January 2014 Philippine Supreme

Court Rulings on Political Law

Posted on February 14, 2014 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines Cases, Philippines - Law

Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political
law:
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a motion for
reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying
bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not
have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special
Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs
decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the
OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and
correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case including the constitutional
issue remains alive for the Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio
A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be
consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that all other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not
by impeachment in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress
from extending the more stringent rule of removal only by impeachment to favoured
public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision
be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it
deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional
determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and
principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and
the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to
Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and
employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts
established by the
Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc.,
et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R.
No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed by the
Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created
by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms,
the framers of the Constitution intended that these independent bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of independence would result in
the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative considerations abundantly show
that the independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by
the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not
scarce on how the independence granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell

Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman reviews a case for
nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In case of public officials, there
is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. The Deputy
Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted
on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OPs ruling that Gonzales had been
grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days as required for Hearing
Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.
Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of
removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process
that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process
required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the
limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try
impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Courts authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The provision in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an
invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue
protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding
Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701.
January 22, 2014.
Just compensation; determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial
function. In the exercise of the Courts essentially judicial function of determining just
compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider
and apply the enumerated factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98)
that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or
structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property subject to
agrarian reform. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC-SACs,
however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute detail,
particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formulas strict
application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formulas application
to fit the factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason
for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law and the rules have
provided.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551,
January 15, 2014.

Just compensation; fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of

the time of taking. The time of taking refers to that time when the State deprived the
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the
property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551,
January 15, 2014.
Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is one which is inherently
susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds
that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on
a political branch of the government. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory
grant of disciplinary authority to the President violates the Constitution, particularly the
core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Ombudsman; investigative and disciplinary powers; scope. The Ombudsmans broad
investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influences of officialdom
and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an independent
office. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit
v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Ombudsman; powers and functions. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the protector of the
people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function
essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check
and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman
is expected to be an activist watchman, the Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by R.A. No.
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with
the law and the Constitution.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.
Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary jurisdiction. The Land Bank of the
Philippines is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for
all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only
preliminary. The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court
for final adjudication. Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No.
6657 rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC must take into
consideration the factors laid down by law and the pertinent DAR regulations. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15,
2014.
Public officer; discourtesy in the performance of official duties. As a public officer and
trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent sheriff to
demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public. Based on the
transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been
remiss in the duty of observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised
restraint in dealing with the complainant, instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate into
a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been sufficient to

relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainants criticisms in the
performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondents demeanor tarnished the image
not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary
measure. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20,
2014.
Public officer; making untruthful statements. The charge of making untruthful
statements must fail. While the statements mentioned in respondents complaintaffidavit were not reflected in the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality
is not conclusive evidence that such event did not take place. As claimed by
respondent, complainants clerk was only able to record a part of the argument. We
cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the argument than what was
caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent narrated and
what complainant recorded both actually transpired. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo
T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA 6770; constitutional; the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman; not entitled to the independence
the Office of the Ombudsman enjoys under the Constitution. The Court resolved to
maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as the Special Prosecutor is
concerned. The Court does not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of
the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of disciplinary authority in the
President over the Deputy Ombudsman; violation of the independence of the
Ombudsman. In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman
to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive department are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot
but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-granted independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily
be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of
their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her
subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is
true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where
graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons,
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, should be declared void. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Special Prosecutor; structural relationship with the Ombudsman; the Special Prosecutor
is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and
prosecution of officials in the Executive Department. Congress recognized the
importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside
from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor and organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control
and supervision over that office. This power of control and supervision includes vesting

the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor
as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly
made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as
an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between
the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the
other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of
the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.