THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 77085. April 26, 1989.

]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION
(PISC), GEORGE LIM, MARCOS BAUTISTA, CARLOS
LAUDE, TAN SING LIM, ANTONIO LIU LAO, ONG TEH,
PHILIPPINE CONSORTIUM CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, PACIFIC MILLS, INC., and UNIVERSAL
STEEL SMELTING CO., INC., Petitioners, v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, as Judge
presiding Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, INTERPOOL, LTD. and SHERIFF NORBERTO
V. DOBLADO, JR., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; FOREIGN JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT; VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE IN THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION, AFTER
ATTAINING FINALITY AND NOT VITIATED BY "WANT OF NOTICE
TO THE PARTY, COLLUSION, FRAUD OR CLEAR MISTAKE OF
LAW OR FACT." The evidence of record clearly shows that the
U.S. District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner PISC under the procedural law applicable in that
forum, i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of
the Summons and Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW) which were in
fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court,
were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, P.I.S.C., Manila."
indicating that service thereof had been made upon and
acknowledged by the PISC office in Manila on, 18 January
1983, and that PISC had actual notice of such Complaint and
Summons. Moreover, copies of said Summons and Complaint
had likewise been served upon Prentice-Hall Corporation
System, Inc. (New York), petitioner PISCS agent, expressly
designated by it in the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement
with respondent Interpool. "for the purpose of accepting service
of any process within the State of New York, USA with respect
to any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to directly
or indirectly, this Lease." The record also shows that petitioner
PISC, without, however, assailing the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court over the person of petitioner, had filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW), which Motion was
denied. All of the foregoing matters, which were stated
specifically in the U.S. District Courts disputed Default
Judgment, have not been disproven or otherwise overcome by
petitioners, whose bare and unsubstantiated allegations cannot
prevail over clear and convincing evidence of record to the
contrary. That foreign judgment which had become final and
executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom and
perfected by petitioner PISC is thus "presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties [i.e., PISC and Interpool] and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." We note,
further, that there has been in this case no showing by
petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S.
District Court in 83 Civil 290 (EW), was vitiated by "want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." In other words, the Default Judgment imposing upon
petitioner PISC a liability of U.S.$94,456.28 in favor of
respondent Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this
jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF OTHER DEFENDANTS NOT
IMPLEADED THEREIN, BASED ON "CONTINUING GUARANTEES
EXECUTED BY THEM; SECTION 6, RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF
COURT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The existence of
liability (i.e., in the amount of U.S.$94,456.28) on the part of
petitioner PISC having been duly established in the U.S. case, it
was not improper for respondent Interpool, in seeking
enforcement in this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment
imposing such liability, to have included the other nine (9)
petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim, Marcos Bautista, Carlos
Laude, Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu Lao, Ong Teh, Philippine
Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific Mills, Inc. and
Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in Civil Case
No. Q-39927, filed with Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. With respect to the latter, Section 6, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides: "Sec. 6. Permissive
joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any
right to relief in respect to or arising out of the some
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may
arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest." The record
shows that said nine (9) petitioners had executed "continuing
guarantees" to secure performance by petitioner PISC of its

contractual obligations, under the Membership Agreement and

Hiring Conditions and Master Equipment Leasing Agreement
with respondent Interpool. As guarantors, they had held
themselves out as liable. "whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative," to respondent Interpool under their separate
"continuing guarantees" executed in the Philippines, for any
breach of those Agreements on the part of PISC The liability of
the nine (9) other petitioners was, in other words, not based
upon the Membership Agreement and the Master Equipment
Leasing Agreement to which they were not parties. The New
York award of U.S.$94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a
breach by PISC of its own obligations under those Agreements.
We, therefore, consider the nine (9) other petitioners as
persons "against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising
out of the same transaction or series of transactions [has been]
alleged to exist." as contemplated in the Rule quoted above
and, consequently, properly impleaded as defendants in Civil
Case No. Q-39927. There was, in other words, no need at all, in
order that Civil Case No. Q-39927 would prosper, for
respondent Interpool to have first impleaded the nine (9) other
petitioners in the New York case and there obtain judgment
against all ten (10) petitioners.
3. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT;
FILING OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE ANSWER AND
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS, TANTAMOUNT TO
VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION THERETO. Petitioners argument of
lack or absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, on the alleged ground of non-service of
notice or summons in Civil Case No. Q-39927, does not
persuade. But we do not need to address this specific
argument. For even assuming (though merely arguendo) that
none of the ten (10) petitioner herein had been served with
notice or summons below, the record shows, however, that they
did in fact file with the Regional Trial Courts a Motion for
Extension of Time to file Answer (dated 9 December 1983) as
well as Motion for Bill of Particulars (dated 15 December 1983),
both addressing respondent Interpools Complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-39927. In those pleadings, petitioners not only
manifested their intention to controvert the allegations in the
Complaint, but they neither questioned nor assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either over the case filed against
them or over their individual persons, as defendants therein.
There was here, in effect, voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the Quezon City trial court by petitioners, who
are thereby estopped from asserting otherwise before this
Court.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 25577. March 3, 1927.]

AFIFE ABDO CHEYBAN GORAYEB, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
NADJIB TANNUS HASHIM,Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENTS; FOREIGN JUDGMENT; MAY BE PLEADED BY
WAY OF DEFENSE. A person who is sued in a Philippine court
and who wishes to have the benefit of a judgment rendered in
an American court may plead such judgment in his answer,
thereby making an issue upon the question of the validity of the
judgment. Section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to
be interpreted as requiring an affirmative original action or
proceeding by one who occupies a purely defensive position. All
that is intended to be secured by the provision referred to is
that our courts shall have an opportunity to pass judicially upon
the efficacy of the foreign judgment.
2. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; FOREIGN DIVORCE; LACE OF
JURISDICTION IN COURT GRANTING DIVORCE; COLLATERAL
ATTACK. A judicial divorce granted in an American State to a
resident of the Philippine Islands may be questioned here upon
the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the court granting the
divorce. While this undoubtedly involves a collateral attack
upon the decree of divorce, the rule must be considered settled
in American and Philippine jurisprudence
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NULLITY OF DIVORCE. Doctrine of
Ramirez v. Gmur (42 Phil., 855), followed, to the effect that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine
their matrimonial status, and the divorce granted by such a
court is not entitled to recognition here.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE RESIDENTS WHO HAVE
BEEN MARRIED ABROAD. The foregoing rule is applicable to
married people who are domiciled in the Philippine Islands

although they may have contracted marriage elsewhere.

5. HUSBAND AND WIFE; ALIMONY; EXCESSIVE PAYMENTS
UNDER ERRONEOUS ORDERS; SET-OFF. Where alimony in
favor of a wife is granted by a Court of First Instance in an
amount not greater than necessary to maintain respectable
existence, this court will not disturb such allowance even
though it should appear that the wife may have been actually
overpaid upon alimony account in the past. Excessive payments
made under valid, though erroneous, prior orders, cannot be
offset against claims for current alimony.
EN BANC [GR No. L-1981. October 30, 1953.]
ARTHUR EUGENE PERKINS, plaintiff-appellee,
v. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
[GR No. L-1982. October 30, 1953.]
ARTHUR EUGENE PERKINS, plaintiff-appellee,
v. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY, petitioner-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. TESTS; JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE; Juico REOPEN THE TEST TO
RECEIVE COURT DECISIONS OF AMERICA. - The court has
judicial notice of decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
District Court of Appeals of California, as well as the Court of
Appeals of New York. There is no need, therefore, to reopen the
hearing and receive such decisions as evidence.
2. FORENSIC PRACTICE; SENTECIAS COURTS OF AMERICA res
judicata. - The plaintiff in the present case had already
obtained judgment in their favor in the Philippines (against
Perkins Perkins Slade, 57 Jur Fil, 215.) Stating that, as man,
was to own and manage the 24,000 shares of the defendant
company. But for reasons that only you know, went to the
Supreme Court of New York, and there, as the first cause of
action, I pose the same question again, and as a second ground
of action, he was the sole owner of these shares. The Court of
Appeals of New York decided that all such shares dividends
were the exclusive properties of his wife. It declares: That when
the applicant came to New York Court to litigate again on the
possession and propieded of share certificates in question, left
the decision of the Court of the Philippines, renunciano rights
award on; had it obtained a favorable decision it is clear that he
would be satisfied would force the other party to the fulfilled v;
allow today to desobedcerla applicant, only because it is
contrary to their interests, is subvert any sense of justice, the
more so that he was the actor, the plaintiff in the second
action. You should not be allowed today challenging the
judgment in a case against the promoted, that litigates for the
third time for the possession and ownership of such stock
certificates with their dividends and be granted another
sentence also equal to that obtained in the Court of the
Philippines, which then abandoned; might promote and even
fourth cause until other subsequent sentence also for your
entire satisfaction. Other jurisdictions hold the same
criteria. (235 SW, 473) Judicial decision not wake Penelope
weaves and unravels it for entertainment party. The rule
preventing multiple actions is imposed.
3. ID,. ID,. ID.,. - In the case of New York and in the present
case no identity of things: 24,000 shares and dividends;'s
indentity of causes because the plaintiff claimed both ownership
and possession, no identity in people because the plaintiff in
both cases is the same husband and the main defendant is his
wife, and there is also identity in the quality with which they
were the plaintiff and the defendant claim as owner of the
shares. It had been decided in the first case the 24,000 shares
and dividends were the property of the defendant wife.The
husband contends that the applicant company who issued such
shares has not been party to the case in New York and,
therefore, does not have to invoke the derech decision rendered
it as an exception of res judicata. It states: That the exception
of res judicata effect in the present case, where the litigation is
pending for the third time the ownership of these shares. The
contention that the company had not taken part in the cause in
New York is irrelevant, because this company does not claim
rights to any adverse actions: it is only a trustee of dividends
and their obligation is to pay the person entitled to them,
according to court decision. (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 2nd
Pac 122, 892,.
4 ID, ID, ID, ID, ID, -...... lawsuit brought by the plaintiff in
New York had another foundation promoted by his wife

Califonia that he was not a party. In the present case, the

applicant contends that the decision of the Court of Califonia
not require him because he had not been a party to the
dispute, based on the doctrine that a party should not be
deprived of their rights . without due process or without
opportunity to be heard is declared: That the applicant having
advanced the cause in New York, the decision on the same is
res judicata and it hurts (Judgment of the Supreme Court of
Spain from December 26. 1879, 42 Jur Civ 494, the same court
sentence also June 15, 1899, 87 Civ Jur, 497, Coca-Cola Co. v
Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 Atl, 260,.. Donato against ... Mendoza, 25
Jur Fil, 58; Pealosa against Tuason, Fil Jur 22, 309) Existte res
judicata "Cunado as the new action was embedded in the first,
or is inseparable consequence of it: thus, dismissed the
petecion course claiming a co-owner co-ownership that is
denied, it is logical that one may not then bringing action to
demand the division of common things. "(8 Manresa, 4. ed.,
535.)
5. CORPORATIONS; CERTIFICATES OF ACTION; DIVIDENDS. There can be no law requiring a corporation to pagardos times
and two different people the dividends of the same action.
6. JUDGMENTS; sentecia EFFECT OF A FOREIGN COURT
AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES. The doctrine of Coke (Coke on Littleton, 3255) "that where
there are two conflicting Judgments on a claim or demand ...
The two Judgments neutralize each other and Their Both parties
assert claims anew May," is not applicable to the present
case . Litigants, whether natural, and foreigners must repetar
decisions Philippine courts, but should they choose to go to a
foreign court, asking for a remedy inconsistent withthe
provision of the sentence also obtained in the Philippines and
be achieve a adverse decision, not should allow them to
repudiate the foreign court then asked the meeting and the
decision of the court that they had abandoned the
Philippines. Allowing that way is contrary to the public interest
in order and the Philippines because pertuba orderly
administration of law.
7. ID,. Opening of NEW BUSINESS ABROAD, LEAVING THE
DECISION OF A COURT OF PHILIPPINES. - "One who subjects
himself to the jurisdiction of a Court, even where I would not be
subject to suit Otherwise, Becomes subject to any valid claim
against him Asserted Directly Relating to the subject matter of
his Initiated voluntarily proceeding." (V Hoxsey. Hoffpauir, 180
F. 2d 84).
8. ID,. ID,. DOES NOT APPLY THE CASE AGAINST CHERUB
CHERUB (L-3693). - Doctrine is inapplicable Querubin against
Querubin (L-3693, July 29, 1950) in this case. In this case, the
decision of the Court of New York has not been obtained by Ms.
Perkins behind the applicant, on the contrary, that decision was
rendered under the complaint filed by Mr. Perkins, the actor was
The initiator of the case that was discussed for the second time
owned 24,000 shares and leaving the decision of the Court of
Manila, requested that such actions were declared its exclusive
property. After a hearing at which the parties had had ample
opportunity to be hearsay, sa issued a ruling declaring Ms.
Perkins owns the shares. This judgment is final between the
two. The plaintiff has no right to challenge the decision
rendered in a case brought by the Court of New York in which
they, plaintiff and defendant are citizens.
9. ID,. ID,. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EXECUTION OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENT AND THE SAME AS interposition of
DEFENDING "RES-JUDICATA." - Do not confuse the execution of
a foreign judgment with the exception of res judicata. There is
a difference between asking Philippines enforcement of a
foreign decision (enforcement of foreign judgment) and present
the defense of res judicata. Sort the enforcement of a foreign
judgment involves direct act of sovereignty, recognizing the
exception of res judicata only involved a sense of justice, hence
that articles 14 and 48-a of Rule 39, there is no special
performance to mediated the exception of res judicata to be
accepted as required by Article 47, which was repealed by
resolution of August 9, 1946. The reason is simple, the
execution is not res judicata as requested enforcement of a
foreign decision is requested; presented only as a defense
against an action.
10. CORPORATIONS; DIVIDEND; WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE
SAME. - Dividends are accessories of the shares, as the interest
continues to capital. The owner of the shares is the owner of
the dividend is the one to receive them, unless otherwise
provided.

EN BANCb[G.R. No. L-22470. May 28, 1970.]

SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY,
INC., Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN

PHILIPPINE COURTS; IF JUDGMENT BASED ON CLEAR MISTAKE
OF LAW, NOT ENFORCEABLE. The decision of the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by
the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta is not enforceable in
the Philippines because it is based on a clear mistake of law and
its enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice. It failed to
apply to the facts of this case fundamental principle of contract.
2. ID.; ID.; HOW REPELLED. It is true that under the
provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment
for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by subsequent title," but when suit for its
enforcement is brought in a Philippine Court, said judgment
"may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID., ID.; CLEAR MISTAKE OF LAW; INSTANT CASE.
Had appellee complied with the delivery of one-hundred fiftyfour Hessian bales on months stated in the contract (July,
August, September, 1949) increase in the export tax, which
became effective only on October 1, 1949, would not have been
imposed. Thus, to enforce the decision sought would make an
innocent party (appellant) suffer the consequences of the
breach of contract communed by appellee.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 45193. April 6, 1939.]

EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN
BOUDARD, GINETTE ROSE ADELAIDE BOUDARD and
MONIQUE VICTOIRE BOUDARD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
STEWART EDDIE TAIT, Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; FOREIGN JUDICIAL RECORDS; REQUISITES FOR
ADMISSION. It was unnecessary for the lower court to admit
Exhibits D, E, F and H to M-1, nor can these exhibits be
admitted as evidence, for the appellants failed to show that the
proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi were in
accordance with the laws of France then in force; and because
it appears that said documents are not of the nature mentioned
in sections 304 and 305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of
the judicial record of the proceedings against the appellee in
the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by the proper authorities
there, whose signatures should be authenticated by the Consul
or some consular agent of the United States in said country.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFIED COPY OF FOREIGN JUDICIAL,
RECORDS. The best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings
is a certified copy of the same with all the formalities required
in said sections 304 and 305 of Act No. 190, for only thus can
one be absolutely sure of the authenticity of the record. On the
other hand, said exhibits or documents, if admitted, would only
corroborate and strengthen the evidence of the appellee which
in itself is convincing, and the conclusion of the lower court that
the appellee is not liable for the amount to which he was
sentenced by the Hanoi Court, for he was not duly tried or even
summoned in conformity with law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMONS UNDER THE LAW OF FRANCE. If
the French law regarding summons is according to its English
translation presented by the appellants: "SEC. 69 (par. 8).
Those who have no known residence in France, in the place of
their present residence: if the place is unknown, the writ shall
be posted at the main door of the hall of the court where the
complaint has been filed; a second copy shall be given to the
Attorney. General of the Republic who shall visae the original",
then the law was not complied with in the summons allegedly
made upon the appellee, because Exhibits E, E-1, F and F-1
show that the alleged summons delivered to the appellee in
Manila on September 18, 1933, was delivered to one, J. M. S.,
representative and agent of Churchill & Tait, Inc., which is a
company entirely foreign to the said appellee.

4. ID,; ID.; ID.; ID. The evidence of record, on the other

hand, shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time
referred to in the complaint, nor were his employees or
representatives or his people in general there. The rule in
matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign
country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against
a party is summons is duly served on him within such foreign
country before the proceedings.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PRIMA FACIE" EVIDENCE. The decision and
judgment rendered by the Court of Hanoi are not and should
not be conclusive in this jurisdiction; under our laws they are
only prima facie evidence that the appellants claim is just.
They admit proof to the contrary under section 311 of Act No.
190, as construed in Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. (47 Phil.,
189) .

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.]

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY,
INC., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; FOREIGN JUDGMENT;
EFFECT; RULE IN CASE OF AN ACTION IN PERSONAM. A
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which is comes, until the contrary is shown. It is
also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and
the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce
the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131,
a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese
court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends
that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its
home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also
void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire
jurisdiction over it.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE PARTY ASSAILING
THEREOF. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to what this law
is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that
it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent
upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
3. ID.; ID.; SUMMONS; SERVICE UPON PRIVATE FOREIGN
CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES; RULE;
CASE AT BAR. Alternatively, in the light of the absence of
proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or
similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be
invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides
that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
there is no such resident agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect, or (3) on any of its officers or
agents within the Philippines. If the foreign corporation has
designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is
exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives

the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Where the

corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance
Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b)
the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission,
in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do
business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so
made, the government office or official served shall transmit by
mail a copy of the summons or other legal process to the
corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such
copy is a necessary part of the service. SHARP contends that
the laws authorizing service of process upon the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Superintendent of Banks, and the
Insurance Commissioner, as the case may be, presuppose a
situation wherein the foreign corporation doing business in the
country no longer has any branches or offices within the
Philippines. Such contention is belied by the pertinent
provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128 of the
Corporation Code and Section 190 of the Insurance Code clearly
contemplate two situations: (1) if the corporation had left the
Philippines or had ceased to transact business therein, and (2)
if the corporation has no designated agent. Section 17 of the
General Banking Act does not even speak of a corporation
which had ceased to transact business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a
resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan.
This silence could only mean, or at lest create an impression,
that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government
official or on any of SHARPs officers or agents in Japan could
be availed of. The respondent, however, insists that only service
on any of its officers or employees in its branches in Japan
could be resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the
respondent court, two attempts at service were made at
SHARPs Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. On the
first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the person
authorized to accept court process, was in Manila. On the
second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but he refused to accept the
summons because, according to him, he was no longer an
employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service could
have been made upon any of the officers or agents of SHARP at
its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a
recourse would not preclude service upon the proper
government official, as stated above. As found by the Court of
Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that
summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the
Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The
Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to
cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents
to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of
Japan sent the summons together with the other legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in
turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila.
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry
(now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to
the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on
the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation
Code. Hence, SHARPs contention that such manner of service
is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTITUTED SERVICE; RULE; RATIONALE.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in the 1940 case of
Milliken v. Meyer (311 U.S. 457) that domicile in the state is
alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of
the states jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by
means of appropriate substituted service or personal service
without the state. This principle is embodied in Section 18, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court which allows service of summons on
residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of
the country. The rationale for this rule was explained in Milliken
as follows: [T]he authority of a state over one of its citizen is
not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.
The state which accords him privileges and affords protection to
him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact
reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence
within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the
protection of its laws, are inseparable" from the various
incidences of state citizenship. The responsibilities of that
citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state which
domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere
absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights
and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on
continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile
is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns

without the state, where the state has provided and employed a
reasonable method for apprising such an absent party of the
proceedings against him.
5. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION; DOMICILE ON
CORPORATION FORMED IN ONE STATE BUT HAS OFFICES AND
TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN OTHER STATE; RULE. The
domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was
incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a
corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation
can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation.
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one state may, for certain
purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in which it
has offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our
jurisdiction and apropos thereof, it may be necessary to quote
what we stated in State Investment House, Inc. v. Citibank,
N.A., (203 SCRA 9, 18-20 [1991]) to wit: . . . This Court itself
has already had occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc.
v. Philippine Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign
corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a
defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident
within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment
against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands; [Sec.
424, in relation to Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules of 1940; Sec. 1 (f),
Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other words, a preliminary
attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on the
asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the Philippines and is
consequently and necessarily, "a party who resides out of the
Philippines." Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a
party not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides
out of the country, then, logically, it must be considered a party
who does resides in the Philippines, who is a resident of the
country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed out that: ". . . Our
laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign
corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of
domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and
Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be
entirely out of line with this policy should we make a
discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner,
and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by
attachment when it has complied not only with every
requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but
in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic
corporations. . . ." Obviously, the assimilation of foreign
corporations authorized to do business in the Philippines "to the
status of domestic corporations," subsumes their being found
and operating as corporations, hence, residing, in the country.
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the
"residence of a corporation, if it can be said to have a
residence, is necessarily where it exercises corporate functions .
. .;" that it is considered as dwelling "in the place where its
business is done, . . .," as being "located where its franchises
are exercised . . .," and as being "present where it is engaged
in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that at "foreign
corporation licensed to do business in a state is a resident of
any country where it maintains an office or agent for
transaction of its usual and customary business for venue
purposes;" and that the "necessary element in its signification
is locality of existence." [Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed.,
vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 403]. Inasmuch as SHARP was
admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was
filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP
may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was
amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be
deemed to have assented to the said court lawful methods of
serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of
summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under
the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 73765. August 26, 1991.]

HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., Petitioner, v. HON. FELINTRIYE
G. SAULOG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch CXLII, Makati,
Metro Manila and CORDOVA CHIN SAN, Respondents.

Challenged in this petition for certiorari which is anchored on

grave abuse of discretion, are two orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXLII of Makati, Metro Manila dismissing the
complaint for collection of a sum of money and denying the

motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order on the ground

that petitioner, a Hongkong-based bank, is barred by the
General Banking Act from maintaining a suit in this jurisdiction.
The records show that on July 18, 1979, petitioner Hang Lung
Bank, Ltd., which was not doing business in the Philippines,
entered into two (2) continuing guarantee agreements with
Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby the latter agreed to
pay on demand all sums of money which may be due the bank
from Worlder Enterprises to the extent of the total amount of
two hundred fifty thousand Hongkong dollars (HK $250,000). 1
Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment, petitioner
filed in the Supreme Court of Hongkong a collection suit against
Worlder Enterprises and Chin San. Summonses were allegedly
served upon Worlder Enterprises and Chin San at their
addresses in Hongkong but they failed to respond
thereto.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Hongkong issued the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"J U D G M E N T
"THE 14th DAY OF JUNE, 1984
"No notice of intention to defend having been given by the 1st
and 2nd Defendants herein, IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that:
"(1) the 1st Defendant (Ko Ching Chong Trading otherwise
known as the Worlder Enterprises) do pay the Plaintiff the sum
of HK$, 117,968.36 together with interest on the respective
principal sums of HK$196,591.38, HK$200,216.29,
HK$526,557.63, HK$49,350.00 and HK$3,965.50 at the rates
of 1.7% per month (or HK$111.40 per day), 18.5% per annum
(or HK$101.48 per day), 1.85% per month (or HK$324.71 per
day), 1.55% per month (or HK$25.50 per day) and 1.7% per
month (or HK$2.25 per day) respectively from 4th May 1984 up
to the date of payment; and
"(2) the 2nd Defendant (Cordova Chin San) do pay the Plaintiff
the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with interest on the
principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of 1.7% per month
(or HK$141.67 per day) from 4th May 1984 up to the date of
payment.
"AND IT IS ADJUDGED that the 1st and 2nd Defendants do pay
the Plaintiff the sum of HK$970.00 fixed costs.
"N.J. BARNETT
Registrar"
Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter to
Chin San at his Philippine address but again, no response was
made thereto. Hence, on (October 18, 1984, petitioner
instituted in the court below an action seeking "the
enforcement of its just and valid claims against private
respondent, who is a local resident, for a sum of money based
on a transaction which was perfected, executed and
consummated abroad." 2
In his answer to the complaint, Chin San raised as affirmative
defenses: lack of cause of action, incapacity to sue and
improper venue. 3
Pre-trial of the case was set for June 17, 1985 but it was
postponed to July 12, 1985. However, a day before the latter
pre-trial date, Chin San filed a motion to dismiss the case and
to set the same for hearing the next day. The motion to dismiss
was based on the grounds that petitioner had no legal capacity
to sue and that venue was improperly laid.
Acting on said motion to dismiss, on December 20, 1985, the
lower court 4 issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On defendant Chin San Cordovas motion to dismiss, dated
July 10, 1985; plaintiffs opposition, dated July 12, 1985;
defendants reply, dated July 22, 1985; plaintiffs supplemental
opposition, dated September 13, 1985; and defendants
rejoinder filed on September 23, 1985, said motion to dismiss
is granted.
"Section 14, General Banking Act provides:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
No foreign bank or banking corporation formed, organized or
existing under any laws other than those of the Republic of the

Philippines, shall be permitted to transact business in the

Philippines, or maintain by itself any suit for the recovery of any
debt, claims or demands whatsoever until after it shall have
obtained, upon order of the Monetary Board, a license for that
purpose.
"Plaintiff Hang Lung Bank, Ltd. with business and postal
address at the 3rd Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway,
Hongkong, does not do business in the Philippines. The
continuing guarantee, Annexes A and B appeared to have
been transacted in Hongkong Plaintiffs Annex C shows that it
had already obtained judgment from the Supreme Court of
Hongkong against defendant involving the same claim on June
14, 1984.
"The cases of Mentholatum Company, Inc. versus Mangaliman,
72 Phil. 524 and Eastern Seaboard Navigation, Ltd. versus Juan
Ysmael & Company, Inc., 102 Phil. 1-8, relied upon by plaintiff,
deal with isolated transaction in the Philippines of foreign
corporation. Such transaction though isolated is the one that
conferred jurisdiction to Philippine courts, but in the instant
case, the transaction occurred in Hongkong.
"Case dismissed. The instant complaint not the proper action.
"SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order
but it was denied for lack of merit. 6 Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari seeking the reversal of said orders "so as to allow
petitioner to enforce through the court below its claims against
private respondent as recognized by the Supreme Court of
Hongkong." 7
Petitioner asserts that the lower court gravely abused its
discretion in: (a) holding that the complaint was not the proper
action for purposes of collecting the amount guaranteed by
Chin San "as recognized and adjudged by the Supreme Court of
Hongkong;" (b) interpreting Section 14 of the General Banking
Act as precluding petitioner from maintaining a suit before
Philippine courts because it is a foreign corporation not licensed
to do business in the Philippines despite the fact that it does
not do business here, and (c) impliedly sustaining private
respondents allegation of improper venue.chanrobles law
library : red
We need not detain ourselves on the issue of improper venue.
Suffice it to state that private respondent waived his right to
invoke it when he forthwith filed his answer to the complaint
thereby necessarily implying submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. 8
The resolution of this petition hinges on a determination of
whether petitioner foreign banking corporation has the capacity
to file the action below.
Private respondent correctly contends that since petitioner is a
bank, its capacity to file an action in this jurisdiction is
governed by the General Banking Act (Republic Act No. 337),
particularly Section 14 thereof which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 14. No foreign bank or banking corporation formed,
organized or existing under any laws other than those of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be permitted to transact
business in the Philippines, or maintain by itself or assignee any
suit for the recovery of any debt, claims, or demand
whatsoever, until after it shall have obtained, upon order of the
Monetary Board, a license for that purpose from the Securities
and Exchange Commissioner. Any officer, director or agent of
any such corporation who transacts business in the Philippines
without the said license shall be punished by imprisonment for
not less than one year nor more than ten years and by a fine of
not less than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand
pesos." (45 O.G. No. 4, 1647, 1649-1650).
In construing this provision, we adhere to the interpretation
given by this Court to the almost identical Section 69 of the old
corporation Law (Act No. 1459) which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporation formed,
organized, or existing under any laws other than those of the
Philippines shall be permitted to transact business in the
Philippines or maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the
recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall
have the license prescribed in the section immediately
preceding. Any officer, director or agent of the corporation or

any person transacting business for any foreign corporation not

having the license prescribed shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two
years or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more
than one thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and
fine, in the discretion of the Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted this last
quoted provision as not altogether prohibiting a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines from
suing or maintaining an action in Philippine courts. 9 What it
seeks to prevent is a foreign corporation doing business In the
Philippines without a license from gaining access to Philippine
courts. As elucidated in Marshall-Wells Co. v. Elser & Co., 46
Phil. 70.
"The object of the statute was to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction
of its courts. The object of the statute was not to prevent it
from performing single acts but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose of business without taxing the steps
necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. The
implication of the law is that it was never the purpose of the
Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to
obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines from
securing redress from Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to
permit persons to avoid their contract made with such foreign
corporation. The effect of the statute preventing foreign
corporations from doing business and from bringing actions in
the local courts, except on compliance with elaborate
requirements, must not be unduly extended or improperly
applied. It should not be construed to extend beyond the plain
meaning of its terms, considered in connection with its object,
and in connection with the spirit of the entire law."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The fairly recent case of Universal Shipping Lines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 10 although dealing with the
amended version of Section 69 of the old Corporation Code,
Section 133 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68),
but which is nonetheless apropos, states the rule succinctly: "it
is not the lack of the prescribed license (to do business in the
Philippines) but doing business without license, which bars a
foreign corporation from access to our courts."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Thus, we have ruled that a foreign corporation not licensed to
do business in the Philippines may file a suit in this country due
to the collision of two vessels at the harbor of Manila 11 and for
the loss of goods bound for Hongkong but erroneously
discharged in Manila. 12
Indeed, the phraseologies of Section 14 of the General Banking
Act and its almost identical counterpart Section 69 of the old
Corporation Code are misleading in that they seem to require a
foreign corporation, including a foreign bank or banking
corporation, not licensed to do business and not doing business
in the Philippines to secure a license from the Securities and
Exchange Commission before it can bring or maintain an action
in Philippine courts. To avert such mis impression, Section 133
of the Corporation Code is now more plainly worded
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines
without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under this provision, we have ruled that a foreign corporation
may sue in this jurisdiction for infringement of trademark and
unfair competition although it is not doing business in the
Philippines 13 because the Philippines was a party to the
Convention of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial
Property. 14

a protective shield for unscrupulous Filipino citizens who have

business relationships abroad.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in a
quandary as to whether the suit below is one for enforcement
or recognition of the Hongkong judgment. Its complaint
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COMES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court, most respectfully alleges
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of Hongkong with business and postal
address at the 3rd Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway,
Hongkong, not doing business in the Philippines, but is suing for
this isolated transaction, but for purposes of this complaint may
be served with summons and legal processes of this Honorable
Court, at the 6th Floor, Cibeles Building, 6780 Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila, while defendant Cordova Chin San, may
be served with summons and other legal processes of this
Honorable Court at the Municipality of Moncada, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines;
"2. On July 18, 1979 and July 25, 1980, the defendant
executed Continuing Guarantees, in consideration of plaintiffs
from time to time making advances, or coming to liability or
discounting bills or otherwise giving credit or granting banking
facilities from time to time to, or on account of the Wolder
Enterprises (sic), photocopies of the Contract of Continuing
Guarantees are hereto attached as Annexes A and B,
respectively, and made parts hereof;
"3. In June 1984, a con plaint was filed by plaintiff against the
Wolder Enterprises (sic) and defendant Cordova Chin San, in
The Supreme Court of Hongkong, under Case No. 3176, and
pursuant to which complaint, a judgment dated 14th day of
July, 1984 was rendered by The Supreme Court of Hongkong
ordering to (sic) defendant Cordova Chin San to pay the
plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with interest on
the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of HK$1.7% per
month or (HK$141.67) per day from 4th May, 1984 up to the
date the said amount is paid in full, and to pay the sum of
HK$970.00 as fixed cost, a photocopy of the Judgment
rendered by The Supreme Court of Hongkong is hereto
attached as Annex C and made an integral part hereof;
"4. Plaintiff has made demands upon the defendant in this case
to pay the aforesaid amount the last of which is by letter dated
July 16, 1934 sent by undersigned counsel, a photocopy of the
letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex D and the
Registry Return Card hereto attached as Annex E respectively,
and made parts hereof. However, this notwithstanding,
defendant failed and refused and still continue to fail and refuse
to make any payment to plaintiff on the aforesaid amount of
HK$279,325.00 plus interest on the principal sum of
HK$250,000.00 at the rate of (HK$1141.67) per day from May
4, 1984 up to the date of payment;
"5. In order to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of
herein plaintiff, it has engaged the services of undersigned
counsel, to file the suit at bar, and for whose services it has
agreed to pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total
amount due and owing, as of and by way of attorneys fees plus
costs of suit.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) To pay plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with
interest on the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of
HK$1.7% (sic) per month (or HK$141.67 per day) from May 4,
1984 until the aforesaid amount is paid in full;

We even went further to say that a foreign corporation not

licensed to do business in the Philippines may not be denied the
right to file an action in our courts for an isolated transaction in
this country. 15

"b) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount

due and demandable as of and by way of attorneys fees, and

Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing

business in the Philippines, it may not be denied the privilege of
pursuing its claims against private respondent for a contract
which was entered into and consummated outside the
Philippines. Otherwise we will be hampering the growth and
development of business relations between Filipino citizens and
foreign nationals. Worse, we will be allowing the law to serve as

"Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs, to which it

may by law and equity, be entitled." 16

"c) To pay costs of suit, and

The complaint therefore appears to be one of the enforcement

of the Hongkong judgment because it prays for the grant of the
affirmative relief given by said foreign judgment. 17 Although
petitioner asserts that it is merely seeking the recognition of its

claims based on the contract sued upon and not the

enforcement of the Hongkong judgment, 18 it should be noted
that in the prayer of the complaint, petitioner simply copied the
Hongkong judgment with respect to private respondents
liability.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not
recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being
sought. Hence, in the interest of justice, the complaint should
be considered as a petition for the recognition of the Hongkong
judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in
order that the defendant, private respondent herein, may
present evidence of lack of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud
or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the lower court are
hereby set aside. Civil Case No. 8762 is reinstated and the
lower court is directed to proceed with dispatch in the
disposition of said case. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. L-27091-92. June 30, 1970.]

CONRADO HABAA and ROSARIO R.
HABAA, Petitioners, v. HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
JOSE T. IMBO and CONCEPCION TEVES, CoAdministrators of the Estates of PEDRO TEVES and
MARIA PASTOR, and MARIANO TEVES, Executor of the
Last Will and Testament of PEDRO TEVES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; INSTANT CASE.
Where in the decision of the Supreme Court on March 31,
1964, in the allowance and probate of the will of Pedro Teves,
among others, the validity of the sale by Concepcion Teves of
the two lots in favor of petitioners was upheld, and it was
stated therein that the executor of the will and all other heirs of
the testator should be precluded from questioning the validity
of said sale of two lots but reserving the right upon any
authorized party to question the validity of said sale in the
proper court, respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the new and separate complaint filed by respondent Jose T.
Imbo and six other grandchildren of the decedent spouses and
their other co-plaintiffs seeking anew to nullify the sale of the
two lots in question by said Concepcion Teves. The complaint in
said Case No. 4390 therefore clearly stated no cause of action,
besides being barred by res judicata and since respondent court
patently has no jurisdiction to even attempt to take cognizance
of the action to nullify or modify a final judgment of this
Court, certiorari and prohibition lie to annul and set aside the
proceedings and to direct respondent court to desist from
further proceedings in the matter, as reiterated recently by the
Court in .Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318
(Oct. 31, 1969).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA MEANING. A
party cannot be permitted to urge one ground at a time and
indulge in "piece-meal and endless litigation," and by varying
the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting

his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the
same parties and their privies." (Florendo v. Gonzales. 86 Phil.
631 (1950).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; MEANING.
The provisions of Rule 39, Sec. 39(b) of the Rules of Court
state that the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, is with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity.
4. ID.; ID.; MINISTERIAL DUTY OF COURT TO EXECUTE FINAL
JUDGMENT. Respondent court also neglected the
performance of its ministerial function of issuing the writ of
execution prayed for by petitioners in the estate proceedings to
which they were entitled as a matter of right, by virtue of this
Courts final judgment.
5. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION IN JUDGMENT NOT JUSTIFICATION
TO DENY EXECUTION. The clause in the dispositive part of
the judgment "reserving the right, if any, upon any authorized
party to question the validity of the sale made by Concepcion
Teves to petitioners, in the pro per Court" could in no sense be
invoked by respondents for justifying respondent courts denial
of the writ of execution or the institution anew by plaintiffsheirs of their new and separate civil action questioning the
same sale. For by express terms of the judgment, the executor
and all other heirs of the estate were precluded from
questioning the validity of the sale in question The reservation
clause was obviously intended as a saving clause to protect
third parties (non-heirs) who may have had any title or rights
to the two lots prior or superior to those of the decedent
spouses whose estates were being settled or of Concepcion
Teves, (to whom the said lots had been adjudicated in the will
of the testator Pedro Teves) whose sale thereof in favor of
petitioners was declared valid as against the adverse claims of
all other heirs.
6. ID.; INDISPENSABLE PARTIES; EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY
APPEARANCE OF INDISPENSABLE PARTY NOT IMPLEADED IN
THE ACTION. Where an indispensable party is not impleaded
in an action as required by the Rules of Court, the defect is
cured by the voluntary appearance in the action of said party
through his counsel.
7. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PARTITION OF ESTATE; HEIR
BECOMES ABSOLUTE OWNER FROM THE TIME OF DEATH OF
TESTATOR; INSTANT CASE. Since the lots in question were
partitioned by will to Concepcion Teves, she became the
absolute owner thereof by operation of law from the death of
her parents, free to sell the same to petitioners, more s, when
the sale was expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs,
as held by this Court in the 1964 judgment.