World War I (Causes)

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Immediate Causes
On June 28, 1914, in the town of Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were assassinated by Slav nationalists. The complicity of Serbia in the assassination was
generally (and correctly) assumed throughout Europe, but in the immediate aftermath of the event there was an
assumption that while Serbia would be held accountable, there was no danger to the general peace of Europe.
Rivalries and Alliances
Events unfolded in a way that confounded general expectation for three reasons. First, the assassination brought to the
fore the desire in Vienna to settle accounts with Serbia once and for all. The hand of Austria-Hungary had been stayed
during the Balkan Wars (19121913), but there was by 1914 the hardening belief that Serbia and the force of Slavic
nationalism were a direct and immediate threat to the very survival of the Dual Monarchy. There was within Austria and
Hungary the belief that Serbia had to be conquered. This belief went alongside the second reason: the belief in Vienna
and Berlin that if war were to come, it was better that it come at this time than several years later when French
conscription and Russian railway construction programs would have been completed. In 1914 Germany saw a window of
opportunity that was slowly closing as its potential enemies added to their strengths. Germany's various railway, heavy
artillery, and increased conscription programs had already been put into effect over the previous decade, and in many
ways it would be to Germany's advantage to induce a war rather than seek to avoid one.
Another reason for war was what has been termed bundnisfhig, which relates to one's value as an ally. Europe was
divided between two alliances, but two alliances that over the previous decade had come under ever greater strain.
Both the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany and the alliance between France and Russia had seen allies not
fully and properly supported in times of previous crisis (the former alliance in 19121913 and the crises provoked by the
Balkan Wars and the latter in 1909 over Bosnia-Herzegovina). In 1914, as the July Crisis gathered momentum, the great
powers were faced by the reality that if they failed to support their associates, their alliance (and with it the seeming
guarantee of security) might crumble. Certainly in July 1914 Russia had little sympathy for Serbia but was not prepared
to stand aside and thus condone what was assumed would be the immediate conquest of the country and with it the
extinguishing of Russian influence and standing in the Balkans. France was only too conscious of the importance of the
Russian alliance, while Germany regarded Austria-Hungary likewise.
Declarations of War
Thus the crisis induced by the Sarajevo assassination led to the Austro-Hungarian decision not to accept what amounted
to a Serbian acceptance of the demands that were made of it. Although Austria-Hungary could not move directly against
Serbia for some weeks, it declared war on Serbia on July 28. At this point Russia began a partial mobilization, for which it
had no plans, in an attempt to up the diplomatic ante, but German war plans called for the invasion and defeat of France
in the time before the completion of Russian mobilization. The start of the latter therefore represented the start of the
clock ticking down. Germany made a series of demands on Russia to stop its mobilization and on France for the
surrender of territory as guarantee of its neutrality. The Russian response was a general mobilization that led to the
German declaration of war. France's refusal to comply with German demands also led to a German declaration of war,
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as well as an advance into Belgium and Luxembourg as part of a plan to outflank French positions and forces. The
immediate consequence was British intervention. By August 5, the major powers were at war, although oddly the two
powers that had been primarily involved in this dispute, Austria-Hungary and Russia, had still to declare war on one
another.

Intermediate Causes
In its associations with France (1904) and Russia (1907), Great Britain had in effect marked its opposition to Germany,
the most powerful nation in Europe at the time. Germany's activities during the First Moroccan Crisis (19051906) and
the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis (19081909) had the effect of forcing Britain to become more closely aligned with France
and Russia. The second crisis was indeed important because as a result of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of two
provinces that it had administered since 1878, Germany directly threatened Russia because of the latter's unwillingness
to condone the actions of Germany's ally. Russian humiliation was complete and was accompanied by the decision never
to be treated this way in a region in which it had such important historical interest.
Naval Race
The Bosnian crisis unfolded at the very time when Britain faced its own crisis in terms of the naval race with Germany.
Britain chose to order 8 capital shipswhich proved to be 10 as a result of imperial benevolenceand in effect provided
itself with a margin of superiority over Germany that was never seriously threatened thereafter. The British might have
been obliged to abandon the historic "two-power standard"a fleet superior to those of the next two naval powers
combinedin favor of a single standard relative to Germany, but the fact was that from this time forward the AngloGerman naval race had been decided. The real point was that the Anglo-German naval race had been just one part of a
general program of naval armament that reflected the new reach of late 19th-century industrialization, the lure and
attraction of imperial possessions, and the lore of sea power as expounded in popular literature and the press in all
major nations. This was a time when all the powers were building the most modern and powerful of warships, but this
was also the time when the major European powers were adding to their military establishments in two ways.
Army Growth and Militarism
The first lay in the growth in the size of armies of all the major European powers. By 1912, Germany possessed a military
establishment of some 646,000 officers and men, a figure that was increased by 130,000 by the end of that year. The
law of June 1913, on a three-year lead-time, made provision for a peacetime army of 870,000 that would be increased to
1,750,000 officers and men plus another 1,800,000 officers and men in the various reserve classes during wartime.
Germany had some 4,250,000 untrained men of military age, a reflection of the fact that before 1912 Germany had
conscripted only some 53% of eligible manpower. German numbers were matched by France and Russia. The growing
size of armed forces, when combined with the impact of successive diplomatic crises within Europe between 1904 and
1912, had the impact of increased instability and growing insecurity on the part of all the powers. France was able to
maintain itself on a basis of numerical equality by extending its conscription period to three years and calling up some
85% of all 18-year-old males. The Russian development of its railway system inevitably pointed to its being able to raise
greater numbers and in less time than had hitherto been the case.
There was another matter of importance: all the major European powers had some form of elected assemblies, and the
demands of conscription and the unprecedented costs of military establishments could only be justified in terms of
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direct comparison with the enemy. In a very real sense, the growth of armies added to the sense of instability and
insecurity, and each crisis before 1912 had the effect of lessening resistance to a recourse to arms in 1914. To this basic
point may be added another: there was an increasingly strident militancy that went hand-in-hand with this increasing
sense of insecurity. Such matters to a large extent explain the welcoming of war throughout Europe when it came in
July 1914.

Long-Term Causes
Congress of Berlin
In several ways, the most suitable single starting point for an examination of the causes of World War I is the Congress
of Berlin in 1878. First, the congress set aside the arrangements that a victorious Russia had made for the Balkans and
marked a return to a situation in southeast Europe that was to prevail until 19121913 and which, in the form of the
antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, was to be the immediate cause of war in 1914. Second, Germany was
obliged to choose between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Germany was to seek an understanding with the latter and to
restrain the former.
Alliances
The basis of the Franco-Russian arrangement was their mutual isolation and vulnerability in a Europe increasingly
dominated by Germany. While Austria-Hungary associated itself with Serbia through the alliance of 1881, the Dual
Alliance became the Triple Alliance in 1882 with the addition of Italy. In 1883 Germany and Austria-Hungary concluded
an alliance with Romania. In seeking to ensure stability in (and Russian exclusion from) the Balkans, Germany brought
France and Russia together. But the political primacy of Germany was tied not merely to military preeminence but, in
the 1890s, to the overtaking of Great Britain in terms of the industrial leadership of Europe. This was underpinned by the
German demographic advantage in terms of population size and higher birth rate as compared to Britain and France.
Balance of Power
Many British histories of the time make much of imperial rivalries and the naval race of the decade preceding World War
I. There is no doubt that these were factors in an increasingly brittle peace within Europe, but in fact their importance
has been overstated. The European powers did not go to war with one another because of extra-European differences,
while the main force of the Anglo-German naval race was over by 1914. These various matters came together in a
German restlessness and assertiveness around the turn of the century that drew Britain over to the side of France and
Russia. Britain was increasingly threatened by the attempt made by Europe's strongest military power to acquire a fleet
that threatened British security and primacy at sea. After 1902, with the conclusion of its alliance with Japan, Britain
sought to settle various extra-European disputes and to associate itself first with France and then with a Russia gravely
weakened by revolutionary upheaval in the wake of defeat in the disastrous war with Japan (19041905). In so doing,
Britain in effect reverted to the policy that had been in place for two centuries before 1870, which was to seek to
maintain the balance of power within Europe.
Hedley P. Willmott

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MLA Citation
Willmott, Hedley P. "World War I (Causes)." World at War: Understanding Conflict and Society. ABC-CLIO, 2015. Web. 3
Mar. 2015.

130 Cremona Dr, Ste C, Santa Barbara, CA 93117-5515

T: 805-968-1911 F: 805-685-9685 www.abc-clio.com