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Introduction
Research Issue
Research Issue
Research Purposes
We add to this literature by examining:
Empirical Methodology
Logistic Regression
X Family
25%
30%
Firm C
Firm A
12%
Voting B = 32%
Cash flow B = 9%
20%
Firm B
Board Composition
Table 1: Basic Statistics of Ownership structure and board compositions one and
two years before the financial distress
one year before
average (%)
distressed healthy t-statistics
firms
firms
A. Ownership structure
control rights
24.80
27.72
-1.125
stock pledge ratio
37.32
15.15
4.050***
ratio of cash flow to
control rights
ownership of the
second largest
shareholder
ownership of
institutional investors
30.71
16.06
-1.392
5.130***
47.92
63.13
-2.382**
62.27
63.22
-0.136
0.93
3.74
-2.756***
1.107
2.992
-1.745*
9.73
15.93
-2.579***
9.36
14.05
-1.660*
B. Board structure
directors held by the
73.74
59.98
3.166***
66.19
59.23
largest shareholder
supervisors held by the
69.63
49.75
2.779***
52.14
48.56
largest shareholder
directors held by non19.21
34.41
-3.921***
28.55
37.24
large shareholder
supervisors held non27.07
43.69
-2.389**
44.02
46.78
large shareholder
management
60.00
44.32
1.722*
58.97
40.00
participation
founder participation
64.44
90.91
-3.942***
76.92
90.67
***: significant at 1% level **: significant at 5% level *: significant at 10% level
1.455
0.419
-1.962*
-0.351
1.942*
-2.023**
Dependent variable =
second
Shareholding of institutionals
Directors
assumed
by
the
largest shareholder
Supervisors assumed by the
largest shareholder
Directors held by non-large
shareholder
Supervisors held by non-large
shareholder
Management participation
Founder participation
Debt ratio
Ln (market value)
RDA(2)
H0: =0
Chi-square
Concordant ratio
**: significant at 1% level
9.825
(2.346)(1)
-0.059
(8.806)***
-0.110
(3.719)*
-0.051
(0.949)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.023
(3.454)*
0.010
(2.506)
-0.034
(6.198)**
0.812
(2.235)
-1.498
(5.307)**
0.044
(7.967)***
-0.138
(0.276)
-0.060
(0.217)
1.002
(3.504)*
-1.453
(4.973)**
0.046
(8.432)***
-0.090
(0.123)
-0.085
(0.382)
0.647
(1.333)
-1.317
(3.965)**
0.041
(6.394)**
-0.131
(0.231)
-0.044
(0.121)
-0.008
(1.472)
0.982
(3.372)*
-1.056
(5.318)**
0.044
(7.844)***
-0.088
(0.116)
-0.083
(0.403)
58.157***
57.230***
61.476***
56.148***
86.2%
86.0%
87.4%
85.5%
Pi
' xi
1 e
' xi
Table 4: Estimated probabilities of financial distress for the holdout sample - one
year before the financial distress
Independent variable
Estimated probability of financial distress
in the estimated
financial distressed firms financially healthy firms t-statistics(3)
model(1)
% of director occupied
by the largest
shareholder, and other
independent variables(2)
0.7237
0.3198
5.487***
% of supervisors
occupied by the largest
shareholder, and other
independent variables
0.6171
0.2273
5.458***
% of director held by
non-large shareholders
and other independent
variables
0.5899
0.1937
4.879***
% of supervisors held by
non-large shareholders
and other independent
variables
0.5929
0.2063
5.441***
Average
0.6309
0.2368
17.77%
% of supervisors
occupied by the largest
shareholder, and other
independent variables
17.77%
% of director held by
non-large shareholders
and other independent
variables
20.00%
% of supervisors held
by non-large
shareholders and other
independent variables
20.00%
Conclusion
Conclusion