Reeves - Enactment of Gender

The Embodied Enactment of Gender: Penetrating Lacan,

Butler and the Phallus
Aaron Reeves
Abstract
This essay attempts to use Lacan, and his critics, in developing a useful theory for the study of
gender, in particular masculinity. I argue that Lacans theory of phallus-determined gender is
untenably static and that Lacan can pluralise the phallus, by allowing it to shift to other body parts
and by not fixing its relation to the genitals. This variable view of the bodily Imaginary focuses our
attention on how gender is organised around the relations to and perceptions of the subjects body
and the bodies of others. In addition, Butlers theory of the materialisation of bodies allows this
Lacanian focus to be empirically grounded in embodied enactments of gender (see Mol: 2007).
Despite the rigidity of Lacans theory of the Imaginary it is possible to use the cracks iek sees in
the Law to posit individual agency through Butlers idea of performativity. Finally, Butlers use of
Foucault (and her resulting rejection of the real) is deemed incommensurable with Lacans thought
and is therefore rejected.
Introduction
Jacques Lacan and Judith Butler have been both widely praised and attacked and seem to
polarise their readers. Yet, the originality and complexity of their thought has provided
fertile ground for gender studies. Within the following discussion Lacans ideas around the
Phallus, the body and Power will be presented and analysed in an effort toward
understanding what Lacan can offer to gender studies. In this essay it will be argued that
incorporating Lacanian theory into an understanding of masculinities will providing a fruitful
framework to explore how an individuals gender is enacted through their perception of and
relation to their body and the bodies of others. Moreover, by using Butler it is possible to
overcome some of the issues in Lacan that suggest a symbolic fixity as gender relates to the
Phallus.
This essay will not be able to describe fully the intricacies of either Lacan (see 2007 [1977];
Homer: 2005; iek: 2007) or Butler (2006 [1990]: 1993), however to appreciate the
argument that follows some familiarity would be helpful. In order to provide this, some
description is provided, but it is done in a summary form. Moreover, to sustain the level of
argument this essay will be constrained primarily to the work of Lacan and Butler, although
there is a much broader literature available (see Braidotti: 2002; Grosz: 1990; Irigaray: 1985
[1977]; Rose: 1996)
Having and Being the Phallus?
Lacan argues that all notions of a stable subject are a fiction and therefore that any notion of
a biologically determined gender is also fictional (see Homer: 2005). The subject is
constituted by relations with other subjects and by the unconscious, which involves a
recognition of, and positioning in relation to, the symbolic phallus (Lacan: 2007 [1977]). The
phallus is always a lack and therefore represents a failure to accomplish jouissance1. In other
words, the total fulfilment of jouissance is a fundamental, unconscious drive that is ruptured
when the subject acknowledges that either, as men, they must pretend to have the phallus
which they believe is the object of desire, while recognising that they never do possess it.
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Or, as women, that they must masquerade as the phallus which they believe is the object of
desire of the other, which they never can be. The phallus is the desired signifier of both
genders (Lacan: 2007 [1977]). Some preliminary points worthy of note here are, first, the
subjects gender is organised by a relation to their own embodiment and also by a relation to
the embodiment of the Other. Second, this pattern of gender is based on a heterosexual
norm. Third that Lacan advocates a form of symbolic determinism. Fourth, that this
argument of having and being the phallus is derived from Freuds view of the Oedipus
complex (see 1995: 661-666, 670-678) which has a few theoretical inconsistencies.
The complexity of these ideas has not been fully expounded here and yet it is essential to
note that despite rejecting biologically essentialist ideas around gender, Lacan does predicate
each gender configuration upon associations with a corporeally dichotomised sexual symbol.
He advocates therefore a form of symbolic determinism. Yet, more problematically, the
association that Lacan draws between penis and phallus means he cannot escape that men
have penises and women dont and that this defines their position in relation to the phallus.
Lacan does recognise that the phallus is a signifier [and] is even less the organ, penis or
clitoris, which it symbolizes (cited in Butler: 1993: 82), but he does not follow this logic
through to its conclusion. Lacans theory of language and the unconscious is based upon the
idea that a signifier does not relate to any real material signified. Therefore there is an
incessant sliding of the signified beneath the signifier because they are not intrinsically
connected (Lacan: 2007 [1977]: 154). How then can the phallus be connected with material
penis? Lacan merely states they are linked. Butler attacks this tautology from two positions:
first by highlighting the fallacy of the sex/gender distinction and second by showing the
malleability of the phallus.
Sex/Gender Distinction
Gender has been described in relation to the sex/gender distinction, where sex is accepted
as fundamental and gender is mapped onto sex, even if it cannot be done neatly (see
Connell: 1995). Lacan seems to be making a similar error when he links the (male) Imaginary
(which is derived from the position of pretending to have the phallus) to the real
unsymbolizable penis. Butler argues that the way the category of sex is understood
depend[s] upon the way the field of power is articulated (2006 [1990]: 25). Therefore the
sex/gender distinction will break down because they cohabit and intersect they lose
their discreteness (in Cheah et al.: 1998: 24).
Butlers (2006 [1990]) issue with the sex/gender distinction is that it is based on applying the
binaries of gender onto sex. Further, that gender is regarded as culturally constructed and
separate from sex in the sex/gender division is evidence of a blindness toward how gender is
positioned and defined in relation to sex. For, can man and masculine just as easily signify
a female body as a male one (2006 [1990]: 9), it would seem not? Butler posits that if the
immutable character of sex is contested the distinction between sex and gender turns out
to be no distinction at all (2006 [1990]: 9-10). As a result Butler notes that it becomes
impossible to separate out gender from the political and cultural intersections in which it is
invariably produced and maintained (2006 [1990]: 4-5). Butler sees Lacan as guilty of this,
but in a way different to other theorists (see Connell: 1995).
The Phallus is an Arm?
Butler provides the reader with a reminder that there is no special connection between the
penis and the phallus because the phallus symbolises a lack (or the castration of jouissance).
From this Butler concludes that all genders are positioned relational to a lack and that there
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is no embodied or symbolic determinant of gender. Thus there may still be a normative
masculine position, but this is not fixed. Butler also argues that this displaceability of the
phallus (1993: 84) allows other kinds of phallic symbols or status, for example the lesbian
phallus. Thus the phallus can be symbolized by an arm, a tongue, a hand (or two), a knee, a
thigh, a pelvic bone (1993: 88). Gallop also notes that the Lacanians desire to separate
the phallus from penis, to control the meaning of the signifier phallus, is precisely
symptomatic of their desire to have the phallus, that is, their desire to be at the centre of
language (cited in Butler: 1993: 58; emphasis in original). Butler tries to counteract such an
effort.
The possible potency of pluralising the phallus is that it can be deployed to break the
signifying chain in which it conventionally operates (1993: 88). Thus the phallus is not a
stable transcendental signifier but is fragmentary and must be reiterated and performed (in
the Butlerian sense). Opening up the Phallus to multiplicity has the effect of showing that
having or being the Phallus is more a position that speaks about an individuals relation to
their body and to other bodies rather than a relation to a privileged sexual symbol.
Copjec (1994) has critiqued Butlers interpretation of Lacanian sexual difference by arguing
that she neglects its theoretically formal role; meaning that it exists as part of the Symbolic
order in the form of linguistic differentiation. Therefore nothing can be deduced from this
regarding the actual social roles that a particular gender will play. Thus the symbolic order
may be invariant but the sociological categories of gender may slide around, which is what
Butler discusses. Although, if there is no connection between the symbolic order and the
sociological actualities of gender then there is little benefit to Lacans thought. Thus either
the ideas are redundant or we accept his ideas with the problems that have been previously
highlighted.
In addition, Braidotti notes that the phallus is neither plastic nor easily transferable, as
Butler would have it (2002: 49). Braidotti believes that Butler has too readily accepted
Lacan, and psychoanalysis, as a philosophical framework rather than a healing practice. For if
seen as practice then an account of pain has to be provided; for any displacement of the
phallus implies a painful castration (see Braidotti: 2002). However, although Butler does
neglect the pain of transition, it does not appear that she makes it easy; she posits only that
it is possible. In fact her account stresses the few hard-won victories of performativity
(Butler: 2006 [1990]). Further, Braidotti notes that Butler collapses a number of key
psychoanalytic movements that are formative in the construction of the subject, namely:
separation from the mother, acceptance of the heterosexual matrix and the rejection of
homosexuality. These lead Butler to view the movement of the phallus as something akin to
playing with plasticine. In this regard a more detailed account from Butler is required.
However, what Butlers analysis shows clearly is that whatever the phallus symbolizes, it is
indicative of a relation to the body and to other bodies. This places embodiment as a central
focus for Lacan within gender studies. Despite Lacans apparent emphasis on the symbolic or
linguistic features of subjectivity - an emphasis which can be seen by his separating the
symbol of the phallus from the anatomical penis (Gallop cited in Butler: 1993) and by arguing
that subject relations are organised at the symbolic level it is clear that the body cannot be
allowed to slip away into something purely cultural or linguistic. In this sense then
Masculinity cannot be defined by anatomy, or even a particular position in relation to the
symbol of the anatomical. Yet, if the implications of Lacans theory of the body for cultural
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studies has not been fully developed (see Homer: 2005) then what is the role of
embodiment in his work?
Lacan and Embodiment
A full account of Lacans ideas on embodiment is not possible here; although having provided
a brief outline of his theory on gender we can now move on to a more detailed analysis of
his thought regarding bodies. Part of the difficulty with outlining this area is that they move
through a number of stages which may not be fully reconcilable (see Homer: 2005). Lacan
first approached the body through the childs early experience as it leads up to and includes
the Mirror Stage. Later, during the 1950s, Lacan began to see a deep disparity between the
body and its image. In the third stage the body becomes a province of the real and is
unsymbolizable (see Homer: 2005). In all these plateaus, understanding the Mirror Stage is
essential to grasping the inconsistencies and problems Lacan was grappling with.
Through the Mirror Stage the subject and the body are intimately related (Lacan: 2007
[1977]). Freud (1995) was unclear regarding how the ego emerged; he only notes that it
required a new psychical action. It was this action that Lacan (2007 [1977]) theorises in the
Mirror Stage. He writes what I have called the mirror stage manifests the effective
dynamism by which the subject originally identifies himself with the visual Gestalt of his own
body (2007 [1977]: 19). Prior to the Mirror Stage Lacan argues that the child senses no
bodily unity and fails to separate itself from the world surrounding it.
Thus it is during the Mirror Stage that there is a recognition, within the child, of itself as a
whole through interaction with other reflective bodies; it is in this stage that the ego2
emerges (Whitford: 1991). This perception of the self-as-whole is derived from the desire of
the child to find stability following the realisation of the world-as-absence. This is a split in
the fabric of what the child thought was intrinsically part of itself, which is often described as
the (m)other. Thus the ego is based on relations between others and its own body (Grosz:
1990: 29) and is also linked with the origin of the Imaginary. This (mis)recognition of the
stable, unified self plagues the subject for life; for the ego perpetuates itself upon the premise
of this illusion through participation in the symbolic order.
The Bodily Imaginary
It is in the Mirror Stage that the ego, or Imaginary, emerges which is a psychical map of the
body. As a result the child becomes at once subject and object; where the body-as-object is
inscribed upon by the symbolic order. Further, through the mirror stage the subject is able to
take itself as a love-object which is usually manifest toward the body (Grosz: 1990: 28-9).
Freud (1995) saw this psychical projection focussed upon the erotogenicity of the bodys
surface. He notes that for every change in the erotogenicity of the organs, there might be a
parallel change in the libidinal cathexis [erotogenicity] of the ego (1995: 552). In addition,
that we can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs (Freud:
1995: 552)3 means the ego has the possibility of change. Lacan also sees the Imaginary as
a map of the bodys psycho-social meaning (Grosz: 1990: 43). Thus Lacan accepts
Freuds association of body and ego but adds other types of meaning to that psychical
projection rather than being solely sexual. The ego or Imaginary in Lacan suggests that
masculinity maybe characterised by a general psychical map that is the result of adopting a
similar set of psycho-social meanings for the body.
Grosz (1990) has criticised Lacan for being ocularocentrist, or vision-centred. That sight
has a sensory-primacy means that other senses can, at best, lead to a body-image conceived
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as an aggregate the body-in-bits-and-pieces (Grosz: 1990: 39). There are two errors
here; the first is taking the metaphor of the mirror too literally4. Is it accurate to suggest that
blind individuals do not learn to separate the subject from the object? Secondly this
argument suggests that congenitally blind people will never sense their body as whole. This
also seems a presumptuous contention.
However, Lacans theory of gender does depend in a significant way on the ability to ascribe
the penis to a male and a lack (or castration) to the female. Consequently Groszs argument
does raise some important questions about the formation of the Imaginary (or the bodyego). Surely bodies that have different surface-senses will form bodily morphologies that
may not centre around the genitals5. Thus blind peoples experiences are different to those
people with sight6. In these cases substance is bearing back upon the Imaginary and Symbolic
order, and further problematises the relation between them and the real. Thus Freuds
shifting body-ego allows different Imaginary bodily morphologies, even if, according to
Irigaray (1985 [1977]), - whose work attempts to write such different morphologies - Lacan
does not recognise it. This suggests that the differing types of body, of relations to it and of
Mirrors would lead to increasingly diverse Imaginaries. Further it is crucial that erotogenicity
be positioned properly in relation to other factors in the Imaginary, for bodies are abjected
upon multiple criteria (Butler: 1993).
Irigaray (1985 [1977]), in noting this possible flexibility in the Imaginary has attempt to write
the female imaginary using other bodily signifiers and without the phallus as the
transcendental signifier. One way of reading this attempt is that while a theory of the phallus
may be one way of theorising the Mirror Stage and the emergence of the ego and the body
in psychoanalytic social theory, yet it is not the only such signifier that can account for these
events. Thus the phallus is not the only primary signifier for the bodily Imaginary. Cornell
(1997) has taken a different approach, but one that is similar to Butler. Cornell has tried to
re-write the phallus from within7. Thus Cornell (1997) has also argued that the phallus
cannot be kept within the position of the transcendental signifier because it is an absence;
thus revealing that relations to the phallus are not fixed. Recounting these ideas here enables
us to understand that Lacans theory of the Symbolic and the Imaginary are tied to the body
but that this is not a static connection; rather that the body can bear upon the Symbolic and
Imaginary while they too can organise value in the psychical map of our bodies.
Butlers (Plastic) Phallus
Butlers argument here is important and so it will be traced in greater detail. We have
already noted the malleability of the phallus and this is further exploited by Butler in her
discussion of the relationship between the Imaginary (or cultural) bodily morphology and the
real (or material) body, a distinction Lacan creates and maintains. Butler, by arguing that
women could have the phallus, is twisting Lacans gender distinctions and turning them on
their head. This makes evident the places where Lacan stumbles.
Thus, where Lacan falls down, Butler tries to stand up. She attempts to work her way
through the aporia of the linguistic and material that Lacan did not fully explicate, and finally
completely separated. She concludes that matter is a process of materialization that
stabilises over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface (Butler: 1993: 9).
Sexing is one such process of materialization. Thus to matter means at once to
materialize and to mean (1993: 32) which captures both the corporeality and the meaning
of matter while recognising that language and materiality are fully embedded in each other
(1993: 69). Butlers theory is also liable to criticism, for as Kirby notes Butler deploys the
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term matter rather than substance because the former is a synonym for
significance/signification (1997: 125). Thus it is possible that Butler is playing a word game
where we are no longer dealing with matter as a substance, but with matter as signification
(Wilson: 2005: 162).
Butler can be read in this way, yet to do so mis-represents the aporia she is dealing with.
Butler is keen to point out that every effort to refer to materiality takes place through a
signifying process which, in its phenomenality, is always already material (1993: 68).
Further she is aware that it must be possible to concede and affirm an array of
materialities that pertain to the body biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal and
chemical composition (Butler: 1993: 66). These cannot be denied but neither can we
separate what these mean or matter to society. Butler sees that each of these categories
have a history (1993: 67) and therefore materialise. The aporia Butler is describing then is a
material one, not a discursive one: for every time we signify we invoke materiality. This
process of signifying matter is then performative8 of the essence or ontology of matter; thus
matter is constituted by the material process of signification (Butler: 2006 [1990]).
This is significant because it deviates from Freuds view of the development of the
Morphological Imaginary9, upon which Lacan builds. Butler argues that Freud vacillates
between seeing some body parts as real or imagined, and that there is a body which
precedes the egos awareness of it. Thus for Freud there is a casual temporality that has the
body part precede its idea (Butler: 1993: 59). In contrast, Butler notes that the body part
and the imagining of that body part are inseparable; therefore the perceived body and the
material body are the same thing. Butler writes that Freud, in making this argument, actually
confirms the indissolubility of the body part and the phantasmatic partitioning that brings it
into psychic experience (1993: 59). Even though Lacan moves beyond Freud by arguing that
the body is known through linguistic signs only, rather than pain, he still fails to account for
the impact of materiality on the subject.
Butlers (1993) analysis highlights how certain body parts come to mean or matter and thus
take on a privileged position. For Butler the phallus is one such part, or symbol; thus the
phallus performatively reinforces the phallogocentrism of western culture. It is the symbolic
castration of the phallus as the primary signifier that allows Butler to play with the phallus
and posit a simultaneous having and being of the phallus (whatever it symbolizes).
Consequently this position on materiality is essential in trying to understand gender and to
develop an empirically and politically relevant practice that can invoke change in the
Imaginary. Without developing a sustained argument of the interrelations, I want to mention
one empirical study by Mol (2007) that takes Butlers insight about performing, or enacting
an identity. Mol provides an ethnography of bodies in a hospital and argues that the body
multiplies in this setting because of the myriad ways that it is enacted, or performed. This
results in various ontological shifts. Lacans and Butlers theory therefore has empirical
relevance to how the Social Sciences investigate gender, but does it have any political
relevance?
Performativity and the Possibility of Change?
Having earlier noted that Lacans theory leans toward a symbolic determinism in regards to
gender; is there scope for change here (seeing also that Butlers concept of performativity
emphasises the normative power of gender practices)? Butler argues that there is a crosscultural hegemonic phallogocentrism and heterosexual matrix in western culture. Butler
(2006 [1990]) describes this hegemony by indicating that such patterns are culturally
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ascendant and that they are supported by a set of naturalised myths. Thus phallogocentrism
and the heterosexual matrix are resistant to change because they are constituted through
discursively constrained performative acts that produce the body through and within the
categories of sex (2006 [1990]: xxxi).
However, Butler (2006 [1990]) also argues that in trying to find room for resistance or
searching for an origin or ground for gender is a misdirected effort. Rather consideration
should be given to the political stakes of defining that origin which is an effect of the
institutions that describe them. Butler would also advocate a study of gender that is aware
of the relational nature of its categories while proceeding with a relational analysis (2006
[1990]: xxxi); thus the importance of the prior discussion of the phallus and embodiment.
There are two possible critiques that may be raised against Butlers position here: first how
can Butler accept Foucaults genealogical method and therefore refuse to search for the
origins [or] the inner truth (2006 [1990]: xxxi) while focussing her critique on the
defining institutions of phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality (2006 [1990]:
xxxi)? Is this not, in a sense, labelling these as the ground of gender? In answer to this it
appears that Butler is critiquing this particular part of western patriarchal culture, one that
she would argue is not the sole source or origin of gender but one of many; one that has
been neglected in the past. Second Butler might also be criticised for not providing any
direction for political action or emancipation for the abused or starving woman; but instead
is writing solely for academia (see Nussbaum: 1999). It must be remembered that Butler is
critiquing a particular part of an oppressive culture with the goal of changing, or at least
destabilising it, so as to increase the possibilities for a livable life for those who live, or try
to live, on the sexual margins (2006 [1990]: xxviii). Butler argues that such critiques have
had some success.
Other theories of gender (see Connell: 1995) provide frameworks that are much more
malleable or fluctuating than Butler. Part of the disagreement between Butler and other
gender theorists, like Connell, over the malleability of gender is based around ideas
regarding the subject. Connell wants to avoid the static term of configuration when speaking
of gender identity while emphasizing gender process[es] and projects (1995: 72). Thus
Connell argues that agents practise gender through the body while changing the culturally
ascendant notion of gender. Butler however sees no doer behind the deed, but that the
doer is variably constructed in and through the deed (2006 [1990]: 195). Thus
performativity is not merely a reflection of agency but is a constitutive feature of the subject
and is bound up with hegemony. Invariably this also makes the subversion of hegemony, in
the Butlerian sense, that much more difficult.
Consequently, for Butler the proliferation of masculinity is unlimited in an idealised sense yet
in practice its performativity is generally constraining. The performativity of gender is not a
singular deliberate act, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which
discourse produces the effects that it names (Butler: 1993: 2). Butler illustrates this through
the phallus; for Lacans claim for the phallus the status of a privileged signifier peformatively
produces and effects this privilege (1993: 83). Thus although it is contingent subversion is
difficult because every enactment must be from within the Law10. However Butlers concept
of performativity is not always simple, meaning that it does not always effectively enact
what it names (Salih: 2002: 79). Thus the subject can be unaware of the naming or they
could respond but in unexpected ways. Such incongruence enacts resistance from within
the confines of the Law. This means that the subject who would oppose its construction is
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always drawing from that construction to articulate its opposition (Butler: 1993: 122).
Consequently the subject can act or resist because of these very relations of power.
Therefore Butler in drawing on Lacan provides a framework for seeing how the subject is
both constrained and enabled by the relations between the Imaginary and the Symbolic.
By exposing the tenousness of gender reality in order to counter the violence performed
by gender norms, Butler (2006 [1990]: xxv) highlights some paradoxical gender positions
that work to resist the Law. For example, butch-lesbianism brings masculinity into relief
against a culturally intelligible female body (Butler: 2006 [1990]: 168). Through such a
resistance both sex and gender are destabilised. Thus Butler not only critiques the
hegemony of gender relations but the concept of performativity provides people with means
to subvert them.
Foucault, Power and the Real
This view of performativity explicitly upon draws Foucaults vision of power. However, can
Foucaults power be made commensurable with Lacan, and if so how? As has been noted via
Butler, power for Foucault is both restrictive and constitutive of the subject. In addition
subjects are constituted by their relations with others. This fits very closely with Lacans
formation of the subject. Foucaults notion of power has often been critiqued by noting the
impossibility of resistance even though this is counter to Foucaults own statements and also
the examples highlighted by Butler earlier.
However, one issue where Lacan and Foucault (and by implication Butler) would collide is
on the matter of a foundation or essence. Foucault argued that the subject is the result of
power, in that people are produced as subjects. In the words of Butler, there is no doer
behind the deed, (2006 [1990]: 195), whereas for Lacan, the unconscious drives of the real
(the desire for jouissance) are fundamental to all subjects. However the real is understood,
by maintaining that it is present leaves a difficult contradiction to be resolved; one that has
important ethical and political implications. This is illustrated by noting that for Foucault the
identity of the subject is based on a successful interpellation [while] for Lacan the subjects
identity is based on a failed interpellation (Newman: 2005: 57) because the subject is a
discontinuity in the real (Lacan: 2007 [1977]: 299). Thus although Foucaults subject may
experience dis-unity and contradictory discursive formations, Lacans subject experiences a
fundamental lack that results in a mis-recognition that perpetually plagues the subject.
There are two ways out of this bind: you can reject the real or you can accept the real as
an outside of power in order to situate resistance. Butlers (1993) position of rejecting the
real has already been intimated. Newman (2005) however argues that the real can provide
a ground from which the resistance can be explained. Either move results in a fundamental
shift in the theory and work of each writer. Removing the real requires that a
reconsideration be given to jouissance, the Mirror Stage and the body in Lacan, whereas
allowing for a ground (however absolutely beyond symbolization) provides a vastly new
paradigm for Foucaults work. It appears that in this regard their views are
incommensurable.
So what of Butler? It seems that Butler can continue to think of power as working from
within, but must also acknowledge the place of jouissance and the drives in understanding
this. In fact, Copjec (1994) argues that Butler has not adequately dealt with the Lacanian
real. Consequently it might be more fruitful for Butler to acknowledge individuals as
desiring subjects that are mutually constituted through their inter-subjective relations. This
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will provide support for the strength of the heterosexual matrix and the phallogocentrist
into which individuals are born. This suggests a motivation for conformity. As iek writes,
every power structure has a crack in the foundation and this crack can be used as a lever
for the effective subversion of the power structure (1996: 3). Butler can use this same lever
for subversion while holding onto the real, which she cannot neglect.
Conclusions
From the preceding discussion it has been argued, following Lacan, that gender is organised
around the perceptions of, and relations to, our and other bodies. Lacans Imaginary also
allows theorists to understand normative patterns and distinctions in the psycho-social
meanings attributed to bodies by differing genders. It has been argued that bodily
morphologies are variable through body modification and embodied practices while Butlers
approach to materiality also provides researchers a frame to understand a materialist
enacted gender. In addition, though Lacan resists change, there is scope for an understanding
of power in the gender matrix but only if it incorporates an account of the pain and difficulty
of such changes. Further Butlers attempted combination of Foucault and Lacan is not
commensurable, yet by retaining the real it is possible to theorise resistance and power
while maintaining the other key Lacanian insights already noted. Consequently Lacans theory
of gender has important ideas that can allow social theorists to trace the way gender is
enacted and constituted through embodiment.
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Ragland-Sullivan E. (1995) Essays on the Pleasures of Death: From Freud to Lacan, London:
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Notes
1

About this concept Homer has written: Jouissance is a very complicated notion in Lacan
and not directly translatable into English. The term is usually translated enjoyment, but it
involves a combination of pleasure and pain, or pleasure in pain the word also has
sexual connotations (2005: 89). Ragland-Sullivan defines jouissance as the essence or
quality that gives ones life its value (1995: 88).
2
In theorising the ego we must recall that Freud believed that the ego is first and foremost a
body-ego (1995:637) meaning that a persons own body, and above all its surface, is a
place from which both external and internal perceptions may spring (1995: 636) and that it
is not merely a surface entity, but is itself a projection of a surface (1995:636-7). This is
what later seems to become characterised in Lacan as the Imaginary. In should be noted
that the ego in Freud has a varied and conflicting history which has been briefly traced in
Grosz (1990). I follow Freuds description in The Ego and the id as that seems to more
closely fit with what Lacan accepted in Freud.
3
Following these comments Freud (1995) notes that such changes are what contribute to
various forms of mental illness. This is disregarded as incorrect but that his prior
assumptions seem to have some validity and importance for the discussion will be shown
shortly.
4
Homer writes that the reference to a mirror does not mean a literal mirror but rather any
reflective surface, for example the mothers face (2005: 24). However, this is easy to
confuse because the stage is correlated in time with the childs recognition of itself in a
physical mirror; yet it is important to remember that although this has some significance, it
is not deterministic. Meaning that having access to a literal mirror is not essential to
entering the mirror stage.
5
Wendell (1997) writes that for some impaired persons sex becomes associated with the
whole body and not just specific zones. Thus they provide accounts of achieving orgasm
without stimulating any of the usual areas of the body. Such experiences suggest that
changes occur in the erotogenicity of the body-ego, as Freud suggests.
6
In this regard Grosz has written that the congenitally blind have different egos and
conceptions of space [therefore] the particular details and limits of bodily organisation
may vary from that of sighted subjects (1990: 39).
7
It is true that Irigaray recognises that one cannot alter symbolic meanings by fiat; one
cannot simply step outside phallogocentrism [f]or this reason, Irigaray adopts the
strategy of mimicry or mimesis (Whitford: 1991: 70); which could be regard as working
from within. While this is accurate, and is comparable to the methods and work of Cornell
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Reeves - Enactment of Gender

and Butler, Irigaray goes further than they in positing a new female Imaginary.
Butlers understanding of performativity sometimes waffles between understanding [it] as
linguistic and casting it as theatrical because they are invariably related (2006 [1990]: xxvi:
1999 Preface). Further Butlers views on what performativity might mean have changed
over time (2006 [1990]: xv: 1999 Preface).
9
Salih in describing what this means has written: The dictionary definition of morphology is
the science of form, and in psychoanalytic accounts morphological refers to the form
assumed by the body in the course of ego formation (2002: 83). The Imaginary refers to
Lacans view that this is the realm of conscious and unconscious images and fantasies.
10
The law in Lacan is the fundamental principles which underlie all social relations (Evans:
1996: 101) and makes possible interaction between subjects. According to Lacan, the
formation of the law is identical with an order of Language (2007 [1977]: 66). Thus
Butlers use of performativity in relation to this is apt.
8

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