ADILLE V.

CA- Notice of Repudiation

Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the
others. Torrens title cannot be used as shield for fraud.

FACTS:
There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the
Petitioner. The second husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a
land and sold the same to a third person with right of repurchase. However, when the
woman died, it was Petitioner who by himself repurchased the land and later on he
executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered the land unto himself alone.
Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they filed an
action to cancel the title.
Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e.
the registration constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is correct.

RULING:
NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not
transfer to him alone. The other heirs only need to reimburse him.
As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the
repudiation because they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact,
they were done clandestinely. One of the co-heir in fact was in possession of the land
and yet he was not informed of the pending registration nor ousted by Petitioner. Hence,
should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when the heirs finally
learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet.

CARAGAY-LAYNO VS CA
FACTS:

Mariano de Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his property until her death in
1966. Salvador Estrada (De Veras nephew) took over as administrator of De Veras
estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an inventory showing that De Veras
property located located in Calasiao, Pangasinan, measuring 5,417 sq. m. however
noticed that the Torrens title under de Vera indicated that his property measures 8752
sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3,732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana
Caragay Layno. Estrada sued to evict Caragay-Layno. She averred that she and her
father have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that they have been paying taxes; that the
title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it was only in 1967 that they initiated an
action therefore laches has set in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caragay is entitled to reconvey the disputed portion?
HELD:
YES. The property which had been wrongfully registered in the name of another, but
which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties can properly seek its
reconveyance. Prescription cannot be invoked against her as lawful possessor and
owner of disputed portion, her cause of action for reconveyance in effect seeks to quiet
title to property falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to the
property is imprescriptible.
Tongoy v. CAG.R. No. L-45645 June 28, 1983
Facts: Petitioners maintain that since the said respondents were never acknowledged
by their father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their
parents, much less could they inherit from the estate of their father, the predecessor-ininterest of Luis D. Tongoy, who is admittedly the half brother of the said respondents.
Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy and NorbertoP. Tongoy
were born illegitimate to Antonina Pabello on August 19, 1910, August12, 1914,
December 1, 1915 and August 4, 1922, respectively; that Francisco Tongoy was their
father; that said Francisco Tongoy had before them two legitimate children by his first
wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello were married sometime before his death on September 15, 1926; that
shortly thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy executed an Extra-Judicial

Declaration of Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and
Norberto, who were then still minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano
and Norberto were known and accepted by the whole clan as children of Francisco; that
they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their parents, but when they went to school, they
stayed in the old family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their
grandmother, Agatona Tongoy, as well as with the Sonoras and with Luis and Patricio
Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod knew them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan;
and that Luis D. Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the education
of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and thateven petitioners admit the fact that
they were half-brothers of the late Luis D. Tongoy.
Issue: Whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto,all
surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated by virtue of the marriage of their
parents, Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello?
Held: The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an acknowledgment
through any of the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code(please see Articles 131 and
135 of the Old Civil Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view of
the provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that "children shall
be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have
been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof." Of course,
the overwhelming evidence found by respondent Court of Appeals conclusively shows
that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in
continuous possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated, children. Still,
it recognizes the fact that such continuous possessionof status is not, per se, a
sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground to compel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat,
21 SCRA 1479; Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larenavs. Rubio, 43 Phil. 1017).It is time
that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural children who, because they enjoy the
blessings and privileges of an acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated
child, found it rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action for recognition
against their natural parents, who, without their asking, have been showering them with
the same love, care and material support.

Salao vs Salao L-26699, March 16, 1976

Jul12
Facts:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel

Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child.
Valentin Salao.
After Valentinas death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.
The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio
her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT
No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names
The property in question is the forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,
Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo daughter of Valentin Salao claimed
1/3 interest on the said fishpond.
The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. of the
fishpond and the other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.
It was alleged in the said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had engaged
in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin Salao and
Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the
earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those
earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no
documentary evidence to support that theory.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January
26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two
fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, in which he refused to
give Benita and Victorinas children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly
amounted to P200,000. However, there was no mention on the deeds as to the share of
Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners
thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in
1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosias one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to
Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as
Valentin Salaos supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in
the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Issue :

1. Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan
Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
Held:
1. There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any
intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to
create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the
two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or
mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary
to consider the Calunuran fishpond being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.
Ratio:
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein. (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were
regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance,
proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing.
The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It
cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations.
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. Where
a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently
strong to prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a
document proving the trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the
recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague and inconclusive proof.
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. In order to establish a
trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the
act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a
trust cannot be established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises
based on ancient hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already
noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence
is required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles
were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for
reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and
convincing.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
2. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches.
Ratio:
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust
in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.
The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its
reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after
the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at
all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92
C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).
Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the
claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they
are threatened or invaded. Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of
the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by
Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The
plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional
rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr.,
her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when
Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan,
Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the
succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half
blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or
great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).