounding Constantinoples
fall through their implications on diplomacy and foreign policy during the last emperors
reign.
Before examining these issues, it is important to place Constantines empire into
its historical context. By the fifteenth century, Byzantium had been reduced to only a
fraction of its former grandeur. The major catalyst of this decline came during the
eleventh century. After Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes failed to prevent the Seljuk
Turks entry into Byzantine territory in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, much of Asia
Minor and all of the eastern provinces were quickly lost to the empire.6 While subsequent
emperors, such as Alexios I Komnenos and Manuel I Komnenos, were able to recover
some of these lost territories as a result of Western crusades, these gains were only
temporary. The Turks had permanently settled in Anatolia. As a result, Byzantium lost
access to its most fertile, wealthy, and populated region, throwing the empire into a sharp
economic decline, especially in the late twelfth century.7
This economic turmoil also led to political troubles during this period. The end of
the Komnenos imperial dynasty led to quarrels between the Byzantine aristocratic
6
George Ostrogorsky. History of the Byzantine State. Trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2002) 349.
7
Ostrogorsky 401.
families seeking to control the throne, while they simultaneously consolidated their
economic holdings throughout the empire. Often these quarrels degenerated into civil
war, further destabilizing the political situation in Byzantium. Even when the Angelos
family prevailed and took the imperial throne, disputes within that clan led to further
instability. In fact, a disgruntled member of the Angelos family approached the Frankish
and Venetian military forces at Zara along the Adriatic coast in 1203, asking for
assistance in claiming the Byzantine throne.8 These political intrigues led to the
impromptu capture and sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204.
The establishment of a Latin Empire in the Aegean following the sack of
Constantinople also significantly handicapped Byzantium, even though the Greeks were
able to re-conquer much of their former empire in less than sixty years. The governmentin-exile, based in Nicaea across the Aegean Sea from Constantinople, slowly pushed the
Latins from Thrace and the southern Morea, forcing them into Thessaly and Attica.
Under the leadership of Michael Palaiologos, the Byzantines recaptured Constantinople
in 1261 and began to consolidate their position. The now-Emperor Michael VIII
Palaiologos deftly defended the empire from the Western Christians, eager to retake
Constantinople and rebuild the Latin Empire, throughout his reign.9 However, his focus
on the Latins gave the Turks the opportunity to expand into the rest of Asia Minor, taking
the remainder by the beginning of the fourteenth century, with a few exceptions.10 After
Michael VIII and his immediate successors, the empire suffered more periods of civil war
8
Ostrogorsky 415-416.
For a detailed study of Michael VIIIs reign and his diplomatic maneuvers with Charles of Anjou, the
Papacy, and the Aragonese, see Deno John Geanakoplos. Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.)
10
Ostrogorsky 548: The city of Philadelphia, in southern Anatolia, resisted the Turks well into the
fourteenth century. In fact, Manuel II, acting as a vassal of the Ottoman sultan, was forced to participate in
the citys siege and capture in the late fourteenth century.
9
between rival claimants to the throne. While the Palaiologan dynasty was eventually
victorious in the late fourteenth century, the damage to the empire was irreversible. The
rival claimants had relied extensively upon Turkish mercenaries to fight their battles, and
these soldiers refused to return to Anatolia after their service. In addition, the Ottomans
took advantage of Byzantine political chaos to establish a permanent foothold in Europe
at Gallipoli. By the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had reduced the Byzantine Empire to
a strip of land along the Black Sea, the Morea, and the imperial capital of Constantinople.
While the emperors tried to exert their independence from the Ottoman sultan at every
opportunity, they were forced into servitude, functioning as his vassals. This was the
situation that Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos entered upon his accession in 1448.
Constantine Palaiologos was born on February 8, 1405 to Emperor Manuel II
Palaiologos and Serbian princess Helena Draga, their fourth son.11 Constantine was
raised in Constantinople and remained there alongside his father Manuel and his elder
brother John, witnessing the failed Ottoman siege of 1422. The young Constantine, only
eighteen years old, so impressed his father and brother during the siege that he was
chosen to serve as regent during co-Emperor John VIIIs journey to Hungary, seeking aid
for Byzantium in late 1423.12 After his successful regency, Constantine was awarded a
small strip of territory in Constantinoples hinterland, extending from the port of
Mesembria in the north to the port of Selymbria to the west of the capital. While small,
11
Donald Nicol. The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, last Emperor of
the Romans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 2; George Sphrantzes dates the year of
Constantines birth at 1404, but other sources confirm that he was born in 1405.
12
George Sphrantzes. Chronicon Minus. The Fall of the Byzantine Empire. Trans. Marios Philippides
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980) 30.
this fief was strategically important since it covered the land approaches to
Constantinople, proving that both his father and elder brother trusted his abilities.13
While the son of the philosopher-Emperor Manuel II, a prolific writer and
theologian, Constantine did not share his fathers deep interest in scholarship and
learning. Scholars in the service of Manuel II tutored Constantine in the Byzantine capital
until he was seventeen years old, but he was more interested in hunting and the martial
arts. He was praised for his marksmanship, hunting prowess, and martial abilities as a
child.14 Constantine had no interest in theology or philosophy, but he did patronize
philosophers and other scholars.15 For instance, he was close friends with the renowned
scholar George Gemistos Plethon, and bestowed honors upon him while despot of the
Morea.16 Constantine showed the same proclivities when an adult as he did as a child. He
was much more comfortable riding into battle than debating philosophy or negotiating
trade agreements with foreign ambassadors.17 Nonetheless, he was a prudent man, and
heeded his councilors advice on important matters of state. He was also a competent
administrator, following his fathers advice while serving as regent in Constantinople in
1423, and learning from his tenure ruling various fiefs around the empire.18 As a result of
these experiences, Constantine was well prepared for the imperial throne upon his
accession in 1449.
After Manuel IIs death in 1425, John VIII offered his younger brother
Constantine a new fief in the northwest Morea, where he would be charged with re13
Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 7.

15
Runciman The Fall of Constantinople 1453 53.
16
Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 22-23.
17
Sphrantzes 36: Constantine charged into battle on horseback against the defenders of Patras while despot
of the Morea on March 26, 1429. His horse was killed from under him and he was also nearly killed.
18
14
conquering the region from its Latin overlords. Upon their arrival, John and Constantine
utterly defeated the Latin ruler of Epiros, Carlo Tocco.19 In order to save his dignity, he
offered his daughter Maddalena to Constantine in marriage, providing several Moreote
ports and villages as her dowry. Unfortunately, she died childless less than eighteen
months later.20 Constantine proceeded to conquer various territories throughout the
Morea, culminating in the capture of the major city of Patras in 1429. Constantines
successes, and Emperor John VIIIs obvious preference for his talented younger brother
as his successor (John had no children), angered his other brothers. This was especially
true of Manuels second son Theodore, co-despot of the Morea based at Mistra, who was
extremely jealous of Constantines ability and popularity.21 At the request of his mother
Helena, Constantine was chosen to serve as regent in Constantinople again during John
VIIIs trip to Italy for the Council of Florence in 1437.22 Constantine was clearly her
favorite son, and she actively advocated that he be chosen as Johns successor. When
John returned from Italy in 1440, Constantine traveled back to the Morea, where he first
arranged to marry the daughter of the Genoese lord of Mytilene, Caterina. However, this
marriage would also be shortlived, as Caterina died while visiting the island of Lesbos in
1442.23
Once Constantine returned to the Morea, he focused upon its defense from
Turkish invasions, and planned his next wars of expansion against the Ottomancontrolled principalities to the north, centered on Athens. He knew that the successful
conclusion of the Council of Florence in 1439 meant that the pope was organizing
19
Sphrantzes 33.
Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 8-9, 13.
21
22
23
Sphrantzes 53.
20
another crusade to help the Greeks, and planned to take full advantage of it.24 Constantine
refortified the Isthmus of Corinth, and prepared to invade the Latin principalities of
Athens and Thebes, technically under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan. Once
Constantine heard that the crusade had left Hungary in 1444, he quickly invaded and
occupied the two cities. However, the crusades destruction at Varna later that year meant
Constantines gains would be short lived. In 1446, Sultan Murad II marched against
Constantines isthmian fortifications, the Hexamilion wall, and smashed them. He also
advanced into the Morea and ravaged it before withdrawing back into Greece.25
Constantine spent the remainder of his time rebuilding the Morea, eventually being
informed of his brothers death and was proclaimed Roman emperor, the eleventh of the
name Constantine, in the palace at Mistra in November 1448.
Constantine arrived in Constantinople in early 1449, and after a brief succession
struggle with his younger brothers Thomas and Demetrios, was acclaimed emperor by the
Constantinopolitans. His mother Helena was instrumental in securing Constantines
accession over his other brothers.26 Forgoing a traditional coronation, the emperor
immediately focused upon the immediate threat posed by the Ottomans toward
Constantinople, seeking aid from the various western principalities. He delicately handled
Byzantine relations with the Papacy by implementing convenient portions of church
union, and actively courted Venetian support for the citys defense. While Constantine
succeeded in gaining some support from the west, he and his advisors misjudged the
determination of the new Ottoman sultan, Mehmed II, upon his accession in 1451. Soon
after taking the throne, young Mehmed invested Constantinople with a vast army and
24
Sphrantzes 54.
Sphrantzes 56.
26
Donald M. Nicol. A Biographical Dictionary of the Byzantine Empire (London: Seaby, 1991) 29.
25
fleet. After a brief but intense siege, the Ottomans succeeded in storming and capturing
the Byzantine capital on May 29, 1453. Emperor Constantine XI was killed fighting at
the walls, and the Byzantine Empire came to an end.
The Byzantine capitals status in the fifteenth century under Emperor Constantine
XI is also important for understanding Greek diplomacy during this period.
Constantinople had drastically changed since its sack by Latin crusaders in 1204. The
Western army had destroyed much of the citys former glory during the Fourth Crusade,
both by fire and greed.27 As a result, the city became a ruralized network of scattered
nuclei by the fifteenth century.28 The mass exodus from the city under Latin rule left
wide spaces between groups of settlements inside Constantinople. The city consisted of
groups of workshops and stores with residential districts and other buildings around a
shared court, essentially individual villages within its walls.29 As a result, the citys
traditional civic center near the Acropolis fell into decay. The Great Palace, home of
Byzantine emperors since before the time of Justinian, fell into disrepair and was
abandoned, especially after crusaders stripped the roof of its lead and exposed its interior
to the elements.30 Many of the citys palaces, churches, and other public buildings were
in a similar ruinous condition by the mid-fifteenth century.
However, some sections of Constantinople did prosper during this period. While
the traditional sections of Constantinople were in decline by the fifteenth century, several
merchant sections around the Golden Horn still prospered. The Western traveler Clavijo,
27
Jonathan Phillips. The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople (New York: Viking, 2004) 208.
Paul Magdalino. Medieval Constantinople: Built Environment and Urban Development. The Economic
History of Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 536.
29
Klaus-Peter Matschke. The Late Byzantine Urban Economy, Thirteenth Fifteenth Centuries. The
Economic History of Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 471.
30
Magdalino 536.
28
10
visiting Constantinople around 1403, marveled at the prosperity of these quarters amid
the ruin and desolation surrounding them.31 Clavijo noted that the Venetian commercial
district, situated along the shore of the Golden Horn, the Genoese suburb-colony of
Galata, across the Golden Horn from the city proper, and the immediate area around the
Byzantine imperial residence along the city walls, the Blachernae Palace, still thrived.
The Italian sectors prospered because they were free from taxation, as emperors of the
Palaiologan dynasty guaranteed their privileges in Constantinople, beginning with
Michael VIII and the Genoese after the Greeks recaptured the city in 1261.32 The area
surrounding the Blachernae Palace flourished because it served as the new civic center of
Constantinople. Since the emperor needed to remain near the land walls in case of attack
or other crises, this palace became his primary residence. As a result, many Greek nobles
and courtiers shifted their residences to the Blachernae section. This prompted a small but
vigorous commercial district which supplied the imperial court and Greek elites with
wares and supplies. Each of these prosperous areas starkly contrasted with the ruined
churches, hamlets, and vast grain fields and orchards inside Constantinoples city walls.
The trends in the citys population followed the trends of its infrastructure in the
fifteenth century. Even though Constantinoples population had significantly decreased
31
Clavijo. Embassy to Tamerlane 1403-1406. Ed. Guy le Strange (London, 1928) as cited in Joseph Gill.
The Council of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) 85: Though the circuit of the
walls is thus very great and the area spacious, the city is not throughout very densely populated. There are
within its compass many hills and valleys where corn fields and orchards are found, and among the
orchardlands there are hamlets and suburbs which are all included within the city limits. The most populous
quarter of the city is along the lower level by the shore towards the point that juts into the Sea [of
Marmara]. The trading quarter of the city is down by the gates which open on the strand [of the Golden
Horn] and which are facing the opposite gates which pertain to the city of Pera [Galata], for it is here that
the galleys and smaller vessels come to port to discharge their cargoes, and here by the strand it is that the
people of Pera meet those of Constantinople and transact their business and commerce. Everywhere
throughout the city there are many great palaces, churches and monasteries, but most of them are now in
ruin. It is however plain that in former times when Constantinople was in its pristine state it was one of the
noblest capitals of the world.
32
Matschke, The Late Byzantine Urban Economy 476.
11
during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the city retained a diverse citizenry until
the empires collapse in 1453. The Black Death of 1347 killed nearly one-third of the
citys population, which had already been shrinking as a result of the Latin occupation
and Byzantine civil wars.33 The citizenry had barely begun to recover from this outbreak
when disease attacked the population again. Another outbreak in 1409 and 1410 killed
nearly 10,000 people in the city, leaving less than 50,000 citizens of Constantinople by
Constantine XIs reign.34
Constantinoples citizenry consisted of several distinct groups by the mid fifteenth
century. Even though many Greeks fled the capital amidst the turmoil of the fourteenth
century, they remained a majority of Constantinoples residents during Constantines
reign. While the Greek exodus continued, a significant portion of the population was
comprised of skilled craftsmen and artisans, as well as their families.35 Emperors Manuel
II and John VIII actively courted these skilled workers, as their expertise was needed to
repair Constantinoples extensive defenses in the face of the Turkish threat. As a result,
the Byzantines retained skilled masons for the land walls, and experts that could fortify
and renew the citys ports and quays.36 In addition, several Greek monastic orders
established themselves near the Acropolis along the Sea of Marmara.37 These monks
sought the relative safety provided by Constantinoples walls, as several monastic
communities outside the city fell under Turkish control in the fourteenth and early
33
Michael Maclagan. The City of Constantinople (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) 119.
Angeliki E. Laiou. The Agrarian Economy, Thirteenth Fifteenth Centuries. The Economic History of
Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 317.
35
Charalambos Bouras. Aspects of the Byzantine City, Eighth Fifteenth Centuries. The Economic
History of Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 500.
36
Klaus-Peter Matschke. Builders and Building in Late Byzantine Constantinople. Byzantine
Constantinople: Monuments, Topography, and Everyday Life. Ed. Nevra Necipolu (Boston: Brill, 2001)
316.
37
Magdalino 536.
34
12
fifteenth centuries, most notably the center of Mount Athos. Aside from these skilled
craftsmen and monastic communities, Greeks engaged in subsistence agriculture within
the city walls, cultivating small fields and tending to modest orchards in the abandoned
areas between the land walls and Hagia Sophia. These farmers grew enough to feed their
families, but could not supply the needs of the entire city. This would become a major
problem during the Ottoman siege in 1453.
The next largest groups living within Constantinople were Italians primarily from
Genoa and Venice. Most of these residents were merchants, taking advantage of the
lucrative trade routes leading through the Aegean and Black Seas into Asia. Both groups
used the city as a waypoint between Italy and their major interests in the Black Sea: Caffa
for Genoa and Trebizond for the Venetians.38 In addition to these merchants, a large
number of metalworkers lived in the city, primarily engaged in the manufacture of
personnel armor and weaponry, since the Byzantines constantly needed war materiel.39
While the Venetians in Constantinople came largely without their families, the Italians in
the Genoese colony of Galata often brought their wives and children.40 This would often
lead to a difference of opinion over strategy during Constantinoples defense in 1453, as
the Venetians often advocated a more aggressive stance than the Genoese, who were
reluctant to risk the safety of their families. These Italians often allowed their conflicts in
Italy to spill over into Constantinople as well. The emperor was constantly forced to
dispel tensions and rivalries between the groups to maintain a tenuous peace within the
38
Anna Avramea. Land and Sea Communications, Fourth Fifteenth Centuries. The Economic History
of Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 87.
39
Nicol Barbaro. Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453. Trans. J.R. Melville Jones (New York:
Exposition Press, 1969) 60.
40
Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 115.
13
city.41 While often troublesome, the Italians of Venice and Genoa were a sizeable
presence in Constantinople during the mid-fifteenth century.
In addition, the Turks maintained a small presence in the city. An active Turkish
merchant population settled around the Adrianople Gate, trading between Constantinople
and the Ottoman capital beginning in the late fourteenth century.42 This population
eventually became so prominent that Ottoman Sultan Bayazid forced Emperor Manuel II
to establish a Turkish quarter in the city, where the Muslims would be subject to their
own kadi (judge), and immune from many Byzantine customs duties.43 However, these
merchants were not long-term residents of the city. They often stayed only long enough
to complete their transactions with the Greeks and Italians in their respective quarters.
This transient Turkish population existed within Constantinople even during Constantine
XIs reign. Doukas explains that the emperor arrested them after an Ottoman massacre of
Greek farmers outside the city walls, but they were eventually released.44 The emperor
reluctantly ordered their execution in retribution for the capture and execution of several
Italian ships crews during the citys siege.45
Several contenders to the Ottoman throne also resided in the Byzantine capital
during the fifteenth century. For example, Emperor Manuel II sheltered the pretender
Mustafa at the behest of Mehmed I, who wanted to keep the Turkish prince away from
41
Makarios Melissenos-Melissourgos. The Chronicle of the Siege of Constantinople April 2 to May 29,
1453. The Fall of the Byzantine Empire. Trans. Marios Philippides (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1980) 113.
42
Matschke, The Late Byzantine Urban Economy 473, 481.
43
John Freely. Istanbul: The Imperial City (New York: Viking, 1996) 167; Matschke, The Late Byzantine
Urban Economy 478.
44
Doukas. Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks. Trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1975) 198.
45
Melissenos 112.
14
Ottoman territory, but close enough to supervise.46 During Constantine XIs reign, the
Byzantines maintained Orhan, a grandson of the Sultan Suleiman, as well as his
considerable retinue.47 These pretenders were potentially great assets for Byzantine
emperors in their negotiations with the Ottomans, as they could threaten to release the
pretenders and ignite civil war among the Turks. While the Byzantine threat to release
Orhan and spark civil war did not succeed, the prince and his retinue assisted with the
defense of Constantinople in 1453.
Constantinople also possessed a small Jewish population in the fifteenth century.
Many immigrated to the city as a result of the declining urban landscape throughout the
rest of Greece, traveling to Constantinople looking for mercantile opportunities. While
the majority of immigrants were Greek-speaking Jews, a significant section came from
the Italian merchant republics as well.48 As a result, many of these Jews resided in the
three main commercial districts, along the Golden Horn, in Galata, and in the imperial
quarter near the Blachernae Palace.49 Most chose to do business in the Venetian quarter,
because they enjoyed an exemption from taxes there. However, this led to resentment
among the Byzantines, who viewed these Jews as agents undermining their authority
within Constantinople.50 Nonetheless, they remained within the city throughout
Constantine XIs reign, as well as during Ottoman rule.
46
John W. Barker. Manuel II Palaeologus (1391 1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969) 343, 355.
47
Doukas 191; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 52.
48
David Jacoby. The Jews of Constantinople and their demographic hinterland. Constantinople and its
Hinterland. Eds. Cyril Mango and Gilbert Dagron (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1995) 230.
49
Jacoby 230.
50
Matschke, The Late Byzantine Urban Economy 476.
15
Figure 1: Constantinople during Constantine XIs Reign (1448 1453)51
As a result of the previously mentioned events, the Byzantine Empire had been
whittled down to Constantinople, ruled by Constantine XI and the Morea, under his
feuding brothers. Therefore, the emperors diplomatic resources were sorely depleted.
This work intends to explore the imperial administrations methods of diplomatic
exchange during the Byzantine Empires final four years of existence. Specifically, it will
ascertain how Constantine and his court adapted to these conditions in the face of an
51
Created by Adam Hellebuyck and Caitlin Kleiboer; Terrain and certain landmarks based upon a map
found in David Nicolle. Constantinople 1453: The End of Byzantium (New York: Osprey, 1999) 50.
16
impending Ottoman assault upon Constantinople, and the efficacy of personal diplomacy
on Byzantine foreign policy.
Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos diplomatic relations with other powers
depended heavily upon his personal relationships with foreign elites and dignitaries. He
developed these throughout his tenure as despot of the Morea and while Roman emperor.
He relied upon these relationships, rather than upon bureaucratic channels, because the
Byzantine bureaucracy deteriorated along with the state. The emperor also relied heavily
upon the personal relationships between members of his court and foreigners within the
imperial capital. When Constantine and his court possessed direct, personal relationships
with influential foreigners, relations with their home states improved. In addition, the
Byzantines created streamlined, coherent foreign policies toward those states. When the
emperor or his court did not possess significant personal relationships with foreign elites,
relations with those states suffered. Also, Constantine and his advisors could not create
coherent foreign policies toward them.
In order to prove the impact that personal diplomacy had over diplomatic
exchanges and foreign policy formation during the empires final years, three distinct
cases will be examined. The first, analyzing Constantines relations with the Ottoman
Turks, represents the failure of Byzantine personal diplomacy, and its effect upon the
creation of foreign policy. Since the emperor and his court could not establish a close,
beneficial relationship with any Turkish elites within Constantinople, they could not
improve relations between the two groups. In addition, Byzantine foreign policy toward
the Ottomans was haphazardly organized and contradicted itself on several occasions.
The second case represents the success of Constantines personal diplomatic approach,
17
examining his relations with the Papacy. Since the imperial administration was intimately
familiar with several influential members of the Western Church, especially the papal
legate sent to supervise the Union of the Churches in Constantinople, the Byzantines
retained a direct link to the pope. The emperor also heeded the legates expertise and
implemented certain aspects of church union in order to gain needed military support for
the empires defense. The third case, Byzantine relations with the Venetians, also shows
the efficacy of personal diplomacy. However, Constantine was only partially successful
in this regard. While he was able to mobilize the considerable Venetian population of
Constantinople to his cause with the support of their baille, he was unable to secure the
Venetian Senates aid until it was too late for Constantinople. Through each of these
examples, the Byzantine administrations use of personal diplomacy will be examined.
18
CHAPTER TWO
On the Sources
In order to clearly understand Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos diplomatic
actions and foreign policies toward the Ottomans, the Papacy, and the Venetians, the
major sources of this period must be examined. Each of these works also falls into one of
two categories. Some sources, such as George Sphrantzes, Makarios MelissenosMelissourgos, Doukas, Nicol Barbaro, and Leonard of Chios, detail the events
surrounding the final destruction of the Byzantine Empire, telling the tale from the Greek
or Western Christian viewpoint. The final siege and fall of Constantinople to the
Ottomans in May 1453 occupies a central place in each of these narratives. Other sources,
such as Kritovoulos and Tursun Beg, view the end of Byzantium through their discussion
of Ottoman ascendancy. While both of their commentaries discuss Sultan Mehmed IIs
conquest of the Byzantine capital, this event opens their narratives, which focus upon the
Ottoman Empires expansion and consolidation under his rule. These sources are useful
to understand Constantines diplomatic and foreign policy actions for different reasons.
However, each possesses limitations that must be examined.
The most informative source on Constantine XIs diplomatic activities is the
Chronicon Minus of George Sphrantzes, the emperors chief ambassador and close
friend. Sphrantzes spent a considerable amount of time with Constantine, both during his
tenure in the Morea and as emperor. As a result, Sphrantzes was privy to nearly all of his
attempts to deter the Ottoman threat to Byzantium, which he details in his chronicle. In
addition, Sphrantzes carefully describes each of his missions while acting as Constantine
19
XIs ambassador to other states. This is particularly valuable to a study of Byzantine

foreign policy in the fifteenth century because his chronicle provides an eyewitness
account of why certain actions succeeded and others failed during the emperors quest to
save Constantinople. He also includes his personal beliefs and opinions on Byzantine
foreign relations, and as a member of the imperial court, describes the opinions of the
emperors other advisors. Since George Sphrantzes was present in Constantinople in the
months prior to, as well as during, the citys siege by the Turks, his account of
Constantine XIs actions in this period is also invaluable to a study of Byzantine foreign
relations, especially toward the Ottoman Empire.
However, there are some problems with George Sphrantzes Chronicon Minus.
Sphrantzes often feuded with Constantines other ministers as a member of his court, and
these conflicts show throughout his writings. For example, he portrays Lucas Notaras,
another respected and experienced advisor, in a negative way. He discredits his policies
throughout the chronicle, and depicts him as selfish and apathetic toward the condition of
the empire. This is in direct contrast to other sources, such as Doukas, which portray
Notaras in more positive ways. Sphrantzes also shows a mistrust of Italians, especially
the Venetians, in the Chronicon Minus. As a result, he barely mentions the emperors
considerable efforts to convince them to stay in the city during the Ottoman siege, or their
role during the final assault. Despite these problems, George Sphrantzes work is the
most informative source on Byzantine diplomatic activities and foreign policy during the
reign of Constantine XI.
Another source useful for understanding foreign policy creation during the last
years of the Byzantine Empire is that of the Pseudo-Sphrantzes, Makarios Melissenos-
20
Melissourgos. This work, which focuses primarily around the events immediately
surrounding the siege of Constantinople, was initially attributed to Sphrantzes. However,
scholars later discovered that this work was created by Melissenos, the metropolitan of
Monemvasia around the time of the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. There are some obvious
problems in using this source, since it details events occurring more than a century prior
to its creation. While much of this account is pure fabrication, coming directly from the
bishops imagination, Marios Philippides has explained that certain sections of this work
are credible. In specific sections of his siege account, Melissenos draws upon information
from both George Sphrantzes Chronicon Minus and Leonard of Chios letter to Pope
Nicholas V when writing his narrative.52 As a result, scholars are able to use Melissenos
as a source if the information used is also reproduced in either Sphrantzes or Leonards
work.53 Therefore, this chronicle of the siege is useful as a point of comparison to these
other two sources, as it helps to confirm the accuracy of their translations from Greek and
Latin into English. Despite its shortcomings, Makarios Melissenos-Melissourgoss
account is helpful for understanding Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy and
confirming the accuracy of other sources.
Doukas history is another useful work for this period of Byzantine history. A
resident of Lesbos, Doukas served the Genoese Gattilusio family as an ambassador to the
Ottomans in the 1450s, and remained in the vicinity of Constantinople throughout the
citys siege. As a result, he had access to firsthand accounts of the events leading to and
surrounding Constantinoples fall. He collected testimony from monks and elites
captured during the siege, as well as from Turkish soldiers who stormed the city. In
52
Marios Philippides. The Fall of Constantinople: Bishop Leonard and the Greek Accounts. Greek,
Roman and Byzantine Studies v.22 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1981) 299.
53
Philippides 300.
21
addition, his work for the Gattilusio family on Lesbos gave him access to further
information that he used to write his history.54 Therefore, Doukas work provides a wellrounded, comprehensive perspective of the final years of Byzantium, synthesizing
information from Greek, Latin, and Turkish sources. Unlike Sphrantzes chronicle that
focuses primarily upon his own travels without providing a general perspective, Doukas
history gives a clear overview of the events leading to the fall of Constantinople.
However, there are some problems with his work. Doukas is also vehemently
anti-Ottoman in his writings and uses every opportunity to vilify the Turks. His hatred
forces scholars to carefully consider the historians portrayal of the Ottomans actions to
ensure that he does not misrepresent any Ottoman interactions with the Greeks. Doukas
accuracy on many of these interactions is confirmed by other contemporary authors, but
his anti-Ottoman stance still merits caution when using his work. In addition, while
Doukas was in the vicinity of Constantinople during the siege, he did not witness it
firsthand, nor was he in the imperial capital at any time during Constantine XIs reign. As
a result, his sections regarding the final Byzantine emperor must be compared to the other
firsthand accounts, such as those of Sphrantzes, Nicol Barbaro, or Leonard of Chios.
Nonetheless, Doukas remains a generally reliable source on the final decades of
Byzantium.
The siege diary of Nicol Barbaro, a Venetian surgeon and resident of
Constantinople, provides an excellent account of Venetian activities both prior to and
during the citys siege in 1453. Barbaros daily account provides a clear chronology of
Byzantine actions shortly before and during the Ottoman siege, focusing mainly upon the
Venetians in the capital, and Emperor Constantines relations with them. Barbaro was
54
Doukas 28.
22
present at several meetings held between the imperial administration and the Venetians,
and describes their proceedings in his diary. While the diary is an excellent source for
Venetian interactions with the emperor and for Venices efforts during the siege,
Barbaros account also poses a major problem.
Nicol Barbaro, a patriotic Venetian, holds considerable contempt for many
Greeks (aside from the emperor) and the Genoese participating in Constantinoples
defense. He constantly downplays the efforts of the Greek soldiers and noblemen during
the siege. For example, he chastises the Byzantines for often abandoning their posts in the
city during the crisis.55 However, Barbaro fails to recognize that these soldiers left their
positions to search for food in order to feed their starving families, since most of the
Venetians in Constantinople left their families in Italy. Therefore, his lack of perspective
leads to a strong anti-Greek sentiment within his diary. Barbaro also shows a typical
Venetian hostility toward the Genoese, Venices Italian rivals. He also minimizes the
Genoese involvement in Constantinoples defense, and blames them for the citys
eventual fall. Even with these limitations, Nicol Barbaro provides the most
comprehensive account of Venetian interactions with the Byzantines in the 1450s,
especially with Emperor Constantine XI.
Leonard of Chios, bishop of Mytilene who accompanied Cardinal Isidore to
Constantinople and assisted with the supervision of church union, presents another major
source of this period. Present during the siege and capture of Constantinople, Leonards
account is written in a letter to Pope Nicholas V, informing him of the citys fall. This
source is most valuable for its information regarding Constantines actions while
implementing union in the capital. Since Leonard was a close associate of Isidore, acting
55
Barbaro 60.
23
as his aide during the mission to Byzantium, his letter also shows the cardinals advice to
the emperor concerning his application of that union. The emperors selective
implementation of union irritates Leonard, and this shows throughout his letter. He also
generally disdains the Constantinopolitan citizenry for their opposition to the Roman
church, as well as the Venetians in the city because of his Genoese heritage. Therefore,
his characterizations of these people must be considered carefully and examined through
this bias. However, his account is generally confirmed by other sources and is crucial to
understanding the Byzantine implementation of church union during the empires final
years.
While each of the previous sources details Byzantiums fall from the Christian
perspective, two major accounts view it from the Turkish one. Kritovoulos, governor of
Imbros while the island was under Ottoman occupation in the 1450s and 1460s, describes
the events leading to the fall of Constantinople from the viewpoint of Sultan Mehmed II.
Kritovoulos work begins with the ascendancy of Mehmed in 1451, providing a detailed
summary of the sultans relationship with Constantine XI, as well as the effect that the
Byzantine emperors efforts had upon Ottoman policy. His chronicle is also important
because it provides a counterbalance to the strongly anti-Ottoman histories written by
Greek authors, such as Doukas. Kritovoulos position also gave him access to
information regarding Turkish actions prior to the siege of Constantinople. For example,
he provides considerable details of Mehmed IIs fortress along the Bosphorus, Rumeli
Hisar, and the emperors attempts to dissuade the sultan from constructing it. While
useful for this information, Kritovoulos wrote his work in order to gain the direct favor of
Mehmed II in Constantinople, as he wanted the sultan to provide him with a pension once
24
he was removed from his governorship. Therefore, the Ottomans are not portrayed
negatively, and the Greeks efforts to save Constantinople from them are marginalized. In
addition, since Kritovoulos was not present at the Ottoman court before the siege, his
account relies upon information gathered approximately a decade after the events he
describes. However, Kritovoulos chronicle provides important information regarding the
Ottoman perspective of Byzantine diplomatic overtures, as well as Turkish preparations
for the assault upon Constantinople.
The history of Tursun Beg, a member of Sultan Mehmed IIs court, also details
the end of Byzantium from the Ottoman perspective. His proximity to the sultan provides
information regarding Mehmeds relationship with his advisors, particularly his Grand
Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha, whom the Byzantines tried to court. Tursun Begs account,
like that of Kritovoulos, also explains the effects that Constantine XIs diplomatic actions
and foreign policy had upon the Ottoman Empire before Constantinoples fall. However,
his explanation is brief. Tursun Beg instead focuses the majority of his work upon
Mehmeds consolidation of power following the capture of Constantinople. Despite his
brevity, Tursun Begs history of Mehmed IIs reign adds to the understanding of
Byzantine diplomacy and foreign policy under Emperor Constantine XI.
While other accounts also show Constantine XIs and his courts reliance upon
personal diplomacy to achieve their objectives, these seven sources constitute the main
body of information regarding the Byzantine Empire of the fifteenth century. Each
provides a unique insight into the events of the period, possessing different strengths and
telling integral parts of the story. Even so, these sources must be used carefully. Each
work possesses limitations and biases that influence the information that they purport to
25
present. These issues were dutifully considered before the works were used in this study.
Even with their shortcomings, each of these accounts is invaluable to the study of midfifteenth century Byzantium.
26
CHAPTER THREE
Constantine and the Ottomans

Constantine XI Palaiologos diplomatic actions and foreign policy toward the
Ottoman Empire did not succeed because he and his administration did not have access to
the expertise of Turkish elites. As a result, Constantine continued the policies of the
previous Byzantine emperor, his brother John VIII, bracing the city for an Ottoman
assault. In addition, the emperor alternated between confronting and supplicating the
Turks, which eventually led to disaster. Constantine and his councilors attempted to court
the widow of Sultan Murad II and the Ottoman Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha to their
cause, but did not succeed. Instead, Murads widow remained apathetic toward the
Greeks and Halil Pasha assisted Sultan Mehmed IIs siege and assault upon
Constantinople in the spring of 1453. When Constantine did not gain access to the
Ottoman court through these elites, he relied upon his advisors for advice on a proper
course of action toward the Turks. However, the emperors advisors heavily relied upon
foreign expertise. Since they did not have access to the Ottoman court, their cohesiveness
disintegrated and they presented differing ideas of how to end the Ottoman threat to the
imperial capital. Constantine XI vacillated between his advisors opinions, alternately
using strategies of aggression and supplication in order to dissuade a general assault upon
Constantinople. These policies were unsuccessful. Without the presence of pro-Greek
Ottoman political elites in the Byzantine capital, the emperor and his advisors could not
formulate a coherent and effective policy toward the Ottoman Empire.
27
Constantines actions were motivated by his courts inability to provide him with
decisive advice for countering the Ottoman threat. By the mid-fifteenth century, the
imperial court degenerated into an arena for personal vendettas and rivalries between
Byzantine notables. While the Byzantine court was always a bastion of intrigue and
revolution, from the days of Basil I to John V, the empires last decade saw these rivalries
increase dramatically. The drastic decrease in imperial territorial possessions led to a
corresponding decrease in the size of the imperial administration. As a result, the
shortage of qualified, capable individuals for imperial positions led emperors, beginning
in the fourteenth century, to increasingly entrust sensitive positions and political activities
to their own men of confidence.56 When each new emperor promoted his own followers
into important positions, they collided with the associates of the previous emperor, who
were eager to retain their positions of influence within the imperial administration. The
administration that Constantine XI inherited upon his accession to the Byzantine throne
suffered from these same problems.57 Even though the emperor reviewed each situation
carefully, he relied upon his own expertise in military affairs, and relied upon his courts
greater expertise in matters of diplomacy and foreign policy. The emperor often
complained that his ministers were too busy feuding among themselves in order to secure
their offices, that they did not concern themselves with the well being of the empire.58 In
addition, when they did offer advice to the emperor, the other ministers would constantly
undermine their suggestions in an attempt to discredit that counselor in his eyes.59 Such
56
Oikonomides, Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 1204-1453: Means and Ends 78.

Nestor-Iskander. The Tale of Constantinople. Trans. Walter K. Hanak and Marios Philippides (New
Rochelle: Aristde D. Caratzas, 1998) 33.
58
Sphrantzes 68.
59
Sphrantzes 63.
57
28
conditions plagued Emperor Constantines administration and severely hindered his

ability to reach decisions regarding a policy toward the Ottoman Empire.
Each of Constantine XIs advisors held a different position regarding relations
with the Ottoman Turks. One of the emperors most prominent advisors was Lucas
Notaras, the megadux, or grand admiral of the Byzantine navy. While Byzantium no
longer possessed any significant naval forces, this position was expanded into that of an
informal prime minister. Notaras gained his position of megadux from Emperor John
VIII, who considered Notaras a close friend.60 However, he did not gain his position
solely based upon imperial patronage. Lucas Notaras accompanied John VIII on several
diplomatic missions before his promotion and was widely considered throughout the
Christian world as a man of great experience.61 The megadux Notaras not only gained the
trust of John VIII, but also became close friends with his brother Constantine. Notaras
also traveled with Constantine during his campaigns against the Franks as despot of the
Morea. In fact, the two became so close that Notaras attended Constantines first wedding
on the island of Lesbos.62 Therefore, his views carried a high degree of influence with the
emperor during his deliberations over a proper course of action toward the Ottoman
Empire.
Notaras believed that any relationship with the Turks had to focus upon
dissuading them from attacking the imperial capital. The megadux believed that the
defense of Constantinople should be the emperors first priority, and any action that could
potentially relieve the Turkish threat to the city should be exploited. However, he
believed that the best course of action toward the Ottomans was to stall for time while
60

62
Sphrantzes 52; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 18.
61
29
Byzantium asked the western Christians for aid. If Constantinoples fortifications could
hold out against Ottoman advances for enough time, Notaras believed that the Western
Christian powers would eventually come to Byzantiums aid.63 In order to achieve this,
the Byzantines needed to exploit instabilities within the Ottoman court, stirring up
pretenders to the throne and rival Turkish emirates to distract the sultan from the
conquest of Constantinople. In addition, Lucas Notaras believed that any action taken by
the Turks against the city would require so much time because of the citys fortifications,
that the Latin Christians could intervene on behalf of Byzantium.64 Throughout
Constantines reign, the megadux stubbornly and vocally maintained this position, often
antagonizing the emperors other close associates, such as George Sphrantzes.65 Lucas
Notaras notable reputation amongst Byzantine citizens gained him many allies among
the lesser nobles and Greek merchants within Constantinople, further enhancing the
power of his ideas. The emperors close relationship with the megadux caused him to
seriously consider Notaras proposals.
Another important advisor of Constantine XI was George Sphrantzes, the
emperors closest friend and associate since his reign as despot, who provided a
counterweight to the views of Lucas Notaras. Sphrantzes grew up in the imperial court of
Manuel II, eventually entering the service of John VIII upon his accession to the
Byzantine throne. Constantine, realizing Sphrantzes talents, requested and received his
services from John VIII.66 Until Constantine became emperor in 1448, George
63
Nestor-Iskander 59; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 60.

Nestor-Iskander 59. Lord Lucas fell silent for a long time then spoke Begging Gods grace, and
if it be His will, we can withstand another five-month siege [of Constantinople].
65
Leonard of Chios in The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts. Trans. J.R.
Melville-Jones (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) 29.
66
Sphrantzes 30.
64
30
Sphrantzes was his personal assistant in the Morea, serving the despot during his
numerous military campaigns against the Frankish lords.67 During this time, Sphrantzes
relationship to Constantine grew from a professional to a personal one. In fact, the two
became so close of friends that Constantine was both best man at his wedding and
godfather to both of his children.68 As a result, when he became emperor, Constantine
brought Sphrantzes to the imperial capital, promoting him to the office of First Lord of
the Imperial Wardrobe. In this position, George Sphrantzes possessed more access than
any other imperial official to the imperial residence, giving him the ability to greatly
influence the emperors opinion.
George Sphrantzes held a very cautious position toward the Ottoman Turks,
especially upon the accession of Mehmed II. Sphrantzes advocated an even more careful
position than Lucas Notaras, whom he believed unnecessarily risked antagonizing the
new sultan. In addition, Sphrantzes opposed Notaras because he and the megadux rarely
cooperated with each other.69 He believed that Murad II, Mehmeds father, was a threat
to Byzantiums survival while he was a young man, but posed little threat to the empire
during his later years. Sphrantzes knew that he merely wished to live the remainder of his
life in peace.70 However, the young Mehmed, only nineteen years old at his fathers death
in 1449, was entirely different. George Sphrantzes believed that directly antagonizing the
new sultan would give him the pretext necessary to begin a war with the Greeks,
eventually leading to the fall of Constantinople. During a conversation with the King of
Trebizond, Sphrantzes reveals this opinion:
67
Sphrantzes 32-40.
Sphrantzes 52.
69
Sphrantzes 68.
70
Sphrantzes 59: The late sultan was an old man, had given up the conquest of our City [Constantinople],
and had no desire of attempting anything like it again; he only wished for friendship and peace.
68
31
This man, who just became sultan, is young and an enemy of the Christians since
childhood; he threatens with proud spirit that he will put in operation certain plans
against the Christians If God should grant that the young sultan be overcome by
his youth and evil nature and march against our City, I know not what will
happen. Indeed God would have granted a joyous occasion if this man, Murads
son, had died instead.71
Therefore, George Sphrantzes clearly opposed any hostile policies toward the Ottoman
Empire. He did agree with the megadux that the Byzantines should seek aid from the
west, but wanted to do so in a discrete manner to avoid Ottoman attention. Like Lucas
Notaras, the First Lord of the Imperial Wardrobe commanded a vast amount of respect
both from the Greek nobility and the Constantinopolitan citizenry. Emperor Constantine
XI also seriously considered following Sphrantzes proposed course of action.
In addition to these two major forces, Constantine entertained the opinions of
many other lesser counselors. Andronikos Kantakouzenos, the Grand Domestic, was
another of Constantines ministers advocating aggressive actions toward the Ottomans.
As commander-in-chief of the Byzantine army, Kantakouzenos wished to use the military
to exploit weaknesses in the Ottoman Empire. Much like the megadux, the Grand
Domestic wanted to take advantage of the constant rebellions and uprisings they faced in
Anatolia from other Turkish groups under Ottoman suzerainty. A zealous Unionist,
Kantakouzenos believed that if Western aid promised by the Council of Florence arrived,
the combined Christian forces would re-conquer the European and Asiatic provinces for
Christianity.72 Constantine and the Grand Domestic often quarreled over the imperial
positions toward other states, especially Serbia. While Constantine was proud of his
mothers Serbian heritage and favored the idea of improving relations between
71
Sphrantzes 59.
Donald M. Nicol. Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos (Cantacuzenus) 1100 1460 (Washington:
Dumbarton Oaks, 1968) no. 68 180.
72
32
Byzantium and Serbia, Kantakouzenos fundamentally mistrusted the Serbian state,

opposing any sort of rapprochement between the two states.73 As a result, the emperor did
not fully trust the Grand Domestics foreign policy advice. The Byzantine armys
extreme decline in the fifteenth century also marginalized Andronikos Kantakouzenos in
the imperial court, since the small size of the regular forces limited his influence.
Therefore, his foreign policy suggestions were less influential than those of Lucas
Notaras or George Sphrantzes.
Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, a cousin of Emperor Constantine XI, also
held a lesser position in the imperial administration as one of the emperors minor
advisors. Demetrios Kantakouzenos served both in the Constantinopolitan administration
of John VIII and in the Morea under Despot Constantine.74 He was instrumental in
convincing John VIII that releasing the Ottoman pretender Mustafa, a political prisoner
held hostage in Constantinople in 1422, would greatly benefit the empire.75 While this
plan ultimately failed, and proved to be a complete disaster for Byzantium, Demetrios did
not lose all of his influence in the imperial court. During Constantines reign, he also
advocated similarly aggressive actions against the Ottoman Turks, most notably through
the release and exploitation of pretenders to the Ottoman throne, such as Prince Orhan.
As a result, Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos became a lesser ally of Lucas Notaras,
although his previous debacle somewhat crippled his prestige amongst the
Constantinopolitan elites.
Several other lesser Greek notables vacillated over Emperor Constantines
Ottoman policy during his reign. Another member of the Kantakouzenos family, John,
73
Sphrantzes 63.
75
Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos no. 75 192-194.
74
33
served as governor of Patras and Corinth in the Morea under Constantine until joining the
emperor in Constantinople in 1449. He also believed that aggressive action was necessary
for Byzantiums survival, but agreed to abide by whatever course of action the emperor
chose to follow.76 Other Byzantine advisors, such as Theophilos Palaiologos, carried
similar views. Instead of creating innovative ways of countering the Ottoman threat, they
merely wished to ingratiate themselves with the new emperor. As a result, these advisors
were useless to Constantine during his decision making processes.
While these ministers provided Emperor Constantine with varying degrees of
advice on the Ottoman problem, several of his trusted advisors were unable to provide
suggested actions because of their deaths prior to his reign. Another Greek notable, the
protostrator Manuel Kantakouzenos, provided the emperor with sound advice throughout
his tenure in the Morea regarding the Franks. Constantine fully trusted his views.77
However, Manuel died sometime before 1451, and Constantine could not turn to him for
advice on his Ottoman policy during his reign as emperor.78 Yet another Greek that
influenced Constantine XI, although in an informal way, was his mother Helena. The
empress always favored Constantine among her children, even securing the throne for
him upon John VIIIs death in 1448, amidst claims by one of her other sons, Demetrios.
As emperor, Constantine heavily relied upon his mothers advice until her death on
March 23, 1450, shortly after his accession. Once she died, the emperor did not know
whom to fully rely upon for advice.79 As a result of the varying positions regarding the
Ottoman Turks among Constantines closest associates, the indecision of significant
76

78
79
77
34
segments of the Byzantine lesser nobility, and the loss of crucial people in his life, the
emperor continued to use stalling tactics against the Ottoman Empire rather than adopt a
new strategy.
The Byzantine courts reliance upon personal diplomacy during Constantine XIs
reign shows through George Sphrantzes proposed marriage alliance with Mara
Brankovi of Serbia in 1451. Mara had been the wife of Sultan Murad II, and a highly
regarded presence in the Ottoman court, especially by her stepson, Mehmed II. In fact,
Mehmed respected the Sultana Mara so much that upon his fathers death, the new sultan
allowed her to return to her fathers house in Serbia.80 While the sultana was nearing
middle age, calling her ability to produce an heir into question, George Sphrantzes
believed that a marriage between Mehmeds stepmother and Constantine would greatly
benefit Byzantium and forestall any future Turkish assault upon Constantinople.81 Maras
respect and reputation among the Ottoman court could also potentially guarantee several
concessions by the Turks, helping to revitalize the Byzantine state.
Constantine XI wholeheartedly supported George Sphrantzes proposition upon
hearing of it. However, rivalries within the Byzantine court led several ministers to
oppose the marriage, casting doubts in the emperors mind concerning its viability. While
Sphrantzes believed in the merits of this marriage alliance, Grand Domestic Andronikos
Kantakouzenos and Governor John Kantakouzenos disputed its usefulness because of
80
Colin Imber. The Ottoman Empire 1300 1481 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990) 145. Imber also states
that Mehmed also granted his stepmother a fief near Mount Athos in 1457 when she resettled in Ottoman
territory. Later, Mehmed granted her monastic lands near Thessalonika.
81
Sphrantzes 60: George Sphrantzes, in a letter to Constantine XI regarding the proposed marriage, had
very few reservations against it. He stated that four possible objections existed: (1) Her family is inferior
to yours; (2) the Church may object on the grounds of close kinship; (3) she has been married already; and
(4) she is older and there is the factor that she may be in danger during childbirth, a common risk according
to physicians. Sphrantzes believed he could counter these objections during any deliberation of the
Byzantine court.
35
their extreme mistrust of the Serbian state.82 As a result, Constantine was paralyzed by
the contradictory recommendations of his associates. Sphrantzes details the emperors
frustration with the discord within his court: On whom could I have relied? On the
monks? They are far impractical in such matters. On the nobles? Whom could I have
found so impartial to keep it to himself?83 Constantines subsequent hesitation in making
a decision regarding the marriage alliance without strong support in his court became
inconsequential soon after the proposal had circulated among the elites in Constantinople,
as Mara had no desire to remarry.84
Maras refusal to remarry signaled the death knell of George Sphrantzes proposal
and also showed the failure of the Byzantines strategy of personal diplomacy toward the
Ottoman Turks. Since the reign of Manuel II, Byzantine emperors attempted to
strengthen the bonds between Byzantine and Ottoman elites and rulers. Manuel carefully
cultivated a relationship with Sultan Mehmed I, eventually establishing a peaceful
exchange between the two states.85 George Sphrantzes tried to accomplish this for
Constantine and Mehmed II as well. By associating Mehmeds beloved stepmother with
the Byzantine emperor, Sphrantzes hoped to create a parental relationship between them.
While Maras refusal to marry ended this particular endeavor, Sphrantzes was
discouraged from trying similar tactics again because of the discord and problems this
event caused among the imperial court and the emperor himself.
Since the proactive elements of Constantines court were discouraged from
establishing new personal relationships with elites within the Ottoman Empire, the
82
Sphrantzes 63.
Sphrantzes 63.
84
Sphrantzes 62; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 45: Mara Brankovi made a vow that if she ever escaped
from the Muslim court, she would rededicate her life to God and remain celibate until her death.
85
Barker 288.
83
36
Byzantines tried to use existing relationships that were cultivated during the reigns of
Manuel II and John VIII. The most important relationship for Byzantium was with
Candarli Halil Pasha, Grand Vizier to both Murad II and Mehmed II. For decades, Greek
nobles sent bribes to the vizier in Adrianople in order to gain his trust and favor.86 Such
actions were successful, and Halil Pasha became well known for his friendly disposition
toward the Byzantine Empire. In fact, even Italians knew of Halils relationship with the
Greeks. The Florentine Tetaldi, who defended Constantinople in 1453, describes Candarli
Halil as the Christians friend.87 The viziers conciliatory nature was also known
among the Turks, who called him gavur ortagi.88 The Greeks bribery did succeed to a
degree, as Halil Pasha occasionally spoke in favor of Byzantium. For example, Halil was
one of the most outspoken opponents of an assault upon Constantinople, since he
believed it would unnecessarily antagonize the Italian merchant states and because the
citys fortifications were too strong to overcome.89
However, the Greeks overestimated their influence over the Ottoman Grand
Vizier. While Halil Pasha did speak in favor of Byzantium, he did so because it was in
the Ottomans best interest. While Greek bribes encouraged him to loudly voice his
opinions that coincided with Byzantine interests, he was still fundamentally loyal to the
Ottoman state. In addition, once Mehmed II rose to the throne in 1451, Halil Pasha lost a
considerable amount of influence over the sultan. While Murad II had often looked to
him for advice and viewed him as a close friend, Mehmed resented the control that Halil
86
Doukas 193: He explains that in addition to being affable and gentle in manner, Halil welcomed
bribes.
87
Tetaldi in The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts. Trans. J.R. Melville-Jones
(Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) 7.
88
Doukas 202: The companion or helper of the infidels.
89
Leonard of Chios 31.
37
held over him. In 1444, Murad II attempted to retire to a private life of contemplation,
leaving the Ottoman government in the hands of Mehmed. However, the Crusade of
Varna crossed into Turkish territory shortly thereafter, and the young sultan did not
possess the knowledge necessary to defeat them. As a result, Halil Pasha led a group of
advisors and army commanders that forced the young sultan to recall his father Murad to
the throne.90 Mehmed, after being sequestered at Manisa, never forgave Halil for his
transgression. Instead, he turned to Halils archenemy, Zaganos Pasha, for advice.
Zaganos had served as Mehmeds tutor during his exile at Manisa, and followed the
sultan to Adrianople upon his succession in 1451. Zaganos took advantage of every
opportunity to berate and undermine Halil Pasha while at the Ottoman court, and slowly
usurped the latters influence and responsibilities in Mehmeds government.91 As a result,
Candarli Halil Pasha no longer held a significant amount of influence over the sultans
actions, as he had during the reign of Murad II. In fact, he was later executed by the
sultan for his misconduct and relations with the Greeks shortly after the fall of
Constantinople.92
This misguided reliance upon Halil Pasha led the Byzantine Empire to disaster.
Constantines aggressively anti-Turkish advisors, led by Andronikos and Demetrios
Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, convinced the emperor to blatantly provoke the Ottomans
because they believed Byzantium had the viziers unconditional support. They thought
that even if their provocation was unsuccessful, Halil Pasha would intervene on the
Greeks behalf to prevent disaster. As a result, Constantine sent a mission to Mehmed
90
Tursun Beg. The History of Mehmed the Conqueror. Trans. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphey
(Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978) 32.
91
Tursun Beg 32-34.
92
Kritovoulos. History of Mehmed the Conqueror. Trans. Charles T. Riggs (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1954) 87-88.
38
explaining that unless Prince Orhans annuity was doubled, the Byzantines would release
him as a rival claimant to the Ottoman throne.93 Halil Pasha, instead of supporting the
emperors demands, railed against them. He scolded the Byzantine ambassadors, saying:
O stupid and foolish Romans, I know your cunning ways from long ago. Leave
well enough alone! The deceased ruler was gentle and to all he was a sincere
friend and a man of upright conscience. Our present ruler Mehmed, however, is
not of the same disposition as you seem to imagine. If Constantinople succeeds in
escaping from his hands I speak of his insolence, savagery, and violence then
I will know that God still ignores your machinations and perversions We are
not children without sense or strength. If there is something you can do, do it
Be certain, however, that you will not succeed in any of these projects. Instead,
that which you think is yours will be taken from you. Nonetheless, I will make
your message known to my lord, and let it be as he wishes.94
Halil agreed to present the Byzantines demands to the sultan, but refused to support
them. The result was disastrous. Mehmed continued his preparations to take the city.
In addition, when the sultan finally decided to undertake the siege and assault of
Constantinople, Halil Pasha provided him with his assistance. When summoned to the
sultans bedchamber and ordered to help plan the conquest of Constantinople, Halil did
not attempt to dissuade Mehmed from the endeavor.95 On the contrary, the vizier offered
his expertise to take the city. Doukas characterizes Halil through his speech to the sultan:
Lord, God who has given you the greater portion of the land of the Romans, will also
grant you the City [Constantinople]. I am convinced that she will not slip through your
93
Doukas 192-193. The historian relates the message of the Byzantine embassy: The Emperor of the
Romans does not accept the annual sum of three hundred thousand silver coins. Orhan, who is like your
ruler Mehmed, a son of Osman, has reached the age of maturity. Every day many flock to him calling him
lord and proclaiming him ruler. He desires to display his munificence by making lavish gifts, but he has
nowhere to stretch forth his hands. Demands cannot be made upon the emperor because he is not
prosperous enough to comply with the requests. We offer you, therefore, one of two alternatives: either
double the annuity or we will release Orhan.
94
Doukas 193.
95
Kritovoulos 33. But those [including Candarli Halil] whose ideas were against the step for various
reasons and especially because of the misfortunes they had had in the war and the difficulties usually
attendant on it, wanted to advise against making war. However, seeing the insistence and zeal of the Sultan,
they were afraid, as it seems to me, and unwillingly yielded and were carried along with the majority. So
the war was sanctioned.
39
hands. Together with God and your might, I and all your servants will fight as one, not
only with our wealth but also with our flesh and blood. You may be certain of that.96
While Halil answered in this way out of fear for his life, this incident shows that the
grand viziers ultimate loyalties were not to the Greeks, but to the sultan who held Halils
very life within his hands. The Byzantines efforts of personal diplomacy had failed.
The Greeks also overestimated the value of their bribery to the Ottoman grand
vizier. While Byzantine nobles provided Halil with considerable gifts in the form of art
and gold, they could not compete with the gifts and salary provided by the Ottoman
sultan himself. Mehmed II, like most Ottomans, knew that the grand vizier accepted
bribes in order to voice certain opinions that were favorable to Byzantium. While he
could have merely sacked the vizier, the sultan instead used the Greeks own tactics
against them. The sultan provided all of his advisors with lavish gifts that were far larger
than anything Byzantium could afford.97 As a result, Mehmed secured Halils loyalty, as
well as the loyalty of all his close advisors, by preempting any foreign attempts to bribe
them.
The Byzantines were also forced to rely upon their relationship with Candarli
Halil Pasha because they did not have access to any of Mehmeds tutors or advisors
before he became sultan. The Greeks weak relationship with Halil Pasha required years
of effort to build, spanning much of Sultan Murad IIs reign. This process was expedited
96
Doukas 202.
Zorzi Dolfin in The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts. Trans. J.R. MelvilleJones (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) 127. Dolfin explains that the sultan rewarded his court well. Mehmed
displayed to them a great quantity of gold, pearls, golden trappings and other treasures. Next, after they
had eaten, he told them that he had brought these riches for them to take; he knew that the Christians with
their bribes were trying to dissuade them from besieging and capturing Constantinople he believed that
they would show greater honesty by accepting presents from him, rather than from the Christians.
However, this could merely be an example of the sultan providing his advisors with generous salaries in
general, not just on this occasion.
97
40
because of Halils location in Adrianople, Murads capital.98 Byzantine and Ottoman

merchants participated in a very brisk and profitable trade between Adrianople and
Constantinople, and it was therefore possible to reach the Ottoman vizier with messages
and gifts.99 However, Mehmed and his advisors resided in Manisa, which was less easily
accessible to Byzantine travelers. As a result, the imperial administration knew very little
about the nature of Mehmeds court and had no opportunities to develop relations with
any of its members through bribery or other means.
Since the Byzantines efforts of personal diplomacy were unsuccessful, the
imperial administration resorted to disjointed actions toward the Ottoman Empire. When
the gamble over Prince Orhan failed, Constantine XI chose to follow his predecessors
policies of superficial appeasement and supplication of the sultan. The emperor hoped to
use this deference to gain time to develop a cohesive plan of action concerning the
Ottomans. This was shown during Constantines confirmation as Emperor of the
Romans. Since Byzantium was essentially a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, the
sultan often oversaw changes in leadership. When John VIII died on October 31, 1448
without an heir, his two brothers Constantine and Demetrios contested the Byzantine
throne. While Demetrios, a fervent opponent of the west, had the support of the antiUnionist faction in Constantinople, Constantine was significantly more popular both in
the Morea and in Constantinople. In addition, he possessed the support of his mother,
Empress Helena, which added overwhelming credibility to Constantines claim to the
empire. However, since the Byzantines were technically vassals of the Ottoman sultan,
Constantine agreed to submit the Byzantine succession to Murad II for arbitration. Such
98
99
Tursun Beg 32.

Klaus-Peter Matschke, The Late Byzantine Urban Economy, Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries 473.
41
an act of deference was extremely uncharacteristic of Constantine, especially because of

his previous actions toward the Ottomans. On December 6, 1448, George Sphrantzes led
an embassy to Murads court, and Constantine was chosen as the Byzantine emperor.100
The new emperor hoped that his deference to Ottoman authority would help pacify the
sultan while he deliberated on ways to combat the Turks. Once Sphrantzes returned from
his embassy, the emperor sent Murad lavish gifts to commemorate a new period of peace
between them.101 Through this episode, Constantine showed false obsequiousness toward
Murad II in order to mask his true anti-Turkish sentiments. This was shown through his
attacks in Greece during and after the Crusade of Varna.
Constantine also used acts of deference toward Murads son Mehmed in an
attempt to stall for more time to create an effective Turkish policy. The historian Doukas
intimates that the Greeks were among the first to greet and congratulate the new sultan
upon Murads death.102 Constantine clearly wanted to placate young Mehmed for the
immediate future, while Byzantium committed to a strategy that would undermine
Ottoman power around the Aegean. The emperors embassy succeeded in creating a truce
with the sultan, creating another temporary respite from Ottoman hostility. However,
such a truce was just as beneficial to Mehmed as it was to Constantine, as the sultan
needed time to secure his rule over his empire. Mehmed extended several concessions to
the emperor, offering a perpetual peace with Byzantium as well as an annual stipend for
the maintenance of Prince Orhan, a rival claimant to the Ottoman throne held as a
100
Sphrantzes 57: The empress, the brothers, right of birth, and the love and wisdom of nearly the whole
population of the City chose Lord Constantine emperor. The sultan approved the choice and sent me away
with honors and gifts.
101
Doukas 186: Constantine immediately sent ambassadors to Murad to pacify him with gifts and
conciliatory messages, thus removing all animosity between them.
102
Doukas 191: He explains that the Byzantines met with Mehmed before the inhabitants of Serbia,
Bulgaria and the islands, Mitylenaeans, Chians, Rhodians, and the Genoese of Galata.
42
political prisoner in Constantinople.103 Through this superficial act, Constantine received

a peace allowing the Byzantines more time to formulate a cohesive and effective
Ottoman policy. In addition, this embassy served as a fact-finding mission for the
Byzantines, who knew very little about the young new sultan.
Constantine XI based his acts of supplication and deference upon those of his
father. Emperor Manuel II often used acts in order to stall Ottoman aggression against the
shrinking empire. For example, when Sultan Murad I sought to absorb Constantinople
into his realm amidst Byzantine civil strife in 1379, Manuel encouraged his father, John
V, to offer himself to the Ottoman ruler as a vassal.104 This supplication worked, and the
Ottomans shifted their attention to more pressing concerns on their borders. Manuel also
used this policy of appeasement to his advantage in 1387, after attempting several
aggressive actions while despot of Thessalonika. Once his offensives were halted and the
Ottomans laid siege to Thessalonika, Manuel turned once again to supplication. He
arranged a meeting with Murad I in the Ottoman capital of Brusa, where he
acknowledged the sultans suzerainty over him.105 As a result, the despot was allowed to
continue to rule in Thessalonika. Such actions also allowed the young Manuel time to
develop new strategies to combat the Ottomans and save his empire. Emperor
Constantine XI used these actions as templates for his own policy toward the Ottoman
Empire, since his advisors and counselors could not present him with a decisive strategy.
103
Doukas 191: Constantine XI was granted revenue of over 300,000 silver pieces, a considerable sum of
money for Orhans upkeep, from villages along the Strymon River in Mehmeds treaty with Byzantium in
1451.
104
Barker 34: John V and Manuel II offered to pay the sultan a large annual tribute, provide military forces
for service with the Ottoman army, and surrender the last Byzantine possessions in Asia Minor, most
notably the city of Philadelphia.
105
Barker 63: John Barker explains that this supplication was a bitter pill for Manuel to swallow, to have
to bow before the victor.
43
Even after Mehmeds intentions of military action against Constantine became

clear, the emperor tried to stall the sultan with diplomatic overtures, trying in vain to
stave off the Ottomans until the Byzantines could develop a counter to the siege of
Constantinople. When Mehmed began building the fortress of Rumeli Hisar, Constantine
realized that his city was in danger of being starved of supplies. Therefore, the emperor
sent numerous embassies to the sultan to try to prevent its creation. Constantines
ambassadors stated that when Sultan Mehmed I wished to build a fortress on the Asian
side of the Bosphorus, he asked for the permission of Emperor Manuel II like a son
importuning his father.106 When Mehmed refused to ask for Constantines permission to
build his fortress, the emperor turned to supplication. He offered to pay the Ottomans a
large annual indemnity if work on Rumeli Hisar would cease, and sent the Ottoman
authorities daily gifts to dissuade them from finishing the fortress construction.107
However, the Byzantines attempts to stall Ottoman efforts against Constantinople were
unsuccessful.
Emperor Constantine XIs actions toward the Turks while despot of the Morea
(from 1443 to 1448) show that he preferred to take decisive, aggressive action against the
Ottomans, and that his acts of deference were merely a stalling tactic. The emperor, while
ruling southern Greece, was clearly anti-Turkish in his views and policies. Constantines
earliest actions against the Ottomans coincided with the Crusade of Varna, launched from
Hungary in 1444. The Byzantines learned of the crusade in 1443, when John VIII went
on a hunting expedition with the Italian traveler Cyriacus of Ancona.108 The Greeks
106
Doukas 195.
Doukas 197.
108
Oskar Halecki. The Crusade of Varna: A Discussion of Controversial Problems (New York: Polish
Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1943) 25-26.
107
44
thought of the crusade in two ways. First, they believed that if the Hungarians could fight
their way to Constantinople, the citys immediate encirclement would be relieved. They
could then concentrate on re-conquering Thrace from the weakened Turks. Second, the
Greeks of the Morea, Constantine included, counted upon the crusade to provide a
necessary distraction so that they could reoccupy portions of central Greece.109
The despot used the distraction that the Western crusaders provided to conquer
several cities and towns from the Turks in Attica and Thessaly. The chronicler Doukas
explains that Constantine foresaw the total destruction of the Turks during his
campaign throughout late 1444 and 1445.110 While the despot made considerable gains
early in the campaign, once the crusaders were defeated at Varna, the sultan could focus
his attention upon the Greeks.111 Despite overwhelming numbers of Turkish troops,
Constantine refused to return control of the conquered territories to Sultan Murad II.
Instead, he prepared for battle at the newly refortified Hexamilion wall across the Isthmus
of Corinth.112 The Byzantines of the Morea also placed more emphasis upon exploiting
human weaknesses in siege warfare than upon technological advantage, since they did
not possess the financial resources necessary to outpace the Ottomans in military
109
Halecki 30.
Doukas 185.
111
For more information on Despot Constantines campaigns against the Turks and Franks in central
Greece, see George Ostrogorsky. History of the Byzantine State, Trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1969.) Constantines Moreote campaigns are detailed on pages 566 and 567.
112
Doukas 185. Constantine had refortified the isthmian wall in 1443, shortly after he became despot of the
Morea. He firmly believed it could withstand any assault by the Turks, as it possessed a series of advanced
forts and towers, and was sufficiently manned by Moreote, Frankish, and Albanian troops. The despot was
also heartened by a series of prophecies concerning the inviolability of the isthmian fortifications. One of
which stated: When dust holds pine and pine receives gore, then will the Isthmus enclosure grow strong;
and justice will come to the race of Hellenes from heaven, along with good fortune, and she will subject to
the yoke their former shameless destroyers. Most blessed is he who for the fourth time will fortify the
Isthmus, the land of the earth-shaker. Since Constantine was in fact the fourth ruler to fortify the isthmus,
he firmly believed he would succeed. For more information regarding isthmian prophecy in the mid
fifteenth century, see Edward W. Bodnar, The Isthmian Fortifications in Oracular Prophecy American
Journal of Archaeology 64.2 (April 1960): 165-171.
110
45
technology.113 Therefore, the isthmian walls were built in a medieval fashion, and did not
possess any defensive artillery to discourage an Ottoman assault. Constantine misjudged
the quality of his fortifications, as Murad, using gunpowder artillery, smashed through
them and routed the defenders.114 The Turks took over 60,000 prisoners, and Constantine
barely escaped with his life.115 This episode shows Constantines tendency toward rash,
aggressive actions against the Ottoman Turks even before his accession to the Byzantine
throne.
However, the emperors actions did have a historical premise. Constantine based
these tactics on previous actions of Manuel II, during his tenure as despot of
Thessalonika. Manuel, in defiance of his father John Vs instructions, began military
operations against the Turks surrounding Thessalonika in the late fourteenth century.116
Manuel attempted to use upheavals within the Ottoman Empire to weaken the Turkish
position in Macedonia, using these distractions to reoccupy several towns and villages in
the area around Thessalonika. However, the Ottomans restored order and the sultan easily
crushed Manuel, as he did to Constantine less than fifty years later. In fact, Manuels
actions directly caused the loss of Thessalonika to the Turks in the first years of the
fifteenth century. Since Constantine believed that circumstances, not Manuels actions,
caused his plans to fail, the despot believed that the plans would succeed because of the
massive distraction caused by the Hungarian crusaders. While Constantines plan also
failed, this episode shows his offensive tendencies toward the Ottoman Turks.
113
Eric McGeer. Byzantine Siege Warfare in Theory and Practice. The Medieval City under Siege. Eds.
Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995) 129.
114
Sphrantzes 56.
115
Doukas 185-186.
116
Barker 46.
46
The only concrete policy that Emperor Constantine XI insisted upon regarding the
Ottoman Empire was the refortification of Constantinople. The Byzantine emperor was a
soldier above all else, and fundamentally believed that diplomacy would eventually give
way to military action and a siege by the Ottomans.117 Shortly after Constantines
accession in 1448, he ordered Constantinopolitan citizens to requisition large amounts of
grain and other supplies to help the city withstand a siege by the Ottoman Turks.118 In
addition, the emperor began transferring the population of Constantinoples hinterland
into the confines of the city. Constantine feared for their safety in the event of war, and
wanted to forestall any Turkish actions against them.119 Emperor Constantines belief that
diplomatic overtures toward the Ottomans would fail led to these safeguards for
Byzantine citizens.
This belief is also a cause of Constantines monumental efforts to repair
Constantinoples triple land walls. Upon his accession to the throne, he immediately
assigned his kinsman Manuel Palaeologus Iagrus the task of restoring the land walls
damaged during Murad IIs abortive siege of the city in 1422. Despite the citys lack of
financial resources, the work was dutifully completed by the end of 1452.120 After their
restoration, the land walls facing the Lycus Valley were extremely formidable.121 The
inner wall, the largest of the three, was over 25 feet high and over eight feet thick, with
117
Barbaro 23. When the emperor reflected that whatever happened the Turks would come to attack the
wretched city of Constantinople, and since all the city walls were very strong and thick, from ten to twelve
feet or more, except that those of the palace were very weak and without barbicans or ditches, he therefore
began to make arrangements to provide the palace also with fortifications, so that if the Turks came, they
should not be able to do any damage.
118
Doukas 197.
119
Doukas 199. Foreseeing the future, the emperor diligently prepared the Citys fortifications and moved
inside those villagers living nearby. The harvested wheat and winnowing fans were also brought inside
120
121
Konstantin Mihailovi. Memoirs of a Janissary. Trans. Benjamin Stolz (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, 1975) 93. The Constantinopolitan defenses are characterized by fine strong, and high walls and
thick towers.
47
the outer wall standing at 15 feet with a thickness of nearly six feet. In addition, the outer
moat was cleared of debris and refilled, providing the city with even more protection.122
While Iagrus possessed sufficient resources, as well as the citys skilled masons, to
restore the walls to a prime medieval condition, he did not have enough money to
modernize the fortifications to support and defend against gunpowder artillery. In fact,
most medieval cities did not possess the resources necessary to modernize their defenses,
since the new building materials of choice, such as granite, were extremely expensive.123
In addition, Ottoman artillery easily demolished large sections of the walls during the
siege because they retained the medieval style.
While the emperor was committed to repairing Constantinoples fortifications
upon his accession to the Byzantine throne, Sultan Mehmed IIs decision to build a
fortress on the European side of the Bosphorus, Rumeli Hisar, deepened his commitment
to the project. In the spring of 1452, Mehmed decided that he needed a way to control the
shipping traveling through the Bosphorus.124 He therefore endeavored to build a modern
fortress, which he named Rumeli Hisar.125 The historian Kritovoulos details Mehmeds
preparations, as well as the specifications of the fortress. While the refortification of
Constantinople took nearly five years because of the citys financial troubles, Mehmed
122
Tetaldi 4. Constantinople is very strong, of a triangular form. The land walls are six thousand paces in
length, the walls facing the sea five, and those facing the harbour and the Bosphorus six again. The land
walls are very thick and high, with barbicans and battlements above them, and false walls and ditches
running along outside them. The principal walls are twenty to twenty-two brasses in height, three and in
some places six brasses thick and in a few places eight. The false walls outside are built up to a height of
twenty to twenty-two brasses, and are three brasses thick. The ditches are thirty-five brasses wide and
fifteen brasses deep. The brasse contains at the most about three and a half palms by the Avignon
standard.
123
Kelly DeVries. The Impact of Gunpowder Weaponry on Siege Warfare in the Hundred Years War.
The Medieval City under Siege. Eds. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press,
1995) 237: Granite walls better withstood the effects of early cannon traditional stone masonry.
124
Kritovoulos 17. Mehmed claimed that the new fortress would protect all local merchant shipping from
Catalan pirates. The Byzantines did not believe such reasons. See also Mihailovi 89.
125
Doukas 197-200. Rumeli Hisar was also called bogas kasen, cutter of the straits or cutter of the
throat. The latter was very applicable for Byzantium.
48
constructed Rumeli Hisar within six months.126 The walls of the fortress, over twenty-five
feet high and nearly ten feet thick, were reinforced with iron and lead joints and designed
to withstand attacks by ship-mounted cannon.127 In addition, the fortress massive towers
were designed to support huge cannons that were capable of sinking any vessel illegally
traveling through the Bosphorus.128 This modern fortress impregnability influenced
Constantines decision to repair Constantinoples defenses. The emperor ordered that
cannons be mounted upon the walls in order to emulate Rumeli Hisar, as well as western
cities that tried to counter the impact of cannons by mounting their own cannons atop city
walls.129 However, these alterations proved ineffective for the medieval walls of
Constantinople. Kritovoulos explains that during Mehmeds siege in 1453 the Byzantines
were unable to fire their own artillery from vantage points on top of the land walls,
because the recoil from the cannons shook the walls and caused pieces of them to fall.
Since the Greeks did not want to weaken the integrity of their walls in the face of heavy
Ottoman bombardment, defensive armament upon Constantinoples walls was limited to
handheld ranged weapons during the siege.
However, the emperor could still place faith in the citys fortifications even in the
face of Turkish cannons. In the fifteenth century, assaulting walled cities was still an
extremely difficult process. Even if city walls crumbled against cannons, soldiers still had
to make their way through the rubble of those walls and into the city, while at the same
time being fired upon by the defenders. These conditions would exist well into the late
126
Barbaro 9.
Kritovoulos 19.
128
Doukas 200-201. A Venetian ship commanded by Antonio Rizzo refused to stop at the fortress to pay
the Ottoman toll required for travel through the Bosphorus. As a result, Rumeli Hisar fired one massive
stone at the vessel, shattering it. The surviving sailors were murdered, and Captain Rizzo was impaled as a
warning to future ships.
129
DeVries 233.
127
49
fifteenth century. For example, the Italian city of Volterra withstood an attack by the
Florentine army in 1472, even after its walls had been destroyed by cannons. The city
only surrendered because of internal dissent among the population and the efforts of
Florentine sympathizers.130 As a result of these factors, the sultans new fortress Rumeli
Hisar, as well as the fortifications of western cities, heavily influenced Constantines
defensive policies aimed against the Ottoman Turks.
When the Byzantine attempt to gain the support of first Mara Brankovi, widow
of Murad II, and then Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha failed, Constantine XI and his
administration resorted to a series of disjointed, ineffective policies toward the Ottoman
Empire. The Greeks alternated between antagonism and supplication. They antagonized
the Turks through their attempt to extort financial resources from Mehmed during the
Prince Orhan incident. The Greeks then turned to supplication once this effort failed.
However, the Ottomans no longer wanted to tolerate the existence of an independent
Constantinople within their territory, capable of causing problems for them in the future,
which the Orhan incident proved. Therefore, the Ottomans continued their preparations,
eventually assaulting Constantinople on May 29, 1453. As a result, the failure of personal
diplomacy led to a series of poor diplomatic and foreign policy actions, and contributed
to the citys fall during Constantine XIs reign.
130
Michael Mallett. Siegecraft in Late Fifteenth Century Italy. The Medieval City under Siege. Eds. Ivy
A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995) 248-249.
50
CHAPTER FOUR
Constantine and the Papacy

The relationship between the Papacy and Constantine XI Palaiologos
administration represents a success in Byzantine personal diplomacy. Even though the
Papacy sent little aid to Constantinople during its time of crisis, the emperor carefully
managed relations between the Latins and Greeks amidst the controversial actions of the
Council of Florence. The emperor accomplished this because he and his court possessed
the expertise of Cardinal Isidore, the papal legate sent to Constantinople to supervise
church union. With his advisors giving him almost unanimous consent, Constantine XI
implemented the union of the churches in Constantinople. In addition, despite the
unpopular Greek submission to the Papacy at Florence, Constantine and his advisors
carefully maintained an uneasy peace in the capital between unionist and anti-unionist
forces.131 Furthermore, the emperor appeased the Papacy through a number of overt and
covert gestures. By foregoing an imperial coronation ceremony in the capital, leaving the
patriarchate vacant following Gregory III Mammes departure to Rome, and only
publicly proclaiming the union in December 1452, Constantine gained tacit support from
both sides. As a result of this compromise, the emperor succeeded and gained papal
support against the Ottomans. Unfortunately for Byzantium, papal reinforcements were
not enough to save Constantinople. Constantine XIs efforts, despite the minimal Latin
response, should be regarded as successful during the Byzantine Empires final crisis and
conflict with the Ottoman Turks.
131
51
The most significant influence over Byzantine-Papal relations during Constantine

XIs reign was established nearly a decade before he took the throne. The Council of
Florence in the 1430s heavily shaped Greek foreign relations with the Latin Church. Just
as Michael VIII Palaiologos traveled to the west and offered to reunite the schismatic
Christian churches to gain military support against an invader, eventually forming a
short-lived alliance through the Council of Lyons, John VIII hoped to gain western
military support against the Ottomans. Therefore, the emperor traveled to Italy in 1437
with a small retinue of churchmen, philosophers, and imperial administrators.132 The
council was initially held in the scenic, fortified city of Ferrara near Venice, the
Byzantine delegations port of arrival. However, the delegates quickly traveled to
Florence after a virulent outbreak of the plague ravaged Ferrara shortly after the initial
convocation.133
Johns father, Manuel II, tried to convince his son that church union would
antagonize the Turks, and western promises of military aid would only be illusory. In the
funeral oration of his brother Theodore, written in 1407, Manuel II describes the possible
results of any reunion with the Papacy. He explains that while the promise of Latin
military aid against the Turks had the potential to save Byzantium, the bitter divide that
church union would cause between the Greeks could lead to conflict or even civil war.134
Manuel II was not the only opponent of union with Rome, as a significant portion of the
132
Doukas 179.
Joseph Gill. The Council of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) 93.
134
Manuel II Palaeologos. Funeral Oration on his Brother Theodore. Trans. J. Chrysostomides
(Thessalonike: Association for Byzantine Research, 1985) 244: O life no longer bearable were it not for
our religious faith, since living is no longer desirable particularly to me, as also to all those who knew
precisely how outstanding your [Theodore Palaiologos Porphyrogenitos] character was, o friend of God.
This then was the meaning of those signs from afar when they declared a change of fortune for the worse.
We however saw this and leapt for joy, thinking that the evil would befall our foes, as some had predicted.
Now that the evil turned out to be against us, clearly affecting us all, so vast, so bitter, so irreparable that
nothing remains but to live in despondency, weeping and mourning for the rest of time.
133
52
common Constantinopolitan citizenry fervently defended Orthodoxy against the Latin

Church. Nonetheless, despite sweltering heat, insufficient supplies and monetary
resources, the prospect of spending years away from family and loved ones, and little
domestic support, the Greek delegation began a two year debate regarding union with the
Papacy.
The Council of Florence debated several discrepancies between the Latin and
Greek Christian practices. The most significant dispute, according to Emperor John VIII,
concerned the procession of the Holy Spirit.135 While the Greeks followed the literal text
of Christian Scripture, stating that the Holy Spirit only proceeds from the Father, the
Latins believed in an implied interpretation of Scripture, explaining that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from both the Father and the Son.136 The addition of filioque to the Nicene
Creed was another point of dispute among the delegates.137 The Greeks argued that any
addition to the Creed after the seven Ecumenical Councils was forbidden.138 However,
the Latins argued that additions to the Creed are prohibited only when they create a
different faith, not merely when they clarify the traditional one.139 Purgatorys existence
was also disputed, as the Greeks fervently denied its validity.140 The Greeks also opposed
the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, but they eventually relented and viewed it
as a minor difference of ritual.141 The Council of Florence also discussed papal primacy
among the Christian patriarchates. After several months of debate, the Greeks accepted
135
Gill 172.
Gill 194.
137
Donald M. Nicol. The Last Centuries of Byzantium 1261 1453 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993) 77: Filioque is the Latin term literally meaning and the Son, inserted into the Creed by Latin
priests beginning in fifth century Spain.
138
Gill 148.
139
Gill 156.
140
Gill 123: Mark of Ephesus was the most passionate Greek opponent of Purgatorys existence at the
Council of Florence.
141
Gill 275.
136
53
the Roman sees primacy, although its actual text in the proclamation was deliberately
vague.142 While each topic was debated and discussed equally between the Greek and
Latin delegates, the Council of Florences results did not reflect that equality.
The Latin delegates and Pope Eugenius IV were not interested in compromise
with the Greeks. They understood that the Byzantine temporal position was tenuous at
best, and without church union there would be no military aid to Constantinople. In each
of their responses to the Greek theological positions, the Latin delegates reminded the
Byzantines that they were in no position to make demands.143 The Greek delegates
quickly understood that the western Church required their signatures affirming the
Byzantine submission to Rome, not their philosophical and theological positions at the
council. Sylvester Syropoulos, grand ecclesiarch of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople,
explains the Greeks frustration at the lack of genuine debate at Florence:
Another day we met again according to custom at the patriarchs lodgings. We
debated there the question of union, and the supporters of Latinism contented
themselves with praising the harmony and the peace. The bishop of Heraclea
observed: It would be good if you would furnish us with the declaration which
you have sent to the Latins. We have heard it only once, though we should have
seen and examined it several times. At once the bishop of Nicaea [Bessarion]
replied: It would be shameful for you to say you have forgotten it after having
heard it once. You should not have forgotten what was said and heard here. Thus
he replied to and avoided the request of the bishop of Heraclea. These are the
kinds of examination and studies that [the Greek] bishops thought they should
devote to this declaration and agreement concerning the faith.144
The Council of Florences results were predetermined well before John VIII and his
retinue even arrived in Italy. The Latins prevailed in all theological matters, especially
142
Ostrogorsky 563.
Gill 146: Did Mark [of Ephesus] forget that the Roman pontiffs had come to the aid of the Eastern
Church on so many occasions, being present in person or by proxy at councils to still the storms of
heresy?
144
Sylvester Syropoulos. A Greek Prelate Describes Greek Disputes over Union. Byzantium: Church,
Society, and Civilization Seen through Contemporary Eyes. Trans. Deno John Geanakoplos (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984) 223-224.
143
54
regarding papal supremacy, subtly rewording translated texts to mislead the Greek
delegates. They granted the Greeks only a small consolation, allowing them to keep their
traditional church ritual.145 In their despair and desire to return to their homes after two
years of discussion, the Greek delegates all signed the decree of union except for Mark of
Ephesus, who would take no part in such a one-sided affair.146 The emperor and his
legates then returned to Byzantium, where the union was openly reviled by the general
clergy and citizenry of Constantinople. Constantine XI Palaiologos inherited these
implications from the Council of Florence nearly a decade later, and his acknowledged
obligation to implement them greatly influenced his foreign relations with the Papacy.
The Byzantine submission to Rome at the Council of Florence, and Emperor
Constantine XIs efforts to execute it within Constantinople during his reign, came solely
as a result of Ottoman pressure toward the empire. The Orthodox Church, which carried a
large amount of power and prestige in the east eve as the Byzantine state declined, had
little interest in surrender to Roman supremacy and doctrine.147 Therefore, the Byzantines
pursued union solely because of the emperors and his courts wishes. Without the
Turkish threat to Constantinople, the Council of Florence would not have occurred. The
Papacy, as a result of previous antagonisms between the groups since the Council of
Lyons in 1274, realized that John VIIIs overtures came because of Byzantiums crisis.
However, the pope used this to gain religious concessions from the Greeks.
Just as the Council of Florence influenced the emperors policy toward the Roman
pontiff, the status of the Papacy throughout the fifteenth century also played an important
role in Papal-Byzantine relations. However, Constantine XI faced a Papacy that had lost a
145
Ostrogorsky 563.
Gill 356.
147
Ostrogorsky 563-564.
146
55
significant amount of the prestige it gained during the High Middle Ages. During the
fourteenth century, nepotism, as well as the Papacys tenure at Avignon, drained the
papal treasury of funds and lowered its stature among Christian leaders.148 In addition,
the election of several rival popes in Rome, Pisa, and Avignon split the western
Christians into rival factions. The papal Curia made several efforts to repair the Papacys
reputation which culminated in the Council of Constance, opened in November 1414.
After three years of debate and negotiation, twenty three cardinals and thirty other
electors deposed the three competing popes and elected Martin V.149 However, the city of
Rome required the bulk of Martins attentions, as it had descended into lawlessness and
ruin during the years of the rival popes in Avignon and Pisa.150 Even after he had restored
order to Rome, Martin was concerned with several major conflicts throughout Western
Europe. The Hundred Years War between France and England, the Spanish reconquista
from the Moors, and the German civil wars occupied the pope for the rest of his life.151 In
addition, Italy was in a constant state of upheaval due to virulent outbreaks of the plague
and political intrigues among the quarrelling princes.152 Even though Martin V
recognized that the eastern Christians suffered numerous defeats at the hands of the
Ottomans, the conflicts throughout Italy and Western Europe drained his resources.153
Therefore, he was unable to provide significant assistance for Byzantium during his
tenure as pope.
148
Walter Ullman. A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen & Co, 1972) 286;
William J. La Due. The Chair of Saint Peter: A History of the Papacy (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999) 146.
149
La Due 164: The three popes were John XXIII of the Pisan line, Gregory XII in Rome, and Benedict
XIII of the Avignon line.
150
Kenneth M. Setton. The Papacy and the Levant (1204 1571) II (Philadelphia: The American
Philosophical Society, 1978) 40.
151
Setton 39-40.
152
Gill 16.
153
Setton 42-44.
56
After the accession of Pope Eugenius IV in 1431, the Papacy faced a new crisis
that distracted it from helping the Greeks. The Conciliar movement, the belief that the
ultimate church authority rested in the decisions of church councils rather than the pope
himself, challenged papal supremacy.154 Supported by French and German clergy and
elites, the Conciliar movement undermined support for papal directives throughout
Western Europe.155 While Eugenius IV tried to focus the western princes attention on the
eastern crisis through the Council of Florence, his decreasing influence garnered support
primarily from the Italian clergy. After the Latins success at the council, Eugenius
prestige temporarily increased and helped him to convince the Hungarians and Venetians
to assist the Greeks. However, when the crusade failed and the Turks destroyed the
crusaders at Varna in 1444, the popes prestige once again decreased.156 His successor,
Nicholas V, faced similar temporal problems upon his accession in March 1447.157 The
Romans opposed his municipal administration, and Italian princes constantly challenged
his temporal authority. While he zealously presided over the Conciliar movements defeat
at Basel and Lausanne, his enthusiasm did not extend toward assisting the eastern
Christians.158 Nicholas V did not believe that the Ottoman Turks possessed the strength
necessary to destroy the Byzantine Empire, and continually disregarded information
relating Greek defeats in the east.159 As a result, Constantine XI faced a Papacy that
possessed a decreased amount of influence among the western princes, as well as a pope
who did not fully understand the extent of the Ottoman threat to Byzantium.
154
Setton 47.
Setton 59.
156
Setton 84-85.
157
Setton 98.
158
Setton 99.
159
La Due 174.
155
57
Constantine XI Palaiologos actions toward the Papacy were heavily influenced

by his courtiers opinions. His advisors, in contrast to their positions toward the Ottoman
Turks, generally agreed on a Byzantine policy toward the Papacy. Each of the councilors
positions revolved around the Council of Florence and its execution in Constantinople.
The megadux Lucas Notaras held a pragmatic position, particularly concerning the
implementation of church union. George Sphrantzes explains that his desire to save the
city from the Ottomans at all costs clearly motivated his position toward the Roman
see.160 He understood that the empires military salvation could only come from the Latin
Christians, and that the Papacy was the only force that could mobilize them.161 Therefore,
he advised the emperor to take the necessary steps in Constantinople to implement the
union of the churches proclaimed at Florence. Notaras also used his position and
influence to advertise these benefits of church union to many courtiers and prominent
Constantinopolitan citizens, especially after papal legate Cardinal Isidore arrived in the
city in 1452.162 While the chronicler Doukas quotes the megadux saying that it would be
better to see the turban of the Turks reigning in the center of the City than the Latin
miter, subsequent authors have often taken this statement out of context and portray him
as an opponent of church union.163 Notaras most likely made such a comment as a
frustrated response to the intransigence of some Italians residing in Constantinople, rather
than as a mark of his anti-unionist sentiments.164 In fact, Lucas Notaras was an extremely
passionate and vocal supporter of church union in Emperor Constantine XIs circle of
advisors.
160
Sphrantzes 63.
Nestor-Iskander 59.
162
163
Doukas 210.
164
161
58
Constantines close friend and councilor George Sphrantzes was equally as

pragmatic concerning relations with the pope and church union. The First Lord of the
Imperial Wardrobe was not concerned with religious dogmas, but merely gaining papal
military assistance for Constantinople. In his chronicle of events surrounding the fall of
Constantinople, Sphrantzes relates a parable describing his beliefs:
Allow me to make use of a parable. For many years I and some others have been
accustomed to meet in the Church of Saint Sophia by our Middle Way, the broad
spacious street of our City. Some time later other people discovered another road
that leads to the same church, as they say, and urged me: Come also by this road
which we discovered; we know that your way is old and fine and known to us
from the beginning with you, but the one we have just found is a good road also.
So I hear certain individuals assert that the new road is the correct way, while
others maintain the opposite. Why can I not say: Go in peace and love to Saint
Sophia by whatever road you please; but I will use the road I have taken with you
for a long time, a good road traveled and witnessed by you and my ancestors.165
He also realized that there were grave risks inherent in any church union. He believed
that the Turks feared any rapprochement between the Christians and the subsequent
military alliance that would result. Until the Council of Florence, with the exception of
the failed Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, the Turks seized territory from Byzantium
without fear of reprisal, since the Greek military was extremely weak and the stronger
Latin Christians were unlikely to aid schismatics.
After church union, the Ottomans needed to exercise more caution. The mere
proclamation of union in Rome led to the Crusade of Varna in 1444, and a Greek
proclamation of union in Constantinople could have led to another. However, Sphrantzes
regarded the unions proposed military benefits as worth the risk.166 If carried out
carefully and discretely, he believed it would succeed. He explains: I wish that the union
of the churches had come about properly, even if it had cost me one of my eyes. But I
165
166
Sphrantzes 49-50.
59
said it because the synod was the single most important cause for the attack that the
impious [Ottomans] launched against our City, which resulted in the siege, our
enslavement, and our great misfortunes.167 George Sphrantzes was so fervent of an
advocate for church union that he recommended the papal legate Cardinal Isidore for the
recently vacant patriarchate in Constantinople, after Patriarch Gregory III fled to Rome,
but the emperor dismissed his recommendation.168 Through these actions, George
Sphrantzes advised the emperor to celebrate the union of the churches to improve
relations between Byzantium and Rome.
Unlike Lucas Notaras and George Sphrantzes, Constantines close friend John
Kantakouzenos and Grand Domestic Andronikos Kantakouzenos advocated Byzantine
submission to the Papacy on religious grounds. While they also believed that the military
union would significantly decrease the Ottomans pressure upon Constantinople, the two
advisors viewed this as a consequence of adopting the Roman faith.169 Andronikos was so
fervent in his beliefs that in 1437, John VIII sent him as an emissary to the Serbians
asking them to send a delegation to the Council of Florence.170 When they refused the
offer, both he and John Kantakouzenos became fervent opponents of the Serbians,
labeling them as heretics.171 Following Constantines accession the throne, the two
advisors consistently explained to the emperor that commitment to church union was
167
Sphrantzes 50.
Sphrantzes 72: The cardinal of Russia [Isidore] happened to be in the City and I argued, as his
intermediary to my late lord [Constantine], the emperor, that he should be appointed patriarch in the hope
that various advantages would come from him and the then pope After many consultations and
deliberations, my late master and emperor decided to abandon the alternative.
169
Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 46-47.
170
Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos no. 68 180.
171
Sphrantzes 63: My grand domestic is an enemy of Serbia and made an agreement with John
Kantakouzenos.
168
60
spiritually correct, and would bring temporal rewards for the empire as well.172 Both
Andronikos and John joined their voices to those of Notaras and Sphrantzes in supporting
union with the Papacy.
Two influential churchmen also made their way into Constantine XIs retinue in
order to advise him on the proper course regarding union with the Papacy, joining the
ranks of his other unionist councilors. Bessarion, Bishop of Nicaea, was one of these
clerics. The bishop was, according to the historian Doukas, the most erudite of the
hierarchs who attended the Council of Florence.173 His eloquence, learned status, and
persuasiveness at the council convinced Pope Eugenius IV that he should be made a
cardinal.174 In fact, his subsequent theological contributions to Latin Christendom so
impressed the other cardinals that he was nearly elected to the papal throne in 1455.175 As
a result, his stature in the west added significant credibility to his messages to
Constantine XI supporting Byzantine assent to the union of the churches. Bessarion spent
little time in the beleaguered capital after 1439, but he communicated with the emperor
and the elites in the city frequently.176 Therefore, despite his distance from
Constantinople, Cardinal Bessarion significantly influenced Constantine XIs decisions
regarding the Papacy and implementing the Council of Florences decisions.
172

Doukas 180.
174
175
Pius II. Memoirs of a Renaissance Pope: The Commentaries of Pius II. Trans. Florence A. Gragg (New
York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1959) 69.
176
Sphrantzes 93: The author intimates that the cardinal spent nearly all of his time between 1439 and his
death in 1472 in Italy. Bessarion spent most of that time in Rome near the pontiff, gaining even more
popularity from western churchmen. George Sphrantzes explains: Cardinal Bessarion passed away on
November 15 [1472]. His body was returned to Rome with all honors and was buried in the Church of the
Holy Apostles, which had been his last residence. He had arranged in advance his own tomb, which was
placed next to the holy martyr, Saint Eugenia.
173
61
The other churchman who advised the emperor on the proper course of action
toward the Papacy exercised his influence while in Constantinople itself. He was also the
integral figure in Constantine XIs strategy of personal diplomacy. Isidore, Cardinal of
All Russia, arrived in the imperial capital in November 1452, with a company of 200
Neapolitan archers, as the papal legate to Byzantium.177 Like Bessarion, Isidore was an
intelligent and eloquent man, first elevated from monastic life to become bishop of Kiev
before attending the Council of Florence in John VIIIs delegation.178 Pope Eugenius IV
was also impressed with Isidore, elevating him to the cardinalship following the council.
When the Kievans rioted against Isidore and the union upon his return, Pope Nicholas V
designated him the papal legate to Constantinople.179 The cardinal was an equally shrewd
politician as he was a talented theologian and orator. He understood that Constantine
faced open rebellion in the capital if the unions implementation did not proceed
carefully. However, Isidore continually pressured the emperor to undertake small steps
toward this goal as the weeks of his visit progressed.180 The cardinal had learned from his
experience in Kiev, and was confident that union could succeed in Constantinople. He
assured the emperor that once church union had occurred, the military aid he requested
would arrive. Instead of returning to the Curia when the Ottoman pressure on
Constantinople increased shortly after his arrival, the cardinal remained in the city and
used his military knowledge to assist with the defense.181 Cardinal Isidore remained in
close contact with Pope Nicholas V during his time in the capital, constantly reporting on
177
Doukas 203.
179
Doukas 203: The pope sent Isidore, cardinal of Poland and former archbishop of Russia, a sagacious
and prudent man, learned in Orthodox doctrine, a Roman by descent, a venerable father, and one of those
present at the Council.
180
181
Melissenos 111.
178
62
the emperors progress toward completing the union of the churches.182 Since
Constantine realized that further western military aid hinged upon his reports to the pope,
Isidores recommendations held a significant amount of influence over the emperors
decisions regarding Rome.
Demetrios Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, Constantines cousin and mesazon
through his and John VIIIs reigns, remained aloof from the debate within the Byzantine
court over union.183 The mesazons delicate nature necessitated his passivity during court
debate and discussion during Constantines reign. He intimately understood that the
general population of Constantinople virulently opposed the submission to the Papacy,
but remained loyal to his former master John VIIIs faith in the unions ability to save
Byzantium.184 He did explain to Constantine the extent to which the Constantinopolitans
opposed church union, but did not elaborate upon any plans to implement it in the city.
Therefore, Kantakouzenos remained virtually silent on the subject in the emperors
presence and avoided any contradictions arising from his delicate position within the
imperial administration.
One of the few elites in Constantines inner circle to oppose rapprochement with
the Papacy was the emperors younger brother, Demetrios Palaiologos Porphyrogenitos.
The prince, who became a co-despot of the Morea following Constantines accession to
the imperial throne, adopted this position after attending the Council of Florence with his
elder brother John VIII in 1437 and 1438.185 Demetrios Palaiologos did not oppose
182

Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos 264: In the later Byzantine administration, the mesazon acted
as the liaison between the emperor and the population of Constantinople.
184
185
Sphrantzes 49: On November 27 of the same year [1437], our emperor Lord John, accompanied by the
patriarch, Lord Demetrios the despot, numerous senators, clerics, and almost all the metropolitans and
bishops, departed for the scheduled synod.
183
63
church union on spiritual grounds. Instead, he recognized that most of the

Constantinopolitan citizenry would oppose any attack upon their faith, leaving them
searching for a leader that would exemplify their beliefs. His opportunism manifested
itself soon after the Council of Florences conclusion. Proclaiming himself the defender
of Orthodoxy and the leader of the anti-unionists, Demetrios laid siege to Constantinople
with a company of Turkish mercenaries in April 1442.186 While he did not possess a
sufficient number of troops to force the city, Demetrios hoped that the anti-unionists in
the city would depose John VIII and offer him the throne. This rebellious act relegated
Demetrios to insignificance within the imperial administration until September 1, 1449,
when he became co-despot of the Morea with his brother Thomas. Before he could rally
the anti-unionists to any seditious acts against Constantine, the latter sent him to Mistra in
the Morea.187 This act effectively ended Demetrios influence over Constantines court
and advisors, as well as any control he held over the emperors policy toward the Papacy.
Therefore, Despot Demetrios anti-unionist opinions held little authority over Emperor
Constantine XIs actions.
Since most of his advisors wanted to implement union with the Papacy, the
emperor undertook several significant actions designed to please Rome and upset the
Constantinopolitan population as little as possible. Constantine knew that he had little
time to waste. Nearly a decade had passed between the Council of Florence and
Constantines accession to the throne, and the Greeks still had not publicly proclaimed
the union. With each passing month, the Papacy grew more impatient, expecting results
186
Sphrantzes 53: On April 23 of the same year [1442], Lord Demetrios the despot, supported by Turkish
troops, ravaged and blockaded the suburbs of Constantinople.
187
Sphrantzes 53.
64
from Byzantium. In a letter to the emperor dated September 27, 1451, Pope Nicholas V
expresses his irritation:
The Greeks cannot really assume that the Roman pontiff and the whole Western
Church are so bereft of intelligence as not to realize why in this delay the
excuses keep coming they understand, but they bear with it But if, however,
you refuse to maintain this decree among your people, you will compel us to
make provisions which look both to your salvation and to our honor.188
Constantine and his government realized that they needed to take action in order to secure
papal support, but they faced another crucial problem. Most of the lesser elites and nobles
outside Constantines inner circle fervently opposed church union. The emperor already
had difficulties controlling and subordinating the Constantinopolitan elites, as they often
refused to give up their wealth to the citys defense. Leonard of Chios explains: Again,
what traitors were among the Greeks, what greedy betrayers of their country! Their needy
Emperor begged them again and again to lend him money to pay his soldiers, but they
swore that they had none, because the poverty of the times had exhausted their resources.
Yet their enemies [the Turks] later found wealth enough among them.189 The Venetian
physician Nicol Barbaro confirms the bishops account, and even explains that these
Greek elites stubbornly refused any imperial initiatives regarding their wealth and
privileges: The Emperor was very poor, and asked his barons to lend him money, but
they excused themselves because they had none; the Turks, however, found a great deal
of money in fact, thirty thousand ducats were found in the possession of one of these
gentlemen. The Emperor was [also] advised not to raise taxes at such a time of
188
P. Lampros Letter from Pope Nicholas V to Constantine XI, September 27, 1451 Palaiolgeia ka
Peloponnesiak (Athens, 1930) as cited in Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204 1571) II, 106.
189
65
trouble.190 The Byzantine nobility did not challenge Constantines right to the throne,
but they fervently defended their wealth and privilege.
While Constantine could have devoted his attention to the insubordinate elites in
Constantinople, he instead refused to divert his focus from the Ottomans external threat.
Leonard of Chios explains: The Emperor lacked firmness, and those who neglected to
obey his orders were neither chastised nor put to death. So each one followed his own
inclinations, and they soothed the Emperors anger with flatteries in their usual way. That
good man, so wickedly mocked by his own subjects, preferred to pretend that he did not
see the wrongs that were being done.191 As a result, the tensions between Constantine
and the citys elites made the emperors efforts in proclaiming church union extremely
difficult.
In order to personally distance himself from the union before slowly
implementing it, Constantine XI refused to partake in an official religious coronation
ceremony. Traditionally, a new emperor would be crowned by the patriarch of
Constantinople in Hagia Sophia shortly after his arrival in the city. However, Patriarch
Gregory III Mammes was a committed unionist and Constantine did not want to be
overtly perceived as supporting the unionists position. In addition, he did not possess the
financial resources necessary to prepare a lavish and traditional ceremony in Hagia
Sophia.192 He satisfied himself with the private and civil coronation ceremony performed
at Mistra on January 6, 1449.193 Two emissaries from Constantinople traveled to the
Morea, informed Constantine of his brothers death, and crowned him emperor on the
190
Barbaro 77.
192
Leonard of Chios 26 and Barbaro 77.
193
Sphrantzes 57.
191
66
Constantinopolitan peoples behalf in the palace of the despots.194 However, the lack of a
proper coronation ceremony did cast some doubt over Constantines imperial legitimacy.
The historian Doukas explains in his chronicle that John VIII was the last true Roman
emperor because Constantine did not participate in a religious coronation.195 However,
only a minor segment of the citizenry disputed the emperors legitimacy in
Constantinople. George Sphrantzes explains that with or without a proper coronation, the
Constantinopolitans acclaimed Constantine emperor.196 While the Papacy gently urged
Constantine to undergo the coronation, the emperor continually delayed claiming that the
Ottoman threat required his immediate attention.197 Patriarch Gregory III Mammes
departure to Rome in August 1451 simplified the emperors problem. Gregory chafed at
the lack of commitment shown to the agreements made at Florence and retired to private
life.198 With the patriarchate vacant, Constantine indefinitely postponed his coronation
until the immediacy of the Ottoman threat consumed the Papacys attention. Therefore,
he placated the anti-unionists within Constantinople without offending or antagonizing
the Papacy.199 This was one of Constantines first actions designed to maintain peace in
Constantinople and gain military support from the pope.
194

Doukas 186: John who had suffered from gout for many years, a condition that was aggravated by the
deep distress and grief he experienced after his return from Italy, partly because of the agitation resulting
from the Union of the Churches, and partly because of the empress death, fell gravely ill and within a few
days died, the last to reign as emperor of the Romans. The officials summoned Constantine to
Constantinople.
196
Sphrantzes 57: On December 6, I set out with an embassy to inform the sultan that the empress, the
brothers, right of birth, and the love and wisdom of nearly the whole population of the City
[Constantinople] chose Lord Constantine emperor. The sultan approved the choice and sent me away with
honor and gifts.
197
198
199
Michael Cordoses. The Question of Constantine Palaiologos Coronation. The Making of Byzantine
History. Eds. Roderick Beaton and Charlotte Rouech (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1993) 139-141.
195
67
Another tactic Constantine XI attempted in his quest for military aid from Rome
involved his fathers tactic of personal diplomacy. Manuel II traveled to England and
France in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and was in constant contact with the
Papacy, attempting to gain military assistance.200 However, without church union,
Manuel II believed that his efforts would not succeed. He received many promises, as he
explains in a letter to the priest Euthymius in the summer of 1401:
Now, as long as our negotiations were stalled at the stage of favorable promises,
and these from men who make them most readily, the awareness that your
salvation depended upon deeds, not words, made me completely numb, hand,
tongue, and mind, although I wanted to intone the hymn of victory. Above all I
had been afraid that, quite unawares, I might be overcome by grief if I should try
to sing a happier song to you.201
Manuel II echoes these beliefs in a letter to Demetrios Chrysoloras, one of his advisors in
Constantinople, later in the year. Even though the Papacy made promises to assist the
Greeks, they had no incentive to fulfill them as long as the schism remained.202 After the
Council of Florence, the emperor believed that another journey to the west would elicit
the promised aid. He was still admired throughout Christian Europe for his daring attacks
against the Ottomans while despot of the Morea.203 Therefore, he believed that a personal
appeal would succeed with the western rulers. However, Constantine was foremost a
soldier. He refused to leave Constantinople while rumors of an impending Ottoman
attack abounded in the city.204 Instead of traveling to the pope himself, Constantine asked
his brother Thomas, co-despot of the Morea with his brother Demetrios, to travel to Italy
200
Barker 174.
George T. Dennis. The Letters of Manuel II Palaeologus: Text, Translation, and Notes (Washington:
Dumbarton Oaks, 1977) 104.
202
Dennis 108: I am aware that your salvation requires deeds, not promises. Now, I have received the
most wonderful promises, but I was very dubious about their fulfillment, since this requires time in which
many things could happen, and so I was informing you of conditions here in another hand.
203
Setton 96.
204
Constantine refused to leave the city several times during his reign, most notably before the final
Ottoman assault on May 29, 1453. For more information, see Nestor-Iskander 59 and Doukas 220.
201
68
in his place.205 Since Thomas was a member of the imperial family, held the prestigious
rank of despot, and came at his brothers request, Constantine believed he would be a
suitable replacement. However, he politely refused, fearing his brother Demetrios would
strike against his lands when he left. Instead, the emperor sent Andronikos Bryennios
Leontaris to the Papacy in April 1451, where he would remain as a spokesman for the
Greek cause, and report relevant information back to Constantine.206 Even though
Andronikos could not rouse the Papacy to aid Constantinople on his own, he did provide
the Byzantines with crucial information regarding the Roman see under Pope Nicholas V.
Constantine XI Palaiologos major action to gain favor with the Papacy involved
proclaiming the union of the churches in Hagia Sophia. The emperor seriously debated
this act before relenting to Cardinal Isidores request. He felt no spiritual need to
proclaim the church union in the great church, and he feared a backlash from the antiunionists within Constantinople.207 However, the emperor knew that finally proclaiming
union publicly in the capital would greatly improve his standing with the Papacy and
finally bring Byzantium aid and he thus gave his consent.208 The Italian and Greek clergy
celebrated church union on December 12, 1452, commemorating the names of Pope
Nicholas V and the departed Patriarch Gregory III Mammes in the liturgy.209 Before the
service, Constantine and his advisors took several precautionary measures to prevent any
riots or other violent acts by the anti-unionist party. According to Sphrantzes, Constantine
205
Sphrantzes 64: The emperor decided to send an envoy to the Morea to escort one of his brothers to the
City [Constantinople], if he accepted and remained faithful to the terms of the agreement, so that if the need
arose to review their policy toward the [Ottoman] sultan, one of the two might travel to the rulers of the
West.
206
207
Doukas 204: Even the emperor only pretended to [support union].
208
Sphrantzes 72: The emperor consented to have the popes name commemorated in our services, by
necessity, as we hoped to receive some aid.
209
Doukas 205: After both Pope Nicholas and the exiled Patriarch Gregory were commemorated in the
diptychs, the Divine Liturgy was concluded on the twelfth day of December in the year [1452].
69
did not force the population to attend. In fact, whoever was willing would pronounce the
commemoration in Saint Sophia; the rest would incur no blame and remain peaceful.210
Constantine also assured the citizenry that complete submission to the Papacy would be
only temporary. Doukas explains that the people agreed to the Article of Union with the
understanding that, once the Turkish threat had passed and peace was restored, a number
of scholars would gather to study the articles and correct whatever was not in complete
accordance with the true faith.211 Fortunately for the emperor, these measures
succeeded.
The proclamation of union caused great lamentation in the city, but no
violence.212 Instead, the anti-unionists merely avoided Hagia Sophia, which Cardinal
Isidore had transformed into a Latin cathedral. Doukas writes: From that day on which
the Union had supposedly taken place in the Great Church [Hagia Sophia], the
Constantinopolitans shunned it as though it were a synagogue of Jews, and neither
oblation nor burnt offering nor censing took place inside.213 Nonetheless, the
proclamation liturgy satisfied Cardinal Isidore, who wrote to Pope Nicholas V shortly
after the ceremony explaining merely that the Greeks had finally proclaimed union with
Rome. Isidore, sympathetic to the Greeks plight, did not inform the pope of the dissention
within Constantinople or the emperors theological apathy.214 As a result, Constantine
210
Sphrantzes 72.
Doukas 205.
212
Barbaro 12: On the thirteenth of December the Union took place in the church of Saint Sophia with
great solemnity on the part of the clerics, and there was there also the Reverend Cardinal of Russia
[Isidore], who was sent by the Pope, and also there was the Most Serene Emperor with all his nobles, and
all the people of Constantinople, and that day there were great lamentations in the city. This Union was
with the intention that they should be united as we Franks are, and not have any more schism in the Church,
and we should say Mass in their churches, and the Greeks say Mass in our Latin churches.
213
Doukas 210.
214
Doukas 205: Every heart and every intent of the Greeks was examined, and their trickeries and
deceptions did not escape the cardinals [Isidores] detection. Since he belonged to the same nation, he
211
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succeeded in convincing the Papacy that the Greeks were serious about church union,
without overwhelmingly alienating his citizenry.
Emperor Constantine XI also delicately managed the problem concerning the
vacant patriarchate following Gregory III Mammes departure in April 1451. He believed
that appointing a new patriarch risked shattering the tenuous peace he created in
Constantinople and was unnecessary until someone defeated the Ottoman threat to the
city. While the proclamation of union in Hagia Sophia in December 1452 implied that
Gregory III could return to the patriarchal throne, he declined and remained sequestered
in Italy.215 Even when his close friend George Sphrantzes recommended Cardinal Isidore
for the patriarchal throne as a way to gain the Roman sees assistance, Constantine
refused to act. The Constantinopolitan citizenry had not yet rioted against church union,
but any provocation could break the emperors fragile peace.216 The proclamation of
church union had come close to inciting riots, but its implementation was absolutely
necessary for papal military support. Filling the vacant patriarchate was not as necessary.
Instead, Constantine again explained that he could not focus upon such matters while the
Ottomans stood at the city gates.217 Once the impending crisis ended, he would decide
upon a new patriarch. The Papacy relented and allowed the emperor to wait. Again,
Constantine XI successfully avoided conflict with his own people while bolstering his
position with Rome.
needed little prompting to offer the City his help. He was content, therefore, to report to the pope only what
had taken place.
215
Doukas 203: The emperor earlier had sent word to Rome that in return for aid Patriarch Gregory
would return to his throne.
216
Sphrantzes 72: After many consultations and deliberations, my late master and emperor decided to
abandon the first alternative altogether, since the appointed patriarch requires the obedience of all;
otherwise riots and war ensue between him and those who are opposed to his appointment; especially at
this time, when we were facing extreme war, what a misfortune to have a war inside the City as well!
217
71
Constantine and his advisors also relied upon leniency to maintain peace within
the city while implementing the union of the churches. The emperor lowered the tensions
within Constantinople by allowing the citizenry to voice their dissent freely. Constantine
and his inner circle refused to take harsh actions against those residents that did not
believe in union. Bishop Leonard of Chios, an assistant to Cardinal Isidore, explains that
the emperor would not punish vocal monks for their beliefs: Indeed, if he had only
shaken off his timidity, he would have punished their [the monks] deceitful pretense of
faith; for he who spurns God and seeks to please man will surely be confounded. If only
they had been repressed, as they should have been, they would not have spread this
pestilential infection.218 Doukas agrees with the bishop, describing the emperors actions
toward anti-unionist nuns: Those nuns, who considered themselves to be pure and
dedicated to God in Orthodoxy, with common resolve and in accord with their teacher
Gennadios [a prominent anti-unionist], and with the abbots and the confessors and the
remaining priests and laymen, cried aloud the anathema.219 Even though the dissidents
opposed church union, many were grateful to the emperor for his leniency, understood
his position, and pledged their loyalty to the emperor and Constantinople. Doukas details
this in his chronicle: The Constantinopolitans, in their despair, had been saying, Would
that the City were delivered into the hands of the Latins, who call upon Christ and the
Theotokos [Mother of God], and not thrown into the clutches of the infidel.220 As a
result, Constantine provided means for dissidents to voice their opinions while retaining
their loyalty to the empire. The papal legate Isidore, along with his assistant Leonard of
Chios, expressed their concern over the emperors leniency, but understood that he
218

Doukas 204.
220
Doukas 210.
219
72
needed to diffuse the tensions over church union.221 Through his flexibility, Emperor
Constantine further maintained the peace between the unionists and anti-unionists during
his quest for papal aid.
Constantines and his administrations efforts to secure papal assistance for
Constantinople during its time of crisis were a partial success. While the Papacy faced
several challenges in Western Europe that occupied many of its resources, Pope Nicholas
V aided Byzantium in a variety of ways. First, Constantines implementation of church
union led the Papacy to recommend another crusade to save the Greeks. Aeneas Sylvius
Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, explains in his autobiography that the Curia wanted to
rouse the western princes to defend Constantinople.222 While matters in the west
prevented Nicholas from organizing a general crusade, he did exhort all Christians to
individually travel to Constantinople to take part in its defense against impending assault.
One of these enterprising westerners was Giovanni Giustiniani Longo. Giustiniani was a
Genoese adventurer experienced in siege warfare.223 Doukas describes his entry into
Constantinople: From Genoa there also arrived Giovanni Longo Giustiniani in two huge
ships which were carrying a large supply of excellent military equipment and well-armed
youthful Genoese soldiers full of martial passion. This Giovanni was a very adept
tactician in the deployment of allied military forces. The emperor welcomed him warmly
221

Pius II 63: Aeneas in his [the popes] name read two speeches in public audience: one thanking the
Pope and the cardinals for the distinguished favors they had bestowed on the [German] Emperor; the other
begging that a crusade against the enemies of Christianity should be proclaimed and equipped and
imploring the Pope to put a stop to the harrying of Christians in Greece and the Orient.
223
Melissenos 103: There was a Genoese nobleman named Giovanni Giustiniani in the City, a skillful,
brave, sensible, and experienced individual in command of the ships.
222
73
and honored him with the rank of Protostrator.224 Giustiniani was one of several private
Italian and German soldiers that traveled to Constantinoples defense.
While not enough to save the city, Pope Nicholas V also provided military forces
and supplies for Constantinople. Troop enrollment and resource procurement in Italy
were long and arduous tasks, as recruiting, training, equipping, and shipping military
units and supplies took a significant amount of time. The first troops arrived in October
1451, in the company of Cardinal Isidore. On his way from Rome, Isidore recruited with
papal funds more than 200 crossbowmen and gunners skilled with gunpowder weaponry
from Naples. The cardinal knew that his gesture would be appreciated by the beleaguered
emperor, as his military escort, small though it was, was a token that the pope would
send practical assistance to a people that recognized his authority.225 Once the Ottoman
encirclement of Constantinople began in earnest (in late 1452), the Papacy shifted its
focus from sending troops to sending supplies for the citizenry. Using its limited
resources, the Papacy outfitted several transports of grain to feed Constantinople. The
most notable of these convoys traveled to Constantinople in April 1453. The pope filled
one of Constantines imperial galleys with grain in Sicily at his own expense, and hired
three Genoese vessels to carry other assorted provisions to the city.226 Despite dozens of
Ottoman vessels surrounding them in the Bosphorus, the four ships fought their way into
Constantinoples protected harbor, supplying the city with foodstuffs and ammunition.
Even though the Papacys troops and supplies did not prevent Constantinoples capture
224
Doukas 211.
226
Melissenos 106: Three Genoese ships finished loading at Chios, waited for favorable winds, and set
sail for our City. On their way they were joined by an imperial vessel transporting grain from Sicily.
225
74
by Mehmed IIs superior army, the shipments that the Papacy provided were a direct
result of Constantine XIs competence.
Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos successfully maintained cordial relations
with the Papacy throughout his reign by skillfully implementing the union of the
churches. The emperor gained confidence from his advisors solidarity regarding the
unions usefulness, which came from the expert advice provided by Cardinal Isidore.
These also emboldened his subsequent actions in Constantinople. By implementing
portions of the union when convenient, Constantine pleased Pope Nicholas V and his
legate in Constantinople, Isidore. In addition, the emperors delicate implementation of
union forestalled any rioting by the large anti-unionist faction in the city. While papal aid
to Constantinople did not prevent the citys capture by the Ottomans, the emperor was
still successful in his relations with the Roman see.
75
CHAPTER FIVE
Constantine and the Venetians

Constantine XIs relationship with Venetian interests in Constantinople before the
siege also represents a partial success in Byzantine diplomacy. While the Venetian
government sent only a token amount of aid to the emperor, Constantine and his court
successfully mobilized the Venetian population within Constantinople to support
Byzantium against the Ottoman Turks during the crisis. Constantine realized that the
Venetian Senate would send him little aid. The city was involved in its own conflicts over
Italian hegemony. He had antagonized Venetian interests during his tenure as despot of
the Morea, the Venetian doge mistrusted Greeks in general, and his advisors, on the
whole, mistrusted the Venetian government. As a result, Constantine focused his pleas
for help upon the merchants, ship captains, and other Venetian residents and travelers in
the Byzantine capital. Instead of fleeing before the Turkish siege, a significant portion of
Constantinoples Venetian population remained in the city, risking death, to aid in its
defense because Emperor Constantine convinced them to do so. As a result of this local
support, despite the Venetian governments refusal to provide significant assistance to
Constantinople, Constantine XI Palaiologos diplomacy toward the Venetians was
successful.
Before discussing the Byzantines relations with Venice, it is important to place
the Italian republic into its historical context in the fifteenth century. While crisis loomed
in the east between Byzantium and the Ottomans, the Venetians prepared for a
confrontation with their neighbors over hegemony in northern Italy. As a primarily
76
maritime republic, Venice wanted to secure food supplies for its citizens and lumber for
its shipwrights.227 However, the Venetian subjugation of towns within its hinterland
irritated and antagonized the other major powers in northern Italy: Lombardy and
Florence. While the Italians avoided open war in the early fifteenth century, the accession
of Francesco Foscari to the Venetian dogeship fundamentally altered the tenuous truce in
northern Italy. Foscari, a prominent member of the hawkish faction eager to exert its
dominance over the Milanese and Florentines, plunged Venice into war with Milan by
1423.228 This disastrous conflict extended throughout the next thirty years, drawing vital
Venetian military assets into the Po River valley region and away from the Levant and
Constantinople.
The Venetians did answer the popes call for a crusade against the Ottomans in
1443, allying and cooperating with the Hungarians. However, the crusades catastrophic
failure at Varna in late 1444 soured the Venetian crusading spirit. In fact, the Venetians
concluded peace and a new trade agreement with the Ottomans shortly after the crusades
dissolution. While the Venetians took Ottoman military strength very seriously after
Varna, their main concern in concluding a new treaty with Sultan Murad involved
gaining an advantage over the other Italian trading republics in their territories.229 After
concluding this new trade agreement, the Venetian government viewed any negative
actions toward the Turks with skepticism. They were not eager to endanger their new
agreement or antagonize their new trading partners, especially with other Italian citystates eager to take their place trading in the Ottoman realms. As a result of these issues,
227
Frederic C. Lane. Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) 225.
Lane 229.
229
Lane 235.
228
77
Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos faced a highly distracted and disinterested Venetian

government in the fifteenth century during his time of crisis.
During his reign, Constantine relied heavily upon his courts advice when
negotiating and communicating with the Venetians, both in Venice and in
Constantinople. However, only a few members of the emperors court possessed any
experience with Venetian interests or opinions on any proper actions toward them.
Among the experienced advisors, the distant Venetian government elicited feelings of
hostility and disdain from many of his councilors. However, these councilors frequently
developed close, friendly relationships with the Venetian merchants, sea captains, and
other artisans and traders traveling and living within the Byzantine capital.
Megadux Lucas Notaras developed the strongest relationships with both the
Venetian government and Venetian travelers and citizens in Constantinople. He built
close ties with the government in Italy by depositing much of his considerable fortune in
Venetian banks, and even settled his three daughters in the city.230 In addition, Notaras
eventually gained Venetian citizenship, proving his connections to influential leaders and
businessmen within the republic.231 The megadux also cultivated close ties with the
Venetian merchants and trader captains that frequented Constantinople. In order to gain
their favor, Notaras frequently devoted Byzantine resources to developing infrastructure
and effecting repairs in the citys Venetian quarter along the Golden Horn. For example,
Lucas Notaras supervised and financed the repair and expansion of harbors in the Golden
Horn to accommodate larger Venetian galleys and merchantmen in 1446.232 The
Venetians in Constantinople also favored him because of his antagonism toward one of
230
Donald M. Nicol. Byzantium and Venice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 415.
232
Nicol, Byzantium and Venice 387.
231
78
the Venetians main Italian rivals: the Genoese. Before the crisis, Notaras clearly favored
Venetian interests over those of the Genoese in nearby Galata, but his bias clearly
showed during the Ottoman crisis and siege of Constantinople. For example, the Genoese
soldier of fortune and the commander of the Christian forces at the walls, Giovanni
Giustiniani and Lucas Notaras entered into heated debates over the correct placement of
military units and defensive artillery against the Turks. The megadux attempted to
frustrate Giustinianis plans at every step, though.233 As a result of these actions, Lucas
Notaras possessed a significant amount of respect from Venetians, both in Italy and in
Constantinople. He worked feverishly to convince them to cooperate with Constantine
XIs plans and advised the emperor of their desires and capabilities to defend the city.
While Lucas Notaras possessed a friendly rapport with the Venetian government
and citizens within Constantinople, First Lord of the Imperial Wardrobe George
Sphrantzes was skeptical and mistrusted Venetians. Sphrantzes particularly scorned the
hawkish Venetian doge, Francesco Foscari, characterizing him as vengeful, deceitful, and
thoroughly anti-Greek in his sentiments. In his Chronicon Minus, George Sphrantzes
describes a supposed marital arrangement between the doges daughter and Constantine,
during his tenure as despot of the Morea.234 Foscari wished to unite Venetian possessions
in the Morea, mainly Modon and Coron, with Constantines realm in the peninsulas
northwest. In addition, he promised the poverty-stricken despot with a handsome
dowry, which Constantine could not deny in his struggle against the Turks and the
Achaean lords adjacent to his realm.235 However, Sphrantzes claims that upon gaining the
233
Leonard of Chios 29: He asked the Megadux Lucas Notaras for the cannon which belonged to the city,
so that he could use them against the enemy. In reply he received a haughty refusal.
234
Sphrantzes 71.
235
Sphrantzes 71.
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throne, Constantine rightfully cancelled the agreement with Foscari on the grounds that
imperial dignity could not permit a lowly Venetian to become Roman empress at
Constantinople.236 After Constantine cancelled the agreement, Sphrantzes claims that
Foscari became a bitter enemy of Byzantium, doing nothing to save it from the Ottomans.
Since George Sphrantzes believed that ending such a marriage agreement was proper and
justified, he vilified the doge for his supposed bitterness and extended his disdain toward
most Venetians. While Donald Nicol refutes the legitimacy of this proposed marriage,
Sphrantzes inclusion of it within his narrative is significant.237 This example shows his
hostility toward the Venetians and his desire to legitimize that hostility through this story.
In addition, George Sphrantzes diplomatic missions around the Aegean and Black Seas
limited his exposure to Venetians living within Constantinople. Therefore, he could not
provide Emperor Constantine with detailed advice on a proper course of action toward
them.
The Grand Domestic Andronikos Palaiologos Kantakouzenos, much like Lucas
Notaras, possessed considerable knowledge of Venice and Venetian negotiating tactics.
Kantakouzenos represented the empire in several treaty negotiations with Venice. His
most notable Venetian diplomatic achievement was the commercial treaty in 1448, where
236
Sphrantzes 71-72: Once Constantine had become emperor and come to the City, this marriage was out
of the question. What nobleman or noblewoman would ever receive the daughter of a Venetian even
though he might be the glorious doge as queen and lady for more than a short time? Who would accept
his other sons-in-law as the emperors fellow sons-in-law, and his sons as the brothers-in-law of the
emperor?
237
Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 32: According to Nicol, no contemporary Venetian sources make any
mention of a marriage alliance or proposal between Doge Francesco Foscari and Despot Constantine. In
addition, Constantines rejection of such a marriage would be completely uncharacteristic of the emperor,
as he desperately sought to connect his realms to those in the West to secure protection from the Ottomans.
For further information on Constantines marriage goals, see: Steven Runciman. The Marriages of the
Sons of the Emperor Manuel II. Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi: Mscellanea Agostino Pertusi. Tomo I
(Bologna: Ptron Editore, 1980) 273-282.
80
he personally represented Emperor John VIII.238 While possessing more knowledge of

the Venetians than George Sphrantzes, he shared the ambassadors opinions of Venice.
Kantakouzenos recognized that the Venetian doge would act in the republics best
interest, whether that meant cooperating with Byzantium or with the Ottomans to gain
economic and political advantages over his rivals. In addition, the memories of the
Venetians role in the Fourth Crusade of 1204 were foremost in Greek minds, especially
that of Andronikos. This traumatic event, ingrained in the Byzantine collective memory,
fundamentally characterized Greek relations with Venice. After Venetian ships and
soldiers assaulted and captured Constantinople, and subsequently stripped the city of its
wealth, the Greeks were extremely wary of trusting them ever again.239 Kantakouzenos
understood that Byzantium needed allies if it was to survive a Turkish attack.240
However, he did not believe that the Venetian government would be the ally that the
Greeks required. While the Venetian residents of Constantinople might act to defend the
city against an Ottoman assault, he believed that the republic itself would not actively
support Byzantium during its time of extreme crisis.
While Notaras, Andronikos Kantakouzenos, and Sphrantzes were among
Constantines most trusted advisors, his most knowledgeable and useful associate when
interacting with the Venetians was their baille in 1452 and 1453, Girolamo Minotto.241
He was also the successful target of Constantine XIs personal diplomacy. While the
previous baille acted mainly as a communications medium between the Venetian
238
Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos no. 68 180.

Laonikos Chalkokondyles. Demonstrations of Histories: Books I III. Trans. Nicolaos Nicoloudis
(Athens: St. D. Basilpoulos, 1996) 93.
240
Cristoforo Riccherio in The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts. Trans. J.R.
Melville-Jones (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) 118.
241
A Venetian baille supervised and administered the Venetian populations in cities outside of the republic,
in most cases independently of local rulers. The baille of Constantinople oversaw one of the most
considerable Venetian populations outside of Venice in the fifteenth century.
239
81
government in Italy and the emperor, Minotto took an active role in Constantines inner
circle.242 Initially interested in balancing Venetian relations between Constantinople and
the Ottoman sultanate, the destruction of a Venetian merchant galley by the fortress
Rumeli Hisar completely altered his orientation.243 The baille realized what this action
implied for Venetian trading throughout the Aegean, and he wanted to do anything he
could to keep its control independent of the Ottomans. Such an act placed the Ottomans
in a state of war with Venice, but the republic wanted to pursue a diplomatic solution to
the situation.244 However, Minotto realized the futility of negotiation with the Turks.
Their recent peace and trade agreement had not prevented the Venetian galleys
destruction in the Bosporus, and the baille had little reason to expect any new agreements
to fair any better than the current arrangement. Therefore, with few prospects of
assistance from the Venetian government, Minotto helped the emperor mobilize the local
Venetian population in Constantinople for his war efforts. He convinced a number of
merchant galleys and transports to remain in the city pending a siege, and acted as the
emperors liaison in defense matters.245 Girolamo Minotto became so important to and
trusted by Constantine XI that he was given command of the Greek and Italian troops
defending the Blachernae Palace, the emperors imperial residence near the walls along
242
Barbaro 21: Girolamo Minotto frequently held councils with Emperor Constantine, especially as the
Ottoman threat to the city intensified.
243
Doukas 200-201: Rumeli Hisar, Mehmed IIs new European fortress, destroyed Venetian captain
Antonio Rizzos galley for refusing to submit to Ottoman inspection. Minottos frustration at the vessels
destruction was compounded by the Turks treatment of its survivors. Doukas explains: The fortress
garrison discharged an enormous stone which shattered the ship. As the vessel began to sink, the captain
and thirty survivors boarded a boat and made it ashore. The Turks seized them, bound their hands and
necks in chains, and, placing them in single file, brought them before Mehmed who was then sojourning in
Didymoteichos. He gave orders to behead them all except the captain whose life was taken by a stake
through the anus. Moreover, they were to be left uninterred.
244
Nicol, Byzantium and Venice 395-398.
245
Barbaro 14-16.
82
the Golden Horn.246 As a result of his close relationship with Emperor Constantine and
his animosity toward the Ottoman Turks, the Venetian baille Girolamo Minotto was one
of Byzantiums foremost advisors on diplomacy toward Venice and her citizens.
However, Emperor Constantines diplomatic relations with Venice were
complicated by his aggressive actions toward the republic while despot of the Morea.
Specifically, Constantines capture of Patras, a port city in the Moreote northwest,
irritated Venice and characterized the future emperor as a maverick. In the fifteenth
century, the city of Patras was administered by its Latin archbishop, Pandolfo Malatesta,
under the suzerainty of the Papacy.247 The Venetians briefly held possession of the city
between 1408 and 1419, but sold the city to the Latin ruler of Epiros, Carlo II Tocco, who
later placed the city under Romes protection. However, the Venetians still coveted Patras
as a commercial center and conducted a brisk trade within the city. They also still viewed
the city as a target for Venetian territorial expansion in the Morea, as Patras was located
across the Corinthian Gulf from their base of Naupaktos. However, after John VIII
established his brother Constantine in the northwest Morea as despot, the port city was a
prime target for him as well. The despot did not waste time attacking the city.
Constantine moved against Patras in 1428, shortly after his arrival in the Morea.
However, even with the aid of his brothers John and Thomas, the despot could not
capture the city. He accepted instead an annual tribute of 500 gold coins from the citys
defenders.248 While the Venetians in Naupaktos were not pleased with this arrangement
246
Melissenos 109.
Sphrantzes 43; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 9.
248
Sphrantzes 33: As nothing useful could be accomplished against Patras, with the exception of the
capture of three young defenders, a peace treaty was struck with those in the castle; it specified that Patras
would pay an annual tribute of 500 gold coins to Lord Constantine.
247
83
between Patras and Despot Constantine, it still allowed them to maintain their
commercial ties to the city as before.
Constantines subsequent actions surprised Venetian observers. Almost
immediately, he laid siege to the city once again, this time with a larger, more committed
army. The despot actively engaged the defenders, barely escaping death during a skirmish
when archers killed his horse from under him.249 After a brief but intense struggle, the
defenders and the despot reached an agreement, since the bishop was traveling through
Italy during Constantines sieges of Patras. If he did not return after a month, the
defenders would surrender to Constantine and proclaim him their overlord.250 When the
metropolitan did not return in the allotted time, Patras surrendered to Despot Constantine,
although the citys citadel, defended by men loyal to the bishop (including some
Venetians), did not surrender for another twelve months.251 Constantines occupation of
Patras annoyed the Venetians and frustrated their plans for domination over the city.252 In
addition, the Byzantine capture of Patras threatened the status of Venetian mercantile
interests in the city, as the despot could force new taxes to finance his further Moreote
campaigns.253 Despot Constantines actions against Patras would become important after
his accession to the throne in 1449, as the military campaign established him as a
maverick in Venetian eyes. Even twenty years later, the Republic of Venice viewed
Constantine as a threat to their possessions in Greece and throughout the Levant, and was
reluctant to provide him with aid.
249
Sphrantzes 36.
Sphrantzes 40: If their lord and metropolitan returned during the month of May, he would act as he saw
fit. If he failed to arrive, however, they would surrender the castle.
251
Sphrantzes 45.
252
253
Peter Lock. The Franks in the Aegean 1204 1500 (New York: Longman, 1995) 108.
250
84
The Venetian government also hesitated to support Constantine XI in

Constantinople because Byzantium possessed a sizeable debt to Venice. In 1449, shortly
after Constantines accession, this debt amounted to 17,163 hyperpera, a staggering
amount to the impoverished empire.254 Constantine himself accrued little of this debt.
Much of it resulted from a loan taken by Anna of Savoy, mother of Emperor John V,
during her civil wars with John VI Kantakouzenos in the late fourteenth century. Anna
received 30,000 Venetian gold ducats for her campaigns, and offered the Byzantine
crown jewels as collateral for future payment.255 Each successive emperor, including
Constantine, felt indignation and embarrassment because the Byzantine crown jewels no
longer resided in Constantinople. However, the emperors had more pressing concerns and
uses for their monetary resources than recovering the crown jewels. Compounding this
debt, in 1390 John VII agreed to pay a considerable amount of gold for damages to
Venetian property in Constantinople during anti-Latin riots and collateral damages from
the earlier civil wars.256 Constantines debt was further increased because of his elder
brother Theodores actions. In 1424, while acting as despot of the Morea, Theodore
attacked the Venetian ports of Modon and Coron, wreaking havoc with their possessions
in the hinterland of those cities.257 Shortly thereafter, in the face of Venetian pressure,
John VIII agreed to compensate Venice for their losses in the region. As a result of these
actions throughout the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Constantine XI and his
court faced a staggering debt that the Venetians wanted to collect.
254

Barker 443; for more information concerning the Byzantine crown jewels in Venetian hands, see John
W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship (New
Brunswick: Rutgers, 1969) Appendix I: The Pawning of the Byzantine Crown Jewels to Venice, 443 445.
256
257
Setton 16.
255
85
One of Constantines first acts as emperor was to stabilize his economic situation.
With increased resources, he could continue to rebuild and repair the city walls, improve
the citys infrastructure, and begin to slowly pay Byzantiums debts to the Venetians in
order to gain their favor and assistance. Emperor Constantines administration did begin
minting new hyperpera for such purposes, but the empire possessed a very limited
amount of specie.258 In order to gain new sources of specie for his coinage, Constantine
levied a new tax upon the foreign merchant interests in the city, extracting customs duties
from their ships as they sailed to and from Constantinople in 1450.259 Almost
immediately, the Venetians in the city railed against these new duties, claiming that they
violated the Byzantine-Venetian treaty of 1448 signed by John VIIIs administration.
This treaty guaranteed Venetian mercantile independence around the city.260 Constantine
also received envoys from the Venetian government in Italy, complaining about the
inconveniences suffered by Venice as a result of his sweeping tax measures.261 While the
emperor desperately needed the revenues from these customs duties to finance
Constantinoples defense against the Ottoman Empire, he carefully considered the
merchants opinions within the city. If Venice itself would not send support to
Byzantium, the goodwill of Venetian merchants and captains residing in Constantinople
would be crucial to its defense. Therefore, while he never withdrew the customs edict, its
enforcement dropped significantly, especially as Turkish pressure on the city increased in
258
Philip Grierson. Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the
Whittemore Collection. Volume Five: Michael VIII to Constantine XI 1258 1453. Part Two: Catalogue,
Concordances, and Indexes. Eds. Alfred R. Bellinger and Philip Grierson (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks,
1999) 529-531; S. Bendall and P.J. Donald. The Later Palaeologan Coinage 1282 1453 (Bristol: A.H.
Baldwin & Sons, 1979) 176-7: Archaeological evidence has discovered various denominations of
hyperpera carrying Constantine XIs name and image, proving that he did mint coinage during his brief
reign.
259
260
Leonard of Chios 26-27.
261
86
1452. As a result, Constantine could claim to the Venetian government that he was
attempting to raise the monetary resources necessary to pay Byzantiums considerable
debt to the city, without alienating the sizeable Venetian population within
Constantinople.
Figure 2: A Silver Quarter-Hyperperon Minted by Constantine XI 262
In order to counter such negative perceptions, Constantine sought to ingratiate

himself to Venetian interests by relying almost exclusively upon Venetian transportation
throughout the Aegean. His decision to use Venetian shipping was not unique. Emperors
throughout the fifteenth century relied upon Venice when traveling both around the
Aegean and the Mediterranean. In 1400, Manuel II used their galleys during his grand
visit to the rulers of Western Europe.263 Constantines brother John VIII also used
Venetian transportation when traveling between Constantinople and Italy for the Council
of Florence.264 This was partly a practical decision, since Venice held a powerful naval
position in the region, with several strategic bases scattered on islands around the
Mediterranean. The Venetians were also the only power that consistently defeated the
Ottomans at sea. For example, a Venetian squadron smashed the Ottoman fleet off of
Gallipoli in May 1416, causing significant damage to Turkish sailors morale.265 In fact,
262
Bendall and Donald 177.

Doukas 87: The Venetians extended him their hospitality, as was meet, and after giving him many
gifts, he returned to Methone on their triremes.
264
Doukas 179, 181; Chalkokondyles 147.
265
Doukas 119: When the Venetians saw the Turkish triremes moving out like the links of a chain strung
out, they bore down upon them, and sounding the attack, joined battle. Ramming first the trireme of
263
87
these sailors became convinced of Venetian invulnerability at sea and were extremely
wary of attacking them in the region. However, the Venetians were not the only group
capable of transporting the Byzantines around the region. After 1261, the sea routes
around Constantinople were essential to Genoese, Catalan, and other European trade
interests centering on the port of Caffa on the Black Sea coast.266 Each of these powers
maintained considerable trading fleets in the region, capable of shuttling the Greeks on
their diplomatic and administrative missions. However, the Byzantine rulers tried to win
the favor of local Venetian captains, giving them the nearly exclusive honor of
transporting them on important missions of state. They also tried to impress the Venetian
government by rarely traveling with their economic or political competitors such as the
Genoese or other Italians.
Constantine XI continued the traditions of his father and brother in this regard.
During his tenure as despot, he often traveled between Constantinople and the Morea to
receive instructions and guidance from his brother John VIII. In almost every
documented case, Constantine traveled by way of Venetian galleys plying the trade
routes between Crete, another Venetian possession, and ports along the Black Sea.267 He
also used their ships to travel around the Morea, even negotiating with representatives of
Patras aboard a Venetian merchant vessel in 1437.268 Upon his accession, Constantines
Admiral ali Beg, they hacked him to pieces and slaughtered mercilessly everyone on board. Then they
boarded one trireme after the other, overpowering all the ships.
266
Anna Avramea. Land and Sea Communications, Fourth-Fifteenth Centuries. The Economic History of
Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 87.
267
George Sphrantzes documents several instances when Despot Constantine relied upon Venetian
shipping. For example, Sphrantzes 47: (In 1435) While my lord the despot was at Stylaria, expecting the
official Venetian vessels for his passage to the City, I arrived, without accomplishing anything. So I took
the boat with him.
268
Sphrantzes 49: My master and I went from Patras to Euripos by a land route. At Karystos, a castle in
Euripos, we took a Venetian ship and met on board Markos, the canon of Patras, who had been there when
we attacked it.
88
court almost exclusively used Venetian shipping while on missions of state. George
Sphrantzes, the most prolific traveler in Constantines court, traveled on their ships
during missions to the Morea, the Ottomans and to Trebizond.269 As a result of this
exclusive usage, the Byzantine imperial family and court became familiar with several
Venetian merchants and ships captains in the region. Many of these merchants and
captains were among those that remained in Constantinople to help defend the city
against the Ottoman Turks, showing that Constantines policy regarding Venetian
transportation did succeed in drawing help for the empire.
By maintaining friendly relationships with several of the Venetian captains who
sailed around the Aegean and Black Seas, Emperor Constantine gained valuable
intelligence concerning Ottoman military movements around Constantinople. The
emperor regularly met with these friendly captains and received information about the
Turks that the merchants would hear throughout their travels. For example, Venetian
shipping alerted the emperor of Mehmeds plans to build the fortress of Rumeli Hisar six
miles away from the capital city. The captains also provided Constantine with detailed
information concerning the armament and fortifications that the new castle possessed. 270
The emperor also wanted these captains to relay the information they gained through
their travels to the Venetian government in order to convince it that the Byzantine capital
was in extreme danger. Constantine XI Palaiologos rightly believed that the government
269
Sphrantzes 55: On the mission to the Morea: At the end of December 1445, I sailed to the Morea with
the Venetian boats which had brought the embassy to the City. Sphrantzes 54: On the mission to the
Ottomans in Thebes: I boarded the vessel of Antonios Hyalinas from Crete and landed at Karystos of
Euripos. Sphrantzes 62: On the mission to Trebizond in 1451: I arrived safely in the City on board the
ship of Antonio Rizzo, the good man who later suffered martyrdom for his faith in Christ.
270
Barbaro 9: In March, 1452, Mehmed Bey the Turk set about building a fine castle six miles from
Constantinople towards the mouth of the Black Sea. It had fourteen towers, of which the five principal ones
were covered with lead and very strongly built.
89
in Italy would believe its own sailors and captains concerning the Turkish threat, rather
than any Greek envoy that the emperor might send to ask the Venetians for assistance.
Since Emperor Constantine could not convince the Venetian government that
their interests in Constantinople were threatened by an Ottoman invasion and that he was
not a danger to their interests, Venice sent only a token amount of aid to Byzantium
during the crisis. While the emperors plan to use Venetian merchant captains to convince
the government of Constantinoples precarious position did work, the main fleet intended
to save the city did not arrive in time. The emperor himself could not sufficiently
convince the Venetians that the city was really in any danger. The citys fortifications had
held off numerous Turkish assaults in the recent past, most notably in 1422, and the
Venetian Senate believed that an attack by the young Mehmed II would also fail at the
triple walls. Venetian naval victories against the Ottomans, most recently in 1416, also
convinced Francesco Foscari and the senate that any Turkish navy posed little threat to
Christians in the East.271 The Venetian government did answer a request by the emperor
and the baille for provisions of body armor and gunpowder, which was sent ostensibly to
defend Venetian interests in Constantinople from Turkish raids before the main siege
began. However, this was the only aid the government sent to the ailing city before its
fall.272
The Venetian government did belatedly take some action to aid Byzantium. In
late 1452, after impassioned pleas by Admiral Alvise Loredan, leader of the naval action
off Gallipoli in 1416, and another merchant galley captain, Antonio Diedo, did the
271
Barbaro 78: Our Senators would not believe that the Turks could bring a fleet against Constantinople.
Sphrantzes 71: George Sphrantzes laments the lack of Italian help throughout this section of the
Chronicon Minus.
272
90
Venetian Senate act to save Constantinople.273 The Venetian Senate begrudgingly voted
to send an armada to the Aegean Sea to reinforce Constantinople when they heard news
of Sultan Mehmed IIs preparations.274 However, this fleet was equipped so slowly that
the Byzantines almost surely knew it would never come in time. Constantine continued to
watch for any signs of a relieving Venetian fleet in the Aegean Sea throughout the siege,
but it never arrived.275 As a result of the Venetian governments lack of support for
Constantinople, the emperor focused his attention upon the citys Venetian residents as
sources of support against the Ottoman invasion.
While Constantine was only partially successful at convincing the Venetian
government to aid Constantinople, he was very successful with the baille, Girolamo
Minotto, and the rest of the Venetian residents of the city through his strategy of personal
diplomacy. Since the government gave Minotto the power to act as he saw fit to protect
the republics interests in Constantinople, whether by assisting the emperor or offering
his friendship to the sultan, he wholeheartedly threw his support behind Constantine.
Even though the emperor tried to impose new taxes upon the Venetian merchants, he
eventually relented and had otherwise shown his friendship to them. In addition, many
members of his court patronized Venetian interests and catered to their various needs in
the city. Minotto knew that Constantine needed the Venetians and other Italian republics
to carry out his trade and other mercantile affairs, and would therefore be amenable to
their interests. On the other hand, Sultan Mehmed II did not need them. While contacts to
lucrative trade markets in Italy did excite Turkish merchants, they were not crucial to the
273
Sphrantzes 72.
Barbaro 78: They decided, however, to arm fifteen galleys and two ships of eight hundred botte each
on the nineteenth of February, 1452, but did not begin to send them until they knew that the Turks had
begun the siege.
275
Barbaro 23-27.
274
91
Ottoman Empires survival.276 As a result, the baille took several measures to ensure the
Venetian residents of Constantinoples support against the Turks.
Baille Girolamo Minotto, in cooperation with Emperor Constantine XI, prevented
all Venetian ships from leaving Constantinople during the crisis. Since the city was an
important waystation for ships traveling from Caffa and Trebizond, where they could rest
and re-supply their vessels before sailing into the Aegean Sea, several merchant ships
arrived throughout late 1452 and early 1453. These vessels were subsequently detained
by the baille for military service.277 While such acts might have angered these merchants,
who were now trapped in Constantinople as the city awaited Mehmeds siege, there are
no accounts of any such feelings in the Greek or Italian sources on the crisis. This can be
attributed to both the bailles and the emperors personal charisma, as they were able to
inspire the citys wary defenders on numerous occasions. However, the emperor still
feared that the Venetians might abandon the city to its fate. The ships captains, as well as
several other merchants who were defending the city, requested that their cargoes remain
stored aboard Venetian vessels, instead of being stored in the citys warehouses. This
would significantly hasten any plan to abandon the emperor and Constantinople, since the
Venetians would not have to waste time loading their ships before fleeing.278 However, in
order to reassure the emperor, the baille forced each captain to swear an oath to
276
Klaus-Peter Matschke. The Late Byzantine Urban Economy, Thirteenth Fifteenth Centuries. The
Economic History of Byzantium. Ed. Angeliki E. Laiou (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2002) 481.
277
Doukas 211: When the Venetian merchant triremes sailed from the Sea of Azov and the Don river and
from Trebizond, on their way back to Venice, the emperor and the Venetians who were residing in the City
would not allow them to continue on their way. They stayed ostensibly to help defend the City.
278
Barbaro 21: When the Emperor had understood the words of the captains and of the Baille, that at all
costs they wanted to have the merchandise on board the galleys, then he and all his barons gathered in a
group and took counsel together, and when they had spoken much with each other, the Emperor, with an air
of great sorrow, replied courteously to the Baille and to the two captains, Indeed I understand quite well,
honorable Baille, and you, honorable Captains, that as soon as you have the merchandise on the galleys,
you will sail as soon as it is dark, and go with God, and leave me alone against the army of Mehmed Bey
the Turk, my treacherous enemy, which we await every day, since intends to attack my empire by land and
by sea with all the force available to him.
92
Constantine that he would not leave until the siege had ended.279 Nearly all of the
Venetian captains honored their agreement with Minotto and Constantine XI, further
showing the bailles and the emperors skills of persuasion and inspiration. In all, at least
nine Venetian vessels, with their crews, participated in the defense of Constantinople.280
Aside from the ships crews, the other Venetian residents of Constantinople also
actively defended the city for Emperor Constantine. Since they could no longer leave the
city, as the baille had cancelled all departures from Constantinople, they also vigorously
participated in the defense. The emperor made constant visits to the Venetian quarter of
Constantinople, encouraging the residents and offering his thanks, making it known that
their support was crucial for the city. Men from all professions joined work parties
repairing the citys fortifications, constructed shields and weapons in the Venetian
quarters workshops, and took watches upon the city walls with the Greeks. For example,
the surgeon Nicol Barbaro details in his diary of the siege that the Venetian residents
wholeheartedly supported the citys defense, as he himself worked diligently to restore
and augment the citys fortifications.281 In fact, the Venetian residents of Constantinople
were so proud of their involvement that when Constantine asked several contingents to
parade along the city walls in their full regalia and armor, they gladly agreed.282 While
the Venetian government sent only a small amount of aid to Constantinople during the
279
Barbaro 21-22.
Melissenos 102: Our naval forces consisted of three ships from Genoa, one from Spanish Castille, one
owned by a Frenchman from Provence, and three from Crete (one from Khandax and two from Kydonia);
they were all well equipped for battle. Three Venetian merchantmen with their escorts, certain fast triremes,
were also in the harbor and assisted in its defense. Since Crete was a Venetian possession during this
period, their ships are counted among the Venetian total. In addition, each merchantman was assumed to
have one escorting vessel, reaching the total of at least nine Venetian ships in Constantinople during the
siege.
281
Barbaro 23.
282
Barbaro 29.
280
93
crisis and siege, the emperor successfully mobilized the local Venetian population to
assist with the citys defense.
However, once the number of Venetians in the city swelled because several
galleys and merchantmen remained for its defense, Constantine XI faced the potential
problem of Italian rivalries erupting into violence. More specifically, the emperor needed
to ease tensions between the Venetians and the population of Galata, the Genoese colony
across the Golden Horn from Constantinople. The Genoese also participated in the
defense of Constantinople. However, their contributions had to remain a secret in order to
maintain the peace between the Ottomans and the Genoese government in Italy, and to
safeguard their colony at Galata.283 Nonetheless, many Genoese crossed the Golden Horn
to assist the emperor with the defense, sharing feelings of Christian camaraderie with the
Greeks that superseded any treaty obligations. While initially the Venetians and Genoese
maintained an uneasy peace in Constantinople, the arrival of Giovanni Giustiniani with
seven hundred Genoese volunteers and mercenaries increased tensions between the two
groups considerably. The emperor handled the situation very carefully. He recognized
that Giustiniani, with his considerable experiences in siege warfare around Italy, would
be the best commander for Constantinoples triple walls.284 However, Constantine placed
several Venetian contingents at key defense points along the walls to avoid showing
favoritism toward the Genoese.285 By equally dividing the Venetians and Genoeses
283
Angelo Giovanni Lomellino in The Siege of Constantinople 1453: Seven Contemporary Accounts.
Trans. J.R. Melville-Jones (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972) 133: Lomellino was the podest (governor) of
Galata during the Ottoman siege of Constantinople.
284
Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 84; Doukas 211.
285
See above; Girolamo Minotto and a Venetian formation were given command of the Blachernae Palace,
Constantines residence in Constantinople.
94
responsibilities during the Ottoman attack, Constantine avoided alienating either group in
such a way that could compromise the citys defense.
The emperors efforts in maintaining the peace between the two Italian factions
were often tested once the Ottoman siege began in earnest in April 1453. There were
several instances of the Venetians quarrelling with the Genoese over defense strategies,
and these disputes often escalated into violence.286 One major incident occurred after the
Christian forces attempted to destroy the Turkish vessels that had been dragged overland
into the Golden Horn, behind the Greek and Italian defensive lines. After a short battle,
the Ottomans completely defeated the Christian attack on their position, and sunk a
Venetian war vessel, killing its crew. Following this failure, open fighting broke out
between the Venetians and Genoese. The Venetians claimed that a Genoese spy informed
the sultan and led to the loss of their vessel and crew.287 Once again, only the emperors
personal charisma and leadership ability ended the violence, as he reminded the Italians
that they could never survive if they remained divided.288 Constantine further tried to
treat both sides equally to avoid resentment from either the Genoese or the Venetians and
to forestall any further conflicts between them. For example, the emperor praises both
sides equally in his final address to the troops on the eve of the fall.289 By continually
communicating with both the Venetian and Genoese forces in Constantinople, reminding
286

Melissenos 112: When our vessels came close to the triremes, God put a stop to our plans, as a
punishment for our sins; it is also possible that through carelessness, one of those young men had revealed
the secret operation to the enemy.
288
Melissenos 113: When the emperor realized what was happening, he hastened to the rioters and in
grief, addressed both the Venetians and the Genoese: I beg you, my brothers, keep the peace among you;
we have enough fighting originating from the outside. Do not quarrel with each other, for the mercy of
God. He spoke at length and restored peace between them.
289
Melissenos 123: Next he turned and addressed the Venetians, who were standing at his right side:
Noble Venetians, my dearest brothers in Christ, courageous men, experienced and seasoned fighters!
Turning to his left, he addressed the Genoese: Most honored brothers from Genoa, courageous and
illustrious warriors! You are aware and know that this City was not only mine but yours too for many
reasons.
287
95
them of their commitments to fight the Ottomans and quickly solving conflicts between
them, Constantine successfully avoided alienating the Italians during the siege. The
emperor effectively mobilized the Venetian residents in Constantinople for the Ottoman
attack, retaining their services and loyalties while still making the most of the other
Italian communities. The most notable of them were the Genoese who arrived in the
capital to offer their services to the empire.
Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos efforts to court the Venetians in
Constantinople paid off as they fought the Ottomans with distinction, especially during
the final assault on May 29, 1453. The Venetian citizen-soldiers fought in nearly every
skirmish and major engagement during the month long siege of the city.290 Some
Venetians, like the baille, Girolamo Minotto, fought until they were surrounded and
captured by the Ottomans once they stormed the walls. Nearly all of the captured
Venetians were executed by Sultan Mehmed II shortly after the citys capture.291 Others,
like Nicol Barbaro, barely made it to the Christian vessels fleeing the Golden Horn once
the battle had clearly been lost. It is a testament to Constantines diplomatic skills, as well
as the personal relationships he and his court established among the Venetian community
in Constantinople, that the Venetian residents fought as long and as hard as they did,
instead of saving their own lives. While they did not possess the numbers to successfully
defend Constantinople from the Ottomans, their devotion to the city was commendable.
Constantine XIs diplomatic relations with the Venetians were a complete success
on one level, but failed in other aspects. The emperor and his court cultivated a close
290
Doukas 217: From the Imperial Gate to Kynegon, the Venetians fought with the Romans against the
Turks.
291
Barbaro 64-67; Melissenos 133: The executions of many eminent noblemen followed, including the
Venetian baille and his son.
96
relationship with local Venetian interests, especially with the merchants and ship captains
that traveled around the Aegean and Black Seas. In addition, Constantine developed a
friendly rapport with the Venetian baille of Constantinople, Girolamo Minotto. As a
result, the local Venetian population was ready to assist the emperor with the citys
defense against the Ottomans, and many of them gave their lives in the struggle. This was
a major diplomatic success for the emperor. Instead of packing their belongings and
leaving the city for safer Venetian bases in the Aegean, the residents of Constantinople
chose to remain and fight. On the other hand, Constantine XI Palaiologos diplomatic
overtures to the Venetian government in Italy were largely unsuccessful. Since his
administration did not trust the Venetian doge, they did not believe it was useful to
aggressively court the republic because it would almost surely refuse to aid Byzantium.
Therefore, the emperor did little to counter the Venetian Senates opinion that he was a
maverick and as much a danger to Venetian possessions in the Levant as the Ottoman
Turks. Eventually Venetians familiar with the emperor pleaded with the senate on
Byzantiums behalf, but a relief force was not equipped in time to save the Byzantine
capital. As a result, Constantine XIs relations with Venice and the Venetian population
of Constantinople show that his diplomatic strategies focused primarily upon courting
individuals, such as Girolamo Minotto and several ships captains in the Levant, in order
to gain support from larger groups of people during his quest for aid to defend his empire.
97
CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
Each of these previous examples shows the importance of Emperor Constantine
XI Palaiologos personal relationships in both Byzantine diplomatic relations and foreign
policy creation during the empires final years. Instead of relying upon an extensive
bureaucracy, as Byzantine emperors of previous centuries had, Constantine relied upon
his charisma and commanding presence. He tried to create personal connections with
influential foreigners, mainly Italians, to accomplish his diplomatic goals and create
foreign policy. He was not always successful, as his relations with the Ottomans portray.
He could not prevent the fall of Constantinople to the Turks on May 29, 1453, since
Sultan Mehmed II was determined to take the city soon after his accession. The
emperors diplomatic efforts and foreign policy toward the Ottomans were largely
ineffective, because Constantine did not develop close relations with any Ottoman elites
during his life. However, the emperor secured resources from Rome and the Venetians
that considerably delayed the citys capitulation because of his relations with Italian
elites, carefully cultivated throughout Constantines travels around the Aegean.
Constantine XI and his court could not gain reliable diplomatic information
regarding the Ottoman Turks, nor create a consistent foreign policy toward the empire
because they did not develop a deep relationship with any members of the Ottoman elite,
particularly Grand Vizier Candarli Halil Pasha. While the Greeks aggressively attempted
to court him to their cause, especially to exert his influence over Ottoman policies toward
Byzantium, Halil Pasha remained loyal to the sultan, following his wishes and assisting
98
in the conquest of Constantinople. As a result, the Byzantine administration could not

formulate an effective foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Greeks
alternated between acts of hostility and supplication to the Turks. In fact, the only
consistent Byzantine action against the Ottoman threat during Constantine XIs reign was
the refortification of Constantinople. These inconsistencies antagonized the Turks and
exacerbated the tensions between the two groups, and did not alter Sultan Mehmed IIs
ultimate plan to conquer the Byzantine capital. The Ottoman case portrays the
shortcomings of Constantine XIs and his courts use of personal diplomacy to save the
empire during its final years.
The Byzantine use of this tactic for diplomatic overtures and foreign policy
creation did succeed with other powers. Constantine XI Palaiologos relations with Rome
improved considerably through his relationship with the papal legate to Constantinople,
Cardinal Isidore. The emperor and his councilors possessed the political skill necessary to
realize that celebrating an imperial coronation in the capital upon his accession, with
unionist clergy, would exacerbate the religious tensions within the city. However,
Constantine and his advisors needed the expertise of someone familiar with papal
expectations of the Greeks in the implementation of church union, in order to gain
military aid for Constantinople. Since the Greek cardinals, especially Isidore, understood
the difficulties facing the imperial administration in the city, particularly the rising antiunionist sentiments, they advised the emperor on the best way to implement union, and
gain the Papacys military support, while avoiding conflict within Constantinople. Even
though the pope did not send enough soldiers to prevent the citys fall, the resources his
ships provided prevented its early capitulation to the Turks. As a result, Emperor
99
Constantine XI used personal diplomacy, shown through his relationship with Cardinal
Isidore, to secure crucial support for the empire during its final crisis.
The Venetian case also highlights the success of personal diplomacy for the
Byzantines. However, Constantines diplomatic overtures and foreign policy were
received differently by two distinct groups of Venetians. The Venetian citizens of
Constantinople responded favorably to Byzantine diplomatic efforts designed to gain
their support for the citys defense, because their baille, Girolamo Minotto, advised
Constantine of how to properly approach them while at the imperial court. For example,
many of the major construction projects in Constantinople during Constantine XIs reign,
besides the continual restoration of the defenses, catered to Venetian interests in the city.
However, the Venetian government in Italy responded to these overtures less
enthusiastically, because they were specifically designed to court the Venetians in
Constantinople. Even so, Constantines relations with Venetian merchants and ship
captains aided his requests for aid from the republic. They were instrumental in finally
convincing the senate that defending the Byzantine Empire was in their best interest, and
at least partially mobilizing the republics resources to assist the Greeks. Venice sent the
Byzantines provisions to Constantinople, and began outfitting a fleet to come to its
defense shortly before the city fell to the Turks. As a result of the imperial
administrations efforts, the Venetian citizens in Constantinople, as well as several
Venetian merchant vessels, actively participated in its defense instead of fleeing to safer
locations. The Byzantines use of personal diplomacy toward the Venetians can also be
viewed as a success despite the fall of Constantinople because the administration created
coherent, effective policies that encouraged them to provide aid for the city.
100
Even though the Byzantine Empire did not possess its former prestige or power
during the fifteenth century, Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos effectively used the
resources available to him in his attempt to save Constantinople. Personal diplomacy was
ineffective against the Ottomans, since the Turkish elites did not reside in the imperial
capital and Turkish residents were mainly transients. As a result, the imperial
administration could not present an effective foreign policy toward them, and they
continued their plans for the conquest of Constantinople. While he was ultimately
unsuccessful in his task of dissuading the Ottomans from attacking, the number of
Italians present during the siege is a testament to the emperors efforts in the face of such
hardships. The death of many of these same Italians, during and following the final battle,
also shows his impact upon them, as he inspired them by example. He refused to flee
Constantinople for the relative safety of the Byzantine Morea, engaging the Turks in
hand-to-hand fighting until he was killed. Even during the darkest period of Byzantine
diplomacy, when the empire faced its final challenge, Emperor Constantine XI
Palaiologos used his particular talents to gain western aid.
Even though the Byzantine Empire fell in the morning hours of Tuesday, May 29,
1453 and the emperor was killed, Constantine XIs diplomatic and foreign relations are
important for study. First, these processes are useful for comparative reasons. While the
diplomatic endeavors during the height of Byzantine power have been thoroughly
studied, those of the empires final years have not received such attention. With a detailed
study of foreign policy creation under Constantine XI, changes over time can be
examined. In addition, a discussion of Byzantine relations toward other powers during the
empires last years proves that the Greeks did not merely react to the actions of those
101
around them, particularly the Ottomans. Previous works detailing the end of Byzantium
portray the Greeks as powerless to influence the events unfolding around them. This is
not the case. Despite their relative weakness, the Byzantines creatively used the resources
at their disposal, particularly through personal diplomacy, to actively seek salvation for
the empire. For these reasons, the study of Constantine XIs diplomatic and foreign
relations is important for Byzantine historical scholarship.
It is also necessary to recognize Emperor Constantine XIs personal growth and
fortitude during this dire period. While a competent administrator and capable warrior
since he was a young man, Constantine gained a deeper understanding of the threat that
the Ottomans posed to the empires survival throughout his life. As the years passed and
his experience grew, he clearly recognized and appreciated that Byzantium was facing its
greatest crisis. Salvation appeared to be out of the empires grasp. However, this did not
deter the emperor from actively seeking aid, which he eventually received from several
sources. Lesser Byzantine emperors fled from their problems. Constantine faced his until
the bitter end: Surrounded by Turks while fighting at the ruined city walls, he died
defending his empire. While his victories were few, Constantine XI Palaiologos efforts
continued the fine tradition of Byzantine diplomacy and foreign relations despite
considerable hardships. His resolve and skill in the face of such adversity make him, and
his administration, some of the most outstanding figures in Byzantine history.
102
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106

Foreign Relations and The End of Byzantium

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Foreign Relations and the End of Byzantium: The Use of Personal Diplomacy

during the Reign of Constantine XI Palaiologos (1448 1453)

For Mom and Dad

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: On the Sources

Chapter Three: Constantine and the Ottomans

Chapter Four: Constantine and the Papacy

Chapter Five: Constantine and the Venetians

Chapter Six: Conclusion

Figure 1: Constantinople during Constantine XIs Reign (1448 1453)

Figure 2: A Silver Quarter-Hyperperon Minted by Constantine XI

history honors colloquiums, helping me both to understand the intricacies of historical

Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 7.

Figure 1: Constantinople during Constantine XIs Reign (1448 1453)51

XIs ambassador to other states. This is particularly valuable to a study of Byzantine

Constantine and the Ottomans

Oikonomides, Byzantine Diplomacy, A.D. 1204-1453: Means and Ends 78.

conditions plagued Emperor Constantines administration and severely hindered his

Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 47.

Nestor-Iskander 59; Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 60.

Byzantium and Serbia, Kantakouzenos fundamentally mistrusted the Serbian state,

Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos no. 80 197-198.

because of Halils location in Adrianople, Murads capital.98 Byzantine and Ottoman

Tursun Beg 32.

an act of deference was extremely uncharacteristic of Constantine, especially because of

political prisoner in Constantinople.103 Through this superficial act, Constantine received

Even after Mehmeds intentions of military action against Constantine became

Constantine and the Papacy

Leonard of Chios 12.

The most significant influence over Byzantine-Papal relations during Constantine

common Constantinopolitan citizenry fervently defended Orthodoxy against the Latin

Constantine XI Palaiologos actions toward the Papacy were heavily influenced

Constantines close friend and councilor George Sphrantzes was equally as

Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 53.

Leonard of Chios 12.

church union on spiritual grounds. Instead, he recognized that most of the

Nicol, The Immortal Emperor 37.

Leonard of Chios 20.

Leonard of Chios 20.

Constantine and the Venetians

Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos faced a highly distracted and disinterested Venetian

he personally represented Emperor John VIII.238 While possessing more knowledge of

Nicol, Byzantine Family of Kantakouzenos no. 68 180.

The Venetian government also hesitated to support Constantine XI in

Nicol, Byzantium and Venice 391.

Figure 2: A Silver Quarter-Hyperperon Minted by Constantine XI 262

In order to counter such negative perceptions, Constantine sought to ingratiate

Bendall and Donald 177.

Leonard of Chios 23.

in the conquest of Constantinople. As a result, the Byzantine administration could not

Kordoses, Michael. The Question of Constantine Palaiologos Coronation. The Making

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