ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

SIERRA MADRE TRUST vs. SECRETARY OF

AGRICULTURE
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES,
DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING
COMPANY, AND J & S PARTNERSHIP.

the decision of the Director of Mines. Aggrieved, Sierra

filed a petition before the Honorable Supreme Court.

ISSUE
FACTS
In July 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the
Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against the lode lease
application (LLA) of Jusan Trust Mining Company (LLA
no. V-7872) over the latters six (6) lode mineral claims
namely: (1) FINLAND 2; (2) FINLAND 3; (3) FINLAND 5;
(4) FINLAND 6; (5) FINLAND 8; and (6) FINALND 9. In
this adverse claim, Sierra Madre Trust alleged that said
six lode claims encroached and overlapped its eleven
(11) lode mineral claims, namely: (1) A-12; (2) H-12; (3)
JC-11; (4) W-11; (5) JN-11; (6) WM-11; (7) F-10; (8) A9; (9) N-9; (10) W-8 and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio
Taduan, Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya. Said adverse claim sought
for an order declaring that the six allegedly encroaching
lode mineral claims of Jusan Trust Mining Company are
null, void, and illegal.
In July 1966, Sierra Madre filed with the Bureau of
Mines another Adverse Claim, this time against J&S
Partnerships LLA no. V-9028 covering six (6) lode
mineral claims namely: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4)
A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30. This time, Sierra Madre
Trusts adverse claim alleged that said six lode mineral
claims encroached and overlapped the 13 lode mineral
claims of Sierra, namely: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13,
(4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9)
F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all
situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of
Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered
with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Sierra prayed for the same relief as it
sought for from the previous adverse claim it filed
against Jusan Trust Mining Company.

Whether or not there was encroachment of Sierra

Madre Trusts lode mineral claims.
HELD
None. On the outset, the Honorable Court did not see
any reason why it had to answer the questions
interposed in the petition, considering that there is no
justiciable issue among the parties, since there had not
been any intervening right established in favor of Sierra
Madre Trust.
Nonetheless, the Director of Mines, acting on the
adverse claims filed by the petitioner Sierra Madre,
found based on sheer force of evidence that there is
no conflict or overlapping among the mining claims. The
Court held that the interpretation by officers of laws
which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to
great respect.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Sierra Madre Trusts adverse claims were heard jointly

before the Bureau of Mines, which dismissed such
claims. According to the Bureau, through the Director of
Mines, Sierra did not establish any intervening right
during such time when the former located the area
covered under the claims. With this, Sierra interposed
an appeal before the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; however, the latter merely affirmed

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORTION vs. THE NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his
capacity as General manager of the National
Hoursing Authority, The HON. Jacobo C. Clave, in his
capacity as Presidential Execuctive Assistant and
Virgilio A. Yuson
FACTS
In August 1970, one Jose Hernando acquired
prospective and beneficial ownership over a certain Lot
no. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in
Antipolo, Rizal by virtue of a contract to sell he had
entered into with Antipolo Realty Corporation (herein
petitioner.) However, in August 1974, Mr. Hernando
transferred his rights over the subject lot to Virgilio
Yuson (herein private respondent), as embodied in a
Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor
(Delegacion) executed with the consent of the Antipolo
Realty. By virtue of such assignment, Yuson was to
assume the performance of Hernandos obligations
under the original contract, which included the payment
of the latters arrears. However, Yuson paid only the
arrearages corresponding to the period of only until
August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment
payments falling due after such date because of Antipolo
Realtys failure to develop the subdivision project within
such time. Under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, in the
event of Antipolo Realtys failure to complete all the
mentioned improvements within a period of two (2)
years shall permit the buyer to suspend his monthly
installments without any penalties or interest charges
until such time that such improvements have been
completed.
In October 1976, Antipolo Realty advised Yuson
through a letter that the improvements in the
subdivision had already been built and requested the
latter to resume payment. In reply, Yuson stated that he
shall only resume payment as soon as he was able to
verify the truth of Antipolo Realtys notice. The same
advice and request had been reiterated in Antipolo
Realtys second letter to private respondent Yuson.
Together with the second letter, Antipolo also made a
formal demand for full and immediate payment of the
amount of Php 16,994.73, which represents installments
accruing during the period while the improvements
were being completed, from Yuson. Notwithstanding the
demand, Yuson refused to pay the monthly installments

from September 1972-October 1976 but agreed to pay

those due after October 1976. In response to this
refusal, Antipolo Realty rescinded the Contract to Sell,
and forfeited all the installment payments paid
previously by Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission, Yuson filed a complaint
against Antipolo Realty before the National Housing
Authority (NHA). On the other hand, Antipolo Realty
moved for the dismissal of the complaint. NHA denied
the motion to dismiss and scheduled Yusons case for
hearing. Thereafter, NHA rendered a decision in favor of
Yuson, i.e., the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell.
Subsequently, Antipolo Realty filed a motion for
reconsideration before the NHA, which was likewise
denied by NHAs General Manager, G. V. Tobias, who
happens to be one of the public respondents in this
present case. Thereafter, Antipolo Realty came to the
Supreme Court for relief; however, the same petition
was denied although without prejudice to petitioners
pursuing the administrative remedy. So, Antipolo
Realty went interposed an appeal to the Office of the
President (OP), assailing the NHA decision. Likewise, the
OP through public respondent Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave dismissed the complaint.
Antipolo Realty interposed once again a petition before
the Honorable Supreme Court to assail the
aforementioned NHA decision/order. Petitioner
Antipolo Realty assers that the NHA had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide private respondent Yusons
complaint and that such jurisdiction is lodged only in
the regular courts since the complaint involved the
interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the National Hoursing
Authority has the power to order for the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell, which was
the subject matter of the dispute; and
(2) Whether or not the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the petitioner and
private respondent is in order.
HELD
(1) Yes. The National Housing Authority has the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivisions, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon it by Sec. 1 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) no. 1344 and Presidential Decree
no. 957.
The Honorable Court held that the extent of the quasijudicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined by the provisions of the Act or law
creating and conferring authority to such agency.
Examining whether or not the NHA has the authority to
hear Yusons complaint, the Court cites Section 1 of P.D.
no. 1344:
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by sub- division lot or
condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
C.

Cases involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphases mine.)

(2) As to whether or not the reinstatement by the

NHA of the Contract to Sell is proper, the Court
in this case ruled that the decision of the NHA in
ordering for the same is based on a substantive
provision under P.D. 957 the law which vests
exclusive authority on National Hoursing
authority to regulate the real estate trade and
business. Thus, in its Section 23:

unit he contracted to buy shall be

forfeited in favor of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due
notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to
the failure of the owner or
developer
to
develop
the
subdivision or condominium project
according to the approved plans and
within the time limit for complying
with the same. Such buyer may, at his
option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization and
interests but excluding delinquency
interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate. (Emphasis mine.)
Since petitioner Antipolo Realty failed to
comply with its contractual obligation to
complete the specified improvements under the
Contract to Sell within the agreed period (two
years from the date of the execution of such
contract), the petitioner is not entitled for the
rescission of the contract and the forfeiture of
payments made by Yuson by virtue thereof.
Hence, the Court upheld the correctness of the
assailed decision/order of the NHA.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the NHAs
order for the reinstatement of the contract to
sell is nothing but a logical consequence of the
NHAs correct ruling that the petitioner was not
entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for
the lengthening of the original contract period
for payment of installments under the Contract
to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months,
during which extended time private respondent
shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original
contract price shall have been paid. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

No installment payment made by a

buyer
in
a
subdivision
or
condominium project for the lot or

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN and
ORLANDO GENOVE vs. FRANCISCO NINO, JOSEFINA
NINO, EMMANUEL NINO, and EURLIE OCAMPO
FACTS
In 1966, one Narcisa Placino was awarded by the
Bureau of Lands (now known as the Land Management
Bureau) a parcel of land designated as Lot no. 10 located
in Saint Anthony Road, Brgy. Dominican-Mirador,
Baguio City. Francisco Nino, who is one of the private
respondents in this case, is an occupant or actual
possessor of said lot. By virtue of said award, Nino filed
before the Bureau of Lands a Petition Protest in 1975.
However, such protest was denied by the Director of
Lands in 1976. In turn, Nino appealed the petition
protest all the way until it reached the Supreme Court
level, albeit to no avail. The Director of Lands order,
having become final and executory likewise in 1976,
Placino petitioned before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Cordillera
Administrative Region (DENR-CAR) for the execution of
said order.
Meanwhile, attempts to execute the aforementioned
Order failed. This prompted Placino to file an ejectment
case before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Baguio City. However, MTCC dismissed Placinos
complaint. Thereafter, Placino (through counsel, Atty.
Claravall) petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a
Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio,
the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the
City Government to demolish the improvements built
thereon by private respondent Nino. DENR-CAR,
however, denied this petition for lack of jurisdiction
over the City Sheriff, the City Police Station, and the
Demolition Team and invoking the provision of Section
14 (now Section 10) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Claravall moved for the amendment of the Order of
Execution. Acting upon Claravalls motion, the DENRCAR Executive Director amended the Order of Execution
addressed to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), which (1) enjoins the CENRO
to enforce the amended order with the assistance upon
request of the Baguio City Sheriff, Baguio Police Station,
as well as the City Demolition Team; and to remove
whatever improvements that may have been built to
the land (or the lot).

In 1997, the aforementioned responsible parties started

demolishing the houses of Francisco Nino and his corespondents.
Although
such
demolition
was
subsequently temporarily stopped, Francisco Nino and
his wife, Josefina, filed with the Regional Trial Court a
petition for Temporary Restraining Order against the
DENR-CENRO (Guillermo Fianza and Teofilo Olimpo),
Baguio City Police Officer (Donato Bacquian), Head of
the Demolition Team (Engineer Orlando Genove), and
Baguio City Mayor Mauricio Domogan.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition filed by
the Ninos for lack of merit. Aggrieved, private
respondent Ninos appealed before the Court of Appeals,
which granted the formers petition setting aside the
Orders issued by the DENR-CAR. The Appellate Court
ruled that the enforcement of the Amended Order shall
require a hearing and court order pursuant to the Rules
of Court. Contending that a hearing and court order are
not necessary in order to demolish Ninos
improvements on the subject land, the petitioners
herein assigns the same error to the Appellate Court in
the petition interposed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the DENR-CAR has the authority to issue
an order of demolition.
HELD
None. The Director of Bureau of Lands of the DENR-CAR
may not issue the demolition or removal of the
improvements introduced by Francisco Nino (and other
co-respondents) for the formers power is only limited
to the disposition and alienation of public lands.
In this case, the Court held that the ultimate power to
resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within
the situs or legal competence of the civil courts for the
purpose of extending protection to actual possessors
and occupants of lands with a view to quell social
unrest. Likewise, the power to order the sheriff to
remove the improvements made on and the turn-over of
the possession of the land belongs only to the courts of
justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Meanwhile, the Court in this case recognizes the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to the determination
of respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or
to cases which involve disposition of public lands.
However, the Court ruled that the power of the Bureau
of Lands is CLEARLY LIMITED to disposition and
alienation of public lands. While it may decide
disputes involving possession, it may do so ONLY
IN SO FAR AS MAKING THE PROPER AWARD of
public lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented
b SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC) vs. DELIA T.
SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-SOLIMAN and HARRY T.
SUTTON
FACTS
Private respondents Suttons inherited and owned a land
situated in Aroroy, Masbate. Such land had been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding as early as
the 1940s since the Sutton family acquired such
landholding in 1948. With the enactment of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in June
10, 1988, private respondents made a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS) of their landholdings in order to avail certain
incentives provided for by the CARL. However, in
December 1990, the Court ruled in its en banc decision
in Luz Farms case that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. With that, the Supreme Court in such
case declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of
the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms within
the coverage of the CARL. Consequently, in December
1992, the Suttons filed before the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) a formal request to withdraw
their previous VOS as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL. Upon survey of the landholding,
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Masbate recommended that the private respondents
landholdings be exempted from the coverage of the
CARL. In 1993, private respondents Sutton reiterated
their formal request to withdraw their VOS to petitioner
DAR and asked for the return of the supporting papers
that the former submitted to the latter in connection to
such VOS. However, DAR did not respond to such
request.
In December 1993, the DAR issued Administrative
Order no. 9, series of 1993, which provided for the
inclusion of livestock farms within the coverage of the
CARL and maximum retention limits for their
ownership. By virtue of this administrative order, only
portions of private respondents lands, which are used
for raising livestock, poultry, and swine as of June 15,
1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
Contending that their land, having been devoted
exclusively for cattle-raising, must be exempted from

the coverage of CARL, the Suttons wrote the DAR

Secretary, advising the latter to consider as final and
irrevocable their withdrawal of their VOS.
In September 1995, the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao
issued an Order PARTIALLY granting the Suttons
application for exemption from the coverage of CARL By
applying the provisions of A.O. no. 9, s. 1993, Garilao
exempted 1,209 hectares of the Suttons landholdings
for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5636
hectares for infrastructure. Then, Garilao ordered THE
REST OF THE SUTTONS LANDHOLDINGS TO BE
PLACED UNDER COMPULSORY ACQUISITION.
Private respondents Sutton moved for the
reconsideration of Garilaos order; however, the same
has been denied. Aggrieved, private respondents
elevated the case to the Office of the President, which in
turn affirmed that of Sec. Garilaos decision. Thereafter,
the Suttons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which ruled in favor of them. According to the appellate
court, the assailed Administrative Order is void for
being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitution,
i.e., to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of the
agrarian reform. Acting upon the Court of Appeals
order, respondent DAR interposed a petition before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Administrative Order no. 9 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform is valid.
HELD
No. The impugned DAR A.O. no. 9 is null and void for it
enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the
scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
In this case, the Honorable Court ruled that as a
FUNDAMENTAL RULE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued
by authority of law and must not contravene the
provisions of the Constitution. The assailed A.O.
sought to include livestock farms by including them
within the coverage of the agrarian reform program of
the government, and even prescribing retention limits
for ownership thereto.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Luz Farms,

livestock, swine, and poultry-raising are INDUSTRIAL
ACTIVITIES and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. This is so because
a great portion of investment in the aforesaid
enterprises is in the form of INDUSTRIAL PRINCIPAL
FIXED ASSETS such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses,
sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Since the Suttons landholdings are devoted exclusively
to cattle-farming, clearly, the petitioner DAR has NO
POWER TO REGULATE their landholdings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:

While administrative rules and regulations have

the force and effect of law, they are not immune
from judicial review. They may be properly
challenged before the courts to ensure that
they do not violate the constitution and no
grave abuse of administrative discretion is
committed by the administrative body
concerned.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS
FACTS
Jesus Cabarrus filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for the
alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code (Falsification of Public Document) and Code of
Professional Responsibility.

On the other hand, Atty. J.A. Bernas avers that the letter
transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute a complaint
because the functions of the NBI do not include quasijudicial powers/functions, as well as prosecutorial
functions; hence, it cannot grant any relief or remedy.
Atty. Bernas maintains that the NBI performs functions
that are merely investigatory and informational in
nature.

Cabarrus alleges that Atty. Bernas is the lawyer of one

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., who subscribed under oath,
before Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia Bernas, a verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. Such verification
and certification was allegedly to Pascuals complaint
for Reconveyance of Property and Damages in a certain
civil case. Said Civil Case was filed in April 16, 1996.

ISSUE

By virtue of the aforesaid verification and certification

of non-forum shopping Pascual deposed and stated
under oath that he is the plaintiff in this case, and
certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing
pleading, the content of which are true to his personal
knowledge and that he has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in any
court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should
learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or any
other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic)
that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this
notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. (Emphasis mine.)

HELD

Cabarrus avers that contrary to verification and

certification of non-forum shopping, Atty. J.A. Bernas
(acting for his client, Pascual) caused the preparation
and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a
public document three days prior to the filing of the
aforesaid Civil Case. Complainant Cabarrus also alleged
that as early as 1995, Atty. J.A. Bernas filed a written
complaint at the NBI involving the same cause of action,
which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the
NBI standard specimen signatures. Hence, Atty. Bernas
must be disbarred for having instigated abetted and
facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the
said verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which is contrary to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Whether or not Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas transmittal of

the letter containing standard specimen signatures to
the NBI constitutes a violation of the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping.

No. Atty. Bernas could not have transgressed the

verification and certification on non-forum shopping
when he sent the letter-complaint to the NBI, for the
latter is not a within the purview of a tribunal agency.
The Court ruled that the powers and functions of the
National Bureau of Investigation are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It is an
investigative body whose findings are MERELY
RECOMMENDATORY. It does not fall within the purview
of courts, tribunal, and agencies that are referred to
under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, and which are vested
with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers. These
courts, tribunals, and agencies do not only hear and
determine controversies between adverse parties, but
make binding orders or judgments.
As held further by the Honorable Court, citing as
reference R.A. 157, which authorizes the creation of a
Bureau of Investigation under the Department of
Justice:
The NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain
an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief,
declaratory or otherwise.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

WHEREFORE, premises considered,
complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

the

instant

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS AND NOTES | BY: TINA SIUAGAN