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To cite this article: Espen D.H. Olsen (2008) The origins of European citizenship in the
first two decades of European integration, Journal of European Public Policy, 15:1,
40-57, DOI: 10.1080/13501760701702157
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760701702157
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INTRODUCTION
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in
1951, nobody could have foreseen a European Union (EU) of 27 member
states, with a European Parliament (EP), wide-reaching common policies and
a common currency. Further, they would surely not have been able to anticipate
the intensity of debate over citizenship that emerged after Union citizenship was
institutionalized in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). After all, the dominant understanding has been to link one citizen and one nation-state with one prevailing
national identity (see, e.g., Heater 1999; Schnapper 1998).
Indeed, in one of the first articles that dealt explicitly with the interface concerning citizenship and the European Economic Community (EEC), the French
sociologist Raymond Aron (1974: 653) succinctly stated: [T]here are no such
animals as European citizens. There are only French, German, or Italian citizens. In this reading, owing to the lack of explicit rights of a political character, a
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2008 Taylor & Francis
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DOI: 10.1080/13501760701702157
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citizenship within those treaties, legislative measures and practices that are
linked to the status of individuals. In this paper the following instances are analysed: the ECSC and Rome Treaties, jurisprudence from the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in the 1960s and free movement legislation in the 1960s/1970s.
By highlighting the empirical development of citizenship elements already in
the first two decades of European integration, this article therefore disproves
grandiose theoretical claims such as that of Aron on the impossibility of regarding the concept of citizenship on another level than the nation-state. Tracing the
initial conceptions of European citizenship also provides evidence of how the
Maastricht Treaty should not be seen as year zero in the EU citizenship discourse. In fact, the founding treaties and subsequent practices created distinct
features of European citizenship such as its dependence on prior national citizenship and free movement as a core principle on which later conceptions
clearly developed (see, e.g., Closa 1992). Furthermore, this empirical insight
also poses a challenge to key theoretical and normative suppositions in the
post-Maastricht literature such as the non-viability of citizenship on the supranational level among no-demos theorists (see, e.g., Grimm 1995; Shore 2004) and
the purported separation of nationality and citizenship among post-nationalists
(see, e.g., Curtin 1997; Gerstenberg 2001; Habermas 1996, 1998).
The article will proceed as follows. First, the theoretical framework will be
presented. As citizenship is a contested and normatively laden concept, attention
will be focused on four analytical dimensions that cover different issues raised by
the concept. In defining each dimension, attention will also be directed to how
they work in operational terms providing empirical indicators for the study of
citizenship. Second, in the empirical part of the article, four different instances
in the early period of European integration will be scrutinized to the extent that
they have affected the status of individuals. In doing so, the focus will be on illuminating how dimensions of citizenship were explicitly or implicitly invoked in
each instance and how they were translated into conceptions of citizenship.
Further, with regard to the empirical analysis, the trajectory of the period will
be discussed, with specific attention to similarities and differences between
the instances. Third, in providing concluding remarks, the findings of the analysis will be linked to a brief appraisal of the main strands of the current theoretical
debate on European citizenship.
DEFINING DIMENSIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
On the most general level I will define citizenship as a status of individuals tied to
a political unit. With this in mind, the concept of citizenship involves issues both
of individuality and collectivity (Heater 1999). Citizenship would hold no
meaning if it was devoid of a collective component it is always granted by
some political unit (see, e.g., Walzer 1983). In fact, it is exactly at the interface
relating the individual with a political unit that conceptions of citizenship arise.
Stating that citizenship is a status of individuals does not, however, provide
much in empirical terms. How is it constituted? As Bellamy (2004: 3) has
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Participation
Empirical indicators
Criteria for who are seen as members (and hence nonmembers) and on what basis.
What kind of community citizenship is linked to.
Notions of what draws the community of citizens together.
Exclusivity in terms of who are held to have which rights
extension of rights.
Degree of boundary between rights of citizens/non-citizens.
Facilitation of voluntary participation.
Specification of duties linked to the status of citizenship.
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(2005: 985, 997) has shown that arguments over European rights were present
already at the beginning of European integration, and even predated the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty.
Notwithstanding the integration of only six countries in the fields of coal and
steel production, the ECSC Treaty was still comprehensive in its outline of the
historical and political foundations for such a community. It stated aims of the
ECSC such as maintenance of peaceful relations, the establishment of
common bases for economic development, and to raise the standard of
living and . . . furthering the works of peace. Finally, it asserted that the abolishment of historic rivalries was to be countered by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and independent community among peoples,
. . . and giving direction to their future common destiny. Obviously, one must
be careful of overstated interpretation regarding lofty considerations in a preamble. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the fields of coal and steel gave rise to
such towering assertions of the rationale behind integration. In fact, as Dinan
(2004: 46) points out, choosing the word community, rather than simply association or organization, connoted common interests that transcended economic
goals. In terms of shedding light on the conception of citizenship within the
Treaty, the crucial question is thus how far it went in its effect on the status
of individuals and more specifically whether this in fact surpassed the
market core of the venture.
Clearly, there was no direct, formal designation of individual membership in the
ECSC Treaty. In fact, there was furthermore no direct reference even to rights of
individuals that could emanate from the Treaty. In spite of that, a notion of individuals and their rights did figure in it. To the extent that individuals were rendered
a status within the framework of the Treaty, it was primarily in the capacity of consumers, workers or producers.1It seems obvious that within the established understandings of citizenship at the time these roles would not be seen as part of
citizenship. To be sure, the aforementioned scepticism of Raymond Aron (1974)
concerning even the conceptual possibility of European citizenship as something
similar to the national counterpart would possibly have rung even more true in
1951. Is Neunreither (1995: 5) then correct in his claim that the ECSC represented
European integration without the citizens? On the contrary, I will argue that some
aspects of the ECSC Treaty did indeed activate issues of citizenship.
The thrust of provisions on individuals in the Treaty is found in Article 69.
This referred to the renouncement of employment restrictions based on nationality for workers in the coal and steel industries. Hence, the assertion of
promoting peace did not foster any direct measures to integrate member state citizens further. There was no notion of a European identity common to citizens of
diverse nation-states concerning what drew individuals together in communal
terms. The Treaty explicitly dealt with the status of individuals in their limited
capacity as potential workers in clearly defined sectors. The basis for individual
membership under the ECSC thus emerged as an effect of other dimensions it
was linked, not to formal membership criteria, but to participation as a prospective individual activity, sectorally defined and circumscribed.
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individuals was not only mediated by the member state level. European integration clearly signified something more than a simple international treaty or
regime. It was perceived to have ramifications for the collectives of individuals
underpinning the member states in terms of community and legitimacy.
It is thus not surprising, notwithstanding the lack of focus on integration
among citizens as such, that issues pertaining to the status of individuals were
scattered throughout the Treaty of Rome. Again, the prevailing image is one
of a focus on individuals as workers and producers.3 Yet, there was some development compared to the ECSC. The Treaty explicitly stated in Article 7 that
any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited,
without specification of the precise circumstances to which this principle
would apply.4 The principle of non-discrimination thus seems to have been
broader at least in terms of the exact wording of the provision than a
narrow focus on the prohibition of such measures exclusively for specific
groups, such as workers. The designation of membership, the criteria for who
were seen as members and on what basis were thus not straightforward. On
the one hand, it is clear that the Treaty established the individual as meaningful
within the framework of European integration in his or her capacity as a worker,
albeit on a general level. Membership was related to participation contingent on
the traversal of political borders in order to work within the common market.
Without the primacy of such work-related participation through marketoriented rights there would be no activated status of individuals under
the EEC. On the other hand, the broad wording of the article on nondiscrimination points to a tension between a conception of the workercitizen and the individual citizen to be protected from discrimination on the
basis of his or her nationality per se.
The thrust of individual rights provisions was linked to the principle of free
movement.5 This was clearly related to the notion of workers as the primary
individual actors in European integration. Yet, it was not a universal principle.
First, the right was bestowed on member state nationals only. Second, free
movement could be curtailed by arguing for reasons of public order and
public safety. When theorizing types of boundaries involved in politymaking in modern Europe, Bartolini (2006: 7 13, 28) has underlined that
the limits surrounding market transactions can be seen as fringes, that is,
rather malleable boundaries subject to ongoing developments of market
relations and practices, while politico-administrative units are delineated by
more settled borders. Thus, the principle regarding free movement of persons
which was to facilitate a common European market through the abolishment
of the fringe boundaries between national markets could cut across the borders
of politico-administrative units previously holding exclusive jurisdiction over
national territory. However, the radical clout of this in theoretical terms was
not emulated in practice. There was no profound challenge to the basic boundaries of states and thus of national citizenship institutions. Ultimate decisions
about citizenship remained national, conceivably because of the persistence of
statehood in the final instance. Further, the potential challenge to the link
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between the individual and the nation-state posed by free movement was clearly
thwarted by the concentration on economic integration and market-making in
the EEC. The range of rights linked to free movement did not entail a deep
intrusion into the political borders of member states.
To conclude, then, the answer to who are the Europeans? in the vocabulary
of the Treaty of Rome was obviously not the democratic citizen as a participant in
a political community, rather the individual-as-worker and market participant.
As Preuss (1998b: 11) points out, [t]he political term citizen was thoroughly
alien to the wording of the original Treaty. There was no notion of a
broader identity which transcended the links generated by market integration,
common institutions and the legal framework on the European level. Still,
the tension regarding non-discrimination possibly points to at least a broadening of the potential effect of European integration on the status of individuals.
Already at the very outset of the integration process, therefore, a dynamic link
between different dimensions is visible primarily by way of an informal determination of individual membership through the corollary of free movement
rights exclusive to member state nationals and participation through work. In
addition, there were some (more inconclusive) elements of a notion of personhood in the Treaty. In the end, however, it is clear that the Treaty of Rome
amounted to a conception of citizenship with heavy emphasis on
participation through work in the common market by the potential crossing
of previously pervasive boundaries of national markets and nation-states.
ECJ jurisprudence: citizenship-as-rights
The jurisprudence of the ECJ is often put forward as one of the main factors in
the development of European integration as a project with state-like features,
but still not a state in its own right (see, e.g., Conant 2002; MacCormick
1999; Weiler 1999). Part of the interest regarding the ECJ in the literature
stems from its so-called seminal decisions in the 1960s which established the
basic principles of supremacy, direct effect and protection of fundamental
rights within the EU order (Weiler 1999: 19 26). These decisions and
especially those on supremacy in Costa 6 and direct effect in Van Gend en
Loos 7 were not brought to court only to adjudicate the status of individuals.
In terms of the subject matter, they focused primarily on specificities of the
common market such as rights of establishment after the exercise of free movement in the former and customs duties in the latter. Yet, in these cases, the ECJ
chose to enunciate principles which reached well beyond the technical minutiae
of the cases as such. It can be argued, therefore, that the principles as such, and
the practices which emanated from these cases, signified the establishment
of a direct link between the EU as a political unit with certain powers and
individual citizens formerly linked only to their nation-states through
citizenship (Preuss 1998a; Weiler 1999).
In Van Gend en Loos, the Court ruled that Community law . . . confer upon
[nationals of member states] rights which become part of their legal heritage. It
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further stated that these were rights which national courts must recognize and
enforce, and emphasized that it has direct effects in the relationship between
Member States and their subjects. In Costa, the emphasis was on the
precedence of Community law. This was affirmed by the declaration that
any European legal norm overrides national legislation in conflict with it (see,
e.g., Weiler 1999: 20 1). Through these judgments, European law thus
circumscribed the exclusive discretion of nation-states in relation to their citizens rights and obligations. In one sense, the judgments can be read as
partial responses to the question of who the Europeans are and what binds
them together in a community. In short, the ECJ answered people with
European rights. This answer, I will argue, highlights that the ECJ provided
elements of a dynamic conception of the status of individuals where rights
through direct effect provided the gist of a thin notion of identity.
What is interesting, furthermore, is the assertion that rights derived from the
European level would have implications on the level of each member state. The
Community created a status which cut across the borders of previously insulated
legal-political systems in terms of membership and the scope of rights. In this
sense, the conception of citizenship was not only linked to the European level
as such, but to two levels European and national. It was not just transnational
in the sense of cutting across national boundaries, but also supranational
through the creation of a direct link between European institutions and individual member state citizens a link that was not present in the founding treaties.
From this discussion, we see that the Court evidently brought issues regarding the status of individuals much more to the fore than was the case in the
founding treaties. The citizen was established as significant per se through
European rights. In this sense, primacy was given to the dimension of rights
in the location of individuals within the system. From the ECJ judgments, it
was further the case, and not surprisingly so, that individuals were given
rights as a consequence of national citizenship. Thus, membership was based
on the national level in terms of formal citizenship, but European rights can
also be interpreted as stipulating a kind of membership as an effect of other activated dimensions. This again illustrates that a dimension such as membership
in addition to formal criteria on the national level was also determined informally through the development of concrete rights that were related to participation in the common market.
One should, however, be somewhat cautious in drawing too far-reaching
conclusions on this. Empirical research regarding the impact of these principles
on the actual use of individual capacities to legal action, for instance, shows that
these have been utilized to a very small extent: There is still today a persistent
cleavage between the theoretical individual rights granted by EU integration
and the rights that private individuals can actually benefit from (Costa
2003: 744). As a result, empirical findings of this sort warn us of inferring
anything close to democratic qualities from legal provisions on individual
rights. Its scope was the private market actor, rather than the public political
participant. In this manner, it did not develop significantly compared to the
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embryonic and market-oriented conceptions of the ECSC and EEC respectively. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that calling attention to the fact that
the Community not only dealt with states, but also with individual citizens,
marked a significant shift insofar as it brought about fundamental questions
regarding sovereignty and autonomy as well as its impact on the bearers of
legitimacy in modern states individual citizens. To summarize, then, the
ECJ brought forward a conception of citizenship-as-rights as part of a
binding legal and political system.
Free movement legislation: citizenship-as-qualified residence
As the analysis of the founding treaties and ECJ jurisprudence have highlighted,
the status of individuals within European integration was primarily linked to
rights for citizens as workers and more specifically to the issue of free movement.
This principle contained the thrust of the idea of economic integration. But, as
has been shown, the exact content and scope of free movement was not entirely
clear in the Treaty of Rome. Subsequently, a series of legislative acts8 towards
the end of the 1960s sought to underpin the principle with policy.
For instance, Regulation 1612/68 was a broad piece of legislation which in
remarkable language underlined the principle of free movement for the idea
and functioning of European integration. Interestingly, it stated in its preamble that freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workers
and their families. The principle was further linked to a guarantee of the possibility of improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social
advancement. In this setting, the status of individuals was thus connected, not
only to their potential participation in the common market, but also to their
basic well-being. Interpreted broadly, the wording of this regulation thus
implies that the individual citizen was to be seen as an end in herself and not
just as a means for the amalgamation of markets.
This was further underlined in Regulation 1251/70 which stated that postwork, citizens had a right based on previous occupation to remain in the territory where they had worked without being national citizens. European citizens were thus granted a kind of membership based on what could be called
qualified residence. What qualified for rights enjoyed under European law
was again participation as workers, albeit increasingly linked to a broader conception of their worth as individuals. This orientation was upheld by the subsequent Regulation 1408/71 which laid down the principles for the
Europeanization of social rights in the wake of free movement of persons.
Here, the aim was to facilitate free movement and mobility in Europe
through the transnationalization of certain social rights and benefits linked
to work and family.
In this sense, even though it was still the worker who was at the forefront of
the relationship between European integration and the individual, a somewhat
broader conception of citizenship slowly evolved. Individuals mattered not only
as participating workers, but also to some extent as citizens who enjoyed certain
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EEC (1957)
Free movement
legislation
(1960s 70s)
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56
5
6
7
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9
10
that as the Treaty was geared towards economic integration and the facilitation of a
common market, the principle would only apply to individuals as they engaged
within spheres falling under these specific aspects of European integration.
EEC Treaty, Article 48.
Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964, ECR 585.
Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963,
ECR 1.
Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of
movement for workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19 October 1968; Regulation (EEC) No. 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of
workers to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed
in that state, OJ L 142, 30 June 1970; Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of the
Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed
persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 149, 5 July 1971.
See section II.B of C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963, ECR 1.
Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 29 July 1992, articles 8 8a.
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