Uy v.

Contreras 237 SCRA 167

Facts:
Petitioner Felicidad Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building.
She operated therein a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired; however, the petitioner was not able to
remove all her personal properties. An argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought
to withdraw from the premises her remaining properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the
petitioner, on the one hand and Atayde and several of Ataydes employees, including private respondent Winnie
Javier. Respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner.
Respondents filed a complaint with the Barangay. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the Barangay;
only petitioner appeared .The Barangay then reset the confrontation. The office of provincial prosecutor filed two
informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with MTC. Respondent MTC Judge ordered the
petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.. The petitioner submitted the required
counter-affidavits. In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the
criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of
Manila. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993,
that there was an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Respondent Judge Contreras denied the motion. Same as the MR. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
in the SC. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that the private respondents failed to comply
with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The private respondents contend
that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable
in the case of private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city
or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not
likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of private respondent Atayde, the latter
had, nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement. The Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge of MTC Makati gravely abused his discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss of the
petitioner considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508 as
reiterated in Sec. 412 of the Local Government Code and the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Ruling:
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June
1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof, 13revised the
law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed
pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code.
It may thus be observed that the revised Katarungang Pambarangay law has at least three new significant features,
to wit:
a
It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.
b
As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed
or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
c
It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration process.
The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation
process at that level would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice would be
achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be
restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.
The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local Government Code, also broadens
the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in
workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said
section. This rule provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are

designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. 14
Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d' etre of the rule on venue.
The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It
discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then
invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the
parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are
essential ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could
spell the difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties.
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon
regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because
its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a
complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could effect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause
of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.
The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise
suits between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.
Prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, noncompliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of
the defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been
seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is
proper.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the
mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of
Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court
on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code,
respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its
denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b) (4) of the Local Government
Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is
because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was
automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed
their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

MAURO BLARDONY, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CXLVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, MAKATI, METRO MANILA and MA. ROSARIO ARANETA
BLARDONY,respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent are spouses. They were married on April 30, 1975. During their marriage,
they begot one child named Patricia Araneta Blardony, who was born on November 10, 1975. Due to irreconcilable
differences, petitioner and private respondent separated in March, 1981.
On different dates, the spouses executed the following agreements:
(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated July 1981 for the support of their child, Patricia;
(b) Receipt dated January 11, 1982, evidencing the Compromise of Settlement of Advances
claimed by private respondent from petitioner;
(c) The Deed of Conveyance of a property situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa; and

(d) The Confirmation of the waiver by private respondent in favor of petitioner over a property
situated in Calatagan, Batangas.
The private respondent filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Partition of Conjugal Partnership
Properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petitioner, in his answer, admitted that he had abandoned the
conjugal home since March 1981; that before the filing of the petition, he and his wife, assisted by their respective
counsel, tried to file a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership but failed due to their inability to
agree upon the equitable partition of their conjugal partnership properties and he prayed the court to order "a fair
and equitable dissolution of their conjugal partnership in accordance with law. Mauro filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that it should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as
provided in P.D. 1508, because he and Ma. Rosario are residents of the same Municipality of Makati. Judge Segundo
Soza dismissed her petition on October 8, 1982 for her failure, as plaintiff, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
However, the courts were reorganized and the case was transferred to Judge Coscolluela, who then set aside Judge
Soza's order of dismissal and required the defendant to submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses,
and commissions. The latter's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied by the court.
Issue:
W/N the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he assumed jurisdiction over the case without prior
referral to the Lupon Tagapamayapa and in declaring that the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of
personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are essentially involved in the petition,
hence, the parties could go directly to court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1508.
Ruling:
The Court held that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a
complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the
court has already acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." (Fernandez vs. Militante,
May 31, 1988; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 287; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA
470). Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a
motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an
equitable partition of the conjugal properties.
Under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be filed directly in a competent court without passing the
Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof,
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there
has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment,delivery of personal properly and support pendente lite
Thus, the respondent judge is correct in observing that:
... the issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership, although not coupled in the strict sense of the word with the instant
petition, are essentially involved in this petition because of the minority of the daughter, Patricia
Araneta Blardony who, as of this date, is not yet 8 years old, and because the resolution or
decision of this court on the pending petition would be incomplete without a clear cut disposition
on the partition of the personal and real properties of the conjugal partnership and consequent
delivery thereof to the proper parties.
The decision is immediately executory.

G.R. No. 115213 December 19, 1995

WILSON DIU and DORCITA DIU, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PETER LYNDON BUSHNELL and PATRICIA PAGBA, respondents.

Facts:
On several occasions from January 8, 1988 up to and until April 18, 1989, private respondent Patricia Pagba
purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran, all valued at P7,862.55,
as evidenced by receipts of goods marked as Annexes "A" to "O" of petitioner's Manifestation filed in the trial court,
dated August 9, 1991. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for hearing, but
private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed
to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File
Action. Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval.
Private respondents, in their Answer, 4 while admitting the indebtedness to petitioner, interposed two
counterclaims, namely, (1) one for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging
to petitioners, and (b) another for P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly
misappropriated. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before
the barangay chairman, petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent and her
husband. The Municipal Trial Court of Naval also resolved the issue on whether or not there was compliance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 on conciliation. the trial court relied on the case of Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy 5 which held that:
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exemption thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining the respondent. Upon this premise, petitioner cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they
had submitted themselves voluntarily.
Due to the dismissal of the complaint, petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court. However, did not find it
necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508. Where it ruled
that the case should have proceeded to its conclusion under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure The claim of
the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The private respondent went to the Respondent Court of Appeals, which set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508. It ruled that that if
efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with

the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. If no conciliation or settlement has been
reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be brought to the regular courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the confrontations before the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the requirement therefor in
Presidential Decree No. 1508.

Ruling:
The court finds for the petitioner.
It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code
of 1991 12 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court
on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former
law have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the latter law.
Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. (b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort
within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed or
instituted in court . . . unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman or the
pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman . . . .
it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were
not sent to the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with said barangaychairman were not
fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. This prompted the issuance of the Certification to File Action by the
Barangay Captain.
While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for
possible settlement. 14 The efforts of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, The Supreme Court believes that there was substantial compliance with
the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation
before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-condition for filing the case in
court.
This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same law that the barangay chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with Section
412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. Thus, it is significant that
thebarangay chairman or punong barangay is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Government
Code.
It is then undeniable that there was substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not
require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the factual antecedents, it cannot be
said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private
respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman.
It is also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the
procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the
validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense.

The conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject
matter and private respondents as defendants therein.