MANEKA GANDHI VS UNION OF INDIA

This case is a landmark judgement which played the most significant role
towards the transformation of the judicial view on Article 21 of the
Constitution of India so as to imply many more fundamental rights from
article 21.
This case is always read and linked with A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras case,
because this case revolves around the concept of personal liberty which
first came up for consideration in the A.K. Gopalans case.
JUDGES INVOLVED IN THE CASEThis case was decided by a 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court in 1978.
The judges involved in the case were-

M.H. Beg, C.J.

P.N. Bhagwati.
Y.V. Chandrachud.
V.R. Krishna Iyer.
N.L. Untwalia.
P.S. Kai asam.
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali.

FACTS OF THE CASEThe factual summary of this case is as follows-

Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport on 1/06/1976 under the Passport

Act 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi, issued a letter dated
2/7/1977 addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender
her passport under section 10(3)(c) of the Act in public interest, within 7 days
from the date of receipt of the letter.
Maneka Gandhi immediatley wrote a letter to the Regional Passport officer,

New Delhi seeking in return a copy of the statement of reasons for such
order. However, the government of India, Ministry of External Affairs refused
to produce any such reason in the interest of general public.
Later, a writ petition was filed by Maneka Gandhi under Article 32 of the
Constitution in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the government of
India as violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASEThe main issues of this case were as followsWhether right to go Abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under
Article 21.
Whether the Passport Act prescribes a procedure as required by Article 21
before depriving a person from the right guaranteed under the said article.
Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 14, 19(1)
(a) and 21 of the constitution.
Whether the impugned order of the Regional passport officer is in
contravention of the principle of natural justice.

JUDGEMNT OF TEH CASETo the extent to which section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorises
the passport authority to impound a passport in the interest of the general
public, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since it confers vague
and undefined power on the passport authority.
Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power since it does not
provide for a hearing to the holder of the passport before the passport is
impounded.
Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution since it does
not prescribe procedure within the meaning of that article and the
procedure practiced is worst.
Section 10(3)(c) is against Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) since it permits
restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles even
though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).
A new doctrine of post decisional theory was evolved.

One of the significant interpretation in this case is the discovery of inter

connections between the three Articles- Article 14, 19 and 21. This a law
which prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty has
to fulfill the requirements of Articles 14 and 19 also.
It was finally held by the court that the right to travel and go outside the
country is included in the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article
21. The Court ruled that the mere existence of an enabling law was not
enough to restrain personal liberty. Such a law must also be just, fair and
reasonable.

P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that the expression personal
liberty in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of
rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man and some of them
have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and give
additional protection under Article 19. Any law interfering with personal
liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure;
(ii) the procedure must withstand a test of one or more of the fundamental
rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given
situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article
14. As the test propounded by Article 14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law
and procedure authorising interference with the personal liberty must also be
right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the
procedure prescribed does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14, it would
be no procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21. The Court thus
expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty
enshrined in Article 21 and sowed the seed for future development of the law.

Indira Nehru Gandhi (Petitioner)

v.
Raj Narain & Another (Respondent)
CASE NUMBER Review Petition in Civil Appeal Nos. 887 and 909 of 1975.
EQUIVALENT CITATION 1976- (003)-SCC-0321-SC-1977-AIR-0069-SC
DATE OF JUDGEMENT- 19.12.1975
JUDGES INVOLVED IN THE CASE

A.N. Ray

H.R. Khanna

M.H. Beg

K.K. Mathew

INTRODUCTIONThis is a case regarding Election Disputes involving the Prime Minister and Purpose of
39th Amendment of the Constitution.
FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case, an appeal was filed by the appellant against the decision of the
Allahabad High Court invalidating Smt. Indira Gandhis election on the ground of
corrupt practices. In the meantime, the Parliament passed the 39th Constitutional
Amendment, which introduced and added a new Article 392A to the Constitution
of India.

It was stated by this Article 392A that the election of the Prime Minster and the
Speaker cannot be challenged in any court in the country. It can be rather
challenged before a committee formed by the Parliament itself.

Although the Supreme Court validated the election of Indira Gandhi but declared
the 39th Amendment to be unconstitutional as it violated the basic structure of the
constitution.

The 39th Amendment was made to validate with retrospective effect the election
of the then Prime Minister which was set aside by the Allahabad High Court.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

The main question involved in the case was of the validity of clause (4) of the
Constitution 39th Amendment Act, 1975. The contention was that this clause in
question not only wiped out the High Court judgement but also the election and
the law relating thereto.

JUDGEMENT OF THE CASE

The clause of struck down by the Court on the ground that it violated free and fair
elections which was an essential feature that formed the Basic Stuctute of teh
Indian Constitution. The exclusion of judicial review in election disputes in this
manner resulted in damaging the Basic Structure.

The Supreme Court held clause (4) of the Constitution 39th Amendment Act,
1975 as unconstitutional and void on the ground that it was outright denial of the
Right to Equality enshrined in Article 14, It was held by the Court that these
provision were arbitrary and were calculated to damaged and destroy the Rule of
Law.

Justice H.R. Khanna held, that the democracy is the Basic Structure of the
Constitution and it includes free and fair election whcih cannot be violated.

The Supreme Court in this case, added the following feature as Basic Features
to the list of basic features laid down in Keshavanandas Case. These are -

1. Rule of Law
2. Democracy, that implies free and fair elections
3. Judicial Review
4. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32.

State of Rajasthan v Vidhyawati

AIR 1962 SC 933
Bench: 5 judge -BP Sinha, Hidayatullah, Shah, Kapur, Mudholkar
Facts
The respondent 1's husband and father of minor respondent 2 was knocked down by a
Government jeep car rashly and negligently driven by an employee of the State of Rajasthan,
while being taken from the repair shop to the Collector's residence, and subsequently died in
hospital.
Respondent sued the driver and the State Government for damages.
Procedural History
The trial court decreed the same ex parte as against the driver but dismissed it as against the State,
holding that as the car was being maintained for the use of the Collector, in discharge of his
official duties, even though it was not being used for any purposes of the State at the time of the
occurrence, that was sufficient to absolve the State of any vicarious liability as the employer.

High Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit against the second defendant, StateGovernment too, with costs.
State of Rajasthan obtained a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c).
Issues
a) Is Art. 300 relevant for determining the vicarious liability for state
b) Can the State of Rajasthan be held liable under Art 300 of the Constitution?

b) Was the jeep being used in exercise of sovereign powers when the accident took place?
Disposition
Appeal Dismissed with Costs
Holding/Conclusion
The liability of the State for damages in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within
the scope of his employment and functioning as such was the same as that of any other employer.
From days of the East India Company, the Sovereign has been held liable to be sued in tort or in
contract. Therefore, the State of Rajasthan would be liable for a negligent act of its employee
performed in the course of employment.
Rule
On Issue 1
The Government of India may be sued and the Government of a State may be sued by the name
of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by Act of Parliament or of the
Legislature of such State, sue or be sued, in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases
as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian
States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted. (Art. 300)
On Issue 2
Art. 300, defines the extent of liability by the use of the words "in the like cases" and refers back
for the determination of such cases to the legal position before the enactment of the Constitution.
S. 176(1) of the Govt. of India Act, which is similar to Art. 300, refers back to the legal position
that existed on the enactment of s. 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Similarly, through a
chain of enactments, the rule governing sovereign liability is the same as applicable to the East
India Company
As held in P &O Steam Navagation Co. v Secy. of State, the rule of liability is different for acts
done in the exercise of what are usually termed sovereign powers, and acts done in the conduct of
undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals without having such powers
delegated to them.
The case also held that the state is liable for the damages occasioned by the negligence of
servants in the service of Government if the negligence is such as, would render an ordinary
employer liable."
The right to sue the Government has already been recognised under the new Constitution. [State
of Bihar v. Abdul Majid].

On Issue 3
Constitution establishes a welfare state whose functions are not confined to law and order but
extend to other activities too. Therefore, state cannot claim immunity from acts of employees
committed in course of employment of performance of such functions.
Reasoning/Analysis
On Issue 1
Articles 294 and 295 are primarily concerned with the devolution of rights, assets and liabilities
and do not define rights and liabilities. But Article 300 defines the extent of liability by the use of
the words in the like cases.
On Issue 2
Since the driver was negligent and this tortious act was done by an employee in the course of
employment, any ordinary employer would be liable.
Therefore, an application of the principle in P&O Steam Navigation case, read with Art. 300 and
preceding enactments, the State of Rajasthan would be liable. There was nothing in this case to
indicate that State of Rajasthan would not have been liable for a similar act on the eve of the
constitution.
The common law maxim of King can do no wrong, based on a feudal notion of sovereign, was
never applicable in India in view of the P&O Steam Navigation case. In any case, such a maxim
would have no application in a Republican Socialistic State with its varied state activities.
Further, the position of law has changed in UK also as a result of the Crown Proceedings Act,
1947.
On Issue 3
The court accepted the findings of the lower courts that the accident was not connected to any
sovereign function. But the Court argued that the Constitution establishes a welfare state whose
functions are not confined to law and order but extend to other activities too. Therefore, state
cannot claim immunity from acts of employees committed in course of employment of
performance of such functions.
Therefore, the question whether the driver was engaged in a sovereign function appears to have
been considered moot.
Additional Comments
The Court applied the rule developed in P&O Steam Navigation Co. case on liability of the
sovereign under tort and contract on the basis of Art. 300 .
At the same time, the court seems to have done away with the distinction between sovereign
function and other functions that the P& O Steam Navigation case had endorsed. In paragraph 10,
the Court says that given that State activities involve not only the use of sovereign powers but

also powers as employer in so many public sectors, State cannot be immune from the
consequences of tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of such employment.
This case represented a seminal moment in so far as it refused to apply the Common Law
principle of sovereign immunity in Independent India by reading Art. 300 together with the P&O
Steam Navigation Co. case.
Yet, it might have been better for the Court to also hold that the very definition of sovereign
function has changed in a welfare constitutional democracy and held that the driving a car meant
for the Collector for repair would also amount to a sovereign function.
Another factor that the court did not take into account was that P&O Steam Navigation case dealt
with liability of a private company, East India Co., which was exercising regulatory powers. The
court should have adverted to the implications of applying a rule developed in the peculiar
context of a private company to a constitutional state entrusted with a number of welfare
functions.
A significant observation, though not material in this case, is that Art. 300 of the Constitution
itself has saved the right of Parliament or the Legislature of a State to enact a law as it may think
fit and proper in this behalf.

3) RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR

1979
The first respondent issued a notice inviting tenders from Registered IInd Class Hoteliers
having at least five years experience for putting up and running a restaurant and two
snack bars at the International Airport of Bombay. In spite of not satisfying this condition
of eligibility, the tender of the fourth respondent was accepted giving rise to the
appellants cause of action. It was alleged by the appellant that in so doing, he and others
were deprived of an equal opportunity of submitting their tenders and being considered
for the contract. While deciding this case, the Court had to first ascertain whether the
International Airport Authority of India, a corporate body constituted under the
International Airport Authority Act, 1973 was State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in this case upheld the ratio of Sukhdev vs Bhagat Ram case and reiterated the test, for finding out whether a body is State, as If a statutory corporation,
body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would be an
'authority' and therefore 'State' within the meaning of that expression in Article 12.
Examination of the provisions of International Airport Authority Act, 1971 along this the
above Agency/Instrumentality, the SC concluded International Airport Authority is
undoubtedly an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and falls within the
definition of 'State'. The Court went on to conclude that just as Govt acting through its
officers is subject to constitutional and public law limitations, similarly Gvt acting
through agency is subject to equal restrictions. Therefore the International Airport
Authority of India is subject to the limiting or restricting provisions of the Constitution
and other public laws.