BRIT.J. CRIMINOL.

VOL 38

NO. 3

SUMMER 1998

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE

AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
BARRY MITCHELL*

There is a growing body of research evidence of the impact of public opinion about
crime seriousness and sentencing policy both in this country (Levi and Jones 1985) and
elsewhere (Golash and Lynch 1995), and policy makers are undoubtedly influenced by
perceptions of public sentiment and the need to maintain public confidence in die
criminal justice system (Indermaur 1991; Roberts 1992). At a theoretical level, it has
been forcefully argued that public opinion has a crucial role to play in denouncing
criminal behaviour and reaffirming society's values (Davies 1993).
The vast majority of criminological research has investigated attitudes across a wide
range of offences. Various polls have elicited views on capital punishment, but apart
from two snapshot surveys by the MORI organization in October 1990 (for the BBC
programme Public Eye) and in August 19952 (for the News of the World newspaper),
there is a conspicuous dearth of detailed investigation of opinion on homicide and how
the criminal justice system should respond to it. The public appear to have an
ambivalent interest in homicide; for some time there has been a demand for
publications depicting detailed accounts of sensational and usually horrific killings,
whilst those same crimes have been roundly condemned, especially by the press and
other sections of the media.
Smith's (1984) study based on the inhabitants of a small area in Birmingham found
that for 52 per cent of her sample the main source of information about crime was the
media,3 and this is supported by research in other jurisdictions (e.g. Knowles 1982;
Broadhurst and Indermaur 1982; and Canadian Sentencing Commission 1987).
Research also suggests that (i) the news media usually provide insufficient information
on which to make reasoned evaluations of events, so that opinions are formed without
School of International Studies and Law, Coventry University, Coventry.
1
This survey was funded by two grants; one for 55,900 from the Leverhulme Trust, the other for f 15,700 from Coventry
University's Research Initiative.
1
A quota sample of 1,527 adults aged 18 years or more were interviewed on 4 August 1995 in the street at 68 constituency
sampling points throughout Great Britain. The data were weighted to match the profile of the population.
9
35.8 per cent relied on hearsay or the supposed experience of friends and neighbours, 3.2 per cent used their own experience,
and just 1.3 per cent used the police.

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This article offers an account of a recent quantitative surveyi of public opinion on homicide and the
criminal justice system. The survey set out to test the assumptions made in substantive criminal law
that the public recognize variations in moral culpability between homicides and that these
variations should be reflected in separate offences carrying separate sentencing provisions. If this
fundamental assumption is well founded, the survey further sought to determine what factors
appear to influence the public's assessment of gravity in homicides, how the law should categorize
homicides, and whatjustifications and excuses should be recognized. Finally, it set out to test public
opinion as to the appropriate penalties for the most serious homicides.

BARRY MITCHELL

* In the more recent of the two MORI surveys (i.e. the one conducted in August 1993) referred to above, 71 per cent said thai rape
of a child and 65 per cent thought that rape of an adult should justify the death penalty, and these figures are very similar to the
percentages of respondents who favoured capital punishment for certain types of murder.
5
'It is no longer true, if it was ever true, to say that murder as we now define it is necessarily the most heinous example of unlawful
homicide' [1974] 2 WLR 607 at 640.
s
'Murder, as every practitioner of the law knews, though often described as one of the utmost heinousness, b not in (act
necessarily so, but consists in a wliole bundle of offences of vastly differing degrees of culpability, ranging from brutal, cynical and
repeated offences like the so-called Moors murders to the almost venial, if objectively unmoral, "mercy killing" of a beloved
partner1 [1987] 2 WLR 568 at 581.

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any substantive knowledge of the issues (Hans and Slater 1983); (ii) the media
invariably reports only the traditional punitive responses to crime (Barrile 1984;
Roberts and Doob 1990); (iii) the media's apparent influence on attitudes towards
crime, through programmes such as Crimewatch UK, Crime Stoppers and
Crimebusters, has lead to a fear of crime (Home Office 1989) and (iv) the 'true crime'
realm provides an inaccurate picture and understanding of homicide (Durham et al.
1995). At the same time, Sparks (1992) warns us against assuming that television
necessarily influences the public's perception of crimefictional crime programmes
are watched primarily for entertainment rather than enlightenment.
Although the law recognizes very specific kinds of homicides through crimes such as
assisting suicide and infanticide, the majority of criminal killings are categorized as
either murder or manslaughter, with the former offence representing what are
regarded as the most serious homicides. The criminal law has long recognized a
distinction between murder and manslaughter (Kaye 1967), and the decision to retain
separate offences rather than a single crime of, say, 'criminal homicide', is based largely
on the hitherto untested assumption that it accords with public opinion (Criminal Law
Revision Committee 1980, paras. 15, 23 and 28; Goff 1988).
It is further assumed that, in broad terms, public opinion on the issue mirrors the
criminal law in its adoption of the principle of fair labelling, that the law should reflect
degrees of wrongdoing through distinct offences, separately labelled and frequently
carrying distinct sentencing provisions, so that offenders can be formally stigmatized in
proportion to their blameworthiness (Criminal Law Revision Committee 1976, para.
7). The details of the conviction should indicate the degree of harm or damage and the
offender's moral culpability, so that the label attached to the crime and the criminal
represents a proportionate response to unlawful conduct (see, for example, Ashworth
1981; Glanville Williams 1983; Horder 1994). Abolition of the murder/ manslaughter
distinction would, it is argued, lead people to think that the law had been weakened and
that 'the law no longer regarded the intentional taking of another's life as being
especially grave' (CLRC 1980, para. 15). Furthermore, the singling out of murder as
representing what is commonly believed to be the worst homicides is also used to justify
the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.4
Yet some of our most senior judges have publicly argued that in its current form
murder does not always represent the most heinous form of homicide (see, e.g. Lord
Kilbrandon in Hyam v. DPP,5 and Lord Hailsham in R v. Howe et al.6). Moreover, it
seems that in practice the verdicts in homicide cases, whether dealt with as guilty pleas
or as contested trials, do not necessarily reflect the theoretical differences between
murder and manslaughter (Mitchell 1991). This apparent discrepancy could not

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

7
It is worth noting here that until quite recently the Australian courts regarded homicides resulting from the use of excessive
force in self-defence as manslaughter, but this was reversed by the High Court in Ztctvic v. DPP (1987) 61 ALJR 375 so that such
cases are treated as murder. In the Republic of Ireland however, the Supreme Court has held that a person who uses no more force
than lie honestly thought was necessary but objectively did use excessive force should be guilty of manslaughter, see PtopU (A-G)v.
Dvjrr [1972] IR 416.

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simply be attributed to evidential issues but may well result from the personal views of
those involved, both lawyers and jurors.
Assumptions about the state of public opinion have also been made in the
rationalization of the law's approach to justifications and excuses in homicide. In cases
where battered spouses kill their abusers, the law has been criticized for its narrow
interpretation of reacting with 'a sudden and temporary loss of self-control', often
thereby depriving the defendant of a manslaughter conviction based on provocation.
Wasik (1982), for example, argued for 'less emphasis upon the need for an immediate
reaction against gross provocation' and urged the law to recognize 'shades of
culpability, even in deliberate killings', claiming that 'all the evidence there is points to
the public's opposition to stigmatising killing under cumulative provocation as
murder'.
In practice, mercy killing is not infrequently treated as manslaughter by straining the
concept of diminished responsibility so as to produce what is perceived as a more just
outcome, namely a manslaughter conviction which in turn does not force the court to
impose a life sentence (CLRC 1976; House of Lords Select Committee 1989). The basis
of this is that '[n]o-one connected with [a mercy killing] case wants to see the defendant
convicted of murder' (CLRC 1980). A person who kills in self-defence theoretically has
a defence even to a murder charge provided it was reasonable for him to use force in the
circumstances and no more than a reasonable degree of force was used; if he exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness by even the smallest amount, he is likely to be convicted of
murderthe law adopts an 'all-or-nothing' approach (e.g. R v. Clegg [1995]). Once
again, though, this is a subject about which lawyers seem to think they have their fingers
on the public pulse. In Palmer v. R [1971], one of the leading authorities on the point,
Lord Morris, commented, 'If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a
person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary
that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been
taken'.7 It is difficult not to harbour a suspicion that ordinary people would at least
reduce the conviction of a killer who used excessive force in self-defence.
Furthermore, the decision of the House of Lords in R v. Howe et al. [ 1987] to exclude
duress by threats (of death or serious injury) as any kind of defence to murder is
presumed to be broadly in line with public acceptance. Lord Hailsham remarked, 'I
have known in my own lifetime of too many acts of heroism by ordinary human beings of
no more than ordinary fortitude to regard a law as either "just or humane" which
withdraws the protection of the criminal law from the innocent victim and casts the
cloak of its protection upon the coward and the poltroon in the name of a "concession to
frailty'". However, commentators have been very critical of this 'heroic argument' as a
rationale of the law (Dennis 1987; Milgate 1988; and Walters 1988). Indeed,
commenting on the ruling in Howe, Professor Smith (1987) claimed, 'Even the most
resolute and well-disposed citizen would be likely to comply (with the threat)'.

BARRY MITCHELL

The Study

In collaboration with Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), a survey was
undertaken with the primary aim of testing the law's assumption that it has public
support for the way in which it deals with homicides. To do this we set out to examine
public opinion in England and Wales on a range of specific homicide scenarios, on
homicides generally, and how the criminal justice system ought to respond to them.
More specifically, the research sought:

Before embarking upon the main national survey, two pilot studies were undertaken.
The first of these, carried out with the assistance of NOP/MAI and funded by a small
grant from the Nuffield Foundation, was in the form of moderated group discussions. It
confirmed that the public recognize the concepts of murder and (albeit slightly less
readily) manslaughter, though not exactly as they are construed in law, and it appeared
to suggest that the public do recognize that some homicides are more serious than
othersi.e. that they merit different levels of punishment and condemnation. A
further pilot study tested a draft questionnaire and confirmed the feasibility of the
general approach of using a series of homicide scenarios as part of a quantitative,
interviewer-administered, questionnaire survey. The survey was based on a random
sample designed to represent the general population in England and Wales, drawn
from the Postcode Address File.8 The response rate was 71 per cent, yielding 822
interviews. On key demographic variables, the sample reflected the population aged 18
or over in England and Wales.
Respondents were asked to consider the following eight hypothetical scenarios:
Card A: Burglary (hereafter the 'burglary scenario')
A burglar was disturbed by the owner of the house, a 25-year-old woman. He panicked.
He picked up an ashtray which was near at hand and hit her over the head with it. She
died of her injuries.
Card B: Terminally ill woman (hereafter the 'mercy killing scenario')
A woman was terminally ill and in great pain. She had been begging her husband to 'put
her out of her misery' for months. Eventually, he gave in to her request and suffocated
her whilst she was asleep.

The interview! were conducted in October 1995.

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(a) to determine whether the public recognize variations in gravity between

homicides;
(b) if they do,
(i) to identify factors which they treat as influencing the gravity of homicides;
(ii) to determine whether they feel such variations should be reflected by the
legal recognition of separate offences carrying separate sentencing
provisions; and
(c) to determine what kinds of sentencing powers the public think ought to be available to the courts when dealing with defendants convicted of'criminal homicides'.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Card C: Woman drowning (hereafter the 'drowning woman scenario')

A young woman was walking her dog by a lakeshe slipped and fell into the water. A
passer-by saw her drowning in the lake. Although he could swim, instead of trying to
save her, he walked by and she drowned.
Card D: Man and woman arguing (hereafter the 'thin skulls scenario')
A man and woman were arguing about who was first in the queue at the supermarket.
He gently pushed her, and she unexpectedly tripped and bumped her head against a
wall. She had an unusually thin skull and she died from her injuries.

Card F: Battered spouse (hereafter the 'battered spouse scenario')

A woman had been physically and sexually abused by her husband for three years. He
came home one evening and started hitting her again. She felt that she couldn't stand
any more abuse, so she waited until her husband was sleeping, then hit him over the
head with a saucepan, killing him.
Card G: Two men arguing at work (hereafter the 'self-defence scenario')
Two men were having a heated argument at work which developed into a Gght. One of
them picked up a screwdriver and lunged at the other. Fearing that he would otherwise
be stabbed, the unarmed man grabbed a spanner, and in self-defence he hit the other
man over the head with it, killing him.
Card H: Killer threatened with his own life (hereafter the 'duress scenario')

A group of terrorists threatened a man with his own life if he did not agree to kill a local
businessman. The man was told by the terrorists that he had a week in which to kill the
businessman, and that if he went to the police he would be shot.9 Scared for his own life,
the man could see no alternative and he killed the businessman.
The law currently treats these homicide scenarios very differently both in terms of
offence category and sentencing. Respondents were asked to
(1) rank them in order of seriousness (i.e. those which were the most blameworthy
and deserved the greatest punishment), and rate them on a 1 to 20 scale (with 20
representing the most serious killing), giving their reasons for the rating;
(2) suggest appropriate sentences for the highest and lowest rated scenarios; and
(3) respondents were invited to reconsider some scenarios in which one factor had
been altered, in order to test the potential relevance of further factors.

0
Tlie killer in this scenario was given a fairly long period in which to kill the businessman for two reasons: (i) to accentuate the
apparent difference between this case and scenario E which raises the possible defence of necessity or 'duress of circumstancej'; and (ii)
because the law on the degree of immediacy of execution of the threat in duress per minas is unclear. The law's ultimate concern seems
to be wheilicr the accused's will was overpowered ahen cotnuiUmg Iht offence (see Lord Edmund-Davies in DPPfor N Inland v. Lynch
[1975] AC 653 at 700), although a threat of future violence might persuade the court that D killed because of the threat hanging over
him rather than because of the immediate pressure on him; tee Lord Parker CJ in R v. Hudson and Taylor [1971 ] 2 QB 202 at 206,207.

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Card E: Mountain climbers (hereafter the 'necessity scenario')

Two mountain climbers were roped together. One of them slipped and fell. The other
tried to hold on to the rocks for both of them, but he knew that if he did not cut the rope,
they would both die. To save himself, he cut himself loose, knowing that the other
climber would fall to his death.

BARRY MITCHELL

Respondents were also asked to consider homicides generally and to describe what they
regarded as die worst homicides and suggest how they should be sentenced, and to
identify what they saw as the least serious killings.

The Homicide Scenarios

(a) Ranking the scenarios

TABLE 1 Ratings of homicide scenarios on 1-20 scale

10

Card A; burglary
Card H: killer threatened with own life"
Card C: woman drowning12
Card G: two men arguing15
Card F: battered spouse"
Card D: woman with thin skull15
Card E: mountain climbers16
Card B: terminally ill woman"

Mean

Standard deviation

15.5
12.7
9.8
9.1
8.1
5.9
5.6
3.5

4.0
4.7
5.4
4.4
5.5
4.3
4.2
4.1

10
Sixty-nine per cent of Uie sample rated card A at 15 or more. There were no significant differences in the rating of card A
(burglary scenario) by respondents' age, gender, qualificatiom or religion, but there were some noteworthy variations based on
social class and marital status. Those in skilled manual occupations rated the case slightly more seriously (16.29) than those in other
social daises; and those living with a partner tended to rate it less severely (14.61) dian others.
11
Very few variations were found between die ratings of different sub-groups for card H (the duress scenario).
"Women rated card C (the drowning woman scenario) more severely than men (mean rating of 10.2 compared to 9.34), as did
younger (18-24 year-olds) and older respondents (65 or over) compared to the intermediate age groups (mean ratings 11.22,10.66
and 9.26 respectively). Those with children rated the case less severely dun those widiout (9.55, compared to 10.49).
"Women again rated card G (die self-defence scenario) more severely than men (mean rating 9.62 compared to 8.46); so too did
older (75 or over) respondents (10.11 compared to 8.79 for die under-35s).
H
Older (die over-65s) and younger (the under-25s) respondents rated it more severely than other age groups (mean ratings
9.93, 8.5 and 7.57 respectively). Of particular interest, married, cohabiting or divorced/separated respondents thought it was
distinctly less serious than those who were single and never married or widowed (7.8,6.98 and 7.29 compared to 9.01 and 9.94
respectively). Additionally, those with a religion and those with no qualifications (mean ratings 8.49 and 8.96) regarded it more
severely than those who had no religion and those wiui educational qualifications (7.27 and 7.78).
18
Fifty-eight per cent of respondents gave this scenario no more dian 5 out of 20. Respondents living with a partner rated card D
(the thin skull scenario) significantly lower than those who were widowed, divorced/separated or single (means ratings of 5.79 and
4.44 compared to 6.1, 6.54 and 6.28).
'"Sixty per cent gave uiis scenario no more than 5 out of 20. Women rated card E (die necessity scenario) more severely dian men
(6.19 compared to 4.98), as did younger (under 25) and older (65 or over) respondents compared to those in intervening age
groups (6.43 and 6.73 compared to 5.15). Widowed and single respondents thought this case was more serious than their married
counterparts (6.34 and 6.1 respectively compared to 5.31).
17
77.8 per cent rated diis scenario at 4 or less. Single respondents who had never inarried tended to give a slightly more severe
rating to card B (mercy killing scenario) than their married or cohabiting counterparts (4.29 compared to 3.19 and 2.50
respectively). Those with a religion also gave it a higher rating (3.84) Uian uiose who did not have one (2.56), as did respondents
with no qualifications (4.24) compared to those widi qualifications (3.13). Similarly, respondents at the two ends of the age spectrum
thought card B merited a higher score (4.51 and 4.61 from 18-24 year olds and 65 years or more respectively) than those between
25 ajid 64 (2.90).

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Whether the average gravity of the eight scenarios is calculated by averaging

respondents' rank orders, or by averaging their gravity scale ratings, the same ranking
emerged. This is shown in Table 1 below.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

" The contrary was wggested in the (acti.

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Trie burglary scenario was perceived as the most serious homicide scenario by 53 per
cent of the respondents. Three-quarters placed it in thefirsttwo, and almost nine out of
ten put it within the three worst killings. Respondents under 25 and those aged at least
65 years were less likely to regard this as the most serious of the scenarios. Those with
children, however, were more likely than those without to rate it as one of the two most
heinous homicides (77 per cent compared to 67 per cent).
The most common reason for giving the burglary killing a high seriousness score
was the fact that the killer was already committing a crime. More than four in ten said
that he should not have been in the victim's home in the first place, and roughly three
in ten reasoned he had set out with the intention of committing a crime (albeit
burglary rather than murder or manslaughter). Thirteen per cent also thought the
fact that the deceased was killed in her own home aggravated the matter. Other
criticisms of the killer in card A were: he should have run away when confronted; the
killing was premeditated,I8 there was no reason for the killing; the killer's motive was
simply to save himself, and he must have intended to injure and was willing to use a
weapon. Interestingly, those who regarded this scenario as relatively serious
elsewhere in the survey described their perception of'the worst kinds of homicide' by
reference to the vulnerability of the victimthe victim was innocent or defenceless
etc.
Almost three-quarters of the sample placed the duress scenario in the three worst
homicides. However, the rating of this scenario should be treated with caution since it
appeared that some respondents were assessing the severity of the threat per se to the
killer rather than his motives and justification. There were no significant differences
between respondent subgroups. The most common reasons for regarding the scenario
as comparatively serious implied that the killing was avoidable. Four out often thought
the killer could have gone to the police, and a further four in ten said he had an
alternative course of action. Just over a fifth regarded the fact that the killing was
planned or calculated as the most aggravating feature, and about one in seven criticised
the killer's motivesaving himself. Others pointed to the cowardly nature of the killing
and to the victim's innocence.
The drowning woman scenario was generally placed third of the eight, though it
provoked a wide range of responses. Forty-four per cent placed it in the worst three, 335
placed it fourth or fifth, and almost a quarter put it in the three least serious scenarios.
Younger respondents, especially those under 34 years, tended to regard it more
critically. The scenario most frequently (four in ten) received the comment that the
killer should have tried to save her. Other aggravating features were the disregard
shown for human life, behaving contrary to the normal rules of society, and the fact that
the killer had an alternative course of action.
like the drowning woman scenario the battered spouse scenario provoked a broad
range of reactions. Almost a third rated it as one of the three worst cases, four out often
thought it one of the three least serious, and 27 per cent perceived it as of middling
severity. Interestingly, there were very few significant differences in the responses of
subgroups. The severity rating varied considerably within each subgroupage,

BARRY MITCHELL

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gender, social class etc. The only statistically significant variation was by marital status;
married or cohabiting respondents were slightly less likely than single or
'never-married' respondents to rate this scenario as one of the two most serious
homicides (14 per cent compared to 25 per cent).
Many of the respondents who were relatively critical of the battered spouse scenario
also identified the presence of an alternative course of action as a particularly
aggravating characteristic. Others noted the fact that the killing was premeditated, and
earlier in the survey those who treated this scenario as serious were more likely to
describe the worst homicides by reference to the killer's motive. Those who rated the
battered spouse scenario (card F) as of relatively low severity said the killer had been
'driven to the end of her tether'. Others said she needed to save her own life, or that she
had suffered such abuse. Earlier in the survey these respondents, when describing their
idea of the worst homicides, placed more stress than other respondents on the victim's
vulnerability and less on the method of killing or the victim's suffering: when describing
the least serious homicides, they again put more emphasis on the victim's vulnerability,
and less on the killing being accidental.
Fifty-five per cent of respondents placed the thin skulls scenario in the three least
serious homicides, and there were no significant differences between subgroups. It was
rated lowly largely because the killing was perceived as accidentalmore than 60 per
cent said the killer bore no fault, the killing was unpremeditated or death was
unforeseeable. Those who thought this was a relatively less serious homicide were more
likely than those who regarded it more gravely generally to characterize the worst
homicides by reference to the killer's motive.
The necessity scenario (card E) was regarded as one of the three least serious
homicides by 63 per cent of the sample and, again, there were no significant differences
between subgroups. Nearly a quarter felt the killer had no alternative, or at least needed
to save his own life. One in ten said it was not the killer's fault; slightly fewer thought the
victim must have known the risks involved, and about 5 per cent of respondents said
they would have done what the killer did in the same circumstances. Respondents who
gave this a low gravity rating were less likely than other respondents to describe the least
serious homicides as 'accidental', but more likely to identify the killer's motive as a
factor in the worst homicides.
The mercy killing scenario was perceived by more than half the sample as the least
serious of the eight scenarios, as one of the two least serious by 72 per cent, and as one of
the three least serious by 83 per cent of respondents. About three-quarters of women,
those with higher qualifications and those without a religion placed this as one of the
two least serious scenarios, compared to about two-thirds of men, those with fewer
qualifications and those with a religion. It was relatively 'well' received primarily (i.e.
four out of ten respondents) because the killing was 'for the right reasons' or an act of
mercy. Other common reactions were: the victim wanted to die, she had a poor quality
of life and was in great pain, people should have the right to die with dignity, and she
would have died anyway. Interestingly, when asked elsewhere in the survey for a general
description of the most serious homicides, those who rated this scenario very low on the
gravity scale were more likely than those giving it a higher rating to focus on the killer's
motive. Yet they were less likely than other respondents to talk about the killer's motive
when describing the least serious homicides, and more likely to focus on the victim's
vulnerability.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(b) Sentencing the highest and lowest rated scenarios

(c) Scenario variations

When asked to re-assess the burglary scenario (card A) on the basis that the victim was
aged 70 radier than 25, two-thirds of the respondents thought that the severity
remained unchanged, whereas 30 per cent regarded the killing as more serious. At die
same time, 52 per cent diought the punishment should be tougher and 47 per cent said
it should be no different. The proportion of respondents who felt that die victim's age
made a difference decreased widi the level of educational qualifications: 41 per cent of
those widi no qualifications regarded killing an older person as more serious compared
to only 26 per cent of those with degree-level qualifications.
Fifty-six per cent of die sample diought diat the killing would be more serious if die
drowning woman (card C) had been die man's daughter dian if she had been a complete

TABLE 2

Sentence recommended for scenario given the highest severity rating

Burglary

scenario
n=473(%)
Death
Natural life imprisonment
30 yrs + imprisonment
20-29 yrs imprisonment
15-19 yrs imprisonment
10-14 yrs imprisonment
5-9 yrs imprisonment
Less than 5 yrs imprisonment
Non-custodial sentence
Psychiatric counselling
Other penalty
No penalty
Can't say

16
20
12
14
15
15
5
1
_
1
1

Duress
scenario
n=163(%)

Drowning
woman

Battered
spouse

scenario

scenario:

n=84(%)

n=54(%)

16
19
10
14
14
13
6
5
1
1
1

1
4
5
9
20

22
13

2
6
1
8
8

461

13
8
15
17
20
_
16
2

Self-defence, mercy
killing, necessity and
thin skull scenarios
n=50(%)
14
15
8
5
8
27
5
4
1
2
6
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The views of respondents as to what they regarded as the appropriate sentences for the
scenarios which they rated as either the worst or the least serious of the eight are shown
in Tables 2 and 3 below. (They were not specifically asked to indicate whether their
responses referred to die nominal sentence or the time actually served in prison,
though some expressed the view that there should be no difference between die two.)
About one in six respondents recommended the death penalty for the burglary and
duress killers, whereas just over half of the respondents thought that a determinate
prison sentence of at least ten years would be appropriate. The sentences for the killers
in the other scenarios in Table 2 were noticeably less severe. Obviously, it was
predictable that respondents would take a generally sympathetic approach towards
sentencing in scenarios given the lowest rating (Table 3), diough it is worth noting that
the self-defence scenario attracted some recommended short prison sentences, albeit
that the figures are clearly very small.

BARRY MITCHELL

TABLE 3

Sentence recommended for scenario given lowest severity rating

Mercy
killing
n=496{%)
_
1
7
5
32
2
51
2

Necessity
scenario
n=124(%)

_
2
2
26
23
15
1
27
6

Battered
spouse
scenario
n=53(%)

2
2
6
10
20

1
10
9
43

51
6

23
13

Drowning woman.
self-defence, burglary
and duress scenarios
n=86(%)

_
2
1
5
1
1 1 0
20
5
22
1
3
21
12

stranger.19 Fifty-seven per cent said that the punishment ought to be tougher. Looking
at subgroupings, 63 per cent of those with no qualifications regarded letting a daughter
drown was more serious than letting a stranger drown, compared to 50 per cent of those
with degree-level qualifications.
If the battered spouse (card F) killed her husband without any premeditation,
two-thirds of the sample thought the offence would be less serious, with a further 30 per
cent saying it made no difference. Four-fifths thought the punishment should be less
severe. No variations between subgroups could be detected.

Homicide generally
(a) The worst homicides

Only 29 respondents chose one of the scenarios as representing the type of homicide to
which they would give a rating of 20, the worst possible type of killing.20 Fourteen chose
card A (the burglary scenario), ten chose card H (the duress scenario), two each chose
cards F and B (the battered spouse and mercy killing scenarios), and one chose card D
(the thin skull scenario).
In describing their idea of the worst possible homicide, respondents tended to focus
on specific aspects of the killing; most commonly (71 per cent) the type of victim, but
also (67 per cent) the killer's apparent primary motive, and (38 per cent) the method of
killing. Ten per cent of the sample referred to an actual homicide recently reported in
the media.
10
Forty-one per cent aid it should make no difference. Furthermore, the killing of a dose relative u likely to lead to tougher
penalties in, for example, Italy, Switzerland and Turkey.
10
Five respondent! felt that all killings were of equal gravity and were thus unable to describe a 'worst possible' homicide.

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Death
Natural life imprisonment
30 yrs + imprisonment
20-29 yrs imprisonment
15-19 yrs imprisonment
10-14 yrs imprisonment
5-9 yrs imprisonment
Less than 5 yrs imprisonment
Non-custodial sentence
Psychiatric counselling
Other penalty
No penalty
Can't say

Thin skull
scenario
n=144(%)

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(b) Sentencing the worst homicides

The views of respondents as to what they regarded as the appropriate sentences for die
eight scenarios and for what diey treated as the worst possible homicides are set out in
Table 4 below.
TABLE 4

Sentences recommended for worst of scenarios and for worst possible homicides

Recommended sentence

Worst of 8 scenarios (%)

Wont possible homicide (%)

Death sentence
Natural life imprisonment
At least 30 years'imprisonment
20-29 years' imprisonment
15-19 years'imprisonment
10-14 years' imprisonment
5-0 years' imprisonment
34 years' imprisonment
1-2 years' imprisonment
Other term of imprisonment
Psychiatric treatment and/or counselling
Other punishment
No punishment
Can't say/no response

13
17
10
12
13
16
8
3
2
1
2
1
1
3

55
34
2
4
1
1
1
-

51

1
2
2

In Uie 1905 MORI survey ihe highest level of support (i.e. 82 per cent) for the death penalty was for die inurder of a child.

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Fifty-five per cent of the sample felt that a 20-rated homicide involved a child
victim;21 other descriptions spoke of a 'defenceless victim' (37 per cent), an 'innocent
victim' (20 per cent), or an 'elderly victim' or policeman/fireman (9 per cent each).
Women were more likely than men to choose child killings as the worst (61 per cent
compared to 48 per cent), as did respondents with children or grandchildren (59 per
cent compared to 44 per cent of those without). The reasons most commonly given for
choosing child victims as representing the worst homicides were the innocence or
defencelessness of the deceased and the fact that children were deprived of a long life
expectancy (23 per cent, 58 per cent and 14 per cent respectively).
The next most commonly cited feature of the worst homicide concerned the killer's
motive, or lack of motive. A third of respondents regarded sexually motivated killings
as relevant here; 27 per cent mentioned premeditated or 'cold-blooded' killings, and
17 per cent referred to apparendy motiveless homicides. Those from higher social
classes were distincdy more likely to explain dieir choice of 'die worst homicide' in
terms of die killer's motive. This may be linked to die higher level of educational
qualificadons57 per cent of respondents widi no qualificadons mendoned modves
compared to 72 per cent of those widi qualificadons.
As to die relevance of die mediod of killing, about one in eight (13 per cent) talked of
horrible or violent homicides, and 16 per cent mentioned cases in which die victim is
subjected to torture or long suffering before dying. Abduction before deadi, especially
of child victims, was mentioned by 7 per cent of the sample.

BARRY MITCHELL

(c) The least serious homicides

Homicides to which respondents attributed a 1 rating largely fell into three main
categorieseuthanasia or mercy killing (49 per cent), accidental killings (30 per cent),
and killing in self-defence or self-preservation (13 per cent). Seven out of ten
respondents chose one of the eight scenarios as illustrative of the least serious homicide.
Forty-three per cent chose card B (the mercy killing scenario), and 14 per cent picked
out card D (the thin skulls scenario).
There were slight variations between subgroups in rating euthanasia as the least
serious homicide. Women, parents and those with educational qualifications were more
likely than men, those without children and respondents with no qualifications to
identify euthanasia here (55 per cent, 52 per cent and 51 per cent compared to 44 per
cent, 41 per cent and 42 per cent respectively). Of those with a religion, Roman
Catholics were less likely than other Christians to treat such homicides as the least
serious (38 per cent compared to 50 per cent of Church of England Christians). In a
study in which the fieldwork was carried out in the spring of 1995 (i.e. just a few months
before the homicide study was undertaken), the authors of British Social Attitudes
Survey (hereafter the BSAS) concluded that 'in certain limited circumstances, there is
overwhelming public support for euthanasiafor the patient in an irreversible coma
on a life-support machine (if their relatives agree) and for people with incurable and
painful illnesses who have requested euthanasia', and 'strong support for the notion
that patients should be able to rely on doctors to end their lives on the basis of written
instructions, such as tfiose in "living wills'" (Jowell et al. 1996). For the BSAS, though,
statistically significant factors were qualifications, disability, ethnicity and religious
beliefs, so that the homicide survey only partially reiterates the BSAS findings.
The reasons for regarding euthanasia in this way focused primarily on the victim's
feelings or situation: 37 per cent spoke of the victim's wish to die, 23 per cent of the right
to die, and 26 per cent cited the victim's poor quality of life and die fact of his/her
suffering.22 In addition, though, 42 per cent identified the killer's good motivekilling
for the 'right reasons', to relieve suffering, made it one of the least serious homicides.

" S i x per cent of the sample said they would want to die in those circumstances, and 3 per cent said they would have done the same
as the killer did.

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It is important to acknowledge that it was not possible to test the extent to which these
respondents agreed about the nature of what constitutes the worst homicides.
Nonetheless, men were more likely than women to propose the death penalty (61 per
cent compared to 50 per cent), and slightly less likely than women to recommend an
indefinite prison sentence (27 per cent compared to 39 per cent). Capital punishment
was also more likely to be desired by those with fewer qualifications, and those from the
lower social classes. There was no apparent significance in the sentencing
recommendations made by respondents with a religion and those without, although
there were some variations between different religions. Sixty per cent of the Church of
England Christians favoured the death penalty, compared to 39 per cent of the Roman
Catholics and 50 per cent of other Christians.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Offence categories (groups of scenarios)

One of the principal aims of the survey was to determine whether the public recognize
variations in the gravity of homicides and, if they do, whether they feel such variations
should be reflected in convictions for different offences such as murder and
manslaughter, or some alternative form of formal labelling. To this end, respondents
were asked to place the eight scenarios into different piles, with each pile representing a
separate category of crime.
The 811 respondents who completed this task created piles that made up 129
different combinations of the scenarios. On average they created 4.4 piles, and men and
those with no educational qualifications tended to make slightly fewer piles than women
and those with such qualifications. Almost eight out often respondents felt that at least
one scenario represented a distinct type of crime and thus placed it in a 'pile' of its own.
Half the sample treated card B (mercy killing scenario) in this way, and about a third
singled out cards A (burglary scenario) and C (drowning woman scenario) as distinct
offences.
In piles made up of two or more scenarios, the most common associations (44 per
cent and 37 per cent respectively) were between cards D (the thin skull scenario) and G
(self-defence scenario), and cards A (burglary) and H (duress). To a slightly lesser
extent respondents associated cards D (thin skull) and E (necessity) (31 per cent), and
cards C (drowning woman) and E (necessity) (30 per cent).
It is obviously very difficult to state with any confidence what the outcome of the
scenarios would be from a purely theoretical point of view, for the facts given are so
scant. However, it might well be suggested that cards A, E and H would probably result
in murder convictions, and that B and D would lead to manslaughter verdicts. The
original scenario F (battered spouse) theoretically looks like murder though in practice
a manslaughter verdict would not be uncommon. Card C (drowning woman) is no
crime, unless the man is related to the woman (as in the varied version), in which case
the verdict should potentially be murder. Card G (self-defence scenario) is either no
" Though whether a person intends a consequence depends on wliether he foresees it with sufficient degree of certainty or
probability.

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Accidental killings were seen as amongst the least serious because there is no fault on
the part of the killer, because there is no intent to kill, and because the killer could not
have foreseen the outcome of his actions. This latter observation by respondents is
particularly interesting in the light of the law's view that a person's foresight of the
consequences of his action is evidence of his intention.23 Women and parents were
slightly less likely than men and those with no children to regard accidental homicides
as the least serious (26 per cent and 28 per cent compared to 35 per cent and 36 per cent
respectively), as were Roman Catholics compared to other Christians (41 per cent
compared to 29 per cent).
Just over one in eight respondents rated self-defence or self-preservation homicides
as the least serious. Most of those (83 per cent) referred to the killer's motivehe
needed to save his own life, or he had no alternative course of action. Some said the
killing was not deliberate or premeditated.

BARRY MITCHELL

** Tluu, the law not only distinguishes murder from manslaughter but also voluntary manslaughter (which usually denotes all the
elements of murder together with some mitigating feature such as provocation), from mvohtnlary manslaughter (where the killing is
not 'wiili malice aforethought').
u
Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of respondents who grouped cards A and H in the same offence category described that
category as 'murder'. So too did more than a third of those Unking cards H and C (the drowning woman).

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crime (if the killer's use of force was reasonable and proportionate), or murder (if he
acted unreasonably).
It was therefore interesting to find a good deal of linkage between scenarios A and H
(37 per cent of respondents) and to a slightly lesser extent between E and H (21 per
cent), but much less so between A and E (only 8 per cent). Scenarios B and F were placed
in the same category quite frequently (26 per cent), though fewer than one infivelinked
B and D or D and F (17 per cent and 14 per cent respectively).
As for piles of three or more scenarios, the strongest associations (13 per cent) were
between cards C, D and E and between D, E and G.
As indicated in the introduction, the law assumes that the public wishes to reflect its
views about the varying degrees of gravity in homicides through the separate offences of
murder and manslaughter. This labelling of crimes is also a means of encapsulating the
essence of the wrongdoing and simultaneously manifesting fundamental distinctions
between different categories of offending.24 Thus, respondents were asked to give a
name or description to each category they had created. Predictably, the names they
suggested varied considerably according to the scenarios in the category.
Half the respondents used the word 'murder' to denote categories linked with card A
(the burglary homicide), and just over two-fifths used it to describe the categories linked
with card H (the duress killing).25 In contrast, only about 7 per cent referred to
categories linked with cards B, D or E (the terminally ill woman, the thin skull woman,
and the mountain climbers respectively).
The word 'killing' was used by about 15 per cent of respondents to describe categories
containing cards A, C, F, G and H (the burglary, the drowning woman, the battered
spouse, the self-defence killing, and the duress scenario), by 16 per cent to describe
categories containing card E (the necessity killing), and by 19 per cent for those linked
with card D (the thin skull scenario). One in ten used it for categories linked with card B
(the mercy killing).
'Manslaughter' was chosen by roughly 15 per cent of respondents to describe
categories associated with cards D (the thin skull scenario) and G (the self-defence
killing), and by about 10 per cent to describe homicides containing cards A (the
burglary), H (the duress scenario) and card B (the mercy killing).
Another quite commonly used term was 'accident' (or 'accidental'). More than
four-fifths of those who placed card D (thin skull) in a category by itself described it in
this way; so too did more than half the respondents who linked card D with other
scenarios. 'Accident' or 'accidental' also described 18 per cent of homicides linked with
card G (self-defence), 17 per cent for those linked with card E (necessity), and 12 per
cent for those linked with card C (drowning woman).
'Self-preservation' was chosen to depict homicides associated with cards G
(self-defence), E(necessity), F(batteredspouse)and H (duress)by 21 percent, 20per
cent, 14 per cent and 11 per cent respectively.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The only other relatively frequendy used names were 'premeditated' or 'planned',
which described homicides linked widi cards H (duress scenario), A (burglary), and card
F (battered spouse)by 15 per cent, 12 per cent and 12 per cent respectively.
Obviously, one of the arguably unique features of card C (woman drowning) concerns
the issue of guilt through doing nodiing (omission to act). It is worth noting that of the
34 per cent of respondents who regarded this scenario as a 'category of its own', 9 per
cent described it as 'omission', 17 per cent as 'indifferent' or 'not caring', 10 per cent as
'neglect', 7 per cent as 'negligence' and another 7 per cent as 'cowardice'.

It is always difficult to draw confident conclusions from a quantitative survey in the

absence of any more detailed qualitative follow-up research. Nonetheless, this survey
provides strong evidence that the initial assumption made by the criminal law that die
public recognize variations in the gravity of homicides is well founded. Furthermore,
the survey clearly suggests diat die public would like these variations to be reflected in
the legal recognition of separate offences.
What is also encouraging for the law is that superficially at least die factors which die
public identify as influencing die gravity of homicides broadly mirror its approach to
the issue, to the extent that gravity appears to be made up of two principal components,
namely die harm caused26 and die offender's personal culpability. However, one
immediate reservation here is diat die law differentiates between gravity in homicides
solely on die basis of die killer's culpability, apparendy assuming that eidier die harm
element remains constant for all cases or diat any variation in levels of harm is
insufficiendy significant to justify separate offence categorization.
Aldiough die majority of die factors respondents identified as affecting dieir
assessment of gravity in homicide essentially concerned culpability, diere were
occasions on which diey referred to some aspect of harmfulness. For example, there was
die response from a number of people diat homicides involving young victims are
relatively serious because diere is a considerable loss of life expectancy. The
significance of harm variations was reinforced here by die further response that
homicides in which die victim is tortured or endures lengthy suffering are particularly
serious.27 Conversely, one of die reasons for perceiving die mercy killing scenario as
amongst die least serious was die deceased's poor quality of life: in crude terms, being
killed did not deprive the deceased of any significant right or interest.
Personal culpability, diough, is predictably and undeniably an important factor in
die public's evaluation of homicides. Comparatively serious homicides were said to be
characterized by premeditation28 or planning or a victim who is defenceless or
odierwise vulnerable. It was interesting tofindthat one of die criticisms of die passer-by
who made no attempt to save die drowning woman scenario (card C) was diat his actions
10
Unfortunately, there was insufficient opportunity in the survey to test, for example, public opinion on offence categorization
and sentencing where there b more than one deceased.
17
Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland also look upon homicides where the victim suffered cruelty as particularly serious.
M
Various other jurisdictions also treat premeditation or planning as aggravating features in homicide; see, for example, Italy,
Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.

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Implications and Conclusions

BARRY MITCHELL

" S e c , for example, Duff(1990) and my 'Culpably Indifferent Murder' (1996: 64-86). It b also worth noting that Dutch law
regards D'I indifference as to whether liii actions will kill another as indicative of an intent to do so.
30
Motive is quite commonly treated as an aggravating feature in other jurisdictions; see, for example, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Switzerland and Turkey.
91
Such as the relationship (e.g. parent/child) between die parties, some contractual obligation on the defendant vis-a-vis the
victim, or where the defendant has created the danger.

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manifested a disregard for human life. This focus on an individual's attitude towards
harm or injury has been advocated as indicating one of the ways in which the law's
traditional narrow emphasis on cognition through its construction of mens rea should
be reformed.29
Accident or lack of fault, or justifiable self-preservation (as where there is no
reasonable alternative course of action) were associated with the least serious
homicides. However, one dimension of culpability which the law largely seeks to avoid
when framing offences and identifying justifications and excuses concerns the killer's
motive, and yet this very factor featured quite prominently in respondents'
assessments.50 Sexually motivated killings, or apparently motiveless killings were
regarded as amongst the most serious, whereas killing for 'good reasons' such as the
relief of suffering or self-preservation rendered the homicide much more acceptable.
Significant numbers of the public appear to have some concept of good and bad
motives, but whether they have sufficiently similar concepts, whether law reformers can
draft suitable definitions, and whether adequate safeguards can be created to ensure
that the law would not then be abused is not at all dear.
As well as identifying factors relating to harm and culpability, respondents also
referred to matters of wider social policy. For example, mercy killing was frequendy
given a low gravity rating on the basis that people ought to be able to exercise a right to
die. (Again, there remains uncertainty about the adequacy of the level of support for
this and concern about the danger of abuse before there can be any serious suggestion
to alter the law.) Conversely, the drowning woman scenario was often regarded
relatively seriously because the passer-by showed a disregard for human life; moreover,
he could easily have made some sort of attempted rescue, and his failure to make any
attempt went 'against the normal rules of society'. Yet it should be acknowledged that
these responses were given with the benefit of hindsightrespondents were told that
the passer-by could swim and that the woman drownedand it is difficult to see how
this kind of censure could be satisfactorily accommodated by the law. For although it
may only imply there should be a general duty to take reasonable measures to try to
prevent fatalitieson the basis that the prevention of death is sufficiently different
from the prevention of other forms of harm as to justify an exceptionthere are
obvious problems. It may not be entirely clear at the relevant time whether death or
some lesser form of injury is likely, nor might the probability of death be apparent.
Thus, it is not easy to see how a court could make die judgment in any given set of facts
that the defendant was duty-bound to attempt a rescue. Hitherto at least, the criminal
law has only imposed a duty to take positive action by virtue of an unambiguous set of
pre-existing circumstances.31
The study strongly suggests that ordinary people agree with the principle of fair
labelling, at least in relation to homicide, that the nature and magnitude of die
wrongdoing should be reflected by die recognition of distinct offence categories.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

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Unfortunately, though not unpredictably, die ways in which respondents placed die
scenario cards into different piles did not generally provide any really dear indication
of how homicides might be categorized or subgrouped. The statistics did not suggest
any obviously striking associations between groups of scenarios, and there was
insufficient time available during the survey in which to ask respondents what precisely
the names of dieir piles signified. One of the potential complications here was die
uncertainty about the way in which ordinary people would use die distinction between
the nature of die convicdon (murder or manslaughter etc.) and die sentence, to reflect
variations in gravity.
Aldiough diere was insufficient time in which expressly to elicit respondents' views on
precisely where to draw die line between criminal and non-criminal homicides, some
clues may be found in dieir comments about sentencing. The fact diat significant
numbers of respondents recommended no punishment for die killers in die mercy
killing, the diin skulls scenario and die necessity scenario obviously implies a perceived
lack of moral culpability at least. The ratings and recommended sentences for other
homicides involving self-defence, duress, battered spouses and omitting to try to save
life were more equivocal, making it unwise to offer any implications about justifications
or excuses for killing.
It is difficult to draw any precise conclusions about die public's assessment of mercy
killing. That 43 per cent should rate it one out of 20 when advised diat die scale ranges
from die least to die most serious homicide and reminded diat diey do not have to use
die extreme numbers on die scale, obviously suggests diat significant numbers of
people regard it as not amounting to a crime. At the same time diough, whilst die
median rating was 1.12, die mean was 3.45. Of die 403 respondents who placed card B
in a category by itself, 80 per cent labelled it 'mercy killing' or 'eudianasia', whereas only
3 per cent described it as 'not a crime' or 'not a killing', and whilst this dearly does not
necessarily imply an element of wrongfulness, nor does it automatically signal complete
legitimacy or acceptance.
The diin skulls scenario (card D) also received a 1 rating from a number of
respondents, and diis represents die kind of homicide which die Law Commission
(1996) recendy recommended should cease to be treated as meriting a conviction for
manslaughter, largely on the ground that die killer lacks suffident moral culpability.
This type of homidde was rated generaUy slighdy higher than die mercy killing
scenario, and was scored very similarly to die case of the mountain climbers (card E)
where the essential issue was whether the circumstances adequately justified or excused
the killing. Bearing in mind diat diere was dien a gap to die ratings of die next group of
scenarioscards C (drowning woman), F (battered spouse), and G (self-defence
scenario)it may be diat respondents would not regard the diin skulls and mountain
cumbers homicides as crimes but would regard higher rated scenarios as offences.
Obviously, diough, diis is a matter which requires furdier examination.
Furthermore, whilst die law distinguishes between duress (by direats or by
circumstances) and self-defence as adequate justification or excuse for homidde, die
differentiation recognized by die public appears to lead to radier different condusions.
Mention has already been made of die unfortunate way in which respondents in this
survey approached their evaluation of card H (die duress scenario) in which die defence
might be based on duress by threat of death. Nevertheless, whatever form of
measurement is used, die mountain dimbers scenario (card E) was regarded as

BARRY MITCHELL

51
i.e. the accused may neither intend to kill nor knowingly risk killing another perion, but the law holds him responsible and
liable Tor killing because he ought not to have been committing a crime anyway. Otherjurisdictions, such as Germany, Luxembourg
and Turkey, also view killing in the furtherance of crime as especially serious.
u
A n interesting analysis of the harm in homicide can be found in Joel Feinberg (1984: 79-83), where die author rehearses
competing arguments about what amounts to 'the most serious harm'.

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distinctly less serious than the two men arguing scenario (card G) where self-defence
was appropriateand yet however much sympathy might be felt the law would treat the
mountain climber as a murderer, whereas the killer in self-defence would be acquitted if
the court thought he had acted reasonably and had used proportionate force against his
victim. Moreover, given the low rating of the necessity scenario, it may be that if
presented with a homicide in which there is clearly no fair opportunity to adopt a third
course of action, significant numbers of respondents would be very sympathetic towards
a person who killed under duress by threats.
The burglar who killed when disturbed by his victim (card A) was undeniably and
predictably treated, both in relative and absolute terms, as a very serious offender. That
this was a 'crime within a crime' was dearly an aggravating feature and, as such, it
resembles the concept of'felony murder' which is widely regarded in the USA as one of
the more serious forms of homicide, notwithstanding the fact that it is an example of
constructive liability.52 However, respondents on average rated this scenario at" 15 to 16
out of a possible maximum of 20, and only 14 people chose it as representing their idea
of the worst homicide. This surely suggests that for many members of the public there
are other, distinctly more serious, forms of homicide.
The point was earlier made that although respondents seemed to regard the
drowning woman scenario (card C) quite seriously, with an average rating of between 9
and 10 out of 20, there was no opportunity to investigate the extent to which they have
thought through the implications of extending the existing law requiring people to
take positive action in specific situations. At the same time, it may well be that this rating
reflects the traditional view of'the sanctity of life' and that taking life is a unique form of
harm (Fletcher 1978), though this does not necessarily mean it is the most serious
harm.33
It was also quite predictable that respondents would want to see tougher penalties for
those who kill. However, it was unexpected that litde more dian half the sample
favoured any form of capital punishment in any circumstances, and they may have had
different forms of homicide in mind. For example, the British Social Attitudes 12th
report (1995) showed that in four surveys between 1983 and 1994, 70-77 per cent of
respondents favoured capital punishment for 'murder in the course of a terrorist act',
67-71 per cent for 'murder of a police officer' and 59-66 per cent for 'other murders'.
The current survey suggests diat the British Social Attitudes authors' comment that
public support for the re-introduction of the death penalty seemed to be 'at an
irreducible minimum' is perhaps unduly pessimistic! Respondents in this latest survey
had already spent some time thinking about different homicide situations reflecting
varying degrees of seriousness, so diat when asked to comment on sentencing diey were
very aware that some homicides do contain elements of mitigation. More specific
questions about punishment appear to attract more moderate responses. Nevertheless,
an aggregate figure of just 55 per cent supporting the death penalty in any
circumstances is surprisingly low.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF HOMICIDE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The discovery that about a third of respondents favoured natural life imprisonment
for homicides appears to support Hough's (1996) conclusions that although the public
often advocates types of sentence which are in line with judicial practice, for serious
crimes they tend to have punitive views about sentence length.*4 Large numbers of
respondents in the survey preferred either a much longer determinate period of
imprisonment or a life sentence in the literal sense. It is commonly supposed that the
public are bemused by the idea that life sentence prisoners should ever be released on
licence; to many, it is simply a contradiction in terms.

A. J. (1981), T h e Elasticity of Mens Rea', in C. Tapper, ed., Crime, Proof and

PunishmentEssays in Honour of Sir Rupert Cross. London: Butteiworths.
BARRILE, L. (1984), Television and Attitudes about Crime', in R. Surette,/astic and the Media.
Springfield, IL: Thomas.
BROADHURST, R. and INDERMAUR, D. (1982), 'Crime Seriousness Ratings: The Relationship of
Information Accuracy and General Attitudes in Western Australia', Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Criminology, 15: 219-34.
CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION (1987), Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach. Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services.
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE (1976), Working Paper on Offences against the Person.
London: HMSO.
(1980), Fourteenth Report: Offences against the Person. London: HMSO.
DAVIES, M. (1993), Punishing CriminalsDeveloping Community-based Intermediate Sanctions, esp.
Ch. 1. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
DENNIS, I. (1987), 'Developments in Duress'.Journal of Criminal Law, 51: 463-80.
DUFF, R. A. (1990), Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
DURHAM, A. M., ELROD, H. P. and KINKADE, P. T. (1995), 'Images of Crime and Justice: Murder
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