Yu vs Hon.

Rosa Samson-Tatad and People of

the Philippines

was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No

reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be
similarly addressed.

Petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin

respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad (RTC).

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes

the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it
involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to
this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal
cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

FACTS:
1. In May 26, 2005 RTC rendered decision convicting the
petitioner of estafa. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9,
2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC,
alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that
would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted. (Denied)
2. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC,
alleging that pursuant to our Neypes v Court of Appeals, she
had a fresh period of 15 dys from Nov. 3, 2005, the receipt
of the denial of her motion for new trial or up to Nov. 18,
2005 within which to file a notice of appeal.
3. December 8, 2005, Prosecution filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal for being filed 10 dys late, arguing that Neypes v
Court of Appeals is inapplicable to appeals in criminal
cases.
4. Petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injuction to enjoin the RTC from acting on
the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision.
ISSUE: w/not RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the
prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal
within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules
of Court, applying the fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes.
HELD:
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural
or inherent
it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin
and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by
statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of the law.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil
cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to
appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15
days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil
cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to
appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on
which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that
[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though
differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as
legal results are concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the
order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner

seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005,
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November
3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for
new trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad
is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further
exercising jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to
dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The
respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to
the petitioners appeal in Criminal Case and to elevate the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the
appealed decision on the merits.

Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. vs

Villareal
Petition on Certiorari
Facts:
1. Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk)
is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation
engaged in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW)
merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on
the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors of RTW
merchandise.
2. Boardwalk filed an amended complaint for replvin against
Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter's
alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
MTC: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant adjudging that the former has the
right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle and for
the latter to pay the costs of the suit.
3. Villareal move for reconsideration.
RTC: reversing the MeTC decision.
Defendant Villareal has the right of possession to
and the value of subject vehicle described in the complaint.
Hence, plaintiff is directed to deliver the subject vehicle to
defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made.
4. Boardwalk filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by RTC on Dec. 14 2006. Boardwalk received it on
Jan. 19, 2007.
5. On February 5, 2007, Boardwalk filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review, praying that it
be granted 30 days, or until March 7, 2007, to file its Petition
for Review.
6. On even date, Boardwalk filed a notice of Appeal with the
RTC which the said court denied for being a wrong mode of
appeal.
CA: In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that
Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying
the docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have done
so with the CA as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk's
erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was as if no
Motion for Extension was filed, and the subsequent March 7,
2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus
late and beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for
under Rule 42.

The CA added that Boardwalk's prayer for a 30-day

extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular,
because the maximum period that may be granted is
only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further
extension of 15 days should only be granted for the
most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the
present case.

Boardwalk's request for the Court to review its case on the

merits should be denied as well. The import of the Court's
foregoing pronouncements necessarily renders the R TC
judgment final and unassailable; it became final and
executory after the period to appeal expired without
Boardwalk perfecting an appeal. As such, the Court may no
longer review it.

ISSUE: w/not petitioner can invoke the liberal

construction of the rules to effect substantial justice
in accordance with rule 1, section 6 of the 1997 rules
of civil procedure.

(Petition Denied)

Santos vs Go
Petition on Certiorari

HELD:
Facts:
Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the
foregoing rules.
The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and
Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant
pleadings and other material portions of the record must
likewise be attached to the Petition.

1. The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly entered into a
Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop
several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
owned by MSDC.

The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by

a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. If the
petitioner is a juridical entity, as in this case, it must be
shown that the person signing in behalf of the corporation is
duly authorized to represent said corporation. In this case,
no special power of attorney or board resolution was
attached to the Petition showing that Lo was authorized to
sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings.
In addition, petitioner failed to attach to the Petition copies of
the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the
record.

2. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert

an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class
residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational
complex. The said Project Agreement clothed FEPI with
authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.

Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently

submitting a board resolution showing Lo's authority to sign
and act on behalf of Boardwalk, as well as copies of the
relevant pleadings. Now, it prays that the Court consider
these as substantial compliance with the Rules.

4. Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI,

however, failed to develop the property. Neither did it
release the TCT to Go. Go demanded fulfillment of the
terms and conditions of their agreement.

Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency

and relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner
committed multiple violations of the Rules which should
sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be
shown below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not
filing the Petition within the reglementary period and paying
the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court.
These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful
fees with the RTC.
The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant
of another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension
is allowed only for the most compelling reason
More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the
appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner "upon the
timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably,
petitioner's appeal was not perfected because of its failure to
timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other lawful
fees before the proper court which is the CA. Consequently,
the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition because it
never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the
RTC's Decision had long become final and executory.
At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner's
right of appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a
strict observance of the periods of appeal, which
requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.
Nor may the negligence of Boardwalk's former counsel be
invoked to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate
court's pronouncement. His negligence or mistake
proceeded from carelessness and ignorance of the basic
rules of procedure. This does not constitute excusable
negligence that would extricate and excuse Boardwalk from
compliance with the Rules.

3. Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38

from FEPI. Lot 17 measured approximately 1,079 square
meters and the purchase price agreed upon was
P4,304,000. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was
the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI.

5. FEPI explained that FEPIs hands were tied by a cease

and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Said order was the subject of several
appeals now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its
clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and
would resume developing the properties once the disputes
had been settled in its favor.
6. Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPIs
statements and he made several demands upon FEPI to
return his payment of the purchase price in full,
7. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed a
separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316
and 318 of RPC in the office of Prosecutor in Pasig.
8. Petitioners alleged that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City
has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on
the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the
contract was not executed nor were the payments made in
Pasig City. They averred that FEPI was not the owner of the
project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint
venture with MSDC, who is the real owner.
9. Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had
jurisdiction over the case. He argued that the Contract to
Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPIs
office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig
City address. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI
appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not
a mere developer.
PROSECUTOR:
no misrepresentation stating that: (1) the Contract to Sell did
not mention FEPI as the owner of the property;
(2) no Deed of Sale had been executed by the parties, then
petitioners are not yet bound to deliver the certificate of title
3) the City Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is
the HLURB, which has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
and controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No.
1344
10. Go appealed the City Prosecutors Resolution to the
Department of Justice (DOJ),

DOJ: reversed the decision

11. Petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals,
CA: The appellate court opined that a
petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be
availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies only to
agencies
or
officers
exercising
quasi-judicial
functions. The decision to file an information or not
is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.
ISSUE: w/not a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper
mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal
case.
HELD:
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly shows that it governs appeals to the Court of Appeals
from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of
Tax Appeals or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not
among the agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43.
We cannot agree with petitioners submission that
a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and
that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasijudicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of
those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause
to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to
the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition for review.
Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review
properly under Rule 45, petitioners want us to reverse the
findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for
review under Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much
we are not inclined to do, for we have no basis to review the
DOJs factual findings and its determination of probable
cause.
courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the
public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged. He may
dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge
insufficient in form or substance, or without any ground. Or,
he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his
view is sufficient and in proper form. Findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless
made with grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing
reason
for
us
to
deviate
from
prevailing
jurisprudence. (Petition denied)

5. Petitioner appealed in Civil Service Commission. (denied)

6. He filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition
was denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c),
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly for
failure to attach certified true copies of material
portions of the records and supporting papers.
ISSUE: w/not the Court of Appeals committed grave
error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner
based on pure technicality.
HELD:
The court already held that Section 6, Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Court is not to be construed as
imposing the requirement that all supporting papers
accompanying the petition should be certified true copies.
We compared this provision with its counterpart provision in
Rule 42, on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, and
noted that under the latter, only the judgments or final orders
of the lower court need to be certified true copies or
duplicate originals. In numerous resolutions issued by this
Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what
is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the
questioned judgment, final order or resolution.
Further, we note that petitioner had attached
certified true copies of the documents supporting his Motion
for Reconsideration and Compliance. As previously held,
submission of a required document with the Motion for
Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with
Section 3, Rule 46.
This Court is not a trier of facts, and its function is
limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower court. In this case, we find no
exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent reason to
set aside the factual findings of the CSC in sustaining the
action of respondent in the dropping of petitioner from the
rolls on the ground that he was found AWOL (absent without
official leave).
The CSC noted that petitioner had admitted that
effective March 2, 1998, he was absent without approved
leave. Petitioners unauthorized absences, as found by the
CSC, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, a ground for disciplinary action under E.O. No. 292
or the Administrative Code of 1987. For his services are
essential to the efficient delivery of medical services and the
exigencies of the service require his presence in the office.
We agree that there is legal basis for dropping petitioner
from the rolls.

Jaro vs CA
Petition for Review

Gonzales vs CSC
Petition for Review
Facts:
1. Petitioner Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II
assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine
Childrens Medical Center (PCMC). Petitioner started
absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and
without explaining the reason for his absence to his
superiors.
2. In view of the exigency of petitioners functions, HR
Manager Officer, wrote a letter directing the petitioner to
report for work within three (3) days from receipt of said
notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls.
3. During his absence, petitioner was seen on several
occasions within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the
Budget Office, Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He
allegedly visited the clinic without consulting any medical
problem and when Dr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he
was not found in his house.
4. officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported
petitioners irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to
Dr. Lillian V. Lee, Executive Director of PCMC,
recommending that petitioner be dropped from the rolls.
Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed
to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from
the rolls.

Facts:
1. Rosario Vda. de Pelaez (respondent for brevity) filed a
complaint for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
Provincial Adjudicator Board, Lucena City, Quezon
(Provincial Adjudicator for brevity).
2. Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late
Rosenda Reyes y Padua (Rosenda for brevity) was the
original owner of a parcel of coconut land.
3. Rosenda allegedly instituted respondent and her husband,
the late Igmedio Pelaez, as tenants of the land. In 1978,
Ricardo Padua Reyes (Ricardo for brevity), the heir of
Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who, respondent
alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land.
4. Petitioner countered that respondent is not and had never
been a tenant of the land for respondent never shared in the
harvests nor was respondent given any share as payment
for her work. In 1978, when petitioner purchased the land
from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to remain on the
land allegedly with the understanding that petitioner could
remove respondents house at any time if petitioner so
desired.
5. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.
In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the
Provincial Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as

evidence were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein

were material to the resolution of the case.
6. Respondent appealed the decision to the DARAB
DARAB: reversing the decision
7. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal on certiorari with the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV of the
DARABs New Rules of Procedure.
CA: the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
dismissing outright the petition. The Resolution reads:
Upon examination of the present appeal on certiorari, the
Court RESOLVED to outrightly DISMISS the same for the
following reasons:
(a) it should be in the form of a petition for review as required
by Supreme Court Revised Adm. Circ. No. 1-95; and
(b) the annexes to the petition are certified as true xerox
copy by counsel for the petitioner, and not by the proper
public official who has custody of the records, in violation of
the same Circular and Adm. Circ. No. 3-96.
8. Petitioner filed his Amended Petition. On November 8,
1996, upon verification that his petition had been dismissed,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of Amended Petition. (denied)
ISSUE: w/not petitioner is entitled to an annulment of the
impugned decision and resolutions of the darab and the
honorable court of appeals?
HELD:
As stated earlier, the DARAB decision on its face
does not show that the DARAB blatantly misapplied the
fundamental rules of evidence to the facts of the case. The
DARAB decision was thus the proper subject of a petition for
review. The next crucial issue for our consideration is
whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
when it dismissed outright the appeal and refused to give
due course to the amended petition.
At the time that petitioner appealed the DARAB
decision to the Court of Appeals, Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 was then the rule that governed appeals to
the Court of Appeals from judgments or final orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies, including
the DARAB. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 has
now been formulated as Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal for two reasons.
First, the appeal was not in the form of a petition
for review as required by Supreme Court Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95.

Second, the annexes attached to the petition were

neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true copies.
The annexes were only certified as true xerox copies by the
counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity,
in contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
defective petition deserved to be dismissed, the amended
petition filed by petitioner should have been given due
course. Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper
form, accompanied by annexes, all of which were certified
true copies by the DARAB. This is more than substantial
compliance
The amended petition no longer contained the
fatal defects that the original petition had but the Court of
Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the
original petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and
that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been
advanced to the court for it to depart from the mandatory
requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
The decisions of the Provincial Adjudicator and the
DARAB are in sharp conflict with each other. The Court of
Appeals could have broken this impasse by giving due
course to petitioners appeal. The Court of Appeals is in a
better position to fully adjudicate the instant case for it can
delve into the records to determine the probative value of the
evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator
and of the DARAB.
After all, the Court of Appeals is empowered by its
Revised Internal Rules to require parties to submit additional
documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of
substantial justice. Moreover, the Court of Appeals could
order that the original records of the case be elevated to it
for the full adjudication of the case. Thus, the remand of this
case to the Court of Appeals is necessary for it to decide the
appeal on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated October 23, 1996, November 15, 1996 and
January 6, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED
to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and
give due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
42231, and to decide the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.