Understanding Pakistan Today

20th Anniversary of
Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy

March 4-5, 2015

India International Centre Annexe
Lodhi Road,
New Delhi

Contents

1.

Construction and perpetuation of Militant Discourse in Pakistan.

Khadim Hussain

2.

Informal Employment and Condition of Workers.

Nadia Tahir

3.

Struggle for Change: State of Social Movements in Pakistan.

Riaz Ahmed Shaikh

4.

Religion a tool for power: A window to obscurantism in Pakistan - The

blasphemy laws.
S. Haroon Ahmed

5.

Understanding Pakistan: A Case for Higher Education, Science and

Technology.
Kauser Abdulla Malik

6.

Nationalisms and Regional Tensions.

Ijaz Khan

7.

Pakistan India Relationship Myth and Realities.

S. Haroon Ahmed

8.

Judicial Activism and the way towards a new consensus in Pakistan.

Sajjad Naseer

9.

Pakistans best kept secret: a resilient economy.

Rashid Amjad

10.

Maldevelopment, Poverty and Destitution in Pakistan.

Parvez Tahir

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Construction and Perpetuation of Militant Discourse in Pakistan

Khadim Hussain
The Peshawar blast of March 14 was one of three prominent incidents owned by the hitherto unknown Ahrarul
Hind. Analysts and media outlets have started probing the whereabouts of the terrorist outfit. Conflicting reports
might start pouring in, leading to another spell of ambiguity and obfuscation.
In the domain of political economy, it is not only the construction of the discourse that produces control,
authority and influence to subjugate a community but also making the existing discourse ambiguous. This process
is manifested in several complicated socio-political processes. We can see it in extremist violence that has granted a
previously unimaginable share of power to the religious right, observed especially in cultural, political, economic
and legal frameworks.
After the construction of the discourse using the concepts of khilafat sans frontiers, jihad and shahadat, the
religious right, in connivance with the militant network, has used all communication modes and sources at its
disposal to create contradictions in the logic of the discourse. It has been able to accomplish the task through its
consistent effort to create ambiguities in the mind of mainstream Pakistan, consisting primarily of Punjabs middleclass, educated youth. One can describe various phases of such obfuscation in a fairly precise manner.
The first phase of obfuscating the discourse started with the good and bad Taliban in which the common
components of the discourse constructed by militant networks across the globe were consciously overlooked and
downplayed. The electronic and print media were used to glorify groups fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir. They
were termed as good Taliban.
The Afghan Taliban were glorified as freedom fighters and later depicted as the upholders of Pakhtun nationalism.
The colonial model of Pakhtuns as valiant ungovernable and independent was reconstructed and allowed to
permeate mainstream Pakistan.
The good Taliban were then identified with the code of Pakhtunwali. This part of the discourse achieves
significance as one observes that much of the destruction was, in fact, inflicted on the Pakhtuns culture, society and
polity. Pakhtun singers and artists were either killed or forced to flee. Their heritage was destroyed. Their social
institutions were smashed. Their language and history were badly affected.
Despite all that was perpetrated on the Pakhtuns by militant networks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the media
continued to harp on the narrative of a Pakhtun backlash in the guise of extremist violence.
When terrorist activities increased and the terror network went on a rampage, the foreign hand theory was cooked
up. Anchorpersons, analysts and researchers assured the public that Muslims could not be cruel enough to inflict this

3|Page

kind of destruction. Religio-political parties blamed Blackwater, a foreign, private security agency, and refused to
accept the existence of militant networks, especially the TTP.
Though responsibility for these attacks was taken by the militant network, the foreign hand theme continued to
resound in the mainstream media. Strangely, no such foreign hand has so far been caught and brought before the
Pakistani public and international media.
Meanwhile, academia and civil society groups remained engaged in making education, poverty and culture
responsible for such kind of barbarism. The most intriguing aspect is the culture specificity regarding the terrorist
network. All other ethnic outfits including the Arabs, Chechens, Chinese, Punjabis, Sindhis, Brahvis and others were
ignored and the Pakhtun genetic make-up held responsible for terrorism.
The third phase in the discourse of ambiguity began when the militant network started contacting media persons.
Spokespersons and the leadership of the militant network gave interviews, issued and disseminated videos and got
themselves snapped by various media outlets. This time the discourse of ambiguity manifested itself in the theory
of revenge.
Rightists in the shape of the PTI and the Jamaat-i-Islami started claiming that militant groups avenge drone strikes
and the presence of NATO troops in Afghanistan through the bombing of Pakistani markets, the killing of Pakistani
security personnel, the murder of political workers and the targeted killing of teachers and maliks.
We now see the fourth phase of the discourse of ambiguity. It is apparent in the mantra of denying responsibility and
of the latter being claimed by hitherto unknown groups. The latest in the series is Ahrarul Hind. It is interesting to
note that tactically its attacks resemble those owned by others in the militant network. All three attacks were owned
on the basis of jihad. All three attacks achieved the same results perpetuation of fear and retreat of state as
had all along been intended by the militant network
----------------------------------------

Informal Employment and Condition of Workers

Dr. Nadia Tahir
Abstract: This paper discusses existing scenario of informal sector employment and socio-economic challenges
faced by informal workers in search of decent work. Informal sector offers the only work opportunity for the low
skilled workers. This sector therefore continues to be marginal to the formal sector but a dynamic subset exists in the
manufacturing sector. We supplement the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) with socioeconomic survey informal workers
in five towns of Lahore. Our analysis shows that employment in informal sector and manufacturing sector growth
rise and fall together. Informal sector workers contribute to large scale manufacturing sector but casual work
environment and contractual labour is exploitative in nature; these workers suffer from poor work conditions and
lack of job security.
Introduction
Pakistan has adopted a neoliberal regime to open up the economy to global competition and reduce the role of the
state. This directional change brought increased flow of overseas remittances, speculative investment, and
consumerism. Consequently, the economy in mid-2000s grew but commodity-producing sector contracted. Public
sector spending has been falling, especially on social sectors. There are inadequate provisions for social security and
employment based income guarantees. However, this growth and stability was short lived and there is now a fragile
state and slowing economy. In the absence of an effective regulatory role of the state, and due to the failure in

4|Page

developing a long-term strategy to harness the labour force potential in formal sector, a huge informal sector exists
side by side with the formal economy. Almost 22 million of the employed labour force is earning its livelihood on
the sidelines of the formal economy and the government has no record of it.
Informal sector is a permanent feature of employment opportunities available to the civilian labour force. Pakistan is
the 6th most populous economy of the world with a total population of 184.35 million in 2012-13. Out of the total
population, 60.35 million (32.88 percent) constitute the recorded civilian labour force for all age groups. According
to Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2012-13, almost 73 percent of employment in non-agriculture work force is
unorganized and informal. It is heterogeneous and has a dynamic sub-sector supporting the formal sector. Almost
91% percent of the informal sector workers are male and 47 per cent of their distribution is employees followed by
the self-employed which are 41 per cent. These workers are directly and indirectly associated with non-agriculture
sector of the formal economy. They benefit from sub-contracting, outsourcing and layering in formal firms whereas
the formal sector has an incentive to use piece rate wage structure. This type of wage policy is most prevalent for
data entry and in industrial sector. This is not an unskilled or illiterate labour force. It is an effective cost cutting
policy that enables firms to escape m 1minimum wage legislation and other fringe benefits. The later include health,
safety and job security related costs. On the whole, informal sector workers receive wages less than the formal
sector wages.
This marginalization continues, despite the workers rights pronounced in the Constitution and recognized in
international conventions. According to the Articles 3 and 37e of the Constitution of Pakistan (2010), the state shall
ensure the elimination of all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle, from
each according to his ability, to each according to his work and make provision for securing just and humane
conditions of work. Pakistan is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 that recognizes
the right to work, to freely choose employment and to have just and favourable working conditions. It has ratified all
eight core conventions that codify the four most basic human rights related to the world of work i.e. the right to
organize and engage in collective bargaining, the right to equality at work, the abolition of child labour and the
abolition of forced labour. For ensuring the implementation, Pakistan has the Labour Protection Policy (2006) and
Labour Inspection Policy (2006). Legislation for domestic workers is under consideration (2014).
The constitutional frameworks, ratification of ILO conventions and labour policy have not satisfactorily secured
labour rights even in Pakistans formal sector. In his budget speech 2014-15, the Finance Minister increased the
minimum wage from Rs.10,000 to Rs.12,000, which is still below a living wage. However, a weak implementation
mechanism denies majority of the workers even this low wage level. There is considerable confusion after the
devolution of the subject of labour to the provinces. Social security arrangements do not cover more than 5 per cent
of the work force. The number of trade unions as well as their membership has declined. According to the Labour
Force Survey 2012-13, 4.18 per cent of the employed persons were in the age group of 10-14 years. The programme
of privatisation has made its own contribution to unemployment. Farm workers are not covered by any labour
legislation.
The informal sector remains unrecognised in rights terms. Informal work appears as the only opportunity for earning
a livelihood, which provides meager means to satisfy basic needs. These workers are financially productive and a
means of earning for the formal sector. Informal workers not only receive less wages and no job security but they
have to face social and economic exclusion. Work opportunities are limited because of low and poor quality of
education and low skills. Low wages, harsh working conditions, poverty, lesser availability of civic facilities and
lack of access to financial services characterise informal work. Employment in informal sector is due to rural-urban
migration and surplus labour because of fewer opportunities in the formal sector. Moreover, wages in informal

5|Page

sector are low because of low productivity, which is due to socioeconomic backwardness. The initial condition bias
is very much present in the case of Pakistan.
This paper looks at the existing scenario of informal sector in Pakistan to understand the socioeconomic
characteristics and work conditions of informal workers. After this introduction, section 2 discusses key issues of
informal sector employment. Section 3 takes note of employment conditions and presents a descriptive analysis
based on information from the LFSs. Section 4 presents the results of our survey of the five towns in Lahore.
Conclusions are presented at the end.
Key Issues of Informal Sector

Data available on the informal sector do not depict the true picture. No comprehensive survey has been carried to
find the contribution of informal sector in Pakistan [Gennari (2004)]. Kemal and Mehmood (1998) made the first
attempt to conduct a survey of urban informal enterprises in Pakistan. Their study finds tax exemption and no
government intervention as reasons for its growth. Informal enterprises are found to be intensive in unskilled labour.
Most of the information about the informal sector and especially womens involvement comes from individual
studies [Shaheed and Mumtaz (1981), Mumtaz and Saleem (2010)] that have highlighted the key characteristics of
the sector i.e. long hours of work, lack of continuity, absence of contracts and its often hazardous nature. Khan and
Khan (2009) termed womens work in informal sector as a struggle for family survival. They were of the view that
womens contribution is an effective way to reduce family poverty.
Data on informal sector is quite general without informing about any integration with the formal sector. Moreover,
there is a lack of data on actual number of informal workers in the economy and the factors involved in their
continuous growth. The government documents such as the LFS, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Medium Term
Development Framework and the latest in the line, Vision 2025, have failed to respond to the dilemmas of informal
workers and to the shortcomings of the informal sector, besides failing to furnish some reasonably reliable
information on the informal economy.
The informal workers can be categorized as self-employed and wage workers doing diversified jobs from petty
traders to small producers and from rickshaw drivers to shoe shiners. It is difficult to measure the value added
contribution of the informal sector in Pakistan. Indirect estimation approaches on the basis of employment and hours
worked have been used to estimate the contribution of informal economy. For instance, Idris (2008) estimates the
share at 36.8 percent of GNP, which is significant. Arby, Malik and Hanif (2010) measured the size of informal
economy in Pakistan through a monetary approach. They find that the size has declined considerably.
Womens work is found invisible and unrecognized. No data is available as it is unpaid and non-monetized.
According to LFS of 2012-2013, only 0.03 % women in informal sector are employers, 1.7% women are unpaid
family workers, 3.1 %, are self-employed and only 4.6 % women account for employees in the informal sector
workers. This abysmally low participation rate of women workers in informal sector is contrary to the findings of
our survey of informal sector.
Further, the rate of income that women in the informal sector earn is usually found to be low in comparison with
those that are associated with the formal sector. The crucial factors for women employment are household size, the
number of children in the household, dependency ratios, fertility patterns and housing characteristics. Most of the
women work because of poverty, which in Pakistan has been on the rise.
Employment Conditions

6|Page

A simple supply-demand view of the labour market clarifies the situation in a country where population is growing
by almost 4 million annually and employment opportunities as well as labour force are growing by less than a
million annually. The situation becomes more alarming as the countrys demography is dominated by the youth
bulge.
Figure -1: Labour Force in Pakistan
60

35

50

30
25

40

Employed and Unemployed

20

30

15

20

10

10
0
1960

Labour force Particiaption Rate

5
1980

2000

0
2020

Years
Employed Total Million

unemployed

Labour Force Participation rate

Source: Relevant Labour Force Survey

Figure 1 shows the Labour force data during 1975-2014. Pakistan is the 6th most populous economy of the world
with a total population of 184.35 million, of which 95.29 million (52. %) are males. The majority of the population,
(approximately 63.7 %) lives in rural areas. Women make up 48% of the population living in urban areas, and 49%
in rural areas. In 2012-13, 32.88% of the total population, or 60.35 million in absolute terms, constituted the
recorded labour force for all age groups. In 2008-09, it was 53.72 million (30.96) %. Due to demographic changes,
labour force is expanding but consists primarily of males (almost 78.5%).
The gap between male and female employment in Pakistan has been historically substantial and continues to be so.
The participation rate of the women work force has increased at a faster rate for rural females than urban areas and
males. It is indicative of increasing poverty and inflation rate in the economy. Interestingly, the participation rate
increased significantly for rural areas from 29.9 % to 34.5 % and for women from 9.9% to 15.5%. Overall, the
female participation in labour force increased significantly. It is an indication of higher participation of women in
the non-farm sector in rural areas and the push into the informal sector in urban areas. Compared with 2001-02, the
male share of the labour force in 2013-14 showed a decline of six percentage points with an almost equal increase in
the female share. It shows that due to the increasing inflation rate and poverty women have to struggle more for the
livelihood. They are seen as cheap, docile and peaceful workers available in a cost cutting environment. Moreover, it
is easy to substitute them for expensive male workers who demand social security and better work environment.

7|Page

Table 1 Educated and perpetual unemployment (% of total labor force) (national estimate)
Youth
Unemploym
Unemploym Unemploym Unemploym
ent (% of
ent with
ent with
ent with
Long-term
Total
total labour
primary
secondary
tertiary
unemploym Unemploym force aged
education
education
education
ent
ent rate
15-24)
1995

25.00

13.9

9.8

7.8

2000

15.10

13

20.6

8.9

2001

15.10

13

20.6

2002

14.70

12.3

24.1

6.2

2003

14.70

12.3

24.1

2004

13.10

12.3

29.1

2005

13.10

12.3

29.1

2006

15.40

10.2

26.9

2007

14.30

11.4

2008

14.70

2010

8.9
7.2

13.3

7.8

13.4

7.4

11.7

12

6.1

8.6

26

11.7

5.1

7.5

10.1

28

14.7

7.7

19.5

5.3

Source: World Development Indicators

During 2008-11, growth slowed down and employment opportunities have been shrinking. With already low
participation rate in the labour force, women have been pushed further into informal employment. Although half of
Pakistan's population consists of women, their participation in the development process is far from equal. Sociocultural traditions reinforced by lack of access to opportunities and resources relegate the majority of women to
traditional roles. In some direct market-oriented economic activities like agriculture, their contribution is substantial,
but it remains largely undervalued and unappreciated. Low female participation in formal economic activities can
lead to gender disparities in education and thus reduce future economic prospects.
Historically speaking, Pakistan is a low unemployment rate country, with the unemployment rate ranging between 35 per cent. It has risen to 6-8 per cent in the past decade and a half. Dissection of the unemployment rate by the level
of education and unemployment type reveals that in early 1995 the most unemployed were with primary education
and unemployment rate with primary education was 25 per cent. It has been declining since, recorded at 14.7 per
cent in 2008. The unemployment rate with tertiary education was 9.8 percent in 1995 and 28 per cent in 2008.
Another bad employment indicator is the long term unemployment which has entered double digit - from 7.8 per
cent in1995 to 19.5 per cent. It is easy to sum up that there are fewer employment opportunities for the literate and
increasing long term unemployment is the main reason for rising informal employment Pakistan.

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Figure 2 Age Specific Labour Force Participation Rate 10-14 years (%)
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

2009-10

20010-11
Total

Male

2012-13

Female

Source: Relevant Labour force Surveys

Distribution of Employed Labour Force and Gender Perspective
Agriculture is the main source of employment in Pakistan absorbing about 42% of the employed labour force with
industry accounting for about 23% (2012-15) and the services sector another 35%. Compared with this, distribution
of employed labour force in 2001-02 was 41, 21 and 38 per cent respectively. According to the Labour Force Survey
(2009-10), female employed labour force is the highest in the agricultural sector (74.9%) and the share is increasing
as well. The share of employed female workers increased in trade sector as well. Liberalization seems to have led to
the exploitation of women at lower than subsistence wage rate. The occupational distribution indicates that
womens strongest participation cluster is found in agriculture and fisheries (62.7%) and its share has increased by
almost 2 percentage points since 2007-08. There is also a slight increase in the professionals and managers category
(0.3%) in 2013-14. The share of technician females declined from 7.2 % in 2007-08 to 6.2 % 2013-2014.
The employment status shows that most women are unpaid family workers (66.3%). Compared with the situation in
2008-09 the share increased by 1.3 percentage points. Only 0.1% women are employers and 13.6% are selfemployed workers. Women thus concentrate in low value activities. Neo-liberal policies encourage the perpetuation
of low value chain for women workers.
Educational levels especially of the female population are important determinants of the nature of employment and
opportunities available to them. In recent years, the total literacy rate for the population aged 15 years and above has
increased only slightly, improving from 52 percent in 2003-04 to 55 percent (72.3% urban; 47.5% rural). In 200910, literacy rate continued the increasing trend to reach 57.7 percent (73.2% urban; and 49.2% rural). Female
literacy rate has increased marginally from 43% in 2007-08 to 45.2 % in 2013-14. But the urban female literacy
increased by 5 percentage points during 2007-08 to 2013-14 as compared to the rural female literacy which grew by
1.7 percentage points during the same period.
Vulnerable Employment and Growth
Figure 3 shows the trend of GDP growth rate and vulnerable employment during 1995-2013. In 1995, vulnerable
employment was 65 per cent of total employed labour force and GDP growth was 5 per cent. In 2013, growth was
around 3 per cent and vulnerable employment also declined.

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Figure 3 Vulnerable Employment and GDP Growth

Vulnerable employmnet

66
65
64
63
4.96
62
61
60
59
58 1.01
57
56

7.67

3.22
1.70

9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
4.025.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

GDP Growth Rate

Years
% of total employment

GDP growth Rate

Source: Relevant Labour force Surveys

Almost 60 per cent of the employed labour force is vulnerable employed. Vulnerable employment is not
significantly related with GDP growth rate in Pakistan. This means that the proportion of own account worker and
contributing family workers is declining and the proportion of paid formal employment is increasing.
Child Labour
Children at work are another dimension which reflects violation of work rights and prevalence of indecent work. In
Pakistan, labour force participation rate for economically active children aged 10-14 is almost 10 per cent and net
primary school enrollment rate for children aged 5-9 is 53 per cent. In 2013, 73 per cent of children had access to
full immunization.
Table 2 shows an alarming distribution of child work in Pakistan. When we looked at the child labour statistics by
economic activity, 76 per cent of total children aged 7-14 years are employed in agriculture, 7 percent are in
manufacturing and 14 per cent in services. Almost 10 per cent of children at work are self-employed, 13 per cent are
doing work and study, and 75 per cent are unpaid family workers.
Growing Informalization
Informal workers are not recognized as members of organized labour force that is governed by labour laws. They
have low incomes, live at subsistence level and have no link and interaction with or access to the Government. They
have no voice, no recognition and no visibility. Informal workers rise and fall with the fate of formal sector due to its
linkages with formal sector industry and trade. It is cost effective for the large firms to hire cheap labour at lower
wages. Informal enterprises exist because of the cumbersome procedures and rules of registration for the firms and
to save taxes (Soto et al. 1989). The informal sector in Pakistan is more or less evenly distributed across rural and
urban areas.
Table 2 Child Labour
Indicator

2008

2011

10 | P a g e

Child employment in agriculture (% of economically active children ages

7-14)
75.37

76.05

Child employment in manufacturing (% of economically active children

ages 7-14)
7.79

6.72

Child employment in services (% of economically active children ages 714)

14.41

14.59

Children in employment, female (% of female children ages 7-14)

16.2

13.5

Children in employment, male (% of male children ages 7-14)

15.6

12.5

Children in employment, self-employed (% of children in employment, ages 7-14)

10.49

Children in employment, study and work (% of children in employment,

ages 7-14)
11.1

12.6

Children in employment, total (% of children ages 7-14)

13

15.9

Children in employment, unpaid family workers (% of children in employment, ages

7-14)
75.08
Children in employment, wage workers (% of children in employment, ages 7-14)

14.38

Children in employment, work only (% of children in employment, ages 714)

88.9

87.4

Source: World Development Indicator 2014

Figure 4: Percentage Distribution of Major Sectors of Employment in Pakistan
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2012-13

Share of agriculture in total EMP

Formal

informal

Source: Relevant Labour Force Survey

Figure 4 shows that in 2012-13, 57.8 percent of the total employed labour force was engaged in the non-agriculture
sector and the informal sector, which falls within it, accounted for 42.5 percent (25.6 million) of all employment.
Thus, the employment contribution of the informal sector in the non-agriculture sector was approximately 74
percent. It was 65 percent in 2001-02. As per Table 3, almost 91 percent of the informal sector workers are male.

11 | P a g e

Women seem to be non-existent in the informal economy. Womens share of the informal non-agricultural
employment was a miniscule 4%; though still more than double that of women in formal employment in the same
sector.
Table 3 Distribution of Employment
2007-08

2009-10

2012-13

Pakistan

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

100

79.5

20.4

100

78.21

21.79

100

77.65

22.35

Agriculture

44.7

29.3

15.3

44.97

28.63

16.33

43.71

26.77

16.94

Non
Agriculture

55.3

50.2

5.1

55.04

49.58

5.46

56.29

50.88

5.41

- Formal

15

13.6

1.4

14.69

13.22

1.47

14.85

13.31

1.53

- Informal

40.3

36.6

3.7

40.35

36.36

3.99

41.45

37.57

3.88

The LFS 2012-13 reveals that there are only 0.07 percent of the female women recorded as employer. Compared to
this, in 2007-08 there was no women recorded as employer. Unpaid family workers were 1.97%, another 3.13% as
self-employed and 4.71 % as employee in the sector. Women employment in the informal sector for all categories
and areas has slightly increased but it contracted for males (Figure 5 and Table 4).
Figure -5: Percentage Distribution of Employment Status in Informal Sector by Sex & Area 2012-13
EMPLOYEE
CONTRIBUTING
Self EMPLOYED
EMPLOYER
0

10

15
Total

20
MALE

25

30

35

40

45

50

FEMALE

Source: Relevant Labour Force Survey

Wages in Formal Sector
Wages in the formal sector increased by almost 60 per cent during 2008-2012.

12 | P a g e

Table7. Average Monthly Wages of Employees by Major Industry Division

2008-09

2009-10

2012-13

Major Industry
Divisions

Total

Male

Fema
le

Total

Male

Femal
e

Total

Male

Femal
e

Total

7635

7997

5189

8623

9017

5821

1211
8

1280
4

7868

Agriculture,
forestry,
hunting and
fishing

4194

5096

2972

4968

5730

3358

6221

7873

3863

1574
0

5168

Mining &
quarrying

7661

7666

7333

6976

6963

9600

1550
8

Manufacturing

6769

7385

2912

7534

8080

3437

1102
2

1173
3

4957

Electricity, gas
and water

12383

1240
1

1005
0

1454
8

14398

25325

2084
2

2093
8

16173

Construction

6510

6531

5020

7389

7397

6207

9614

9609

10454

Wholesale &
retail trade
and
restaurants &
hotels

5705

5708

5479

6609

6660

4013

8656

8668

7245

Transport,
storage and
communicatio
n

8069

8026

1113
9

9396

9328

13685

1246
9

1240
7

22993

Financing,
insurance, real
estate and
business
Services

16440

1636
3

1815
8

1817
4

17897

31240

1978
2

1982
0

30356

Community,
social and
personal
services

9718

1051
9

7104

1098
4

11771

7761

1797
4

1863
3

11659

13 | P a g e

Source: Relevant Labour Force Survey

Table 7 relates to major industry divisions. It shows that for all industry divisions total nominal wage has risen by 58
per cent between 2008-09 and 2012-13, but it increased by 52 per cent for women. Monthly wage for women was
64.9 per cent of monthly wage for men in 2008-09, 64.6 in 2009-10 and 61.4 per cent in 2012-13.It has thus
declined by 3 percentage points between 2008-09 and 2012-13. Generally, the nominal wage for women increased
between these two years but the gap of women wage in proportion to men has increased. As women are mostly
contract workers, piece workers, informal workers and least unionized, their wages are generally lower than male
workers across industries as we as occupations. In mining & quarrying, electricity, gas and water transport, storage
and communication, financing, insurance, real estate and business services, monthly wages for women were higher
than men. This, however, is a sampling error as women constitute a very small proportion of the sample. Wage
differentials by occupation are given in Table 8. In the categories of professionals and skilled agricultural & fishery
workers, the higher wages for women relative to men are the result of the same sampling error.
Table 8. Average Monthly Wages of Employees by Major Occupational Groups
Major Occupational
2008-09
Groups

2009-10

2012-13

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

7635

7998

5189

8623

9017

5821

12118

12804

7868.87

Legislators/senior
officials &
managers

18612

18653

17849

21688

21707

21365

37923

38113

34618

Professionals

15368

15322

15650

17761

17510

19463

21080

24326

15051

Technicians &
associate
professionals

9878

10975

7525

12154

12385

8071

18892

19801

13429

Clerks

10903

10935

9390

11125

12181

10905

18852

19029

13720

Service workers/
shop & market
sales workers

6888

6900

5777

7942

7989

5867

11031

12804

9516

Skilled agricultural
& fishery workers

6187

6402

6550

7220

7182

8263

8914

38113

3337

Craft & related

trades workers

6412

6985

2536

7586

8141

3167

10401

24326

4563

14 | P a g e

Plant/ machine
operators &
assemblers

7149

7155

5784

8560

8577

6024

11693

19801

6862

Elementary
(unskilled)
occupations

5305

5691

3095

5716

6118

3474

7927

19029

4309

Source: Relevant Labour Force Survey

Per capita food availability
Food availability per capita in Pakistan, despite bad harvests, is satisfactory though not according to norms. As can
be seen in the Table 7, the availability of cereals is stable, while it has increased for milk, meat, edible oils. It
decreased for pulses and sugar. Per capita availability of proteins has also increased. Yet malnutrition is persistent in
women and young children. Half of infant and child deaths occur due to malnutrition.
Table 4. Per capita food availability
200607

2007
08

200910

201011

201112

201213(P)

2013-14(T)

Cereals (Kg)

148.8

166.3

158.8

158.7

160

160

160.5

Pulses (Kg)

7.2

7.2

6.8

6.7

6.7

**6.5

Sugar (Kg)

32.2

31.5

26.1

26.5

29.5

31

31.5

Milk (Ltr)

170.1

172.1

117.2

112.3

96.5

97.4

100.8

Meat (Kg)

20.6

20.1

20.5

20.9

21.5

21

21

Eggs (Dozen)

5.4

5.3

5.8

Edible Oil

12.8

13.3

12.6

12.6

13

13

13

Protein per day

69.0

72

71.5

72

72.5

72.5

72

P: Provisional, T: Target**: Heavy rains affected the crop of gram pulse, which is main contributor in the output of
pulses.
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2009-10& 2013-14
Disparities in education
The Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for primary schools (Age 5-9) has remained constant at 91 percent between
2006-07 and 2008-09 and GER for the middle level has increased negligibly from 51% to 53% (Table 9). The Net
Enrolment Rate (NER) was 57 percent in 2008-09, substantially lower than the GER.
The Gender Parity Index (GPI) is the ratio of female enrolment to male enrolment. The GPI for Pakistan as a whole
in 200809 is 0.65 compared to 0.64 in 200708. Pakistans progress on MDGS is slow. It has missed the GPI goal

15 | P a g e

in primary and secondary education. With the current scenario there is every possibility that GPI will remain
unachievable by 2015. It is possible to deal with socioeconomic gender gap with appropriate policy measures.
A new Article 25A - Right to Education has been inserted in the constitution under the eighteenth amendment, which
states: The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in
such manner as may be determined by law. As education is a provincial subject, the provincial assemblies are
required to legislate within a maximum period of two and a half years. No progress is in evidence in this regard.
Table 5. Disparities in Education

Indicators

Literacy rate
s
(10 years &
above)

GER Primary
(age 59)

NER Primary
(age 59)

Male

Femal
e

Both

Rural

Urban

Gender
Index

200607

67

42

55

45

72

0.63

200708

69

44

56

49

71

0.64

200809

69

45

57

48

74

0.65

2012-13

71

48

60

51

76

0.59

200607

99

81

91

84

106

0.82

200708

97

83

91

83

106

0.86

200809

99

83

91

85

106

0.83

2012-13

98

83

91

86

105

0.82

200607

60

51

56

52

66

0.85

200708

59

52

55

51

66

0.88

200809

61

54

57

53

68

0.87

2012-13

51

54

57

54

67

Years

Parity

Source: Pakistan Social & Living Standard Measurement Survey 200809

Overall expenditure on health has been low and declining as a percentage of GDP. This can be seen in Table 6. Of
the total amount spent, the share of women is far less than for men. There are also serious gender gaps in health. A
recent estimate of rural malnutrition rates shows 65 percent of rural girls to be chronically malnourished (low height
for age). Health indicators reveal a range of female disadvantages. When the various indicators are pieced together
to explain the existence of excess female mortality in Pakistan, it appears that gender differences in access to
preventive and curative medical care are responsible for the pattern of gender gaps in health outcomes observed.
According to a report compiled by the Ministry of Women Development, the health status of women in Pakistan "is
poor as compared with other countries in Asia. Some 30,000 women die each year due to complications of
pregnancy, and 10 times more women develop life-long pregnancy-related disability. Many girls die prematurely
because of common infections and malnutrition, which could have been easily prevented and treated." There is some
progress in the area of maternal mortality ratio as it is declining in Pakistan. It was 350 in 2001-02 and reported as

16 | P a g e

276 in 2006-07. However, it is one of the highest MMR in the South Asia and far more efforts are required to bring
it down to half by 2015. Low expenditure on human development and inefficiencies in spending related to women
produce poor outcomes in key indicators. According to the Human Development Report 2010, Pakistan ranked 112
out of 169 countries in terms of Gender Inequality Index (GII). The GII measures womens disadvantage in
reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. It reflects human development lost due to inequality
between female and male achievements in the afore-said dimensions. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) rank
of Pakistan among 109 countries was 99, really at the bottom. The GEM quantitatively measures empowerment of
women and includes the measure of inequality in control over earned economic resources, participation in political
decision-making and economic decision-making.
Table 6. Health & Nutrition Expenditures (200001 to 2013-14) (Rs. billions)

Total health
Expenditure

Development
Expenditure

Current
Expenditure

Percentage
Change

Health
Expenditur
e as % of
GDP

2001-02

25.41

6.69

18.72

4.70

0.59

2002-03

28.81

6.61

22.21

13.40

0.58

2003-04

32.81

8.50

24.31

13.80

0.57

2004-05

38.00

11.00

27.00

15.80

0.57

2005-06

40.00

16.00

24.00

5.30

0.51

2006-07

50.00

20.00

30.00

25.00

0.57

2007-08

60.00

27.22

32.67

20.00

0.57

2008-09

74.00

33.00

41.10

23.00

0.56

2009-10

79.00

38.00

41.00

7.00

0.54

2010-11

42.00

19.00

23.00

(-)47

0.23

2011-12

55.12

26.25

28.87

30.97

0.27

201213*

79.46

17.34

62.12

44.16

0.35

201314*

102.33

27.84

74.50

28.78

0.40

Source:

Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14

Weak labour legislation and implementation
Conventionally, the issues of labour market fall within the domain of social policy. Legislation and proper
implementation is part and parcel for providing the efficient work environment and decent work in labour market.

17 | P a g e

Government has to provide the enabling environment which can protect the workers rights with proper legislation.
The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work requires that government should protect all
types of workers.
Right to work and earn a decent living under conditions of freedom and dignity is recognized as one of the
fundamental human rights. According to the Constitution of Pakistan, the state shall make provision for securing
just and humane conditions of work (Article 37c), and shall ensure the elimination of all forms of
exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle, from each according to his ability, to each
according to his work (Article 3)
Pakistan is a signatory of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 that recognizes the right to work, to
freely choose employment and to have just and favourable working conditions. Pakistan has ratified the entire eight
core Conventions that codify the four most basic human rights related to the world of work-the right to organize and
engage in collective bargaining, the right to equality at work, the abolition of child labour and the abolition of forced
labour. For ensuring the implementation Pakistan has Labour Protection Policy 2006 and Labour Inspection Policy
2006. The constitutional framework, ratification of ILO conventions and labour policies fail to satisfactorily secure
labour rights in Pakistan, particularly of women. Implementation of these policies needs will and determination for
resolving the labour issues.
Role of institutions
Institutions play vital role for the decent work, improvements in living conditions, reduction of poverty and
developing linkages between informal and formal sector. Labour institutions relate to working hours, training and
unemployment insurance. Within the neoliberal framework, World Bank has developed an indicator of working time
regulations. It disregards essential regulatory distinctions and says nothing about actual work time. There is need to
apply the insights of new institutional economics to understand the relevance unemployment insurance systems in
developing countries. A number of institutions exist in Pakistan, but there working leaves much to be desired.
In Punjab, the Centre for the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment (CIWCE) is responsible for
ensuring better employment conditions. The Centre is part of the Labour Department. It provides training to the
labour and government official. It also deals with labour health. Finally, CIWCE carries out and sponsors research
on various issues facing labour.
Wages are a key channel through which labour market institutions are thought to affect economic performance. In
particular, wage floors can be created by collective bargaining agreements, unemployment insurance benefits
(argued to raise the reservation wage), and through minimum wage policies. The negative effect of the minimum
wage on employment is often overestimated by standard quantitative methods, while its positive effects in reducing
wage inequality, sustaining the demand for goods and services and contributing to social cohesion tends to be
ignored.
Labour Inspection Policy
Laws are for formal sector. There is no law directly affecting the informal workers or about their living or working
conditions. However, the Labour Department does not discriminate between formal or informal worker. Whenever
there is a complaint, labour inspectors inspect under the law of Labour Protection and Labour Inspection Policy.
Nowadays these inspections are suspended. There are complaints of corruption and misuse of authority, but to
suspend these inspections altogether is no solution. There is need to adopt transparent mechanisms which can help in
checking implementation. Inspections will vary with levels of intensity of the case. There is need for issue based
inspection policy. There are only a few labour inspectors, none of them a woman.

18 | P a g e

Temporary Employment
For resolving the issue of contract employment and permanent employment there is a draft Employment and
Services Condition Act, 2009 and an Occupational Safety and Health Act, 2009. These are currently in consultation
process and have not been tabled in the Parliament as yet. This legislation will improve contractor/employee
relationship, as factories are made responsible for all safety and social protection rights like pension, and health
benefits to contract employees as well.
Awareness Campaign
Official awareness campaigns are not very frequent. In Punjab, CIWCE is overseeing a project on health and safety
titled Labour laws, Health and Safety Awareness. Under this project, CIWCE published a booklet for the
awareness of workers. There is no assessment available to judge whether it has improved workersaccess to
departments such as Labour department.
Poor unionization and bargaining position
Rise of neoliberalism is associated with the weak enforcement of existing labour laws foot dragging on improving
legislation. It has adversely affected unionization and collective bargaining. Women workers should benefit from the
application of ILO Convention on Equal Remuneration, 1951 (No. 100), ratified by Pakistan in 2001. Minimum and
above-minimum wages have to be ensured on the basis of equal pay for equal work, and equal pay for work of equal
value, as between men and women, in accordance with Pakistans obligations under ILO Conventions 100 and 111
concerned with equality and non-discrimination respectively. Women workers are also entitled to better information
concerning their working conditions and arrangements in the informal economy, from improved maternity
arrangements, codes of conduct relating to sexual harassment and, where possible, day care arrangements for their
children.
However, labour rights, especially of women workers, have suffered in Pakistan as a result of the rising openness to
the world market and linkages to globalization. Export processing zones and special economic zones are no-go areas
for unions. Whether stronger trade union rights and higher
Social security and underemployment
People without social security coverage in developing countries usually work in the informal rather than the formal
economy. No access to social security coverage is usually part of the definition of informal employment. Even in
developing countries with high economic growth, increasing numbers of workers most often women have less
than secure employment, such as casual labour, homework and self-employment, lacking social security coverage.
This has an enormous impact on their lives and on work itself. What little earning power the impoverished have is
further suppressed by marginalization and lack of support systems particularly when they are unable to work
because of old age, illness or disability.
The social security net in Pakistan is far from exhaustive. The distribution of assets is highly skewed and something
to fall back on in rainy season is simply not available to most of the populace. Thus, only a small minority can
afford to remain off the work. Further, employment scene is preponderated by agriculture, and informal
activities with low threshold of entry, exit and paraphernalia of requisites. As such, most of the people tend to get
engaged in some sort of economic activities irrespective of any considerations regarding size of reward and
working age, in order to make both ends meet. Not surprisingly, the unemployment rate in Pakistan tends to be
estimated lower than perceived.

19 | P a g e

Policies and actions

Two major women-specific programmes have been started by the government, the Benazir Income Support
Programme (BISP) by the federal government and the land distribution programme by the government of Sindh.
A cash transfer programme, the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) was started with an allocation of Rs.34
billion in 2008-09. It was allocated Rs. 70 billion in 2009-10 and Rs 50 billion in 2010-11. Almost 5.25 million
families benefited from BISP in 2013-14 and BISP annual disbursements increased from Rs. 16.0 billion in 2008-9
to Rs. 48.18 billion in the first three quarters of 2013-14. In 2009-10, a total of Rs. 32 billion was actually disbursed
to 2.29 million beneficiaries against Rs.15.8 billion and 1.76 million respectively in 2008-09.
The objective is to cover almost 40% of the population below the poverty line and 15% of the total population.
Woman head or an adult female member of the family is eligible to receive cash grants.
The disbursement under BISPs cash grants was almost doubled and beneficiaries increased by 198 percent in
comparison with2008-09. The registered families are given a monthly cash assistance of Rs.1000 at their doorsteps.
The present government has increased cash grant amount to Rs 1200 per month. The programme has been extended
to all four provinces, FATA, Azad Kashmir and Islamabad Capital Territory. It has now become the main social
safety net programme of the country. The vulnerable are identified on the basis of poverty scorecard and a
countrywide survey is being conducted for the purpose.
Table 9. Disbursement by Operating Units/Special Initiatives
SNo.

Components

Amount (Rs Million)

Waseela-e-Haq (BISP)

298

Institutional Development/Social Mobilization

481

Microfinance Portfolio Management (MPM)

5253

Livelihood, Employment and Enterprise Development (LEED) 1603

Community Physical Infrastructure

341

Water, Energy and Climate Change

130

Education, Health, and Nutrition

312

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013-14.

In addition, the BISP is envisaged as a platform for other social assistance programmes. These include transition to a
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) programme, complementary poverty exit programmes, health insurance
programmes, and workforce programmes. One member from each qualifying household will be equipped with
technical and vocational skills making them employable. In the second phase, micro finance will be made accessible
for poor families to start small businesses. The component of health insurance will cover the entire family including
household head and spouse, children up to 18 years, dependent parents, and unmarried daughters aged 18 and above.
The policy benefit will cover full hospitalization, pregnancy, daycare treatment and diagnostic tests. Accident
compensation for bread earning family member will also be given insurance cover. To avoid dependency, there is an
exit strategy. The Management Information System of BISP does not provide exact beneficiary details about the
graduating clients and the new clients separately for each province. It is not possible to assess how many have
actually exited from abject poverty.

20 | P a g e

Disbursements have lagged behind budgetary allocations. This is not just because of the macroeconomic difficulties.
Utilization has been slower than the release of funds. There are a number of implementation bottlenecks. Stories of
corruption and political favouritism have been reported in the media.
In Sindh, a significant section of those below the poverty line are landless haris. Their number is variously estimated
at round 2 million. The Government of Sindh has prepared a programme to distribute state land to these haris.
Although no substitute for a genuine programme of land reform in the feudal dominated province, Sindh's state land
distribution program is unique in the sense that the preferred allottees are landless women. It will contribute to the
objective of economic and social empowerment of women. As rural poverty has the face of a woman and it is
significantly associated with increasing assetlessness, the programme will also contribute to poverty reduction. This
will however be a drop in the ocean as mass poverty continues to rise at an increasing rate.
Laws and measures by the government
A number of women-specific laws have been enacted. Despite being a support to the family, women in the work
force face domestic violence. To address this, Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was passed in 2008. Harassment
at work place is another serious issue faced by the working women. It violates their right to work with dignity. The
Parliament has passed Protection against Harassment at Work Act, 2009. Employers are required to implement the
Act, institute a code of conduct and set up an inquiry committee. Relevant amendments were also made in Pakistan
Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Act. 25 Women Centers have been set up in selected districts for legal and
other assistance.
In the Federal Government jobs, the quota for women has been increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. Two new
women universities have been approved for Multan and Sukkur, and a third one is proposed for Sialkot. Pilot
projects for economic empowerment have also been set up. A land allotment policy has been made to allot state land
to peasant women. Federal Ministry of Women Development is spending 3-4 per cent of its total development
budget on the advancement of rural women on a programme called Jafakash Aurat Programme. Its other major
overhead is for building crisis centre in major cities of Pakistan.
International Labor Organizations project Women Employment Concerns and Working Condition in Pakistan
(WEC-PK) funded by CIDA has been implemented in collaboration with Ministry of Labour and Manpower to
enhance the quality and number of women employment in Pakistan with ultimate goal of economic empowerment of
women in rural and urban areas. A number of productive programmes have been completed under this project aimed
at creating conducive working environment for women such as sensitization and capacity building of policy makers
and implementing partners in public and private sectors; Direct Assistance to Women in getting Decent
Employment; Promoting Gender Equality in Private Sector Employment in Pakistan; and promoting Women's
participation and Leadership in Trade Unions in Pakistan Another project titled Towards Gender Parity was
initiated in January 2010 in collaboration with Ministry of Labour for a period of one year. The focus of the project
activities capacity building of stake holders in relevant areas and International Labour Standards (ILS);
establishment of coordination mechanism among partners to monitor, learn and share experience; Promotion of
gender- responsive data collection, analysis and reporting through a joint effort of all stake holders; strategy for
gender equality in skill development; small and medium enterprise programme; strategy for implementation of
Women Empowerment Act; Advocacy for the implementation of national policy of Home-based Workers and pilot
activities for integration of HBWs into main stream.
Socio-economic profiles

21 | P a g e

On almost every site of the Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA), 2003 2, women were found to be
engaged in productive work (sewing shoes, footballs, peeling nuts, etc. etc.). A number of reasons may be offered
for the invisibility, including the fact that women dont seem to own businesses in the informal economy; that
women are less likely to be reported as self-employed and much more likely than men to be reported to be unpaid
family workers. Our survey in Lahore showed informal workers losing out not only from the exclusion from the
economic sector, but also suffer the pains of social exclusion. This exclusion is reflected in low education, low
skills, low wages, and poverty, lesser availability of civic facilities, financial services, and harsh working conditions.
Table 10. Sample Characteristics of Survey
Mean age

25

Age range

14-50

Average number of children

Family size

7-9

1 bread winner in the household

80%

own a shared house

57%

Concrete foundations (Pucca Ghar)

86%

Literacy rate

65%

Female literacy rate

56%

Primary school not completed

59%

School access

95%

Average mean income per month

6000

Assets value above Rs.100,000 (livestock, equipment,

10.70%
land)
Banking facilities

10%

First, our research area showed that all respondents are buyers of basic urban facilities but due to living in
underserved katchiabadis receive poor quality of service. Streets and roads were a shambles. All respondents have
shared housing, 57.2 percent of the respondents own a house which is mostly family property, 23.4 percent live in
rented houses and the rest of the respondents live in government subsidized housing or properties owned by the
employers. Around 70 percent of these houses were in katchiabadis. Most of these houses are small and consist of
one to two rooms. 86 percent of the houses are pucca (have concrete foundations). Almost 96 percent of the
residents have electricity, 81.4 percent of the inhabitants have access to gas, and 73 percent have usage of telephone.
Drinking water is available to 96 percent of the households and 98 percent have toilet facilities available in their
vicinity. 5 percent of the inhabitants own agricultural land and of this 85 percent own land that is valued at over
Rs.100,000. Almost all informal workers complained about electricity shortages and high load shedding. About 40

2Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment, National and Punjab, Sindh, NWFP,

Baluchistan, AJK, FANA Reports. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission,
Islamabad. 2003

22 | P a g e

percent of the respondents had no transportation facility, whereas about 10 percent use bicycles and a quarter carts
for their work related activities. Child care was an issue for women who worked outside the house as vendors.
Secondly, low education is a distinct feature of informal sector in our research. The total literacy rate among those
who are above 10 years is 60 percent, and 56 percent for females. The net primary enrolment rate in research area is
72 percent with 59 percent for girls. The gross primary school enrolment rate is 104 percent with 97 percent for
girls. The primary public school attendance rate of students between 5 to 17 years is 24 percent though the access to
schools (less than 2 km) is 95 percent. Amongst the interviewed, almost 65 per cent have received some type of
education. Within the literate, 40 percent had received formal education with 41 percent completion rate at primary
level. Only 4 percent managed to complete the matriculation level. None of the workers had received any training.
Only two learned on the job what they were currently doing. This shows that in informal sector many are deprived
of better education and skill training.
Thirdly, low income is also an attribute of informal sector. Most of the workers (69 percent) are earning hardly Rs.
6000 per month: 20 percent of the respondents earn less than Rs.3000 per month, 6 percent earn more than
Rs.10,000 every month and 5 percent of the households received remittances from abroad with the median value of
Rs. 400,000 in the year 2010-11. Low education, low income, large family size and high dependency ratio are
reasons for the prevalence of extreme poverty in the informal sector. Informal workers (34 percent) in our survey
felt they had no other option as preferred mode of earning. Only half of the respondents wished to be part of the
formal sector to benefit from the facilities that they feel are being provided in the formal sector e.g. the minimum
wage. A small number (less than 5 percent) also felt that they would be eligible for social protection and have better
access to the market through formalization and better economic prospects. The remaining respondents are happy
with their informal status. However, for more than two-thirds of those interviewed, poverty played a key role in
forcing them to join the informal sector. A small number (10 percent) felt that with rampant unemployment they had
been almost forced to join the informal sector. Almost 52.5 percent of the respondents had households with 7-9
members with 24.6 percent households having eight to ten family members and about 5 percent having more than
eleven family members. Informal households are poor because only a few family members are part of the
workforce. There were only 20 percent families with more than two breadwinners and the rest of the families had
only one member of the household with the responsibility to earn.
Fourthly, a crucial aspect of the informal sector is very low capacity to save and poor access to financial services.
Approximately 52 percent claimed that they just mange to live and spend all their earnings, while over 44 percent of
the respondents reported having taken out loans. There seem to be five main purposes of borrowing in the sample:
business, household expenditures, marriage of daughters, medical treatment, and childrens needs. Most informal
workers borrow for medical treatment and household expenditure. These loans are usually obtained in informal
ways and only 10 percent of the respondents tried to avail loans from formal banks and only 6 percent succeeded.
Around 20 percent have obtained loans from various NGOs and the rest of the respondents prefer to borrow from
friends and relatives. Only 6 percent of the households are able to save and 4 percent of them use informal ways of
savings (committee system and gold). Only 10 percent of the informal workers have bank accounts and 4 percent
have the facility of ATM card and credit card.
Fifthly, all informal workers reported poor medical facilities. They usually use traditional medicine or fake healers.
Headache was the most common ailment that the respondents suffered from, besides seasonal ailments like fever,
coughs, cold and diarrhea. Some also got injured during work. When injured, almost half of them tried home
treatments and the other half sought medical help. Those working outside homes (waste pickers and vendors) are
also exposed to road accidents and occasionally dog and snake bites. Employers/contractors were never willing to
pay compensation for the accidents occurring at work.

23 | P a g e

Sixthly, almost nonexistent entertainment facilities were reported for the lowest tier. It appears that these workers
toil all day and hardly get time for recreation. In spite of that, 75 percent respondents said they do manage to take
time out for watching television, 15 percent of the respondents said they listen to the radio and tape recorder in their
leisure time. Occasionally, they went to public parks and attended marriage ceremonies and family get-togethers on
Eid, which they reported as entertainment.
Work and working conditions in informal sector
Most of the workers were not satisfied with their working conditions and wanted to leave work if they could, though
a quarter of the sample said they were happy and would like to stay in the work that they were doing. About 30
percent were uncertain and evasive about what they would prefer to do, as they did not have any other options. The
rest of the respondents were of the view that they were willing to leave work if a government job was available.
Most (80 percent) of the women were satisfied and contented with their work as it was just a part time activity,
allowing them to contribute to family earnings. Here are the details.
First, our research showed that harsh working conditions are a reality of the informal sector. 68 percent of the
respondents complained about it: 60 percent of them complained about tough work and long working hours, 12
percent talked about heat and no provision of shade, and remaining 28 percent had other problems like traveling,
non availability of Sui gas and lack of husbands permission to work outside. Another prominent feature of informal
work condition is abuse at work but our respondents considered it as something separate from working conditions. A
little over a quarter reported being abused at work, the majority stating that they had been victim of verbal abuse, 5
percent said that they were subjected to physical abuse, and one percent of the workers had suffered from sexual
abuse. It should be noted that family members and associates had generally abused them. Two had been exploited by
their employers. All the home based workers in our survey reported exploitation by the middle man, whereas waste
pickers reported abuse by the contractors and family associates.
Secondly, most of the workers reported long working hours and having to carry heavy loads, something that the
home based workers were spared. But they too had to work for long hours. About 41percent worked for 9 to 12
hours a day and another 34.3 percent for up to 8 hours a day with no day off in a week. However, 25 percent
respondents managed to get a day off during the week. Almost 12 percent respondents carried up to 12 kgs of
weight, 56 percent had to carry between 13 kgs to 50kgs of weight, 22 percent respondents load ranged between
51kgs to 100kgs and that of 10 respondents as heavy as 100kgs to 200kgs.
Thirdly, as the focus principally was on home-based workers, street vendors and waste collectors, these three groups
were asked about the period for which they had been involved in this kind of work. Our survey showed that most of
the respondents (about 68.9percent) had been involved in their work for more than 5 years, and rest of the
respondents joined informal work with no experience and for less than 2 years. Most of the informal workers are
young, 70 percent of the respondents having started work when between 13 and 15 years of age and about 11.5
percent were forced to work at the age of seven.
Fourthly, 72 percent of those surveyed were unemployed and only 28 percent were doing some petty work in the
formal sector. Out of these 28 per cent, 4 percentage points were working as helpers/assistants, 10 percentage points
were working as contract workers in different factories, 2 percentage points were assisting their fathers, selling
vegetables or were working in a garment factory and 12 percentage points of the respondents (mainly women)
reported doing nothing apart from the household chores.
Fifthly, isolation and no interaction with any government official or department is the hallmark of our survey. Nonregistered, the informal workers are outside the tax net. All street vendors pay someone either in bribes or as bhatta
and think of themselves as registered. They have the pride of working for themselves. Vendors putting up stalls in

24 | P a g e

the weekly Tuesday/Sunday Bazaars pay Rs.100/day to the Market Committee as a fee on a weekly basis. Even
those collecting waste in these Bazaars have to pay, though it is not clear whether this was official or just some kind
of commission to the organizers to guarantee the collection.
Sixthly, those surveyed reported a general lack of support from official or unofficial quarters (NGOs,
contractors/intermediaries). In cases of emergency or crises about two-thirds reported seeking help from family or
friends though not necessarily receiving positive responses. Just one-tenth of the respondents confirmed that they
had been approached by NGOs who had tried to assist them and some 15 percent reported assistance and support
from contractors. When enquired about the kind of help they expect to get from the government or the NGOs, 55.7
percent respondents said that they needed financial assistance in order to meet their expenses: home/ shelter; shop to
be allocated to them in the market where they work; funds for marriages of their daughters and sisters. Only 2
percent respondents asked to provide education for their children and 5 percent wanted jobs for themselves, while 38
percent were not clear about the kind of help they needed.
Wages in informal sector
Workers in informal sector are engaged in manufacturing activities but their wages are lower than formal workers.
The workers in our survey were involved in stitching, jewelry making, electronics (making energy saver bulbs),
mehndi, cooking food, dari making and embroidery on suits. Their remuneration varied because they work on piece
rate basis which depends on their bargaining capacity and skill level. Workers involved in stitching clothes of
women at home informed that they finish almost 2-3 ladies suits daily and charge Rs 100-150 per suit. Their
monthly income was almost Rs 7000 per month.
Workers stitching trousers for a garment factory get Rs. 20 per piece. They usually sew 20 shalwarsa days but the
garment factory was not providing this much work. Workers engaged in hand stitching and sitaremoti on the
readymade embroidered clothes stated that for one packet of sitaremoti they used to get Rs. 70 to Rs100 depending
on the nature of work. Most of the time they had to do raffu (graft the damaged clothes), which is not regular work.
The artificial jewelry makers are the most satisfied workers. They earn almost Rs 100-200 daily. These workers not
only chrome but also have to do angina work. There is another type of the home based workers who are involved in
washing syrup bottles with caustic soda. These workers get Rs. 0.50 per bottle and have to wash hundreds of bottles.
There are no safety measures applied or available for washing these bottles.
Table 11. Wages in Informal Sector
Home based workers - Activity

Monthly income

Stitching

7000

Artificial jewelry

8000

Artificial jewelry

8000

Energy saver

2500

Stitching

5000

Mehndi cone

6000

Embroidery

4000

Printing suits

1000

Cooking food

5000

25 | P a g e

Embroidery

1100

Hand stitching

1200

Artificial jewelry

5000

Washing bottles

3000

Weaving

7500

Embroidery

6000

Information in Table 11 makes it clear that wages in informal sector are significantly lower than the formal sector
Conclusion
The problem in Pakistan is not labour inefficiency but poor economic performance, low and falling growth and
rising inflation. These problems, macroeconomic in nature, cannot be solved by the microeconomic approach of
deregulating labour markets, union busting and soft enforcement of minimum wages. The situation is made worse
by the grossly inadequate social security arrangements. Domestic market has to be developed and the global market
engagement has to be a strategy to maximize work opportunities rather than holding on to a false notion of real wage
resistance. Good labour institutions and regulations add economic and social value. In various policy documents, the
Government has declared its commitment to provide decent work opportunities. It has promised to re-examine
existing legislation for workers and to ensure that women are not denied access to suitable jobs. However, the
agreement of the Government with the IMF has led to further strengthening of the policy prescriptions of the
neoliberal economics, which essentially views informal employment as low-cost substitute for formal work.
----------------------------------------References
Asad Sayeed and Sohail Javed (2001). Household Characteristics, Poverty and Indebtedness among Women Workers in Urban Pakistan. Working
Paper No.3, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Karachi.
Demery, Lionel and Addison, Tony (1987) Stabilization policy and income distribution in developing countries, World Development Volume
15: 12, Pages 1483-1498 Overseas Development Institute, London, UK
Farida Shaheed and Khawar Mumtaz, Invisible Workers: GOP. 1981; Shahanz Kazi and Zeba Sathar; Akmal Hussain et al, UNHDR Pakistan.
2003
Federal Bureau of Statistics, PSLM FY 2005-06, 2007-08 and 2012-13Government of Pakistan
Gibson-Graham, J.K (2002) Beyond Global vs. Local: Economic Politics outside the Binary Frame. In Geographies of Power: Placing Scale
Edited by A. Herod and M. Wrights. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Government of Pakistan (2013-14) Pakistan Economic Survey, Finance Division, Economic Advisers Wing, Islamabad.
Luta Bertulfo, Fatima Ihsan, and Luceta Lazo, Home-based Workers Scoping Exercise, a report for CIDA. July 2009. (Unpublished)
Mumtaz, Khawar and Saleem, Nadia (2010) Informal Economy Budget Analysis in Pakistan and Ravi Town, Lahore Urban Policies Research
Report, No. 3 Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing
Noam Chomsky (1997) Market Democracy in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality Z Magazine, November, 1997
Noam Chomsky (1999) Profit over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999. /Limited preview available in
English/
Noam Chomsky (2005) Government in the Future New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005.
Obando, Ana Elena (2003) Women Facing Globalization: The impact of neo-liberal globalization on the economic, social and cultural rights of
women Women Human Rights Network (WHRnet) Madrid
Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2001-02, 2005-06, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2012-13 Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistic Division, Government of
Pakistan.
Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment National Report. (2003)Government of Pakistan.
Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment, National and Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan, AJK, FANA Reports. Government of Pakistan,
Planning Commission, Islamabad. 2003
Sen, Amartya. 2002. How to Judge Globalism. The American Prospect, Special Supplement: Globalism and the Worlds Poor. Winter: 2-6.
Shahanz Kazi and Zeba Sathar; Akmal Hussain et al, UNHDR Pakistan. 2003
Shaheed Farida and Mumtaz, Khawar (1981) Invisible Workers: Government of Pakistan
Smith, Dorothy. 1987, The Everyday World as Problematic. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Soto, H. de (1989). The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism. New York

26 | P a g e

Standing, Guy (1999). Global Feminization through Flexible Labour: a Theme Revisited World Development, Vol. 27, No.3: 583-602.
Stiglitz Joseph (2003) The End of Neo-liberalism? http://www.project syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz101/English
Stiglitz, J. E. (2003). Globalization and Its Discontents, London: W.W. Norton.
United Nations (1999). World Survey on the Role of Women in Development: Globalization, Gender and Work. New York: United Nations.

Appendix I

Unemployme
nt Rate (%)

Labour
force
Participatio
n Rate

3.6

7.69

30.41

47.37

3.13

6.2

32.22

52.41

49.68

2.73

5.2

32.17

165.45

53.22

50.45

2.77

5.2

32.17

2009

168.99

55.91

52.86

3.05

5.46

32.81

2010

172.57

56.92

53.76

3.16

5.55

32.98

2011

176.2

57.84

54.4

3.44

5.95

32.83

2012

180.71

59.33

55.8

3.53

5.95

32.83

2013

183.57

60.34

56.58

3.76

6.24

32.88

Years

Populatio
n

Labour
force
(mln)

Employe Unemploye
d
d
(mln)
(mln)

2005

153.96

46.82

43.22

2006

156.77

50.5

2007

162.91

2008

Appendix II - Vulnerable employment

Years
1995

% of female
employment

% of male
employment

% of total
employment

74.9

63.5

64.9

GDP growth
Rate
4.96

27 | P a g e

1996

74.9

63.5

64.9

4.85

1997

66.7

61.9

62.5

1.01

1998

75

62.1

63.9

2.55

1999

75

62.1

63.9

3.66

2000

66.8

63.1

63.6

4.26

2001

66.8

63.1

63.6

1.98

2002

62.6

58.8

59.3

3.22

2003

62.6

58.8

59.3

4.85

2004

68.7

59.7

61.2

7.37

2005

68.7

59.7

61.2

7.67

2006

74.2

58.9

61.9

6.18

2007

75.3

58.4

61.8

4.83

2008

77.8

59.3

63.1

1.70

2009

77.3

58

61.9

2.83

2010

79

57.7

62.2

1.61

2011

78.3

57

61.6

2.79

2013

75

54.6

59

4.02

Appendix III - Global Gender Gap Index 2013

28 | P a g e

Paki
stan

The Global
Gender Gap
Index 2013

ECONOMIC
PARTICIPATION
AND
OPPORTUNITY

EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT

HEALTH AND
SURVIVAL

POLITICAL
EMPOWERME
NT

Rank

Rank

Rank

Ran
k

Rank

score

135

0.545
9

Nep
al

121

0.605
3

116

Indi
a

101

0.655
1

124

Ban
glad
esh

75

0.684
8

121

Chin
a

69

0.690
8

62

135

score

score

129

0.768
5

0.5151

0.4465

score

124

0.955
7

130

0.746
2

120

0.857
4

0.4954

0.6752

0.3108

score

64

0.148
7

112

0.961
2

41

0.198
9

135

0.931
2

0.385
2

115

0.884
6

124

0.955
7

0.403
6

81

0.988

133

0.939
8

59

0.160
4

-------------------------------------------------

Struggle for Change: State of Social Movements In Pakistan

Prof. Riaz Ahmed Shaikh
Abstract: Pakistan has witnessed a number of social movements that speak volumes about the energy and openness
of the society as well as about the uncertain issues and conflicts. Due to the denial of democratic rights to ordinary
citizens and constrains placed on the freedom of expression, resilient people of Pakistan have registered their point
through protest and expressed their inspirations via numerous social movements.
This paper while discussing the classical and changing concept of Social Movements globally will focus on the
nature of different social movements emerged in Pakistan and how their trends have been keep on changing as per
needs and requirements of the situation. Interestingly on one hand such trend reflects the positive developments
taking place in the country.
On the other hand extremely right wing forces have tried to capture debate in their favour. Paper also focuses on the
class based social movements. It would also address how women of this country are still busy in tiring and unending
struggle. Efforts of different professional organizations to bring change in the society would also be highlighted.
Introduction

29 | P a g e

Social Movements have been defined by scholars in different ways. According to Prof. Mario A network of
informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and / or organizations, engaged in a political or
cultural conflict, on the basis of shared collective identity (Diani, 2000). Another views explains Organized efforts
to promote or resist change in society that rely, at least in part, on non institutionalized forms of political action
(Gary & Adam, 1994).
Scholars have identified several key characteristics about social Movements including (i) basically movements
demand for change in public policy, but they also make claims that effect the culture and values of society but they
also make claims that effect the culture and values of society (ii) They provide outlets for expressing constructed
social and political identities (Meyer and Kretschmer, 2007).
A Social Movement is comprised of Social Movement Organizations (SMO), which are a complex or formal
organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter movement and attempts
to implement goals. (Carthy and Zald, 1997)
Most important question is why to study Social Movements? It helps (i) One to understand why people protest and
what they want to accomplish (ii) One to learn more about politics including existing public policies, (iii) Sheds
light on major resources of change and conflict in society (iv) Provides information about technical changes and
their advantages and disadvantages (v) Helps one to recognize that certain movements may want to restrict social
change because they believe it would disrupt society or be harmful to certain members of society (Godwin and
Jasper, 2003)
Social Movements have long history, but process has not remained stagnant and there is a vital change in the
character of old and new movements. As far as old Social Movements are concerned, they were more class based,
political in nature, focusing more on wages, job security, benefits, targeting state, supporters of such movements
were most working class and such movements were very much bureaucratic and centralized in their working. As
compare to these, new social movements are more non-class based, highly fragmented, cultural, post-modern
cultural, focusing issues like peace, environment, human rights and identity.
State is one possible targets of their activity. New Social Movements are addressing gender, sexual orientation and
ethnic and racial issues. Their supporters are new Middle Classes, students, unemployed youth. Modern Social
Movements ideology is based on socially constructed nature of grievance and their organizations are informed
networks.
Social Movements in Pakistan
With an estimated population of 190 Million, seventh most populous country. Pakistan is on one hand part of global
community and the changing taking place globally, but simultaneously there are certain movements exclusive linked
to this country.
Pakistan has witnessed a number of social movements that speak volumes about the energy and openness of the
society as well as about the uncertain issues and conflicts. Countrys has grown exponentially in the last 67 years
with the large number of unskilled youth that present a wide range of social and political problems. Radical and
extremist ideas have taken roots and sectarian and ethnic movements are on rise. Beside this on political side, there
have been many democratic movements with the objective building or restoring democracy like the movements for
the womens rights which has made considerable progress but still has to go a long way. More than 60% of
population is made of young people and a vast ethnic diversity. Pakistan has immense resilience against extremism.
The new social media has provided powerful tools for social mobilization. This power of technology will be shaping
the future of societies including Pakistan.

30 | P a g e

Pakistan today faces multiple challenges in order to deal with these challenges, political stability and social
solidarity are imperative. But it is regrettable fact that Pakistan witnessed more years of Martial Law rule and
democratic values were not allowed to take roots. Similarly, in the past, Pakistan has focused more on economic
development related to infrastructure and national security. Social sector did not get its due share of attention. Due to
this reason Pakistan is seen as middle income country as far as economic development is concerned but is
considered to be a least developed country when it comes to social indicators. Depressing situation be measured
from the fact that people living below the poverty line have increase in the recent years. Pakistan is among those
three country where poliovirus has become epidemic. But state is still proud of being nuclear power. This existing
wide gap from denial of freedom of expression to targeting religious minorities, social exclusion of women from the
process of development, shortage of energy to stagnant economy despite stark increase in population growth (2.4%
per annum) has provided fertile ground for social Movements in the country. Misplaced priorities increasing
corruption, deteriorating law and order situation less human security increasing pressure on the existing structure
ignorant agriculture sector (despite providing employment to more 42 percent work force) has increased the
frustration of common in the country. State has nearly lost its writ on a large territory of the country and has agreed
on the principle of marriage of convenience with certain fundamentalist group who maintain their silent sleepers
throughout Pakistan (Baqir, 2014).
In the recent years Lawyers Movement of 2007 against the dictatorial regime of General Musharaf emerged as a
strong voice, this movement ended with unexpected victory. It set the precedence of supremacy of constitution, and
blocked the ways of future interference by any institution. In the past, judiciary followed the dictates of military
rulers, and allowed them to subvert constitution. This movement had wide ranging impact like Chief Justice took
hundreds of suo moto actions against corruptions of high officials and politicians, to control human rights violations,
addressing missing persons issue while challenging ISI and other influential institutions, deteriorating, law and order
situation in Karachi, Balochistan unrest etc. Movement has solidified the legal platform for the common citizen
(Akbar, 2014).
Despite all the signs of a political movement the 2007 lawyers protest could not become a political movement.
Because at least following components required for any mass movements success were not available for 2007
lawyers protest:
1- A broad goal or cause which has an appeal for a wider segment in a society.
2- Call for regime change, inclusion or representation of excluded groups.
3- A framework which means ideological content, enhancing value and norms for promoting rule of law and
citizens right, and
4- Credible leadership (Shafqat, 2014)
Restored Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry followed the hyper judicial activist Model which could not sustain. By
after his retirement his successor Chief Justice Tasadaque Jillani restored the grace of the superior courts and
simultaneously gave several landmark decisions including one related to the religious minorities of Pakistan. This
crucial decision came few days before his seven months brief tenure as Chief Justice (Siddiqui, Dawn, July 2014)
Pakistan Diaspora and youth are playing very pivotal role in recent political movements of PAT and PTI, but with
different impacts. Students Movement has a very rich history in Pakistan. 1952, 1954, 1968 were true years of
progressive student movements. But General Zias action to ban student in 1984, stopped any further chances of
healthy student activism. Students were divided on religious, sectarian and ethnic identities. Use of torture and
weapon become routine against their opponents. Now a significant youth is getting close to PTI but most of these
youth are direction less and apolitical as far as political nurturing is concerned.

31 | P a g e

A huge Pakistani workfare is working outside the country. Previously they used to work in Western Societies, where
they learnt about unionization and other rights. But after Petro dollars emergence in mid 70s, their new destiny
became Middle East. Unfortunately, this time they were exposed to religious fundamentalism and extremism in
Middle East. They promoted extravagance and culture of madrassas in Pakistan. They now insitated on a new
religious identity based on extremist- Wahabi Islam. The clash between Moderate and extremist Islam would
continue in the coming years and decades. It is unfortunate fact that religious discourse- through Islamization and
religious socialization- is encroaching further into civil society Jurisdiction (Rana, 2014)
Due to the denial of democratic and political rights to the Federating units for the longer time, new movements for
more political autonomy, creation of new provinces and even insurgency movement in Pakistan became strong in
recent years. In Punjab, movement for Sirakai and Bahalpur province, In KP movement for Hazara province and in
Sindh, demand for Muhajir province pleaded their cases from time to time. Insurgency in Balochistan is in fact a
result long negligence and exploitive strategy adopted by the central government against the province since its
inception. Now state institutions support to sectarian organization to suppress nationalist trend especially in Sindh
and Balochistan. This strategy has further aggravated the existing fault lines. Disappearing of Sindhi and
Balochistan nationalist and recovery of their mutilated bodies is further alienating these nationalities (Amin, 2014).
Feudalism and feudal culture has remained strong element in Pakistans political-social culture. Half hearted impacts
of 1959, 1972 and 1977 for law reforms received serious jerk when Sharia Bench of Supreme Court declared any
type of land reform illegal and against Islamic principle. But peasants continued their struggle despite all constrains.
One significant peasant movement emerged from Okaras military farm during General Musharafs days. Despite of
all state repression, peasants refused to succumb. Rather this protest soon shaped into a proper movement- Anjumane-Mazareen other peasants movements like Sindh Hari committee, and Hashat Nagar Movement have unfortunately
lost their grounds. But, a strong sentiment is emerging against the inhuman repressing feudal system in the country.
Left orientated and progressive party- Pakistan workers party- has recently approached supreme court to declare
earlier decision of Sharia Court about land reforms as void.
Strong resistance to state repression came forward in federal capital- Islamabad, when dwellers of slums / Karachi
Abadies of the city protested against their displacement and handing over of their land mafias to make shopping
plazas and ultra modern malls under the impression of neo-liberal economy. The movement was lead by progressive
elements and especially Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, an academic and political activities (Sajjad, 2014).
Pakistani women has a long history of suppression. After a dormant role for initial decades, Pakistani women
became very active during the martial law days of General Zia. Islamization laws starkly targeting women forced
them to join hands. WAF emerged as a strong voice for women rights. In the recent years women have become a
very visible voice (Saigol, 2014). Due to constant persuasion of their agendas, they have achieved several
milestones. Reserved seats in parliament, establishment of National Commission on the status of Women,
appointment of female judges in superior courts, several legislations favouring women are few successes. Mukhtara
Mai became the symbol of courage and resistance against biased and patriarchal system prevailing in the country.
Despite strong feminist movement, recent retrogasive recommendations of council of Islamic Ideology (CII) have
left no stone unturned to snatch all legitimate rights of Pakistani Women.
Transgender have been one of the most humiliated group in the sub-continent. They have exploited sexually and
faced inhuman practices. They restored to protest for the achievement of their due status in the society. Due to their
constant protest and favourable support from the superior court, they luckily enough to get many rights for
themselves.
Conclusion

32 | P a g e

The contemporary history of civil society movements in Pakistan can be traced to several decades back. Civil
society movements in Pakistan have been dominated by three major trends- radical resistance of revivalists against
encroachment of social space by the state, revolutionary challenge to the legitimacy of state and market economy by
left wing progressives, and reclaiming the space encroached upon the state by reformists of liberal secular thinking
through constitutional means. These trends continue to this day. Pakistani society has been in continuous flux since
the end of Muslim rule in sub-continent. A sense of fear about its existence and insecurity from giant neighbor
developed a psyche to which Sigmund Freud named as Thainod and unfortunately states all policies revolved
against this paranoia. This situation calls for a deeper understanding of the forces which are shaping Pakistan society
and determining the role of various actors in facilitating or hindering this change throughout these changes.
Pakistans civil society played a key role in four areas: (i) Social reformation, (2) freedom and social justice (3)
socio-economic development, and (4) the provision of welfare and social safety net. This struggle would continued
in Pakistan in future as well.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------References
Akbar, Shahzad. (2014). Impact of Lawyers Movement on New Legal and Social Order in Pakistan, Islamabad: ISS.
Akhtar, Aasim Sajjad. (2014). The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, Observations on Agrarian Politics, Past,
Present and Future, Islamabad: ISS.
Amin, Tahir. (2014). Identity and Ethnic Politics, Islamabad: ISS
Baqir, Fayayz. (2014). Civil Society Movements in Pakistan, Islamabad: ISS.
Carthy, Mc & Zald, Mayer N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of
Sociology, Vol 82 (6).
Diani, Mario. (2000). The Concept of Social Movement, The Sociological Review, Vol 40(1), Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Gary Marx & Adam Douglas Mc (1994). Collective Behavior and Social Movements, California: Prentice Hall.
Goodwin, Jeff & Jasper, James M. (2009). The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts, Wiley-Blackwell.
Meyer, David S. and Kretschmer, Kelsy. (2007). Social Movements. Pp. 540-548 in The Handbook of 21st Century Sociology,
edited by Clifton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Rana, Amir. (2014). Role and Trends of Political Islam in Pakistan, Islamabad: ISS.
Saigol, Rubina. (2014). Collusion, Confrontation, Capitulation: The State Fundamentalisms and the Womens Movement,
Islamabad: ISS.
Shafqat, Saeed. (2014). Political Movements and democratization in Pakistan: 2007 Lawyers Protest or a Political Movement,
Islamabad: ISS.

-----------------------------------------------------

Religion - a tool for power: A window to obscurantism in Pakistan

- The blasphemy laws
Prof. S. Haroon Ahmed
In the brief history of Pakistan its creation is still debated whether it came into being for Islam or for Muslims.
Earlier Mohammad Ali Jinnah spelled out that in Pakistan everyone is free to practice their faith and in the eyes of
state everyone has equal rights. However, soon those in powers, mostly migrants from India had no constituency of
their own, colluded with the religious forces (who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan). Thus Islam, Quran,
Kashmir, emerged as symbol of our existence and India was the arch enemy bent to destroy us. While civilians,
bureaucrats and military shared power, both have used religious forces to stay in power.
The next phase started after the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan. The United States in collaboration with Saudi
Arabia and Zia Ul Haq government in Pakistan called for Jihad and facilitated Jihadis from all over the world to

33 | P a g e

fight the infidel. After the withdrawal of Soviet Union in eighties and its dismemberment in nineties, the Jihadis with
a sense of pride in defeating one of the super power had no new target. They turned to Kashmir supported overtly
and covertly by the establishment of Pakistan.
It took sometime before the Jihadis and their handlers luke warmed under international pressure. They then turned to
Pakistan state. Full circle! Since then they have caused havoc by attacking Mosques, Imam Bargahs, the security
establishment and caused panic and scare in Bazars and Mazars.
Later after 9/11 and threat from Collin Powel, Mushraf dutifully agreed for u-turn. However this pronouncement at
the top could not turn the age old collaboration between our security outfit (more retired than serving) and Jihadis.
In this process the rightist, religious parties and fundamentalist forces became powerful and non state forces
emerged supported by Foreign aids.
The political scene has now changed radically. At the same time India drifted from secularism to fundamentalism. It
appears that they have learnt from us: arousing faith for political gains.
The realization came late to our foreign policy handlers i.e. army to feel the heat. The recent event in Afghanistan
(election) and insecurity of common citizens in Pakistan, army took the initiative to launch Zarbe Azb on the
reservoir of Jihadis in Waziristan.
The recent unrest caused by the Tehreek e-Insaf about alleged rigging in the elections of 2013 has propped up new
forces. The charismatic cricketing hero has high-jacked the young cricket loving youth to the slogan of corruption
free new Pakistan. But the emotional and so far politically nave young blood fails to see the born again Muslims
Imran Khans of Tehreek e- Insaf Pakistan (TIP) and its connection with Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP). His
self pronounced statement is that his policy is same as Jamat-e-Islami.
Blasphemy Laws: an indicator of social regression
To take only the havoc caused by Blasphemy laws, will indicate the extent to which Pakistani society is drifting into
obscurantism.
The history of Blasphemy Laws in the subcontinent goes back to 1860 (Indian Penal Code) when it was made a
criminal offence. In Pakistan almost no blasphemy offence was brought to the court till eighties. In 1980 during
martial law of Zia Ul Haq there was resurgence of states interest in blasphemy and sections 295, 295 A, 295 B, and
295 C (punished with death) were introduced in Penal Code. Since then section 295 C has been abused by vested
interest and more than 60 cases has been reported since 1992.

34 | P a g e

Pakistan Penal Code - sections of the blasphemy laws

Section 295: Injuring or deling place of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any
class
Section 295-A: Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any
class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs
Section 295-B:Whoever, willfully deles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran
or, of an extract there from, or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful
purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life. (1982.)
Section 295-C: Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, deles the sacred name of the
Holy Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to ne. (1886.)

Salman Taseer, Governor of Punjab was killed by his guard and another prison guard attacking and seriously
injuring a mentally ill British Pakistani in the most secure ward of prison are example of the state of affairs. The
attack by enraged crowd in Christian colonies, Shatninagar in 1997 (on 27th Ramzan a call from the mosque, detail
in Appendix I), Gujar Colony 2009, Joseph Colony 2009, Francis Colony 2003. Hindu Temple in Larkana
(Appendix II) and Ahmedis locality killing seven people in Gujrawala in 2014 are all to grab land and business. The
most recent in early November this year was the brutal burning alive of a Christian couple for contrived blasphemy
allegation. They were demanding wages from the owner of a brick kiln.
A group of lawyer threatening openly a blasphemy defender lawyer Rashid Rehman in the court in presence of judge
and later killed in broad day light. Nobody was arrested or punished (Zohra Yousuf, Dawn, November 17, 2014).
I. A. Rehman commented on Gilgit courts pronouncing 26 year sentence on media magnet of Jung Group, Mir
Shakeel Ur Rehman and famous Veena Malik and her husband for a morning show dubbed as blasphemous. No less
than 75 cases were registered against them all over the country on charges of showing disrespect to Ahle Bayt. He
stressed that the threat to media freedom has assumed menacing proportion (Dawn 4 December 2014).
Appendix I Appended is a relevant portion of report on Shantinagar carnage in 1997 where a team of Pakistan
Association for Mental Health visited to assess the psychological trauma (Monograph: Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder. Pakistan Association for Mental Health July 1997)
Appendix II
Another brief report seventeen year apart, was a painful visit by a team of Society for Secular
Pakistan to Larkana in 2014 for solidarity and fact finding.
At both places, our personal observation was Blasphemy is used to grab land and business. It takes very little time
to incite people when announcement is made from the mosques (29 March 2014).
--------------------------------Appendix 1

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Khanewal / Shantinagar:
Khanewal is around 50 miles east of Multan, and situated between Ravi and Sutlej rivers. It was a Tehsil
of Multan district until 1985. The prominent political family of Dehakans gave the city its name. the
original inhabitants are a Rajputs and have lived in this area for ages. It has rich soil and the main
occupation is agriculture. It has eight villages of Christians and the rest are Muslim villages. In 1947
after partition of the subcontinent a great majority of immigrants came from Rohtak, Hisar and settled
there. Rohatakis now most powerful business influence in the city. They are known for their hard work
and hot temper. Mostly belong to Sunni school of Islam. The militant religious organization Sipah-iSahaba has a strong following in the area and it actually had its birth in Kabirwala, a village near
Khanewal.
In February 1997 Khanewal became the focus of attention due to two major catastrophes which shook
the nation one a communal conflict at Shatinagar where 30-40 % of houses were burnt, the other the
great a train disaster at Mehershah killing more than 130 people (Mehershah report not included).
Shantinagar: It was a communal conflict where on trumped up charges of desecration of Holy Quran a
vested interest group exploited the sentiments against the Christian community. It was February 5,
1997 which was also the 27 th of Ramzan when announcements from the mosques were made about
the desecration of the Holy Book. Between 10 20 thousand people (according to different estimates)
gathered around Shantinagar and launched an attacked.
While the resident made their way to the nearby fields, houses the churches were severely or
damaged and shops looted. Luckily no one was killed.
Two focus groups report conducted by us is interesting.
Focus Group Discussion
Khanewal
Several focus group meetings were scheduled at Khanewal but precise methodology could not be
followed in all. However. two group discussions based on focus group methodology were held. In one
of them, the top administrative officer (ADCG) participated while in the other public relation officer and
those in contact with Christian community were present. Others participants were representative of
Muslims and Christians community beside opinion markers.
Khanewal Group Meeting I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Dr. Pervaiz Ahmed

Mr. Shahid Majid
Mr. Nathanyal
Maulana Alizir Rehaman Hamadi
Father Darshan Theodore
Father Alvin Wilson
Mr. lnam Qureshi
Chamber of

8.
9.
10.
11.

Mr Imtiaz Ali Asad

Dr. Rafey Ahmed
Dr. S. Ali Wasif
Prof. S. Haroon Ahmed

Guest House 31 March 1997 at l1.am

ADCG, Khanewal
Magistrate, Khanewal
Namberdar Shantinagar
Religious Scholar
St. Joseph Church Khanewal
Church of Pakistan
Journalist & Member,
Commerce, Khanewal
Editor Shahroz
Psychiatrist, Karachi.
Psychiatrist, Karachi.
Psychiatrist (Convener), Karachi.

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After a brief input from convener, the group started discussion rather pleasantly. However, it was
guarded to the extent as if the incident has settled down. "There was no reason for such a tragic
incident . the relief work will be completed in a month's time.; there has been a lot of good will
among Muslirns and Christians. Christian leaders expressed satisfaction over relief work and Muslim
representatives believed that normality is coming soon (auto-rickshaw and wagons are running and
everyone is working?). A few weeks back at Mehar Shah, the site of tragic train accident many
Christians were involved in rescue operation (voluntarily).
Gradually the discussion proceeded to the real issues, though the cordial atmosphere was
maintained. Frequent eye contact among participants and tone of speech was noted, which
was also expressive of anger and hostility, but guarded and well controlled. The grievances spelt
out earlier were of minor nature. There was sense of uneasiness among Christians when it was
mentioned that they are getting everything. The life in Shantinagar and Tibba is still unsettled.
The extent of property loss is not appreciated - may be due to insensitiveness of Muslims who
believe that everything is now settled. There cannot be real peace until culprits are apprehended was
emphasized by Christians. The police handling of the entire issue was discussed.
Identifying the process leading to the carnage in Shantinagar and Tibba. Following points were
made:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Bible was found on the ground of the house of Raji Baba at Shantinagar.
Christians demanded action based on Blasphemy law.
FIR was registered after several days on the intervention of administration.
Culprits (from police) were arrested but were seen on duty on Election Day.
Pages of Quran with Christian's names were found in an isolated mosque on the outskirts of
Shantinagar.
6. Within hours few unidentified persons on motorcycles went around mosques asking the Imam
to announce the desecration of Quran on loudspeaker, which was done by the majority of the
mosques.
7. It was 27th of Ramzan and 5th of February (and Kashmir day) which seems to have specially
selected, when a large number of Muslims were praying.
8. Estimated 5-20 thousand people gathered around Shantinagar wanting the custody of the
seven persons.
9. Unknown small groups of people were inciting the public.
10. Police were around but they did not do anything.
11. After the carnage - burning of about 30-40% of household of Shantinagar army appeared.
They apprehended some looted property (including cattle).
12. About 50-60 people were armed with explosives including a small special type of bombs
(shells have been found).
Later discussion concluded that it was not Muslims Christian confrontation but engineered by
a vested interest group who chose 27 Ramzan to take revenge of personal nature.
It was also concluded that, the incident was organized by gangs who have no religion but their
vested interest. They need to be isolated. It was then re-iterated by the Christian representative
that unless, the culprits are apprehended there will not be any peace. The tribunal was set-up but
there is apprehension that the report may not be made public - like so many tribunals whose
reports have been suppressed. It was emphasized that no person would write their names on the
pages of Holy Quran and that it must have been planted to take revenge.
It was proposed that:

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1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

A peace committee, which was to be set up, should be revived (Christian leader failed
to give names for the peace committee).
All effort should be made by Christian and Muslims to prevent the recurrence of such incident
(Christian leaders informed that leaders from outside are trying to cash on the situation. But
the local leaders have countered any build up).
Seminars between Muslim and Christian communities should be conducted to bring
peace, harmony and goodwill.
Government should put more efforts in rehabilitation programme.
Formation of small groups in both communities at grass root level to help resolve the
conflicts in future and promote peace.
Needs for psychological rehabilitation was emphasized, with the formation of self-help
groups (a sizeable female population of the locality are nurses. It was found easy to brief them
for lay counseling).

Khanewal: Group Meeting II

.
1. Mr. Imtiaz Ali Asad
2. Mr. S.M. Dutt

31st March 1997 at 3.20 p.m.

Editor Shaboroz, Khanewal
Christian leader, Shantinagar

3.

Mr. Abid Kamalvi

Information Department, Khanewal

4.

Major Shafi Masih

Salvation Army, Khanewal region

5.

Moulana Sofi Abdul Haq

Religious Scholar, Khanewal

6.
7.
8.

Mr. Mushtaque Sohail

Mr. Amin Warsi
Mr. Shahid Majid

Christian's representative
Journalist, Akash
Magistrate, Khanewal

9.

Mr. Waheed Imran

Daily Akhbar-e-Khanewal.

10. Dr. Rafey Ahmed

Psychiatrist, Karachi.

11. Dr. S. Ali Wasif

Psychiatrist, Karachi.

12. Prof. S. Haroon Ahmad

Psychiatrist (convenor), Karachi.

After brief introduction the discussion started rather frankly around justice, crime and punishment.
The Christian representative expressed that reconciliation is possible only if they get justice. The
tribunals/court proceedings are generally thrown into waste paper basket. The misunderstanding is
likely to persists or even get worse.
"We have some consolation from prompt action and genuine feeling from our administration. The
Muslim and Christians have lived peacefully in Khanewal. It is the third party with vested interest that
is responsible for such havoc. They must be punished". The Muslims participants agreed and that they
must be taken to task. There was some satisfaction that inspite of such a large-scale destruction no
loss of life have been reported. "The women and children are worst affected.
After justice is dispensed everything should be alright". However, there was a view that the
process of justice may take time but the need of women and children is immediate. They need to
be emotionally rehabilitated. The example of train accident was quoted where Salvation Army team
reached immediately and helped irrespective of religion or cast.
There was general complain from Christians that the people are of the impression that we are
blackmailing the administrations. They should be made aware of the extent of destruction and
unsettled life. Christians men and women cannot go out for work due to fear.
What need to be done now was then urged to be discussed. After extensive discussion, following was
proposed.

38 | P a g e

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

Liaison between religious leaders of both the communities should be made and frequent meetings
among them are desirable.
The mosques from where announcements were made should announce contradiction and appease
Christian people (religious leaders present agreed to announce). Moreover, people should be
educated from mosques to promote peace and to teach tolerance.
Small self help group of both the communities should meet and review the causes and allay fear.
Women and children should receive special attention. Their physical and psychological
rehabilitation is urgent; role of Sunday school and counseling was recommended. The group from
Karachi gave a self-help programme.
Delegation of Muslim (men, women and children) should be formed to make contact with the
Christian community.
Proceedings and the decision of the tribunal should be made public. Whosoever is found guilty
should be punished.

Appendix II
March 29 2014
Pilgrimage to Dharamshala, Larkana: Fact finding and Solidarity
The society for Secular Pakistan took the initiative to express solidarity with the Hindu Panchayat and Hindu Community in
Larkana, after a mandir was attacked by obscurantist on the rumour that few pages of Holy Book had been found around the
Dharamshala, located in the prime location of the city.
We were a team of ten who started from Karachi, at 8:30am on Saturday morning 29 th March 2014 joined by representatives of
HRCP, DSF and WAF, arriving around 6 pm, Larkana City Center and straight to Dharmshala.
An impressive gathering was waiting for us. We were immediately put on a 12 seat podium. The master of ceremony was a young
Muslim psychiatrist Dr. Inayat Magsi. The basic points made in the speeches were that the Hindu community is living in Larkana
for centuries in harmony with all. Sindh is a desh of Sufis and peace is their motto.
After the session we visited veteran communist leader Sobho Gianchandani at his residence. The organizer lodged us in our
hotel and guest houses to rest and later to a dinner hosted by DC Larkana, Mr. Gawar Laghari. He is a young and smart
bureaucrat posted hardly a few weeks ago. His version of the event and handling was later corroborated by other eye witnesses
and press. The crowd was swelling from hundreds to several thousand. When the police force was getting weak they were
strengthened by Rangers. In this process DC was man-handled, his shirt was torn. The fire was controlled by 3 am. The crowd
dispersed. No FIR was lodged against anybody.
Next day DC joined Hindu Community and celebrated Holi with them. By morning the whole ugly episode was controlled. It is
claimed to have been controlled in record time as compared to happenings elsewhere. No damage was done to Dharamshala,
though in the temple, worshipping idols were attacked. Next day shops opened and life came back to normal.
A press conference was held at the Labour Union office. The media patiently waited as our group arrived late by two hours from
a visit to Mr. Qureshis residence, a leader of J.S.Q.M, who was slain few weeks back. The press was very appreciative and fully
aware of the actual happening. A judicial inquiry was demanded by our group.
At the Press Conference we were told that a few Maulanas came looking for Dr. Haroon who was inadvertently quoted to have
criticized Molvis. Some of us then went to the shrine of Qaim Shah Bukhari, meeting Moulana Manzoor Ata and Hafiz Roshan
and others. Surprisingly we were welcomed with garlands. They belonged to Jamiatul-Islam JUI and informed us how they
personally reached the site on the appeal by Hindu Community and helped in diffusing the crises. We appreciated their role of
media.
When we analyzed the situation it appeared like a conspiracy to harass Hindu community and stop them from celebrating Holi
festival. The incident was traced to a personal enmity between a Hindu family and a Muslim boy who was accused and arrested

39 | P a g e

for robbery in their house. Some residents were also of the opinion that land mafia under the political patronage is cashing the
incident by stating that pages of Holy Quran were found in the vicinity.
All these factors have contributed to Larkana episode but a series of such incidents took place in Dumbalo, Hyderabad and
couple of other places. The rise of extremism is a serious threat to the peaceful, secular and pluralistic society of Sindh. The
mushrooming of Madrassas all over Sindh is contributing in widening the gulf and isolating religious minorities (Dr. Haroon
Ahmed, President, and Society for Secular Pakistan).
Alas, he passed away on 8th December, Society for Secular Pakistan organized a reference on 16 th December 2014 in Karachi.

------------------------------------------------------------------

Understanding Pakistan: A Case for Higher Education, Science &

Technology
Dr. Kauser Abdulla Malik
Pakistan after 9/11 has passed through a phase of perpetual war. It has been dubbed as an epicenter of terrorism;
centre of Islamic fundamentalism and a target of 'travel advisories by several countries' giving a sense of isolation to
the people of Pakistan. This was further compounded by refusal of many countries especially India to play cricket in
Pakistan. Inspite of being victims of terrorism, losing more than 50000 lives at the hands of Islamic Fundamentalists
in the form of Taliban, resilient people of Pakistan continued to prove to the world that a large majority of its
population is peace loving and does not subscribe to any fundamentalist philosophy. However due to historical
reasons the image of Pakistan among Indians is generally quite blurred and most of the times not based on facts.
Same may probably be true for Pakistanis not knowing much about Indians except the images portrayed by
Bollywood.
I do not belong to a generation who had migrated from India nor have any reminiscence of partition. To me India is
a beautiful neighboring country with whom we want to have friendly and peaceful relations as we would like to have
similar relations with Iran and Afghanistan. All our misgiving and mistrust can be overcome by increasing people to
people contact which can be a forerunner to solve all territorial and political issues.
It is interesting to note that Pakistan during this post 9/11 period has gone through renaissance in science and higher
education. Pakistan has a population of about 100 million below the age of 20 which presents both a challenge and
opportunity. In order to effectively use this human resource, budget of higher education was increased by 3500%
and that of science and technology by 6000%. Pakistan embarked on an ambitious program of HRD by establishing
new universities both in public and private sector. In year 2000, there were only 59 universities in the public sector;
these have increased to 157. The university enrolment also increased from 135,000 to 1,300,000 in 2013. Faculty
development programs were initiated and a large number of foreign PhD scholarships were awarded for studies in
Europe, North America, Japan etc. Nearly 11,000 foreign scholarships awarded to date (PhD, post-doctoral, split
PhD etc, mostly for Europe). Also, world's largest Fulbright Scholarship program for US is currently in operation.
Over 15000 indigenous PhD scholarships have also been awarded. A massive Post-doctoral training program was
initiated for local PhDs. In addition, all locally enrolled PhDs are provided scholarship to spend up to six months in
any academic institution in the developed world. Another program which greatly helped the Universities was
Foreign Faculty Hiring Program under which over 600 eminent scientists and educationists have been attracted
back---after living most of their lives in the West. This resulted in significantly improving the standards of our
University education. All these programs are supported by a transparent competitive research grant system which
has resulted in developing a research culture in our academic institutions. Contribution of Pakistani scientists to the
world scientific literature increased significantly over the last ten years. In the year 2000 there were less than 1000

40 | P a g e

scientific publications annually in international journals which exponentially increased to more than 8000 in 2012.
Similarly in 2000 less than 200 PhDs were produced annually which increased to more than 800 annually in 2012.
In order to attract good faculty in the universities, tenure track system has been introduced due to which a Professor
can draw a monthly salary of around US$ 5000 which is several times more than a Federal Minister! All this has
resulted in giving respectability to university teaching and is attracting bright students to adopt this profession.
Another area, for which Pakistan can boast, is telecommunication and internet connectivity. The coverage of Internet
services has increased from 29 cities in 2000 to more than 2000 cities and towns in 2012. The Optical Fibre has been
laid in more than 1000 cities. The internet users are estimated to be more than 12 million. Explosive growth in
cellular phones continues till today (over 130 million phones todayhottest sector of the economy). Bandwidth
costs have been drastically reduced enabling an increased usage of this technology. One of the major benefits of
internet connectivity has been for the Universities. Higher Education Commission (HEC) has developed Pakistan
Educational and Research Network (PERN) which has been provided to all major universities allowing them access
to nearly 25000 full text journals and nearly 65,000 text books from 220 international publishers. In addition to these
facilities, HEC has provided video conferencing facilities to all the public sector universities to facilitate series of
international lectures (nation-wide) by top professors from leading world universities.
The purpose of narrating these developments is just to point out some of the positive aspects of Pakistan which are
generally not highlighted. The objective is not to compare with India where similar achievements must have also
been made, but to dispel some of the negative perceptions about Pakistan.
Based on science and technology, there are several avenues for collaboration between the two countries. There are
numerous common problems in agriculture and health where scientists from the two countries can join hands to
solve these if an enabling environment is provided. Scientists from both countries have been trying on their own to
have some kind of a collaborative activity. Few years back, when I was Secretary of the National Commission on
Biotechnology, we had a fairly high powered meeting in Lahore which was participated by Prof. M.S. Swaminathan,
Prof V. Chopra (Member, Planning Commission of India) and Dr. Manju Sharma (Secretary Dept. of Biotechnology)
along with Prof. Dr. Roger Beachy from USA. The agenda was to prepare a tripartite collaborative project to
develop crops tolerant to salinity through genetic engineering. We have been doing some fundamental work in this
area and were keen to collaborate with our Indian colleagues. We prepared a project and then decided what and
where to undertake required research. All this could not materialize because subsequently none of us could get visas.
Recently Indian National Academy of Sciences (INSA) and Pakistan Academy of Sciences has been having joint
meetings. We hope that these respective bodies will be able to influence the policy makers to ease the visa regime
enabling free movement of at least Fellows of both Academies.
------------------------------------------

Nationalisms and Regional Tensions

Prof. Ijaz Khan
Nationalism like any other term, especially of social science, is used to describe a certain fact, idea and program. It
has definitional problems too, again like most other terms. The basic idea is of group identity. A group of people
having some commonalities, which others dont have and thus can be identified as separate. More important for
political purposes are that such a group also believes it is different and has a unique identity. The substance of
commonalities is contextual and changes with time and space. It has sociological, cultural, economic, legal and
political aspects.

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When we talk of Nationalism in International Relations, we look more at its politics and law with some reference to
economics too. For IR, the Nationalism that matters is the one that crosses international boundary or has some
connection outside the borders of a State. The National identity that crosses international borders is present on
almost all borders of this region; Bangladesh India, Pakistan India, Pakistan Iran, Pakistan Afghanistan,
Afghanistan Iran, Afghanistan Central Asian States. We also have some national identities that may not cross
international borders, but are of interest when they challenge an existing state and thus have implications for the
region / IR. All these identities are not necessarily of interest to students of IR or the region. The identities become
of interest when they form basis of an active political nationalist movement. At the minimum, a Nationalist
Movement is when a certain identity demands political expression in the form of political structure, demanding
control of its resources and preservation and promotion of its language and culture.
The Modern State system based on territorial sovereignty had conflicted with Nationalisms in most states around the
world. Though modern state conceptually arose in response to aspirations of different National Groups in Europe for
a political identity, the contradiction State and National Boundaries was not completely absent. In Europe, this
contradiction became the most important cause of large-scale wars and violence, including the two World Wars in
the 20th century. We note conflict wherever national identities cross international boundaries. Additionally, we also
witness conflict where more than one nationality lives in a single territorial sovereignty. The intensity of the conflict
may vary, but conflict exists.
Nationalism has been looked upon as a political doctrine of self- determination.3 in this context nationalism may be
viewed as a particularistic phenomenon that intends to draw a distinction between people on the basis of various
socio-cultural categories. On the basis of distinct cultural categories they claim for the right to self-determination
and claim their right over a territory so as to emerge as a distinct political identity. Gellner states that nationalism is a
political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. Smith on the other hand, has
viewed it as a sentiment which he believes is as old as history. Karl Deutsch dealing with the issues of nation and
nationalism quite, at length viewed it as a positive historical frame which channeled racial mobilization in an era of
rapid urbanization and stimulated cultural mobilization in era of social alienation. There are many other scholars
who have viewed nationalism in terms of a process leading to various disparate ethnicities towards right to selfdetermination.
In non European World modern State arrived via colonial route; this contradiction is more pronounced and has
influenced state-to-state relations profoundly. The modern State arrived in most of non European World, via
European Colonialism. States there did not emerge in response to internal social, economic or political
developments, but were imposed from above. They mostly catered for the needs of the colonial powers than the
colonies. More significantly, colonial reach, holdings and divisions determined their boundaries. Termed Nation
state refers to a nation forming a state, however, in practice this has not happened absolutely. We note even in
Europe, cases of contradiction between State and Nation. Such contradictions had been cause of many wars there. In
France State pre dated French National identity. French revolution created French national identity and we can trace
the basis of French policy of considering all within Frances territory to be French, unlike Britain, which permits
plurality of ethno linguistic identities. Returning to non European World, the contradiction is even more pronounced
and thus continues to provide basis for conflict.
In sub continent, we see some unique features along with similarities of expression of this contradiction and conflict
based on it. One notes religion playing the role of National identity along with ethno linguistic and historical
identities. We also note different approaches to dealing with diversity within and its impact on State-to-State
relations. Except for Maldives, all South Asian States are Multi National States.
There is big number of national identities contradicting with State boundaries in South Asia. There is also a peculiar
South Asian, more specifically India understanding of what is meant by nation and national identity. T K Moor

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identifies 7 basis of National identity formation in South Asia These are: (1) ancient civilisational entity, (2)
composite culture, (3) political entity, (4) religious entity, (5) geographical/territorial entity, with a specific cultural
ethos, (6) a collection of linguistic entities, and (7) unity of great and little nations. Only the last three are relevant to
the post-colonial era.
A large number cross State boundaries with direct implications of regional relations, but many that do not cross
International Boundaries also have impact on regional politics. Bengalis, though crossed the border between India
and Pakistan (and since 1971 Bangladesh) however, due to a variety of historic and religious factors, the Bengali
National Movement that became the reason for War between India and Pakistan in 1971 was the movement for
independence of Bengalis of the then East Pakistan.. Pakhtun National Movement is the only one that really crosses
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Interestingly it has implications for relations between not just these
two states but influences relations of these two and India as well; has implications for international relations beyond
the South Asian region.
In almost all cases of Nationalist movements, especially when it challenges the State boundaries within which it is,
leads to accusations of support from a neighboring State. How much such allegations are facts is debatable. But
most States do directly or indirectly, materially or diplomatically do use Nationalist challenges to the other state for
a variety of Foreign/Security Policy goals.
In South Asia, different States have approached the multi-national composition of the people within their boundaries
differently. India, accepting the diversity of its peoples, tried to accommodate them in re drawing and creating new
states/provinces based on these national identities. Even now at least one such state is in the final stages of creation.
However, a number of challenges and movements for territorial sovereignty exist with accusations of external
support. Bangladesh based its unitary Bangladeshi identity on Language culture and territory denies the separate
identity of some smaller groups, however, these groups do not pose a serious territorial threat. Sri Lankan policy of
creating one identity based on majority Sinhala faced a violent resistance from the Tamil; fought a long war against
Tamil identity, and seemingly may have suppressed it militarily. The religious identity of the state, in Nepal is under
attack in the recent years and the non-Hindu communities are challenging it. The Mongolians have started asserting
for their distinct ethno-cultural and linguistic identity. They are against the Hindu character of the state and demand
for a secular nationalism. Bhutan has tried to impose a cultural policy aimed at Bhutanizing the large number of
Nepalese migrants. Maldives seems to be the only State in the region with no diversity.
Afghanistan ethno linguistic divide plays a major role in its politics; however, a much stronger historical Afghan
identity stops any of these groups from demanding secession. Even in the absence of secessionist movements,
Afghan ethnic plurality has been used by its neighbors to promote their interests inside Afghanistan, which is one of
the major causes of continued instability. Pashtun National identity lives across Pakistan Afghanistan border, is one
of the major causes for Pakistan, India and Afghanistan trilateral relations. Pakistan policy of dealing with its ethno
linguistic mosaic has been of denial. Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of State Nation, meaning creating a one
nation of all diversities within its borders. Its federalism is based on more administrative considerations and denial
of its diversities rather than their acceptance. This policy led to separation of East Pakistan in 1971, and even today
we note a very violent Baloch secessionist movement, with different degrees of such movements among Pakhtuns
and Sindhis. There are also quite active demands for separate provinces by some other national groups. Pakistan has
been accusing India of fomenting these movements specially Baloch and Pakhtun through Afghanistan.
Conclusions
In the traditional State Centric State system, we have rarely seen any peaceful resolution of ethno linguistic issues,
especially when they cross sovereignties; however, there have been instances where states have outgrown from their
conflicting claims, rather than their resolution one way or the other. The various border/ ethno linguistic claims have

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been overtaken by time and changes in International / regional governance. The evolution of European Union has
overtaken various territorial and ethno linguistic claims and conflicts.
Territory continues to be a vital element of State, however, disputes over them, whatever their historical / legal
legitimacy may be are consequence of an international system that depended and stressed on territorial exclusiveness
and separateness and insisted on absolute loyalty of the people to the territory. The end of Cold War has unleashed
forces and processes that were leaking out even during the hay day of Cold War. These forces and processes have
undermined the strict division of people on the basis of citizenship, nationality or sovereign territory. The post cold
war international system has also undermined the sanctity of International Borders as witnessed by the creation of
many new states on the Sovereign Territory of various states and the increased flow of capital, people, ideas,
movements and internationalization of production.
This process has also resulted in decrease in urge to secede when coupled with certain policies and changes in
governance, thus while giving increased international recognition to people over territory it has reduced the
significance of holding territory, which means also a decrease in the urge to acquire territory or secede. The
Germans of Bozen/Bolzano continue to be as Germans as they always were, but the urge to secede and return to
German State has also been decreased by the lowering of the Sovereignty wall that separated them from their fellow
Germans. An important element of that is the Italian policy of accepting the diversity and very important the
capability of Italian state to economically handle the economic cost of that diversity. The recent referendum in
Scotland and the one planned in Spain points towards a fact; you simply cannot wish away National Identities.
However, given choice they may or may not want a separate state. Its more about freedom of choice, socio
economic opportunities and share in State decision making. A Democratic way is the way forward, which leaves
behind these disputes, subduing and ending its violent expression. There can be a lesson for South Asia in that too.
Policies of open or very loose borders will lead to more secure borders.
This study consciously avoids using the term resolution of disputes between the two (or three). It suggests growing
out of the disputes. By lowering the sovereign territorial divisions, the claims on territory will lose its sting. With
time, these claims will just be part of very formal routine public statements or may be cricket matches.
But the million dollar question is will the decision makers change their perceptions as result of reading some
academic arguments or demands from some peace activists? Karl Marx says Men make their own history, but they
do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them, but under circumstances
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brain of the living. Environment may permit and provide conditions for some action to achieve
something. To act accordingly will however depend on the potential actors capabilities, motivation and priorities or
perceptions of what needs to be achieved at what cost. That in turn will depend on the personality of the entity in
question. So, to change perceptions, the personality of the States in question has to change. Ayub argues, The
problem for most Third World states has been compounded by two further factors. The first is the weakness of civil
society and of political institutions, which precludes the emergence of strong checks on the security apparatus
proclivity to usurp state power and resources. Second, the telescoping of the phases of the state
building into one phase, and the curtailment of the time available to complete the process, enhance the political
importance of the coercive functions and of the agencies that perform these functions."
The Westphalian State based on absolute territorial sovereignty and exclusivity has not been able to provide
resolution to the ethno linguistic National identity though it came into existence essentially as a response to the
aspirations of Nations for exclusive political expression. The Whether India with its acceptance of diversities or
Pakistan through its policy of denial of diversity, we note dissatisfied Nationalisms all over the region with serious
implications of region. This region has to grow out of it by accommodating the notions of decreased territorial
exclusivity, open borders, democratic governance and prioritizing of people security rather than territorial security.

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--------------------------------------------------

Pakistan India Relationship: Myth and Realities

Prof S. Haroon Ahmed
Violence is on the increase all over the world. This could be ascribed mainly to rising expectations of the masses
amid economic, political and territorial injustices. Easy access to weapons with real or supposed justification has
made the situation worse. Since World War II more than 200 wars of high or low intensity have been waged in
developing countries with most of the weapons sold by the five permanent members of United Nations. The
message of power flowing through the barrel of a gun (now nuclear bomb) has been clearly received and seriously
taken by the rest of the world. Even at the level of common man, the gun supersedes logic, the right or rational
thinking. In the subcontinent, the recent nuclear tests may appear disturbing to a few, but the general response is of
jubilation which is in fact reflective of raw emotions of scared people.
Aggressive behaviour
Many theories of the origin and nature of aggression have been floated and data generated to support them. The
inborn instinct, drive and motivation, conflict and stress resolution, social learning experience and individual
determinants to social environment are but a few of them. However, the consensus today is that aggression is
basically
a
form
of
learnt
behaviour
rather
than
an
emotional
or
needmotivated phenomenon.
Attitude and value system play a significant role in formulation of behavior patterns. Attitude is a relatively enduring
evaluation of an object or situation often with emotional content. Values are strongly held preferences and
judgments which define behavior as correct, acceptable or appropriate. The attitude towards deadly weapons has
been carefully toned down through beguiling misnomers like fat man, little nuke and star war.
Indo Pakistan
The Muslims ruled India for several centuries during which they acquired the presumptuous identity of being
superior, a sense of self-aggrandizement that alienated them from the rest of the populace. The concept of Umma
aggravated the situation and completed their alienation. The minority-majority complex, as defined by Dr. Mubarak
Ali, goes to explain the genesis of this attitude. The Muslims refused to recognize the over lordship of the Hindu
who had once remained under their control. The Muslim minority preferred British rule which came as a blessing,
saving them from the humiliation of domination by a Hindu majority. When the departure of British became
imminent they demanded the partition of India.
During the Ziaul Haq regime the state sponsored campaign of Islamic ideology being the driving force behind the
creation of Pakistan gained currency with religious parties (with street power) coming to the fore, even though they
hardly had any support at the grass-root electoral level.
Over the last 67 years Pakistan and India became arch rivals with Kashmir as the main symbol of discord. Many
more symbols were propped up in the process. However, when Pakistan began its erratic experiment with a
democratic system of governance, the biggest democracy of the world ironically started losing its secular identity.
The Muslim identity of Pakistan and Babri Masjid issue provided the Muslims in India with a religious slogan and
symbol. A Hindu India began emerging to confront a Muslim Pakistan. Not very surprisingly, Hindu sentiments
were aroused which swept the nation. In a way this is a form of conflict resolution and stress management. A sense
of insecurity is being force-fed to the people of a much bigger, much larger and very powerful India. Both countries

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have now detonated the Bomb, a so-called symbol of security and power. To name our missiles Prithvi and
Ghauri is an attempt to prop up more symbols.
Intolerance and hate are the major weapons used to divide people. New symbols are created and fancy slogans are
coined with unabashed religious, sectarian and communal overtones. Fictitious patriotism is flaunted, dissent is
punished and submission rewarded. Perpetrators of intolerance are glorified and the opinion of liberals and
intellectuals is suppressed.
The race for nuclear superiority between the two super powers in the recent past led to the disintegration of one of
them, but unfortunately the message so loud and clear has been totally lost on South Asia. Then there were lessons
to be learnt from armed conflicts between India and Pakistan. Instead, we have been distorting history, and what is
still worse, believe in it.
Both in Pakistan and India, the Bomb has been promoted as a symbol of strength, and greatness, and something to
be proud of. We have linked this so-called strength to patriotism and religion. This is a mental set ossified by
constant reinforcement by bellicose pronouncements across the borders. Attempts to decalcify this fixation met with
little success. Yet those who can see know that osteoporosis has set in and it is bound to fracture.
We are witnesses to and victims of violence all around us - social violence, political violence, religious and sectarian
violence, ethnic and linguistic violence, tribal, clan, family and domestic violence. There is violence within the
precincts of the mosque, the parliament, the court, the police station and educational institutions. There is violence
by the State against the citizens and by citizens against one another. No place howsoever sacrosanct is safe. We have
abandoned the path of argument, reasoning and persuasion.
The most destructive forms of violence spreading like an epidemic across our society are religious and sectarian.
Our political culture does not leave any room for tolerance or dissent which is the essence of democracy. Political
differences are sought to be settled, not through discussion and dialogue, but through resort to arms. Political leaders
and religious fanatics freely indulge in promoting violence against their opponents.
The need for civil society playing its historic role in conflict resolution has never been greater than today. All efforts
need to be made and all resources need to be mobilized, however meager they might be for the moment, to create
and spread social awareness. The voice of reason, howsoever feeble must be put across to as many ears as possible.
The feeling of inadequacy must not be allowed to hinder the role of civil society. Separation of religion from body
politics is the only answer.
The Security Myth and Mind Set:
Conflict resolution by use of force has played a major role in the world we live today. Security through the balance
of terror remains the major policy option. But the result is insecurity and the perpetual danger of death, destruction
and dislocation. The creation of ever larger armies equipped with more and more sophisticated and lethal weapons in
the later half of last century has caused the diversion of physical and financial resources, science and technology is
invested in so-called 'defense needs.'
The myth of contrived 'security' has been broken, yet the mindset created by the military-industrial complex lives
on. It has generated its own politics, culture and imaginary needs. People under the impact of this mindset are
contemptuous of democracy, insensitive to human rights and have their own brand of justice. In the name of
security, personal freedom, political process and environmental needs are undermined.
There are lessons to be learnt from the two armed conflicts between India and
Pakistan. We cannot afford basic need like health and education yet demand so-called 'defense needs'. The

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emergence of Bangladesh should have taught us basic lessons in the practice of democracy, justice and human
rights. But we have repressed them. The fallout of the Afghanistan crisis is clearly visible in everyday life in
Pakistan, yet we talk about war and Jihad.
Peace Movement: a psychological perspective
Erick Fromm says "the irrationalities of any given society result in the necessity for its members to repress the
awareness of many of their own feelings and observations. This necessity is greater in proportion to the extent to
which the society is not representative of all its members ". Then he asks a basic question "Is it possible that most
people should be so lacking in natural intelligence that they do not see with how much incompetence many of their
leaders - whatever the method by which they came to the top - perform their functions? Yet where would social
cohesion and unified action be if such facts became conscious to more than a tiny minority?" Of course cold war,
war-like situation and even war is one of the means used by the elite to hammer in the so-called social cohesion.
The fact remains that the powerful western media dominates the thinking process of the common man today.
Without going into a sizeable literature available to understand the mechanisms, let us look at one set of examples,
the social influence theories: Kalman (1958) put forward three main reasons why someone behaves in a conforming
way. They were compliance, meaning accepting majority view based on its power, identification meaning
conformity to the demands of a given role in society (we are what others think about us); and internationalization
meaning fully accepting and believing the prevalent views.
The information explosion through electronic devices television, computer, internet, mobile and the lot have yet to
find their place in our strategy. They provide stimuli to more than one sensory pathway. It holds attention by shape,
shade, colour, movement and illusion. It has also reduced the attention span of common man today. There is patience
enough to rush for the bottom line, the heart of the matter better appreciated by a slogan, catchword or symbols.
Historical Facts
The contemporary history of the Indo Pakistan Sub-continent, including the emergence of Pakistan on the world
map and the subsequent separation of Bangladesh as an independent nation, needs an impassionate and objective
review. Much subjective and emotional analysis has been dished out providing rationalism and cover-ups of
blunders. A few facts that emerge are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The feudals, bureaucracy and armed forces took turns, used each other and collaborated to divide people
and perpetuate their rule.
Long years of martial law did not allow any political process or culture to evolve.
The handling of Bangladesh issue should have given enough insight to formulate future policy. It has been
scraped from our mind.
Armed forces have been glorified and remains in control of foreign policy as well as privileged industrial
activity.
The Bhutto era was a period of slogans and promises. His contribution is remembered for what he said
and less for what he did.
The non-party elections staged by Gen Zia ul Haq were the greatest divisive force and I am afraid those
divisions are becoming irreversible.
The Afghanistan phenomenon was not tackled rationally. A fresh look at the Afghanistan situation would
give us some insight into the Kashmir issue.
Global changes and the demands of the post-cold war era economic needs, have not yet sunken into South
Asian psyche. We are still tied down by our old ways.

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9.

The system has reached a stage where if corruption is eradicated with a magic wand, the entire economy /
society will collapse.
10. Dynamic as the Pakistanis are, they have never been given a chance to shape their
destiny.
11. The freedom of the press is the greatest boon. The information explosion and media
management has yet to expose its power and potential. For me a calculated use of
the media is of utmost importance in bringing about meaningful awareness.
------------------------------------------------------------------

Judicial activism and the way towards a new consensus in Pakistan

Prof. Sajjad Naseer
Introduction
In the recent past, Pakistan experienced a phase of judicial activism for the first time, disturbing the equation
regarding the functioning of the political system. Restoration of the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Ahmad Chaudhry, through
a lawyers movement spreading over two years injected a new life and orientation in the superior judiciary. The
politically restored judiciary led to the evolution of a new power-center which asserted vigorously bringing the
executive and judiciary in a confrontational mode. After the passage of the 18 th Amendment and bringing back the
1973 Constitution in its original form, the last two years of Zardaris government saw two Prime Ministers of
Pakistan sent home as a consequence of judicial orders. Similarly many high profile cases were decided in a manner
that was embarrassing for the government. This contestation between the two organs of the state has thrown open
the question regarding the functioning of the trichotomy of power operating within their respective domains. This
calls for an end to Huntingtons formulation of Praetorianism establishing the principle of boundary
maintenance.
These developments are to be seen in the context of British legacy and the politico-constitutional evolution of
Pakistan in its historical context. Pakistan inherited and adopted the Government of India Act 1935 as its governance
document with minor changes. The norms and biases of operating the inherited political machine persisted and in
terms of structural functioning the British practices were adhered to. The British Raj judiciary never adjudicated
upon high profile cases against the government and no such precedent was set. The authoritarian vice-regal system
had little space to accommodate issues of public interest and the democratic forces unleashed after independence.
This caused multiple stresses and the famous case of Justice Munir Ahmad invoking Kelsens doctrine of
necessity and resisting the encroachment of representative forces in the authoritarian functioning of the political
system. The authoritarian streak of governance thickened and broadened with successive military governments and
even when the civilian governments were in power they continued with the same attitude and outlook. The contest
between the authoritarian and democratic forces came to the breaking point and the lawyers movement seems to
have worked as catalyst and the emerging situation for renegotiating the basis of the political system by developing
a consensus to operate the nation-state system, which is also invaded by the globalisation paradigm. A habitually
subordinate judiciary began to assert and claim its sphere of independence.
This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of the lawyers movement and its consequences. Has this disturbed the
functional equation of the political system which calls for a new consensus to be negotiated?
Judicial Crisis

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Pakistans chequered political history took yet another turn, when General Pervaiz Musharraf ordered the removal of
Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the Chief Justice of Pakistan on 9 thMarch 2007 by filing a reference against him. 1
This triggered a legal and political tsunami that swept across the country in varying degrees and intensity.
Uncharacteristically, the legal community collectively rose to defend their chief and demonstrated an unprecedented
show of strength and unity. While the legal battle was fought in the court, the lawyers added a political dimension to
their struggle by resorting to street protests, rallies, and demonstrations and by boycotting the court proceedings
throughout the country every Thursday of the week. The political void caused by the inaction of political parties was
filled by this mobilization process launched by the legal community, and the chief justice emerged as more of a hero
and Musharraf started looking like a villain. This mobilization proceeded with speed and the arrival of the chief on
12th May 2007 at Karachi to address the Bar, witnessed a brutal use of violence resulting in forty nine deaths.
While the legal community was in the vanguard of this struggle, the political parties, civil society groups,
intelligentsia, print and electronic media dove - tailed to raise the political temperature. Emboldened by the populous
sentiment, the Supreme Court Bench threw the reference out under Article 209 of the Constitution and unanimously
held to restore the Chief Justice. This happens to be the first fiercely contested clash between the overpowering
executive and a subordinate submissive judiciary, resulting in the victory of the latter.
This lustrous victory turned out to be short - lived and Musharraf lost his nerve with the continuing defiant
behaviour of the Chief, his colleagues, retired judges and the lawyers community. On November 3 rd 2007 President
Pervaiz Musharraf, in his capacity as the Army Chief2, issued a Proclamation of Emergency (Proclamation) under
which an Emergency was imposed in the country and the Constitution was suspended. The same day, a Provisional
Constitutional Order No 1 of 2007 was issued by the Army Chief under the authority that he derived from the
Proclamation, while an Oath of Office (Judge) Order 2007, was issued by the President. It was a unique violation of
the constitution, where under Clause 2 (1) of the PCO gave the President the power to amend the Constitution
simply through the issuance of an executive order, and clause 4 authorized him to alter, amend or repeal any law of
the country.3Ironically, this power was allowed to him by the then reconstituted Supreme Court (1999) to amend the
Constitution (a power that does not exist with the Supreme Court under the 1973 Constitution).Assuming all powers,
Musharraf virtually sacked 60 judges of the Supreme and High Courts and reconstituted the higher judiciary by
hand-picking the judges, reducing the judiciary to its historic subordinate role.4
These unusual and dramatic events puzzled political analysts, foreign observers and practitioner of politics alike.
This may be seen as fallout of the sustained struggle of the lawyers for over a year. During this period, people at
large began to see more clearly the other side of the political spectrum as highlighted by the powerful electronic
media. The excesses of the regime were debated and analyzed; its policies received critical scrutiny and the
oppositions political leaders and analysts got regular visibility as they articulated their views against the
government. The role of print media was no less significant as more and more anti Musharraf articles were
published regularly. These activities resulted in a general state of mobilization, reinforcing the anti-Musharraf
sentiments without translating into a mass movement as there existed structural tensions and the political forces did
not coalesce on one point. Even after the February 18th 2008 elections, where people gave their verdict against
Musharraf and his Pakistan Muslim League (Q) Party, the continuing crisis has not rested. Even after the formation
of Governments at the Federal and Provincial level, there is no movement towards the resolution of two contentious
issues viz; the restoration of judges to their position of November 3 rd 2007 and the future of Musharraf. Differences
have erupted between the major coalition partners, Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N)
over these issues and the latter has withdrawn its ministers from the federal cabinet as the Bhurban Declaration
was not implemented.5The lawyers continued to be defiant and organized the Long March from all over Pakistan
which took five days to reach Islamabad. It was a mammoth gathering of its own kind for the capital but fell short of
its objective as it required besieging the newly elected parliament, which could have serious implications for the
future of democracy. Without getting into the conflicting opinions and evaluation of the outcome of the Long

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March; the judges issue occupies the centre stage of political discourse and activities. As a result, there is a
growing perception that the government in Islamabad is not fully functional casting doubts about the viability of the
new political setup.
Pakistan is home to a variety of crises on a regular basis and its track record of managing these hardly seems
encouraging. The multiple crises as witnessed today may be summed up as a manifestation of the clash between the
forces of status quo and the popular will asserted through elections. The parliament has been impotent and the
judiciary subservient to the will of the Executive. The external variable resulting in Pakistans alignment with the
West, first during Ayub Khans rule (1960s), then a decade of General Zia (1980s) and now nine years of
Musharraf (1999 to date) as an ally in the war against terrorism has serious implications for political management.
Pakistan in its political history has moved much beyond the concept of Praetorian Society formulated by Samuel P.
Huntington in his book, Political Order in Changing Societies to explain the emerging realities in the developing
world.
The institutions of the Parliament and the Judiciary have been exploited, manipulated and broken at regular
intervals. The overpowering Executive has been dominant and moved regularly towards monopolizing power. In
structural terms, the power is concentrated in the Executive through the 17 th Amendment, the establishment of
National Security Council as a supra-constitutional body and even the terms and conditions of the February 18 th
elections were issued and determined.
As multiple crises persist in a stinging manner for over a year, the critical hour has arrived and the different players
and stake holders need to reach a new consensus about the institutional functioning of the polity under a
constitutional rule.
This paper seeks to explore and examine the various facets of judicial crises along with other contributing factors.
The focus will be to evaluate the place of judiciary in an institutional setting, the current political system and its
functioning, the lawyers movement and mobilization, the breakup of the existing consensus and the prospects of a
new one emerging.
Judicial Activism and Institutional Functioning
Though various Constitutional dispensations in Pakistan delineated the role of judiciary as an organ of the
government in an institutional setting, its role and performance fell short of its designated position. This was caused
by the repeated military interventions6 and extended rule by the uniform men for 34 years. This pattern of recurring
interventions did not allow the judiciary to evolve as an institution. An institution is characterised by its longevity,
traditions, norms and practices it develops over a period of time. As the life of the judiciary was terminated at
regular intervals, it failed to develop the features of an institution. Each time, the superior judiciary validated the
military rule, took oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order issued by the military ruler. These exercises
relegated the higher judiciary to a subordinate position to act and work under the coercive power of the Executive.
The law of necessity propounded by Dr Hans Kelsen was interpreted in a manner to give protection and validation
to military rule. This promoted a judicial culture of perpetual subordination depriving the judiciary to play its
meaningful role within the ambit of the Constitution. Thus the institutional functioning of the superior judiciary is
suspect and questionable.
It is, however, pertinent to note that the Supreme Court at two different occasions gave decisions contrary to the
ones it habitually pronounced. In the Asma Jillani case, the Supreme Court held that the military rule of General
Yahya Khan was entirely illegal in 1972.7Whereas this judgement is instructive for practitioners of law and politics,
the fact of the matter is that the regime of Yahya was not in power. This can hardly be a case where Supreme Court
demonstrated its independence.

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The second case came up before the Supreme Court in 1993 when the Parliament was dissolved and the Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif was dismissed by the President of Pakistan invoking 58(2B), a power that was vested in the
President through the 8th Amendment of 1985. The dismissal of the Sharif government came when there was no
Martial Law and country had experienced the military rule of Zia for 11 years (1977-88). In this context, the
Supreme Court full bench declared the dismissal of Sharif government illegal and directed its restoration. Surely,
this was the first decision of its kind exhibiting courage and independence. But the informal dynamics of Pakistani
politics prevented Nawaz Sharif to return to government or the political leader lacked courage to honour the
decision. So the decision whatever its worth failed to institutionalise the independence of the judiciary.
With this background of judicial functioning, the Supreme Court reconstituted after the October 1999 military
takeover and having taken oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order began to shape and behaves
independently. Intriguingly as it may appear, the superior judiciary activism falls in the category of public interest
litigation. The burden of explaining this newly acquired orientations towards independent behaviour, perhaps lie in
the prolonged rule of 8 years, its consequences in the context of policies, alienation of groups, drop in the popularity
of Musharraf and the excessive and unconstitutional rule by the Executive.
As the cases of public interest came before the Supreme Court particularly during 2007, the Executive began to
lose face and in the public perception, such decisions were greeted stimulating the judiciary to move on this track.
The decisions in three outstanding cases helped the judiciary to assert its independence, which eroded the authority
of the overpowering executive. The first case pertained to the privatisation of the Pakistan Steel Mills. It was held
that the Constitutional requirement and procedures of the Privatisation Commission were ignored and the
government went through the process in indecent haste. The second case was Lal Masjid, and the Supreme Court
entertained petitions of the arrested and released many on bail. 8 The third case that attracted the attention of the
Supreme Court was that of the missing persons. Many people (some put the number over 500) in Pakistan had
disappeared allegedly by the American (FBI, CIA) and Pakistani agencies (ISI,MI,IB) in pursuance of the War on
Terror. These actions were challenged in the Supreme Court and a bench under the Chief Justice Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry had directed Ministry of Interior and the representatives of the military agencies to appear in
Court and answer the issues raised. As a result, some people were released but the Supreme Court kept pressing the
issue that embarrassed the government. These two cases had serious implications in terms of foreign policy,
particularly War on terror.9 This was indeed causing cracks on the consensus around which different policies were
pursued.
Apprehending the mood and the newly acquired disposition of the Supreme Court, Musharraf anticipating a decision
declaring his election as President illegal, moved to impose an Emergency on November 3 rd, 2007, sacking 60
judges of the superior Judiciary. Consequently, his position as President is surrounded by controversies, 10 and even
Mr Zardari, co-chairperson of the Pakistan Peoples Party repeatedly declared that his party did not accept
Musharraf as the constitutional President.
Judicial activism is a functional category in many democratically governed political systems around the world.
This tends to work within the democratic framework. Whenever a decision of the court helps the people at large or
provides relief even on policy issues, the democratic government takes the decision in good stride as it does not
erode the legitimacy of the government. Hence judicial activism is compatible with democratic government. On the
contrary, it runs into problems as it is incompatible with authoritarian dispensation. The decisions of the superior
Judiciary threatened the legitimacy of Musharraf government and caused fissures in the consensus on foreign policy.
Political System and its Functioning

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General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, seized power in a bloodless coup on October 12, 1999 by
deposing Mian Nawaz Shariff the then Prime Minister of Pakistan and his elected government, which commanded a
two-third majority in both the houses, proclaiming to be the Chief Executive and not the Chief Martial Law
Administrator.11 On October 17, 1999, the General in his address to the nation outlined the aims and objectives of his
regime by pledging to implement the seven-point agenda. 12 The Supreme Court validated his take - over, directing
him to hold elections in three years but strangely enough, empowered him to amend the Constitution.
9/11 2001, changed the political fortunes of Musharraf as he decided to be an ally of the U.S in its war on terrorism.
This virtually ended the isolation of his regime from the international community. Encouraged by this engagement
and supported by the allies economic and military support, he decided to move quickly on the home political turf.
On April 30, 2002, Musharraf ordered a referendum for his election as the President of Pakistan and the Pakistan
Election Commission declared him winner, having captured 97% votes. While he ensured his position as President
of Pakistan for 5 years, the opposition alleged gross irregularities in polls and according to their count, only 5 to 7%
voted in the referrendum.13
Before venturing for the exercise of the referendum, the ISI and MI were shaping the political landscape since
1999, creating a new Muslim League, supervising, and monitoring the outcome of the 2000 local elections, queering
the pitch for the 2002 general elections, organising the defection of the Patriots from the PPP, and getting the 17 th
Amendment, which gives constitutional cover to General Musharrafs actions, passed with the help of the MMA
mullahs.14 The 17th Amendment changed the equation of power in favour of the President empowering him to
dismiss the government and also set up the National Security Council as a supra-constitutional body to oversee the
working of the civil government. Musharraf also promised to drop his uniform at the end of 2004, 15 which he did
not honour.
Having fractured the mainstream political parties and keeping their leadership in exile, the elections of 2002 yielded
a political outfit tailored to suit the needs of the Musharraf regime. The decision-making centred around the
presidency and the assembled weak political forces played no role on key domestic and foreign policy issues, though
it is proudly claimed that this is the first assembly of Pakistan having completed its five year term.
As the war on terrorism intensified and the consequences of Musharrafs policies alienated groups and parties, the
need was felt to negotiate realignment of political forces. It was realised that one mainstream political party (PPP) be
taken on board along with the Kings Party and MQM to form a coalition to have a replay of 2002 2007.
It is interesting to note that the external variables played a key role in bringing about an understanding between
Musharraf and Benazir of PPP. Washington initiated the process and was outsourced to London at a later stage. It
successfully culminated in the return of Benazir to enter the politics of Pakistan. This activated the third variable
(Saudi Arabia) to push for the return of Nawaz Sharif, who had lived in exile in that country before moving on to
London. This pressure facilitated the return of Sharifs family back in Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif entered the politics
of Pakistan by taking a hard anti-Musharraf line.
The entry of these mainstream political leaders along with others was made possible through a National
Reconciliation Ordinance enabling the disabled politicians to enter politics. The assassination of Benazir postponed
elections for six weeks to be held on February 18, 2008. These elections took place on Musharrafs terms and
conditions. The election process was manipulated but the outcome of elections changed the political landscape of
Pakistan. Musharrafs Pakistan Muslim League (Q) lost as people of Pakistan generally cast an anti Musharraf
vote. Political situation further changed as mainstream political parties formed a coalition government at the centre.
Nawaz Sharif persisted with his strident anti Musharraf rhetoric and Zardari limping under the Reconciliation
Ordinance.

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For three months, the coalition partners neither failed to resolve the judges issue nor moved to impeach the
President. The structural constraints inherent in the rules of politics issued by Musharraf inhibit any movement
forward. Additionally, Washington continued its support of Musharraf and seeking to win over Zardari to possibly
re-arrange the governmental setup according to the original plan. 17 The federal government seems paralysed and
many hiccups in the provincial setups. The democratic forces haltingly struggling to regain the political space but
the status-quo forces are resisting. The opposition forces (APDM) to Musharraf keep their pressure and luring
Nawaz Sharif to join them. As the political forces are pulling and pushing within and outside the system, there is a
stalemate which cannot stay like this for long. There is an urgency to negotiate another contract or political
dispensation enabling the political system to function.
Lawyers Movement and Mobilisation:
The removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry on March 9, 2007 will stand out as an extraordinary event which
played a pivotal role in trying to change the legal and political landscape of Pakistan. Initially, the legal community
rose in protest against the unconstitutional decision but soon they moved to the streets to demonstrate peacefully.
The Bars of the Superior Judiciary, District and even Tehsil level legal forums joined in to display a remarkable
show of strength and unity. The lawyers rallied around the objective of restoring the Chief Justice and demanded an
independent Judiciary.
These protests and rallies turned political, as workers of almost all political parties including the PPP and the ML
(N), civil society groups, intelligentsia, print and electronic media supported the cause of the lawyers. Political
forces which had remained dormant all these years got an opening to flex their muscles. This mobilisation of public
opinion by the lawyers made the judiciary feel powerful and on July 20, 2007, a 13 member bench of the Supreme
Court reinstated the Chief Justice unanimously and unequivocally.
This decision was a serious set-back to Musharraf regime, which had made preparations for getting him elected for
another five year term with President in uniform and without Benazir and Nawaz Sharif returning home. Musharraf
also sought this election from his tailor made Parliament, whose term was to expire soon thereafter.
The revived Supreme Court supported by public opinion was a serious challenge to Musharrafs authority and
perceiving it as a threat to the continuation of his rule, he decided to disband it by imposing Emergency Rule in the
country. He recreated the judiciary in his own image by re-writing the constitution with an executive order.
The lawyers continued their struggle which culminated into a six-day long march ending before dawn in Islamabad
on June 14, 2008. Nawaz Shariff along with other opposition parties fully participated. Paradoxically, Nawaz as a
coalition partner took part but the other partner, the PPP, stood out seeking resolution of the problem through a
constitutional package in the Parliament. The lawyers faced the dilemma of confronting a newly born parliament and
prudently decided not to besiege the representatives of the people. This dashed the hopes of thousands who were
hoping for the decision through pressure tactics. This abrupt termination of the long march without reaping the
dividends caused cracks within the legal community and its leadership. It also disappointed the public at large and
resolution of the problem appears to be problematic.
In the comparative politics literature, there is discussion to explain the activities that were launched by the lawyers.
In developing countries, where the political system is not functional to respond to the needs and demands of groups,
there erupts anomic interest group activity. As more and more groups begin to join, the protests expand and grow
in size and momentum. Students, trade unions and political parties enter the process and begin to shape as a mass
movement. This activity becomes threatening and has the potential to overthrow the government. Mobilisation of
groups is the key to success yet it fails to capture power after the government is removed.

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This formulation holds validity in the case of Pakistan twice in its history. The mass movement against Ayub Khan
(1968 - 1969) and Bhutto (1977) toppled their respective governments but resulted in the military take-over in each
case. The dynamics of the ongoing crises are different.
The mobilisation generated by the lawyers movement failed to attract several important elements like the trade
unions, student bodies of public sector universities professional groups, big businesses and the Muslim League (Q)
and MQM. Additionally, the support of the west stayed with Musharraf and the army of Pakistan held back its
support to the mobilisation process. Without the participation of these vital elements, the movement of the lawyers
failed to grow and shape into a mass movement.
The elections of February 18, 2008, though upset the political calculations of the regime, the mainstream coalition
partners articulated divergent strategies on the restoration of the judges. This inevitably helped Musharraf to stay on
despite his unpopularity. Despite the widespread demand for the restoration of judges, the divided groups and forces
have resulted in a stalemate awaiting resolution.
Towards a New Consensus:
Any political system to be stable and sustainable needs to be based on consensus. The pre-condition for an efficient
political system is the widespread acceptance of decision-making process which is called consensus. When
consensus exists, the state is legitimized. Consensus and legitimacy are the key indicators of a political system; its
absence translates into instabilities and uncertainties. Legitimacy also means observing constitutional rules and
regulation and political legitimacy implies overwhelming support for the political system.
Pakistani consensus building was the consequence of 9/11 and Musharraf regime was accommodated and accepted
by the international community. This enabled Musharraf to manufacture and engineer a political arrangement
domestically through various motions of electoral politics. The consensus with west was dominant and overlapped
into the domestic politics. This consensus was shaken by the decisions of the Supreme Court particularly on the
missing persons and the lawyers movement further threatened it. The elections of February 18, was seen and
interpreted as an anti-Musharraf vote, which changed the domestic political setup. The present federal government is
not the one that Musharraf had in mind.
The democratic forces have been unleashed but the status-quo forces are doing their best to prevent the change.
There are divisions regarding the support for the political system; in fact the demand for changing the system is
growing signaling a crisis of political legitimacy. The democratic forces are also vociferous about the restoration of
the consensus constitution of 1973. Both on consensus and legitimacy issues there are serious problems translating
into instability and uncertainty. The external variable is doing its best to win over the PPP to cement the cracks that
have emerged in the consensus operating since 9/11. This contest between opposing forces is taking a heavy toll and
it is to be seen which combination of political forces prevails. The time, however, has come to negotiate a new
consensus to ensure the continuity of the state.
End Notes
1. The reference included charges of misconduct and corruption.
2. Pervez Musharraf relinquished the office of Army Chief later that month on November 28, 2007.
3. The Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, Islamabad, Saturday, November 3, 2007, Part 1, P. 1459.
4. The sacked judges, particularly those of the Supreme Court were put under house arrest along with their family
members. They were set free through a verbal order of the Prime Minister, Mr Yousuf Reza Gillani during his first
speech on the floor of the National Assembly.
5. The Bhurban Declaration signed by Mr Zardari and Nawaz Shariff pledged to restore the deposed the deposed judges to
their November 2, 2007 position within 30 days, a commitment that still awaits implementation.

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6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Pakistan was subjected to 5 Martial laws; the two by Musharraf escaped the term Martial Law due to global climate and
its compulsions; the last one was declared an emergency though he exercised power as Army Chief, deposing judges
and amending the constitution.
For detailed discussion of the case, see PLD 1972 SC49.
The Lal Masjid (Mosque) in Islamabad housed supposedly militants fully armed and Musharraf government ordered
military operation against them that lasted for nine days resulting in dozens killed.
That is why the US did not object to the emergency declared by Musharraf on 3 rd November 2007 and issued no
statement regarding the restoration of judges.
Some commentators view the ongoing term of President Pervez Musharraf as his third term in office. Under Article
44(2) of the constitution the Presidential terms are limited to two consecutive terms.
In the obtaining climate of globalising world, martial laws were not welcomed. Despite, Musharrafs packaging of his
take-over that may not look as martial law, the western world reacted negatively; Pakistan was suspended from the
Common-Wealth and for three years Pakistan faced the worst kind of acute isolationism.
See article by Ardeshir Cowasjee in the daily Dawn of June 4, 2006, where he evaluates the performance of Musharraf
regime in the light of his famous Seven-Point agenda.
http://news.bbc.co.uk retrieved June 28, 2008.
See Ayaz Amirs article, The meaning of enlightened moderation in the daily Dawn of March 4, 2005.
Musharraf did not honour his word and continued to wear uniform till the end of 2007.
See the Daily Times, Lahore, October 6, 2007. The Ordinance enabled the corrupt elements to be eligible to take part in
politics. This was a violation of the UN Convention against corruption.
The original plan envisaged a PPP led government with Pakistan Muslim League (Q) and MQM as coalition partners.

------------------------------------------------------Annexure-1
Name of Court

Total number of judges

Number of judges who

before the Proclamation

refused to take oath

Supreme Court of Pakistan

18

13

Lahore High Court

31

11

Sindh High Court

28

14

Peshawar High court

13

Balochistan High Court

------------------------------------------------------

Pakistans best kept secret: a resilient economy

Dr. Rashid Amjad
Pakistans economy has confounded its critics more than once by performing much better than expected, while at
other times disappointing those who believed it could and should have performed far better than it did. Indeed, many
observers had predicted that the economy would be unable to bear the shock of Partition in 1947 and soon collapse.
Pakistans early economic performance was to prove them very wrong. At the same time, those who, in the 1960s,

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had portrayed Pakistan as a model for economic development based on its impressive economic performance long
before countries such as the Republic of Korea and other newly industrialized countries (NICs) were disappointed
when Pakistan failed to achieve sustained high economic growth.
While it is true that Pakistan did not realize its earlier potential or replicate the stellar performance of the NICs,
China and (till more recently) India, its growth performance (averaging around 5percent between 1947 and 2014) is
still respectable by developing country standards. During 196090, the Pakistan economy was among the top ten
fastest-growing economies in the world.3 Except for 1951, when it recorded a negative growth rate, the economy has
always registered positive growth.
Pakistans economic growth path has been cyclical with periods of high economic growth followed by low growth
and lackluster performance. The causes of these stop-go cycles have been subject to much debate and interpreted
differently in recent years. An important issue underlying this debate is why the economy has performed much better
under periods of military rule than under civilian governments. It also raises the issue of whether the third Sharif
government can finally break this cycle and show that civilian governments, too, are capable of providing economic
leadership and prudent economic management that can shift the economy to a higher and sustainable growth path.
In analyzing Pakistans economic performance in a historical context, this paper argues that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 was a defining moment in terms of its far reaching impact on the formers future growth
prospects and structural transformation. Overnight, Pakistan became a frontline state in the war against the Soviet
occupation and the ensuing civil war; after 9/11, it became a frontline state in the war against terror. In the process,
the country has also fallen victim to the rise of extremist forces forces that were originally built up mainly by the
West to fight the Soviet occupation, but have since triggered a domestic insurgency and sectarian violence across
Pakistan.
Fortunately, these events have not led to a collapse of the economy, as they well could have had it not been for the
resilience and inert dynamism it has shown during these difficult years. We examine the forces that have helped
generate this resilience and present evidence to show how ithas cushioned the worst impact of the recent economic
downturn. However, this resilience of the economy desirable as it may be is by no means sufficient to overcome
the daunting economic problems that have arisen over the years.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to locate the current economic challenge against the backdrop of the complex
forces that define it and to identify measures beyond mere economic solutions that would help overcome the
challenge. The paper is divided into four parts:
Part I analyses the cyclical boom-bust cycles that have characterised the economy over the last 67 years in order to
identify the major drivers of high growth as well as those factors that have constrained sustained growth and
triggered the downturns. It attempts to determine why military governments have been more successful in delivering
high economic growth compared to their civilian counterparts and what lessons this holds for the current civilian
dispensation.
Part II presents a new perspective on judging Pakistans economic performance in terms of its capacity to remain
resilient in the face of economic shocksinternal and external. We identify four key shocks to which the economy
was subjected:(i) the immediate period following independence and the partition of the Subcontinent in 1947, (ii) the
1971 civil war and subsequent separation of Pakistans eastern wing, (iii) the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and,

3Pakistans average growth during this period was around 6.5 percent. The economies that grew faster than
Pakistan included China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong (derived
from data on GDP growth in various issues of the World Development Report).

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more recently, the post-9/11 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by the US and NATO forces. We show how the
economy adjusted to each of these shocks and what lessons can be drawn from the experience, especially in the
post-9/11 period.
Part III argues that, although the economys resilience may have helped Pakistan cushion the negative impact of
economic shocks, it is in no way sufficient to overcome the challenges the economy now faces. These arise from its
high growth rate of population and labour force, high levels of poverty concentrated in certain regions, increasing
income inequality and, most worrying, its continuingly very poor human development indicators especially in
education and health. The challenge then is not just to revive growth but also to transform the economy into
generating sustainable and equitable development.
Pakistans growth spurts and reversals: Do military governments perform better?
Ahmed and Amjad (1984) as well as other studies tend to divide the economy into periods of relatively high growth
(the 1960s, 1980s, and 200207), which were also associated with military rule, and periods of low growth (the
1950s, 1970s, 1990s, and 2008/09 onward), which coincided with periods of civilian or democratically elected
governments. Their main explanation is that, in most cases, the economic downturns were triggered by the
emergence of a foreign exchange constraint; this was eased considerably when military governments took over in
situations where Western governments needed Pakistans support, which the military in power were both better able
and willing to provide.
It is, therefore, no coincidence that economic upturns and military rule coincided with major geopolitical
developments:(I) the Cold War between the West and the former USSR in the 1960s (General Ayub Khans
government ruled from 1958 to 1969);(ii) the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistanfrom1979 to
1988,whichwas actively opposed by the US and other Western powers who provided rebel forces with arms and
funds channeled through Pakistan (General Zia-ul-Haqs government ruled from 1977 to 1988), and (iii) the post9/11 occupation of Afghanistan by US and NATO forces(supported by General Pervez Musharrafs government,
which ruled from 1999 to 2008).
This division of Pakistans economic performance into periods of military and civilian rule and the major
explanation that the better performance of the former can be traced to large doses of external assistance is contested
by McCartney (2011).First, using sophisticated statistical tools and measures; he identifies a different breakdown of
Pakistans growth performance. He divides this into three episodes of growth 1951/52 to 1958/59, 1960/61 to
1969/70, and 2003/04 to 2008/09 and two episodes of stagnation 1970/71 to 1991/92 and 1992/93 to
2002/03.The early period of civilian rule in the 1950s is seen as a period of economic growth and structural
transformation. Interestingly, McCartney does not see a break in the downturn in the 1970s with the beginning of the
Zia-ul-Haq government or indeed throughout its rule till 1987; thiscontinues all the way till 1992/93.
Second, and more importantly, McCartney finds no credible evidence for attributing Pakistans episodes of growth
to increases in foreign aid inflows or to shocks emerging from the external economy. His view is that, even when
Western aid was cutoff or slowed down, Pakistan managed to turn to other countries such as China (after 1965) or
Saudi Arabia and other donors in more recent years.
McCartneys view is that the role of the state, rather than external factors, was mainly responsible for Pakistans
economic growth spurts and reversals. He argues that the state creates conditions through its economic policies (as it
did, for example, by restricting imports after the Korean War boom in the early 1950s), which result in high profits,
and then channels credit to the private sector to invest in these sectors or industries (as in the 1950s and 1960s as
part of an import substitution industrial strategy). He also finds no systematic relationship between economic growth
and external finances or economic liberalization.

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While one would fundamentally agree with McCartney on the critical role of the state in spurring episodes of growth
or development as Amjad (1982) shows for the 1960s he perhaps underplays the role of rising foreign resource
inflows in breaking or at least easing the foreign exchange constraint that Pakistan has periodically faced. While,
with hindsight, Amjad (1982) may have overemphasized this role, it would appear that McCartney takes an extreme
position in almost completely ignoring it.
There are, however, some important lessons to draw from McCartneys analysis. If the role of the state is critical, as
he argues, in creating conditions that are conducive to investment and growth, then clearly after the 1950s the
military governments were relatively more successful in creating such conditions than their civilian counterparts.
More recently, the World Bank (2013) and Lpez-Clix, Srinivasan, and Waheed (2012) have analyzed growth
patterns in Pakistan for the period 19602010. They identify eight episodes of high growth (more than 5 percent)
spanning 28 years in all with an annual average of 7 percent; the longest spurt extends over six years from 1978 to
1983. They also identify eight episodes of low growth (less than 5 percent) spanning 22 years in all with an average
growth rate of 3.3 percent; here, the longest period lasted seven years from 1997 to 2003.
Relying on these results and other studies, the World Bank (2013) points to increasing episodes of short growth
acceleration as well as the fact that growth expectations (at least in its view) are becoming increasingly less
optimistic. Since various studies, including by the well-known economist Dani Rodrik (see Hausmann,
Pritchett,&Rodrik, 2005), have shown that developing countries need growth acceleration to stretch over a period of
at least eight years in order to move onto a higher and sustained growth path, the Banks findings are clearly
worrying.
The World Bank draws two major explanations from its analysis: (i) external shocks (i.e., those resulting in
increased foreign resource inflows) produce growth accelerations that fizzle out (when these inflows decline), and
(ii) economic reforms remain a significant predictor of sustained accelerations.
There are three important conclusions that we can draw from the World Banks analysis. First, it reinforces the
earlier view that the availability of external resources has played an important role in generating episodes of
economic growth and, therefore, in partly explaining the better economic performance of military regimes who had
easier access to such resources during their rule.
The second is that economic reforms increase the efficiency and productivity of the economy by fostering foreign
and domestic competition as well as through measures leading to better governance and economic management.
This occurs in part when the arbitrary interference exercised through government controls is reduced and plays an
important role in accelerating economic growth. Again, there is evidence that military governments have been far
more committed to and successful in implementing such reforms compared to their civilian counterparts.
The third that the potential of the economy to accelerate economic growth is over time being reduced. This would
appear to be the result of the economy becoming structurally more inefficient and hence the reforms needed become
more severe and thus more challenging to implement.
What main conclusions can we draw from this analysis?
The earlier clear-cut division of Pakistans economic history into periods of military and civilian rule now appears to
have been replaced by new divisions and timeframes that are less emphatic in arguing that the military have always
performed better in generating episodes of economic growth. That said, on balance it would appear that military
regimes have been more successful in undertaking reforms and better utilizing external resource inflows.

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The key lesson from this analysis is that it is essential for the Sharif government to draw up an economic reform and
development agenda with clear timelines and to exercise the political will and economic management skills needed
to implement it. On its performance in the first year at least, it still has a long way to go. We return to this issue in
the last section.
Economic resilience in the face of internal and external shocks: An important but underplayed dimension of
the Pakistan economy
Both the print and electronic medias well as many recognized political scientists and historians are inclined to run
down Pakistans economic performance and in more recent years to portray the economy as one bordering on
economic collapse. This has pushed a large number of Pakistanis within the country and even more living abroad
towards this view.
This paper strongly contests this outlook although it readily admits that the economy could have performed much
better and faces major structural constraints that need to be overcome urgently (as discussed in the next section).Our
earlier analysis already testifies to Pakistans capacity to bounce back from economic downturns: it has achieved an
average growth rate of around 5 percent over 19472014 and only once in the last 67 years registered a negative
growth rate (in 1951).
We now argue that an important dimension of this economy that is not sufficiently recognized is its resilience
against internal and external shocks. We show this by analyzing the response of the economy to four major structural
and external shocks: (i) the period following independence and the partition of the Subcontinent, (ii) the separation
of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), (iii) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and a related event, (iv) the
occupation of Afghanistan by the US and NATO forces in 2002.
Independence and Partition 1947: Pakistans finest hour
There was always considerable skepticism surrounding the economic and financial viability of an independent state.
The reasons were not difficult to see. When Pakistan came into being, it had hardly any industries and its main raw
materials, jute and cotton, were processed in factories in neighbouring India. It also lacked a functioning government
structure, including key financial institutions. The earlier years were made even more difficult when Pakistan
refused to devalue its currency as India had done, following Britains devaluation of the pound sterling in 1949.
India cutoff all trade relations and refused to pay higher prices to Pakistan for the latters raw material exports. This
resulted in a negative growth rate in 1950/51 the only year in Pakistans economic history for this to occur.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided much-needed relief as the world price of Pakistans raw materials
jumped up. When the war ended and Pakistans foreign exchange reserves declined, the country imposed barriers on
the import of manufactured goods. Perhaps mindful of its over-reliance on India, it embarked on a drive for
consumer goods-led industrialization, mainly in textiles. In this, it was extremely successful as traders who had
made high profits during the Korean War boom now shifted their surplus into setting up new industries, which also
promised a very high rate of return, given that there was no external competition. The government also played an
important role in setting up industries, especially in jute and sugar, which it then sold to the private sector. The State
Bank of Pakistan and other financial institutions and bodies were also set up in this period, the existing infrastructure
upgraded, and new infrastructure built.
Hasan (2013) lists four main factors that explain why Pakistan was able to cope so well with the formidable
economic challenges it faced as a new country (to this, we might add an element of luck!): (i) a competent,
committed, and honest bureaucracy; (ii) a large number of migrants that included well-educated professionals who

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played a vital role in strengthening the civil services and in setting up and running the financial structure; (iii) a class
of dynamic entrepreneurs, many of who had migrated from India mainly from the Memon, Bohra, and Khoja
communities and settled in Karachi; and (iv) the availability of external funding at concessional terms to finance
much-needed public infrastructure.
The breakup of the country in 1971
This remains one of Pakistans most controversial periods of economic history both in terms of the role played by
different actors in leading to this breakup as well as the economic policies pursued by the Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP), which came into power after the breakup.
The question with which we concern ourselves is how well the Pakistan economy (formerly West Pakistan) adjusted
to this new situation, given that the erstwhile eastern wing had served as a major destination for its exports and been
a valuable source of foreign exchange earnings. In their separate report as part of the Panel of Economists set up by
the government in 1968 to draw up the outline of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (197075), economists from former
East Pakistan had argued that there had taken place over the years a major drain of economic resources from East to
West Pakistan; this included foreign exchange earnings from jute, which was grown and manufactured in the eastern
wing.
On the whole, Pakistans economy adjusted well to this severance of ties. Given the far-reaching economic reforms
introduced by the Bhutto government, which initially created labour unrest, the economys performance was all the
more creditable. Growth rates had plummeted to less than 1 percent during the year of the tragic civil war and
military action that sadly claimed many innocent lives. The economy, however, recovered in the first three years of
the Bhutto government and posted a healthy growth rate of over 5 percent. The government also devalued the
currency and removed the multiple exchange rate system fostered by the earlier export bonus scheme. This certainly
helped in diverting exports to new markets.
Ahmed and Amjad (1984) have summed up Pakistans economic performance in this period as follows:

In the first two years, the economy was successfully rehabilitated and structural economic reforms
undertaken (the nationalization of banks and selected industries; land reforms and more secure tenancy
arrangements; and labour laws that strengthened workers rights, including the right of association).
Raising the prices of agricultural products helped, to some extent, in removing the earlier pro-industrial
bias in policymaking. The resulting incentive structure improved terms of trade for the agriculture sector.
Although this in later years proved to be at a high cost, the economy moved towards a more balanced
industrial sector by setting up heavy industries (e.g., the Karachi Steel Mill and Taxila Heavy Mechanical
Complex) mainly in the public sector to remove the earlier thrust on consumer goods industries set up by
the private sector.
The government was instrumental in sending a large number of workers abroad, mainly to the Middle East,
by making it much easier to obtain passports. The large increase in remittances and valuable foreign
exchange was generated later.
It brought about a fundamental change in the attitudes of the working class, which became more conscious
and assertive of its rights.

On the whole, therefore, the economy adjusted well to the shock of losing the captive eastern wing market: it was
also able to generate exports to replace the more easily available foreign exchange from exports produced by the
former eastern wing. That the economy was unable to move onto a higher growth path in later years under the PPP
government can be attributed to several factors: poor economic policies, made worse by the oil price shock of 1973;

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the floods of1974; and, most importantly, the drastic fall in private investment that resulted from the loss of business
confidence following the nationalization of selected industries and the governments pro-labour stance.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979
A fundamental premise of this paper is that the USSRs invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the ensuing civil war
even after Soviet withdrawal has had a far-reaching impact on Pakistans economy and the pace, structure, and
direction of its future growth.
The most disastrous impact of this conflict was that it led to the weaponisation of large parts of the country
(including what can be termed the Lebanonisation of Karachi). Arms were now freely sold and bought in a
country where the availability of weapons had been strictly controlled and regulated and very few people outside the
tribal belt owned firearms. This was to lead to a sharp deterioration in law and order and seriously erode the writ of
the state in large parts of the country. It encouraged the emergence of armed militant extremist groups not only in the
regions bordering Afghanistan, but also in areas such as southern and central Punjab where they had not existed
earlier. These developments saw the rising incidence of kidnappings for ransom, the spread of violent crime, and
increasing acts of sabotage and suicide bombings. It did not take long for foreign investors and even Pakistans own
citizens to see it as a dangerous country for investment.
Although the economy showed steady growth in the early 1980s, resulting from increased aid inflows, the high level
of remittances, and spillovers from the large expenditures incurred by the US and Western powers, the overall costs
of the civil war in adjoining Afghanistan were very high in terms of Pakistans medium- to long-term growth
prospects.
Some of the major costs were as follows:
First and foremost, Pakistan lost out on the rising tide of globalisation that started in the mid-1980s. (India, for
example, which was a more closed economy than Pakistan at the time, greatly benefitted from this phenomenon. 4)
The reasons for this need much more detailed analysis, but the regional instability generated by the Afghan war
clearly dampened foreign investors interest in Pakistan as alluded to earlier. Unfortunately, Pakistans economic
policymakers (led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, otherwise reputed to be an excellent economic manager) delayed
instituting economic reforms as foreign inflows at concessional terms were more easily available. In that sense, the
1980s rather than the 1990s was a lost economic decade.
Second, the inflow of 3.2 million refugees from Afghanistan posed daunting problems, including environmental
damage; almost two thirds of them still live in Pakistan. While many stayed in refugee camps, a large number made
their way to Karachi the countrys industrial and commercial hub which had earlier attracted labour from Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and the Tribal Areas. Soon, Karachi became the worlds largest Pashtun city after Kabul and perhaps
even Peshawar (see Lieven, 2013). This heightened ethnic and sectarian tension and resulted in violent strife and turf
wars from which the city is still suffering.
Third, there was a large increase in military expenditure during the 1980s while expenditure on the social sectors
remained abysmally low despite some increases.
Post-9/11: the US and NATO occupation of Afghanistan

4 According to Jones (2013, p. 123), During the 1970s, Indian government policies, especially price and exchange
controls, and demands for local equity participation, resulted in many MNEs divesting from that country.

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As in the post-1979 period, Pakistans economy post-9/11 saw a surge in economic growth followed by a period of
stagflation low growth and high inflation that started in 2007/08 and has continued into 2013/14.The boom years
between 2002/03 and 2006/07 were a result of increased foreign aid inflows, sizable debt relief, a substantial
increase in public investment, and a revival in business confidence. Both the manufacturing sector, including
exports, and the services sector performed well. The agriculture sectors performance was mixed but, on the whole,
the country was food self-sufficient.
However, the cost to the country and economy increased manifold as the government turned against its earlier allies,
the Taliban (while still providing them refuge). This spurred the emergence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban a militant
fundamentalist movement based in the Tribal Areas but now with active groups operating all over Pakistan. The
result has been a marked deterioration in law and order, with the larger cities targeted regularly in militant attacks,
and considerable loss of innocent lives.
Resilience during the economic downturn: 2007/08 to 2012/13
To illustrate what the paper claims to be a resilient economy and people, we analyse in some detail Pakistans
economic performance during the years of low growth and high inflation from 2007/08 to 2012/13 in terms of some
key economic variables.
The basic argument is that, despite its overall poor performance in these years (as the macroeconomic indicators
show), the economy has displayed dynamism in terms of the growth of certain sectors: the agricultural and rural
economy, services, the informal economy, and parts of the large undocumented economy. This was further spurred
by several factors: (i) the PPP-led governments policies, which raised the procurement prices of agricultural goods,
especially wheat, from PRs 450/40 kg in 2007/08 to PRs 950/40 kg in 2008/09 which spurred agriculture production
which spilled over to the rural economy (though it also resulted in rising inflation levels) ; (ii) large inflows of
remittances, which increased from around US$ 1.5 billion in 1999/2000 to over US$ 14 billion in 2012/13
(accounting for almost 7 percent of GDP, estimated in that year at US$ 225 billion); and (iii) spillovers from the
large expenditures incurred by the Western powers in Afghanistan around US$ 16 billion in 2011/12, of which
slightly less than half was allocated to development and civil works (World Bank, 2012) as well as from the opium
trade, which flourished during these years.
Other factors contributing to this resilience include the youth bulge as Pakistan enters a demographic transition with
many young people entering the labour market or finding jobs overseas. More and more educated women are also
entering the labour market and finding jobs in the services sector although the overall labour force participation rate
remains very low at just over 20 percent. There has also been a shift in the growth pole from Karachi to central
Punjab where the interaction of growth in agriculture, light engineering, and high remittances has resulted in a
vibrant growth triangle enveloping the major cities of northern and central Punjab.
The costs, too, have been high. The Pakistan government estimates the loss attributable to the war in Afghanistan at
almost US$ 70 billion in terms of loss of infrastructure, exports, foreign investment, industrial output, and tax
collection during 2001/02 to 2010/11 (Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 2011). Private investment also fell drastically
to around 12 percent in 2011/12 from a peak of over 22 percent in 2005/06. Energy shortages have shaved off almost
2 percent of GDP in terms of loss of production in recent years although this cannot be attributed directly to the war
in Afghanistan (except perhaps to delays in tapping cheaper energy sources from Central Asia) but rather to poor
economic management in the last years of the Musharraf government and the even worse performance of the
subsequent PPP coalition government.

The dynamism of Pakistans economy in the last five years is evident in the movement and performance of
some key economic variables:

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Despite low economic growth, consumption levels have grown faster. This reflects not only the fact that a
larger portion of national output is being consumed rather than invested, but also that a large part of
remittances and income generated from the undocumented economy (estimated at 80 to 90 percent of the
documented economy) (see Kemal & Qasim, 2012) is driving these higher levels of consumption.
The high levels of consumption are reflected in the high profitability ratios of food industries quoted on the
Karachi Stock Exchange over the last five years as well as the high profits of foreign companies such as
Pepsi, Unilever, and Nestle whose profits and sales have grown between 15 and 20 percent per annum in
this period.
Poverty levels have declined at least till 2010/11 (for which data are available). Poverty levels based on a
2,350 caloric intake (an income of around PRs 11,000 per month for a six-person household or Rs 56 per
day in 2010/11) declined from over 30 percent in 2000/01 to around 17.2 percent in 2007/08 and further to
12.4 percent in 2010/11. The latest data have also been examined by the World Bank, which, after taking
into account some of the criticism leveled against the 2010/11 estimates, concluded that poverty levels had
indeed fallen (although they may be slightly higher if measured by a higher poverty line) (Newman, 2013).
There is an emerging middle class whose share of the total number of households increased between
2007/08 and 2010/11 from 18.8 percent to 24.2 percent, based on a strict definition of the middleclass, or
from 34.6 to 42.9 percent, based on an expanded definition (see Nayab, 2011, 2013). An Asian
Development Bank study (2010) has shown that, in 2005, the percentage of total households living on US$
24 (PPP) a day in Pakistan was around 32.94 percent (compared to 20.45 percent in India the same year).
The proportion living on US$ 410 (PPP) was 6.56 in Pakistan compared to 4.15 percent in India. The
annual sale of around 1.7 million motorcycles a year in 2013 points to an emerging middle class as do the
rising sales of many consumer durables.
The real wages of agricultural workers increased during 2007 to 2010, based on the reports of the
Agriculture Price Institute. The Labour Force surveys also point to an increase in wages in the agriculture
and services sectors, although they declined in construction (see Amjad, 2012).
Pakistan has a very high tele-density: in November 2013, the number of subscribers to mobile telephones
was 132 million out of a population of 180 million.

What main conclusions can we draw from our analysis in showing Pakistan to be a resilient economy?
First and foremost, despite having been buffeted by internal and external shocks (in large part as a result of the
neighbourhood in which it lives), the economy has displayed a robust capacity to bear up to these pressures rather
than being derailed or even collapsing.
Second, while it has weathered the most severe shock thus far the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and post-9/11 the
US and NATO occupation of that country this has seriously impaired its capacity to regenerate sustained higher
growth.
Third, the economys resilience to shocks depends increasingly on external factors such as the manifold increase in
remittances, which now account for just over 6 percent of GDP. This is cause for concern because it leaves the
economy vulnerable to changes in remittance inflows; there is no real guarantee that these inflows will remain
continuous or necessarily rise.
We can conclude, therefore, that while its display of resilience has been an important feature of the economy and
stood it well in difficult times, there are now clearly emerging signs that merely finding solace in this fact is not
enough.

63 | P a g e

Why economic resilience is not enough: Breaking out of low-level growth equilibrium
Not only does Pakistan need to break out of the current stagflation, it must also move onto a higher, sustained, and
more inclusive growth path. Despite its respectable growth performance in many periods, its record in developing
human resources has been extremely poor, which some critics have described as a case of economic growth without
development.
A major factor that has seriously dampened the countrys growth performance has been the continuing high growth
rate of population: at 2.1 percent, it is the highest in South Asia and among the highest in the developing world with
the exception of countries in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. This high growth rate has also meant that
Pakistan has not reaped the demographic dividend unlike the East Asian economies and, more recently, India, for
who this transition was an important factor in spurring higher growth (see Sathar, Royan, &Bongaarts, 2013).
This high growth rate of population has resulted in a continuing high growth rate for the labour force, variously
estimated at 33.5 percent. This implies that the economy must grow by at least 78 percent, based on the historical
elasticity of employment growth to GDP growth, to absorb new entrants into the labour force. It must grow even
faster to reduce the high level of unemployment and underemployment. The growth of the informal economy and
overseas migration has blunted to some extent the pressures on the labour market, but the emerging youth bulge, if
not productively and remuneratively employed, could seriously threaten the existing and already fragile
socioeconomic fabric.
The continuing energy crisis, resulting in daily power outages of between 8 and12 hours in urban areas and 12 to 16
hours in rural areas especially in the summer, has also shaved off an estimated 2 percent of annual GDP growth.
Basic mistakes made in the past such as Pakistans increasing reliance on oil- and gas-powered energy plants in the
1990s when the price of oil was relatively low and indigenous gas abundantly available have resulted in an
economically unaffordable energy supply structure. This is because oil prices have since increased tenfold while
indigenous gas reserves have been almost depleted because of criminal negligence in selling them at throwaway
prices. A major factor in the PPPs ignominious defeat in the 2013 elections was its very poor performance in
reducing power outages.
At the heart of the current economic downturn is the sharp decline in investment never very high even historically
to 12 and 14 percent in 2012/13 and 2013/14. Both private and public investments have declined, the former as a
result of uncertain conditions and energy shortages and the latter due to a resource crunch. A sustained economic
revival would need investment levels to return to their earlier high of around 25 percent, but if the economy is to
generate growth at 78 percent, then investment levels will need to rise to and be sustained at 3035 percent of GDP
(as, for example, India has recently done).
Public investment needs to increase from its current low level of around 34 percent of GDP to 78 percent, given
the growing gaps in physical infrastructure and badly needed investment in education and health. A major part of
this investment needs to be undertaken by the provinces whose share of government revenues has increased
significantly after the 7thNational Finance Commission Award. Many of their responsibilities have increased in
tandem, especially in the development of human resources, following the 18 th, 19th, and 20th Constitutional
Amendments, which have devolved these areas from the federal governments Concurrent List to the provinces.
A major structural constraint is Pakistans poor export performance and its failure to take advantage of rapid
globalisation unlike the NICs, China and, in the last decade, India. The share of exports in GDP has remained
stagnant at around 10 percent and the countrys share of world trade has not increased. This poor performance has
been a major factor in triggering recurring foreign exchange crises and compelling the government to resort to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance to avoid defaulting on foreign loans. Low levels of investment,

64 | P a g e

outdated technology, and the lack of an educated and skilled workforce have contributed to Pakistans loss of global
competitiveness. Moreover, the overall security situation and fear of terrorist attacks, even if vastly exaggerated,
have driven away not just foreign investors but also foreign buyers. Again, this reflects the unfortunate link between
economic performance and political security.
Another major constraint to sustained growth and the governments ability to invest in physical infrastructure and
human capital is Pakistans very low tax-to-GDP ratio. At less than 10 percent, it is far below the required 1720
percent the average for fast-growing developing countries including India. The low tax-to-GDP ratio has translated
into recurring high fiscal deficits, resulting in inflation and pressure on the current account deficit. This is clearly an
area in which both military and civil governments have failed, mainly due to the lack of political will and strong
vested interests, especially among the agriculture lobby (which has not allowed any direct taxation on agricultural
incomes) and a strong middleclass-led business community (which either avoids falling within the tax net or grossly
under-declares its earned income).
While extreme poverty may have declined, it still remains high in certain regions, especially in rural Sindh and
southern Punjab. Using a slightly higher poverty line puts a major proportion of the population below it.
Pakistans greatest weakness in terms of its development performance is its very poor human development
indicators. A glaring reflection of this is that the country still lags significantly behind in achieving many of the
Millennium Development Goals by 2015, which it had committed to at the turn of the century. These shortfalls are
especially severe in female education, child mortality rates, and malnutrition and stunting among children.
In terms of physical infrastructure, and notwithstanding the urgent need to resolve its growing energy shortfall,
Pakistan must invest heavily to increase the availability of groundwater if it is to meet rising demand and rehabilitate
the Indus irrigation system, which Chaudhry (2013) refers to as the strong heart of the countrys economy. This
will require increasing its storage capacity and building two large dams on the Indus, which Pakistan should have
done in the last two decades but which was shelved due to political differences.
Pakistans major economic challenges thus encompass the following: regaining macroeconomic balance and
ensuring macroeconomic stability, breaking out of the current stagflation, reigniting growth, reintegrating itself with
the global economy and increasing its share of global markets, overcoming energy and water shortages, and most
importantly improving its poor human development indicators.
Overcoming these daunting challenges will need action in the following areas:

Renewing confidence in the economy at the national, regional, and global level to attract domestic and
foreign investment in key sectors

Prudent macro-management and removing the current disconnect between fiscal, monetary, and
development expenditures

Remaining focused on resolving the energy crisis and prioritising the use of limited resources, especially in
developing an educated and skilled workforce

Shifting the economy from consumption-driven growth to export- and investment-led growth

Setting up transparent mechanisms and putting in place competent managers who can ensure timely, costeffective delivery while ensuring quality.

65 | P a g e

What measures could help revive growth? In the immediate future, given its underused capacity, better utilization
especially by increasing the power supply could lead to a significant increase in production levels. Some of the
measures outlined earlier could increase economic growth by almost 2 percent.
The grant of GSP-plus status by the European Union in 2014 also has considerable potential for boosting exports
and pushing up economic growth. An annual increase of between US$700 million and US$1 billion in exports is
projected. The government announced a 15 percent increase in textile exports in July 2014, primarily due to the
availability of this facility. These are positive signs and, if carried through with concerted effort, could bear
considerable fruit.
However, the real positive that this government needs to capitalize on is the groundswell of confidence the feelgood factor it has generated among businesspeople and producers (whether large, medium, or small) as well as
among foreign investors on coming into office (ab karobar chalay ga or business will flourish again). Even if
some of the shine on this sentiment has worn off after its first year in office, there is little doubt that this
government, in stark contrast to its predecessor, generates confidence in the private sector. The real challenge now is
for it to help translate this sentiment into concrete investments that will generate job opportunities and stimulate
growth.
There are three major areas in which government action could yield positive results in this direction.
The first is to concentrate federal public sector development expenditures, in close collaboration with the provincial
governments development plans, in removing the binding constraints to the economy. In this, the government has
been slow in action and wayward in direction. A year has passed and the Planning Commission has not yet come up
with a comprehensive and coordinated medium-term development strategy even after promising one by December
2013. The Annual Plan for 2014/15 announced with the budget in June 2014 shows no real concentration and
prioritization in development expenditures. Unfortunately, ambitious motorways, highways, and road projects a
past obsession take up a large share of the limited available resources. The priority that should have been assigned
to energy and education is glaringly absent though promises have been made in both these critical sectors.
The second critical area that will encourage new investment, both domestic and foreign, is an improvement in the
law and order situation and the firm re-establishment of the writ of the state. Here, some decisive steps have been
taken: the launch of a military operation in North Waziristan against terrorist outfits, many of who have come from
abroad, shows that the state has finally decided to confront terrorism rather than appease it. The government has also
launched a concerted operation in Karachi although this has yet to show significant results.
The third decisive area of restoring investor confidence in Pakistan will be the return of peaceful conditions in
Afghanistan and good relations with India. With the planned withdrawal of US and NATO forces at the end of 2014
and the still contested results of the presidential elections, Afghanistans future remains uncertain. The Pakistan
government has, for its part, clearly stated that its policy will be one of non-interference and that it will support all
measures that will ensure a peaceful transition during this challenging period in Afghanistan. On improving relations
with India, the grant of most-favoured nation status (now termed non-discriminatory market access) with safeguards
as well as working mechanisms to help resolve problems arising from existing nontariff barriers will go a long way
in facilitating trade and investment with considerable economic benefits for both countries. The fact that both
countries have pro-business governments with economic revival as their major goals presents an opportunity that
should not be lost.

66 | P a g e

Conclusion
A fundamental premise of this paper is that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 played a major role in
deflecting the growth path of Pakistans economy, reducing considerably its chances of achieving potentially higher
and sustainable growth.
The paper has also pointed to a number of factors that provide a real opportunity for a turnaround in the economy.
These include (i) its inherent resilience, (ii) the groundswell of support that the current government has generated
among domestic and foreign investors, (iii) the start of military action against those who have challenged the writ of
the state, and (iv) some prospects of an improvement in the situation in Afghanistan and better trade relations with
India.
The stakes are indeed high and domestic economic challenges are mounting. There is an urgent need to move the
economy onto a higher, sustained, and more equitable growth path. This would lead to decisive improvements in the
standard of living for the vast majority of people who increasingly believe that the system has so far benefitted only
the few.
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Press.
Amjad, R. (1982). Private industrial investment in Pakistan 196070. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Amjad, R. (2012). Stagflation, labour market impact and the poverty puzzle in Pakistan: A preliminary analysis. Lahore Journal
of Economics [Special Edition], 17, 5171.
Amjad. R., & Yusuf, A. (2014). More and better jobs for Pakistan: Can the manufacturing sector play a greater role?
(Monograph).Lahore, Pakistan: Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Asian Development Bank. (2010). Key indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010. Manila, The Philippines: Author.
Chaudhry, S. A. (2013).Pakistans Indus Basin strategy: Past, present and future. In R. Amjad &S.J. Burki (Eds.), Pakistan:
Moving the economy forward. Lahore, Pakistan: Lahore School of Economics.
Hasan, P. (2013).Failed economic promise: Lessons from Pakistans development experience. In R. Amjad & S. J. Burki (Eds.),
Pakistan: Moving the economy forward. Lahore, Pakistan: Lahore School of Economics.
Hausmann, R., Pritchett, L., & Rodrik, D. (2005).Growth accelerations. Journal of Economic Growth, 10(4), 303329.
Jones, G. (2013).Entrepreneurship and multinationals: Global business and the making of the modern world. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar.
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Kemal, M. A., & Qasim, A. W. (2012, November). Precise estimates of the informal economy. Paper presented at the 28th Annual
General Meeting of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists, Islamabad.
Lieven, A. (2013, May).The coming blowback. American Review, 12. Retrieved from
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Lpez-Clix, J. R., Srinivasan, T. G., & Waheed, M. (2012). What do we know about growth patterns in Pakistan? (Policy Paper
Series on Pakistan PK 05/12). Washington, DC: World Bank.
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Routledge.
Nayab, D. (2011). Estimating the middle class in Pakistan. Pakistan Development Review, 50(1), 128.
Nayab, D. (2013). Youth bulge and the middle class (Mimeo).Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
Newman, J. (2013). Recovering strong positive trends in poverty and opportunity (Pakistan Policy Note No. 5). Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Ocampo, J. A. (2005). The quest for dynamic efficiency: Structural dynamics and economic growth in developing countries. In J.
A. Ocampo (Ed.), Beyond reforms: Structural dynamics and macroeconomic vulnerability (pp. 343) Washington, DC:
United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Pakistan, Ministry of Finance. (2011). Pakistan economic survey 201011. Islamabad: Author.
Sathar, Z., Royan, R., & Bongaarts, J. (2013). Capturing the demographic dividend in Pakistan. New York, NY: Population
Council.
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Maldevelopment, poverty and destitution in Pakistan

Dr. Pervez Tahir
Preliminary Remarks
Pakistan today cannot be understood without looking at Pakistan yesterday. Since
independence in 1947, the country embraced virtually every developmental experiment, but
failed to achieve sustained development or even sustained growth for a reasonable length of
time. An important feature of Samir Amins concept of maldevelopment, introduced first in
1989 and reiterated in 2011, was that the capitalist states in the South lay down the basis of
increasing inequality rather than furthering development. Neither statism nor liberalization
responds to the aspirations of the people. The alternatives need to be explored in a national,
popular and South-South framework. It is imperative for the South countries to delink from
the North. Pakistan, however, has been linked to the North right from the beginning. As is
obvious from Table 1, the national saving rate has been low and well behind the investment
rate. The gap was filled by foreign economic assistance the OECD countries, mainly the
United States, Arab countries, China and the Multilateral Financial Institutions. The decades
of high growth - the 1960s and the 1980s were also the decades of high inflows of foreign
assistance. Inflation was low only up to the 1960s, as was the fiscal deficit. Tax to GDP ratio,
already low relative to countries of comparable income levels, has declined to single-digit
level.

GDP Growth
(% Annual)
Total Investment (% GDP)

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2011-14

3.1

6.8

4.8

6.5

4.6

4.7

3.8

19.1

17.1

18.7

18.3

17.9

14.5

11.2

14.8

13.8

15.9

13.4

National Saving
Inflation Rate (%)

3.2

12.5

7.2

9.7

7.3

10.2

Fiscal Deficit (% GDP)

2.1

5.3

7.1

6.9

4.4

6.2

13.8

13.4

10.3

9.6

Taxes (% GDP)

Only once in the countrys history, i.e. the 1980s, the growth-inequality-poverty triangle had
the right signs. High growth was accompanied declining inequality as well as poverty. The
1990s, termed as the lost decade, were the opposite. Growth was low, poverty and

68 | P a g e

inequality were rising. Growth returned in 2000s, but inequality has begun to rise again
since 2009. This is also the time when growth has seen its historic lows and inflation reached
new nights. Table 2 shows the trend of inequality.

Period

Gini Coefficient

1990s

0.403

2000s

0.300

2009

0.321

2010

0.328

2011

0.332

2012

0.345

In the face of heavy odds, the people of Pakistan have struggled for their political, economic,
cultural and religious rights. After the formation of the state in 1947, security of the state
took precedence over the security of the people. All public polices in general and foreign,
economic and defence policies in particular were geared towards the single-minded pursuit
of this objective. A centralised state appropriated the bulk of resources to develop an
apparatus to ensure territorial integrity to the neglect of the integrity of human beings.
Instead of peace, people to people contact and trade, the South Asian region has been in a
state perennial conflict, varying from low to high intensity. The rights and benefits of
citizenship of a civilised state eluded the people of Pakistan. Access to justice, rule of law,
education, health and livelihood for all citizens remains a distant dream.
The foundation stone of the struggle for the rights of the peoples in the present day Pakistan
was laid in the Lahore Resolution in 1940, which demanded Independent states in which
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. In his address to the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947, the founder of the state declared all of its citizens
to be equal. However, the process of constitution-making led to different outcomes. First the
Objectives Resolution of 1949 diluted individual rights. This was followed by the denial of the
national rights by merging the states, now called provinces, into One Unit in 1955. A parity
formula reduced the economic and political size of East Bengal to that of the One Unit
named West Pakistan. These centrist moves were reinforced by the military coup in 1958.
Protection of territory took precedence over the protection of the people. The large bulk of
the national resources and the foreign assistance were deployed to serve national security
objectives.
In both West and East Pakistan, there was a movement against the military dictatorship in
1968-71. The people revolted against the usurpation of their rights and military dictators.
The first phase of the movement culminated in the elections of 1970, but the protectors of
national security refused to accept the results. Huge expenditure on national security failed
to protect territory. In 1971, Pakistan was reduced to West Pakistan. A new consensus
constitution in 1973 recognised the rights of the provinces and of the people by making
social and economic well-being of the people and end of exploitation as the corner stone of

69 | P a g e

the Principles of Policy. However, the centralised control over natural resources and
revenues, and population-based distribution of revenues among the provinces continued to
sustain the dominance of the national security paradigm. Two more military take overs rolled
back the constitutional advance of rights and left an inheritance of obscurantism and
terrorism which is now challenging not only the state the national security paradigm was
aiming to protect, but the very ethos of the Pakistan society.
In 2010, the 18th Amendment to the Constitution allowed substantial autonomy to the
provinces and the 7th National Finance Commission Award ended the federal dominance over
resources, besides recognizing the special needs of the less developed provinces of
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Planning for development, though no more an
exclusive domain of the Federal Government continues to be centralized.
Human Security
As a concept, human security was first discussed in UNDPs Human Development Report,
1994.Six years later; it was placed on the international policy agenda by the UN SecretaryGeneral at the Millennium Summit in 2000 when he issued a call for a world free from want
and fear. This marked a fundamental shift from the state-centric security to individualfocused security. Eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were identified and national
targets fixed for achievement by 2015. Discussions of Post-2015 agenda are taking place in
the broader perspective of human security. A UN Commission on Human Security had begun
its work in 2001. It looked at multifarious threats to human life to emphasise the interface
between security, development and human rights within and between countries. The2005
World Summit declared that: all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to
freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy their rights
and fully develop their human potential. A report by the Secretary-General, A Life of
Dignity for All,' outlines the Post-2015 development agenda for negotiations among UN
members. A consensus is emerging on an agenda applicable to all countries and leaving no
one behind, focusing on an inclusive economic transformation, peace and governance. A
consensus is emerging around 17 Sustainable Development Goals.
As already stated, security in Pakistan has been understood mainly as the security of the
territory of the state, not its citizens. Public resource allocation gives priority to national
security over human security. Before the 18th Amendment, a centralised state appropriated
the bulk of resources to develop an apparatus to ensure territorial integrity to the neglect of
the integrity of human beings. Instead of peace, people to people contact and trade, the
South Asian region has been in a state of perennial conflict, varying from low to high
intensity. The rights and benefits of citizenship of a civilised state eluded the people of
Pakistan. Access to justice, rule of law, education, health and livelihood for all citizens
remains a distant dream.
The be-all and the end-all of making adequate budget allocations to achieve social,
economic and cultural rights are to ensure an inclusive economy and society that provides
human security for all citizens. Human security is the outcome of progress in various
dimensions. The major input to achieve the desired outcomes is the budgetary
allocations. The UN Commission on Human Security identifies seven dimensions of human
security - economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal

70 | P a g e

security, community security and political security. In Table 3, allocations to the seven types
of security have been summed up to make an overall estimate of allocations to human
security. These allocations have been compared with the allocations for national security.
Table 3. Human and National Security
2009-10 2010-11

2011-12 2012-13R 2013-14R 2014-15B

Human Security (Rs Billion)

1,389

1,584

2,167

2,2801

2,862

3,165

National Security (Rs Billion)

468

530

637

729

785

877

Human Security as % of Total

Expenditure

38.7

37.5

44.1

42.1

43.9

44.8

National Security as % of Total

Expenditure

13.0

12.5

13.0

13.5

12.0

12.4

Human Security as % of GDP

9.3

8.7

10.8

10.0

11.3

10.9

National Security as a % of GDP

3.1

2.9

3.2

3.2

3.1

3.0

Human / National Security Ratio

2.97

2.99

3.4

3.13

3.6

3.6

R= Revised estimates. B= Budget Estimates

Human security expenditure is larger than the national security expenditure. Since the 18th
Amendment and the 7th NFC award, the ratio of expenditure on human security to national
security has marginally increased from 3 to 3.6, but this is low relative to countries with
comparable GDP per capita. In the budget for 2014-15, the allocation for human security as
a per cent of total budget increased to 44.8 per cent from 43.9 per cent in the previous year.
In the same period, the increase in the share of national security expenditure was smaller,
from 12 per cent to 12.4 per cent. As percentage of GDP, however, both types of allocations
declined, but the decline in human security expenditure was sharper, i.e. from 11.3 per cent
of GDP in 2013-14 to 10.9 per cent in the budget for 2014-15. For the same period, national
security budget declined from 3.1 to 3 per cent of GDP.

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13R

2013-14R

201415B

Federal

26.1

24.3

29.2

28.9

32.6

28.6

Punjab

73.6

60.2

61.3

55.3

58.6

63.9

Sindh

65.6

63.9

79.6

78.1

67.7

69.0

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

79.8

55.5

73.8

75.4

88.3

88.1

Balochistan

61.5

57.4

86.1

75.7

86.7

94.1

71 | P a g e

The Provincial Governments spend much more on human security than the Federal Government. Table 4 gives the
relevant information. The reason is that all national security expenditure is reflected in the Federal budget. Before
the 18th amendment and the 7th NFC award in 2009-10, which allowed the Provinces a larger quantum of autonomy
including complete responsibility for the social sector and greater share of resources than the Federal Government,
all Provincial Governments devoted more than 60 per cent of their budgets to human security, whereas the Federal
government spends less than half. Post 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC, the Provincial expenditure on human
security should have risen further and that of the Federal Government declined. There is, however, a mixed picture.
In 2010-11, the first year after the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC, the proportion of expenditure on human
security declined at all levels of government. It can be said that the governments were still adjusting to the profound
Constitutional change at a time of a low growth of 2.4 per cent and one-fifth of the main cultivated land under heavy
floods. In the second year, the human security expenditure recovered, but in the case of Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, it was lower than the level before the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC. The rise in the share of
Federal Government is attributable to the Provinces reluctance to take over higher education, vertical health
programmes and population planning. In the budgets of the last two years, Sindh has also been allocating less than in
the previous years. The smaller provinces have been devoting the lions share to human security.
Punjab by reducing the expenditure on human security and the Federal Government by increasing it, continue be the
outliers. The analysis of the budgetary priorities of Punjab demonstrated its preference for brick and mortar rather
than humans. The largest claimant on its resources is infrastructure. Social sector comes second, with many of its
components mis-specified as social sector. In 2014-15, a 35 per cent increase is budgeted over the revised estimate
of last year for economic security, while the increase in human security allocations is of the order of 31.6 per cent.
Allowing for smaller than desired share of human security in total expenditure, the increase is lower than necessary
to raise the share of human security. From the peoples perspective, the overall expenditure on human security is far
less than the desired level. Any decline in the share, especially in the largest Province, does not augur well for
delivering rights, strengthening of the democratic process, service delivery and poverty reduction.
Tracking MDGs
Low spending on human security is reflected in the extremely poor track record of Pakistan in striving towards the
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the end of 2015. It has posted the worst
performance in South Asia. Out of 33 indicators, Pakistan is on track in only 14 indicators. As Table 5 shows, none
of the indicators related to universal primary education and maternal mortality is on track. Only half of the indicators
on child mortality and less than half of the indicators on women empowerment are on track. Punjab and KPK are
doing better than Sindh and Balochistan.
Table 5. Progress on MDGs
Goal

No. of indicators

On Track

Off
Track

1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger

2. Achieve Universal Primary Education

3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower

Women

4. Reduce Child Mortality

5. Improve Maternal Health

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Table 5. Progress on MDGs

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other
Diseases

7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability

33

14

19

Total No. of Indicators

Poverty Reduction
Global data shows that the progress on the MDG target of halving poverty by end 2015 is
likely to be achieved. Official data in Pakistan reveals that Pakistan surpassed its target of 13
per cent well before. In 2010-11, the headcount poverty ratio was estimated at 12.4 percent.
A massive decline claimed from 34.4 per cent in 2000-01 to 22.3 per cent in 2005-06 made
the entire exercise suspect. The World Bank also estimates that Pakistan has more than
halved the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day between 1991 and 2011. The
latest Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14 describes the figures as an interim indication of
poverty situation in the country, while a technical group reviews official methodology.
Table 6. Estimates of the Poverty Ratio
Year

Headcount Ratio
1991

26.1

1993

26.8

1994

28.7

1997

29.8

1999

30.6

2001

32.1(34.4)

2005

23.9?

2006

22.3?

2008

17.2?

2011

12.4?

While the official data shows declining poverty, the poverty related budgetary expenditures
have, however, been decreasing. As Table 7 shows, these were 9.7 per cent of GDP in 201112, but have been declining since. The allocation in the Federal and Provincial budgets of
2014-15 is 7.3 per cent of GDP, which is lower than 7.6 per cent of GDP in 2013-14. Little
wonder, Pakistans ranking in the Human Development Index remains 142.

73 | P a g e

Table 7. Poverty Related Expenditure

Rs Million

% of GDP

2009-10

1,110,762

7.5

2010-11

1,245,541

6.8

2011-12

1,938,357

9.7

2012-13

1,913,287

8.4

2013-14

1,935,095

7.6

2014-15B

2,121,993

7.3

Right to Food
The right to food does not find recognition in the Constitution as a right, but the importance of access to food cannot
be overemphasized. In 2013, Pakistan was 75th in the 107 countries included in the Global Food Security Index for
2013. Availability, access and utilization are the key aspects of food security. Policymakers largely focus on
availability. For instance, the Government of Sindh has decided to export one million ton of wheat, as it thinks the
province is surplus in wheat production. Yet its own official reports describe 71 per cent of the provincial population
as suffering from food security issues. In the country as a whole, 26.6 per cent of the population has food
consumption as per norm. The Informalization and actualization of work and the massive existence of vulnerable
employment, together with rising food inflation, has gravely weekend access to food. This is especially so in GilgitBaltistan, FATA, Balochistan and many districts of Southern Punjab and Sindh. The developing situation in Thar
indicates the continuing neglect of nutrition. Allocations related to food security in the budget include the
expenditure on agriculture, food support and subsidies. These are given in Table 8. It will be seen that the total
budget has been declining in absolute terms since 2011-12. As a percentage of respective budgets, the
expenditure has drastically declined in the case of the Federal Government, reflecting
essentially the effect of devolution. It has increased in the case of Punjab from 3.2 per cent
last year to 5.1 per cent in the current year, but is less than in the previous years.
Allocations in Sindh are lower in the current year than the previous year. There is a drastic
decline since 2011-12. Balochistan has allocated 11.1 per cent of its budget for 1014-15,
which ihigher than 8.9 per cent in the previous year. The KPK has kept the allocation at the
level of last year. All these allocations largely relate to agricultural production and reflect
declining the impact of declining food subsidies. The priority is clear for availability, not
access and utilization.

Table 8. Expenditure on Food Security (% of Total)

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13R

2013-14R

2014-15B

Federal

10.2

9.2

8.5

8.2

9.0

5.2

Punjab

7.0

5.2

17.0

7.4

3.2

5.1

Sindh

7.8

8.0

10.0

6.4

3.8

3.4

KPK

6.4

5.8

7.1

5.3

5.7

5.7

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Table 8. Expenditure on Food Security (% of Total)

Balochistan

14.8

11.8

15.3

10.3

8.9

11.1

Total

9.5

8.2

16.8

10.0

7.3

5.1

Right to Life
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his
family, including ... medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.In a similar vein, Article 38(a) and (d) of the
Constitution of Pakistan envisions that The state shall secure the well-being of the people,
irrespective of sex, caste, creed and race ... provide basic necessities of life, such as ...
medical relief, for all such citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as are
permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness
or unemployment. This does not, however, make health an enforceable fundamental
right. But access to healthcare has been interpreted as a necessary condition for the right to
life under Article 9.

Table 9. Health Expenditure (% of Total)

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13R

2013-14R

2014-15B

Federal

0.9

0.9

0.3

0.3

0.9

0.9

Punjab

8.0

5.3

7.1

5.2

5.5

5.4

Sindh

6.4

6.2

7.5

9.6

7.5

7.3

KPK

6.6

4.6

7.2

4.8

8.6

7.9

Balochistan

5.2

4.8

7.3

7.7

7.9

9.9

Total

2.6

2.5

2.8

2.5

2.9

3.1

Public expenditure on health in Pakistan has always been under one per cent of GDP. This is
too low in the face of threats from deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, and malnutrition
poor access to basic health. There is a bias towards the tertiary care. Along with low priority,
the primary and preventive care now has the additional problem of providing security for the
health workers, especially the polio workers. The Budgetary allocations continue to be low.
In the entire Federal and Provincial budgetary outlays for 2014-15, health receives only 3.1
per cent. Balochistan makes the highest allocation, followed by KPK and Sindh. The lowest

75 | P a g e

allocation has been made by the Punjab, i.e. 5.4 per cent, which is slightly less than the
revised allocation of the previous year. Details are given in Table 9.

The Right to Education

Article 26(1) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:Everyone has the right to
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis
of merit.According to Article 13 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; secondary
education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education,
shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in
particular by the progressive introduction of free education; higher education shall be made
equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in
particular by the progressive introduction of free education.Pakistan has acted to reflect the
internationally recognized right to education in the 18th Amendment to the Constitution
which inserted Article 25A to make elementary education a fundamental right. The said
Article states: Right to Education.The State shall provide free and compulsory education
to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by
law.Education is considered important as a means to realise other social and economic
rights. Equitable and sustainable development is not possible without an educated
population. Budgetary allocations, however, do not raise hopes of an early realization of the
goal of universal primary education. The quality and the content of education also continue
to be lower down in the scale of priorities.

Table 10. Expenditure on Education

% of
Total
Expendit
ure

Federal

Punjab

Sindh

KPK

Balochistan

Total

2012-13

2.08

28.38

24.35

34.04

21.08

9.75

2013-14

2.32

29.15

23.62

34.54

22.90

10.00

2014-15B

1.98

19.70

18.78

30.12

21.89

9.28

% of
GDP
2012-13
2013-14

2.09

2.12

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Table 10. Expenditure on Education

2014-15B

2.25

As a percentage of GDP, the total expenditure on education is increasing but at a snails

pace. It can be seen in Table 10 that the expenditure was 2.01 per cent in 2012-13 and 2.12
per cent in the following year. The budgets for 2014-15 promise to increase it further to 2.25
per cent. However, this is far lower than the level achieved in most developing countries.
The expenditure is low even as a proportion of the total budgetary expenditure. It was
budgeted at 9.28 per cent in 2014-15, which was lower than the 10 per cent achieved in
2013-14 and 9.75 per cent in 2012-13. While the Federal Government has reduced its
allocations after the devolution of education to the provinces, the share of education in the
respective budgets of the provinces for 2014-15 is less than the revised expenditure in
2013-14, the largest reduction of around 10 percentage points being in the case of the
largest province. The highest proportion of the budget is allocated to education in KPK,
followed by Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh. To accelerate progress towards the
implementation of Article 25-A, the expectation would be that the distribution of the
budgetary allocation for education should be biased towards primary education. This is,
however, not the case. Except for Sindh, the largest share of the education budgets in 201415 is allocated to secondary education.
The Right to Clean Environment
Without any formal statutes, the world now recognizes the right to a clean environment as a
fundamental human right. Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters,
pollution, unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation are a threat to sustainable
development. Safe, clean and healthy environment is a necessary condition for the right to
life and the right to health is not possible without a safe and friendly environment. In the
Shehla Zia case in Pakistan in 1994, the Supreme Court held that Articles 9 and 14 related to
the right to life and dignity required clean atmosphere and unpolluted environment for
their delivery. The environmental vulnerability contributed hitherto by Pakistans known
environmental problems of population, water stress and urban squalor has been made worse
by the climatic changes. Floods, droughts, cyclones, meting glacier and earthquakes are
becoming a common sight. There is a National Climate Change Policy suggesting measures
for mitigation and adaptation. There is also a federal ministry by the same name. But
environment as a subject has been devolved. Even as a concurrent subject looked after
mainly by the Federal Government, the subject remained under-funded. Table 11 shows
expenditures directly related to environment, water supply and sanitation, and disasters.
The Federal allocation has crashed to Rs 2.9 billion in the current budget from Rs 47.5 billion
in 2011-12. As a per cent of its total budget, Punjab is spending less on environment after
the 7th NFC and the 18th Amendment than it did before. Same is the case for Sindh. KPK
and Balochistan are spending a larger proportion of their budget now than in the predevolution period. As a whole, the expenditure on environment as a per cent of federal and
provincial budgets together in 2014-15 is 1.1 per cent, exactly the same as in 2009-10 - the
year before the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC award.

77 | P a g e

Table 11. Expenditure on Environment (% of Total)

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12

2012-13R

2013-14R

2014-15B

Federal

0.2

0.7

1.5

0.4

0.1

0.1

Punjab

3.2

3.3

2.5

1.6

1.6

2.4

Sindh

2.6

4.0

5.1

1.4

1.1

1.2

KPK

4.9

3.8

4.1

4.2

5.0

5.7

Balochistan

4.0

5.2

5.4

5.9

5.3

6.1

Total

1.1

1.8

2.3

1.1

0.8

1.1

Employment
Employment opportunities are created and expanded by the promotion of productive
investment. Total investment in the economy, the main driver of growth and employment,
declined from 14.6 per cent of GDP in 2012-13 to to14.0 per cent in 2013-14. The target
fixed in the budget 2014-15 at 15.7 per cent of GDP is unlikely to be achieved. It is as
ambitious as the unrealized target of 15.1 per cent last year. A disturbing feature is that
gross fixed investment in the manufacturing sector has also been declining. Indeed the
share of manufacturing in total private investment has slumped from 25.6 per cent in 200506 to 11.3 in 2013-14. Despite a pro-business stance of the government, private sector
repaid more loans than it borrowed for investment in July 2015. As production as well as
investment remains sluggish, more jobs are being lost than are being created. The latest
World Bank report on Doing Business reveals that Pakistan has slipped further down from
its previous bottom rank of 127 to 128.It will be seen in Table 12 that the rate of
unemployment has raised from 5 per cent in 2007-08 to 6 per cent in 2012-13, the last
published Labour Force Survey. Women have a higher rate of unemployment than men. In
2012-13, the rate of unemployment was the highest in KPK at 8.5 per cent, followed by
Punjab (6.1 per cent), Sindh (5.0 per cent) and Balochistan (4 per cent). Of those employed,
over 73 per cent work in the informal sector. This includes household enterprises owned and
operated by own-account workers, irrespective of the size, and enterprises owned and
operated by employers with less than 10 persons - (owner[s], contributing family workers,
occasional or continuous employees and apprentices. Enterprises engaged in agricultural
activities or wholly engaged in non-market production are excluded. Now own-account
workers and contributing family workers, included in the informal sector, fall in the category
of vulnerable employment. Own account worker is a person working during the reference
period, on own account or with one or more partners at a self-employment job, without
any employee engaged on a continuous basis; but, possibly, with one or more contributing
family workers or employees engaged on an occasional basis. It includes owner cultivator,
share cropper and contract cultivator. Contributing family worker is a person who works
without pay in cash or in kind on an enterprise operated by a member of his/her household
or other related persons. Not only that 73 per cent of the total employment is in the informal

78 | P a g e

sector, around 60 per cent are in vulnerable employment. Women have a higher rate of
vulnerable employment than men.
Table 12. Employment Trends (%)

2007-08

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2012-13

5.0

5.2

5.3

5.7

6.0

8.7

9.0

9.2

9.0

9.1

Share of
Employmen
t in the
Informal
Economy

72.4

73.0

72.9

73.5

73.3

Share of
Own
Account
Workers in
Employmen
t

35.9

34.8

35.6

36.3

34.9

Vulnerable
Employmen
t

61.9

62.2

61.6

59.0

58.0

57.7

57.0

54.6

77.3

79.0

78.3

75.0

Unemploym
ent Rate
- Women

-Men

- Women

Privatisation
Privatisation programme started in early 1990s. It was claimed that the programme would
promote efficiency and productivity, end bleeding of public exchequer to free resources for
development programme, improve the climate for private investment and thus raise the
level of total investment. An Asian Bank study looked at the post privatisation performance
of 79 privatized units in 1998. The largest numbers of units doing worse than before were
were in the manufacturing sector. It found that only 16 units were doing better than before.
Javedan Cement privatized at throwaway prices in 2006 is now Naya Nazimabad Housing
Society in Karachi. Privatised units of cement have formed a cartel, limiting competition and
exploitating consumers. Table 14 indicates that privatisation did not make any significant
difference to the level of private investment. Nor did it lead to the reduction of fiscal deficit
and debt. It certainly led to a decline in the development expenditure of the Government, as
reflected in Table 15. The so-called bleeding by the loss making enterprises continues. As a

79 | P a g e

matter of fact, the Government of Punjab is actively involved in creating public sector
entities that are likely to add a huge subsidy burden. Take the case of Lahore metro bus. The
cost was 11 million dollars per kilometre, whereas the fit for purpose estimate could not be
more than 5-7 million dollars per kilometre. There is a gap of Rs 35-45 between the fare
charged and what the market will bear. A subsidy of around Rs 2 billion at present is likely to
increase in future.

Better

No change

Worse

Total

Manufacturing
units

13

16

38

Ghee mills

12

19

Rice mills

Miscellaneous

10

14

16

35

28

79

SOEs

Total

Table 14 Private Investment

Year

Priv.
Investment/GDP

Year

Priv.
Investment/GDP

1990

8.9

2000

10.3

1991

9.0

2001

10.1

1992

9.8

2002

11.1

1993

10.1

2003

11.2

1994

9.6

2004

10.9

1995

8.7

2005

13.1

1996

9.1

2006

15.7

1997

9.5

2007

15.4

1998

9.8

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Table 14 Private Investment

1999

7.9

Table 15. Fiscal Deficit and Development

Year

Deficit/GDP

Development/GDP

1990

7.0

7.0

1991

8.8

6.4

1992

7.5

7.6

1993

8.1

5.7

1994

5.9

4.6

1995

5.6

4.4

1996

6.5

4.4

1997

6.4

3.5

1998

7.7

3.9

1999

6.1

3.3

2000

5.4

2.4

2001

4.3

2.6

2002

5.5

2.7

2003

3.6

3.4

2004

2.3

3.2

2005

3.3

3.9

2006

4.0

3.7

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Table 15. Fiscal Deficit and Development

2007

4.1

4.2

Privatisation in Pakistan has failed to achieve nearly all of its stated objectives,
supportingNobel laureate Stiglitzs argument that the theoretical case for privatisation is at
best weak or non-existent.Privatisation programme excludes in the form rising
unemployment rather than include. Workers have become a pawn in the game of
privatisation. Over employment in the PSEs is the result of crony managements appointed
by the governments. Privatisation leads to declining employment without necessarily
improving the quality of products or reducing effective protection. As most privatizations
have taken place at the time of a deteriorating economy, the lack of alternative employment
opportunities has led to increasing levels of unemployment. Absence of social security
coverage pushes the jobless into abject poverty.
Rights of Labour
The rights of workers and the amount of work itself have suffered setbacks after setbacks
since the advent of the regime of deregulation, liberalization and privatisation. Minimum
wage is announced, but not necessarily enforced. It is far below the decent living threshold
and varies across country. Factory inspections are banned in many areas in the name of
better investment climate, leading to unsafe and unhealthy work environment. Instead of
protecting their welfare and rights, the Government used police to brutally suppress the
workers protest in Islamabad against the sale of the shares of OGDCL, a public sector gas
company. The employees of the company were excessing their democratic right to stage
peaceful protest. The Government has a privatisation policy, but no labour policy. Conceding
that Labourers need jobs and ample wages, the Finance Minister increases the minimum
wage.
Labour as a subject has been fully devolved to the provinces after the 18 th Constitutional
Amendment. The provincial governments are still struggling with the problems of transition.
They did not follow suit in regard to minimum wage announced by the Federal Government.
Social security coverage is limited. In 2012, the number of beneficiaries of Employees Old
Age Benefit Institutions (EOBI) was 365,913. Similarly, the number of beneficiaries of
Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) was 21,775. Unions have become weaker over time and most
work is outsourced to contract employees. Total registered trade unions numbered 7,382 in
1999. In 2008, the number declined to 6,793 out of which only 1,209 were reporting for
data. The total membership of the reporting unions was 245,383, only 1.8 per cent of which
were women. Total labour force recorded in 2008 was 51.78 million, out of which 15.60
million was urban. An official child labour survey conducted in 1996 found 3.3 million
children aged 5-14 years working full time. The latest Labour Force Survey 2012-13 shows
4.18 per cent of the employed persons in the age group of 10-14 years or 1.8 million.
Agricultural workers neither have minimum wage, nor unions. Workers were promised
golden handshakes and one year continuity in job while they looked for alternatives. In the
nineties, around 63 per cent of the workers accepted golden handshakes and many
continued on contract in the same units. The government was so keen on privatisation that,

82 | P a g e

in some cases, the amount of golden handshake exceeded the bid value of the units. Private
sector neither paid for golden handshakes nor created new decent jobs. Workers were
offered to take over the strategic shares. The lone case of the Allied Bank ended in failure,
as the State Bank had to assume control for subsequent privatisation. Workers are offered
retraining for alternative jobs, as is the case of the present policy. With falling investment
and an economy suffering from low growth and inflation, there are not many alternative job
opportunities.
Protection Against Destitution
The available social safety nets for those not in the organized work force includes budgetary
and non- budgetary cash transfers. The largest budgetary intervention is the Benazir Income
Support Programme (BISP). Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM) is a smaller budgetary programme.
Zakat is a modest non-budgetary programmes, besides an expanding network of micro
finance. The major programme is BISP. Started in 2007-08 at a time high inflation with an
allocation of Rs. of 34 billion (US $ 425), it allows a monthly cash grant of Rs. 1200 paid to
women. It has rapidly grown into the largest single poverty alleviation programme. The
number of beneficiaries has gone up from 1.7 million families in the first year to 5.3 million
in 2013-14. Annual disbursements rose from Rs. 16.0 billion in 2008-9 to Rs. 67.7 billion in
2013-14. The poor households are identified through a Poverty Scorecard Survey and the
eligible households through a Proxy Means Test. Payments are made through Benazir Debit
Card.
Small in comparison to BISP, the PBM disabused around Rs 2 billion in 2013-14 and Zakat
disbursement was slightly less than that.
Concluding Remarks
Pakistans maldevelopment is as much the result of its weak indigenous response as it is due
to the foreign aid trap. The Budget 2014-15 and the economic policies embodied in it are
unlikely to make things any better. There is an IMF programme in place and the
macroeconomic situation is precarious, despite a temporary respite provided by the falling
oil prices. With over 60 per cent of those working in vulnerable employment and around 75
per cent of population poor or vulnerable, slowdown of growth over the past six years and its
failure to pick up despite the pro-business stance of the government, together with high
fiscal and current account deficits portray a picture an economy with deeply embedded
structural deformations.
The issue of prudent fiscal management has to be dealt with by progressive and equitable
taxation, elimination of the SRO culture, the end of exemptions for agricultural and property
incomes and restructuring of the Federal Board of Revenue to control abetted and unabetted tax evasion. Expenditure side must be rationalised by strictly implementing the 18 th
Amendment to the Constitution. The myopic focus on privatisation should give way to
improving the management of PSEs by appointing autonomous boards and professional
managers.
The analysis of the Federal and Provincial budgets for 2014-15 shows that the country
continues to be emphasise national security more than human security. The room provided
by the 7th NFC award to the provinces to allocate larger amounts to the achievement of

83 | P a g e

social and economic rights have been pre-empted by the internal security needs of the
provinces. A deteriorating law and order situation demands greater resources, but this does
not prevent the political class from allocating resources to its favourite programmes of
motorways, metro buses and transport corridors. Energy, the main infrastructural
bottleneck, comes a poor second in terms of priorities. Universal primary school enrolment
and the gender parity in schooling are not achievable in the foreseeable future. Inequity in
health sector is even greater. The access of the poor to food and health, especially in rural
areas, has not seen any mentionable improvement. Maternal and child health care is the
worst in terms of allocations and outcomes. The sub-Saharan Africa does better than
Pakistan in terms of nutritional status of children. Immunisation coverage and contraceptive
prevalence tell a similar story. Environmental concerns need money to be addressed. The
relatively better performance in the MDG targets related to the environmental protection has
more to do with a misspecification of targets than anything else.
To reap the benefits of the youth bulge, investment in human capital is the key. The youth
population in 1998 census increased to 19.3 per cent of the total from 17.1 per cent in the
1981 census. This demographic dividend ends in 2045. A number of years have already
been wasted due to a continuing social deficit.
In the face of rising inflation, the recent increase in minimum wage, even if implemented
across the board, will still be far below a living wage. The myopic focus on privatisation has
made workers a pawn in the game of privatisation played by the changing governments.
Privatisation was sold as a project to achieve the autonomy of the state from the elites. In
effect, it has meant relative autonomy from the interests of workers and ordinary
consumers. Economic policy making continues to be a matter of rent seeking between
contending interests. Privatisation has led to declining employment without necessarily
improving the quality of products or reducing effective protection. As most privatizations
have taken place at the time of a deteriorating economy, the lack of alternative employment
opportunities has led to increasing levels of unemployment. Absence of social security
coverage pushes the jobless into abject poverty. Social protection needs to be extended
beyond the Benazir Income Support Programme. The poor state of labour governance in the
post 18th Amendment period has led to the neglect of labour rights granted under the
Constitution and agreed under various international conventions. This was starkly evident in
many official conferences arranged to assess the compliance requirements of the GSP-Plus.
Economic and political philosophy has advanced to a stage where ideological support for
public or private sector does not have blanket endorsement. The role of the state is to
ensure economic and social wellbeing of people as citizens, workers and consumers.
Whether it can be achieved through activist state or progressive economic and industrial
policy agenda or both is a matter of practical policy to be decided by the Parliament.
Effective service delivery requires decentralized structures. Devolution under the 18th
Amendment should have led to further devolution to the local levels. Local leadership,
thrown by elections, good governance, and effective management, particularly at the
provincial and district is necessary to respond to the needs of the people and implement the
social and economic well being promised by the Constitution.

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Pro-poor growths, inclusive growth, even if pursued diligently, are unlikely to alter the
underlying structure of inequity. The poor need assets, physical and social. Once this need is
satisfied, poverty will take care of itself and the society will become more just.
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privatization in Pakistan. Manila.
Kemal, A.R., 1997, Pakistans industrial experience and future directions. Pakistan Development
Review. Winter.
Khan, A.H., 2012, The Impact of Privatization in Pakistan. Lahore: Ferozsons
Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. Pakistan Economic Survey. Various issues.
Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003.
Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, PRSP Progress Report 2011-12.
Naqvi, S.N.H. and A.R Kemal, 1997, Privatization and efficiency in Pakistan. In: Bennet, A. ed.
How Does Privatization Work? London: Routledge.
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey. Various issues.
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2012
Stiglitz, J. 2008, Foreword. In: Ronald, G. ed. Privatization: successes and failures. New York:
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World Bank. World Development Indicators 2014.

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