TANADA VS TUVERA

FACTS:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada et al seek a writ of
mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees
(PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive
Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they
shall take effect.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date
of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official
Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in
the present case where the president may on his own issue laws.
The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis
non excusat. Publication is indispensable.

People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of
US dollars, USchecks and US money orders amounting to about
$7000 but failed to sell the same tothe Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20.Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949
but was published in the Official Gazetteonly on Nov. 1951 after the
act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.Que Po Lay appealed from
the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265sentencing
him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it tobecome effective and subject violators to
corresponding penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a
rule, circular andregulations of the Central Bank in question
prescribing a penalty for its violationshould be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the
public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a
law,regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be
officially andspecifically informed of such contents including its
penalties.Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed
from and acquit theappellant, with costs de oficio

Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction
worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow,
Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment
of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of
negligence.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for
itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the
following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality
or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence
arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the
inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application

of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the

incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmens
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the
Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have
waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came
under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she
wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she
already had.

Emetrio Cui v Arellano University

FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University.
He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949)
until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was
awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a
total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester
as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to
take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano
University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid
back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he
could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued

Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools,
colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97

payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.

HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law
where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in
nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous

students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before

graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good
morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights
and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87
with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the
institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing
defendants counterclaim.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private

respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil
had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner.
The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned
to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by
the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus

presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the
complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining
a divorce decree?

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made
permanent.
NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be

prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to

institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence
since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of
the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in

the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital
bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a

valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the

Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the

nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Roehr v. Rodriguez
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to
dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides
that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a
divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was
granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between
her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and
custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial

motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality, as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening
events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was

given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German
court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res
judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental
custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court
were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens participation
in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody

of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

Garcia vs Recio
FACTS:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an
Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of
divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family
Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen.
Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace Garcia, a
Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and
Garcia lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that
his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce
obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry Garcia.
The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage
between Garcia and Recio dissolved and both parties can now
remarry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto
capacitated him to remarry.
HELD:
The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence.
Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that Recio who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to
marry Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare
her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may
turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to
marry Garcia as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the
following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.