BOOK REVIEWS 247

'Dasein is ... a realized. Changes that are detrimental to this process are morally unacceptable. This
finite Seinsver­ solution may be charged with anthropocentrism. However, it is no more anthropocentric
~ to Stefanovic
than the interpretation of place as our mode of being-in-the-world.
nunicate better In fact Heidegger seems to play only a heuristic role here. The main theses of the
:y do not fulfill book are Aristotelian: things possess qualitative and quantitative properties, and we are
Il to be obvious
able to cognize them. That is, we are able to discover truth, even if-since our
It sustainabiIity
understanding is finite and aspectual-it always includes some measure of forgetting and
and useful for error (139). And having discovered truth we should follow it in our praxis. Even for this
one thesis Stefanovic's book is certainly worth reading.
ility Stefanovic
~r, she does not AGNIESZKA LEKKi\-KOWALIK
S a theoretical Faculty of Philosophy
Jrality. We may Catholic University of Lublin
that it may be

lS far as we are, Focal Lengths

). Place is not Technology and the Good Life?
lns and events, ERlc HIGGS, ANDREW LIGHT & DAVID STRONG (Eds)

order to build Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000

me" any more. xii + 392 pp., cloth: $65.00; paper: $25.00

possibilities of This book serves at least two stated purposes. The first and most apparent one is as a
lentally already critical reader on Albert Borgmann's philosophy of technology. The second, equally
regulatory and important but less foregrounded purpose is to "[address] the problems at work in
ips" (172), we philosophy of technology today," (373) which the editors see as stemming from the lack
should be seen of recognition that existing work in philosophy of technology is accorded by philosophy
lrising by virtue in general, and the isolation and lack of encouragement that individuals have in pursuing
it. The inter- and intra-disciplinary connections of philosophy of technology has not
by listening to been broad enough (7), and it has lacked focus and orientation (17). This book intends
u environment. to rectify that. To do justice to the book, then, both purposes must be assessed.
lbjective. They As a critical reader of Albert Borgmann's work on technology, this book is head and
e. This should shoulders above anything else available. Faint praise, perhaps, in that there really is little
)vic shows with else apart from scattered reviews, papers, and conference discussions, but I do not mean
the praise faintly. It really is useful, especially for someone who is familiar with
lce listening to Borgmann and the debates that have surrounded his work. The papers explore a broad
or meanings of range of issues in philosophy of technology (and necessarily also environmental philos­
l places, not by ophy), from a wide variety of perspectives ranging from sympathetic to critical (although
ferent and each none are dismissive). The editors have chosen contributors and themes wisely, and while
case we pass a some contributions are stronger than others, there is not a weak essay in the volume.
derivable from The book is organized into four sections. Section one gives an overview of the state
.ces, as a tape­ of philosophy of technology, and places Borgmann's work in the overall scheme. David
its complicated Strong and Eric Higgs give as good an introduction to Borgmann's seminal distinction
between devices and focal things as could be imagined, while Paul Durbin gives a brief
However, only and useful overview of the field, and Borgmann's place in it.
loes not need to The second section, "Evaluating Focal Things," consists of five contributions which
re fruitful than address Borgmann's positive agenda for the future of technology. These papers meth­
• determine the odically assess the idea of focal things, ijhding models to account for it (Lawrence
sion are morally Haworth), addressing the most tempting/objection, that they are merely Heideggerian
o answer. Aris­ pre-technological romanticism (Gordon Brittan), comparing focal things to other ac­
teniialities to be counts of technology, particularly "pragmatechnics" (Larry Hickman), accounting for
248 BOOK REVIEWS

the seeming political conservativism within his work (Andrew Light), and unearthing the This'hoc:
overlooked, though central issue of character (Carl Mitcham). This is a robust and useful marginalizati,
section, as Borgmann himself recognizes-he spends most of his time in his reply might exist.
responding to these papers and the issues they raise.
The third section, "Theory in the Service of Practice," attempts to apply Borgmann's
thought to specific examples. This seems to me to be the most interesting section of the
volume. The notion of focal practice is extended and criticized in relation to film (Phillip
Fandozzi), farming (Paul Thompson), the design of technology Gesse Tatum) and
ecological restoration (Eric Higgs). Considering how focal practices might be understood
(and criticized) in these contexts makes them more readily applicable in other contexts.
The Infinit1J
Contemporary
Thompson's article is particularly useful in this regard.
The fourth section, "Extensions and Controversies," contains six papers which ALAN RosE'­
New York: l:
critique aspects of Borgmann's thought. These critiques range from those which either
355 pp., clod
recover positive human experience from or think more critically about technology
Borgmann would tend to classify as "devices" (Diane Michelfelder, Douglas Kellner, The Holocau
Andrew Feenberg), to those which question the context in which engagement with focal its repercussil
practices might occur (Mora Campbell, Thomas Michael Power). As more of an meaning as w
extension than a controversy, David Strong imagines what philosophy might look like if others, the H
it took seriously Borgmann's preoccupation with things, not only as technological entities ourselves ane
but as philosophical ones as well. West in partil
As a systematic reflection on Borgmann's work, then, this collection is successful. testify to the
But what of the second purpose? I happen to spend much of my time in a field (African inextricably a
philosophy) which suffers from the same kind of lack of recognition that the editors of For yet a
this book identify. These are the questions I hear: Does Africa really have a philosophy? if it ever leave
Is it not just a "negative" philosophy, one which begins from exclusion? Do you really EnlightenmeJl
want to work in a field where no one in "real" philosophy knows the major figures? Often have the tools
when Africa is "rediscovered" by someone in "mainstream" philosophy, they don't do the historicitj
their homework and the careful work of Africans and others over time is ignored. The perfect-what
colonizer has landed, ready to plunder resources, claim the terra incognita, ignore or Heidegger fo
suppress the locals and move on. Sound familiar? Nazism. Wha
But there are differences. Africa doesn't cross the consciousness of most people, and one whic
while technology is so imbedded that it is hard to make it an object of reflection in a Although
manner other than either "gee-whiz" or "doom and gloom." Even philosophers think they self-contained
already know about technology, whereas they don't know and don't care about Africa. of postmoden
So I can identify with the feelings of marginalization expressed in the introduction genocide-bol
and afterword. But what does this book change? More to the point, what would the poetry, to an
editors like it to change? Perhaps, following David Strong, this book is an exercise in Celan's work
"philosophy in the service of things." But who will listen? section focuse
I have observed from working in African philosophy that, while this area is either inherent in tel
subsumed under existing philosophical history, or dismissed as irrelevant or pointless, this and the stubl:
changes when it is actually able to make a positive contribution to the rest of philosophy, someme~
to (in Deleuze's words) "create new concepts." Of course, the problem is still getting come (back) i
anyone to listen, but other previously marginalized sub-disciplines have walked this path The dileJl
before-feminism, for example. The key for feminists was to bridge the gaps, to find the and hence me
local ways of communicating across the disciplinary barriers. Strong is probably right, the term "Fin
that "the history of philosophy needs to be rethought in terms of focal things" (331). That theological ref
is a new contribution-but how, other than by producing in-house conversations, will economy of lif
this new concept become something more than a way of highlighting the unreflectiveness economy. Het
of the mainstream? proach, any 51
 BOOK REVIEWS 249

mearthing the This book is a good start. The next step is to move from identifying sub-disciplinary
ust and useful marginalization, to thinking about where the profitable local, non-internal conversations
: in his reply might exist.
BRUCE JANZ
y Borgmann's
Depanment of Philosophy
section of the
Augustana University College
o film (Phillip
Tatum) and
>e understood
The Infinitude of the Final Solution
ther contexts.
Contemporary Portrayals of Auschwitz: Philosophical Challenges
AlAN ROSENBERG, JAMES R. WATSON & DETLEF LINK (Eds)
papers which
New York: Humanity Books, 2000
~ which either
355 pp., cloth: $70.00
It technology
Ilglas Kellner, The Holocaust refuses to end. It refuses to be over; we remain caught and entangled in
.ent with focal its repercussions and for some in this text, this simulataneous lack of intelligibility and
, more of an meaning as well as its overwhelming character will forever be ahead of us-to come. For
~t look like if others, the Holocaust provides an eerie and uncanny platform from which we launch
logical entities ourselves anew, although shattered, transformed and stripped of illusions. We, in the
West in particular, must continue to create art, renew religion, write, memorialize and
is successful. testify to the genocides of today as well as yesterday. For these, the impulses are
field (African inextricably a mixture of the moral and political.
the editors of For yet another group of notable writers of this collection, the Holocaust leaves us,
a philosophy? if it ever leaves us, in crisis-this crisis, these crises, are not only of Modernism and the
Do you really Enlightenment, of humanism, but also for the work of postmodernism. We still do not
figures? Often have the tools or the motifs to comprehend the testimonies, the eyewitness accounts, or
they don't do the historicity of the Holocaust events themselves. That they are a part of the future
ignored. The perfect-what will have been-is only another ironic twist of the dangling corpse which
lita, ignore or Heidegger foresaw in spite of himself and his own dangerous entanglement with
Nazism. What will the Holocaust have been? This is perhaps the question of this text
most people, and one which every essay attempts to address.
~efiection in a Although originally a collection of conference papers, this text reads as five
lers think they self-contained subsections. We move from issues of witnessing, testimony and the trials
about Africa. of posttnodern and post-Holocaust subjectivity to the moral and ethical dimensions of
~ introduction genocide-both past and present. From here we take up Adorno's challenge to art and
lat would the poetry, to artists and poets, to create after Auschwitz. This section considers kitsch,
m exercise in eelan's work and the images of people labeled by numbers in the camps. The fourth
section focuses on the issues of historicity and memory and the problems of forgetting
area is either inherent in temporality. The last part turns again to the issues of crisis in representation
pointless, this and the stubborn defiance the Holocaust maintains as we attempt still to grasp it in
)f philosophy, some meaningful or encompassing way. What slips away from our grasp, what will never
is still getting come (back) into focus is the subject of the discourse here.
lked this path The dilemma for Debra Bergoffen revolves around the unthinkable, unintelligible,
ps, to find the and hence meaningless character she attributes to the "Final Solution." She argues for
robably right, the term "Final Solution" rather than "Shoah" or "Holocaust" since the latter entail a
," (331). That theological reference to sacrifice, to the burning of an offering to God as a part of an
ersations, will economy of life and death. The "Final Solution" neither offers nor instantiates any such
rreiilectiveness economy. Her essay speaks throughout of the inadequacy of any language, any ap­
proach, any story to the events of te Final Solution. It remains, she claims, forever