NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

A New World Order:

China's Move Backward Toward Great Power Politics

By
Scott Minium
Captain, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the winter elective of Chinese Statecraft.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed
by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________

27 JAN 2010
 A New World Order:
China's Move Backward Toward Great Power Politics

The major obstacles to understanding China's grand strategy are their contradictory

actions. While many of these actions appear to be in national interests of China, others seem

to be aimed more at undermining the position of the U.S. and the current international system

it supports. The exclusively short term gain sought by some of these actions is sharply

myopic and runs contrary to the conventional wisdom about China and its grand long term

plan. In fact, China's drive to remove all signs of international leadership threatens to rend

the fabric of the world system that the Chinese Communist Party is heavily relying upon now

and in the future for economic growth and its own legitimacy. This paper will examine

several examples of these long vs short term conflicted goals, and demonstrate that the

realpolitik employed by China is either dangerously off target for its interests, or on target for

a future the US and the rest of the world should be concerned about.

The House the U.S. Built

The world is always changing, and the world of today is no different. In the aftermath

of the Cold War, the United States has found itself to be the somewhat reluctant world leader.

Presiding over a global system of international institutions set up mostly at its own behest or

actions, the U.S. seeks a world free from war that enables prosperity for all. Naturally, some

disagree with that rosy narrative, but the current world order the U.S. maintains has

unquestionably delivered on the promise of peace. Conflicts do still flare up from time to

time, but no conflagrations like the Great Power wars of old (e.g., Napoleon, WWI, WWII)

have taken place. To understand what the U.S. seeks to maintain is to look upon a complex

international system that seeks to restrain nation-states existing in an anarchic world.

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 The anarchy of the world today is not much different than it was in the past. Despite

the existence of the United Nations and its Security Council, there is no higher authority than

the nation-state. Treaties and agreements only serve to bind state actions should they choose

to do so. Even though it is just a loose union of the willing, the international system of the

last sixty five years has ushered in an era of state relations that would have been nearly

unrecognizable before World War II. The current model of state relations is still just a young

experiment when compared to the centuries that went before. It remains to be seen if this

adventure will continue to be successful or will be overturned.

From the Treaty of Westphalia until 1945, international relations were characterized

by ruthlessness: forced annexation of new lands, subjugation of populations, frequent wars

for all manner of reasons and a nearly complete lack of cooperation in the absence of war.

Alliances were the only functioning international institutions, and those served only as

barriers and triggers of war. War was the only arbiter of disputes between states and the only

thing that constrained their behavior.

The years following World War II seemed to indicate the world had finally decided

the price of playing great power politics was to great. Colonialism came to end.

International institutions brought new ways to resolve issues between states. Some wars

were fought, some with great loss of life, but generally peace reined. True it was not perfect,

but nowhere in the world has an entire country mobilized for war.1

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. fought a Cold War over which ideology would rule the

world, but it never became hot. Even in the midst of this 'conflict,' the global system of

institutions shaped by, and largely funded and defended by, the U.S. took the place of great

power politics. The U.S. performed a significant leadership role in the world after World War

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II, but after the Cold War the U.S. was the undisputed leader. The U.S. has historically

turned inward after major conflicts, but as the sole remaining superpower with the ability to

influence events around the world, by force if necessary, the U.S. remained engaged.

The global institutions of the U.N., WTO, World Bank, and others remain functional

so long as the vast majority of nations continue to see their usefulness. Naturally, all

countries, including the U.S., seek to improve their position in the world if for no other

reason than keeping the people at home happy. The system functions as well as it does due in

no small part to the actions of the U.S. to maintain it, and for most of the last sixty five years

no country voiced strong opposition to this order, benefiting collectively as they were from

the efforts of the one large benefactor. There are signs, however, that this may be changing,

but how much and to what extent it will change is very much in question.

The House China Lives In

Perhaps China is the only country that has benefited more than the U.S. from this

international system. Despite the Korean War, China has certainly enjoyed the state of

relative global peace of the last sixty five years. The end to colonialism and forced

occupation saw the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the end of the 'century of

humiliation.' Economically, the U.S. led efforts to improve free trade have substantially

benefited China. Further, China's own stated plans indicate that the relative peace in the

world means the time is now for China to focus on its economy.2 With respect to national

security, China's position was greatly improved with the demise of the Soviet Union. And

while China still has unresolved border issues with another nuclear power, India, the two

have not fought a war over those disputes since 1962. The improvement in the economies of

both countries is certainly one reason tensions have not flared again.3

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 Additionally, the enormous increase in China's gross domestic product has made it an

economic force. The per-capita income remains far below the rest of the world's major

economies, and this is a singular focus of the CCP.

Before attempting to answer the question of what China wants for the future, we

should assess what China sees as its concerns in this world system. China's burgeoning

economy has need of resources, energy, and markets for its products. Another big concern

for China is territorial integrity. Clearly no territorial dispute is of more concern to China

than Taiwan, and barring some novel approach to diplomacy, U.S. involvement in that

dispute seems likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Finally, driven by the memories

of the century before WWII, another key issue is sovereignty—in this case the ability to do

what it wants within its borders. Thus the sovereignty issue adds yet another dimension to

the frustration with the U.S. over Taiwan. The combination of economic growth and

territorial integrity form the core regime survival issues for the CCP.

As a rising power, China is forced to face the current world order and decide if it will

continue to exist within that framework or change it. Perhaps China's broader entry into the

system means change is inevitable, but the question is not so much if the system will change

as much as if China will seek to alter it into something completely different. In terms of

power transition theory the question is whether China is a satisfied power (one that gets what

it wants from the current world order), or a revisionist power (one that seeks to overturn the

order in favor of a new one).4 Unfortunately there are many indications that China is a

attempting to be the former while backing (perhaps blindly) into the latter.

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 The Problem of the Five Principles

After the end of Mao era in Chinese history, Deng Xiaoping ushered in a very

different era, setting China on a path to reenter the world politically and economically. Given

the state of China at the time, there was likely concern within China as to whether or not this

was a bit premature. Deng sought to ease such concerns, both internal and external, with the

declaration of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The five principles are: mutual

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression, non-interference in

each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.5 All of

these may be seen as influences on China's statecraft to this day. However, as China's power

has risen, their realpolitik approach to the world has clashed with these principles to result in

a decidedly Janus-like nature that has critical implications for the future of the current world

order.

A cynical, but not inaccurate, view holds that one result of the five principles is the

right to do whatever it wants to its domestic population. Naturally China defends this disdain

of human rights by stating it will not interfere in the affairs of other countries. This has

endeared China to practitioners of human rights abuses around the world. The duplicitous

nature of this stance also means that if a nation wants nuclear, chemical or biological

weapons it is their business and the world should not bother them. Peaceful coexistence is

only called into question if such weapons are used, or so the Chinese logic goes.

Another application of the principles is found in the realm of world trade. Currency

manipulation in the face of world concern is of no interest, since currency rates are purely an

internal matter. Of course, it is difficult to argue that 'mutual benefit' is obtained from

artificially maintained trade imbalances, but that principle is apparently not as important as

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the non-interference principle. But this raises the same question as the weapons discussion:

at what point do the 'internal' actions of a state violate peaceful coexistence? The answer

appears to be determined by what is convenient at the time.

Strict application of the five principles indicates they are a perfect set of rules for

doing what you want to the world while still allowing you to believe you are not responsible

for it. The reasoning allows all manner of behaviors: “China is not manipulating currency, it

is simply developing itself,” “China supports non-proliferation, but each country should be

free to acquire and choose on its own,” and “China does not oppose U.S. leadership in the

world, China just thinks everyone should be free to do what they want.”(Of course, the latter

does not apply to its own citizens.) The net effect is that China follows realpolitik and does

whatever it wants regardless of the effect on others, then wraps itself in the warm blanket of

the five principles and professes its benevolence.

The New Colonialism

Although colonialism in its historic sense ended in the decades after World War II, it

is possible the main reason was the inability to fund the cost of maintaining an empire while

rebuilding after the war, more than a sense of inherent wrongness. However, the fact remains

that the system did end and has shown no signs of returning in its earlier form as

characterized by the European powers of old. However, there are reasons to believe China is

interested in embarking on its own and slightly different version of this old way of doing

business. There are two ways in which China is engaging in colonialist behavior. The first is

its undertaking of maritime colonialism while the second is found in it dealings with state

suppliers of needed raw materials.

Based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence (see discussion below), one

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would expect China not to engage in colonialism in the old sense since that would overtly

undermine the sovereignty of the foreign state. Certainly the rules of the world since 1945

do not condone forced annexation of the land of other states. After all, even China voted to

take action after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Land grabs, at least land grabs where people

live, are no longer part of the accepted behavior of states. However, China is nurturing a

slightly different view toward maritime claims. While a land claim can be contested by air,

land and sea forces, it can only be sustained with presence of some kind of force. In contrast,

maritime claims are often made and contested through nothing more than legalities and the

threat of force. China has settled most of the land disputes on its borders, but has active

maritime disputes with many of its neighbors. In the South China Sea the disputes are with

every country that borders that body of water. With very few, if any, exceptions, none of the

islands or rocks in the SCS qualify for an EEZ.6 The various rocks and atolls thus form a

series of 12nm circles of control. However, China claims all of the islands in the SCS.7

In addition, there is the matter of the so-called 9-dashed line in the SCS that appears

in some Chinese books and maps. While China has not stated what this line means, their

actions in regard to it are strangely inconsistent. On the one hand, sources inside China claim

the line indicates China's historic claims to the SCS. That is, the whole of the area are

Chinese territorial waters. However, the official Chinese baseline claims include the Paracels

and Spratlys independently, which would be unnecessary if China considered the SCS as

territorial seas.8

The behavior of China in the matter of the 9-dashed line is what the author terms

maritime colonialism. The claim to the property is accomplished by 'planting a flag' and

calling it yours. Colonial claims do not require the permission of the locals, something

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which is made even easier when there are no people around. The claimed area, if that is what

it is, clearly intrudes into the areas that most of the bordering countries claim as their own

EEZs under UNCLOS. China supports UNCLOS, and as such it plays an interesting janus

game. On the one hand China wants the water and resources while on the other it supports

UNCLOS. Asserting the claim to the 9-dashed line area attempts to subvert UNCLOS by

claiming it was always part of China. There can be no doubt that China fully intends to claim

the SCS as its own. In the 1990's China contracted with an American company to conduct oil

exploration well within the Vietnam EEZ. Protests by Vietnam were not only ignored, but

China stated it was prepared to back its statements with force.9

Although it has not happened yet, there is really no reason why claims similar to those

by China in the SCS cannot be put forward by other countries around the world once the new

precedent is set. At this time international treaties and custom do not recognize claims on the

open ocean. The current system of an open maritime commons is the bedrock upon which

international trade is built. By staking claims to part of the high seas China not only

infuriates its neighbors, it jeopardizes the very system it is using since a claim must be

backed by force if challenged. The actions in the SCS by China will likely motivate other

nations of the world to stake similarly outrageous maritime claims. It is not a stretch to see

that if these claims are to be exploited for their resources they will have to be defended

against interlopers and aggrieved parties. Extending this line of reasoning into the future,

one can see that these defended areas will be treated as territorial waters, thus greatly

restricting freedom of movement. Additionally, as these new territorial seas pop up all over

the world, there will be an ever increasing chance for conflict—just as there was in the earlier

colonial era.

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 UNCLOS is an example of an international institution that China supports until it is

inconvenient. If and when China's national interests come into conflict with an institution, a

bit of sophist legal reasoning is employed so that one part of China can continue to believe it

is following the law while another part violates it.

The second type of colonialist-like behavior is the purchasing of raw materials direct

from supplier countries rather than the markets. Some have argued that ultimately China will

recognize this kind of private extraction is less efficient than a market solution, but for now

China is engaged in a wide variety of state sponsored resource extractions in Africa. A

number of things make this practice very different from either previous colonial enterprises

or the existing resource market mechanisms. First, in many cases China supplies all the

materials and labor to build and operate the extraction facilities. This has minimal impact on,

and minimal benefit for, the local economy. It also provides little or no training for the local

population. Although the government is paid for the extracted raw materials, once China

leaves there will be nothing left behind. Second, although China may pay more for the

resources because of a lack of market efficiencies, it also means the supplying country gets

less for the material than it would on the market. Fortunately, since China makes little

attempt to use and develop local labor and skills, they are not undermining the sovereignty of

the local government. Thus the five principles again fully support the course of action.

Nuclear Proliferation

Although China has signed the Non-Proliferation treaty, many of their actions to date

have demonstrated they are not interested in enforcing it. The whole point of this treaty, of

course, was to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While China delayed approval of

the treaty for quite some time, they ultimately signed it. This should indicate support for the

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underlying principle of non-proliferation, but this is not the case. It is likely that China was

the source of Pakistan's initial nuclear weapons designs, probably supplied in the 1980s.10

While this action predates China's signing of the NPT, but it clearly demonstrates Chinese

unconcern with proliferation even in the Deng era. Further, there can be little doubt that

China expected Pakistan to share this technology with others, and most of those others were,

fortuitously for China, antagonistic toward the US (e.g., Iran, DPRK, Libya). China now

states they are dedicated to the idea of non-proliferation while at the same time adhering to

the idea that sovereignty is immutable.11 In this China again attempts to claim the high

ground of non-interference with other states while at the same time claiming to desire non-

proliferation. Curiously, the only way non-proliferation works in this mind set is by willing

acquiescence. Some have opined that China now sees proliferation as a threat to its interests,

but this seems to be a case of trying to close the barn door after the horses have escaped.

The US certainly sees negative security consequences from Chinese disinterest in

stopping proliferation, but short sighted Chinese actions have also seriously degraded the

Chinese security position. China imports most of its oil from the Middle East and is likely to

continue to do so for some time. Just like the rest of the world, Chinese oil imports benefit

from stability in that region. Increasing the number of nuclear weapons states in the Middle

East, specifically the possible addition of Iran, could seriously embolden Tehran in the

region. Given their neighbors concerns about Iranian hegemony, the other countries in the

region could respond with weapons of their own. There also seems to be the idea that there is

little chance these countries could ever turn their enmity on China, no doubt due to their

adherence to the five principles. However, as China becomes more and more tied to the

resources of the region and their means of extraction, China will be increasingly visible to the

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same forces that even now despise the U.S. Moreover, efforts by China to push the US out of

the global hegemon position will result in this shift of attention happening more rapidly.

Interestingly, it is certainly in the security interests of the U.S. for Middle Eastern anger to

have a new target. In regards to North Korean nuclear weapons the Chinese have taken no

substantive actions. As the DPRK's only meaningful trading partner, China has done

essentially nothing to move Pyongyang toward disarmament. Once again China will claim it

should not interfere with the internal matters of another state; however, this case clearly

demonstrates the myopia of that view. As China moves to push the U.S. out of the Western

Pacific, their tacit support for a nuclear North Korea could easily move South Korea and

Japan toward nuclear weapons. A nuclear Japan cannot be seen as an improvement to

China's security position.

Begun in 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an attempt to stop global

trafficking in materials that could be used in nuclear and other types of proliferation. Simply

stated, the PSI is a true coalition of the willing wherein member nations agree to allow other

members to inspect their civilian cargo vessels.12 Although it is a good step toward

countering proliferation, the weakness of this initiative is international law itself. Each PSI

country could, at best, stop vessels of other PSI countries. But if a state like North Korea

wanted to ship plutonium, there is nothing under international law that can be done to stop it

on the high seas. To counter this problem the U.S. pushed for UN resolution 1540, which

would have required states to enforce non-proliferation; however, China blocked this

resolution until all language mandating action by states was removed.13 One of the reasons

China opposes PSI is out of concern for boarding authority. But as already stated, PSI does

not flout international law and does not purport to allows flag-states to board other flag-state

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vessels without permission. Nevertheless, China opposes the measure while still claiming to

be interested in non-proliferation. How then should one interpret the actions of China?

Based on the actions of China it is difficult to argue they are interested in non-

proliferation. If they were their bomb designs would not have made their way to Pakistan

and Libya and they would have done something with the DPRK before that country

detonated a nuclear device. Chinese actions indicate they are not so much in favor of

proliferation as in undermining the U.S. position. First, by allowing or even encouraging the

DPRK to continue its nuclear saber rattling, China makes the U.S. appear weak if the U.S.

does not intervene by force. Second, by blocking the PSI and UNSCR 1540, China makes

U.S. proliferation initiatives anemic. Third, China has steadily blocked efforts to push Iran

off its path toward nuclear weapons.14 Fourth, China once again wraps itself in the five

principles and claims attempts to change the behavior of Iran or the DPRK are meddling in

their internal affairs.

The overall effect of Chinese nonsupport of non-proliferation has been a steady

increase in the number of security concerns for the U.S. But perhaps the most interesting

aspect of proliferation is that while China may bear a good amount of the blame, the U.S.

responses to proliferation are not aimed at China. For China, this is a wonderful win-win

scenario—the adversary gets all the headache and China gets little if any of the resulting

negative attention and blame.

Refusal of Global Leadership

It has been said that global leadership and global hegemony are essentially the right to

set the agenda.15 The U.S. has certainly done its part to set the agenda since assuming its role

as a superpower after WW II. The many international institutions that have been mentioned

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in this paper would not have come into existence, or continue to exist now, without the

leadership of the U.S. Although the U.S. has on some occasions, some of them significant,

failed to live up to its self imposed position of global leadership, China recently indicated the

outright intention to refuse it.

In the past ten years climate change has gone from a possible issue to one of global

importance. When it comes to fossil fuel emissions, the U.S. and China own the lion's share

of the world's problem. The last U.S. President had no interest in the matter and actively

pursued policies that demonstrated exactly no concern over climate change. China, for its

part, is investing vast amounts in non-fossil fuel energy sources. While the motivation for

China's actions may be energy self-sufficiency more than climate change, the fact remains

their actions are at least not making the problem worse. Both China and the U.S. could be

seen as simply executing realist policies of just looking out for their own interests. Of course

if climate change is real then those interests are being pursued to their own long term

detriment. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the U.S. Congress now taking up the role of

climate change denial and refusing to work for improvement, the world's leaders came

together in Copenhagen in December 2009 in an attempt to address the problem.

Many of China's 'satellite' supporters in Africa and around the Indian Ocean are

severely threatened by climate change projections. Discussions at Copenhagen mentioned

the 'developed world against the developing world.'16 As a self proclaimed developing

country, China has de facto leadership of the group of countries that feels it is being

threatened by the developed world. Moreover, the developing countries state, somewhat

correctly, that carbon restriction policies will hurt their development while the rich countries

just rest on prior success based on fossil fuel usage.

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 As China has stated its own goals of emissions reductions, it was reasonable to

assume that China would show up at Copenhagen ready to hold the feet of the West to the

proverbial fire. Much to the chagrin of the assembled countries, China showed up with a

much different agenda. China's actions at the big meeting demonstrated that not only is it not

interested in assuming a leadership role, it is against anyone being in that role. First, China

did not even send a top tier diplomatic official to the negotiations. The Chinese diplomat in

Copenhagen sent a lackey who had to call for permission before agreeing to anything.

Second, although China has emissions goals and a temperature rise target of its own, it

refused to be party to anything requiring those reductions in writing.17 Since the targets of the

treaty were not in excess of China's own plans, why did they stifle an agreement? It is

possible that China is not concerned about climate change despite their statements to the

contrary, but that is just supposition. What is certain is that China stymied a binding treaty in

a manner that undermined an attempt at leadership on the issue by the U.S., while at the same

time demonstrating China did not wish to assume that leadership role.

Conclusion: The New (Chinese) World Order

The U.S. alone will decide if it remains a world power in the future, but China's rising

power cannot be ignored. The future includes a number of possible generalized outcomes.

The happiest is that China and the U.S. end up being the two biggest powers in a world

system that looks a lot like the current one. The second is a similar system, but with China

rather than the U.S. at the helm. The third, and least rosy, is the decline of the U.S. and the

debut of a new world order with no leadership. To date, the U.S. correctly appears interested

in the first option and is actively trying to bring China over to that view. Unfortunately,

China is steadfastly opposed to U.S. leadership, some reasons for which have been touched

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upon in this paper. U.S. efforts to get China to be a stakeholder in the world require China to

take up some leadership, but this is conveniently hampered by dedication to the five

principles. Recent increases in U.N. peacekeeping show that some improvement has been

made in this area, so the first and second options are not gone yet.18

However, if China refuses leadership and succeeds in removing the U.S. from its

position on the world stage, then the last outcome may come to pass. The anarchy of the

world system, where all countries answer to no higher authority, is unlikely to change. What

the U.S. led world system has done in the last sixty five years is to put finer controls on what

those countries can do before running afoul of the rest of the world. This has required a set

of international norms underwritten by a global security system, provided nearly gratis by the

U.S.

While it may be possible for the system to continue largely as it is without a leader or

agenda setter, this has never been done. The current system has always had a dominant voice

to lead and direct the discussion, and one ready to stand up for the system when others would

refute it with violence. If China not only seeks to unseat the U.S. as the agenda setter, but

additionally desires there to be no agenda setter, the world system will be in new territory.

Unfortunately, a number of China's moves do not seem to be in the direction of something

new, but rather something old.

China has stated a desire to be the regional hegemon in Asia.19 China has backed the

idea of U.N. reform that would improve regional representation on the Security Council and

undo the concept of the permanent five veto.20 China has made moves toward a new kind of

colonialism in the maritime domain, and instigated or directly supported nuclear proliferation

that has resulted in one arms race (India-Pakistan) and threatens new ones in the future

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(DPRK-ROK-Japan-Iran). Against the canvas of possible futures, such actions seem

strikingly myopic given that China's rise has come as a result of the current world system, not

in spite of it.

These actions harken back to the world of great power, dog-eat-dog politics of the

period before World War II. Whether China is blindly backing into this insane return to the

past or deliberately coaching the world in that direction is important for only one reason:

stopping this trend with China's help is dependent on their acceptance of the former, while

stopping the trend requires fully blocking China in the latter. Ultimately, to be successful in

managing China's rise the U.S. must convince China that the current world order is the best

method yet tried, and that maintaining it is in China's best interests in the long term.

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 Notes

1. With the extremely odd exception, perhaps, of the DPRK.

2. “Peace and development remain the principal themes of the times, and the pursuit of
peace, development and cooperation has become an irresistible trend of the times.” See
“China's National Defense in 2008”, China.Org.CN,
http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009-
01/20/content_17155577_3.htm (accessed 22 January 2010.)

3. Another significant factor is that Mao, a product of the era of great power politics and a
very risk accepting individual, died in the 1970s.

4. “Power Transition Theory,” Wikipedia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_transition_theory accessed 5 January 2010.

5. Jiang Zhuqing, “Five Principles Still Shaping Global Peace,” China Daily (29 June 2004),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/29/content_343578.htm.
(accessed 5 January 2010)

6. Although the language can be found in UNCLOS, this summary was put forward by Prof
Dutton in one seminar.

7. Jianming Shen, “China's Sovereignty over the SCS Islands, A historical perspective”,
Chinese Journal of International law 2002 1(1):94-157. accessed 12/20/09.

8. “Chinese Claimed Straight Baselines,” Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C. :

CIA, 1996). http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/gmd:@field
%28Number+@band%28g7821f+ct002815%29%29 (accessed 22 January 2010)

9. Chien-peng Chung, “The Spratlys and other South China Sea Islands Disputes,” The
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Spring 1999): 21.

10. Richard Cronin, Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation
Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and
Options, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005.

11 Edward Cody, “U.S.: China Is Ally Against Proliferation,” Washington Post, February 17,
2004.

12. International law generally prohibits searches of vessels of one state by another without
prior agreement. See Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M, July 2007, 3-4.

13. James Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara and Andrew Winner, “Maritime Counter-proliferation

17
with Chinese Characteristics,” Defense & Security Analysis 22 (March 2006): 8.

14. Evelyn Leopold, “China squashes US hopes for Tough UN Sanctions,” Huffington Post
(5 January 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/evelyn-leopold/iran-china-squashes-us-ho_b_412555.html
(accessed 10 January 2010)

15. This discussion of hegemony and agenda setting was put forward by Prof Dutton in one
of the seminars.

16. Mark Lynas, “How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal?” The Guardian (22
December 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-
change-mark-lynas (accessed 13 January 2010)

17. Ibid.

18. Colum Lynch, “China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping,” Washington
Post (24 November 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/23/AR2006112301007.html
(accessed 20 December 2009)

19. Manu Pubby, “China Proposed Division of Pacific, Indian Ocean Regions, We
Declined,” The Indian Express (15 May 2009), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-
proposed-division-of-pacific-indian-ocean-regions-we-declined-us-admiral/459851/0
(accessed 8 January 2010)

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http://china.org.cn/international/china_voice/2008-10/07/content_16573926.htm
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