Cua v.

Vargas
Facts:
A parcel of residential land in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by Paulina Vargas. A
notarized Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulinas heirs partitioning and
adjudicating among themselves the lot in question.
Some of the heirs did not sign the document but it was
published for 3 weeks in the Catanduanes Tribune.
An Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was
again executed over the same property but again, this
was not signed by the other heirs. According to Gloria,
one of the heirs, she came to know of the said
document only when the original house built on the lot
was being demolished. She was also unaware of the
previous settlement published in the newspaper.
Gloria tried to redeem the property but was refused so
she filed a case for annulment of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot and
consigned P100k with the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes
against Joseph Cua, the buyer of the shares in the lot.
Respondents (Gloria et al) claim that as co-owners,
they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him the price of the sale and that the
30-day period following a written notice to co-owners
for them to exercise the right of redemption had not
yet set in, because there was no written notice sent to
them. Hence, the documents of settlement were null,
void and not legally binding.
MTC dismissed the complaint and declared the
documents valid and binding. Sale was also upheld.
Although the requirements of a written notice in Art.
1088 were not strictly complied with, it was cured by
the respondents actual knowledge of the sale and the
consignation of the purchase price. RTC affirmed.
CA reversed saying that pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 74,
the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs
is not binding upon respondents considering that they
never participated in it nor did they ever signify their
consent to the same.
Issue:
1. W/N the heirs are deemed constructively
notified and bound regardless of failure to
participate, when the extrajudicial settlement
and partition has been duly published.
2. W/N the written notice required to be served
by an heir to his co-heirs under Art. 1088 can
be dispensed with when such co-heirs have
actual knowledge of the sale (such that the 30day period will start from the time of actual
knowledge of the sale).
Held:
1.

NO. The procedure outlined in Sec. 1, Rule 74

is an ex parte proceeding. Persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby.

2.

NO. Based Art. 1088, there is a need for the

written notice to start the period of
redemption.

Ruling:
Issue 1:
The rules contemplate a notice that has been sent out
or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon. The publication of the
settlement is not constructive notice to the heirs
because such was notice after the fact of execution.
The requirement of publication is for the protection of
the creditors and never intended to deprive heirs of
their lawful participation in the decedents estate.
In this case, the respondents never signed either of
the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. These settlements do not bind respondents
and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid.
But the heirs who actually participated in the execution
of the settlements are bound by it. However, the
respondents are given the right to redeem their shares
under Art. 1088. The right was never lost because they
were never notified in writing of the actual sale.
Issue 2:
Art. 1088 states that, Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of
the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
The period of one month should be reckoned from the
time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor
of the actual sale. This written notice is indispensable
and mandatory. The Code does not prescribe any form,
but the method of notification remains exclusive, there
being no alternative provided by law. This proceeds
from the very purpose of Art. 1088 which is to keep
strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, the
presence of outsiders be undesirable and other heirs
be willing to repurchase the share sold. The obligation
to serve the written notice devolves upon the vendor
co-heirs.
In this case, respondents co-heirs failed to comply
with the written notice requirement, therefore, there is
no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner.

Gabriel v. CA
Facts:
Nine months after Domingo Gabriel died, his son,
Roberto Dindo Gabriel (private respondent) filed a
petition for letters of administration in RTC Manila. No
opposition had been filed and subsequently, probate
court appointed him as an administrator.
Petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie and
Maribel Gabriel filed their Opposition to the Petition and
Motion alleging that that (1) they were not duly
informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter, should be preferred over private
respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting
and/or adverse interest against the estate because he
might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of
the properties of the decedent have already been
relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to
petitioners and should not be included in the value of
the estate sought to be administered by private
respondent.
Probate court denied the opposition on the ground that
they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to
overturn Roberts appointment. Petitioners then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed.
Petitioners main argument is that under Sec. 6, Rule
78, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of
preference for the appointment of an administrator,
therefore, Felicitas Gabriel, the surviving spouse should
be preferred over Robert who is an illegitimate child of
the decedent. Assuming that Felicitas is incompetent,
the next of kin should be appointed and there, Nilda
comes in.
Private respondent contends that the order of
preference is not absolute and the choice of who to
appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He
called attention to the fact that petitioners applied for
appointment belatedly. Lastly, he was not shown to be
incompetent and disqualified from being appointed
administrator.
(Read

Sec.

Issue:
Who
should

6,

Rule

78

for

reference)

improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest

interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.
The widow is preferred in the appointment because she
is supposed to have a conjugal interest as a partner in
the conjugal partnership. She would have a right of
succession over the portion of decedents property in
addition to the share in the conjugal partnership. On
this ground alone, Felicitas, has every right to
the administration of her husbands estate.
It is true that under the rules, the preference may be
disregarded by the court where said preferred persons
neglect to apply for letters 30 days after decedents
death. However, such failure is not sufficient to exclude
the widow from administration of the estate. In this
case, there is no compelling reason to disqualify
Felicitas from appointment as administratix.
BUT WAIT THERES MORE
The court sees no reason to nullify the
appointment of Robert. Determination of a persons
suitability as administrator rests in the sound judgment
of the court. The legal and specific causes for removal
under Sec. 2, Rule 82 should be present to justify
removal. In this case, the mere importunity of some
heirs of the deceased, there being no factual or
substantial bases is not adequate to remove Robert as
administrator. Moreover, the court may exercise its
discretion to appoint an administrator where those who
are entitled to letters fail to apply within a given time.
ON CO-ADMINISTRATION
This is both legally permissible and sanctioned in
practice as Sec. 6(a), Rule 78 allows issuance of letters
to both surviving spouse and the next of kin. Sec. 2,
Rule 78 contemplates a contingency where an
executor/administrator dies, resigns or is removed
which is remediable by co-administration. Also, coadministration will constitute a recognition of both the
extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and
the creditable services rendered to and which may
further be expected from private respondent for the
same estate.
Co-administration is upheld for the reasons below:

be

appointed

as

administrator?

Held:
The court deems it practical that there be coadministration between Robert (IC) and Felicitas (SS).
Ruling:
Sec. 6, Rule 78 prescribes the order of preference in
the issuance of letters of administration. In the
appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest of the one
to be appointed in the estate. The underlying
assumption is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate or suffer the consequences of waste,

(1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps

at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased;
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;
(4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; and
(5) when a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.