EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Altman & Co. v. United States

Facts:
Appeal from an order to the Circuit Court of the United States affirming a decision of the Board of General Appraisers which
sustained an assessment of duty by the collector at the port of New York upon a certain bronze bust imported by Altman & Co. The
bust was imported from France and was assessed a duty of 45% ad valorem under paragraph 193 of the Tariff Act of 1897. Petitioners
contend that the bust should be classified as statuary under the commercial reciprocal agreement with France which was negotiated
under the authority of Tariff Act of 1897.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Circuit Court of Appeals Act did not repeal the revenue act but broadly provided for direct appeal to this Court from
the circuit court in any case in which constitutionality of any law of the United States or the validity or construction of any treaty, etc.
was drawn in question.
The court will entertain a direct review in a revenue case which involves not only questions of classification and amount of duty
thereunder as specified in the revenue act to which we have referred but also the constitutionality of a law of the US or the validity or
construction of a treaty under its authority.
Generally, a treaty is defined as "a compact made between two or more independent nations, with a view to the public welfare."
The treaty-making power is vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and a treaty must be ratified by a
two-thirds vote of that body.
While it may be true that the one in question is a commercial agreement made under the authority of the Tariff Act of 1897 was not a
treaty requiring ratification of the senate, it was an international compact, negotiated between the representatives of two
sovereign nations and made in the name and on behalf of contracting parties dealing with important commercial relations
between two countries and proclaimed by the president. Nevertheless, it was a compact authorized by the congress, negotiated and
proclaimed under the authority of the president. Such then is a treaty, according to the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, where its
construction could be reviewed by the court.
(2) Whether "statuary" should receive its popular construction and that the term should include such a piece of cast bronze as is here
involved.
The piece imported by Altman & Co. does not fall under those stipulated in the agreement.
Resolution:
Judgement affirmed.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco & Sons, Inc.
Facts:
The WHO, an international organization with a regional office in Manila, enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined in the
Host Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the said organization. Section 11 provides, inter alia, that "the Organization,
its assets, income and other properties shall be: (a) exempt from all direct and indirect taxes. It is understood however, that the
Organization will not claim exemption from taxes which are, in fact, no more than charges for public utility services;..."
When the WHO decided to construct a building to house its offices as well as the other UN offices stationed in Manila, it entered into
a further agreement with the Philippines allowing it to import materials and fixtures required for the construction free from all duties
and taxes and agree not to utilize any portion of the international reserves of the government.
In inviting bids for the construction, WHO informed the bidders that the building to constructed is exempt from the payment of all
fees, licenses, taxes. Sometime after the building was constructed, WHO received an opinion from the CIR, reversing his earlier
position stating that the 3% contractor's tax is not a direct nor an indirect tax on the WHO, but a tax that is primarily due from the
construction and is not covered by the host agreement.
Case was filed with the CTA which dismissed the petition of the CIR.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Host Agreement is null and void not having been ratified by the Senate
While treaties are required by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be entered into
by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host agreement comes within
the latter category; it is a valid and binding international agreement.
(2) Whether the 3% contractor's tax assessed on Gotamco is not an "indirect tax"
The host agreement specifically exempts WHO from "indirect taxes" which although not paid by the organization directly, form part
of the price paid or to be paid by it.

Resolution:
Judgement affirmed.
DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
Go Tex v. Deportation Board
Facts:
In 1963, agents of NBI searched an office in Sta. Cruz Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerrilla unit of the "Emergency
Intelligence Section Army of the US" and among those arrested was Go Tek, an alleged sector commander and intelligence records
officer. It is further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession violating Art. 168 of RPC and rendering him to
be an undesirable alien. Prosecutor prayed that after the trial, the Board should recommend to the president the immediate deportation
of Go Tek as an undesirable alien.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature due to the pendency of the case. He contended that
the board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of the obiter in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board that it may deport aliens only
on the grounds specified in the law. However, the Board reasoned that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the sate may exercise
its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding.
Go Tek then filed a prohibition in the CFI against the Board. The trial court granted the writ of prohibition for the Board to desist from
taking cognizance of Go Tek. Citing again Qua Chee Gan, it held that mere possession of forged dollar checks in not a ground for
deportation under the Immigration Law and that under 37 (3) since Go Tek has not been convicted, the deportation was premature.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified in section 37 of the
immigration law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him
The Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek in spite of the fact that he has not been convicted yet. The ratio decendi in Qua Chee
Gan is that the provision of EO 398 allows the deportation board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of a formal complaint is
illegal because it is contrary to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution.
The president's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided in the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code. Under the law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected by (1) by order of the
President after due investigation pursuant to section 69 of the RAC and (2) by the commissioner of immigration upon the
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration law.
The state has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens and that power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems
such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
Resolution:
Judgment reversed.
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
In 1947, the Philippine and the US forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines entered into
a Mutual Defense Treaty in which the parties agreed to respond to any external attack on their territory and armed forces. An extension
to the bases agreement was rejected by the Senate on 1991. On 1997, negotiations for the VFA started and thereafter, Ramos approved
the VFA which was respectively signed by the executive secretary and the US ambassador. In 1998, Estrada, through the secretary of
foreign affairs, ratified the VFA which was transmitted to the Senate for ratification. In 1999, Senate ratified the treaty with a twothirds vote.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the complaint. (Held: No)
(2) Whether the VFA is governed by Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution
Petitioners maintain that Section 25, Article XVIII should apply since it covers the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines while the respondents maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement
but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreement which requires the ratification of the Senate. Section 25, XVIII
on the other hand is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the Philippines. The two provisions far, from contradicting each other, show a common ground. As to the matter of voting, Section
21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty must be concurred by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the
other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty must be duly concurred in by the senate. The "concurrence
requirement" here must be interpreted under the provisions of Article VII.

(3) Whether VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the US

Petitioners contend that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" should have the advice and consent of the US Senate. Respondents on the
other hand argue that the letter of the US Ambassador stating the the VFA is binding on the US is conclusive. The court rules that the
phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party "accepts or acknowledges" the agreement. Furthermore, it is
inconsequential whether the US treats VFA only as an executive agreement because under international law, an executive agreement is
as binding as a treaty. A treaty, as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is "an international instrument concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation."
(4) Whether the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA
The power to enter into treaties or international agreements is a power vested to the President subject to the concurrence of the Senate.
The negotiation and subsequent ratification of the VFA is within the lawful exercise of the powers granted by the constitution. As to
the power to concur with treatise, the constitution lodges the same with the senate alone. Hence, the court cannot invade the into the
separation of powers and neither could it dele into the political questions arising from the field of foreign relations.
Resolution:
Petitions dismissed
Digest Note:
The case falls under the "Deportation of Aliens" but the main issue discussed delved in to the topic of "Treaties and Executive
Agreements" (note the discussion regarding the definition of a treaty by the Vienna Convention).
The Court no longer discussed the issue on whether the VFA is an abdication of Philippine sovereignty in relation to: (a) are the
Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military personnel, and (b) is the Supreme
Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher. The pertinent provisions could be found in
Article V of the VFA ("Criminal Jurisdiction").
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Soliven v. Makaisar; Beltran v. Makaisar
Facts:
Libel case involving Beltran's allegations that President Aquino was hiding under her bed during the height of the coup de etat against
her government.
On March 20, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the the resolution sustaining
the finding of the fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners. A subsequent motion was also denied. On appeal, the
President through the Executive Secretary affiremed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and subsequently the President (Held: Moot and
academic)
Beltran, upon filing a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect waived his right to refute the complaint by filing a counteraffidavit.
(2) Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witness, if any, to determine probable cause
What the constitution underscores is the exclusive personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents of the fiscal or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the report and require the submission of support ing affidavits of witnesses to aid him at arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
(3) Whether or not the President of the Philippines under the Constitution may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Beltran argues that the filing of suit is an indirect way of defeating her privilege of immunity. The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction. But this privilege of immunity may be invoked only by the holder of the office and not by any other person in the
President's behalf. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
Resolution:
Petitions dismissed

Kilosbayan v. Ermita & Gregory Ong

Facts:
On 16 May 2007, Ermita, by representation of the President, announced an appointment of Gregory S. Ong as an Associate Justice of
the SC to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Callejo Sr. On 19 May 2007, major daily publications reported that Ermita
stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the JBC."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They claim that Ong is a Chinese citizen and invoke the constitution regarding the
qualifications of a justice of the Supreme Court.
On 24 May 2007, petitioners filed a TRO to prevent and restrain Ermita from releasing the appointment of Ong and to prevent Ong
from assuming the office. Respondent Ermita accordingly filed his comment essentially stating that the appointment was made by the
President pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 9. Respondent Ong on the other hand, maintained that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as people's organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost
and far-reaching constitutional importance.
(2) Whether or not the president should have been included as an alleged necessary party.
This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President. Furthermore, the suit does
not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong
from accepting the same
(3) Whether or not Ong is a natural-born Citizen
It could be inferred from the submitted records that Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Furthermore, no substantial or correction in
an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order. Respondent Ong had the burden of proving in court his alleged
ancestral tree as well as his citizenship. Until this is done, he cannot accept the appointment.
Resolution:
Petition granted.
Rubrico v. Arroyo
Facts:
On 3 April 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence Security Squadron based in Lipa City abducted Lourdes Rubrico
who was then attending a Lenten Pabasa and brought to and detained her in the air base without charges and was subsequently
subjected to a week of relentless interrogation. She was released afterwards. During the time that Lourdes was missing, P/Insp.
Gomez, then sub-station commander kept sending text messages to Mary Joy, Lourdes' daughter and asking her questions about
Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. A week after Lourdes' release, Jean, another daughter, was constrained from
leaving their house due to the presence of men watching them.
Lourdes filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention and an administrative complaint for
gross abuse of authority and grace misconduct against Capt. Cuaresma, Ruben Alfaro, Jimmy Santana but nothing happened.
The petitioned prayed for a writ of amparo issue ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman to immediately file and information for kidnapping. Before
the CA, respondents President Arroyo, Gen. Esperon and Director General Razon, P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez through the
OSG filed a joint return specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. By way of general affirmative defense,
the respondents interposed the following defense: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency, and (2) the petition is
incomplete as it fails to indicate the matter required by section 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo rule. Also attached are the statements of the
impleaded to the steps they took regarding the claimed disappearance.
CA dropped the president and denied the motion for TPO for the court's want of authority. It issued a partial judgement where it
dismissed the petition against Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez and the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, it directed the investigation of the
disappearance of Lourdes.
Issues
(1) Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dropping the President as party respondent.
Petitioners take issue on the President's purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office as it is absent in the 1987
Constitution which was evident in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution. The Court ruled that the immunity remains preserved under our
system of Government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Settled in the doctrine is the fact that the President
during his tenure of office may not be sued in any civil or criminal case.

(2) Whether Esperon and Razon are responsible, under the doctrine of command responsibility, for the unlawful acts allegedly
committed by their subordinates against the petitioners
The doctrine, though defined, developed and applied under international laws has little, if at all, bearing in writ of amparo
proceedings. The court does not rule in such proceedings on issue of criminal liability, even if incidentally, a crime of infraction of
administrative rule has been committed. The writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief
against the violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons. It does not pinpoint criminal
culpability, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability for the purposes of imposing appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.
(3) Whether petitioners have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes
Petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally
formed part of either military or the police chain of command. Also, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged
abductors namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana etc. have yet to be established.
(4) Whether the OMB failed to act on the petitioners' complaint against those who abducted and illegally detained Lourdes
Resolution:
Affirms the dropping of Arroyo from the petition for writ of amparo; Affirms the dismissal of the amparo case against Esperon, Razon
and the OMB; Directs investigations regarding the disappearance of Lourdes
Gloria v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of the Division of City Schools, Quezon City in 1989. On 1994,
Gloria recommended to the President that the respondent be reassigned as Superintendent of Marikina Institute of Science and
Technology. The president approved the recommendation of Gloria. Director Rosa subsequently informed the petitioner of his
reassignment. Private respondent then requested that Gloria reconsider the reassignment but this was denied. The petitioner then filed
an instant petition which was denied by the CA but was subsequently reversed and a TRO was issued. Petitioners now seek relief to
the Court from the decision of CA.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks the President in violation of the doctrine
of presidential immunity from suit.
Petition is directed against petitioners (Gloria et. al.) and not against the President. The question acts are those of the petitioners and
not the president. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned when there is the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(2) Whether or not the assignment constitutes grave abuse of discretion
The reassignment is indefinite and lacks the period of duration. Such feature then violates the security of tenure of the private
respondent which is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of the civil service.
Resolution:
Petition denied.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
US v. Nixon
Facts:
A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special
prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon
asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other
government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided
together with Nixon v. United States.
Issues:
(1) Whether the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely
immune from judicial review.
The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited
executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law
in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon
resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.
Resolution: Judgement affirmed.