ART OF WAR

BELLUM GALLICUM
The manifold aspects of the Gallic War
t took less than ten years and
an army that never exceeded
75,000 combatants for Caesar to transform a prosperous geographic aggregate consisting of
several million inhabitants into a
Roman province. To accomplish
such a colossal task, the Roman
proconsul developed a very broad
range of operative methods. He
was enabled thereby to complete
his victory over the Gauls, whose
own sturdy military tradition, moreover, was at that time solidly established.

FRDRIC BEY
Georges FINGeorges suiteThe independent Gaul of the first century B.C. based
its prosperity on a subsistence economy
and a thriving commerce. The land was
rich and well-exploited, despite widespread
forests. The practice of keeping livestock,
which they had inherited from their nomadic ancestors, was one of the chief sources of wealth for the Gauls. The productive regions sold their grain via a network
of well-established riverine ports. Merchants
sold jewelry, wine, horses, slaves, and mer-

cenary contingents. Artisans excelled in

the metallic arts and knew how to extract
minerals and how to make charcoal. They
also produced fine pottery, which they
exported to the Roman world. For Caesar,
in dire financial straits at the time when he
was named proconsul, the conquest of
Gaul seemed much more a way to pay off
his debts than to establish his military
renown. How then do we evaluate the risks
of his enterprise?

The disparate forces

of the Gauls
What sorts of adversaries would Caesar
find in Gaul? The Romans were well acquainted with the Celts. They feared them, because
they had confronted them for three centuries in northern Italy and later in southern
Gaul. Celtic society relied on a tripartite
organization typical of Indo-European peoples, which Georges Dumzil has described brilliantly. A priestly class, that of the
druids, presided over the religious domain
and influenced the laws. It shared the government with a knightly class (Caesar called
them equites) which managed military operations. Its members made up the Senate,
consisting of powerful families and nobles.
Finally, a productive class farmers, cattlemen, artisans and merchants provided

48

Above. The surrender of Vercingetorix (19th century French color lithograph). Caesars victory at
Alesia sealed the fate of the last independent part
of Gaul. Despite the alliance of the majority of
Gallic tribes against him, the Roman proconsul
succeeded in imposing the law of force.
Bridgeman.

for the needs of the society as a whole.

Thus it was the nobility who formed the
relatively small nucleus of Gallic armies.
These nobles fought on horseback alongside their closest dependents, the ambacti,
who constituted a separate caste of semiprofessional soldiers.
There were no standing armies in Gaul.
Whenever it went to war each tribe would
assemble its contingents, and when they
formed part of a coalition these would fight
autonomously under their own leaders.
When Caesar captured the Helvetian camp
by assault in 58 B.C., he discovered census documents listing the names of all men
capable of bearing arms. This evidence
reveals the foundation of the Gallic military tradition: each leader must be able to
state how many men he could provide in
case of mobilization. The levies were made
up of infantry contingents. These consisted of non-professional but well-trained soldiers enrolled just for the duration of a campaign. They were armed only with shield,

ART OF WAR
spear and sword. The cavalry had better
equipment. They often wore a coat of mail
or leather armor and a helmet. Their weapons were lances or swords. The Gallic civilization used metals, and so the Celts were
at no disadvantage against the Romans
with respect to weaponry. On the contrary,
the Romans often copied their helmets or
their swords. At the beginning of their war
against Caesar, Gallic weapons were fabricated in large numbers by a method partaking of almost proto-industrial swiftness.
When the assembly of leaders decided to
call them to arms, the levy was immediate
and general. For the warriors this consisted
of the obligation to join their troop along with
their servants and slaves. When an army
consisted of several tribes, especially when
major tribes were involved, inevitably a debate
would begin over which tribe would be in
command. These rivalries were reminiscent
of those of the cities of classical Greece. As
an example, in 57 B.C. during the revolt of
the Belgian tribes of Gaul, the Bellovaci, the
most powerful militarily, were in competition
with the Suessiones, the richest and most
influential of all the Belgae. In the end it was
the latter tribe which obtained command of
the army. When they went into combat, Gallic warriors placed themselves under the protection and direction of their gods. The figure
of Taranis, the Celtic Mars, dominated the
pantheon of the Celts. In war the Gauls were
known for their furor, to use the term employed
by the Romans. For Strabo, the most recognized trait of the entire Gallic race is that of
being irritable and mad for war . The Gallic
furor had nothing to do with barbarism; rather,
it corresponded to an ideology of being
beside oneself with a strong religious connotation. The Gallic warrior renounced his individuality and placed his personal destiny in
parentheses, linking it to that of his leader till
victory or death. Here we see an ideology
close to that of the devotio of the Romans.
Death in combat was always glorious, a sacrifice always preferable to the dishonor of capture or, even worse, enslavement.
In the evolution of the art of war among
the Gauls, the appearance of the civilization of the oppida (fortified towns or strongholds) at the end of the second century
B.C. marks an important change. Under
pressure from the Romans, who had conquered southern Gaul, and the Cimbri and the
Teutones, who had ravaged their territories, the Gauls constructed numerous strongholds equipped with the famous murus
gallicus, thereby establishing refuges that
were often impregnable. Thenceforth, wars
were envisaged as events within the context
of a longer period of time as the Gauls turned toward more defensive strategies for
which fortifications became essential.

Diplomacy and
collaboration
Central to Caesars military campaigns
was the primary role held by diplomacy.
Had they lacked allies within independent

Gaul, the Romans could not have achieved so rapid and complete a conquest of
such a vast geographic area. The tribe of
the Arverni, who had long held a dominant
position, had lost their hegemony at the
time of Caesars consulate. The conquest
of southern Gaul by the Roman legions
during the previous century had in fact
deprived them of powerful client tribes that
were now subject to the governor of Gallia Transalpina. Presently, it was rivalries
and a precarious equilibrium among the
most important tribes that best defined the
political situation of Gaul. The Arverni and
their clients (the Cadurci, Gabali, and Vellavii), their rivals the Aedui and their clients
(the Segusiavi for example), and the Sequani
and the Bituriges were among the richest
and most powerful tribes in independent
Gaul. In the northeast, the Belgic tribes
kept themselves apart from these power
struggles, remaining self-reliant in their stilluntainted military vigor.
For intruding into this maze of influences, Caesar and the Romans possessed a
formidable trump card: for a dozen years,
a veritable alliance had existed between
Rome and the Aedui. The latter were a
genuine client of the Roman Republic. They
monitored and controlled the Arverni, who

49

were traditional enemies of Rome, in

exchange for the power to maintain a kind
of primacy among the Gallic tribes. But this
power was only apparent, since the political structures of Gaul were, taken as a
whole, in rapid decline. Each tribe, jealous
of its independence, was controlled by an
oligarchy made up of nobles who made
decisions purely on the basis of local, frequently quite selfish interests. Caesar would
exploit these divisions so as to fight his
adversaries one at a time, most often using
the logistical and military support of some
tribes against others. Other than in 58 B.C.
against the Helvetii, and the final phase of
the great rebellion of 52 B.C. (after the
Aedui joined the alliance), Caesar always
had Gallic contingents, mostly cavalry, in
the ranks of his army. Starting in 57 B.C.,
he recruited cavalry from the Treveri, reputed to be the best in all of Gaul. At certain
points in the war, peoples as powerful as
the Bellovaci, the Suessiones or the Ambiani
were capable of temporary alliances with
Caesar. Even during the siege of Alesia he
could still count on the indestructible support of the Remi or the Lingones, who furnished him with provisions. Indeed, such
symbolic figures of the campaign of 52 B.C.
as Comnius and even Vercingetorix himself had aided Caesar in the past, at the

ART OF WAR
Finally, in 52 B.C. he raised twenty cohorts
of conscripts in Cisalpine and Transalpine
Gaul to oppose the great rebellion inspired by Vercingetorix; these later became
the V and VI Legions. After the Aedui defected, he reinforced his cavalry with German
mercenaries at the start of the summer of
52 B.C. In that decisive year the proconsul
thus had at his disposal about 70,000 men
in an army made up of twelve legions, plus
some contingents of light infantry and above
all the fearsome German cavalry that he
had recently recruited. In addition, the number of servants and slaves following the
army was at least as large as that of the
combatants.

Gallic warrior resting

on his sword (19th
century German color
lithograph). The Gallic
infantry was
numerous and
relatively well
equipped.
It fought in tribal
contingents which,
however, lacked
cohesion when they
had to face the
Roman military
machine and its professional organization
Bridgeman.

head of auxiliary cavalry contingents from

their tribes. Caesar had utilized Aeduan
auxiliaries in one way or another starting
in the very first campaign year. Contingents
from other tribes later accompanied him
in his operations against the Germans and
during the expeditions to Britain. Speaking
generally, we may conclude that struggles
for influence, the allegiance of some tribes
to Rome, and diplomatic intrigues dulled
the warlike spirit of Gaul and contributed
in a decisive way to its conquest by Caesar.

The Gallic War: a

simple military walk
in the park ?
Unlike Gallic armies, after Marius reforms
the Roman army had become a genuine
standing army, with professional soldiers
signed up, as a rule, for twenty years service. In 59 B.C. Julius Caesar had at his disposal only four legions attached to his proconsular province: the VII, VIII, IX and X

Legions. Three of these legions were based

at Aquileia and the fourth was probably
stationed in Roman Gaul, near Narbo. The
X Legion, consisting of more battle-hardened veterans, was considered the elite unit
of Caesars army, and he would place special confidence in it from the very first operations of the campaign. In 58 B.C. the proconsul recruited two new units at his own
expense in Cisalpine Gaul, the XI and XII
Legions. With about 5,000 men per legion,
his initial army thus contained about 30,000
men, to whom must be added several units
of auxiliaries: Cretan archers, Balearic slingers, Numidian light infantry, and Roman
or Gallic cavalry (from allied tribes). In 57
B.C., two more legions were recruited in
Cisalpine Gaul: the XIII and XIV Legions.
Partly to make up for his losses and partly
to increase his forces, Caesar made further
recruitments in 53 B.C. Furthermore, he
raised another new legion, the XV, and borrowed the I Legion from Pompey, bringing
his armys total effectives to ten legions.

50

With this army, Caesar had at his disposal a magificent instrument. At Rome, far
from the combat zones, there was never
or almost neverany anxiety over the outcome of the war. In fact, it was only in 58
B.C. that the Senate and Roman citizens
showed some slight apprehension over the
outcome of events. The Helvetian migration and the incursion into Gaul by Ariovistus and the Suevi, both occuring that
year, reminded them of the bad old days
when the Cimbri and the Teutones reached
the very gates of Italy exactly forty years
earlier. After the two difficult but decisive
victories gained by Caesar over the course
of his first campaign in Gaul, Roman public
opinion tended to consider the war being
waged by Caesar as a fascinating expedition, but one with little military risk. In 54
B.C., when the orator Cicero wrote to his
brother serving in Caesars army, he expressed anxiety over natural conditions but
never over the fighting involved: What
pleasure your letter from Britain has given
me! I was anxious about the Ocean; I was
anxious about the coast of the island. It
isnt that I consider the rest negligeable,
but there I find more reasons for hope than
for fear. In 52 B.C., the great revolt of
Vercingetorix caused genuine stupefaction
in Rome: by then nobody thought that any
kind of setback for Caesars legions was
possible. So, then, was this war a mere matter of a military walk in the park for Rome?
As a matter of fact, when the number of
major battles and sieges conducted by the
Roman army is tallied, it becomes evident
that they were relatively few in number:
hardly thirty at most.
In 58 B.C a battle took place on the left
bank of the Sane, followed by combats
with the rear guard on the right bank, the
great battle against the Helvetii and the
decisive victory against Ariovistus and his
Germans: in all, only two major battles. The
year 57 B.C. was busier, with five major
military episodes: the sieges of Noviodunum and Atuatuca, the battles on the Aisne
and the Sambre against the Belgae, and
finally the fighting outside Bibrax. The year
56 B.C. had the same degree of intensity,
but with fewer major battles: the fighting
at Octodurus (Martigny), the naval battle
against the Veneti, the campaign of Publius

ART OF WAR
Crassus in Aquitania, that of Labienus against
the Treveri, and finally Sabinus campaign
in the Cotentin peninsula. With the year
55 B.C. we come to a very calm period,
with just three minor episodes: the surprise
attack on the German camp, the crossing
of the Rhine (without provoking any battles on the right bank) and the clash with
the Britons on the occasion of the first landing upon their island. In 54 B.C. there was
renewed warfare, with five notable events:
two combats in Britain, the attack of the
Eburones and their allies upon the camp
of Sabinus and Cotta, then the attack upon
Ciceros camp, and finally that of the Treveri upon Labienus camp. All these attacks
were concentrated in the winter season so
that the Romans mobility would be limited. In 53 B.C., the only notable event was
the German attack on the camp of Atuatuca, protected by Cicero. The remaining
operations consisted solely of punitive expeditions waged by the Romans. The first six
years of the war thus saw only twenty significant engagements among Gauls, Britons,
Germans and Romans. In comparison, the
year 52 B.C., that of the great revolt led by
Vercingetorix, was especially intense, with
nine major battles or sieges in a single year:
the capture of Vellaudunum, that of Cenabum, that of Noviodunum of the Bituriges,
the siege and destruction of Avaricum, Caesars battle at Gergovia, the battle won by
Labienus at Lutetia, and the cavalry battle
preliminary to the siege of Alesia and the
fighting around that town. The Romans finished the conflict in 51 B.C., conducting
only four operations: an expedition against
the Bellovaci, a campaign against the Treveri, the victory over Dumnacus, and finally
the siege of Uxellodunum.
This list of major military operations of
the Gallic War allows us to conclude that
it was a war of only moderate intensity,
without any major battles between 57 and
52 B.C. (except for the naval battle against
the Veneti). With the Helvetii and the Belgae vanquished, the legions met with no
genuinely dangerous opposition before 52
B.C. The Belgic tribes were by far the most
warlike, as Caesar himself indicates. They
regulary practiced the art of war, and they
opposed trade and the fruits of civilization.
To sum up, the Gallic War was characterized more by pacification operations and
by fighting on a small scale than by major
battles, which were relatively rare. As for
the hazards encountered by the Roman
soldiers, these were minor, as is proved by
the very low number of reverses they experienced in eight years of conflict.

The rare Roman

missteps

57-56 B.C., when a legion was detached

for an independent mission and found itself
in great danger: Servius Sulpicius Galba,
sent into Switzerland (Helvetia), was driven out by the inhabitants of Octodurus
(Martigny) and the tribes of that region (the
Veragri and the Seduni). Galba had to retreat
and go into winter quarters among the Allobroges, inside the boundary of the Roman
Province. The XII Legion thus lost control
of an important line of communication
through the Alps. At the end of that same
year, after his triumph over the Veneti Caesar moved against the Menapii in the north
of Gaul. This time he was confronted with
an unexpected problem: the Gauls refused to fight, and fell back into their swamps
and forests. The proconsul decided to cut
down their forests, but he had to abandon
that effort due to lack of time, upon the
onset of winter.

Roman military superiority was so marked that it led quite naturally to a certain
degree of overconfidence. On several occasions Caesar underestimated his adversaries ability to react, and it was at these
times that he suffered his rare reverses. The
first of these occurred during the winter of

The most serious Roman setback occurred at the end of 54 B.C. After his second
expedition to Britain, Caesar installed his
legions in seven winter camps, distributed
across the whole of Belgic Gaul, which he
wanted to divide up into sections so as to

51

Above. Gallic cavalryman (19th century Italian

engraving). Caesar used Gallic cavalry as auxiliaries in his army even when opposing other Gauls,
during the greater part of the Gallic War. In 52
B.C., the general revolt of the Gallic tribes deprived him of these precious mounted troops, and
he had to call upon Germanic mercenaries.
Bridgeman.

keep it under tighter control. The Eburones launched a rebellion, probably at the
end of October, and marched against the
most isolated Roman camp, which was
situated in their territory. Their king, Ambiorix, was able to induce the legates Sabinus
and Cotta to leave their camp, where they
had fifteen cohorts, by promising to let
them march to either of the nearest Roman
camps, those of Labienus and Quintus
Cicero, which were located farther south.
This, however, was a trap. The Eburones
attacked and surrounded the legionaries
while they were on the march, and all fifteen cohorts were massacred.
Q. Cicero, whose camp was in the territory of the Nervii, would be luckier. This
time the legate refused to quit his camp,
and the assailants, lacking siege equipment,

ART OF WAR
soon had to give up their plan, for they learned that Caesar was approaching with two
legions to reinforce him. The following year,
after he had begun a new punitive campaign against the Nervii and Ambiorix, Caesar again had to divide
his army so as to trap his
elusive adversaries. He
left his baggage at
Atuatuca, with a
single legion
commanded
by Q. Cicero
to guard it.
The brother
of
the
author of
the De Re
Publica
o n c e
m o r e
found himself assailed
by
numerous
rebellious
Gauls and
Germans,
especially the
Sugambri.This
time, Cicero erred
through imprudence
and barely escaped,
losing five cohorts of recruits,
or close to 2,000 legionaries.
Meanwhile, Caesar for his part engaged in
systematic destruction according to the
principles of guerrilla warfare, but he did
not succeed in capturing Ambiorix. In all,
between 58 and 53 B.C. Caesar lost the
equivalent of two legions, always in the
same circumstances: numerically superior
rebels attacked isolated camps. In each
case, the Gauls gained a temporary advantage by using their mobility to get the jump
on the proconsul. And in each case, the
Romans returned in force to crush the region
that was in revolt.
Another significant Roman check occurred at Gergovia in 52 B.C. During the rather
complex course of this battle of investment
against the oppidum of the Arverni, Caesar launched an assault to try to take control
of the high ground near the town. Part of
his infantry, overconfident of its strength
and carried away by the lure of booty, incautiously assaulted the town. This unexpected attack, hampered by lack of coordination and planning, as well as by the defending Gauls energetic resistence, resulted
in the Roman legionaries suffering a bloody
reverse. Only the solid defensive position
established by the X Legion halted the rout
which ensued. Once again Caesars veterans had bailed him out. Nevertheless, the
Romans lost 700 men and, worst of all, 46
centurions, who always fought at the head
of their troops. This loss was only equivalent to two cohorts, or less than two percent of Caesars effectives, but in this case
the psychological effect was more impor-

tant. The Gauls saw it as their first great victory in an actual battle, rather than an
ambush.

A legion on
campaign: the
VIII Legion in
Gaul
To have an idea of
the real intensity
of the Gallic War,
it is interesting
to follow in
the footsteps
of one of
the Roman
legions
over the
whole
duration
of
the
conf lict.
For this, it
seems preferable not
to choose
the armys
elite X Legion,
which played a
specific role both
on the ground and
in Julius Caesars writings. Let us consider,
then, the case of the VIII
Legion, which was one of the four
legions employed in Gaul by the proconsul
from the very start of operations.
Caesar took command of the VIII Legion
at Aquileia in Cisalpine Gaul in mid-March
of 58 B.C. Two other legions joined it around
that city before leaving for independent
Gaul. These were the VII and IX Legions.
The X Legion was already at Geneva. In 58
B.C., the VIII Legion participated actively
in Caesars first victories, over the Helvetii
and over Ariovistus Germans. It went into
winter quarters with the other legions of
the army among the Sequani. Labienus
assumed command of the troops during
the winter of 58-57 B.C. while Caesar returned to the province of Cisalpine Gaul.
The year 57 B.C. was without a doubt
one of the most difficult for the VIII Legion,
which fought in the two pitched battles of
the campaign against the Belgae. The first
took place beside the Aisne River and ended
in a fairly easy victory. The second battle
saw the Romans opposed by the Nervii,
Viromandui and Atrebates near a stream
Caesar calls the Sabis (probably the Sambre River). The VIII Legion was deployed
in the center of the army and was paired
with a legion of new recruits (the XI Legion).
Opposed by Viromandui warriors, the legionaries of the VIII Legion pushed the Gauls
back to the bank of the stream after fierce
fighting, and finished by massacring them.
Somewhat later that same year, the VIII
Legion was part of the force which successfully besieged Atuatuca, the oppidum

52

Bust of Julius Caesar. General, politician, diplomat, organizer and leader of men of the highest
caliber, Caesar appears as the most emblematic
Roman of his epoch. His intelligence and his abilities as an organizer allowed him to deal with the
many complexities involved in so vast a project as
the conquest of the long-haired Gauls .
Bridgeman.

of the Atuatuci. The Bellum Gallicum gives

no precise indications for determining whether the VIII Legion spent the following
winter with the group of units stationed
among the Belgae or with the group sent
to the banks of the Loire River. For the years
56-53 B.C., Caesars writings do not mention the VIII Legion by name, indicating
thereby the reduced intensity of the fighting. The VIII doubtless participated in the
Armorican campaign and then the various
pacification operations which were the
type of activities Roman legionaries normally engaged in.
With the year 52 B.C., the VIII Legion
returned to major campaigning. In midJanuary, the dead of winter, it left Transalpine Gaul and crossed the snow-covered
Cvennes to ravage the territory of the
Arverni. The VIII Legion then returned to
Vienna (modern Vienne, France) to join
the rest of the army in the territory of the
Senones. Caesar then led forth his army
and captured Vellaunodunum, Cenabum,
Noviodunum and Avaricum. From the oppidum of the Bituriges, which was the last of
these strongholds to fall into Roman hands,
the VIII Legion went on to Gergovia along
with the other legions. During one episode
of the assault, the centurions of the VIII
took ill-judged risks with their legion, and
before Caesar sounded the retreat the centurion Lucius Fabius, who ardently wanted
to be the first to set foot on the ramparts
of the oppidum, led forward his century
and got three of his legionaries to hoist him
up onto the wall. While he was doing this,
another centurion, Marcus Petronius, and
his men were engaged in attacking the
towns gates. But the VIII Legion was soon
cut off from the rest of the army, which had
complied with Caesars order to fall back.
Partly isolated, the two centurions met a
heroic death. It required the intervention
of the X and XIII Legions to disengage the
VIII, which had suffered most of the Roman
losses in the battle of Gergovia (see above).
Bolstered by new recruits, the VIII Legion
later participated in the siege of Alesia
without distinguishing itself above the ordinary. In 51 B.C., the VIII Legion carried out
pacification operations against the Atrebates. After eight years of campaigning in
Gaul, the VIII Legion acquired the name
of Legio VIII Gallica and the reputation of
great merit, along with Caesars other three
veteran legions. The reverse at Gergovia
was soon forgotten, and the confidence
accorded to the VIII Legion during the
course of the Civil War that followed the
Gallic War was clearly that of a unit linked
to its leader by indissoluble bonds.

ART OF WAR

The war and the

civilians
Numerous aspects made the Gallic War
a conflict during whose course the civilian
population was heavily impacted by events.
Organized pillaging occupied the first rank
among actions by soldiers that had a direct
impact on non-combatants. Even before
the advent of the Roman legions, the Helvetii ravaged and pillaged the territory of
the Aedui. They did so with a clear
conscience, because the Aedui were rightly
accounted allies of Rome. Whether done
by Gauls or Romans, this pillaging resulted
in both destruction and thievery; the soldiers hauled off everything valuable that
they could carry.
As the Gallic War progressed, pillaging
grew ever more systematic, sometimes
becoming an overall strategy. When Caesar wanted to get rid of Ambiorix, the indomitable leader of the Eburones, he decided to turn that tribes territory into a desert and destroy everything in itpeople,
houses, and livestockand thereby pay his
adversary back for all the trouble he had
caused him. Even when leaders did not
directly order it, pillaging could sometimes
be the work of soldiers looking for provisions: legionaries were free to plunder
enemy territory as much as they liked. In
the end, destruction with the same effect
as pillaging took a new turn when Vercingetorix decided in 52 B.C. to fight the
Romans by employing a scorched-earth
policy.
In connection with pillaging, it should be
pointed out that to conquering soldiers
anything was allowed. Hence the Gallic
War became the theater of rape and occasional assassinations, and these occurences were not usually mentioned by authors
of the period since they were not considered worthy of mention. However, when
Caesar narrates the fighting at Gergovia
he mentions that at one point the Gallic
women, thinking all was lost, partially disrobed and in some cases were lowered
from the wall and surrendered to the soldiers ; they were hoping somehow to substitute being raped for being killed.

peoples which put up the greatest resistance. The Atuatuci, once they were vanquished, were sold at auction in a single
lot. He later subjected the Veneti to the
same fate. After his victory at Alesia, Caesar gave a slave to each legionary, meaning
that not less than 70,000 Gallic men were
given to deserving soldiers in the Roman
army as a bonus in addition to their pay.
The latter hastened to resell their slaves to
the merchants who followed the army, so
as to transform this gift of Caesar into
liquid cash. During the Gallic War as a
whole the estimated number of Gauls enslaved by Caesar and carried off to Italy or to
other provinces approached the total of
one million! From an economic point of
view, this massive influx into the servile
workforce would have decisive consequences for the transformation of the expiring
Republic, detaching it permanently from

its traditional structures.

Translation Stephen Neuville

Another consequence of the war for civilians was that in many cases their status
changed from being free to being hostages or slaves. Caesar made systematic use
of the practice of taking hostages in order
to guarantee peace and the continued submission of conquered tribes. This was indeed
a very widespread practice throughout antiquity, and the Romans merely employed
it on a grand scale in Gaul. As a rule Caesar treated his hostages very well, unlike
Ariovistus, who apparently threatened to
subject his Gallic hostages to brutal torture
if even his smallest wishes were not granted. The fate of Gauls who were reduced
to slavery was obviously even worse. Caesar was usually magnanimous in victory,
reserving reduction to slavery for those

53

Above. A fight during one of the numerous sieges

of the war . Litography of Joliet. DR

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Sources
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2008-2010
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dAlexandre et de Csar, Les Belles Lettres,
2003
Essay
Luca Canali, De Jules Csar Jsus-Christ,
Arla 1999
Hans Delbrck, Warfare in Antiquity, Bison
Books 1990
Christian Goudineau, Csar et la Gaule,
Points Histoire, 2000
Jacques Harmand, Vercingtorix, Fayard
1996
Eberhard Horst, Csar, Fayard, 1981
Chris McNab, The Roman Army, Osprey
Publishing 2010
Napolon (crit par M. Marchand sous la
dicte de lEmpereur), Prcis des guerres de
Csar, Gosselin Libraire-diteur 1836
Jos Ignacio Lago, Las Campaas de Julio
Csar, Almena 2004
Marc Landelle, Le lgionnaire romain au
temps de Csar, Illustoria, 2008
Yann Le Bohec, Csar chef de guerre, Editions du Rocher, 2001
Franck Matthieu, Le guerrier gaulois, du Hallstatt la conqute romaine, Errance, 2012
Philippe Richardot, Les erreurs stratgiques
des Gaulois face Csar, Economica 2006
Zvi Yavetz, Csar et son image, Les belles
Lettres, 1990