1. RTC JUDGE CAMILO E.

TAMIN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA
ROSELLON, respondents.
G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992
ABATEMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint
for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel
of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was
reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality
leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate
the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the
rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the
efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a
municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not
continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public
nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code?
Held:
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property or anything else which: hinders or impairs the use of the property.
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.
Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:
1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance
2. Civil action
3. Abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the
municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of
the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before
summarily abate a public nuisance.
Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ
of demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been
sufficient to eject the private respondent.
2. Greater Balanga Development Corporation
vs.
Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)
G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market
in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of
Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by the Camacho family.
The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon
Camacho, which was later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold,
others donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition
and delivery of titles.
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor
of Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and
delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a real estate
dealer/privately-owned market operator. However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on
the ground that the issue as to the ownership of the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty
and restiveness among the stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the
Mayor to revoke the permit to operate a public market. The Mayor then revoked
the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.
Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the
municipality's collection of market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He
alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's no reason for revocation of the
permit; 2) Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the
collection of market fees is illegal.
On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive
has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was
due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code
when it: 1) made false statement in the application form, failing to disclose that the
lot was subject to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply
for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).
ISSUE:
W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.
HELD:
NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi
juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The
authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee
of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be justified under the
Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2)
deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.
In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the
type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for. Petitioner left this
entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that
petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner
did not make any false statement therein.
Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for
revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require
two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that

separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that separate permits
are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards
the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.
The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of
the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a
public market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court,
the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any
business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under
which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149
[1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and
traders doing business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a
valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.
Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's
right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga
Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner
informed of this specific violation. Moreover, Respondent Municipality isn't the
owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner
can do.
3. ALFREDO TANO, et. al.
vs.
HON. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al.
G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:
"AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2)
Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to engage in
any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his
possession any of the articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain
first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from
Puerto Princesa and,
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THEC
ATCHING, GATHERIN, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARI
NECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS The petitioners
contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of
their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine
whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it took away their right to
earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers Association
are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and
entering "into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out

their business endeavors to a successful conclusion Public respondents

Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause; they
likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional
HELD:
NO. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16
(the General Welfare Clause), andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1)
(vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve theexercise of police power,
the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish
or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the
coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province
of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
4. JOSE D. SANGALANG, et. al.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 71169
December 22, 1988
FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of
several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning
regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later
gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for
public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was
brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to
maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed
their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation
violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use?

HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to
build a [f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence
of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential
and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still
overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the
Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
5. FRANCISCO U. DACANAY
vs.
MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., et. al.
G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992
FACTS:
An ordinance was issued designated certain city and municipal streets, roads,
and other public areas for sites of public markets. Pursuant to this, licenses were
issued to market stall owners to put up their stalls in certain streets. Thereafter,
the OIC mayor of Caloocan has caused the demolition of the stalls, which was
upheld by the trial court, saying that the public streets are part of the public
dominion and is not open to the commerce of man. Then there come about a
change in administration of the city. The next mayor did not continue the
demolition of the stalls. Using the trial courts decision, here now comes
petitioner asking for the demolition of the stalls.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a public street may be subject to commerce of man?
HELD:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
respondents market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public
street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man.
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract.
The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through
contract. The interests of the few should not prevail over the good of the greater
number in the community.
6. Macasiano vs. Diokno
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
FACTS:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of
J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC

Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20,
1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract
agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets
and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.
On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a
letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial
court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his
letter-order against Palanyag.
ISSUE:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.
HELD:
No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are
local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of
respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence,
local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU
use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available
to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public
property devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose
or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be
considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by
the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials
of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public
office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.
7. MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune
Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent
of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic
and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory
(LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the
Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers] provided under
the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant
of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a
development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither
an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA
Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
the MMDA is illegal.