Silliman materials (2002)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

ART I
Sovereignty over Place Ligitan and Palau Sipadan
FACTS: In case of Indonesia/Malaysia over Palau Ligitan and Palau Sipadan, the Philippines
specified that it seeks to intervene in the case as non part. Philippines believe that its claim of
sovereignty over North Borneo might be affected by the courts reasoning or interpretation of the
issue in the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.
HELD: The Philippines has emphasized the importance of a document dated January 22, 1878
by which the Sultan of Sulu with whom title, a lease to part of Sabah (North Borneo) lay, had
made a grant in that part to Messrs. Overbeck and Dent (which grant does not include Palau
Ligitan and Palau Sipadan). This instrument, according to the court, is said by the Philippines to
be its primal source of title in North Borneo and is observed that neither Indonesia nor
Malaysia relies on the 1878 grant as source of title to Ligitan and Sipadan. Court cannot grant
application to intervene.
ART III
SEC 1
Santiago vs Vasquez
217 SCRA 633
FACTS: Petitioner-Meriam Santiago was planning to go abroad for study purposes. But the
Sandiganbayan ordered the CID not to allow her to leave on the ground that she has a pending
case under the Anti Graft and Corrupt practices Act pending on the said court. Since that order
was issued without notice and hearing, petition argued that it has violated here right of due
process.
HELD: The issuance of the order by the Sandiganbayan is an exercise of its inherent power to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioner. Courts
have the power to do all necessary things, as long as it is reasonable for the administration of
justice within their jurisdiction.
Central Bank vs CA
220 SCRA 536
FACTS: Based on examination report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Section of
Central Bank, it stated that the financial condition of TSB is on insolvency and continuing its
business would probably mean great loss to its deposition and creditors. The Monetary Board
issued a resolution ordering the closure of TSB, and not allowing it to do business in the
Philippines, and placing it under receivership. TSB contended that such closure denied TSB due
process of law.
HELD: Under the Central Bank Act, there is no requirement that a hearing be conducted before
a bank may be placed under receivership. It is sufficient that a report be made after examination
of a bank that shows that the bank is insolvent. The appointment of receivership may be made

without notice and hearings but it is subject to judicial review. Due process does not require a
prior hearing. The hearing may be subsequent to the closure. A prior hearing will only result in a
bank run.
Court Administrator vs. Pascual
259 SCRA 604
FACTS: A municipal judge was charged with bribery as well as administrative cases before the
Sandiganbayan. In submitting his report, the RTC judge who investigated the case relied solely
on the complaint, the answer, the memorandum of respondent, and the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing before the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Pascual was not given procedural due process. He was not given the right to an open
trial where he could confront the witness against him and present evidence in his defense. The
procedure fell short of the requirement of due process.
Bernardo vs CA
275 SCRA 417
FACTS: Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC. All pleadings on his behalf were filed by the
law firm Puerto, Nuez and Associates. During the initial trials, the court interpreter informed
the Judge that Atty. Jose Puerto died. Pending verification of Atty. Puertos death, the court
proceeded with the trial. A new lawyer appeared and mentioned that Atty. Puerto had died.
Without acting on the matter, the court decided the case in favor the respondent. Petitioner
argued that he was denied due process since he was not allowed to present evidence.
HELD: A verified proof of death must accompany the appearance of a new counsel, whenever
the death of previous attorney is the cause of substitution of a counsel. Petitioner failed to
comply with the requirement. The death of Atty. Puerto is not significant, because it is the law
firm that represents him. Petitioner alleged that the other associate died ahead of Atty. Puerto
such that he was the only lawyer in that office. But, Atty. Puerto misled the court into believing
that the law firm consisted of more than one lawyer.
People vs Teehankee
249 SCRA 54
FACTS: Teehankee was convicted of 2 counts of murder and 1 count of frustrated murder. That
said crime was highly publicized. He claimed that he was denied due process, because of the
pervasive prejudicial publicity which attended the trial.
HELD: Freedom of the Press is not incompatible with fair trial. Publicity is not prejudicial to the
rights of an accused to a fair trial. Judges are competent and are trained to disregard off court
evidence. Publicity does not infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity,
there must be proof that judges were unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Webb vs People
276 SCRA 54
FACTS: Hubert Webb was charged with rape with homicide. The Judge denied most of his
pleadings. Such as a motion to be hospitalized because of asthma of the skin. The judge refused
to allow the defense to confront the witness with the school records to show that her testimony
regarding her educational attainment is false. The trial judge denied the motion to take the
deposition of witness in the U.S. The judge admitted only 10 out of the 142 exhibits of the

petitioner. The trial judge denied the petition for bail. Petitioner argued that the trial judged
should be disqualified for bias.
HELD: Extrinsic evidence is required to established bias, malice, bad faith or corrupt purpose in
addition to palpable error. Repeated rulings against the accused, no matter how erroneous and
vigorously expressed are not bases for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias.
Grapilon Petition
302 SCRA 138
FACTS: The complainants seek the removal of Atty. Grapilon from being the IBP president.
Complainants, who were employees of the IBP, charged Atty. Grapilon with immorality,
questionable disbursement of funds, dishonesty, etc. Thereinafter, complainants were dismissed
by the IBP Board of Governors for according to the latter, the employees were guilty of
committing acts inimical to the interest of IBP. Complainants contended that said termination
was a violation of the IBP employees right to due process of law.
HELD: The IBP Board of Governors had complied with the requirement of the law. The
petitioners were notified of the clarificatory hearings and also the charges that were raised
against them. The hearing was intended to give the petitioners the opportunity to answer the
charges against them. By their refusal to participate at the hearing they may be deemed to have
forfeited their right to be heard in their defense.
Marcos vs Sandiganbayan
297 SCRA 99
FACTS: Five counts of violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was charge against
the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Unanimity was not reached so the presiding justice
constituted a special division of 5 justices. One of the justices requested that he be given 15 days
to submit his manifestation. On the same day 3 justices had lunched together and discussed the
case in the absence of the 2 justices. A justice who was not member of the division was present.
The 3 justices agreed to acquit petitioner in three of the cases and to convict her on the other.
When they returned to their office, the presiding justice dissolved the special division.
HELD: Based on the rules of the Sandiganbayan, sessions should be held at its principal office.
Their rules likewise state that unscheduled discussion is not allowed nor shall informal
discussion be allowed. It also does not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of
cases and does not allow the exclusion of a member of a division in the deliberation of cases.
Petitioner had the right to be heard by all 5 justices of the special division. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan is void for violating the right of petitioner to substantive and procedural due
process of law.
Lacson vs. Secretary
301 SCRA 298
FACTS: Principal accused Lacson was among the accused of the Kuratong Baleleng rub out.
The Sandiganbayan initially took charge of the case as the policemen involved were public
officers. But the Sandiganbayan transferred the case to the RTC because some of the principal
accused have been classified falling below salary grade 27 (RA 7975). However, RA 8249 was
enacted which includes the rank of chief superintendent as covered under the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. Is the RTC divested of jurisdiction?

HELD: The case shall remain with the RTC. The salary grade as it cannot be shown that the
crime as alleged was perpetrated by the police officers in the performance of their duties as
public officers.
DECS vs Sandiego
180 SCRA 533
FACTS: The Secretary of DECS issued a regulation not allowing a student who has failed the
National Medical Admission Test for three times from taking it again. Respondent, who had
failed three times and wanted to take the test again, claimed the regulation violated due process.
HELD: There is a substantial distinction between medical students and other students. The
regulation is intended to insulate the medical school from the intrusion of those not qualified to
become a doctor. The regulation is within the police power of the state. It is the responsibility of
the state that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those not qualified.
Agcaoili vs Felipe
149 SCRA 339
FACT: This is a petition challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Election Code
particularly the part which requires the indelible marking of the forefingers as requisite or
condition to the exercise of suffrage and insofar as it penalize failure to comply or refusal to
submit to said requisites.
HELD: In safeguarding the integrity of the ballot, the state may adopt appropriate and
reasonable measures in order to regulate the electoral process such as marking of the forefingers
of the voters to prevent multiple voting.
JMM Promo vs CA
260 SCRA 319
FACTS: The DECS issued an order which required training testing and certification of
performing artist before their deployment abroad. An artist who complies with the requirements
would be issued Artist Record Book, which is a requirement for processing their papers by the
POEA. Petitioner argued that the requirement violates due process, since the right of the artist to
return to work abroad having qualified under the old procedure could not be abridged and their
accreditation was a property right.
HELD:
The order in question is issued in pursuant to the police power of the state; this is
because a lot of artists ended up as prostitutes. These measures were adopted to ensure that those
individuals who will meet the set of standards which would qualify them as legitimate artists
would be deployed. The constitution likewise mandates the government to extend protection to
OFWs. While ones calling is a property right, it is subject to the valid exercise of police power.
Salvacion vs Central Bank
278 SCRA 27
FACTS: Accused Greg Bartelly an American tourist was charged of raping a 12 yr old girl . A
writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the trial Court against the dollar deposit of the
accused. However, garnishment cannot be instituted against the dollar deposit of the accused on
the ground that Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular prohibited it. Said provision is assailed as
unconstitutional as it takes away the right of the petitioner to have the bank deposit of accused
garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners favor. It is contended that the
provision is a violation of the substantive due process guaranteed by the constitution.

HELD: The application of the law depends on the extent of justice. The court ruled that the
questioned Sec. 113 of central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of the court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body. To make it applicable to foreign transient/tourist, would result to
injustice especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like Greg Bartelli. Such circular is
applicable only to foreign investors and not transients.
Ople vs Torres
293 SCRA 141
FACTS: The president issued Administrative Order. No. 308, the national computerized
identification reference system. Sec. 4 A.O. 308 provides that the population reference number
shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies
and that the Secretariat should coordinate with the different social security and services agencies
to establish the standard in the use of biometrics technology and in computer application designs
of their respective systems. Petitioner contended the A.O. No. 308 violates the Bill of rights.
HELD:
A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy. The broadness and the vagueness of
the act will put the right to privacy of the people in clear and present danger. A.O. 308 does not
state that specific biological characteristics and what particularly biometrics technology shall be
used to identify people who will seek its coverage. A.O. 308 is indefinite and can give the
government moving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his population reference number. A.O. 308 does not state
who will control and access the data under what circumstances and for what purpose. This
makes A.O. No. 308 unconstitutional.
Guzman vs NU
142 SCRA 699
FACTS: NU refused to allow petitioner to re-enroll on the grounds that they had participated in
activities without prior permit which disrupt classes. NU also filed a separate criminal case for
malicious mischief, and a civil case for damages. Petitioner filed an action to compel NU to
allow them to re-enroll on the ground that in effect they were expelled without due process.
HELD: The imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon students requires the observance of due
process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceeding similar
to those prescribed for proceedings in court. The students in student discipline cases may be
summary. There are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process. Since respondent never conducted any proceeding, petitioners should be allowed to
re-enroll without prejudice o any disciplinary proceedings to which they may be subjected.
Ateneo de Manila University vs CA
145 SCRA 100
FACTS: A cafeteria waitress complained to the Board of Discipline that the son of respondent, a
college student, cursed and slapped her. The son admitted the truth to the chairman of the Board
of Discipline. The board posted a notice of its meeting. The son of the respondent was also
informed of the meeting and told to secure the help of his parents. The son of respondent
admitted the truth of the charge before the board. As a result, he was dropped from the roll of
students. Claiming denial of due process, respondent filed an action for damage.

HELD: All the requirements of due process were met. The son was given a notice of the
proceedings. He actually appeared and admitted to the charge. The 18 yr old son was matured
enough to know his responsibilities. The claim of the respondent that they should have been
informed is untenable. The son is assumed to have reported the matter to his parents. If he did
not, that is his fault. Violation of disciplinary regulation is a valid ground for dropping a student.
Hence, respondent cannot recover damages.
UP vs Telen
227 SCRA 342
FACTS: Respondent wrongfully state in his application for reduction of tuition his family
income. He was ordered expelled by the Executive Committee. Upon appeal to the Board of
Regents, the penalty was reduced to suspension of 1 year, but still found him guilty. He was not
notified of the meeting when the Board of Regent acted on his case, thus he is now claiming that
he was not accorded due process.
HELD: University rules do not require the attendance in board meeting of individuals whose
cases are included in the agenda of the board. Due process also does not require sending of
notice of the board meeting to respondent.
Sto. Domingo vs Ordoez
166 SCRA 123
FACTS: Petitioner, a municipal planning and development officer, is holding a permanent
position. But his employment was terminated by the OIC Mayor. Petitioner complained that he
was terminated without due process of law. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was dismissed because of lack of merit.
HELD: The fundamental rule in the due process clause is the opportunity to be heard. In the case
at bar, petitioner was heard on his motion for reconsideration filed with the Review Committee.
He was accorded every opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. The charges against him
are easily related with documentary evidence regarding the completion of the project. There is
absolutely no evidence of arbitrariness or caprice in the questioned act of the respondent. Hence,
he cannot claim that he was deprived of his right to due process.
Doruelo vs MND
169 SCRA 448
FACTS: Petitioner was assigned to be a captain of a vessel, which collided with a tanker
because of the recklessness of the petitioner. The Philippine Coast Guard suspended petitioner
for 2 years, after investigation. Petitioner appealed to the National Defense, but it increased his
suspension to three years because of information that he was involved in another collision.
HELD: In administrative proceedings the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing or at least contained in the records and disclosed to the parties affected. Therefore
this makes the increase of duration of suspension of petitioner erroneous.
Go vs NAPOLCOM
271 SCRA 447
FACTS: A raid of the house of the petitioner, a police officer resulted in the arrest of 15 persons,
including his wife, a confiscation of materials used in jai alai. A second raid in a report that
petitioner and his brother were involved in jai alai. No formal complaint was filed nor any

supporting affidavit of witnesses. The summary dismissal board took cognizance of the case
against petitioner. Petitioner appeared before the summary dismissal board thrice, but no hearing
was held because either the complainant or his witnesses were absent. The board ordered the
dismissal of the petitioner for alleged involvement on Jai alai. The director general of PNP and
the NPC denied his appeal. Petitioner argued that he was denied due process.
HELD: The claim of the petitioner has merit. The summary dismissal board received the report
on the two raids, but the report is not in the record of this case. This is in violation of the rule on
administrative proceedings, which state that decisions must be rendered on the evidence
contained in the records and disclosed to the party affected. Nor was petitioner heard in his
defense.
Lumigued vs Secretary
282 SCRA 125
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with malversation through falsification, violation of COA rules
and regulation and oppression and harassment. An investigation was conducted and was directed
to submit counter affidavit. Committee hearing was conducted but Lumigued was not assisted by
a counsel. On the 2nd hearing he moved to reschedule it to enable him to hire a counsel. But
neither he nor his counsel arrived on the day he has chosen. So the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for additional hearing alleging that he
suffered a stroke, but on the day of the trial he was discharge this fact was shown through his
discharge record.
HELD: The right to counsel is not indispensable in due process unless required by the
constitution or law. The assistance of a counsel while desirable cannot validly act at all except
only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process, as long
as a party was given the opportunity to explain once side. An actual hearing is not always
indispensable aspect of due process, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interest in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.
People vs Cayat
68 Phil 12
FACTS: Cayat, a member of the non-Christian tribes, was convicted for violation of Act No.
1639. Sec 2 state that It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of
the non-Christian tribesto buy, receive, have in his possession or drinks any ardent, spirit, ale,
beer. other than the so called native wine or liquor which members of such tribe have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this act. Counsel for defendant says that
the phrase member of non-Christian tribe violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution.
HELD: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of the equal
protection of the law is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. Act No.
1639 satisfies the conditions given. The classification rests on real and substantial distinction, not
only imaginary or whimsical distinctions. The term non Christian tribes refers not to religious
belief, but in a way geographical area and more directly, to the nature of the Philippines of a lowgrade civilization. Usually living in the tribal relationship apart from settled community. Act No.
1639 therefore does not violate equal protection clause.

(note: requisites of a valid classification: a) must not be arbitrary b) based on substantial

distinction
c) classification is germane to the issue d) not only based on present
condition but shall apply to future conditions as well e) must apply equally to all members of a
class.)
Inchong vs Hernandez
101 Phil 1152
FACTS: Petitioner on behalf of other aliens adversely affected by the provision of RA 1180
brought this action to obtain judicial declaration that the said act is unconstitutional. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the act contending that it denies to alien residents equal protection
of the law and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law. RA 1180
prohibits non-citizen of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly with retail business.
HELD: The equal protection of the law is against undue favor on individual or class privilege as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequalities. It is intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality among residents, it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances both as to privilege conferred and
liabilities enforced.
Philippine Judges Association vs Prado
227 SCRA 703
FACTS: RA No 7394 repealed franking privilege of the Judiciary. Petitioner are questioning
the constitutionality of the said act particularly Sec.39. They argued that it violated equal
protection since the franking privilege of the President, Vice president, Senator, member of the
lower house, COMELEC, former President, widows of former president, National Census and
Statistic Office, and the people filing complaints against public officer were retained.
HELD: The grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation which would justify a waiver of revenue by the Philippine Postal Corporation.
There is no reason why the Judiciary be likened with other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn. Sec 35 placed the court in a category to which it does not belong.
It was similarly treated as the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee. The
repealing clause denies the Judiciary equal protection.
Tiu vs CA
301 SCRA 278
FACTS: Petitioner alleged the E.O. 97-A violates their right of equal protection. EO 97-A
provides, inter alia, the tax and duty free privilege granted to the secured area in the former
Subic Naval Base Business and enterprise. Individuals residing within the secured area are free
to import raw materials, capital goods, equipments and consumer items are tax and duty free.
HELD: E.O. 97-A is valid and constitutional. It does not violate the equal protection clause. It is
settled that the equal protection guarantee does not required territorial uniformity of law. As long
as there is actual and material difference between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause.

If the grouping were characterized by substantial distinction that made real difference,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all belonging to the same class.
Tolentino vs Secretary
249 SCRA 628
FACTS: RA 7716 expanded the scope of the Value Added Tax. It repealed the exemption from
the value-added tax of the publisher of newspapers and magazine. The Cooperative Union of the
Philippines also argued that the law violated equal protection because it retained the exemption
of electric cooperatives but abolished the exemption of other cooperatives.
HELD: The argument is without merit. The classification is reasonable. It rests on a
congressional determination that there is a greater need to provide cheaper electricity to as many
people as possible than there is to provide them with other necessities. The Legislative dept is not
required to adhere to all-or-nothing policy in choosing the subject of taxation.
SEC 2
People vs Tonog
205 SCRA 772
FACTS: A dead body was found. During the investigation a person told the police officer that it
was the accused who killed the victim. The accused was charged of murder, but he claimed that
his pair of pants was not admissible as evidence.
HELD: A peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant when an offense has just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of the fact indicating that the person to be arrested
committed it, this justifies the warrantless arrest. The police officer, who effected the arrest, had
knowledge of the facts which were gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation
indicating that the accused was one of the killers. The pair of pants was taken as an incident of
the arrest. Because of that fact, it is admissible as evidence.
People vs. Gerente
219 SCRA 756
FACTS: There was a mauling incident reported at the police station. At the hospital, where the
victim was brought, the police found out that the victim was dead. The police officer went to the
place where the mauling took place. They found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hallow
block and two roaches of marijuana. The accused was one of the killers according to an
eyewitness. When the police frisked the accused, they found marijuana in a coin purse. Accused
argued that the marijuana leaves were not admissible as evidence, because it was illegally seized.
HELD: A crime has just been committed, and the police officer had personal knowledge of the
fact indicating the accused, such that this makes the warrant less arrest of the accused valid. The
police officer saw the dead victim at the hospital. The police officers found the instrument of
death, a piece of wood and a hollow block. An eyewitness pointed to the accused as one of the
killers. The search conducted on the person of the accused was lawful because it was an incident
of a valid arrest.
People vs Aminnudin
163 SCRA 402

FACTS: An officer of the Philippine Constabulary accosted defendant while he was descending
from a boat, inspected his bag, confiscated the marijuana leaves inside in side it, and arrested
him, this was done in response of a tip from an informer given two days earlier. They did not
have any warrant of arrest and search warrant. Defendant was charged with violation of the
Dangerous Drug Act.
HELD: Defendant was not caught inflagrante delicto, this makes the search illegal. At the
moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done
a crime. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel.
Lim vs Felix
194 SCRA 292
FACTS: Four informations for murder against the petitioner were filed by the fiscal in Masbate.
But the SC ordered a transfer of venue to Makati. Petitioner asked the court at Makati to order
the transmittal of the records of the preliminary investigation to enable it to determine if there
was probable cause for their arrest. The court denied the motion and issued warrants for the
arrest of petitioner.
HELD: The judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause, when he relies
solely on the certification of the prosecution when the records are not brought before him. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge has not personally examined the
witness. There should be a report and necessary document supporting the certification of the
prosecutor. All these should be before the judge. The extent of the examination of the report and
the documents depend on the circumstances of each case. The judge should exercise his sound
discretion.
Columbia vs CA
262 SCRA 219
FACTS: After verifying the information he received that respondent had in his possession
pirated videotapes, poster, advertising materials and other items used for sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibit of the pirated video tapes, an intelligence officer of the VRB
obtained a search warrant. Respondent filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground
that the search warrant did not state specific offense, but was denied by the court. Respondent
filed another motion to lift search warrant on the ground that it was issued without probable
cause, which was granted by the lower court. Hence Petitioner questioned the said decision.
HELD: Petitioners consistent position that the order of the lower court denying respondent
motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued there having been satisfactory
compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determining probable cause is
indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from
petitioner in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence and
the existing and judicially accepted requirements with respect to the finding of probable cause.
People vs Estrada
296 SCRA 383
FACTS: The BFAD applied for a search warrant against respondent for selling drugs without a
license from them in violation of Art. 4 of the Consumer Act. In support of the application, she
submitted the affidavit to the police stating that he bought drugs from respondent and upon

10

verification from the registry of BFAD, he found out that respondent had no license to operate.
The application also stated the residence as located at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu
City, which was a compound and attached a sketch indicating the resident of respondent with
X.
A search warrant was issued to look for drugs in possession and control of respondent.
Police did not found anything at the resident of respondent, they went to nearby warehouse
owned by somebody and seized the drugs they found.
HELD: Documentary proof that respondent had no license to sell drugs should have been
presented. Fact and circumstances that show probable cause must be the best evidence
procurable under the circumstances to prove that respondent had no license to sell drugs is the
certification to the effect from the DOH. Likewise the search team exceeded its authority by
conducting a search in another place belonging to another person.
People vs Malmsteadt
198 SCRA 401
FACTS: There was a report that a foreigner was transporting prohibited drugs; the police
officers set up a checkpoint. They stopped a bus in which the accused, a foreigner, was riding.
They noticed a bulge on the waist of the accused and asked for the passport. When he failed to
comply, the police asked him to bring what was bulging on his waist. It turned out that it
contained hashish. The accused was asked to alight the bus. He stopped to get 2 bags, which has
teddy bear in it. It was only then that he presents his passport. He was brought to the police
headquarter. The teddy bear was found to contain hashish the accused was charged with violation
of the Dangerous Drug Act. Accused argued that the search was illegal.
HELD: The search made upon his personal effect was lawful as an incident to a lawful arrest;
this is because the accused was arrested while in the act of transporting drugs. The receipt of
information that a foreigner had prohibited drugs in his possession and the failure of the accused
to produce his passport, gave rise to the probable cause, which justified the warrant less search.
People vs. Li Wai
214 SCRA 504
FACTS: At the condominium of the accused, he was arrested by police officer while selling
heroin powder. They then searched the premises and seized a pocket of marijuana leaves and a
bag containing shabu. Accused argued that the arrest and search was illegal.
HELD: The accused was caught inflagrante delicato; this makes the arrest valid. While entry
into his dwelling was effected without a search warrant, it was merely coincidental since the
accused chose to consummate the illicit transaction inside the dwelling. The search of his
condominium is valid as an incident of lawful arrest. It was conducted in a confined place within
his immediate control, where he might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence
constituting proof of his crime.
People vs Salazar
266 SCRA 607
FACTS: In an entrapment, a police officer, posing as a buyer, bought marijuana from the
accused in her store and arrested her without warrant. A police officer likewise seized a plastic
container on the table inside the store from which the accused took the marijuana. The plastic

11

container contained six more marijuana sticks. The accused was charged with selling marijuana.
Salazar argued that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was illegal.
HELD: The accused had been caught inflagrante delicto. The arresting officers were duty bound
to apprehend her immediately. The search being an incident of a valid arrest needed no warrant
to be valid. Warrant less search and seizure, as an incident to a lawful arrest, may extend to
include the premises under the immediate control of the accused. The accused may not
successfully invoke the right against a warrant less search, even as regard to the plastic container
with dried marijuana leaves found on the table in her store.
People vs Cuenco
298 SCRA 621
FACTS: A police officer who posed as a user of marijuana arrested the accused for selling
marijuana. At that time the accused was standing by the door of the store, which was part of his
house. The police officer search, the house of the accused and seized dried flowering tops of
marijuana in his bedroom. The accused was then charged with selling marijuana and illegal
possession of marijuana. Accused argued the search at his house is illegal.
HELD: The accused was arrested inflagrante delicto. In a valid arrest, it becomes both the duty
and the right of the police officer to conduct a warrant less search not only on the person of the
suspect but also in the area within his effective control. Since the store was part of the house of
the accused it became advisable, if not necessary, for the police officer to undertake a search of
the house as being within the area of immediate control of the accused.
Padilla vs CA
269 SCRA 402
FACTS: A citizen saw the accused driving his motor vehicle very fast. He then heard that the
motor hit somebody. Accused start driving, the citizen reported the incident to the police by radio
and chased the motor vehicle. The radio comptroller flashed the message to all police units. A
mobile unit intercepted the motor vehicle and forced it to stop. The accused alighted from his
vehicle; police saw the butt of a revolver protruding from his waist. The police confiscated it.
Another police saw a magazine of an Armalite tucked in his back pocket. He seized the
magazine. The police opened the door of the vehicle and saw an armalite with magazine.
Accused was arrested and surrendered the pistol and magazine. Accused argued that seizure was
illegal.
HELD: The seizure of the revolver and the magazine was justified, for they were ceased within
the plain view of the police officer who inadvertently discovered them. The same justification
applies to the confiscation of the Armalite, which was readily apparent when the police took a
casual glance at his vehicle. The accused voluntarily surrendered the pistol and three magazines.
This was a waiver of the right against the search and seizure. Moreover, the seizure of the
firearm and magazines can be justified as an incident of a lawful arrest. Besides, the warrant less
search of a motor vehicle is constitutionally permissible.
Court Administrator vs. Barron
297 SCRA 376
FACTS: Respondent, a judge called the president of a corporation which had a pending case
before him, and told him that he would decide the case in favor of the corporation. He asked for
money. The president of the corporation reported the case to the NBI. It drew up a plan to entrap

12

the judge. The president of the corporation handed to judge a bag containing marked money. At a
signal agents of NBI rushed to the car of the respondent. They caught him placing the money
under the drivers seat. Respondent was arrested and charged with bribery. Judge argued that the
warrant less search of his car was illegal.
HELD: Since respondent was caught inflagrante delicto, and there was no need for a warrant for
the seizure of the fruits of the crime. The search was incidental to the lawful arrest.
Malacat vs CA
283 SCRA 159
FACTS: A team of police conducted a patrol because of a report that a group of Muslim
extremists would explode a grenade. The police officer saw petitioner trying to detonate a
grenade. Police chased petitioner and his companion so the attempt was aborted. Two days later,
police saw petitioner, who acted suspiciously with his eyes moving very fast. When the police
approached him, he hurriedly fled. Once they caught up with petitioner, they found a grenade
tucked inside his waistline. Petitioner was caught and was charged of illegal possession of hand
grenade.
HELD: The police officer had no personal knowledge of an overt physical act on the part of the
petitioner indicating that he committed a crime. This makes the warrant less arrest of the
petitioner illegal. Hence, the warrant less search conducted on petitioner was not incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Larranaga vs CA
287 SCRA 581
FACTS: Petitioner is charged with 2 counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Petitioner alleged the he was denied the right to preliminary investigation and sought to annul the
information as well as the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. On Sept. 15, 1997
some members of the PNP CIG went to CCA in QC to arrest petitioner without a warrant.
Petitioner resisted arrest and sought the aid of his lawyer, after negotiation the PNP allowed
petitioner to go home, but made an undertaking that they will appear on Sept. 17, 1997 for
preliminary investigation. On that said date petitioner moved the he be accorded a regular
preliminary investigation but was denied, stating that petitioner is only entitled of inquest
proceedings
HELD: The fact of this case shows that kidnapping was committed July 16, 1997. One of the
victim was found dead on July 18, 1997, while the other victim remains missing to date. There is
no showing that at the time of arrest the other victim was being detained by petitioner. Hence,
petitioner may not be considered as continually committing the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention at the time of the arrest.
People vs Leangsiri
252 SCRA 213
FACTS: Accused was arrested at the arrival area of the NAIA with heroin. He informed the
authorities that he was to deliver the heroin to 3 people at Las Palmas Hotel. Later while at room
504 of said hotel, accused (together with Narcotics Agents) received a phone call that the heroin
will be picked up. At about 10 pm appellant went to the room of the accused and got the heroin.
On her way out of the room, the NARCOM agent arrested the Appellant who said that she was
staying at Rm. 413.

13

Accompanied by Hotel owner, the NARCOM agent searched room 413. Tuck in the
telephone book was a piece of paper in the name of Leangiri written it. The paper and other
possession were confiscated. Appellant, Amidus, argued that search is illegal.
HELD: In the case at bar appellant were arrested in Rm. 504 of the Hotel. The piece of paper
bearing Leangiri name was obtained through warrant less arrest at Rm. 413. Clearly the warrant
less search, is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangiris name cannot be admitted as
evidence against appellant. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however exculpate
appellant. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecutions case against appellant. The remaining
evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable ground.
People vs Cubcubin
GR. 136267, July 20, 2001
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of murder by the RTC. The police found the victim dead on
his tricycle which was parked on the road. A tricycle driver told the police that the accused and
the victim were seen coming out from a caf. When the police went to that caf, the waitress also
told them that she had seen accused with the victim in the caf. The police proceeded to the
house of the accused. They confiscated a white shirt stained with blood, 2 empty shells of .38
caliber bullet and a .38 revolver without serial number. The accused assailed the illegality of the
search and seizure conducted by the policeman in his house because there is no warrant.
HELD: The search of accuseds house was illegal. Therefore the things obtained as result are
inadmissible in evidence against him. Waiver by implication cannot be presumed. A warrant less
search is in derogation of a constitutional right; peace officer cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions. Even assuming the warrant less arrest to be valid, the search
cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence of
dangerous weapon within the person or area of his immediate control. It is clear that the warrant
less search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the T-shirt nor the gun was
within the area of the accuseds immediate control.
People vs Pasudagi
GR 128822, May 4, 2001
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of illegal cultivation of marijuana by the RTC. A policeman
spotted a 70 square meter marijuana plantation. He then formed a team to conduct an
investigation with such matter. Thereafter, the team went to the house of the accused which is 5
meters away from the said marijuana plantation. They took pictures of the accused standing
beside with the marijuana plant and took him to the police station.
HELD: Generally, a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search the
person, house, paper or effect of any individual. In the case at bar, policeman had ample time to a
secure search warrant: they failed to secure one. Time was not of the essence to uproot the plant.
The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized
plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused because evidence is inadmissible.
People vs Hindoy and Negrosa
GR. 132662, May 10, 2001

14

FACTS: Informant gave information to the policemen that there was a shipment of illegal drugs
which was received by the accused Negrosa. Therefore, an organized team was sent to the house
of the accused to conduct a buy bust operation. It was Hindoy, who sold a kilogram of marijuana
to a member who posted as buyer. After that, police identified themselves and searched the
house, where 12 more kilograms of marijuana were found. The RTC found the accused guilty for
violation of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659. Accused contended in their appeal that the trial
court erred in admitting the marijuana in evidence since it was confiscated without search
warrant.
HELD: The search, being incident to a lawful arrest was valid notwithstanding the absence of a
warrant. In fact, the warrant less search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest
may be extended beyond the person or surrounding under his immediate control. Evidence
obtained in violation of Art III. Sec 2 is inadmissible, however it is not without exception, as in
instances of searches incidental to lawful arrest. Under Sec 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
SEC 3
GAANAN v IAC 145 SCRA 112
FACTS: This petition asks for the interpretation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the anti
wiretapping act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices, such that when it is used to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
The phrase any other device or arrangement in RA 4200 known as the anti-wire
tapping law does not cover an extension line. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the
use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording the communication. There must be a physical interruption thru a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record the
spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be place in the category as a Dictaphone,
dictagraph or other devices enumerated in sec 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. They were not liable for the violation of the antiwiretapping act.
PEOPLE v MENDOZA 301 SCRA 66
FACTS: Appellant was accused of parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The trial court held him guilty of both charges. The possession of the fatal gun by the appellant
was established by the memorandum receipt signed by the appellant himself and a mission order
authorizing him to carry the said weapon from Nov. 15, 1986 to Dec 15, 1986. The
memorandum receipt and the mission order was found by the father of the wife-victim in the
appellants house after the killing of the wife in 1988. The appellant claims that these documents
were illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
The solicitor general is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed against the government and its agencies. The case of Pp v Marti is in point where the
Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches

15

and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by the government and it
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion. In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were
discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law, a private citizen.
OPLE v TORRES 293 SCRA 141
FACTS: The president issued Administrative Order No. 308, which provides for the adoption of
a national computerized identification reference system. Sec 4 of AO No. 308 provided that the
population reference number shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage
among concerned agencies and that the secretariat of the inter-agency coordination committee
should constitute with the different social security and services agencies to establish the
standards in the use of biometrics technology and in computer application designs of their
respective systems.
HELD: Assuming arguendo, that AO 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster, as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.
Said the Court, in no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does
not bar all intrusions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
Intrusion into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions.
AYER v CAPULONG 160 SCRA 861
FACTS: Senator Enrile seeks to enjoin the movie company from producing The Four Day
Revolution, a dramatization of the February 1986 revolution, for public showing, on the ground
that it would violate his right to privacy.
HELD:
Motion pictures are protected medium for the communication of ideas and
expression of the artistic impulse. This freedom is available to both local and foreign owned
production companies even if they are commercial. Indeed there is such a thing as the right to
privacy. But this cannot be invoked to resist publication of matters of public interest. What the
right to privacy protects is the right against unwarranted intrusions and wrongful publications of
the private affairs of individuals which are outside the sphere of legitimate public concern.
Enriles role in that revolution is a matter of public interest because he was a principal figure in
that event.
ZULUETA v CA 253 SCRA 699
FACTS: Petitioner, the wife of respondent, went to the clinic of the respondent, in the absence
of the said respondents knowledge and consent, took documents consisting of private
correspondence between respondent and his alleged mistresses. Thereafter, respondent sued
petitioner for the recovery of the documents and had her enjoined from using them as evidence.
HELD:
The court ruled the mentioned documents are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional provision declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is applicable even between spouses. The only exception is if there is a lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

16

PEOPLE vs. ALBOFERA 152 SCRA 123

FACTS: While the accused was charged with murder, he wrote the prosecutions witness a letter
asking him to change the declaration in his affidavit and to testify in his favor. The prosecution
presented said letter as evidence. The accused argued that its admission in evidence violated his
right to privacy of communication.
HELD:
There was no violation of the right of the accused to PRIVACY of
COMMUNICATION. The production of the letter was not the result of an unlawful search and
seizure nor was it through any unwarranted intrusion into his privacy. It was the recipient who
produced it in the course of his testimony in court.
SEC 4
JACINTO v CA GR 124540, Nov 14, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners, teachers from various schools in Metro Manila, incurred unauthorized
absences between the period Sept 17-21, 1990 in connection with the mass action they staged.
On Sept 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Carino issued a return to work order which was
ignored by the petitioners. As a result, petitioners were charged administratively with gross
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions, ignoring return to
work order, unjustified abandonment of teaching posts and non-observance of civil service law,
rules and regulations, etc. Sec Carino, after an investigation has been made, found the
petitioners guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal except to petitioner Merlinda
Jacinto and Adelina Agustin who were suspended for 6 months.
HELD:
Petitioners, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their
right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for redress of grievances. Rather the
CSC found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having
absented themselves without proper authority, from their school and during regular school days,
in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding
of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. As it
was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public
services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibitions against strikes by government
workers.
EASTERN BROADCASTING v DANS 137 SCRA 628
FACTS: A petition was filed by petitioners to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of
Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears that the respondents
charged petitioners of inciting people to commit acts of sedition because of the petitioners
shift towards what it stated on its coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared
towards public affairs.
HELD:
All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection
of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule that words are use in such circumstances, and
are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmakers has the right to prevent. The clear and present danger test,
however, does not lent itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

17

ZALDIVAR v SANDIGANBAYAN 170 SCRA 1

FACTS: For claiming that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision in
retaliation against him, respondent was cited for contempt and indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law. Respondent argued that the Supreme Court adopted the dangerous tendency rule
rather than the clear and present danger rule.
HELD: The SC did not adopt a new doctrine of visible tendency. Under either the clear and
present danger test or the balancing of interest test, the statements made by respondent were of
such a nature and were made under such circumstances as to transcend the permissible limits of
free speech. The substantive evil which the SC is seeking to prevent is not physical disorder but
the degradation of the judicial system and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar.
OSMENA v COMELEC 288 SCRA 447
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Sec 11(b) of RA No. 6646, which
prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates, on the ground that it had
not leveled the playing field but worked to the disadvantage of poor candidates by depriving
them of a medium they can afford to pay while their more affluent opponents can resort to other
means to reach voters like rallies, parades and handbills.
HELD:
There is no total ban on the political advertisements, much less restriction on the
content of the speech. Since print space and airtime can be controlled or dominated by rich
candidates, there is a legitimate government interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power
of the Commission of Elections. The provision in question does not only prohibit the sale or
donation of print space and air time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to
candidates. The clear-and-present danger is inappropriate as a test for determining the
constitutionality of Sec 11(b) of RA 6646, which is not concerned with the contents of political
advertisements but only with their incidents.
BORJAL v CA, 301 SCRA 1
FACTS: Between May and July 1989, a series of written articles by the petitioner was published
on different dates in his column at the Philippine Star. The article dealt with the alleged
anomalous activities of an organizer of a conference without naming or identifying private
respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as conference therein mentioned.
Respondent reacted to the articles and sent letters to the Philippine Star insisting that he
was the organizer alluded by the petitioners column. Thereafter, respondent filed a libel suit
against petitioner.
HELD: Publication which are privileged for reason of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. In order that a discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based
on a false supposition if the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
Borjal is acquitted of the charges.

18

In Re: Jurado, AM no. 93-2-037, Apr. 6, 1995

FACTS: A newspaper columnist wrote in his column about corruption in the judiciary. When he
was asked to shed light on his charges, the columnist did not do so. Two of the individuals he
mentioned executed affidavits denying his accusations. When he was asked why he should not be
cited for contempt, the columnist invoked the freedom of the press.
HELD:
False reports about a public official are not shielded by freedom of the press.
They belong to the category of utterances which are not essential part of the exposition of ideas
and are outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
SEC 5
EBRALINAG v DIV SUPT. OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
FACTS: Petitioners, who are members of the JEHOVAHs witnesses, were expelled from
school for refusing to take part in the flag ceremony on account of their religious beliefs. They
considered the flag ceremony as an act of religious devotion which they cannot give to anyone
except God.
HELD:
The expulsion of petitioners from school violates their religious freedom.
Petitioners quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right
of those who choose to participate in the flag ceremony. They do not engage in disruptive
behavior. Absence of threat to public safety, the expulsion of petitioners from school is not
justified. Exempting petitioners from the flag ceremony has not produced a nation bereft of
patriotism. They may be taught the virtues of patriotism in school. The expulsion of petitioners
from school also violates their right to receive education.
While the state has the responsibility to inculcate patriotism in the youth, its interest in
molding the young into patriotic citizens is not free from a balancing process when it intrudes
into fundamental rights such as freedom of religion. Refusal to take part in the flag ceremony is
not so offensive as to prompt legitimate state intervention. The state argues that to exempt
petitioners will benefit a privileged few. The essence of the guarantee of free exercise of religion
is freedom from conformity by the conformity to religious dogma. The zone of protection
afforded by the constitution cannot be violated except upon a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent.
TOLENTINO v SEC OF FINANCE 235 SCRA 630
FACTS: RA 7716 expanded the scope of the value added tax. It repealed the exemption from
the value added tax of printed books and articles. The Philippine Bible Society argued that the
removal of the tax exemption of religious books and articles violated freedom of religion.
HELD: Freedom of Religion does not prohibit the imposition of a tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization which is generally applicable.
GERONA v SECRETARY 106 Phil 11
FACTS: This is an appeal to the decision of the CFI of Masbate banning Jehovahs witnesses
from admission to public schools, solely on account of their refusal to salute the flag which in
violation of Education Dept. Order No. 8 which compels daily flag ceremony in all public or
private schools. The Jehovahs witnesses are teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God
is superior to that of laws by the state.

19

HELD: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of
National Sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
constitution guarantee and protect. Under the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious
ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission
to the bar. (note: this ruling has been abandoned by the Ebralinag case)
IGLESIA ni CRISTO v CA 259 SCRA 529
FACTS: Petitioner presents over its television program its religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often in comparison with those of other religions. The Board of Review of Moving
Pictures and TV disapproved several video tapes of the program for public viewing on the
ground that they constituted an attack against other religions. Petitioner argued that requiring
that its TV programs be reviewed by the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and TV violates
freedom of Religion and of Speech.
HELD: The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
attacking other religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence will
show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were
not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under sec 3(c)
of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its
right to free exercise of religion.
Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental laws, past and present. The court has affirmed this preferred status well aware that
it is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others with the common good
The court thus rejected petitioners contention that its religious program is per se beyond
the review by the board. Its public broadcast on TV of it religious program brings it out of the
bossom of internal belief. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the state when it
will bring about the clear and present danger or some substantive evil which the state is duty
bound to prevent.
SEC 6
MARCOS v MANGLAPUS, 177 SCRA 668
FACTS: Petitioners Marcos and his family, after they flew from the country after the EDSA
Revolution, were barred by President Aquino from returning to the Philippines. Petitioners filed
a petition to compel the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to issue to them travel documents to enable
them to return to the Philippines.
HELD:
The right to return to ones country is not among the rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. Executive power is not limited to the power to enforce the laws, for the president
is head of state and head of government. Whatever powers are inherent in such position pertain
to the office unless the Constitution withholds it. Executive power is only one of the powers of

20

the president. The powers of the president are not limited to the specific powers enumerated in
the constitution.
Under the Constitution, it is the duty of the government to serve and protect the people
and to maintain peace and order. In making any decision, the president has to consider such
principles. To protect the peace, the president has the power to bar the petitioners from returning.
The history of the efforts of petitioners to destabilize the country indicates that their return would
intensify the violence against the state.
MARCOS v SANDIGANBAYAN, 247 SCRA 147
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on two
accounts. She filed a motion for reconsideration, which was pending resolution. She filed a
motion for leave to travel abroad for treatment of hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina
pections, and anterior myo-cardial infraction.
The Sandiganbayan sought the opinion of the Philippine Heart Center. The
Sandiganbayan informed petitioners of the referral. Her counsel requested the court to submit
additional questions to the PHC. On the basis of the reports attached to the motion of the
petitioner, the panel of specialists of the PHC made a finding that the petitioner was not suffering
from coronary heart disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure, that she was not in the high
risk group for sudden cardiac death, that the recommended tests are available in the Philippines,
and that the facilities and expertise in the Philippines are more than adequate to treat patients
with hypertension and coronary heart disease. The chairman of the panel testified and was crossexamined. The court denied the motion of the petitioner.
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Since the
subject of her motion was beyond the competence of the court, it was justified in seeking the
opinion of specialists in the field. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of
the physician of the petitioner. Petitioner did not have an absolute right to travel because of the
criminal cases against her. She failed to prove the necessity for her travel.
OPLE v TORRES, 293 SCRA 141
FACTS: The president issued Administrative Order No. 308, which provided for the adoption of
a national computerized Identification reference system.
HELD: Assuming arguendo, that AO 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy.
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The court further held that if they extend
their judicial gaze, the will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions or our constitution. This includes Section 6- the liberty of abode and of the right to
travel.
SEC 7
BROADCAST ATTYS v COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 92 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which requires all radio and TV stations to provide radio or TV time free of charge to be
allocated equally and impartially among candidates within the area of coverage of the radio and
TV stations.

21

HELD:
The court affirmed the validity of BP Blg. 881, Sec 92 for public broadcasters has
the obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is
maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free
speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuing that the people have
access to the diversity of views on political issues. It is the right of the viewers or the listeners or
of the people not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount.
CHAVEZ v PCGG, 299 SCRA 744
FACTS: Because of the reports that the PCGG had entered into a compromise with the Marcos
family to settle all claims against the latter for their acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, petitioner
filed a petition in his capacity as taxpayer, Filipino citizen, and former solicitor general to
compel the PCGG to disclose all negotiations and agreements with the Marcos family.
HELD:
Under EO Nos. 1,2, and 14, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties
acquired by former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and associates through illegal
use of government funds or properties by taking undue advantage of their public office, or by
their use of power, influence or relationship. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government.
For all intents and purposes, they belong to the people. Petitioner has a right to the
disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the purported ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcos family. The intent of the framers of the constitution is to include negotiations leading
to a transaction within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information. It is
incumbent upon the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the Marcos family. Such information must pertain to definite
propositions of the government and not to recommendations or communications in the
explanatory stage.
ACT v CARINO, GR 95590, Aug 6, 1991
FACTS: On Sept 17, 1990, Monday, regular school day, some 800 teachers who joined the mass
action did not conduct their classes; instead they convened at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the
morning when they proceeded to the national office of the DECS for a whole day assembly. The
Sec. of DECS, who brushed aside their grievances, warned them that they would lose their job
for going on illegal and unauthorized mass leave. To avoid the disruption of classes, respondent
Carino issued a return to work order and warned them that dismissal proceedings will be
instituted against them if they do not return to work within 24 hours from their walkout. The
issue here is on the rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the constitution.
HELD: Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances
but not during class hours.
SEC 8
STATEHOOD v SEC (pls refer to Albanos reviewer)
JUCO v NLRC, GR 98107, Aug 18, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent Natl Housing Corp
(NHC) from Nov. 16 1970- May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service
for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Petitioner

22

filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Dept. of Labor. However,
respondent NHC filed its appeal holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code and
thus is not under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
HELD:
NHA is within the jurisdiction of the Dept of Labor and Employment, it being a
government-owned or controlled corporation without an original charter. NHA workers or
employees undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees organization, and that there
is no impediment to the holding of a certification of election among them as they are covered by
the Labor Code.
UNITED PEPSI COLA Supervisor UNION V LAGUESMA, 288 SCRA 15
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route of managers of
respondent. The Secretary of Labor and Employment denied the petition on the ground that
under Sec 245 of the Labor Code, managerial employees are not eligible to form any labor
organization. Petitioner argued that the provision violates Sec 8, Art III of the Constitution.
HELD:
As the law stood at the time the constitutional commission considered Sec 8, Art
III of the constitution, Art 248 of the Labor Code then prohibited supervisors and security guards
from forming labor unions. The objective of Sec 8, Art III was to reinstate the right of
supervisors and security guards to organize. Commissioner Lerum, who proposed the
amendment of Sec 8, art III, never referred to managerial employees. Art 245 of the Labor Code
is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by RA 6715. Sec 8, Art III is not
infringed by a ban against the formation of labor union by managerial employees.
The right guaranteed is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes
not contrary to law. There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming
labor unions. If they would belong to a labor union, the labor union might not be assured of their
loyalty in view of the conflict of interests.

SEC 9
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272
FACTS: The COMELEC adopted Resolution No 2772, which provided that it would procure
free print space of not less than one-half page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city and would allocate the space free of charge among all candidates. The
COMELEC then sent letters to various publishers of newspapers directing them to provide onehalf page to be allocated among the candidates.
Petitioner, an organization of newspapers and magazine publishers, questioned the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2772 on the ground that it constituted taking of property for
public use without just compensation.
HELD:
To compel print media companies to donate free space amounts to taking of
private property for public use. The necessity of the taking has not been shown. It has not been
shown that the print media companies are unwilling to sell print space to the COMELEC for
election purposes. It has not been shown that the COMELEC has been granted the power of
eminent domain by the constitution or by the legislature. The taking of private property for
public use must be with payment of just compensation.

23

MANOSCA v CA, 252 SCRA 412

FACTS: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by petitioners as a
national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of FELIX MANALO, the
founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the
land. Petitioner argued that expropriation was not for a public purpose.
HELD:
Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a
public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the
Philippines.
NATIONAL POWER CORP v CA, 254 SCRA 577
FACTS: Believing that it formed part of the public land reserved for them, petitioner NPC
took possession of a parcel of land belonging to the private respondents to build hydroelectric
power plant. After more than 10 years, petitioner recognized that the property really belonged to
the respondent. As the parties could not reach any agreement as to the market value of the
property, respondent filed a case to recover the possession of the said property and asked for the
repayment of rent from 1978, the time of the taking. In turn, on July 1992, petitioner filed an
expropriation case.
The two cases were consolidated. The trial court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner
but fixed the compensation on the basis of the value of the property when it filed the action for
expropriation. Petitioner argued the compensation should be based on the market value of the
property in 1978, the time of the taking of the disputed property.
HELD:
The general rule is that the time of taking is the critical date in determining the
just compensation. There will be an injustice to the expropriation if the incremental advantages
arising from the use to which the government devoted the property expropriated will accrue in
favor of the owner. However, it is difficult to conclude how there could have been an
extraordinary increase in the value of the land arising from the expropriation. Taking is the entry
into the property, should be under warrant or color of legal authority, for petitioner believed it
was public land. There were negotiations for the purchase of the property, but they constituted an
attempt at a voluntary purchase. It was only in 1992 when petitioner filed its complaint for
expropriation that it manifested its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. The
compensation should be based on the fair market value of the property in 1992.
LANDBANK v CA, 258 SCRA 404
FACTS:
DAR and Landbank contended that the opening of trust accounts in favor of the
landowners is sufficient compliance with mandate of RA 6657. The validity of constituting trust
accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them
is further premised on the latters refusal to accept the afford compensation thereby making it
necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the landbank for safekeeping and in trust for
eventual payment to the landowners.
HELD:
The Court rejected DARs contention with respect to Sec 16 of RA 6657 which
maintains that the deposit contemplated by Sec 16 (e) absent any specific indication may either
be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary or other forms know in law,
and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying. The court said that Sec 16
of RA 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the
rejecting landowners, that it is in cash or in Landbank bonds.

24

Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner
is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
DE KNECHT v CA, 290 SCRA 223
FACTS: Petitioner owned a parcel of land along EDSA and Harrison in Pasay. They constructed
8 houses, 7 were leased and occupied one of them as their residence. The city treasurer of Pasay
discovered that the petitioners failed to pay real estate taxes in the property from 1980-1981.
The treasurer sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder Barbieras and
Sangalangs. Petitioners failed to redeem the property with one year, thus the Barbieres and
Sangalangs both filed for registration of their name as co-owner of the subject land without
notice to the petitioners. The Register of Deeds issued a new title in the names of the
aforementioned new owners. The petitioners only learned about the auction sale by the time they
received the orders of the land registration courts. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 340 authorizing the
national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay for the EDSA extension.
HELD:
When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner of the fee simple is
not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation in the American jurisdiction,
the term owner when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate persons
who are to be made parties to the proceedings, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a
mortgage, a lessee and a vendee in possession under executory contract.
The petitioners lost whatever rights or colorable title they had to the properties after the
court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. The fact that the
petitioner remained in physical possession cannot give them another cause of action and
resurrect an already settled case.
REPUBLIC v TAGLE, 299 SCRA 549
FACTS: Respondent Benitez is the registered owner of two parcels of land. The Philippine
government thru Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), signed a
memorandum of agreement which provides that Benitez undertakes to lease within the 20 years
and / or sell a portion of that property in favor of PHRDC. In view of that agreement to sell,
PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, Benitez did not sign the deed of absolute
sale. Furthermore, she even demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the
premises within 30 days from notice. For failure to acquire the property involved thru negotiated
sale, petitioner thru DTI, to which it is attached, instituted a complaint for eminent domain.
Respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of possession but
move to quash it.
HELD:
It is clear that, in quashing the writ of possession, respondent judge violated EO
1035 on the quaint and whimsical ground that petitioner was already in actual possession of the
property.
It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the state that need not be
granted by the fundamental law. Section 9, art III of the constitution in mandating that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Petitioner has deposited not
just 10% required under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the just compensation that private
respondent is entitled to.

25

SEC 10
OPOSA v FACTORAN, Jr, 224 SCRA 792
FACTS: Petitioners, who are minors, filed a case to compel the Sec of Environment and
Natural Resources to cancel all timber license agreements on the ground that they have a right to
a sound environment. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that granting that the
relief prayed for would impair the obligation of contracts.
HELD:
A timber license agreement is not a contract or a property right protected by the
constitution. Under the forestry reform code, any license may be rescinded when national interest
so requires.
LIM v PACQUING, 240 SCRA 649
FACTS: Invoking the provision in the charter of the City of Manila, which authorized it to
regulate betting by the public on jai-alai and to grant exclusive rights to establishments for this
purpose. The municipal board of manila passed Ordinance No. 7065, which authorized
respondent to operate jai-alai. PD 771 revoked all existing franchise issued by local governments
to permit betting on jai-alai. Respondent argued that PD 771 violated the constitutional
prohibition against the impairment of contracts.
HELD:
A franchise is not a contract. It is privilege especially in matters which are within
the power of the government to regulate or prohibit through the exercise of police power. A
gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.
DBP v CA, 262 SCRA 245
FACTS: Private respondents were the original owners of a parcel of land. On May 30, 1977,
private respondents mortgaged said land to petitioner. When private respondents defaulted on
their obligation, petitioner foreclosed the mortgaged on the land and emerged as a sole bidder in
the ensuing auction sale.
On April 6, 1984, petitioner and private respondents entered into a deed of conditional
sale wherein petitioner agreed to reconvey the foreclosed property to private respondents. Upon
completing the payment of the full repurchase price, private respondents demanded from
petitioner the execution of a deed of conveyance in their favor. Petitioner then informed private
respondents that the prestation to execute and deliver a deed of conveyance in their favor have
been become legally impossible in view of Sec 6 of RA 6657 and EO 407.
HELD:
The trial court and CA have correctly ruled that neither Sec 6 of RA 6657 nor
sec 1 of EO 407 was intended to impair the obligation of contract.
The CARL (RA 6657) was not intended to take away property without due process of
law. Now is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner, EO 407 be
regarded. It was enacted 2 months after private respondents had legally fulfilled the condition in
the contract of conditional sale by the payment of all installments on their due dates. These laws
cannot have retroactive effect unless there is an express provision in them to that effect.
EO 407 took effect on June 10, 1990 but private respondents completed payment on Apr
6, 1990. Hence, the land covered was detached from the mass of foreclosed properties held by
DBP.

26

CMMA v POEA, 243 SCRA 666

FACTS: Petitioner CMMA, an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies,
and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for
and in behalf of the respective foreign shipowner- principals, urge to annul resolution 01, series
of 1994 of the governing board of the POEA and POEA memorandum circular no 05, series of
1994 on the ground that the resolution is unconstitutional for they violate the equal protection
clause and the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not
absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to
property on some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of
justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the state and involving the public rights and public welfare of the
entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the state of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the wealth, safety, morals,
comforts or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected,
for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the state to regulate and
control them.
SEC 14
Marcos VS Sandiganbayan
297 SCRA 95
FACTS: Petitioner was charge with 5 counts of graft and corruption before the Sandiganbayan.
As there was no unanimity of votes, the presiding justice constituted a special division of 5
justices. One of the new justices requested for 15 days to submit manifestation. On the same day
3 justices lunch together and discussed the cases in the absence of 2 other member. A justice who
was not a member of the division was present. 3 justices agreed to acquit petitioner in 3 of the
cases and convict her in other cases. When they returned to their office, presiding judge
dissolved special division. On appeal to the SC, it was suggested that case be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for the promulgation of a new decision.
HELD: Petitioner was first indicted in January 1992. More than six years have passed, but the
prosecution of petitioner is far from over. To remand the case into the Sandiganbayan will violate
her constitutional right to the speedy disposition of case.
Marcelo VS Sandiganbayan
301 SCRA 102
FACTS: Pasicolan, a public officer together with two other private individual Romero and
Marcelo was arrested, charged, they convicted of qualified mail pilferage (all as principal).
Petitioner says that only government employee can be charged of qualified theft mail pilferage,
unless there is a conspiracy between government employee and private individual. Petitioner
argued that it was his first time to meet with Pasicolan and denied having anything to do with the
transferring of mails.
HELD: As long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art 310 of the RPC, the crime
is qualified theft. In this case it is mail matter. Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown
to have been in conspiracy with a government employee in order to hold him liable of qualified
theft.

27

Be that as it was may his testimony was refuted when NBI agent testified that petitioner
was instrumental in transferring the contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan handed to them to
their traveling bag, this testimony was also collaborated by Tumagan.
Hizon VS CA
265 SCRA 517
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of PD 704 committed by using sodium for
fishing. Sec 33 of PD 704 provided that the illegal fishing is presumed to have been committed
when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by
electricity are found in a fishing boat. Petitioners alleged that the presumption of guilt violated
the presumption of innocence established by the constitution.
HELD: The legislative has the power to provide that proof of certain facts will constitute
accused provided there is a rational connection between the acts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed. The fact presumed by Section 33 of the PD No 704 is a natural inference from the fact
proved.
Parada VS Veneracio
269 SCRA 371
FACTS: Complainant was charged with estafa. He notified the court of his change of address.
Notice of the hearing was sent to his former address. For failure of the complainant to appear at
the hearing, respondent ordered trial in absentia and rendered judgment convicting him.
HELD: For a valid trial in absentia, the accused must have been notified of the trial and his
failure to appear must be unjustifiable. Complainant had not been duly notified of the trial,
because the notice the notice of hearing was sent to his former address despite the fact that he
notified the court of his change of address. The sending of the notice of hearing to his former
address cannot bind complainant.
Amion VS Chiongson
301 SCRA 614
FACTS: Amion claims the respondent judge erred in appointing a counsel de officio for him on
a hearing day despite the fact that he can hire a counsel de parte of his choice. Because of this he
alleged he was denied of his constitutional right of counsel of his choice.
The fact of the case shows that the case was already pending for almost 4 years. This is
because of a lot of delaying tactic employed by Amion. Among them are that his lawyers was ill,
counsel did not show up, motion for inhibition against the judge, change of counsel more than
once & withdrawal of counsel.
HELD: There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte pursuant to the courts desire to finish the case as
early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
An examination of related provisions in the constitution concerning the right to counsel,
will show that the preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a
person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
De Guzman VS Sandiganbayan
256 SCRA 171

28

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with graft and corruption for his alleged failure to account
P200,000 he received for training program of Department of Agriculture. After the prosecution
had rested the lawyer of petitioner asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to the evidence. The
request was denied. The lawyer invested just the same in filing a demurrer to the evidence. As a
result the case was submitted for decision and petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme court. He filed a motion to set aside his convictions to show
that he had properly disbursed the P200,000 he received.
HELD: Petitioner is about to lose his liberty because his former counsel pursued a carelessly
contrived procedural strategy of investing on filing a demurrer to the evidence although it had
become an imprudent remedy. As a result petitioner was barred from presenting his evidence.
The higher interests of justice and equity demand the petitioner be not penalized for the costly
importuning of his previous counsel. A contrary rule will amount to condoning a serious injustice
to petitioner, who reposed his faith on his previous counsel. The motion should be granted.
De la Rosa VS CA
253 SCRA 499
FACTS: 9 Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against petitioner. The first 3 hearings
were postponed at the instances of petitioner, who claimed that he had no lawyer. The cross
examination of the 1st prosecution was postponed at the instance of petitioner. I other hearing was
postponed at the instance of petitioner, because his lawyer have previous commitment. A hearing
was also postponed upon motion for prosecution without any objection from petitioner because
of a previous out-of-town commitment of the complaining witness.
At the next hearing, the prosecution asked for postponed on the ground that the
complaining witness needed time to refresh his recollection of the details of numerous
transaction involved. Invoking his right to a speedy trial, petitioner objected. The trial court
denied the motion for postponement and dismissed the case.
HELD: The several postponement the accused obtained amount to a waiver of his right to a
speedy trial. The reason of the prosecution for asking for postponement were not capricious. The
dismissal of the case is capricious. It does not give rise to double jeopardy.
People VS Catubig
G.R.No 137842 Aug, 23, 2001
FACTS: Accused was charged the crime of rape with no qualifying circumstances stated in the
complaint. However during the trial it was proven that his victim is his own daughter who is
under 18 years old. He was found guilty by the RTC and sentenced to death.
Upon appeal the accused explained that the lower court erred in not taking into
consideration the fact that the information was defective to failure to state that the accused was
the father of the victim and that the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of commission
of the alleged rape.
HELD: The minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender are special qualifying
circumstances that need to be alleged in the information for the penalty of death to de decreed.
The Constitution guarantees to be inviolable the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It is a requirement that renders it essential for every element
of the offense with which he is charged to be properly alleged in the complaint. In the case at bar
accused should only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua because for failure to include the
qualifying circumstance in the complaint.

29

Maliwat VS CA
256 SCRA 718
FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the CFI charging petitioner with crime of
Falsification of Public and official document. The court notes that from the time of petitioners
arraignment up to the time the prosecution offered its evidence and rested, the hearing were
either reset or cancelled no less than thirty. The court convicted the petitioner of the crime
charged. Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process.
Petitioner further alleged that former clerk of court, Diaz, now the Judge who convicted
him testified against him while Diaz still clerk of court.
HELD: Petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process. The record shows that he
testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Admittedly he was
unable to adduce additional documentary evidence. It was petitioner who sought the
postponement and cancellation of hearings. It took almost a decade from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment.
Regarding the issued raised against Diaz the solicitor general correctly averred that the
testimony of Diaz was limited to certain facts directly connected with or arising from the
performance of his official duties as clerk of court without any pronouncement as to innocence or
guilt of the petitioner.
Perez VS Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29,2001
FACTS: KBP requested the SC to allow live media coverage of the trial against former Pres.
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. Justice is a matter of public interest & the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern.
HELD: The right of the accused prevailed over the right of press and public information. Due
process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until he contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public attention and where
the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence
and arguments give in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An
accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemn and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago; a public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be opened to those who wish to come sit in the
available seats. In the constitutional sense a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of public to observe the proceedings, not too small and not too large.
SEC 15
People VS Labriager
250 SCRA 163
FACTS: Accused was caught selling two bags of marijuana in a buy bust operation conducted
on Jan 21,1988. Accused was found is possession of 115 grams of marijuana. She was convicted
of drug pushing and was sentenced to life imprisonment. When RA 7659 was enacted to life
imprisonment. When RA 7659 was enacted she filed a motion and prays for the retroactive

30

application of the Act, and for her eventual release from confinement at the correctional Institute
as a consequence of the application of the new law to her case.
HELD: Where the decision convicting the accused is already final, the appropriate remedy of
the convict who invoked the retroactive application of a statute is to file a petitioner for habeas
corpus, not a motion for reconsideration with modification of sentence. Rules on habeas corpus
should be liberally applied in cases which are sufficient in substance.
Feria VS CA
325 SCRA 525
FACTS: Petitioner has been under detention for 12 years. He sought to be transferred to the
Bureau of correction in Muntinlupa. Because of such request it was found out that the entire
records of the case which includes the judgment were missing. It was then discovered that t he
records have been destroyed in a fire at the 2nd and 3rd floor of the city Hall.
Petitioner filed a petition for Issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus praying from his
discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention w/o any valid judgment
is illegal and violation of his Constitutional Right to due process.
HELD: The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction
will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by
virtue of writ of Habeas Corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstruction of judicial records
which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense. The writ of Habeas Corpus may
also be availed of where , as a consequence of a judicial proceeding A) there has been a
deprivation of a Constitutional right resulting in a restrain of a person; B) the court has no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, C) an excessive penalty has been imposed as such sentence is
void as to such excess. The burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint.
SEC 16
Guerrero vs CA
257 SCRA 703
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. When the
case was already submitted for decision, it was raffled to a new judge. As the transcripts of
stenographic notes were incomplete, the judge ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the
witnesses. Petitioner claimed double jeopardy.
HELD:
The retaking of the testimonies of the witness will not place petitioner in double
jeopardy, as there has been no termination of the first jeopardy.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
301 SCRA 207
FACTS: This is originally as action by Republic of the Philippines against retired Brig. Gen.
Baldanero alleging that the latter acquired funds, real properties and other assets manifestly out
of proportion, to his total salaries and emoluments as an army officer and as incomes from
business other legitimately acquired properties. Associate Solicitors Tagapan and del Rosario
manifested during the hearing, that they had been relieved from the case and that there were 2
solicitors who were designated for the case. But the latter 2 were not able to attend the case for
they had an official business. Associate Solicitor Tagapan asked for the resetting of the hearing

31

to which the Sandiganbayan reacted adversely. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and that it
be allowed to present evidence in formal trial. It was denied. Counsel contends that the reason
given for the requested resettings of hearings were meritorious ground which were not intended
to delay the case nor violate private respondents rights to speedy trial.
HELD: Petitioner failed to show patent and grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in denying its oral motion for postponement. A careful reading of the question order
of the Sandiganbayan shows that public respondent objected not so much on the assignment of
the case to young and inexperienced solicitors, but that such re-assignment was done on short
notice very close to the date of scheduled hearings. The excuse given by the OSG completely
failed to justify why the re-assignment had to be done so near to the scheduled hearing and worse
the solicitor who were not even present.
SEC 17
Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan
301 SCRA 102
FACTS:
Pasicolan, a public officer, together with two private individuals Romero and
Marcelo were arrested for mail pilferage. They were brought to the NBI headquarters along with
the motorcycle owned by Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their
possession. They were asked to affix their signature on the envelopes of the letters. They did so
in the presence of NBI Administrative and Investigation staff, without any counsel. They were
convicted of qualified theft by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner contend that their signature on the
envelope in inadmissible as evidence for it is done without the assistance of a counsel.
HELD: The signature of the accused, secured during custodial investigation and without
assistance of counsel, which were affixed in the envelopes seized as a means of authenticating
the same as those seized from them are inadmissible evidence, the same being evidence of
admission obtained under Art III, Sec 12 &17 of the constitution. But the letters are not
themselves inadmissible in evidence, they can stand on their own being the fruits of the crime
validly seized during a lawful arrest. Petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on
the basis of the signature found on the letter, but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of
NBI agents and other prosecution witness.
People vs Suarez
267 SCRA 119
FACTS:
Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with Homicide
Accused questions the lower courts decision by challenging the admissibility of their
extrajudicial declaration. Accused claims that their extrajudicial declaration were obtained
through force and intimidation and without the benefit of effective counsel.
HELD: Once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the
accused bears the burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
SEC 19

32

People vs Echegaray
267 SCRA 682
FACTS: The accused was convicted of raping his daughter and sentenced to death pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7959. He argued that the restoration of the death penalty is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Art III, Sec 19 of the Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose
the death penalty. The exercise of the Congress defined only crimes that qualify as heinous. The
preamble of R.A. 7659 sufficiently describes what are to be considered heinous. These are
crimes which by their very nature are despicable because life was callously taken or the victim
was treated like an animal. There are crimes which are abominable because of the significance
and implication of the criminal acts in the scheme of the socio-political and economic context in
which the State find itself to be struggling to provide the underprivileged. R. A. 7659 correctly
identified the crimes warranting the penalty of death.
Echegaray vs Secretary
297 SCRA 754
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted for rape and sentenced to death by lethal injection. Petitioner
argued that execution by lethal injection is a cruel degrading, and inhuman punishment because
R.A. No. 8177 did not provide for the drugs to be used, the dosage for each drugs, the law is
uncertain as to the date of execution and this uncertain as to the date of execution and this
uncertainty causes sufferings to the convict, and the possibility of mistake in administering the
drugs renders lethal injection cruel.
HELD: Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional prescription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. The cruelty which the Constitution protects is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment. While improper doses or improper administration of the
drugs causes severe pain the few minutes of pain do not rise to a constitutional violation. The
implementing details of R.A No 8177 are matters which are properly left to the administrative
officials. Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 requires that all personnel involved in the execution should
be trained.
SEC 20
Vaca vs CA
298 SCRA 656
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by the RTC and affirmed by CA for violation of BP22,
Bouncing Check Law. Petitioner was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment and pay a fine of
P10,000 and cost.
BP22 Sec 1 par 1 provides for a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not
more than 1 year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000 or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court. Petitioner pray that in the alternative the penalty be modified by deleting the
sentence of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them.
HELD: Petitioners are first time offenders. In determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of BP 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed
namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal of social orders. In the case at bar a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the

33

check involve is an appropriate penalty. Sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioner are
ordered to pay a fine of P200,000 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
LIM vs People
GR 130038 September 18, 2000
FACTS: CA & RTC petitioner guilty of twice violating B.P.22 and imposing on her two 1year
imprisonment for each of the 2 violation ordered her to pay 2 fines each amounting P 200,000.
On Aug. 25, 1990 petitioner bought various jewelry worth P 300,00. She wrote a check
dated Aug. 25, 1990 payable to cash drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000 and gave
the check to Seguam. The next day petitioner again purchased jewelries valued at P 241,668 and
issued another check payable to cash dated Aug. 16, 1990, same bank. The 2 checks were
returned when presented with notice of dishonor for the account was closed.
Petitioner argued that she issued 2 checks and gave to Nadera and not Seguam.
HELD:
The gravaman of BP22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious,
and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a good intended and to guide and
prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued in irrelevant in
determining culpability in BP22 one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of
obligation or if there was damage. The damage is done to the banking system. If an act is mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is has the law been violated?
The court affirmed the CA decision with modification that the sentence of imprisonment be
set aside and sentence her to pay P200,000 in each case with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency or non payment not to exceed 6 months (Art. 39 RPC)
SEC 21
People vs Quijada
259 SCRA 191
FACTS: Accused was convicted by the RTC of two offenses which were separately charged in
two separate information. The first was under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the second
was illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866. Both have arisen in the
same incident, so the case were consolidated and joint hearing was held.
HELD: Sec 21, Art III of the Constitution deals with two different kinds of double jeopardy. The
first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment of the same offense, while the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment of the same act. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the
previous and subsequent offense charged.
The elements of illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form are different from the
element of murder or homicide, let alone that these crimes are defined and penalized under
different laws, the former being malum prohibitum, while the latter in mala in se.
Martinez vs CA
237 SCRA 575
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of the crime of libel before the RTC of Manila but was
subsequently dismissed because of the DOJ Secretary order or opinion that the language used in

34

the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable for libel.
Complainant Laurel filed an appeal to CA. The appeal was granted and the appellate court
ordered that the case be remanded to the lower court for arraignment. Petitioner contended that it
violated his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Appeal against the order of dismissal was not foreclosed by the rule of double
jeopardy said order having been issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only (1)
upon a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) a valid plea having
been entered, and (5) the case was dismissal or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused.
The right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to any party
except when the accused is placed in double jeopardy. In a previous case the SC ruled that the
word party must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also
other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus
the party injured has been held to have the right to appeal.
People vs Pimentel
288 SCRA 542
FACTS:
Respondent was previously charged of the crime of subversion. Upon arrest, an
unlicensed revolver and six rounds of ammunition were found in his possession. He was then
subsequently charged of Illegal Possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of
subversion under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Private respondent contends that he was placed
in double jeopardy with the filing of the second information against him.
HELD: In order that the protection against double jeopardy may be used to benefit the accused
the following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action (A) valid complaint and
information (B) competent court (C) defendant had pleased to the charged (D) defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated with out
his express consent. In the case at bar, respondents motion to quash filed in the trial court did not
actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. The private
respondent had not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion. Besides, the
two criminal charges against private respondent are not of the same offense as required by Sec
21. Art III of the Constitution.
Cuison vs CA
269 SCRA 159
FACTS:
The trial court convicted the accused of double homicide and ordered him to pay P
30, 000 to the heirs of each of the victims. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision with the
modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P 50,000. When the case was remanded to
the trial court for promulgation of the decision of the CA, the trial court promulgated the
decision only with respect to civil liability. The CA ordered the trial court to promulgate the
decision anew and to include the affirmance of the conviction of the accused. The accused
invoked double jeopardy on the ground that the first promulgation of the decision of the CA
terminated the criminal cases against him.
HELD:
The trial court promulgated the decision with respect to the civil aspect of the case
only. The promulgation was not merely incomplete. It was also void. The grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court rendered the act void. Since the criminal cases had not yet been
terminated double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.

35

People vs Nitafan
302 SCRA 424
FACTS: Respondent Imelda Marcos was charged of three criminal information for violation of
Sec 4 of Central Bank Circular No 980. Respondent judge dismissed the two cases on the
ground, that Marcos right against double jeopardy was violated. It is respondent judges posture
that based on Solicitor Generals allegation in its motion for consolidation filed in Branch 58 of
Pasig, that the three cases form part of a series of transaction which are subject of the cases
pending before Branch 26 of Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent
judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondents for a series of transaction
would endow it with the functional ability of multiplication or reproduction.
HELD:
The ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge is improper and has
neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy requires the concurrence of three
requisites, thus (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second (2) the first jeopardy
must have been terminated (3) the 2nd jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or
the 2nd offense includes or in necessarily included in the offense charged in the 1 st information, or
is an attempt to commit the same as is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that
no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated.
SEC 22
Wright vs CA
235 SCRA 341
FACTS:
Australia and the Philippines entered into an extradition treaty. The treaty provided
that extradition may be granted irrespective of the date when the offense was committed.
Australia asked that petitioner be extradited for swindling and perjury committed before the
treaty took effect. Petitioner argued that his extradition for offenses committed before the
affectivity of the extradition treaty violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
HELD:
The prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to penal laws only. The extradition
treaty is not a criminal statute. Therefore it is not covered against ex post facto laws.
Lacson vs Secretary
GR 128096, Jan 20, 199
FACTS: Accused Lacson was among those accused of rub out of the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members. The Sandiganbayan initially took cognizance over the case as the policemen involved
in said murder were public officers. But petitioner were able to persuade the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the case to the RTC because none of the principal accused are in the salary grade of 27
pursuant to RA 7975. However, RA 8249 was enacted, which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It specifies the rank of superintendent as covered by the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that RA 8249 is an ex post facto law.
HELD: Ex facto law generally prohibits retrospectively of penal laws. RA 8249 is not a penal
law. It is substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Not being a penal law,
the retroactive application of RA 8249 cannot be challenge as unconstitutional.
An ex post facto law is a law that (1) makes an act criminal before the passing of the law,
which was innocent when committed, and punishes the act (2) aggravates a crime (3) inflicts a

36

greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed (4) alters the legal rules
of evidence. (5) alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage (6) imposes a penalty of
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful (7) deprives accused of lawful protection
when he was entitled to.
People vs Taguba
229 SCRA 188
FACTS: The accused were found guilty of eight counts of illegal recruitment and convicted of
illegal recruitment on a large scale in violation of Presidential Decree No. 2018.
HELD: Under Presidential Decree No. 2018, illegal recruitment is committed on a large scale
if it was committed against three or more persons. Presidential Decree No. 2018 took effect of on
February 10, 1986. Since only two of the complainants were illegally recruited after this date.
Presidential Decree No. 2018, cannot apply to the accused retroactivity or otherwise it would be
an ex post facto law.
Benedicto vs CA
GR 125359 Sept 4, 2001
FACTS:
On Dec. 27, 1991. Accused Imelda Marcos & Rivera were indicted for violation of
CB Circular 960 prohibits person from maintaining foreign exchange account abroad without
prior CB, approval for foreign exchange funded expenditure obtained from banking system.
Circular 1318 and 1253 contained saving clause excepting from their coverage pending criminal
action, involving Circular No. 960. Petitioners contend that they are prosecuted for acts
punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal of
Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353.
HELD: The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of Constitution is
does the law sought to be applied retroactivity take from an accused any right that was regarded
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution as vital as the protection of life and liberty and
which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him? The crucial
words of the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty. The test is not applicable to the
penal clause of RA 7653. Penal laws and laws not penal in nature have provisions defining
offenses prescribing the penalties for their violations operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be
given retroactive effect except when they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in RA 7653, is
any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate
retroactively. There is therefore no ex post facto law in this case.
ARTICLE IV - V
Yu vs Santiago
169 SCRA 384
FACTS:
Petitioner was previously a Portuguese citizen. He became a naturalized Filipino.
He applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport. He declared his nationality as Portuguese
in commercial documents he signed. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered
his deportation. Petitioner argued that he was a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
The acts of petitioner considered together constitute an express
renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship acquired through naturalization. Express renunciation
means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or

37

implication. With best knowledge and legal capacity after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippines citizen, Petitioner resumes his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen. Such resumption of Portuguese citizenship is inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
Labo vs Comelec
176 SCRA 1
FACTS: Petitioner married an Australian citizen in 1976 (but was later annulled) but did not
automatically became an Australian. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized
through a formal and positive process. As a condition of his Australian naturalization he took the
oath of allegiance and renounced all other allegiance.
He came home to the Philippines using Australian passport. He later asked for a change
of his status and was granted certificate of residence. He also categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statement voluntarily made by him.
Petitioner claims that his naturalization in Australia made him only a dual national and
did not divert him of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
CA No. 63 enumerates the mode by which Filipino citizenship may be lost.
Among these are (1) naturalization to foreign country (2) express renunciation of citizenship
and (3) subscription to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of a foreign country,
all of these are applicable to petitioner. Under Art IV Sec 5 of the present constitution.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. Even if the marriage was annulled the fact shows that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced Australian citizenship. The
annulment did not automatically reinstate him as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA 63
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired (1) by direct act of congress, (2) by naturalization, (3)
by repatriation. It does not appear that petitioner reacquire citizenship by any of these methods.
Aznar vs COMELEC
185 SCRA 703
FACTS: On November 19, 1987, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of governor. On January 22, 1988, petitioner filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen, since he registered with Commission on Immigration and Deportation
as an alien.
HELD:
Respondent is the son of a Filipino father and is presumed to be a Filipino
citizen. Petitioner failed to present any proof that respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner merely argued that since respondent was issued an alien certificate of registration and
was given permission to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, he has been naturalized as an American citizen. Respondent denied that he took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. From the mere fact that petitioner obtained an Alien
certificate of registration, it does not follow that he has renounced Philippine citizenship.
Co vs Electoral Tribunal
199 SCRA 692
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were candidates for Congressman. Respondent won,
petitioner filed an election protest on the ground that respondent is not a natural born Filipino
citizen. The grandfather of respondent became a permanent resident. The mother of respondent is

38

a natural born, Filipino citizen. His father applied for naturalization and was declared a Filipino
citizen. When he took his oath of allegiance, respondent was a minor. Respondent passed the
board examination for CPA, such requires Philippine citizenship. He worked in the Central Bank
as examiner. He is a registered voter. Respondent has considered himself a Filipino.
HELD:
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subject on April 11, 1899 and were residing in the Philippines and their children born
subsequently were conferred the status of Filipino citizen. Respondents grandfather was
qualified and formally elected Philippine citizenship when he became of age, thus, he was
already a Filipino citizen because of the naturalization of his father when he was a minor.
The acts of respondent are formal manifestation of his choice of Filipino citizenship.
Respondent could have foreseen that the 1987 Constitution would require him to have a sworn
statement electing Philippine citizenship. Sec 1 Art IV should be applied to those who elected
Philippine citizenship before February 2, 1987.
Republic vs De la Rosa
232 SCRA 785
FACTS:
A petitioner for naturalization was filed by Frivaldo. The trial court directed the
publication of the petition and order in the O.G. and a newspaper of general circulation for 3
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should at least 6 months before the scheduled
date of hearing. But through the petitioners motion, the court heard the petition before the
scheduled date of hearing, the change of schedule was not published and it was heard within 6
months from the last publication of hearing. The petition was granted and petitioner took his oath
of allegiance the same day.
Petitioner used to be a Filipino Citizen but became naturalized U.S. citizen. Ran for
governor and won 1992 election.
HELD:
Naturalization procedure should be complied by everyone as prescribed by law
and not just select the requirements he think is applicable to him and disregard the rest. Failure to
comply with the publication and posting requirements under Revised Naturalization Law
rendered null and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and oath of allegiance
taken.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the Solicitor General of his copy of the
decision. A decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until
after two years from its promulgation. Courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petitioner for naturalization before its finality. Petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines
therefore not qualified to hold public office.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed elected governor on January 1988 election. A petition to
annual his proclamation was filed on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalize in U.S. on Jan. 20 1983. Petitioner insisted that he was a Filipino because his
naturalization as an American was no voluntary (force because of martial law). He contended
that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural born citizen is a sufficient
repatriation. He further claims that his active participation in election automatically forfeit his
American citizenship.

39

HELD:
The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was not his own free choice must
be rejected. There are many Filipinos in the U.S. similarly situated who did not take oath of
allegiance to the U.S. Even if he lost his American citizenship by his participation in Phil
election, such did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. By simply
filing his certificate of candidacy, he has not effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. That is
not the formal declaration required for repatriation. Citizenship is favored by the Constitution
and law. But once surrendered and renounced it is gone and cannot be lightly restored. The
returning renegade must show by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty land
love.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of
governor. Respondent filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen. While the petition was granted, the motion for reconsideration of petition was not denied
until after the election on May 8, 1995. Petitioner won as governor. On May 11, 1995, the
COMELEC, denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. It then ordered the
proclamation of respondent as the winner since he obtained the 2 nd highest member of votes.
Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation. He claimed that his petition for
repatriation was granted by a special Committee on Naturalization created by PD 725 and he
took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995.
HELD:
The repatriation of petitioner should be deemed to retroact to the date of the
filing of his application on Aug. 17, 1994. Statutes which are curative and which create new
rights should be given retroactive effect. P.N. 725 created a new right and provides for a new
remedy to reacquire Philippine citizenship under simplified procedures of repatriation. It is not
only the law which should be given retroactive effect. Even the repatriation granted under it
should be deemed to have retroacted to the date of application. It is the intent of the law to
benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos. Retroactivity also prevents prejudice to
applicants in case of delay in the processing of their application.
Caasi vs COMELEC
191 SCRA 229
FACTS: Private respondent Miguel was elected Municipal Mayor of Bolinao Pangasinan.
Petitioner who was a rival candidate of Miguel sought the disqualification of private respondent
(elected mayor) on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao.
HELD: To be disqualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of the status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of the USA. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any elective office.

40

Marcos vs. COMELEC

243 SCRA 300
FACTS: Private respondent Montejo filed a petition of cancellation and disqualification of the
candidacy of Imelda Marcos alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency. Private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the one year requirement on
the evidence of declaration made by her in her voter registration record and certificate of
candidacy stated that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence
HELD:
When the constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only
of domicile. The court has stated many times that an individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. The absence from legal residence to
pursue a profession, to study, or to do other things of temporary nature does not constitute loss of
residence in Tacloban City her residence since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate
of candidacy.
Aquino vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 400
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the 2nd district of Makati City. He provided in his certificate of candidacy that
he has been residing in district for 1 year and 13 days as evidenced by a lease contract between
petitioner and an owner of a condominium unit in said city. MOVE Makati, a duly registered
political party, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner lacked
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as provided by Sec 6, Art VI of the
Constitution. Facts show that the petitioner was a resident of Tarlac since his birth, hence 52
years immediately preceding that election.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
second district of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but
domicile of choice. The place where a party actually or contructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, his domicile, is that to which the constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purpose of election law, from the data furnished by petitioner to the Comelec at various times
during his political career, what stands consistently clear is that his domicile of origin of records
up to the filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 election was Conception
Tarlac. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. Petitioner must prove actual removal. Petitioner is
ineligible for the elective position of representative of Makati.
Rodriguez vs COMELEC
259 SCRA 296
FACTS: Petitioner Rodriguez and private respondent Marquez were protagonist for the position
of Governor in Quezon Province. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly elected governor.
Marquez challenge Rodriguez victory as the former revealed that Rodriguez left the U.S. where a
charge is pending against the latter for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted
grand theft of personal property.
The issue raised has whether or not Rodriguez was considered a fugitive from justice
so as not to qualify him for the said gubernatorial post. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on
June 25, 1985, while the filing of the felony complaint against him was on Nov. 12, 1985 and the
issuance of the arrest warrant was almost five months after.

41

HELD:
The Supreme Court has already ruled that a fugitive from justice includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition stated indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. There can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez case just cannot fit in this concept. For it is impossible for him to have known
about such felony complaint & arrest warrant at the time he left the U.S
Bayan Muna vs COMELEC
GR 147613, June 26, 2001
FACTS:
This is a case about the party list system of the 2001 Election. The COMELEC
approved the manifestation. Of 154 parties and organization and quality them for the party list
election. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the
party list system has intended to benefit the marginalized and under represented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
HELD:
The court ruled that Sec 9 of RA 7941 must be followed such as that the nominee
must be natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for
a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of election, able to read and wrote, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days
preceding the day of the election, is at least 25 years old on day of election, and not more than 30
years old if representing youth sector. The nominee of the party must belong and represent
marginalize by a retiree. Nominees must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

Appendix to Minnies Habeas Corpus Opus

Habeas Corpus # 9
Moncupa v. Enrile
Facts: Moncupa et al were arrested & detained. He was alleged to be a National Democratic
Font staff member. A Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued vs. them. After 2
separate investigations, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive
organization. Both investigators recommended his prosecution only for illegal possession of
firearms & subversive documents. The petitioners motions for bail were deined. Respondents
claim that the privilege of the writ of HC had been suspended as to Moncupa & filed a MTD
stating Since the pet. is free & no longer under the custody of the resps., the present petition for
HC may be deemed moot & academic as in similar cases.
Held: Moncupa may have been released fr. his detention cell, but the restraints attached to his
temporary release preclude freedom of action & under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant
the Courts relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal. It is not physical restraint alone
w/c is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
The principle is clear. A release that renders a pet. for a WHC moot & academic must be
one w/c is free fr. involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, & where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent devts., become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
42

Toyoto, et al. V. Ramos

Facts: Petitioners temporarily released fr. detention. So, does writ lie?
Held: Ordinarily, a pet. for HC becomes mute & epidemic (he he) when the restraint on the
liberty of the pets. Is lifted either temporarily or permanently. But the instant case presents a
diff. situation. The Q to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a
person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense.
Such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws & not of men principle. Under this
principle the moment a person is acquitted on a crim charge he can no longer be detained or rearrested for the same offense.
Alimpoos v. CA
Facts: Reynaldo Mosquito has been accused of Robbery w/ less Serious Physical Injuries. He
was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest which was issued without the observance of the
legal requirements for the issuance thereof. Mosquito filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before
the Trial Court. Mosquito named as defendants in the case the Prov. Fiscal and the private
offended parties. he also filed a claim for damages premised on Arts. 32 (4) and other applicable
provisions of the Civil Code.
Issues:
1. WON the writ of Habeas Corpus if the proper remedy for Mosquito?
2. WON damages may be awarded in a Habeas Corpus case?
3. WON private offended party may take part in the case?
Held:
1. The WHC is not the proper remedy. When a warrant of arrest is being assailed for improper
preliminary investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or petition for
reinvestigation of the case. It is the gen. rule that a HC shld. not be resorted to when there is
another remedy available.
2. No. Damages cannot be awarded. The sole function of the writ is to relieve fr. unlawful
imprisonment and ordinarily it cannot be properly used for another purpose.
3. While the issuance of the writ connotes the commencement of a civil action, the proceedings
for HC is technically not yet a suit bet. private parties. The proper party is the Chief of Police or
the person having the accused in detention and not the private offended party. It is also only the
fiscal who may appeal the order granting the writ as mandated by Sec. 19 RULE 41 of the ROC.
Salvana v. Saliendra
Facts: Salvana and Saliendra are the parents of 15 year old Felicisima Salvana. The minor is
presently in the custody of a justice of peace. The parents filed a petition for WHC to regain
parental authority over the minor. The pet. was denied on the ground that the parents are guilty
of abusing their child by forcing her to marry another against the her wishes.
Issue: WON WHC should issue?
Held: It should issue. A WHC is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter even though the child is in custody of a 3rd person of her OWN
FREE WILL. Neither the fact that the parents sought to compel her to marry against her wishes
a legal ground for depriving parents their parental authority over the child as to deny them the
right.
SUAREZ VS. CA
Facts: Respondent Manese filed a petition for writ of HC vs. petitioner Renato Suarez, his
mother & sister. She filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file another
action for custody of minor, contending that the issue as to who has rightful custody of the child

43

could be fully adjudicated in another action and not in the present action for HC. TC granted
motion but with prejudice.
Issue: WON order of dismissal with prejudice is res judicata to present action for custody of
minor & support
Held: The order of dismissal cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits which
would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor. TC dismissed the case without
stating the reasons or the basis therefore, contrary to the constitutional mandate that decisions
rendered by the court must clearly & distinctly state the law & facts on which it is based. It is
worthy to note though that the ground upon which the motion to dismiss was filed was erroneous
since the question as to who shall have custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the
petition for writ of HC pursuant to Rule 102, ROC.
The controversy in the instant case involves a litigation initiated by the natural mother
over the welfare & custody of her child, in which the State has a paramount interest. The
fundamental policy in the Constitution promoting & protecting the welfare of children should not
be disregarded by a mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family & youth.
GALVEZ VS. CA
Facts: Three separate information (1 homicide, 2 frustrated homicide) were filed vs. Galvez
(incumbent mayor of one of the towns in Bulacan ... Peter, dont follow his footsteps, OK?) for
the alleged shooting of the Vinculados. Said infos. were later withdrawn in a Motion by the
prosecutor, but on the same day, filed four separate information (same three plus illegal
possession of firearms). Judge ordered the arrest of the petitioners since no bail was
recommended.
Issue: WON petition for HC was properly filed together with the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus
Held: Writ of HC and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to
the supervisory powers of the higher courts. The writ reaches the body & jurisdictional matters
while certiorari reaches the record. But HC does not lie where pet. has the remedy of appeal or
certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for
the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having
jurisdiction over the person & subject matter.
Writ cannot be granted in the case at bar since petitioners failed to adduce any
justification or exceptional circumstances which would warrant the grant of such writ. HC is not
ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. In
the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued & the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Petition for HC is not the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial.
PEOPLE VS. FIGUEROA
FACTS:
The accused were found by the Philippine Navy off the province of Palawan with
untaxed blue-seal cigarettes in their possession. They were brought to Manila and investigated.
During this preliminary investigation, each of the accused executed affidavits and waived their
rights under Art. 125 of the RPC (arbitrary detention). On recommendation of the Manila fiscal,
the accused were brought back to Palawan and another preliminary investigation was held,
allegedly for the purpose of affirm(ing) the truth of the sworn statements. This time, however,
the accused declined counsel and readily affirmed their previous affidavits. Their counsel filed a
MTQ, claiming that the information was filed without a preliminary investigation and, if there
was, it was held in Manila and not Palawan where the alleged crime was committed. The lower
court granted the MTQ, holding that the preliminary investigation was conducted hurriedly.
ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly dismissed the information based on the lack of
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
NO. Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given
more ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation, what it should
have properly done was not to dismiss the information but to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. The absence of such
investigation did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much
less did it affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the case.
44

ENRILE VS. SALAZAR

FACTS: Juan Ponce Enrile, Gregorio Honasan, and the Panlilio spouses were arrested by PNP
agents on a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Salazar. They were denied bail, none being
recommended in the information which charged them with the crime of rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the failed coup attempt of Dec. 1990.
Enrile and the Panlilios filed this petition for habeas corpus, invoking denial of the constitutional
right to bail.
ISSUE:
WON a petition for habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial.
HELD:
NO. The criminal case before Judge Salazar was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there. The Court will no longer countenance pleas like the present that clearly
short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the
original competence of the lower courts.
PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: A criminal complaint was filed against Governor Paredes for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. A preliminary investigation was held but the summons for
Paredes to appear therein did not reach him. An information was subsequently filed and a
warrant of arrest issued against Paredes. He now petitions for habeas corpus on the ground that
the preliminary investigation was invalid and that the offense has prescribed.
ISSUE: WON the circumstances constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
HELD: NO. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction
over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The
remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a
preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court,
instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to
conduct a preliminary investigation.
The defense of prescription of the offense should be pleaded in the criminal action,
otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a proper ground for a motion to quash which should
be filed before the arraignment of the accused for whether the crime may still be prosecuted and
penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.
All questions which may arise in the orderly course of a criminal prosecution are to be
determined by the court to whose jurisdiction the defendant has been subjected by the law, and
the fact that a defendant has a good and sufficient defense to a criminal charge on which he is
held will not entitle him to his discharge on habeas corpus.
ILAGAN V. ENRILE
(When we went to Davao, Judge Quitain, the Daddy of Mamay, introduced as to Atty. Ilagan who
was then pres. of Integrated Bar of the Phils. Davao Chapter. May picture pa kami w/ him.)
Facts: Atty. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City & detained on the basis of a mission order
allegedly issued by the Ministry of Natl. Defense. He was visited by 15 lawyers fr. IBP Davao
Chapter. One of the visitors was also arrested & detinaed on the basis of an unsigned MO. After
several days, another IBP member was arrested. Petitioners argue that the arrests were illegal &
violative of the Consti, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of mission orders. Resps.
Answered that the Writ was suspended as to them by virtue of Proc. #2045-A.
Held: IF the detained attys. Question their detention bec. of improper arrest, or that no prelim
inv has been conducted, the remedy is not a pet. for a writ of HC but a Motion for the TC to
quash the Warrant of Arrest, &/or the info on grounds provided by the rules or to ask for an
investigation/ reinvestigation of the case.
45

This pet. is now mood & academic bec. of criminal charges for rebellion filed vs. the
lawyers.
Luna v. Plaza
Facts: Supporting the complaint for murder were sworn statements of prosecution witness in the
form of Q & A taken by the PC investigator, & subscribed & sworn to before the resp. Judge at
the time of filing comp. Judge read to the proecution witnesses the Q & A. This was how he
examined them. The latter declared that their answers were true, freely & voluntarily made, &
that they fully understood the Q & A & were willing to sign their respective affidavits. Judge
issued warrant of arrest. Pet. filed writ for certiorari on the ground that he was deprived of
liberty w/o due process since the imprisonment & detention was the result of a WOA issued by
resp. judge in violation of law since the exam was not reduced to in writing in the form of
searching Q & A. Judge claims substantial compliance.
Held: There was substantial compliance. The existence of probable cause depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the exam. RA 3828 does not prohibit
the Mun Judge fr. adopting the questions asked by the previous investigator.
The term searching Q & A means only taking into consideration the purpose of the
prelim exam, w/c is to determine whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense
has been committed & the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be
issued & the accused be held for trial, such Qs having tendency to show the commission of the
crime & the perpetrator.

46