Journal of Applied Philosophy,Vol. 27, No.

4, 2010
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00497.x

Licensing Parents Revisited

japp_497

327..343

HUGH LaFOLLETTE

abstract Although systems for licensing professionals are far from perfect, and their problems
and costs should not be ignored, they are justified as a necessary means of protecting innocent
peoples vital interests. Licensing defends patients from inept doctors, pharmacists, and physical
therapists; it protects clients from unqualified lawyers.We should protect people who are highly
vulnerable to those who are supposed to serve them, those with whom they have a special
relationship. Requiring professionals to be licensed is the most plausible way of doing that. Given
the overwhelming support for the licensing of these professionals, I find it odd that so many people
categorically reject proposals to license parents. Although the relationship between a parent and
her children is different in some respects, it is also relevantly similar to that between a professional
and those she serves. To defend these claims, I show how and why the rationale for licensing
parents parallels the rational for licensing professionals. I then ask whether such a program could
be justifiably implemented. Finally, I describe and reject what I see as the flawed view of the
relationship between parents and their children.

I have an idea. Lets stop requiring physicians to be licensed. The practice is unreliable
because it does not guarantee that all doctors will be competent. It is unfair because it
bars admission to some who would be competent or even excellent. Moreover, by
limiting the number of physicians, we harm or seriously inconvenience some needing
health care. Finally, the practice is intrusive. Those wanting to be physicians must study
for years, work insane hours as residents, and take extensive exams. Even if they succeed,
this will take a significant toll on them. If they fail, they are financially strapped and their
goals are thwarted. Arguably it is unfair to prohibit people from fulfilling their dreams
just because we predict that they would not be competent. To intervene because they
merely risk harming others violates their rights.
We should also cease similarly flawed practices of licensing dentists, pharmacists,
chiropractors, lawyers, counselors, and physical therapists. These licensing systems
mistakenly admit some unqualified professionals and deny licenses to others who
would be competent. Lets demolish these ineffective and invasive practices; lets
remove the obstacles impeding those wanting to be professionals. Surely we can do
that.
We could. However, that would be imprudent and immoral. For although these
systems are far from perfect, and their problems and costs should not be ignored, they
are justified as a necessary means of protecting innocent peoples vital interests. Licensing defends patients from inept doctors, pharmacists, and physical therapists; it protects
clients from unqualified lawyers. We should protect people who are highly vulnerable to
those who are supposed to serve them, those with whom they have a special relationship.
Requiring professionals to be licensed is the most plausible way of doing that. That is
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why most people desiring to be professionals embrace this rationale and are willing to
demonstrate their competence.
Given the overwhelming support for the licensing of these professionals, I find it odd
that so many people categorically reject proposals to license parents. Although the
relationship between a parent and her children is different in some respects, it is also
relevantly similar to that between a professional and those she serves.1 Doubtless most
objectors think that, despite obvious similarities, licensing parents relevantly differs from
standard professional licensing. In my experience, though, objectors rarely spell out and
defend this belief. In the end, I suspect that most objectors simply find the idea so odd
that they assume that professional licensing must be legitimate while parental licensing
is not even if they cannot say why. I also think many people embrace, at least in
attenuated form, a flawed view of the relationship between parents and children.
To defend these claims, I show how and why the rationale for licensing parents
parallels the rational for licensing professionals. I then ask whether such a program could
be justifiably implemented. Finally, I describe and reject what I see as the aforementioned flawed view of the relationship between parents and their children.

Theoretical Reasons for Licensing

The theoretical rationale for licensing certain activities has been with us for a long time;
as stated in US law: When practice of a profession or calling requires special knowledge
or skill and intimately affects public health, morals, order or safety, or general welfare,
legislature may prescribe reasonable qualifications for persons desiring to pursue such
professions or calling and require them to demonstrate possession of such qualifications
by examination on subjects with which such profession or calling has to deal as a
condition precedent to right to follow that profession or calling.2 Similar ideas are found
in the laws of other developed countries.
Following this law, we can specify two conditions that theoretically justify licensing an
activity:
People are engaged in an activity that may harm those they serve, either directly or by
failing to fulfil their fiduciary duties; the harm can be significant and life-altering.
People can safely perform these risky activities only if they are competent.
These conditions, by themselves are powerful, but insufficient to justify licensing.They
ignore the possibility that there are countervailing theoretical reasons against licensing
(i.e. requiring licenses for certain activities). There is always one general (and in that
sense, theoretical) countervailing reason against licensing: it is costly to society and
individuals. Licensing, like all regulatory activities, is expensive and government coffers
are not bottomless. It also limits peoples options, and it does so not because the
individual will harm others, but because she is statistically likely to do so. This general
theoretical cost does not rule out all licensing. However, it places the burden of proof on
those defending it. Defenders must show that the benefits of licensing would outweigh
its costs.Thus, a program is theoretically justified only if it also satisfies a third condition:
The benefits of the licensing program outweigh any theoretical reasons against it.
Lets examine each condition in more detail.
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Actions Risky to Others

Most of our actions are relatively benign. What I choose to eat, read, where I choose to
walk, and when I choose to sleep do not ordinarily put others are risk.That is why we do
not and should not generally consider regulating these human behaviours. However,
some activities regularly put innocent people at risk. The risk of significant harm is high
when the parties have a special relationship like that between professionals and their
patients or clients. Incompetent physicians can significantly harm their patients; illprepared lawyers may condemn their clients to imprisonment or financial ruin.
Professionals can cause so much harm because their clients are especially vulnerable
to them. Few of us can accurately diagnose our own complex medical problems, give
ourselves astute legal advice, or design our own bridges. So we must seek those with the
requisite competence. We must entrust them with our health, life, financial security,
infrastructure, freedom, etc. That is why we should license these activities. It is the most
feasible way of protecting vulnerable citizens.
People Can Safely Perform Risky Activity Only If They Are Competent
These professionals can perform their tasks efficiently and safely only if they have the
relevant knowledge, abilities, judgment, and dispositions.

Knowledge
A professional cannot safely carry out her role unless she has basic facts ready to hand.
A physician cannot diagnose or propose treatments for diseases or conditions of which
she is ignorant. An attorney cannot make plausible arguments or file compelling motions
if she does not know rules of evidence, legal procedure, or the relevant statutory,
common, and judicial law. Of course we cannot specify exactly what she must know to
perform each task competently. However, we know that a professional needs considerable knowledge before she can perform her tasks competently, and even more knowledge
to perform them excellently.

Abilities
Bare knowledge does not guarantee competence. The professional also needs certain
skills. A surgeon must have steady and accurate hands. Competent attorneys need verbal
and written facility. We do not know exactly which skills and to what degree a
professional needs to perform her tasks. However, we know that she can perform her
professional tasks competently only if she has considerable abilities; she needs even
greater skills to perform them excellently.

Judgment
It is not enough for an aspiring professional to have the requisite knowledge and abilities;
she also needs judgment to make appropriate decisions. A physician must use her
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knowledge and abilities to decide whether the rash she sees is a common and innocent
cellulitis or a rare and dangerous necrotizing fasciitis.3 If she does not know, she must
know where to find that information; otherwise, her patient may die. An attorney must
decide which of two motions to make before Judge Jones. If she makes the wrong motion,
the client may lose her livelihood or freedom. A civil engineer must decide which bridge
design is strongest given the local geology and climate. If she chooses the wrong design,
people may die when the bridge collapses. Of course we cannot exactly know the nature
and extent of judgment that a professional needs. Still, we do know that if someones
judgment is severely defective, then she cannot reliably, competently, and safely carry out
her professional tasks.
Dispositions
Even if someone has the requisite knowledge, ability, and judgment, she may lack the
appropriate dispositions; that makes her unlikely to regularly perform her tasks competently. An incurious physician may not take the time to use her knowledge and abilities
to correctly diagnose a potentially lethal condition. An insufficiently self-critical lawyer
may fail to see that she is not vigorously defending her client because the client
unconsciously reminds her of a mean-spirited elementary (primary) school teacher. Of
course we do not know exactly which dispositions and to what degree any
professional must have. Still, we know that if she has (or lacks) certain dispositions, then
she is less likely to perform her tasks competently.
In short, the nature and extent of knowledge, skills, judgment, and dispositions that a
professional needs vary from profession to profession and from task to task within the
same profession. Nonetheless, we know that a competent professional needs some
degree of each.That is why it is so important for us to license her.That will not guarantee
that she never harms her clients. It would, however, make it less likely.
Theoretical Costs Do Not Outweigh Its Benefits
All licensing programs cost money. All limit individual choices. They admit some
ill-prepared professionals and deny licenses to others who are qualified. Since the former
are incompetent, they will harm some they serve. Since the latter are denied access to a
job they desire, they are harmed. Because these are general features of all licensing
programs, this is best seen as a theoretical cost of licensing, an explanation of why we
need good reasons for licensing an activity.
At least one scholar has argued that these costs are so high that we should not tolerate
licensing.4 Few buy this view. For as significant as these theoretical costs are, we
continue to license physicians because we think it is a necessary means of protecting
innocent individuals from risk. Without licensing [Q]uacks [will] abound like locusts in
Egypt.5
No licensing system could be perfect. If we set the requirements for a license very high
in an effort to guarantee that no incompetent people are licensed, then we will reject a
larger number of deserving candidates. If we lower standards to decrease the chance that
deserving candidates are excluded, we increase the number of incompetent applicants
who are licensed. This is unfortunate, but not surprising. It is what we should expect as
fallible creatures in a complicated world.
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There may also be special costs of some licensing programs. After first explaining the
rationale for licensing parents, I will discuss one purported special cost of licensing
parents.

Why License Parents?

The reasons for licensing parents are the same as those for licensing people seeking
entrance into the paradigm professions.
Parenting Is Risky
As a group, children are the most vulnerable members of a society. That is why it is
especially important that someone shield them from harm. Normally parents bear this
responsibility. They should protect their children from physical harm and provide for
their basic needs. Not all parents do what they should do. Some directly harm their
children; others harm their children by failing to fulfil their fiduciary duties to them.
Since a parent has almost exclusive control of her children over many years, children are
especially vulnerable to their parents.
The Costs to Children Are Substantial
We license physicians because they can seriously, and sometimes permanently, harm
their patients. Parents can likewise significantly, pervasively and irrevocably harm their
children.There are nearly two million cases of substantiated child abuse and neglect in the
US each year.6 Authorities speculate that the real number of incidents is three times
higher.7 One national study found that each year one in seven children is abused or
neglected.8 That number is rising, at least in the United States.9 Parents were responsible
for nearly 80% of child maltreatment, while their unmarried partners account for
another 4%.10 Some portion of the remaining cases could have been prevented by
adequate parental supervision.
The results are devastating. In the US, more than four children a day die from abuse
and neglect.11 Others suffer significant long-term physical effects. Individuals who have
been maltreated during childhood are more likely to develop diabetes, cancer, cardiovascular disease, et cetera.12 Recent studies suggest that childhood traumatic stressors
represent a common pathway to a variety of long-term behavioural, health, and social
problems including premature death.13 Many others are emotionally scarred for life.14
The damage does not stop with the victims. Their maltreatment affects how they will
treat others when they grow up. They are far more likely to abuse their own children,15
and they are more likely to become criminals. Some researchers claim that child abuse
creates an additional 35,000 violent criminals and more than 250 murderers.16 Others
found that child maltreatment roughly doubles the probability that an individual
engages in many types of crime.17 This is much higher than the effects of factors
normally thought to cause criminality including unemployment and crack cocaine use
(Currie & Tekin, 2007, p. 20).
Someone might wonder why I focus on abuse and neglect.18 After all, a parent may fail
to love, care for, encourage, and guide her children in many ways, ways that can cause
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them serious harm. We all know adults haunted by memories of an inattentive, selfabsorbed, or unsympathetic parent. Why not focus on these parental failings? There are
two reasons. One, as the statistics in the previous paragraphs reveal, harms from abuse
and neglect are typically highly significant. Working to prevent them will yield the
greatest benefits with the least intrusion. Two, although we might disagree about the
appropriateness of some parental behaviours, we can all agree that abuse and neglect are
inappropriate.This is a similar approach we take when evaluating professionals.We hope
that our system of training and licensing will yield a professional who not only does not
harm her patients or clients, but significantly promotes their interests. Nonetheless, our
primary aim is to ensure that a physician does not directly harm her patients, or seriously
(i.e. negligently) fails to care for their medical interests. It is sensible to do the same with
parenting. That explains why we should legally focus on abuse and neglect. At the same
time, we should urge a parent to do more than simply not maltreat her children; we
should find ways to empower her to provide the care, direction, support, and love her
children need.19
The Need for Competence
We license professionals because they need knowledge, abilities, judgment, and dispositions to competently discharge their tasks. A parent needs similar characteristics to
competently rear her children.
Knowledge
A parent cannot adequately care for her children if she does not know or know how
to meet their needs. If she does not understand infants biological needs, she may fail
to provide appropriate nutrition or she may feed them something dangerous (e.g.
peanuts). If a parent is ignorant about childhood diseases, she might overreact to a minor
problem while ignoring a potentially lethal one (e.g. Reyes Syndrome). If a parent does
not know the importance of introducing young children to language, she may hinder
their development. Or course no parent knows all that she must know.We should not set
impossibly high standards. Still, a parent needs a basic repository of knowledge if she has
any hope of adequately caring for her children.
Abilities
Since no parent can know everything, she needs the ability to find information she lacks.
She must know where to look or whom to ask, and she must have the intellectual
wherewithal to comprehend what she finds. When children are very young, the parent
also needs the physical ability to feed them, change their diapers, cuddle them, etc. We
cannot specify all abilities that a parent must have. However, we know that someone
lacking most of these cannot adequately care for a child by herself.
Judgment
A parent needs more than a repository of knowledge and an array of physical and
intellectual abilities. She needs to be able to use these to make wise judgments about the
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care of her children. She must be able to judge what food to introduce when, how to
discipline them, and how to develop their intellectual and social skills. Of course some
fine parents have less judgment than others; we should not hold parents to impossibly
high standards. Still, we know that the less judgment a parent has, the more likely she will
harm or inadequately care for her children.

Disposition
A parent with knowledge, abilities, and judgment may still put her children at risk if she
lacks the appropriate intellectual and emotional dispositions. If she is impatient, easily
frustrated, or violence prone, she might hit her children. If she is excessively selfabsorbed, she may not reliably provide adequate care. If she is inattentive or insufficiently
self-critical, she may not notice the ways that she ignores or downplays her childrens
needs. Of course, we should not expect too much from a parent. Still, the more deficient
a parents dispositions, the more likely that she will harm her children, the less likely she
is to love them or adequately fulfil her fiduciary duties to them.
At some point the risk of neglect, abuse, or other malfeasance becomes sufficiently
great that we should consider intervening. That is why we must consider licensing
parents.
Theoretical Objections to Licensing Parents
All licensing programs cost money, have false positives and false negatives, and limit
peoples options. However, this does not stop us from licensing physicians, lawyers, or
engineers; we think the benefits of these programs outweigh their costs. Neither should
these costs stop us from licensing parents. The risks to children (and the adults they will
become) of ignorant, bungling, maladapted, or malicious parents are widespread and
significant likely as great as the risks to patients being treated by incompetent
physicians. Barring any special considerations, the theoretical reasons for licensing
parents are as strong as those for licensing professionals.

Parenting Differs from the Paradigm Professions

Some objectors claim that parenting relevantly differs from the paradigm professions.
Although there are some disanalogies between these practices, these differences do not
undermine the theoretical case for licensing parents. Let me explain.
Someone might claim that we license those in the paradigm professions because they
can harm large numbers of patients or clients; in contrast, although a parent can harm
her children profoundly, the number of children she can harm is relatively small.
However, I do not see that or how this undercuts the theoretical argument for licensing.
One, the general rationale for licensing does not depend on a professional being able to
harm large numbers of people, but only that she can profoundly harm those she serves.
Two, some professionals serve only one or a small number of clients. Three, children are
more vulnerable to their parents than patients are to (most of their) doctors. Since
children are with their parents longer and in more varied circumstances, then the
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opportunities for a parent to harm her children are especially high. Four, whereas
patients can (usually) leave their physicians, lawyers, etc. to find another; children cannot
normally leave their less-than-competent parents. These differences strengthen not
weaken the case for licensing parents.
Perhaps, though, the objector has something different in mind. She may think
that people have a right to their children, whereas people do not have a right to be
professionals.
A Right to Have Children
Many think people have the right to be parents and that this right bars any parental
licensing program.To assess this claim we must first disambiguate it. It could mean three
different things:
If people are able to procreate, then no one should forbid them from doing so (right
to procreate).
If people have children under their control (whether by procreation or other means),
then no one should forbid them from rearing them (negative right to rear).
If people are incapable of having children, then the state (or others) should provide
them with a child (positive right to rear).
Do people have a right to procreate? Even if they do, the right is not unqualified. A
man does not have a right to father 500 children just so he can be recognized in Guinness
Book of World Records. Of course there are reasons why we should be leery of coercively
limiting procreation. Nonetheless, any plausible right to procreate has to be contingent
[on their] having or making some feasible plan for their children to be adequately reared
by themselves or by willing others.20 However, if an adult has made plausible plans, then
arguably she has a strong albeit qualified right to procreate. Many people desperately want children. If licensing were to limit procreation, then thwarting peoples desires
is a cost of the program that should not be disregarded or discounted. I say more about
this cost in the next major section of the paper.
What about a positive right to rear? Some people talk in ways that might suggest there
is such a right. However, the only plausible related right is a right of access to reproductive services.21 That is far short of a robust positive right to children. I dont know any
serious thinker who avers that the state must give children to any person who wants
them. Even if there is a positive right to rear, it, like the previous one, would have to be
qualified in the same ways that a negative right to rear must be.
A Negative Right to Rear
Does a parent have a right to rear the children under her control, without interference
from the state? Although it would be disastrous if the state regularly interfered in the
day-to-day decisions of parents, it is implausible to think that parents have an unqualified
negative right to rear. For sure, some parents disagree. In several cases chronicled by
DeCourcy and DeCourcy,22 parents thought that it was not only permissible, but also
mandatory, for them to beat their children. However, even if they were sincere we would
not and should not let them act on that belief. That is why we have laws against
child abuse.
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That is why, if there were such a negative right to rear, it must be qualified. Law and
morality forbid a parent from abusing her children. It mandates that she have her
children vaccinated for common childhood diseases (unless explicitly excused) and that
she insure they are educated. We need not pretend that these requirements are precisely
specified or perfectly enforced. Nonetheless, they reflect our unflagging belief that any
right to rear children under ones care must be qualified.23
This qualified right resembles the right to become a professional. Jerris right to
become a physician is conditional on her demonstrating the requisite competence. The
right, although qualified, is significant because it forbids any ad hoc bar to her being a
physician. The qualification is critical because it protects those she serves, those especially vulnerable to her. Jerris right to parent is also qualified. The right, although
conditional, is significant because it forbids any ad hoc prohibition against her being a
parent. The qualification is critical because it protects children, those especially vulnerable to her.

Is the Right Conditional only on Actual Abuse?

Someone might claim that the right is conditional not on our predicting that she will
abuse and neglect her children, but only on her actually abusing or neglecting them.
However, since this is not true of professional licensing, barring special considerations,
there is no reason to think this should be true of parental licensing either. Moreover, this
objection assumes that licensing laws are an arm of the criminal law. In the criminal law,
we standardly punish people only if they actually commit a crime, not because we judge
that they are likely to do so.
However, this objection misconstrues the nature of and rationale for licensing.
Although both the criminal law and licensing aim to protect innocent people, they seek
this end in importantly different ways. Even though the aim of the practice of punishment is to protect citizens by curbing crime, we punish individual criminals (actions
falling under that practice) because of their actions, not primarily to protect others. In
that sense the criminal justice system is retributive, past oriented.24 In contrast, licensing
programs are future-directed in both aim and execution. Not only are the programs
designed to protect innocent people from risky actions, the decision to bar a specific
person from becoming a physician, lawyer, or engineer is also future-oriented. We deny
her a license because we think she is ill-equipped to serve the clients or patients with
whom she would have a special relationship.
We see the same contrast if we compare reasons for licensing a parent with those for
punishing an abusive one. We punish an abusive parent for what she did; we would
license parents to protect children. This difference is manifested in different judgments
a court might make against an abusive parent. The court might imprison the parent or
it might remove her children. It would do the former to punish her. It would do the latter
to protect the children. In the latter cases, the court predicts that she would likely
re-abuse her children. Doubtless this prediction is based largely on her past actions. But
not entirely. Courts sometimes leave children with their abusive parents. In so doing the
courts show that we can employ other factors to predict a potential parents future
behaviour. It is akin to laws forbidding an 11-year-old from rearing a child by herself.We
bar her from being a parent at that age, not because she previously abused children, but
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because we think she lacks the requisite knowledge, abilities, judgment, and disposition.
This shows that we already recognize that the negative right to rear children is qualified.
So does the practice of adoption.

Adoption
It is neither easy nor cheap to adopt a child. An aspiring parent must apply to an
adoption agency. The agency scours her background and financial records, and then
conducts home visits. These intrusive procedures are designed to protect children, to
increase the chance that they will have supportive, loving, and stable homes. The results
are impressive. Because of the trauma children face before they are adopted, many have
problems. Yet they are less than half as likely to be maltreated compared to children
reared by their biological parents.25 Of course adoption programs are not perfect. They
exclude some people who would have been fine parents, let some abusive parents adopt,
and there is intentional abuse of the system.
Yet we continue to use this process because we think its benefits are greater than the
costs. That gives us powerful reason to think that the licensing of parents is at least
theoretically defensible. Notice, too, that the purported disanalogies between being a
professional and being a biological parent are equally disanalogies between being a
professional and being an adoptive parent. The disanalogies do not show that adoption
programs are impermissible. Nor do they show that a program of licensing parents is
theoretically indefensible.
Others may claim, though that the relevant difference is between natural parenting
and adoption. They may think biological parents have a natural affection or love for
their children and that the strength of this affection makes it unlikely that a parent will
maltreat her children. Even if many parents do feel a natural affection for their
children, this is insufficient to keep all biological parents from maltreating their
children. Nearly 92% of parental abusers are biological parents.26 Other studies indicate that biological parents are no better parents than their adoptive counterparts.27
Consequently, if we continue current adoptive practices and certainly we should
we are rationally compelled to establish a licensing program for all parents unless we
have special reasons for thinking there are unique practical problems with licensing
parents.
The Argument So Far
I have argued that it is theoretically appropriate to license parents. That does not yet
show that we should establish a licensing program. We must still decide if it is practical.
Nonetheless, this tentative conclusion is extremely important. It shows that we should
regulate parenting (a) if we can specify criteria for a competent parent, (b) if we have
moderately accurate methods for determining competence, and (c) if there are no special
reasons for thinking that the programs costs exceed its benefits. If any of these conditions is not satisfied, then we should not license parents. However, were that so, we
should lament it since, by not regulating parenting, we subject innocent children to
significant risks. Therefore we should diligently seek ways to more accurately determine
competence while lowering regulatory costs.
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The Practicality of Licensing: Worries about Implementation

Many who object to licensing parents claim that we cannot satisfy all (or any) of these
conditions. I am not so pessimistic.
Criteria of Competence
A competent parent must be knowledgeable, and have the requisite abilities, judgment,
and dispositions.The problem is specifying the precise nature and degree of each quality
required. Nonetheless, although there is a continuum of possibilities, there are crystal
clear cases at the extremes and many clear cases in between. A competent parent must
have enough intelligence to identify and know how to satisfy childrens basic needs. She
requires the abilities and judgment to meet those needs. And she must have the appropriate dispositions: she cannot be violent or exceedingly self-absorbed.We can, of course,
disagree about the degree of each trait necessary to be a competent parent. However,
they must have them all in some degree.
There are other traits about which thoughtful people might disagree, in part because
they disagree about the central goals of child-rearing. Feinberg and more recently
Brighouse and Swift argue that a parent should rear her children in ways that promote
their autonomy when they become adults.28 Nonetheless, this claim is sufficiently contentious that we should not immediately make it a legal criterion for obtaining a
parenting license. We should permit some experiments in parenting just as we should
permit experiments in living.29 We cannot fully specify criteria for being a good parent.
We also cannot exhaustively specify criteria for a good physician or lawyer. However that
does not prevent us from licensing these professionals. Neither should this prevent us
from licensing parents.
Determining whether Prospective Parents Meet Those Criteria
Determining whether prospective parents meet these criteria is difficult but not impossible. We know competent parents need a modicum of intelligence, and we have ways of
identifying those with significant mental limitations.We know they need some knowledge
about children and child development. We can test for that. We have tests to determine
if someone is violent or exceedingly self-absorbed; these would identify the most dangerous potential parents.We have even more fine-grained tests, but arguably nothing that
gives us the predictive power we might want before establishing a robust licensing
program. However, we should not put too much weight on this. After all, we have made
little effort to identify the requisite knowledge, abilities, judgment, and dispositions that
competent parents need.The first attempt to do something in this ballpark the Child
Abuse Potential Inventory appears to be reasonably accurate.30 With further study we
could likely devise a reliable test.31
Costs and Benefits of Licensing
Even if that were true, some think the costs of licensing parents would be too high. They
aver that the program would be intentionally abused by unscrupulous or biased bureaucrats and unintentionally abused by inattentive ones. I was concerned about this possi Society for Applied Philosophy, 2010

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bility when I wrote the original essay thirty years ago. I am more worried now. Events of
the past decade made me more aware of ways that an administration can take a sensible
goal (controlling terrorism) and pervert it. Other administrations could pervert the
legitimate aims of a robust parental licensing program.
I wonder, though, whether these worries are sufficient to reject parental licensing.
After all, I know that adoption programs favour rich, white Christians, yet I am not
tempted to scupper them and let aspiring parents adopt (i.e. purchase) children at the
local superstore. Rather, I think adoption programs do considerable good that we could
not achieve in any other way. I do not want to forego these gains. I would prefer to alter
adoption policies to avoid ignorance, bias, and hanky-panky.We should do the same with
a general parental licensing program.
In doing so, however, we should not forget the costs of parental licensing. For many
people, the desire to have a child is central to their sense of self. That is not a reason to
categorically reject licensing. After all, we think adoption agencies should not let unacceptable applicants adopt, even if they have strong desires to parent. Nonetheless,
recognizing the strength and centrality of this desire gives us reason to move cautiously
before instituting parental licensing on a grand scale.
An Intermediate Conclusion
Licensing parents is theoretically appropriate.We can categorically reject parental licensing only by rejecting the licensing of all professionals. That would be imprudent and
immoral. Still, we have reasons to worry about mistakes within or abuse of the system.
Additionally, a sizable segment of the population would vehemently resist a robust
licensing program. That resistance could easily undermine the programs aims.
However, we should not stand by and do nothing. The costs to children are too high.
So how to proceed? One approach, advocated by David Archard, is to seek a less
intrusive means of achieving (roughly) the same results.32 If there were such means, I
would support them. Unfortunately, I fear this strategy would fail to protect children or
would (partly) succeed only by instituting unacceptably intrusive measures. First, as I
understand this scheme, it would not limit incompetent parents until they had already
harmed children. That resembles forbidding someone from practicing medicine only
after she had harmed patients. Taking this approach would thus undermine a key aim of
licensing parents.33 Second, extensive monitoring can damage the parent-child relationship in the same ways that that monitoring can alter any intimate relationship.34 This
is a cost we should try to avoid.
In short, we need more than mere monitoring, although we would be wise to employ
relatively unintrusive means. So I propose a limited licensing scheme. Try it out and see
if it works. Depending on what we find, we can jettison it, sustain it, or expand it.
A Limited Licensing Program
What would a limited licensing program look like? I am no social engineer, so I cannot
say with any certainty. Here, though, is one option: set minimal requirements for a
license, then reward those with licenses say with special tax breaks rather than
punish those without. This could entice most prospective parents to seek licenses, while
being less intrusive than a more robust scheme. This approach would resemble one
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insurance companies employ to encourage adolescents to take a drivers education

course. Insurance companies give lower rates to adolescents who successfully complete
drivers education. Few people complain about these programs. They see them as an
attractive way to lower their rates. If we give tax breaks to licensed parents, then
prospective parents might see a license as a benefit rather than a burden.
The centrepiece of this program might be free-standing or high school parenting
courses. People successfully completing the course would be licensed. If the course
were rigorous, it would insure that more parents have vital knowledge about childrens
needs and development. Perhaps some people think this is not a serious problem: they
think most parents have sufficient knowledge to competently rear their children.
They are mistaken. A recent study discovered that one-third of US parents lack basic
knowledge about child-care and development.35 Parents lacking such knowledge are
far less likely to have quality interactions with their children. This will make parents
more frustrated with their children, and subsequently more likely to abuse or neglect
them.
What, though, could this course do to insure that parents have the appropriate
abilities, judgment, and dispositions? Enhancing peoples abilities and judgment could
be a significant aim of the course. Although there is no simple test for these traits, we can
find ways to insure that prospective parents dont wholly lack them. The fourth is more
difficult to assess. Still, we might try this: students might take a self-graded personality
inventory. The teachers could then discuss the potential problems parents with certain
personality traits might have caring for children.
This system would give most people a reason to seek a license. If the program gained
public support, even those who failed the course would feel social pressure to retake the
course before becoming parents.
This approach would not be problem-free. It arguably favours the rich since they are
better able to forego the tax breaks. However, most wealthy people will want these tax
breaks as much as anyone else. Therefore, I think this could be a relatively cheap,
relatively effective, and a relatively unintrusive way of lessening abuse and neglect and
generally improving childrens lot. Still, we might worry that children will suffer. Since
unlicensed parents will pay more money in taxes, then they will have less money to care
for their children. Nonetheless, if the tax breaks for licensed parents were sufficiently
large larger, say, than the current deduction for dependents then parents will be
motivated to become licensed. Moreover, children in licensed families will be financially
better off than they are currently.
Additionally, we might establish a program to assist and, as a side effect, monitor
parents with young children, say a scheme like the UK Health Visitors program.36 This
program assigns a nurse to every home in the country with a child under five. The nurse
is available for home visits to examine and care for the child, and to offer advice on
nutrition, parenting, development, etc. This is a service many people find beneficial.
When providing this supportive care, the nurse can watch for potential problems. If there
is an immediate and pressing problem, she can initiate an intervention.That is especially
important since nearly half of all maltreatment involves children less than four years of
age.37
Finally, we can protect children indirectly by strengthening public education, expanding health care, and bolstering childrens services. For even if some parents are likely to
abuse or neglect their children come what may, many who maltreat their children do so
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Hugh LaFollette

while economically, socially, or interpersonally stressed. A strong safety net would

lessen parental stress.
If after some years, we see that this multi-faceted approach fails, we can jettison or
modify it. On the other hand, if it is successful, we could consider trying something more
robust. Nonetheless, this would be a serious start that would avoid many costs of a
full-bore licensing program and would be more likely to garner significant public
support.
Some might contend that this approach loses the appeal of a more developed licensing
program, and that it abandons the view advanced in my original paper. I reject both
contentions. First, there are compelling reasons to worry about starting a rigorous
parental licensing scheme. We need to move incrementally as we did with professional
licensing generally; those schemes were not implemented all at once, but emerged and
morphed over decades.38 Second, the central aim of the original paper was to argue that
licensing is theoretically justified. I thought that getting people to acknowledge that
would be significant since doing so would, among other things, undermine the familiar
view that children are their parents property.

Children as Property
Once we brush away extraneous considerations, most who categorically reject parental
licensing do so because they think it fails to recognize a parents natural dominion over
her children. English common law on which most US law is founded explicitly
treated children as their fathers property.39 In some countries, this view of children is
still widely accepted. In western countries that view is rarely openly embraced, but it still
shapes many peoples views of children.40 In the original paper, I described this natural
dominion view thusly:
[P]arents legitimately exercise extensive and virtually unlimited control over
their children. Others can properly interfere with or criticize parental decisions
only in unusual and tightly prescribed circumstances for example, when
parents severely and repeatedly abuse their children. In all other cases, the parents
reign supreme.41
Although I thought that view was lurking just beneath the surface, I assumed few
would openly acknowledge its sway. However, Albert Mohler, president of the most
prestigious seminary of the USs largest Protestant denomination, finds that the above
description of parental rights and parental authority is both concise and accurate.
Indeed, belief in parental sovereignty over children has been one of the most important
means by which the state has acknowledged the primacy of the family, and thus the limits
of its own power.42 For every person like Mohler, who openly acknowledges this view of
children, I have no doubt that there are many more who silently embrace it.
Jettisoning the belief in natural dominion will eliminate attitudes, dispositions, and
laws that make abuse more likely by leading parents to believe their interests are
paramount.43 Attenuating this belief will make parents more willing to seek assistance
and encourage them to give children a serious voice in shaping their futures.
This view is closely linked to another dangerous view, namely that biological parents
have a special moral claim to their children, a claim that outweighs the interests of
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341

children in all but rare cases.44 This leads child protection agencies to assume it is almost
always best to reunite children with their biological parents. It leads parents and the
states to ask irrelevant questions and make detrimental decisions. Consider the following
fictional case: two babies are inadvertently swapped at birth. When they are twelve years
old, the parents discover the error. Should the parents exchange children so that each
now has theirs? I would hope not. If they did, that would show that something was
profoundly wrong with them as parents. In any meaningful sense the child they have
been rearing is theirs. Unfortunately, the law would likely support a parent who wanted
her child returned. This is a view of children we must abandon.

Conclusion
The theoretical reasons for licensing are compelling. Acknowledging them forces us to
rethink parent-child relationships, to reject the idea that parents have natural dominion
over their children. This will not insure that parents are always loving, caring, knowledgeable, and supportive. But it will help. I also think there are reasons to try a moderate
form of licensing. This is better than leaving children in the hands of ignorant, selfish,
inept, short-sighted, and short-fused parents.
Hugh LaFollette, University of South Florida St. Petersburg, 140 7th Ave. S., St. Petersburg,
FL 33701, USA. hughlafollette@tampabay.rr.com

Acknowledgements
For their time, insight, support, and feedback, I am indebted to David Archard, William
Aiken, David Benatar, Jeffrey Gold, George Graham, Chris Hackler, Eva LaFollette,
James Rachels, Adam Swift, members of the University of Tennessee Philosophy
Department, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal.

NOTES
1 Although this is the offspring of Licensing parents (Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 18297), it is a
new essay. Rather than summarize the original essay and then respond to criticisms point by point, I
through-composed it. This should make it easier for readers to follow, especially those unfamiliar with the
earlier essay. The view taken here differs somewhat from the one I advanced earlier. The argument has also
been corrected, expanded and revised throughout, largely in response to criticisms.
2 50 SE 2nd 735 (I949). Earlier statements of the same idea can be found at I99 US 306, 3I8 (I905) and I23
U8 623, 66I (I887).
3 A. Gawande, Complications: A Surgeons Notes on an Imperfect Science (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2002), pp. 22948.
4 D. B. Hogan, The effectiveness of licensing: History, evidence, and recommendations, Law and Human
Behaviour 7,2/3 (1983): 117138.
5 As quoted in R.H. Shyrock, Medical Licensing in America, 16591965 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1967), p. 5.
6 US Department of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment 2006 (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2008), p. xiv.
7 Childhelp, National Child Abuse Statistics (Scottsdale, AZ: Childhelp, 2005).
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8 D. Finkelhor et al., The victimization of children and youth: A comprehensive, national survey, Child
Maltreatment 10,1 (2005): 525, at p. 10.
9 Associated Press, Report: Child-abuse deaths rising, MSNBC.com (2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
33405080.
10 US Department of Health and Human Services op. cit., Table 5-2.
11 US Department of Health and Human Services op. cit., p. 65.
12 Centers for Disease Control, Transcript: Press conference on maltreatment of infant study, (2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/transcripts/2008/t080403.htm (statement by Dr. Illeana Arias).
13 D.W. Brown et al., Adverse childhood experiences and the risk of premature mortality, American Journal of
Preventive Medicine 37,5 (2009): 389396, at p. 395.
14 P. DeCourcy & J. DeCourcy, Silent Tragedy (Sherman Oaks, CA: Alfred Publishing Company, 1973).
15 R. J. Gelles, Child abuse as psychopathology: A sociological critique and reformulation, American Journal
of Orthopsychiatry 43,4 (1973): 611621, at p. 619.
16 Fight Crime, New hope for preventing child abuse and neglect: Proven solutions to save lives and prevent
future crime, (Washington, DC: Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, 2006), p. 4.
17 Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin. Does child abuse cause crime?, NBER Working Paper (2007), p. 20.
18 In this essay I rely on a common understanding of child abuse and neglect. Those seeking a more detailed
account could examine the World Health Organizations attempt to define these terms in their 2006 report
(Geneva: WHO Press) found online at: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/9241594365_eng.pdf).
I do not see that or how minor squabbles about definition affect the argument herein.
19 L. Cassidy, That many of us should not parent, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 21,4 (2006):
4057.
20 O. ONeill, Begetting, bearing, and rearing in O. ONeill & W. Ruddick (eds) Having Children: Philosophical
and Legal Perspectives on Parenthood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 25.
21 D. W. Brock, The Moral Bases of a Right to Reproductive Freedom in P. Tittle (ed.) Should Parents Be
Licensed? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004), pp. 22429.
22 DeCourcy and DeCourcy, op. cit.
23 H. Brighouse & A. Swift, Parents Rights and the value of family, Ethics 117 (2006): 80108, at p. 105.
24 J. Rawls, Two concepts of rules, The Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 332. Rawls distinguishes the
justification of a practice from the justification of actions falling under that practice.
25 Compare these sources: R. Barth, The value of special needs adoption in R. J. Avery (ed.) Adoption Policy
and Special Needs Children (Westport, CT: Auburn House, 1997); and US Department of Health and
Human Services op. cit. Table 5-4.
26 US Department of Health and Human Services, op. cit.
27 L. Hamilton, S. Cheng & B. Powell, Adoptive parents, adaptive parents: Evaluating the importance of
biological ties for parental investment, American Sociological Review 72 (2007): 95116.
28 J. Feinberg, The childs right to an open future in W. Aiken & H. LaFollette (eds) Whose Child?: Childrens
Rights, State Power, and Parental Authority (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), pp. 12453; Brighouse
& Swift, op. cit. I have made similar arguments in: Circumscribed autonomy: Children, care, and custody
in J. Bartkowiak & U. Narayan (eds) Having and Raising Children (State College, PA: Penn State University
Press, 1999), pp. 21237; and in Freedom of religion and children, Public Affairs Quarterly 3 (1989): 7587.
29 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. G. Sher (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1979), p. 54.
30 C. P. Mangel, Licensing parents: How feasible? in P. Tittle (ed.) Should Parents Be Licensed? (Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2004), p. 106.
31 Michael T. McFall discusses this is and other tests in Licensing Parents: Family, State, and Child Maltreatment
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Book, 2009), esp. pp. 119ff.
32 D. Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 2nd edn. (Milton Park: Routledge, 2004), p. 191.
33 Michael McFall, op cit., argues that the needs of children demands that we do something before abuse and
neglect occurs. See especially p. 112.
34 J. Rachels, Why privacy is important, Philosophy and Public Affairs 4,4 (1975): 32333; Brighouse & Swift,
op. cit.
35 H. Paradis, G. Montes & P.G. Szilagyi, A national perspective on parents knowledge of child development,
its relation to parent-child interaction, and associated parenting characteristics, in Pediatrics Academic Society
Publication (Honolulu, HI: The Society, 2008).
36 Department of Health, Facing the Future: A Review of the Role of Health Visitors (Crown Copyright, 2007).
37 US Department of Health and Human Services op. cit., Table 3.3.
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38 Shyrock op. cit.

39 M. A. Mason, From Fathers Property to Childrens Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
40 S. Grover, Children as chattel of the state: Deconstructing the concept of sex trafficking, The International
Journal of Human Rights 11, no. 3 (2007): 293306; American Academy of Pediatrics, The child in court:
A subject review, AAP Policy Statements (1999), http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/
pediatrics;104/5/1145.pdf, p. 2.
41 LaFollette 1980 op. cit., p. 196.
42 A. Mohler, Should parents be licensed? An ominous new debate, (2005), http://www.almohler.com/
commentary_read.php?cdate=2005-04-28.
43 D. I. Bonina & R.A. Bahe-Jachna, The treatment of children as chattel in recent adoption decisions, Human
Rights Magazine 28, 2 (1999): http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/sp99bonina.html.
44 Bonina op. cit.

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